PRETERITION

January 25, 1967 - G.R. No. L-17818

TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all surnamed
Reyes y Barretto, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendantappellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Civil Case No. 1084,
dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes and ordering the same to deliver to the
defendant-appellee, Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, the properties receivea by his deceasea wife
under the terms of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto, consisting of lots in Manila, Rizal,
Pampanga and Bulacan, valued at more than P200,000.
The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as follows:
"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the barrio of San Roque,
Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13734 of the Land Records of
this Province, being the share of plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the deceased Salud Barretto,
widow of plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors."
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired
a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan, covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 41423, 22443, 8858, 32989, 31046, 27285, 6277, 6500, 2057,
6501, 2991, 57403 and 12507/T-337.
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share of these
properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a
small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew an
nieces The usufruct o the fishpon situate i barrio Sa Roque Hagonoy, Bulacan, abovementioned, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo I the meantime Maria
Gerardo was appointe administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which
was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project
of partition was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The
distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a
consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the
cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the
distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5, 1948. Upon her
death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud
and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same
and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and
the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of
Salud Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria
Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the same.[[1]]
WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 1

Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria
Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto,
which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of
one-half portion, thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the
fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for
being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby
directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court
based thereon as well.
The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in
question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title thereto, and that the
court did not acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who was then a minor.'
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared the project of
partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto (Civil
Case No. 49629 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null and void ab initio (not merely
voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was
not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of
partition was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force)
providing as follows:
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall
be null and void.
The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that since Bibiano Barretto
was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in
favor of Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded
that, as defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover
from Salud, and from the latter's children and successors, all the Properties received by her from
Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines
establishing that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the
real owner. Hence, as stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Court a quo not only dismissed
the plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them to return the properties received under the project of
partition previously mentioned as prayed for in defendant Milagros Barretto's counterclaim.
However, it denied defendant's prayer for damages. Hence, this appeal interposed by both
plaintiffs and defendant.
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been misapplied
to the present case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been
instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant
Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was
believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void under said article. The
legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without
distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to
be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his
testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to
whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of
Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 2

Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime
invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of
a forced heir. For this reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, invoked by appellee, is not at all
applicable, that case involving an instance of preterition or omission of children of the testator's
former marriage.
Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil status of
Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This view is erroneous, since a compromise
presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties (Civil
Code of 1889, Article 1809; Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 2028); and the condition of Salud as
daughter of the testator Bibiano Barretto, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the
settlement of the estate of the testator. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute.
And while a compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the
parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate.
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is merely a
proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that
makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to
which each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629, 643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules
of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final,
that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the
testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become
final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud.
It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and
the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's distribution of the estate of the late
Bibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of partition executed by Salud Barretto and the
widow, Maria Gerardo (who signed for herself and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto),
and since no evidence was taken of the filiation of the heirs, nor were any findings of fact or law
made, the decree of distribution can have no greater validity than that of the basic partition, and
must stand or fall with it, being in the nature of a judgment by consent, based on a compromise.
Saminiada vs. Mata, 92 Phil. 426, is invoked in support of the proposition. That case is authority
for the proposition that a judgment by compromise may be set aside on the ground of mistake or
fraud, upon petition filed in due time, where petition for "relief was filed before the compromise
agreement a proceeding, was consummated" (cas. cit. at p. 436). In the case before us, however,
the agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but actually
consummated, so much so that the titles in the name of the deceased were cancelled, and new
certificates issued in favor of the heirs, long before the decree was attacked. Hence, Saminiada
vs. Mata does not apply.
Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were shown that the sole
basis for the decree of distribution was the project of partition. But, in fact, even without it, the
distribution could stand, since it was in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano Barretto,
against the provisions whereof no objection had been made. In fact it was the court's duty to do
so. Act 190, section 640, in force in 1939, provided:
SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
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administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands. Such estate,
after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to
such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is
provided by law in cases of estates in these Islands belonging to persons who are inhabitants of
another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court distributed the estate
of her father in 1939 does not imply that the said court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree
of distribution. Passing upon a like issue, this Court ruled in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports,
pp. 741 and 742:
If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally intervene, still they would be
concluded by the result of the proceedings, not only as to their civil status but as the distribution of
the estate as well. As this Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, "The proceeding for
probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons
interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 C.P.C.; and any order
that any be entered therein is binding against all of them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39
Phil. 156.) "A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land
of the estate in the distributees". (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil.
895.) There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutary doctrines should not apply to intestate
proceedings.
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary
period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the
instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed
and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared in Reyes vs. Barretto Datu,
94 Phil. 446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157), that:
... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed the partition, and that
Maria Gerardo was not her judicially appointed guardian. The claim is not true. Maria Gerardo
signed as guardian of the minor. (Secs. 3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.) The mere statement in
the project of partion that the guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto are
pending in the court, does not mean that the guardian had not yet been appointed; it meant that
the guardianship proceedings had not yet been terminated, and as a guardianship proceedings
begin with the appointment of a guardian, Maria Gerardo must have been already appointed when
she signed the project of partition. There is, therefore, no irregularity or defect or error in the
project of partition, apparent on the record of the testate proceedings, which shows that Maria
Gerardo had no power or authority to sign the project of partition as guardian of the minor Lucia
Milagros Barretto, and, consequently, no ground for the contention that the order approving the
project of partition is absolutely null and void and may be attacked collaterally in these
proceedings.
So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only made a party by
publication but actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through her guardian: she,
therefore, can not escape the jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First Instance which settled her
father's estate.
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Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria Gerardo) could not
have ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said widow in agreeing to the
oft-cited partition and distribution was a fraud on appellees rights and entitles her to relief. In the
first place, there is no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and
distributed appellants' predecessor, Salud Lim Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's
child: so that if fraud was committed, it was the widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely
responsible, and neither Salud nor her minor children, appellants herein, can be held liable
therefor. In the second placegranting that there was such fraud, relief therefrom can only be
obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and the record shows that this period had elapsed long
ago.
Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years old (Exhibit 24), she
became of age five years later, in 1944. On that year, her cause of action accrued to contest on
the ground of fraud the court decree distributing her father's estate and the four-year period of
limitation started to run, to expire in 1948 (Section 43, Act. 190). In fact, conceding that Milagros
only became aware of the true facts in 1946 (Appellee's Brief, p. 27), her action still became
extinct in 1950. Clearly, therefore, the action was already barred when in August 31, 1956 she
filed her counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto's estate.
In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto introduced evidence that appellant
Tirso Reyes had induced her to delay filing action by verbally promising to reconvey the properties
received by his deceased wife, Salud. There is no reliable evidence of the alleged promise, which
rests exclusively on the oral assertions of Milagros herself and her counsel. In fact, the trial court
made no mention of such promise in the decision under appeal. Even more: granting arguendo
that the promise was made, the same can not bind the wards, the minor children of Salud, who are
the real parties in interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of disposition,
and not of administration, can not bind his wards, being null and void as to them unless duly
authorized by the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil. 136, 142).
In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the Court of First
Instance of Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void for being contrary to either
Article 1081 or 1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros Barretto's action to contest said
partition and decree of distribution is barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that
plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received
from the properties inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that
the plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should have been given
due course.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under appeal is reversed
and set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee Milagros Barretto
Datu the properties enumeracted in said decision, and the same is affirmed in so far as it denies
any right of said appellee to accounting. Let the records be returned to the court of origin, with
instructions to proceed with the action for partition of the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709),
covered by TCT No. T-13734 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and for the
accounting of the fruits thereof, as prayed for in the complaint No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 5

June 23, 1966 - G.R. No. L-23445

MEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs.FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID,
oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and
Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios,
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years
before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and
mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground
therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the
deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line
were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto,
oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will
perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition
without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate
of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the
extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and
the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be
presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not
called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any
devise or legacy therein.[[1]]
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or
not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the
will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated.[[2]] But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on
the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained.
On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the
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event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once
again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of
time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to
a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question.[[3]] After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the
will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain
amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have
when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In
witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and
fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious. .
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the
Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir;
but the legacies and betterments[[4]] shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. .
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity.
On this point Manresa comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun
nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente
ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a
legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el
testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea
completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.
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It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem
before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa.
484.[[6]]
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree
upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void
or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs.
Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.[[7]]
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to
abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.[[8]]
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now
oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them:
They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither
were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of
Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este
ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. [[9]] The onesentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific
legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is
complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en
parte? No se aade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se
anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe,
pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el
caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. [[10]]
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno,
varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial.
Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes
por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula,
porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la
pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... [[11]]
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion
that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the
will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir without any other testamentary
disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded
and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive
meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the
"Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses
the rule of interpretation, viz:
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero,
no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto
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aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no
significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por
lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte
la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a
los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo
tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es,
segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la
voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha
exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del
derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con
pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese,
sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus
terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una
cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de
interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere
establecer. [[12]]
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding,
"the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises
merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854
suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will void because of preterition
would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There
must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or
legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the
two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the
heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero
subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero
... . [[13]] As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance
including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. [[14]]
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as
universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one
of preterition". [[15]] From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the
case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and
disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited." [[16]] Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " [[17]] In
Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La
privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." [[18]] Sanchez Roman emphasizes the
distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand,
is presumed to be "involuntaria". [[19]] Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be
supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. [[20]]
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits
their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in
which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 9

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution
of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions
in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code,
such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice
the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. [[21]] Better stated
yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs
have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the
preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other,
runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio
o dos tercios, [[22]] el caso. [[23]]
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their
legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so
instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. [[24]]
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case
heretofore cited, viz:
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the
second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely
annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of
Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into
the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of
Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely
meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in
said article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage
because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be
destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish
institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With
reference to article 814, which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must
be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from
legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly
and separately treated in said article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of
heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific
property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be
taken as a legacy. [[25]]
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of
the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will
before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the
result is the same. The entire will is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby
affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.
WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 10

G.R. No. 72706 - October 27, 1987

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third
Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of Appeals in ACG.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the
petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985
(Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of the
Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition
in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now
Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to
the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
(Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his
brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were
instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was
written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner
without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites,
payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of
the testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money
which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother
SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C
Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the
money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute
my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion,
Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming
to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors
(respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the
latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for
the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir
and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was
denied by the trial judge.
WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 11

After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which
was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated
March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the
trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the
review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents'
Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153).
Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum
for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it
is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The
preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of
"compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who are not
compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that mere
institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in the
inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly
expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be in violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the petition in
Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore unconstitutional and
ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 12

the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he
effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code
may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory
heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition
even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code)
however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose
legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the
Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of
the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that
she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the
entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado
mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals,
114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and
devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes
are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance
of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers
no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having
been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to
petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be,
necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper
legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by
it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor
(Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a
devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an
individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At
the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the
Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of
law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the
universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal
WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 13

standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No.
591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned order is
an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de
Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308
[1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador Construction
Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a
grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded
on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the
general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the
due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the
Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the
proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno
v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions
of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the
probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the
motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without
costs. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical
considerations. The Court said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the
record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case
will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of
the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the surviving
spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which was
fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The
Court upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the petition deals
with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The
Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent
judge should have denied its probate outright. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved,
WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 14

the probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v.
Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings
No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no
legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and
the adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an
order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are
matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits
of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on
February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress
when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters
were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents
had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could
have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity
of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of
certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the
right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not
dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the
existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of
justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford
speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned
decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated
October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 - November 27, 2006

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D.
SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,
SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO,
Respondents.
AZCUNA, J.:
WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 15

This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999
and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the
petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of
Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the RTC, and praying
for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and
guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the
deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power
to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is
the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because
she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20,
1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a
will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings
for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 9993396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the
probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 9890870 because testate
proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat
at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan
sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia
Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw
gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa
mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.

WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 16

At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan
ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya
makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi.
3

(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. 9993396
were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings 5
primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does
not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a
will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an
alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all
other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is
preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained
that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is
not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the
petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary
disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2)
private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply
because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or
more compulsory heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings:
WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 17

A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al.,

clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia.
[T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar
as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a
compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse
of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA
100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for respondents to have tolerated the probate of the
will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void
would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved
(underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF
RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS,
DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL
IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE
THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF
THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE
TESTATORS TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES
OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS
INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATORS WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS
AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 18

III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place
to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of
general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of
the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title
clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory
heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not
intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with
the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of
Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both
intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of
the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners,
and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed
and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents
did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos
intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited
therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected
through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for
the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the
incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son,
Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:

WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 19

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit
such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant; 8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in
or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from
the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words,
the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those
who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the
form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is
only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be
given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an
expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the
intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if
captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic
will. Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14
WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 20

With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct
line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to
bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo
did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the
name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the
universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo
and his son, Alfredo.1wphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil
Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is
directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of
Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the
termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

EUNICE R. TABINAS
2012 - 0085
Arellano University School of Law

WILLS & SUCCESSION (PRETERITION) - Atty. Abugan (Sunday Class) EUNICE 21