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MAPPING SYSTEMIC KNOWLEDGE

INDEX
MAPPING SYSTEMIC KNOWLEDGE......................................................................................... 7
1.1. Mapping Systemic Knowledge by Giulia Mancini ..................................................................................... 7
1.2. Beyond Disiplnary Borders by Mariarosalba Angrisani ........................................................................... 11

CHAPTER I
THE SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE AS A PARADIGM FOR UNIFIED APPROACHES IN
THE SCIENCES
By Rainer E. Zimmermann ............................................................................................................. 14
1.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 14
1.2. The Concept of Emergence ....................................................................................................................... 16
1.3. Continuous Modeling ................................................................................................................................ 19
1.4. The Systemic Perspective .......................................................................................................................... 23
1.5. An Everyday Example ............................................................................................................................... 27
References ........................................................................................................................................................ 32

CHAPETER II
THE SOCIAL USE OF COMPLEXITY THEORIES
by Massimiliano Ruzzeddu ............................................................................................................. 35
2.1. The beginning ............................................................................................................................................ 37
2.2. The 70s and 80s ...................................................................................................................................... 42
2.3. Nowadays .................................................................................................................................................. 47
2.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 49
References ........................................................................................................................................................ 50

CHAPTER III
MEDIA THEORY AND WEB-BASED GROUPS AS SOCIAL SYSTEMS
by Federico Farini ............................................................................................................................ 53
3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 53
3.2. Structural coupling between consciousness and communication .............................................................. 54
3.2.1. Consciousness as an autopoietic system ............................................................................................ 54
3.3. The concept of structural coupling ............................................................................................................ 55
3.4. Media/form ................................................................................................................................................ 57
3.5. The evolution of media, the evolution of improbabilities ......................................................................... 61
3.6. Social networks.......................................................................................................................................... 66
3.6.1. Social networks as forms in the digital medium ................................................................................ 66
3.6.2. Persons in the social network ............................................................................................................. 67
3.7. Web-based groups in the social network ................................................................................................... 69
3.7.1. Content-centered groups .................................................................................................................... 69
3.7.2. Web-based groups as social and temporalized system....................................................................... 72
3.8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 76
References ........................................................................................................................................................ 77

CHAPTER IV
RETHINKING ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARIES VIA LUHMANNS THEORY OF
ORGANIZED SYSTEMS
by Maria Pilar Opazo and Dario Rodriquez ................................................................................. 79
4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 79
4.2. Organization versus Environment ............................................................................................................. 80
4.3. Openness and Closure: Organizations as Autopoietic Systems ................................................................ 83
4.4. Where are the Boundaries of Organizations?: Action, Communication and Decisions ............................ 93
4.5. Conflict, Contradictions and Coordination .............................................................................................. 102
4.6. Discussion ................................................................................................................................................ 107
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 110

CHAPTER V
SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO THE ASSESSMENT OF E-LEARNING MANAGEMENT
by Irina Dudina .............................................................................................................................. 116
5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 116
5.2. The e-learning process as a hierarchy ..................................................................................................... 117
5.3. Managing complexities of e-learning ....................................................................................................... 119
5.4. Constructing e-learning contexts ............................................................................................................. 121
5.5. Assessment of e-learning via the Google Site technology ...................................................................... 124
5.5. Conclusions and recommendations ......................................................................................................... 129
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 130

CHAPTER VI
CONDITIONS OF PARTNERSHIPS IN THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHYS
PRESS SOURCES
by Edit Fab ................................................................................................................................... 133
6.1. The advertisements and their senders ...................................................................................................... 134
Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................... 169
Pictures ........................................................................................................................................................... 174

CHAPTER VII
THE RELATIONSHIP IN THE SYSTEM: A COMPARISON OF DONATI AND
LUHMANN
By Simone DAlessandro ............................................................................................................... 179
7.1. The relationship that includes the form of distinction ...................................................................... 179
7.2. Donati-Luhmann: for a possible coexistence between the human and the non-human .......................... 183
7.3. The relationship in the system: insider or outsider? ................................................................................ 185
7.4. Relationship and form of Distinction: functional equivalents? ............................................................... 189
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 190

CHAPTER VIII
PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEMIC APPROACH IN RUSSIAN CORPORATE EDUCATION
by Loktyushina Elena .................................................................................................................... 192
8.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 192
8.2. Implementing the Systemic Approach in Russian Corporate Education ................................................ 194
8.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 200

CHAPTER IX
HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE
by Jiri Subrt .................................................................................................................................... 201
9.1. Memory and Media ................................................................................................................................. 201
9.2. Historical Consciousness ......................................................................................................................... 207
9.3. Historical Consciousness and Collective Memory in the systemic Perspective ..................................... 212
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 218

CHAPTER X
FROM OBJECTS TO SYSTEMS. FROM SYSTEMS TO NETWORKS?
by Fabio Introini ............................................................................................................................ 222
10.1. Sociology and complexity: which relationships? .................................................................................. 222
10.2. Why objects? ......................................................................................................................................... 227
10.3. Morins meta-complexity ...................................................................................................................... 230
10.4. Latours networks .................................................................................................................................. 234
10. 5. So what? Sociology and the question of complexity ............................................................................ 237
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 240

CHAPTER XI
A TRANSACTION BYTE PARADIGM FOR RESEARCHING ORGANISATIONS
by Shann Turnbull ......................................................................................................................... 243
11.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 243
11.2. Science of Governance .......................................................................................................................... 247
11.3. The architecture of complexity .............................................................................................................. 250
11.4. Ecological governance ........................................................................................................................... 256
11.5. Concluding remarks ............................................................................................................................... 262
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 263

CAPTHER XII
BASIC ARCHITECTURAL ALTERNATIVES IN DESIGNING SOFTWARE-INTENSIVE
SYSTEMS
by Gerard Chroust ......................................................................................................................... 268
12.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 268
12.1.1 Essential Difficulties in Engineering Software-intensive Systems ................................................. 268
12.1.2 A Hierarchy of System Complexity ................................................................................................ 269
12.1.3. Development of Wicked Systems .................................................................................................. 271
12.1.4. The need for a System Architecture ............................................................................................... 271
12.2. Basic Architectural Alternatives ............................................................................................................ 272
12.2.1 The Notion....................................................................................................................................... 272
12.2.2 Dimensions of Basic Architectural Alternatives ............................................................................. 273
12.2.3 Properties of Basic Architectural Alternatives ................................................................................ 274
12.2.4. Observations on Basic Architectural Alternatives ......................................................................... 276
12.3. Examples of Basic Architectural Alternatives....................................................................................... 277
12.3.1. Example: Enactment Time ............................................................................................................. 277
12.3.2 Example: Location .......................................................................................................................... 278
12.3.3. Example: Granularity ..................................................................................................................... 278
12.3.4. Example: Control ........................................................................................................................... 279
12.3.5. Example: Human-Computer Task Distribution ............................................................................. 280
12.4. Basic Architectural Alternatives in the design of real Systems............................................................. 281
12.4.1. Interaction of Dimensions .............................................................................................................. 281
12.4.2 The Influence of Alternatives on overall system parameters .......................................................... 282
12.4.3 Aggregated Contributions to Global System Properties ................................................................. 286
12.5. Summary ................................................................................................................................................ 290

CHAPTER XIII
THE SIMULATION MODEL OF A COMPLEX SYSTEM: THE NEURAL SYSTEM
by Demetrio Errigo ........................................................................................................................ 297
13.1. The Authors Research Path .................................................................................................................. 297
13.2 Concluding Considerations..................................................................................................................... 313
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 317

EPILOGUE
THE FOURTH PARADIGM REDESIGNING EVOLUTIONARY COMPLEX SYSTEMS
OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION
by Andrea Pitasi ............................................................................................................................. 331
14.1 Prologue .................................................................................................................................................. 331
14.2. Systems as Immaterial Constellations ................................................................................................... 332
14.3. Luhmanns Theory and the Paradigm Shift in Sociology ..................................................................... 336
14.4. The Systemic Paradigm Shift ................................................................................................................ 339
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 341

AUTHORS.......................................................................................................................................343

MAPPING SYSTEMIC KNOWLEDGE

1.1. Mapping Systemic Knowledge by Giulia Mancini

The aim of this book and the sum of all the papers presented here is to offer a
multitude of epistemological, theoretical, methodological, technical and practical
contributions, using systems theory as a reference.
Nowadays discoveries in all fields of knowledge increase and spread widely, creating
the need for definitions and interpretations of the world. Science is characterized by a
continuous increase of hyperspecialization. It is divided and organized into
innumerable converging fields of application. Biology, social science, cybernetics,
economics are joined together with a need to communicate with a new language
between these systems and the outside world.
This book aims to address and develop important reflections on society in all its
spheres touching different disciplines.
Sociology is capable of adapting to the new challenges that impose themselves in
front of our eyes.
Sociology becomes a powerful tool, a tactical strategy to identify new opportunities.
Luhmann writes that we do not live in the best of all possible worlds, but in a world
full of better chances.
Cosmopolitan societies, hypertechnological societies, multicultural societies,
societies with a high degree of flexibility with products that are more intangible, in
which the diffusion of innovation must be elevated lowering the cost of Williamson
(Pitasi, 2008).
7

The problem of organization is precisely one of decomposing the enterprise in


efficient informational processing (Williamson 1985: 283).
Terms such as humanism, cosmopolitanism, complexity, and social systems are
beginning to be studied in the twentieth century and continue to be the object of
analysis.
Sociology has an extreme strategic importance nowadays.
This book attempts to answer these questions, and the needs that arise under the eyes
of contemporary sociologists.
The book investigates the possible solutions to reduce complexity that can produce
risk, complexity means the need for selectivity, and the need for selectivity means
contingency and contingency means risk (Luhmann 1993).
When thinking about complexity, two different concepts come the number of
possible relations becomes too large with respect to the capacity of elements to
establish relations (...) complexity enforces selection. The other concept is defined as
a problem of observation. Now, if a system has to select its relations itself, it is
difficult to foresee what relations it will select, for even if a particu-lar selection is
known, it is not possible to deduce which selections would be made (Luhmann,
1990: 81).
The goal is to identify a suitable paradigm to the contemporary world the successive
transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental
patter of mature science (Kuhn 1970, 12)
The book is divided into 4 main areas, arranged in a linear order to ensure timely and
accurate analysis to the reader of the topics discussed during the conference.
The four areas face multiple aspects.
We starts from a theoretical approach through the study of organizations, the analysis
of the Russian media system.
We study the paradigms of contemporary sociology between two major theories:
Luhamanns theory and Donatis theory.

Finally, we get to the study of cybernetics as in the book entitled Science of control
and communications in the animal and the machine. (Wiener, 1948)
The theory of systems is brilliantly told through a study of all the important steps
detailed in this theory.
A paradigm that is born in the twentieth century by Ludwig von Bertalanffy but that
spreads and is enriched by remarkable personalities from different fields of human
knowledge.
Systems theory was developed in a time when the strong development in many fields
of science (from biological discoveries to the first forms of automation) began and
contemporaneously the first studies on self-regulation and communication appeared.
Such theory spreads the concept of a system according to which an order cannot be
studied or analyzed focusing on the single parts but as a whole:
Systems of various orders not understandable by investigation of their respective
parte in isolation () general system theory is a general science of wholeness (1968,
37).
Systems theory was born as a need to find a theory capable of unifying different
subjects through an interdisciplinary knowledge, being able to create a map of
knowledge.
Systems theory was born out of some assumptions that are outlined by the founder of
this theory Ludwig von Bertalanffy and that nowadays indispensably returns.
While in the past, science tried to explain observable phenomena by reducing them
to an interplay of elementary units invetigable independently of each other,
coceptions appear in contemporary science that are concerned with what is somewhat
vaguely termed wholeness, i.e., problems of organization, phenomena not
resolvable into local events, dynamic interactions manifest in the difference of
behavior of parts when isolated or in a higher configuration (Ibidem).
Nowadays we are in a time of high complexity, of revolutions in all branches of
human knowledge: Even more than in the past it has increased the need to use a

systemic approach failing to find possible solutions to problems that occur with a
high degree of uncertainty and undecidability.
Thats why the book aproaches these issues both at a theoretical level and through
case studies.
The relationship between knowledge and social system is studied and analyzed
focusing attention on the role of information and communication the relationship
between consciousness and social systems, discusses how individual thoughts and
communication are connected, influencing each other without being able to control
each other.
As we can see in the essay Principles of Systemic Approach in Russian Corporate
Education which explicitly refers to the need to use a systemic approach within the
corporate education. Where the author says: It is evident that we need to create
the united platform for mutual cooperation and informational enlargement based
on the systemic approach with the aim to develop the corporate education in the
world. Such platform will help to connect education with different forms of business
and create fruitful relations among three major participants of this market: business
companies, educational establishments and state.
The book is a continuous succession of studies (at a macro and a micro level) of the
role of knowledge. They analyze the development of organizational systems: the
construction and persistence of the identity of an organization depends on its capacity
to maintain its boundaries.
The study of some cases allows the reader to question and find practical applications
of the systemic approach to the current challenges.
In the Russian University Scholars and Researchers try to highlight the hierarchical
nature of the systems, whereas the same systemic view helps either the managing of
the complexity of institutions and the single objectives of learning, including elearning systems, with a hierarchical perspective.
From the role of the organizations, we move towards cybernetics, studies are
presented both theoretically and practically, concerning an elementary electronic
10

circuit, which can produce signals that are similar to those produced by intracellular
and extra-cellular circuits, and with a hardware that works autonomously with no
need of an external software because it self-creates it.
We also present here a methodology to analyze, evaluate and compare any human
and/or non-human social systems defined Transaction Byte Analysis (TBA).
The strategic result of this book confirms that only a systemic science can be a
powerful tool for conceptualizing the socio-economic evolution of humanity; in fact,
systems theory proves to be an excellent tool for the evolution of our society by
passing either the all/parts and the system/environment paradigms.
The system theory aims to impact on the fading of knowledge, as well as to develop
a methodology able to face the challenges of complexity [...]. After the
deconstruction of the old disciplines [...] it has now become indispensable to focus on
a new synthesis of pieces of knowledge, following a unity principle, necessarily
different from those used before because it must be adequate to other levels of
learning (Delattre, 1984: 3-5)
Only an open, only the ability of a higher level of integration and communication can
guarantee to interpret a society that goes global, not only in geographical terms, but a
global one in which the rights are mixed with each other, the languages no longer
have their precise identification and the assessment criteria assume a global weight.
In the gamut of modern science and life new conceptualizations, new ideas and new
categories are required (Von Bertalanffy, 1968: 10).

1.2. Beyond Disiplnary Borders by Mariarosalba Angrisani

Instead of studying first one system, then a third, and so on, it goes to the other
extreme, considers the set of all conceivable systems and then reduces the set to a
more a reasonable size. This is the method I have recently followed (Von
Bertalanffy, 1969: 94-5)

11

The map has been finally traced.


After going through all the contributions included in this book, the concept of
knowledge itself can be subject to several interpretations and remarks.
Indeed, the knowledge of a system in which different fields converge, with no
apparent linkage, is a knowledge that goes beyond the conventional scope of the term.
The concept of systemic knowledge embodies a new, thorough way to analyse and
understand reality.
As stated in the previous paragraph, the ultimate attempt was to map the multiple
ways in which knowledge can be achieved, shifting from biology to social sciences,
from cybernetics to economics.
Moreover, the topic has been studied according to a multi-faceted approach, be it
epistemological, theoretical, methodological, technical or practical, thus to underline
the different purposes that the authors aimed at attaining. In fact, each contribution is
meant to describe or feature a specific aspect of knowledge, according to what is
worth for the author to be labelled as systemic knowledge.
Therefore, the accent is sometimes put on the need for a unified approach in science,
or, alternatively on the social effects of complexity theory. Additionally, the
relationship of relationships in the system has been chosen as a suitable topic to be
discussed.
Whether speaking of historical consciousness, or of organizational boundaries within
the framework of a systemic perspective, we should bear in mind the basic principle
of the general Systems Theory, according to which each system is constituted by
relations between parties capable of generating something different from the sum of
the individual parts, and each system may interact with other systems in turn
composed of sub-systems and so on recursively, generating additional complexity
that needs to be controlled and reduced formal concepts placed at the level of
creation of relationships between relationships, as affirmed by Luhmann (1989: 74).
A convincing argument claims that: It is not accurate to say that sociology studies
the relations between social facts () but rather it studies social facts as
12

relationships (Donati 2009: 155). According to such a view, the act of mapping
represents nothing but the study of linkages and connections, hence relationships.
Knowledge can be improved and fostered by stimuli converging from disparate
directions in order to provide further knowledge.
By mapping knowledge according to a systemic paradigm, this book aimed at
depicting a more complex and structured view of reality. Thus, it also achieves the
purpose of providing further tools to perceive knowledge.
The systemic approach enhances the value of knowledge, and that is precisely the
idea underneath the whole bulk of this project.
The ensemble of all these proceedings embodies the collection of samples of that sort
of knowledge that only systems theory is able to transmit.

References

Delattre P. (1984) Teoria dei sistemi ed epistemologia, Enaudi, Torino.


Donati P. (2009) La societ dellumano, Marietti, Genova.
Kuhn T. (1970) The structure of scientific revolutions. The Chicago University Press
Chicago.
Luhmann N.(1990) Essays on Self-Reference, Columbia University Press, New York.
Luhmann N. (1989) Comunicazione ecologica, FrancoAngeli, Milano.
Pitasi A., Ferone E. (2008a.) Il tempo zero del desiderio, McGraw Hill, Milan.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York:
Free Press.
Weiner N., Cybernetics (1948) Control and communication in the animal and the
machine. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Von Bertalanffy L. (1968) General System Theory, Fundations, Development,
Applications, George, Brazille.
13

CHAPTER I
THE SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE AS A PARADIGM FOR
UNIFIED APPROACHES IN THE SCIENCES
By Rainer E. Zimmermann

1.1. Introduction
The recent convergence in the fields of physics, biology, and computer science,
respectively, has drawn the attention towards the underlying systemic perspective that
is implicitly shared by all of them. It is the paradigm of unified approaches in the
sciences, in fact, originating within the epistemological framework of the 19th century
and leading up to recent efforts of formulating a TOE1 in the 21st century, that
visualizes processes in nature as the outcome of some historical evolution of
underlying entities and profits most from this systemic perspective. This is mainly,
because the relevant approaches deal primarily with the organization of energy and
information, respectively, which can be visualized as the most important observable
attributes of the world as it really is. Note however that selecting this perspective
automatically entails a number of decisions that although of genuinely
epistemological origin unfold their influence onto viewpoints of ontological type: if
the various domains of scientific research fields are visualized in terms of
representations that are inherently systemic, then, consequently, the (physical)
Universe altogether would show up as the largest possible system observable by
human beings. But then, if the Universe is a system, it is at the same time implied that
this system is situated within an environment that itself consists of other systems and
1

Theory of Everything. (Note however that this refers to physical theories only in order to eventually find a
unified formulation for the four known physical interactions including their source entities: gravitation,
electromagnetism, weak interactions, strong interactions.) A detailed exposition of related aspects is
discussed in some detail in Rainer E. Zimmermann: System des transzendentalen Materialismus, Mentis,
Paderborn, 2004.

14

some excess regions that are essentially non-systemic.2


This viewpoint is entailed by the actual choice of the conceptualization, although at
the same time, it is quite compatible with what the recent theory of decoherence is
actually implying: According to the picture of quantum physics, the world is indeed a
(non-observable) soup of coherence out of which large (observable) objects may
emerge as a consequence of ongoing mechanisms of decoherence. Nevertheless, the
viewpoint is chosen after all. Hence, for human beings, there is an obvious freedom
of choice as to the modelling of the world!
Hence, the particular choice of a systemic perspective is already imprinting secondary
choices onto the world in the first place. But this is not very much of a surprise after
all, when noting that the conceptualization of systems altogether (similar to the
conceptualization of related aspects such as the concepts of complexity or emergence
themselves) is nothing but the communicative result of human reflexion starting from
its cognitive input. In other words: Concepts that are used as categories that
adequately map the observable world are human concepts in the first place, in the
sense that the modelling and reflecting being undertaken by human beings is the
outcome of the (biologically grounded) cognitive capacity of humans who are
themselves (as its products) a part of the world they try to describe.
So, in the end, the question is not really what the world is according to objective
criteria of truth, but instead of how the world shows up (is observed) such that a given
conceptualization is reasonable. And it fulfils this criterion, if applications can be
well defined and performed within a reasonable range of errors. Life is thus a
permanently adapting (if not improving) approximation to what there is. Obviously,
the crucial difference between what there really is and what can be observed, is at the
2

This is e.g. an obvious argument in favour of cosmological natural selection as introduced some time ago
by Lee Smolin, because we would have to accept then the existence of a multitude of Universes of which our
Universe is a special case, though probably quite in the average of the relevant distribution. See also Rainer
E. Zimmermann: Cosmological Natural Selection Revisited. Some Remarks on the Conceptual Conundrum
and Possible Alleys. www.arxiv.org/pdf/physics/0304053. For more conceptual details see also Rainer E.
Zimmermann: Spinoza in Context. In: E. Martikainen (ed.), Frankfurt a.M., 2002, 165-186. Id.: The
Modeling of Nature as a Glass Bead Game. In: E. Martikainen (ed.), Helsinki, 2005, 43-65. Id.: On the
Modality of the World. In: F. Linhard/P.L.Eisenhardt (eds.), Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M., 2007, 217-242.
Id.: Conceptualizing the Emergence of Entropy, Quantum Biosystems 1 (2), 2008, 152-164.

15

roots of the very structure of human reflexion, separating the domain of sceptical
philosophy (relating to the sciences and arts and their mediated totality) from the
domain of speculative philosophy (dealing with the foundation of totality).3
In the following we will bear this starting point in mind when discussing the impact
of the systemic perspective onto the present state of the art in the sciences. We begin
with aspects of emergence (in section 1.2) that shows up as the most important
concept that might be able to promise deeper insight into the way in which the world
unfolds itself as visualized in terms of human reflexion. We give then (in section 1.3)
an example discussing one of the first papers ever on the organizational structure of
complex systems as applied to a biological sample case. After listing a number of
important points relating to the systemic perspective itself (in section 1.4), we give
another example, more of the everyday type in order to demonstrate that the problems
of conceptualization mentioned here are not exclusively confined to the scientific
domains (section 1.5). Finally (in section 1.6), we discuss universal aspects of
systemic approaches.

1.2. The Concept of Emergence


We recently dealt with problems of emergence within the framework of our ongoing
research project.4 But as can be easily seen, similar problems have been dealt with
within different contexts5, and the results are very much on the line of what we have
done so far. As far as our own approach is being concerned, we start from two groups
of assumptions that are underlying the definition of systems: so what we do is to
follow a systematic line that is essentially derived from the philosophies of Spinoza,
3

Note that traditionally, speculation does not mean the arbitrary use of imagination, but instead the latters
application according to what is known in sceptical terms before which is a kind of minimal boundary
condition on sepeculative (i.e. extrapolated) knowledge.
4
Cf. e.g. our: Emergence & Evolution of Meaning: The General Definition of Information (GDI) Revisiting
Program. Part I: The Progressive Perspective: Top-Down. Information 2012, 3 (3), 472-503.
5
See among others: Gilles Chtelet: Lenchantement du virtuel. Ed. Charles Alunni, Cathrine Paoletti, Rue
dUlm (ENS), Paris, 2010. Louis H. Kauffman: Eigenforms and Quantum Physics (at the Foerster 100th
birthday jubilee, U Vienna 2011). Richard Healey: Gauging Whats Real. Oxford University Press, 2010.
John Baez, Javier P. Muniain: Gauge Fields, Knots, and Gravity. World Scientific, 1994.

16

Schelling, and Bloch, leading up to the modern interpretation of what is called


dialectic materialism. While we follow a methodological line that is chiefly based on
two conceptual triads, namely the ontological triad of cognition, communication, cooperation as introduced by Wolfgang Hofkirchners Vienna group, and the
epistemological triad of spaces, networks, systems as introduced by the Kassel
group.6 The idea is to isomorphically relate ontological conditions of human beings
as visualized within the observable world to the epistemological means of the
modelling of this world. The actual dynamics of emergence is governed then by the
concept of network (communication = interaction) that points to the underlying
skeleton (or circulation rather) of the overall systemic structure finally achieved.
Hence, essentially we work with three basic assumptions: (1) the (metaphysical)
difference between what there really is and what is actually observed, (2) that
evolutionary systems are models of the worlds substratum as primordial stuff of
what is observable (in the sense of the Aristotelian hypokemenon), (3) that the
concept of motion (in order to actually define the notion of processes in the first
place) is an epistemological rather than ontological instrument.7
The importance of the concept of emergence is easily understood, once we differ
between initial emergence, and evolutionary emergence, respectively. Obviously, the
common aspect is here that something new emerges more or less spontaneously
within what is observable. Hence, an innovative structure that is observed for the first
time is called new in the sense that it is something that was not observable earlier.
Note that this is a genuinely observational criterion only that does not tell us anything
about the existence of the structure in question.
6

For a detailed documentation of these two approaches see the results of the research co-operation project
under the auspicies of the EU commission on Human Strategies in Complexity (2001-2005) under
www.self-organization.org
7
For a more detailed discussion of the role of attributes with respect to what is traditionally referred to as
substance (substance = the world as it really is, attributes = the world as it actually observed) see n. 7 above
(essentially treating energy and information as attributes of this modern concept of substance) as well as
Rainer E. Zimmermann: New Ethics Proved in Geometrical Order: Spinozist Reflexions on Evolutionary
Systems. Emergent Publications, Litchfield Park (Az.), 2010. Also id.: Nothingness as Ground, and Nothing
but Ground.
Northwestern University Press, Evanston (Ill.), 2013, in press. And id., Simon M. Wiedemann: Kreativitt
und Form. Springer, Heidelberg etc., 2012.

17

So according to its mode of being, something which is new in this observational


sense, is not necessarily new in an absolute way. If so, then emergence is a concept
which is itself emergent with respect to the observable world. On the other hand, the
difference between initial and evolutionary emergence becomes necessary, because
for its (linguistic) representation it is vitally important whether something new
emerges for the first time altogether or in a repetitive manner several times in a row.
The two examples discussed in this present paper are both cases of repetitive
emergence.
A case of initial emergence would be the spontaneous emergence of a Universe by
what is called a Big Bang.8 However, when applying the systemic assumptions to
the Universe as a whole as mentioned above, then globally, on the level of the large
scale set of possible Universes, this emergence is again a repetitive one.9 In other
words: We have to decide about the relevant level of analysis in order to classify
possible phenomena of emergence accordingly. It is thus plausible to call most of the
emergent phenomena that can be observed simply cases of evolutionary emergence,
because they show up as results of former, similar phenomena (in the run of the usual
evolution of the world). The question of true initial emergence is hidden however,
behind the veil of a cosmological horizon which is essentially constituted by the
mechanisms of de-coherence that emerge themselves spontaneously somewhere
within the soup of quantum coherence that is basically grounding the world.10 In
the early times, when the concept was hardly created, three accompanying aspects
were given as to its definition: (1) radical novelty (features not previously observed
in systems); (2) coherence or correlation (meaning integrated wholes that maintain
8

We do not discuss here whether the Big Bang is a true space-time singularity or not. Hence, we do not
specify in detail what we actually mean when talking about such an origin of the Universe. Nevertheless,
under the macroscopic perspective which is mainly described in terms of Einsteins relativity theory, the
Universe begins with some process of initiation, and as a physical object it thus emerges initially.
9
Because the emergence of a Universe is one phenomenon among many other of the same kind, as there is a
whole distribution of Universes that exist simultaneously in different positions of the appropriate state space.
10
Note that the definition of Lewes (1875) who is possibly the first protagonist who introduced the
expression, is far more modest: Every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are
homogeneous and commensurable. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable
motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation
of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, and
it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference. (my italics)

18

themselves over some period of time); structural stability, interaction of micro- and
macro-levels (upward & downward causation (supervenience), top-down & bottomup); (3) product of a dynamical process (it evolves).
Note that the last condition is practically redundant, because all observed processes
are in fact dynamical. The concept of evolution essentially means that structures
that have been unnoticed so far (i.e. that lay ready as a potential to be eventually
evolved) are noticed now. Also, the additional qualification of novelty referred to in
the first condition as to its being radical in some sense, is likewise redundant,
because we clearly recognize that new according to observations does not entail new
altogether. The second condition simply reproduces the definition of observable
object, because the listed properties are necessary in order to observe something as
something, in the first place.

1.3. Continuous Modeling


In order to illustrate in more detail what evolutionary emergence means and how it
actually works, we discuss an example from biology that has been introduced by
Keller and Segel some time ago.11 This model is called continuous, because it is
formulated in terms of differential equations that require the fulfilment of conditions
of continuity and differentiability of functions which are often unrealistic as to
processes in concrete nature (but technically comparatively simple to handle). The
model shall map the processes relevant for the onset of aggregation of a special type
of amoebae, which form a higher organism called a slime mold. In fact, the latter is
to the amoebae what an organized collective (organism) is to a collection of
individuals. This is indeed the formation of a new structure (i.e. of an organism out of
individuals), although each slime mold so formed is only one sample of the same type.
Hence, emergence is not initial here: Instead, this would refer to very first formation
11

Evelyn F. Keller, Lee A. Segel: Initiation of Slime Mold Aggregation Viewed as an Instability. J. Theor.
Biol. 26 (3), 1970, 399-415.

19

of a slime mold on this planet. The relevant evolution of equations are the following:
If we call (a, ) the vector of particle number density of amoebae and the chemical
concentration of acrasine (which is a pheromone providing the means of chemotactic
communication

among

amoebae),

respectively,

then

after

an

appropriate

simplification of the ansatz we are left with two equations of the form

a/t = (D1 ) + (D2 a),


/t = k1 + k-1 c + a f () + D 2,

where k is the rate constant for acrasin-acrasinase reactions, and the balance
equations for c and have been skipped (they would be responsible for the complex
building of an intermediate compound). Unfortunately, these equations are non-linear
and coupled, so that it is unlikely to find a closed solution. But what we can do is to
linearize the problem by expanding the relevant entities around the critical points of
the equations. In graphical form we can represent the cyclic process structure
described by the (mathematical) dynamical system in the following manner:
Slime Mold Aggregation (Dictyostelium discoideum)

20

What we realize here when inspecting the different levels of this cycle (which is a
spiral rather than a cycle in fact, because the slime molds are left over after renewed
germination, and the next generation of slime molds responsible for the subsequent
germination are not identical with them), we notice that the dialectic rules of
sublation are valid here: because the amoebae are sublated in their organism (the
slime mold) in the well-known three-fold sense of being conserved, elevated, and
annihilated, at the same time. Indeed, what we can do is to formulate the whole
process in terms of a recursion of appropriate negation operators (called negators
here). This is mainly because the formation of structure is explicitly based on the
features of instability: It is an unstable state that precedes the onset of aggregation in
the first place. This happens, when a certain critical combination of values has been
reached for the coefficients that govern the processes by means of the differential
equations displayed above. We can formalize this by choosing a matrix
representation of the operators that define the dynamical system. For this purpose, we
write

E11 = (D1), E12 = (D2) /t,


E21 = p () + D 2 /t, E22 = f (),

as matrix components and call E the evolution (matrix) operator of the system such
that according to matrix multiplication the expression

E x = 0. (x = (,a))

reproduces the above set of equations. The idea is then as follows: The operator
remains invariant as to its operations while the coefficients change. In the critical
case, the system becomes unstable. If E is the stable operator configuration, the call
21

E* the unstable one. Obviously, a new configuration (in our case the collective of the
amoebae which is the slime mold) is achieved that is stable again. Let us call it E**.
Then we can say that the transition from E to E* (E E*) is described by a negation
operator that acts on the stable form E. Because, essentially, the unstable state can be
visualized as the negation of its stable counterpart. Consequently, the transition E*
E** can be interpreted then as the negation of the negation. It is quite straightforward
then to define an operator recursion of the form
E* E** = N (E*) = NN (E) = N2 (E).
If in particular, E = N0 (E), then the following diagram is consistent:

1 (structurally stable state) N (E) 2 (unstable state)

N2 (E)

4 3 (stable again)

Note that on the top at the left-hand-side, the cycle should be (spirally) open as
mentioned above. We speak here of sandwich structures, because we have essentially
three layers (the evolution operator, the first and second negators) which constitute
one round of formation. It is interesting to find that such structures are also wellknown from the metaphysical grounding of Schellings philosophy of nature as laid
down in his 1832/33 Munich lectures on the Foundation of Positive Philosophy
(Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie). Schelling deals with his theory of
potentiality when formulating that: () a potential must be loaded with concrete
power in order to become actualized. This is formally the equivalent of a transition
from the unobservable micro-level of the world to its observable macro-level. Hence,
the metaphysical perspective taken is that it is nothingness loaded with power that
22

becomes non-being. Non-being that is actualized becomes Being. As we have seen,


this ontological statement, as it is part of the dialectic approaches of the 19th century,
be they idealistically or materialistically oriented, can be formally rephrased in
mathematical terms when applying (mathematical) category theory to it. We will
come back to this in later sections.
1.4. The Systemic Perspective
We can now easily fit in the systemic perspective in this by selecting the three
epistemological concepts of network, space, and system proper in order to compare
this fundamental structure with that of the (mathematical) dynamical system
described by the equations displayed above. In this sense, network shows up as the
dynamical core of the interactions involved. In fact, interactions can be visualized in
terms of the transport of Information and thus provides the software of the
processual phenomena observed. In our example, the network is constituted by the
interactive amoebae which represent the agents of the processes, including interactive
flow itself represented by the chemotactic enzyme.
On the other hand, the concept of space describes the mean free path (or mean free
range) of the relevant interactions. This is the domain of influence as defined by the
system altogether. As agent and thus an active component of the system, each
individual finds itself within the field of possibilities that is spanned by the systemic
space. Hence, space serves as a cognitive vehicle to orient the activities of the
respective individuals. Space is mainly software, because it is defined relative to
the interactions that actually take place and can be observed. However, it is also
partly hardware, because at the same time, it refers to the agents themselves which
are objects in space as centres of attraction.
Finally, we have the system proper: topologically, this is defined in terms of the
boundary operator that defines the region of interaction between system and
environment. Hence, it is both software and hardware. In particular, it is consisting of
all material (stuff) that it necessary in order to produce structures (that in turn serve as
23

memory stores of the interactions that initiated them in the first place). The system is
unifying therefore all what there is relevant in terms of cognition and communication
as well as co-operation.
The technical problem of evolution is however that it can only be modeled in a static
manner by utilizing various graphical methods.
Thanks to the advent of computer graphics of cellular type, the explicit unfolding of
evolutionary dynamics can be observed in detail by now. But the point is that in the
past, this problem has led to the actual spatialization of dynamics which can be
interpreted as a property of human modeling in the first place: This becomes very
clear in the Einstein theory. The metric line element of the classical theory which is
essentially derived from the fundamental theorem of Pythagoras in Euclidean
geometry, ds2 = dt2 dx2 dy2 dz2, is nothing but a static invariant into which the
flow of classical time is encapsulated.12 Another example is given by Thoms spaces
of interaction whose topological genus is related to the latters frequency. While the
spatial picture integrates the interactions into the topological and geometrical
structure of the selected spaces, the alternative is to deal with force fields such that an
essentially neutral space is loaded with pointwise acting potentials of pre-defined
forces that are sources of interaction. (This is utilized e.g. in the social field
conception by Bourdieu.) As it appears, the spatial picture is probably more elegant
and has its technical advantages.
Another approach in order to integrate motion into a basically static language is the
usage of mathematical logic based on the theory of topoi: Essentially, a topos is a
category plus an additional structure including initial and terminal objects, push-outs
and pull-backs. In order to illustrate the general idea, we need categories first: A
category C is a class of objects ob (C) and a class of morphisms mor (C) such that
each morphism has a unique source and target object, respectively. Also, for every
three objects a, b, c there is a binary operation of the form mor (a, b) x mor (b, c)

12

In fact, this is the reason that in modern approaches to quantum gravity, the modified version of the Schrdinger
equation, called Wheeler-de Witt equation, is practically timeless, namely of the form H = 0, where H is the
Hamiltonian operator and the wave function.

24

mor (a, c) called composition such that associativity and left and right identity laws
are valid. As to the additional structures, we can say the following: If A, B, C are
samples of a given type of objects, whose name is D and whose concept is D*, and if
it shall be decided whether A, say, really belongs to the same type of objects, then
there are essentially two relevant morphisms, namely and =, respectively. The first
kind of morphisms performs the mapping is similar to, the second the mapping is
a. Hence, they are nominators (associate a name with the sample object and quasiontologically state that objects carrying this name would actually be what the name
signifies 13 ) or identifiers (associate other objects which are already identified
according to given criteria of similarity), respectively. The argument runs as follows:
If A is similar to B, and if A is also similar to C, and if on the other hand, B is a dog,
and also C is a dog, then also A is a dog. Arguments of type If X and Y and Z, then T
are said to be of the form of the modus ponens. This form of logical implication is
also common in everyday life. Moreover, the necessity of differing between name
and concept leads to another map that is called push out such that the diagram
displayed is commutative: [diagram: topostheory_1]
The idea is now that a concept is not correctly understood before the argument can
also be performed the other way round by formally inverting the arrows in the
diagram. In the first case, one concludes from the individual sample case (called
initial object) a result concerning its concept (bottom-up). In the second (reversed)
case, one concludes from the concept a result concerning the individual sample case
(called terminal object then). This is a top-down approach. Not before both of them
can be performed, is the sample case well-understood. In other words, what the
diagram shows is the relationship between cognition and communication in proving
their inseparability (because children e.g. learn these concepts of sample cases by
having someone who for the first time utters the objects name). Hence, cognition
does not work without communication in the first place. Understanding thus emerges
13

This is what in everyday life is always done without reflecting about it: to take the name for the mode of
being. Hence, because the shepherd is called dog, usually one says that it is a dog. Obviously, this is not true
in the strict ontological sense. Instead, it is an epistemological simplification.

25

in an evolutionary manner, because a person learning a new name has to refer to


other persons who have already learned the name before and so forth. Learning to
understand the meaning of a name is thus repetitive emergence.
Based on what we have said so far we can introduce two generic conjectures
concerning the problem of emergence: We can make the set of negators as defined
above into a category and call it NEG. The objects of this category are structurally
stable world states. The morphisms are the negators themselves. Then we formulate:
Conjecture 1: NEG is a topos.

We call then GAME the category of games with the objects being positions of agents
in their utility space, and the morphisms being the strategies (actions) of agents. We
then formulate:

Conjecture 2: NEG and GAME are generically isomorphic.

(Because essentially, strategies act as negators among agents or their positions in the
interactive network, respectively.)
Note that also looking back e.g. to the continuous model above the logic implicit
in a topos entails assumptions about the various shifts of possibility that determine
the evolution of objects. The overall scheme is as follows:

Continuous scheme:
o = coefficient, x = differential operation

ox + ox + + ox = 0,
,
ox + ox + + ox = 0.

26

In that well-known scheme (the one we have also utilized earlier in this present
paper) we can identify sleeping variables: their o = 0. (the x are actually there) as
well as the field of possibilities: their x = 0. (the x may come later) In the first case,
this means that all possible variables are always existing, but not effective, because
their associated coefficient vanishes. In the second case, this means that the
possibilities belong to a field that can change itself. This hints already towards the
necessity of precisely determining the respects shifts of possibility available for a
given process.

1.5. An Everyday Example


The most complex, ill-understood, but nevertheless, best-known example of
evolutionary (repetitive) emergence (otherwise called reproduction) is the
transition from figure 1.1 to figure 1.2 within an interval of at least nine months:

Fig 1.1

27

Fig. 1.2

Note that both these states are stable, hence they can only be states 1 and 3 of the
appropriate sandwich structure. In other words: The child must be the negation of the
negation of the adults. (What we would have expected anyway!) The important is that
in what we know about evolution, this is the only strict case of individuality! This is
decisively different from other animals, i.e. each new-born is a singularity different
from all the other human co-subjects (both in biological as well as social terms). In
other words: The case of human birth is a unique case of innovative emergence, and
although it is repetitive by its nature, because humans reproduce themselves by this
procedure so that individuality is practically limited to the new sample of the same
type, altogether, especially with respect to the social evolution, this kind of
emergence is always almost the same as initial emergence! The interesting point here
is that humans are the only species that combine two paradigms in one sample: the
living (biological) body plus (social) mind, i.e. propositional reflexion, to be more
precise. Hence, in principle, a family is a fundamental structural unit of social
organization and thus the most important part of the social system, but nevertheless, it
consists essentially of a collection of singularities. However, the communication
among such singularities within the framework of all possible recombinations is able
of eventually forming coherent behaviour, be it in groups or whole societies. This is
the most striking example of self-organization. Note that a family network both
28

vertically and horizontally adds to the overall small-world structure that is


exhibited by social systems (Fig. 1.3).

Fig 1.3.

The first objective of trying to understand this and similar processes of emergence is
to perform an analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions. According to the
Aristotelian viewpoint, this begins with the simple differentiation between
enrgeia/entelecheia (actuality) and possibility, where the latter is consisting of two
viewpoints again: kat t dynatn vs. dynmei n (being according to possibility
(Ill do my best) vs. being in possibility: the potential to become something). The
respective concepts and types are connected in the following sense:
concepts
1. thinkability in the logical sense
2. adequacy with respect to formal experience (in the epistemic sense)
3. relationship between possibility and actuality (in the metaphysical sense)
types
1. what is not yet
2. what is contingent
3. what is included in the necessary

29

Of this Aristotelian thoughts, Bloch has given his own interpretation by formulating:
Actualizing is thus to activate subjective potential in order to produce consequences
of the objectively-real possible. (EM 255; my translation) This can be easily
compared with the Aristotelian formulation in Physics, 201b.3-5: The becoming
actualized of what is possible in so far as it is possible [of the being in possibility],
this is obviously motion. ( he tou dynatou, he dynatn, entelcheia phanern ti
knesis estin.) In fact, similar ideas are still present later, when Cusanus attempts a
more theological formulation: God is everything in complicated manner (omnia
complicite). Hence: it is necessary to unfold what is folded (explicari in mundo). This
is an essential idea that can be found much later in quantum physics, especially in the
approach of David Bohm and Basil Hiley concerning implicate and explicate order.
Finally, it is Bloch again who lists a whole table of the shifts of possibility in order to
classify possible process outcomes more precisely.

Shifts of Possibility (Bloch)


1. the formally possible (that can be thought)
2. the matter-of-fact objectively possible (that can be: problematic judgement)
3. the possible according to matter and object (that can become, independent of its
knowledge), the active can be (power: vermgen) vs. passive can become
(potentiality) [subjective vs. objective factor: open power vs. open potentiality]
4. the objectively real possible (the substratum = matter/dynmei n/Urstoff)
Hence, all these factors must be discussed in detail in order to give a complete
description of a complex case of emergence as e.g. the case of human birth: Hence, it
is the whole collection of social, psychological, biological (chemical as well as
physical) factors that shapes the field of possibilities. (Fig. 1.4)

30

Fig. 1.4.

Rosetta Stones

The concept of a scientific Rosetta stone has been introduced by John Baez recently,
in order to display structural similarities among various fields of mathematics and
physics.14 Essentially, the Rosetta stone visualized under this perspective, gives a
table of universal isomorphisms. The topos of negators as well as more general topoi
of operators can be utilized for the formulation of a conjecture that is based on this
idea of a Rosetta stone such that we have a long chain of isomorphies in the end, of
the form,
NEG OPS GAME SOCS,

where SOCS refers to the (conjectural) topos of social systems. In other words, it is
this chain of isomorphisms that illustrates best the universality of the systemic
paradigm that is topic of this paper. Note that here, emergence shows up in terms of
initial and terminal objects. (0 A, a: 1 A), where an element of a set A is any
mapping whose codomain is A and whose domain is 1.
The quantum physics counterpart of this formulation as to the concept of emergence
shows up in the definition of particle annihilation and creation operators, traditionally
of the form:
|n> = (n!)-1/2 (a)n |n>,

14

John C. Baez, Mike Stay: Physics, Topology, Logic, and Computation: A Rosetta Stone. 2009.
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/rosetta.pdf

31

where we use the Dirac notation as applied to state n here. Creation and annihilation
is given then in terms of
a|n> = n |n 1>,
a|n> = (1 n) |n + 1>,
a|0> = 0,
with the last line giving the ground-state convention. Altogether, states can be
recursively defined then by simply applying the relationship |k> = ak|0>.
Louis Kauffman is actually able to bridge the gap between physics and the biology of
DNA by generalizing the algebraic principles underlying the above such that a
creation operator cup := |a>: C V V and an associated annihilation operator
cap := <a|: V V C can be introduced (C referring here to the complex numbers,
and V V to the tensor product of an appropriate vector space with itself), in order
to define the computation of a link amplitude (state sum) of type Z = <cup|M|cap>,
where M is called braiding.
So what we find in the end is the universality of the systemic paradigm such that in a
large variety of research fields the systemic organization is not only implicit in the
type of mathematics which is best adapted to the problems involved15.

References

Baez, J. C., Javier P. Muniain (1994) Gauge Fields, Knots, and Gravity. World
Scientific.
Baez, J. C., Mike Stay (2009) Physics, Topology, Logic, and Computation: A Rosetta
Stone. http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/rosetta.pdf
15

We cannot refer to Kauffmans theory of knots in the present paper. This is related to a variety of
algebraical insight referring to the Temperley-Lieb algebra, the Artin braid group, and the Jones polynomial
of invariants of knots and links, respectively, that have become of utmost importance for ongoing research in
the quantum gravity and quantum information domain. Instead, we simply point to Kauffmans best-known
book: Knots and Physics, World Scientific, Singapore, 1993.

32

Chtelet, G. (2010) Lenchantement du virtuel. Ed. Charles Alunni, Cathrine Paoletti,


Rue dUlm (ENS), Paris.
Healey, R. (2010) Gauging Whats Real. Oxford University Press, John Baez,
Javier P. Muniain (1994) Gauge Fields, Knots, and Gravity. World Scientific.
Kauffman, Louis H. (1993) Knots and Physics, World Scientific, Singapore.
Kauffman, Louis H. (2011) Eigenforms and Quantum Physics (Talk at the Foerster
100th birthday jubilee, U Vienna.
Keller, Evelyn F., Lee A. Segel (1970) Initiation of Slime Mold Aggregation Viewed
as an Instability. J. Theor. Biol. 26 (3), 399-415.
Zimmermann, Rainer E. (2002) Spinoza in Context. In: E. Martikainen (ed.),
Frankfurt a.M., 165-186.
Zimmermann, Rainer E., Cosmological Natural Selection Revisited. Some Remarks
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the

Conceptual

Conundrum

and

Possible

Alleys.

www.arxiv.org/pdf/physics/0304053 .
Zimmermann, Rainer E. (2004) System des transzendentalen Materialismus, Mentis,
Paderborn.
Zimmermann, Rainer E. (2005) The Modeling of Nature as a Glass Bead Game. In:
E. Martikainen (ed.), Helsinki, 43-65.
Zimmermann, Rainer E. (2007) On the Modality of the World. In: F.
Linhard/P.L.Eisenhardt (eds.), Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M., 217-242.
Zimmermann, Rainer E. (2008) Conceptualizing the Emergence of Entropy, Quantum
Biosystems 1(2), 152-164.
Zimmermann, Rainer E. (2010) New Ethics Proved in Geometrical Order: Spinozist
Reflexions on Evolutionary Systems. Emergent Publications, Litchfield Park (Az.).
Zimmermann, Rainer E. (2013) Nothingness as Ground, and Nothing but Ground.
Northwestern University Press, Evanston (Ill.), in press.
Zimmermann, Rainer E., Jos M. Daz Nafra (2012) Emergence & Evolution of
Meaning: The General Definition of Information (GDI) Revisiting Program. Part I:
The Progressive Perspective: Top-Down. Information, 3 (3), 472-503.
33

Zimmermann, Rainer E., Simon M. Wiedemann (2012) Kreativitt und Form.


Springer, Heidelberg etc.

34

CHAPETER II
THE SOCIAL USE OF COMPLEXITY THEORIES
by Massimiliano Ruzzeddu

Von Bertalanffy and Ashby define two different approaches for systemic science.
Two main lines are readily distinguished. One, already well developed in the hands
of Von Bertalanffy and his co-workers, takes the world as we find it, examines the
various systems that occur in it zoological, physiological, and so on- and then
draws up statements about the regularities that have been observed to hold. This
method is essentially empirical the second method is to start at the other end. Instead
of studying first one system, then a third, and so on, it goes to the other extreme,
considers the set of all conceivable systems and then reduces the set to a more a
reasonable size. This is the method I have recently followed (Von Bertalanffy, 1969:
94-5).
Von Bertalanffy agrees with Ashby on the fact that both the inductive and the
deductive approaches fit to system theories, and in general, to complex sciences.
Von Bertalanffy defines the first as empirico-intuitive method, and it refers to an
epistemic approach, in which theory comes after, and is the consequence of the
observation of empirical facts: when a sufficient amount of data is collected, then it is
possible to construct a theoretical representation of a given phenomenon.
The second approach is deductive, and Ashbys intentions above shown, do fit with a
scientific practice, in which that theory emerges in the human mind through
reasoning or intuition; only afterwards, a comparison with empirical reality can take
place in order to confirm or change the theoretical model or, according to other
opinions, to interpret reality.
Now, this problem is not so original, as science and philosophy have always accepted
both approaches (Popper, 2009) in all disciplines and in the general model of the
scientific activity.
35

Nevertheless, it is interesting to point out that, although Complexity Theories are a


quite young discipline, since the beginning they have switched between the two
approaches.
The goal of this paper is to show how those changes have occurred so far; this will be
the theoretical framework to outline a history of Complexity Theories.
In fact, in his work La place du dsordre (1984: 38) states that the notion of
complexity is not complex, as the notion or circle is not round.
Actually, very few ideas have shown so far a higher complexity than complexity
itself. In fact, since Complexity Theories arose in the intellectual scenario, many
different points of view have emerged on what complexity is and how it can affect
scientific activity, which implied different representations of how complexity could
affect scientific activity and, more generically, the knowledge process.
Thus, although Complexity Theories still represent themselves as a new discipline,
maybe the moment has arrived to reconstruct a kind of history of this discipline, not
only for a matter of intellectual completeness, but especially with the goal to clarify a
debate that, in the last few decades, has provided many definitions of this notion and
constructed many different models of it. In fact, these continuously changing ways of
conceiving it, have made almost impossible to provide a clear and short definition of
what complexity actually is; so that, the historical approach according to Ashby
(1956: 98), might clarify all the possible nuances of this notion, better than a mere
logical approach can.
Within this framework, the reference above shown to the inductive-deductive
approach will create a peculiar scope of investigation: in fact I will take into account
the cultural-social environments of the scientific communities that have created-used
the notion of complexity. It is in fact renown, that science performances - objects,
methodologies, results, as well as scientists relationships, prestige etc. - are not the
result of the autonomous dynamics of the scientific institution itself, but depends on
the representation, that social actors have, at any moment of science, and the
expectations that they produce. As we are going to see, it is possible to match, at each
36

different period, the different models of relationship between theory and reality, and
the different expectations of science that social actors have changed through the time.
2.1. The beginning
Complexity theories are the synthesis of a wide range of studies and experiences, that
started in the second half of the XX century both in Europe and the United States.
Those experiences are related to different theoretical and practical problems (see
Heims, 1994) and took place in quite different domains, like physics, engineering,
psychology, communication etc.
Their main feature was that the epistemic and theoretical background of classical
science, based upon linear dynamics, had came out to be unfit any longer for a deep
and exhausting comprehensions of a number of objects larger and larger, so that they
implied defining and testing new notions. As an example, the introduction to Von
Bertalanffya pivotal work, contains long discussions on what systems are and what
concepts they can include; furthermore the author points out, that already if the 60
system science was very popular, especially because of the technological problems,
that had occurred since the IIWW and implied either a complex management or a
man-machine interaction (Ibidem: 4).
This is why in the works that are considered the foundations of complexity-related
disciplines, very few are the mentions to new empirical facts; for those works focus
on the definitions of formal concepts, the references to reality are mainly about
objects that the readers are likely to have already known.
This is a choice that also Von Bertalanffy clearly assesses: in the gamut of modern
science and life new conceptualizations, new ideas and new categories are required
(Von Bertalanffy, 1969: 10) and the point to be reiterated is that problems
previously not envisaged, not manageable or considered as being beyond science or
purely philosophical are progressively explored (Ibidem: 23). So that, the author
only refers to phenomena that the scientific communities already knew, such as
Atoms, molecules, crystals, biological structures (), clocks, conventional
37

machines in general, solar systems (), symbolism, past and future, self and world,
self-awareness etc. () populations of organisms (humans included) (Ibidem 28-9).
The same trend emerges in other parts of the work: Von Bertalanffy s goal is to
highlight the domains and the principles of systemic, so that he does not report new
data or discoveries; on the contrary, the works, which he mentions, are often decades
older that the book General system theory itself, so that their content is renown to
most readers or, at least, most readers should know how to deal with that information.
In other words, that book shows two different dimensions, crossing each other; on
one side, the main object are the formal systemic notions, such as equifinality or
hierarchy etc.; on the other side, Von Bertalanffy shows well known information in
order to insert that into the systemic framework, and have the reader consider those
notions from this new scope.
For example, everybody knows and knew, that human bodies swap energy and
materials with the external: food, gases etc.; Von Bertalanffy writes, that The
organism is not a closed, but an open system.
Furthermore, we term a system closed if no material enters or leaves it; it I called
open if there is import and export of material. There is, therefore, a fundamental
contrast between chemical equilibria and the metabolizing organisms. The organism
is not a static system closed to the outside and always containing the identical
components; it is an open system in a (quasi-) steady state, maintained constant in its
mass relations in a continuous change of component material and energies, in which
material continually enters from, and leaves into, the outside environment (Ibidem:
121).
It is clear that the author has the reader consider all the physiological phenomena, that
permit the bodys survival, and on which any average reader has a sufficient
knowledge. By showing those notions from the scope of homeostatic equilibrium,
this operation will permit the readers to construct a formal and abstract representation
of homeostatic equilibrium in their minds.

38

The same about human psychology: Von Bertalanffys goal, in this domain, is to
rearrange the set of psychological notions, commonly known at his time, within a
systemic framework; namely, his idea is to overcome reductionist representations of
the human mind, especially the behaviorist, whose authors think that is possible to
explain no matter of human action by the equation Stimulus-Response (Ibidem: 105
and ff.). So that, for describing the systemic approach to psychology, he refers to the
main humanistic models, which were popular at that time, and describes the
narrowness of their epistemic bases (Ibidem: 188 and ff.). The same approach is
evident, when he shows the systemic approach to understand human nature and
behavior. Juvenile delinquents who commit crime for fun, a new psychopathology
resulting from too much leisure, the fifty percent metal cases in our hospitals all
this is proof that the scheme of adaptation, adjustment, conformity, psychological and
social equilibrium doesnt work. There is a wide range of behavior - and, presumably
also of evolution which cannot be reduced to utilitarian principles of adaptation of
the individual and survival of the species. Greek sculpture, Renaissance painting, and
German music - indeed, any aspect of culture - has nothing to do with utility, or with
the better survival of individuals or nations. Mr. Babbit is in every utilitarian respect
better off that Beethoven or Michelangelo (Ibidem191-92); the same model for
historical theory: in order to match systemics and a nomothetic idea of history he
quotes the Italian philosopher Vico in the early 18th century, and continued in the
philosophical systems and the investigations by Hegel, Marx, Spengler, Toynbee,
Sorokin, Kroeber and others (Ibidem: 198). Similarly, in order to demonstrate that
the great civilisations imply a unified and coherent symbolic system (Ibidem: 201),
he relies on the readers knowledge of the Greek-Roman Asian cultures, as well as
the Canadian biculturalism. (Ibidem: 202)
The same trend it is possible to find in another milestone of complex science:
Introduction to cybernetics.
In this work, Ashby provides an example of a different state system by reporting the
description of the threespine stickleback coupling The males first reaction, the
39

zigzag dance, is dependent on a visual stimulus from the female, in which the sign
stimuli swollen abdomen and the special movements play a part. The female reacts
to the red colour of the male and to his zigzag dance by swimming right towards hi.
This movement induces the male to turn round and swim rapidly to the nest. This, in
turn, entices the female to follow him, thereby stimulating the male to point its head
into the entrance. His behavior now releases the females next reaction: she enters
the nest (). This again releases the quivering reaction in the male, which induces
spawning. The presence of fresh eggs in the nest makes the male fertilize them
(Ashby, 1956: 26; contains quotations from Tinbergern, 1951).
Still, he recalls chemistry related notions to show the notion of very large systems;
those are systems consisting of a large number of components, that trigger emergent
properties by coupling to each other; in order to show that at a microscopic level he
fact that some coupling does not take place he refers to the creation of AgCl (silver
nitrate in a solution of sodium chloride), that always occurs at a macroscopic level in
spite of those local irregularities (Ibidem: 68).
Later in the same book, Ashby provides a vivid example of a cat chasing a mouse; by
considering the mouses conditions (alive, running, harmed, dead etc.) As different
states it matches those states with the formal notion of stability (Ibidem 197).
Still in the cybernetic domain, Wiener (1961, 1965) shows the same relationship
between theory and reality.
Just as a matter of an example, when he needs to show what irreversibility is and how
it changes the classical notion of time and order, he refers to the intuitional
differences between the order of the planets and the disorder of the clouds.
In the first place, the meteorological system is one involving a vast number of
approximately equal particles, some of them very closely coupled to one another,
while the astronomical system of the solar universe contains only a relatively small
number of particles, greatly diverse in size, and coupled with one another in a
sufficiently loose way that the second-order coupling effects do not change the
general aspect of the picture we observe, and the very high order coupling effects are
40

completely negligible (). The position, velocities, and masses of the bodies of the
solar system are extremely well known at any time, and the computation of their
future and past positions, while not easy in detail, is easy and precise in principle. On
the other hand, in meteorology, the number of particles concerned is so enormous
that an accurate record of their initial positions and velocities is utterly impossible
(Wiener, 1961: 30 -31).
No need to highlight that, in that passage, the reader can find more difficult to catch
the meaning of the notions of second order or high-order coupling that figure out a
meteorological system or the planets around the sun.
It is possible to mention many other examples lie this, though, generally speaking, we
can assess that the first period of Complexity runs from the mid 40s through the late
60s; this is a period, when the main notions related to Complexity emerge during
long debates among specialists, devoted to solve scientific or technical problems.
We have seen that in the first part of their history the classics of complexity
principally aimed to formally define the theoretical framework of the domain, as well
as its principal notions.
As a consequence, it is possible to assess that the relationship with empirical reality is
mainly inductive: the theoretical effort, in this phase is exclusively analytical, for the
aim is to provide effective and logical coherent concepts; this means that the
references are about parts of reality, that most readers are likely to know or on which
they can easily achieve information. The empirical references are principally
examples that can show the meaning or the domain of any theoretical discourse.
We can assess, that this phase ends in the late 60, when the main classics, above
mentioned, are issued.

41

2.2. The 70s and 80s


The following phase implies a different relationship between theory and reality; in
fact, Complexity Theories starts being considered a complete set of theoretical
statements, and expectations start arising of providing a better knowledge on reality.
From this point of view, a distinction is necessary between two research paths, related
to different domains.
First, Complexity Theories have been the theoretical frameworks for studies on
perception; although this field has implied heavy consequences for philosophical and
sociological theory, it is an example of the typical inductive-deductive relationship
theory-reality in the traditional science; in fact, theoretical debates and studies on
perception, which had taken place independently (see Mascolo, 2011, 65 and ff.)
were the theoretical base for the gestalt based idea of knowledge; on its turn, this
theoretical core orientated studies and empirical researches, which confirmed the
hypothesis, that the neuronal system of superior animals does not perceive images
from the environment, but only simple inputs; the images that portray the external
world, are the outcome of a construction process, which takes place in the nervous
system. These empirical findings gave birth to the Second Cybernetics (see
Maturana-Varela, 1988) as well as the parts of Piaget (1967; 1970) Ceruti (1986) etc;
those authors would provide strong references for new visions of the world, based
upon the idea of the constructed character of reality; those visions are powerful sensemaking instruments, just like classic systemic was; nevertheless, it is interesting to
consider that cognitive studies have constitute a classical domain on empirical
research, basing upon complex categories.
Beside this, in the same period other ways of conceiving complexity arose.
Before treating them, it is necessary to assess the social and the cultural condition of
the time when those theoretical streams appeared. In facts, we are in the late 70s and,
in the Western countries, the era of the new, revolutionary social movements, which
had been actual mass phenomena in so many countries, was next to finish.

42

According to Lyotards terminology (1979, the political narrations) that had


orientated the visions-of-the-world and the actions of the baby boomers generation
was losing credibility; fewer and fewer actors believed that a perfect society would
arise, in which no injustice, inequality or social constraint would exist any longer; the
conviction was mainly fading away, that this perfect society would be the
consequence of organized, human (political) actions and, generally, that human
reason and would be able to change reality no matter what obstacles would appear.
The late 70s are considered the beginning of the era of disillusion, in which social
reality (just like the natural) appeared to be independent and stronger than human
intentions, and market a more effective institution than politics at regulating social
relationships. Within this framework, also the social expectations of social and
human sciences underwent a strong change: namely, individuals stopped considering
social sciences as an instrument to make justice and freedom come true in every
society.
Since that moment, social science was supposed to simply describe how social
reality worked and changed, so that social actors could develop effective strategies of
adaptation.
Needless to say, the fact that social structure and changes exist independently from
the individual subjects, recalls the structuralist idea of society, that had emerged
between late XIX and early XX centuries, in France and USA.
Therefore, in this phase, the epistemic debate among Complexity theorists mainly
highlighted the notions that fit to this framework. Typical example is the concept of
emergence: the fact that a set of elementary or simple elements can join together
and show collective properties - which none of those units use to have singularly can perfectly describe a social reality, that seemed so far and independent from
human beings; in fact, emerging properties do not fit to traditional logic and science,
which base upon linear dynamics and cannot operate prevision on those phenomena,
like they did with mechanical properties. Even less is the subject able to manipulate
or control emerging changes; while in the former decades the human - especially
43

collective - action seemed to be effective at changing the social world, it is now clear
that one of the core characters of emerging phenomena, is that they are social facts:
they are independent from human will and actions.
Briefly speaking, the only set of strategies that social actions are able to perform, are
the adaptations to this reality. As a consequence, social science is supposed to assess
what those strategies are and, if possible, how effective they are.
This is perhaps the reason why Complexity Theories first wave of popularity took
place just in the 80s: their robust logic coherence, as well as the fact that their rooted
in the natural science, made of those theories a valid response to Marxist theories,
that still appeared able to put capitalist reality into discussion, although the Marxbased movements had become so weak, that they did not represent a threaten any
longer. Of course, other notions complexity related notions meet the need to
scientifically respond to radical thought: words like boundary or hierarchy, that
in the systemic theory have a peculiar meaning, in the sociological and political
language might be used as a naturalistic response to scientific Marxism.
This trend is even more evident if we consider the social meaning of the notion
system at that time: also due to a matter of etymologic closeness, the only kind of
system, with which the main authors deal, is the social system or, in a broader
sense, society itself.
In fact, by considering it as the emergence from elementary units, the whole society
turns to be the outcome of a process of self-organisation, i.e. independent from
individuals intentions.
Furthermore, this match of structuralism and systemics permitted to overcome the
limits of the classical interpretation of structuralism: it is in fact renowned, that the
main limits of Durkheim or Parsons theories was the fact that they had left too little
room or the social/historical changes and provided a very static representation of the
society.

44

On the contrary, systemics are a theoretical framework that also takes into account
the dynamic sides of any society and can include change, evolution and progress
(even conflict) and the same time, still portray societies like independent beings.
Typical example of this time complexity is Morins thought.
When he starts reflections about complexity, he does not only highlight the
structuralist dimensions of complexity, but also tries to focus on the notions of
incertitude.
For example, in his work La Nature de la Nature (1977) he matches the dimensions
in his reflections on the problem of the order: starting from the physical world, he
tries to construct an ideal type of the relationship between order and chaos that
happen in the reality.
Lunivers ne sest pas seulement construit malgr le dsordre, il sest aussi construit
dans et par le dsordre, cest--dire dans et par la catastrophe originaire et les
ruptures qui ont suivi, dans et par le dploiement dsordonn de chaleur, Le dsordre
est partout en action. Il permet (fluctuations), nourrit (rencontres) la constitution et
le dveloppement des phnomnes organiss. Il co-organise et dsorganise
alternativement et en mme temps tout le devenir est marqu par le dsordre:
ruptures, schismes, dviances sont les conditions des crations, naissances,
morphognses. Rappelons que le soleil, n en catastrophe, mourra en catastrophe.
Rappelons que la terre, tout en tournant sagement et rgulirement autour du soleil,
a une histoire faite de cataclysmes, effondrements, plissements, ruptions,
inondations, drives, rosions (Morin, 1977: 75)
Of course, systemics is the theoretical framework for this operation, so that essential
notions of appear, such as entropy, emergence etc.; this set of notions also implies
reflecting on the limits of the observer and the influences that this observer exercises
of the object and the perception process.
Namely, the doubt is expressed that the lack of order, which the observer perceives, is
actual chaos or depends on the observers incapability to seize a more complex, or
subtle order that hides behind the apparent chaos.
45

In spite of this, in his following words the focus on this problem seems to fade away.
He keeps mentioning that issue, as well as the incertitude in the knowledge process,
but the sensation is strong that he believes that just mentioning the problem could be
enough to overcome it. On the contrary, he strongly insists on the structuralist part of
complexity: by matching the notions of system and society, he often claims that a
deeper knowledge of social phenomena will be possible (See Morin 1982, 1990).
This perfectly matches with the cultural climate of the 80s, in which the belief was
great to control reality, although a perfect world, in the Marxist way, or according to
the Frankfurter idea of Reason: now society is a system and implies boundaries and
hierarchies, i.e. inequality, power asymmetries, etc.
The other example of systemics in these years is the Santa F Institute, set in the New
Mexicos capital.
Like many other experiences in the complexity domain, it bases upon the expertise on
systemic studies in the fields of natural sciences.
Though, differently from Morin, the members of Santa F Institute never try to
ontologically define society and social facts through systemic (See Waldrop, 1994);
they just have yielded an original intuition about the relationship with social reality,
when they find out that they might use stochastic previsions to foresee the behavior
of complex systems like demographic trends and stock markets.
In fact, according to the theoretical grounds of Santa F Institute, a system is a set of
a large amount of units, whose emergence-related features cannot be the object of
linear previsions; though it is possible to overcome this incertitude through statistic
calculations and simulation processes.
Now, the idea of using systemics to make previsions on the markets, does not only fit
to the political and social environments, that were existing in the 80s, when the
economic and financial success was the main expectation on social actors; this also
implies a peculiar vision of the world: Santa F Institute members never talk about
global positive changes, i.e the possibility of making justice and equality make
through in a next or remote future; on the other side, the idea of using complex,
46

mathematical categories, at the end of the day to make money, reflects a strong
optimism about the possibility of using complexity theories to master this categories
of objects like traditional science did with mechanical phenomena.

2.3. Nowadays
What follows later, is quite complicated to describe; the 90s are a really complex
time, so that finding cultural and intellectual trends, both among scientific
communities and the whole societies, is very hard.
In fact, the end of the big narrations that had started already in the 70s, in the 90s
became largely widespread in many layers of Western societies.
Nevertheless, this lack of robust references among social actors was quite far from
producing anxiety or pessimism; also thanks to a good performances of world
economy, which was experimenting a boom of e-commerce and web-based economy,
social actors were looking at the global changes with a sort of optimism; in fact, the
subtle belief was widely spread, the collapse of certitudes that was taking place
would also imply the triumph over the old cultural traditions and geographical
boundaries.
The arising of new gender identities, the mix of different cultures made possible by
migrants integration and the opening of many frontiers and the affordable price of
plane tickets.16All this gave rise to positive feelings toward the future. We are already
very far from the strong and general utopias that prevailed in the 60s and the 70s,
nevertheless, in large parts of Western societies, the belief was strong that on the
individual point of view, this condition of indeterminacy as an offspring of
opportunities, at the same time, reduced the need for reliable previsions of the future.
This cultural environment does reflect the scientific debate of that time: in fact, on the
sociological side, the main authors of those times are Giddens (1990) and Baumann
16

Although most of the social critics in the late 90s used to call themselves No global, they just relied on
the fact the geographical and social distances could turn smaller; the famous slogan Another world is
possible

47

(1993, 2000, 2001), that depicts, with different styles and lexicons, the fast change
pace that was occurring and the incertitude that it implied.
In this moment, many are the works devoted to complexity and many are the debate
trends among scientific communities.
Among the most representatives, there are the works of Prigogine (especially 1996
and 2003), which principally underline the dimension of incertitude that complexity
entails.
Generally speaking, we can assess that while the early complexity theorists had based
upon the notion of entropy; Prigogines theory considers the principle of
indeterminacy as the main tool for interpretation of reality (Prigogine, 1991: 151 ff).
Just like entropy, indeterminacy breaks the linear determinism of classical rationality
and opens to a world uncertain and changeable.
Of course, this is not only valid in the physical and biological realms, but also in the
human and social realities.
What the observers can do is only accepting and managing this incertitude, by basing
up statistics or scenarios.
In other words, the debate on complexity in the 90 was principally focusing on the
impossibility of overcoming the incertitude that often characterizes observed
phenomena, while the main intellectual effort of the theorists was to yield notions
that could at least describe this incertitude, like the of one of bifurcation17 (Ibidem
80) or time arrow (Ibidem, 85 e ff) etc.
Nevertheless, this was far to be a problem from large parts of the public. On the
contrary, this general idea of indetermination did fit to the visions of the world of
most social actors that claimed for life styles based upon spontaneousness and free
individual choices; in fact, indetermination is an effective instrument to asses that
traditional references, no matter if political, social or economic, are just useless, if not
problematic boundaries; traditions, rules, conventions are far from be reliable
benchmarks for decision making, because they cannot tackle with the tremendous

17

Second Cybernetics and Constructivism also can be considered within this framework

48

incertitude, that affects any existence; as a consequence, the only way for every
human being to deal with this dimension is to keep free and accept the good and the
bad that incertitude implies.

2.4. Conclusion
Although globalization in the last decade has much strengthened, at least in the
Western societies, this has not implied and improvement of life conditions.
International terrorism, financial crisis, unfair income distribution, etc. have produced
deep changes in social actors lives.
The increased change rate in the material life conditions and the international
relationships have turned quite useless the traditional cognitive references, that
cultures had provides.
Politics, religion and science have lost credibility among social actors, and even
rationality itself is not able any longer to provide reliable representations and
previsions of reality.
Though, the real change that has occurred in those last years, is that social actors do
not represent any longer this uncertainty as a source of opportunity or as a
synonymous of freedom.
Because of the lower life conditions, what social actors seem to need most at the
moment is stable and reliable standpoints that can help them face the current
turbulences.
This implies a deep reflection on the role of science and namely, Complexity
Theories.
For sure, what is to pass by, is that sort of laziness that affected sociology and social
science in the 90s. In fact, once that social theory acknowledged that if was
impossible to perfectly mirror social phenomena, it principally devoted to describe
the reasons and the conditions if this ignorance; although this limitedness also
implied that social hetero-direction from above authorities is never completely
49

ineffective, and therefore there is always room for individual freedom, social science
maybe has the possibility and the function of providing some points of reference for a
so complex world.
Especially such a difficult times, social actors need to have the instruments to define
the situation, assess their personal goals and choose the appropriate means to reach
the goals.
Of course, the awareness remains, that a complete knowledge of social world is
impossible, and so are reliable previsions on the future states of social systems.
This is why a different approach to sociology complex might be useful: we have seen
above that one of the main goals of complexity has been to define the order and to
seize complex order in apparently chaotic phenomena. In earlier periods the
conviction was strong that any complexity was an instrument to seize and describe
kind of order any, while more recently we know that the idea was the opposite. Well,
maybe in this very moment the main goal of a complex approach to sociology should
be to make a clear distinction, among chaotic phenomena, between what is
potentially knowable and what is supposed to appear, also on the long term, chaotic
(See for example Morin, 1999 and 2003; Gell-Mann (1996) and especially
Luhmanns (1995) works also can be robust theoretical references for this approach
to complexity). This might be a useful instrument for social actors to decide, when
facing any complex problem, if they have to adopt a strategy of problem solution of
ignorance management.

References

Ashby, W. R. (1956) An Introduction to cybernetics. London, Chapman & Hall Ltd


Bauman, Z., (1993) Postmodern ethics. Oxford; Cambridge (Massachusetts),
Blackwell
Bauman Z., (2001) The individualized society. Cambridge, Polity
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Bauman Z., (2000) Liquid modernity. Cambridge: Polity; Oxford; Malden: Blackwell
Boudon R., (1984) La place du dsordre : critique des thories du changement social.
Paris, Presses universitaires de France
Ceruti M., (1986) Il vincolo e la possibilit. Milano, Feltrinelli
Gell-Mann, Murray (1994) The quark and the jaguar: adventures in the simple and
the complex. New York, Freeman
Giddens A., (1990) The consequences of modernity. Cambridge, Polity
Heims, S. J., (1991) The cybernetics group. Cambridge, Mass.; London, MIT Press
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1988). The Tree of Knowledge,
Shambhala, Boston and London.
Luhmann N., (1995) Social systems. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press
Lyotard, Jean-Franois (1979) La condition postmoderne : rapport sur le savoir.
Paris, Ed. Minuit
Mascolo R., (2011) Lemergere della biologia della cognizione. Roma, Aracne
Morin E., (1977) La Methode tome I, La nature de la nature. Paris, Du Seuil
Morin E., (1982) Science avec conscience. Paris, Fayard
Morin E., (1999) La tte bien faite : repenser la rforme, rformer la pense. Paris,
Du Seuil
Morin E., (1990) Introduction la pense complexe. Paris, Du Seuil
Morin E., (2003) L' identit humaine. Paris, Du Seuil
Piaget J., (1967) Biologie et connaissance. ditions de la Pliade, Paris.
Piaget J., (1970) L' pistmologie gntique.Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.
Popper K., (2009) The two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge. London,
New York Routledge
Prigogine I., (1996) La fin des certitudes: temps, chaos et les lois de la nature. Paris,
O. Jacob
Prigogine I., (2003) Is future given? New Jersey, World Scientific
Tinbergen N., (1951) The study of instinct. Oxford, Clarendon Press

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von Bertalanffy L., (1969) General system theory : foundations, development,


applications. New York, G. Braziller
Waldrop M., (1994) Complexity : the emerging science at the edge of order and
chaos. London, Penguin Books
Wiener N., (1961) Cybernetics, or control and communication in the animal and the
machine. New York, London, MIT press ; Wiley
Wiener N., (1965) God and Golem, inc.; a comment on certain points where
cybernetics impinges on religion. Cambridge, MIT Press

52

CHAPTER III
MEDIA THEORY AND WEB-BASED GROUPS AS SOCIAL SYSTEMS
by Federico Farini

3.1. Introduction

This article consists of four sections. The first section analyzes the relationship
between consciousness and social systems, discusses how individual thoughts and
communication are connected, influencing each other without being able to control
each other. The second section develops an interdisciplinary approach which refers to
phenomenological philosophy, theory of forms, second order cybernetics and the
theory of autopoietic systems, describing a socio-evolutionary process where new
media alter the societal capacity to handle complexity in time and space.
In the sections 3.3 and 3.4, the article takes a micro-level perspective by applying the
theoretical framework build in sections 3.1 and 3.3 to concrete social formations
(groups in social networks), observed as self-organizing interactive systems. In
particular, the article discusses web-based groups in the social networks, observing
them as: 1) bounded interaction systems, as forms in the medium of the social
networks, organized as tight couplings of elements, users' profiles, that are loosely
coupled in the medium, 2) social systems that produce themselves as the output of
their own operations, creating a border of meaning by condensing a distinction
between actual communication and possible communication.
In this way, it will be possible to analyze how these web-based but nevertheless
concrete social formations make a border of meaning, how they reproduce it, and
what possibilities it has for the communication in the groups. This, at the same time,
will count as an example of the situation of the individual in the modern society,
53

where there is always a border of meaning when we want to belong to the social that
determines what we can observe, and say.
3.2. Structural coupling between consciousness and communication

3.2.1. Consciousness as an autopoietic system

Internalization can be observed if an individual is considered a recipient of


knowledge coming from society. In recent years, the idea of internalization of
knowledge by an individual who is considered a recipient of inputs coming from
society has been challenged by constructivist epistemology, that understand
knowledge of reality as a construction performed by an observer. The problem is
what is the individual who creates knowledge? Or, in other words, what is a
consciousness that creates its reality?
In order to discuss these questions, it would be useful to understand consciousness as
a system. In general terms, a system is defined on the basis of the operation that
differentiates it from its environment; a system happens when operations
reproducing elements create lasting differences in the world between the occurring
operations themselves and the everything else that becomes the environment of the
system. Thus, a system is a difference that makes a difference (Spencer Brown, 1969),
a difference reproducing itself by means of a recursive network of operations.
If we take another perspective, looking not to what a system is, but to what a system
does, it is possible to observe that all systems that produces themselves as a
difference are autopoietic (Maturana & Varela, 1979); autopoietic systems consist of
operations of reproduction of their elements within the network of their elements. The
operations are not controlled by the environment, otherwise there would be no
difference between system and environment; however, they can happen under
particular conditions; their success depends on its viability in its environment. But
these environmental conditions exist for the system only when the operations happen:
the autopoietic system and its environment arise together.
54

Consciousness is a type of autopoietic system; its mode of operating that is, the mode
in which it reproduces itself by reproducing the difference between it and the
environment, reflects the mode of all other autopoietic systems: it consists of the
reproduction of thoughts through the network of thinking-forming consciousness.
Thoughts are not things but events or, in other words, operations happening in time
during an autopoietic process; that implies, against post-Cartesian philosophy, that
there is no mental substance but a continuous production of thought as the output
and the precondition of self-referential operations.
It comes out an interesting, double-faced, reality: as only a network of thoughts,
which is outside the control of society, can determine individual actions, each
individual is likely to start having coordination problems with other individuals. If
individuality means autopoiesis of thoughts, it is necessary to explain how
coordination among autopoietic individuals is possible; here, is where the concepts of
media, forms and structural coupling arise.

3.3. The concept of structural coupling


Coordination between individuals is basically a coupling of constructions: Alter
(ego)s construction of action and Egos construction of understanding. When Alters
action is understood by Ego, it is an utterance of information; only when Alter
defines his or her world through action, Ego becomes able to construct autonomously
(to understand) both the motives for this action and the meanings realized as
information through it.
Thus, according to Luhmann (1992), communication can be defined as the unity of
utterance and understanding that produces information. It is necessary both that
something be said by someone (Alter) and that someone (Ego) understands what is
said and that it is said by someone. Alters utterance and Egos understanding form a
unity because they happen in a unique event, the event in which Alter says
55

something and, simultaneously, Ego understands that Alter has said something
(attributing motives for it) and what Alter has said (information).
The relevance of understanding motives comes from the necessity to attribute
responsibility for the utterance; without such an attribution, Ego cannot refer to
Alters utterance, and then communication is not realized: there would be only
perception. Information is not the product of utterance alone, because it exists in
communication only if Ego understands it. For this reason, a single consciousness can
neither produce nor control communication: it can neither produce nor control the
unity of utterance and understanding. Communication is produced on the basis of
other communication. A new communication refers to utterance or information, and
in this way it marks a connection to previous communications. Consequently, a
network of communications is produced. Any communication is produced through its
reference to previous communication, not to individual meaning: in this way
autopoietic, self-referential social systems are produced, with individual bodies and
consciousnesses in their environment.
Communication and thought are simultaneous but not overlapping. They are
produced in different kinds of autopoiesis. Thought and communication are different
operations of construction of reality; representation (thought) and narration
(communication). Social systems and psychic systems are autopoietic systems in each
others environments that exist simultaneously in the world.
The relationship between thought and communication can be defined as structural
coupling, based on operations of interpenetration. According to Luhmann,
penetration is the way one system makes its complexity available to another one
while remaining in its environment. Interpenetration means that both of the systems
penetrate: psychic system penetrates into communication and social system
penetrates into thought. Penetration and interpenetration, are special kinds of
contact between systems, produced in time, that is, in a single event. Thoughts and
communications are events that do not last; on the contrary, they are events that
continuously disappear, reproducing the system only in their continuous happening
56

and disappearing. Only their quality of being events makes autopoiesis possible:
since it disappears immediately, any thought can be followed by another thought and
any communication can be followed by another communication.
In communication we observe an event of penetration; penetration is based on the
simultaneous happening of one communication and one thought. Communication is
an event of penetration because any utterance and any understanding coincide with
thoughts. When their thoughts coincide with understanding and utterance, psychic
systems penetrate into communication. In penetration, the single operation of the
penetrated system (social system) coincides with the single operation of the
penetrating system (psychic system), while the two systems remain separated. There
is coincidence between communication and thought, but communication remains a
social operation. It remains an operation of the social system because only the
network of communication of this system assures its production (autopoiesis).
Communication cannot be produced inside the psychic system because in the psychic
system there is no difference between utterance and understanding (there is no Alter
ego inside Ego). Rather, communication is an environmental perturbation for a
psychic system. The concept of perturbation indicates that something happening in
the environment is simultaneously constructed in the system: the system is
perturbed because it cannot avoid considering what is happening in its environment.

3.4. Media/form
Social perturbation is not simply undifferentiated noise because it has a form. The
form is a marked boundary separating two sides: one side is what is indicated, and the
other is what is distinguished from the first. Thus, the question is: what is a form? In
order to answer to this question, Heider (1959) offers a theory of mediation that is
compatible with our purpose. According to him we can say that a medium is a loose
coupling of elements, e.g. light or sound that in them are invisible. When light waves
57

run through the air, the rays are relatively unaffected by this substratum. But when a
solid object reflects them, e.g. a stone, they are coordinated with the object in a
special way: you see the stone and not the light. The object can be said to print itself
into the medium as a rigid coupling, which is perceptible as a figure on a ground.
Heider makes a distinction between a medium plan and a thing plan; so the things are
perceptible at a distance only through media: you can see them, smell them, and hear
them.
Already at this point of theorizing we have left the idea of transmitting and started on
the theory of differentiating. You must differentiate between what is ground and what
is figure. In this constructivist conceptual framework, perception is not an adequate
reflection of the surrounding world but system internal construction: according to
Maturana and Varela (1980) there is no transmitting of data but an ability to
differentiate figure from ground on the basis of different media. Starting from
Heider's distinction, Luhmann abstracts the difference between medium and thing by
replacing the concept of thing with George Spencer Browns concept of form. This
distinction makes it possible to use the theory for analysing what system internal
construction is, and to include the different media as a variable in the social
reproduction.
Spencer Brown (1969) defines form as the distinction between indication and
distinction. Construction of a form means to draw a distinction; only by drawing a
distinction can one be able to indicate something. Inspired by Baecker (1999), we can
say that a distinction contains everything: the indication that the distinction makes,
the non-indicated rest of the world (which the indicated is distinguished from) and the
distinction itself, separating the states indicated from the states non-indicated. Now
we come closer to what construction is; it is always a result of the process of drawing
distinctions. And, going a bit more further, we come to another question: what is the
consequence of drawing distinction? Here, is where meaning come about.
According to Luhmann (1995: 74), who takes the concept from phenomenological
philosophy (Husserl, 1973) also meaning is a form, namely the difference of actual
58

and potential. But, as a sociologist, Luhmann adds to the conscious level of meaning
construction the social level; if meaning is the difference of actual and potential, in
the sociological perspective what is said must be differentiated from what is not said
but could have been said, and in this way gets meaning from this simultaneous
representation of the actual and the potential.
Social construction of meaning in society maybe understood as the construction of
social forms, that is, of distinctions that orient communication by marking two sides
(e.g.

true/false,

right/wrong,

conformity/deviance,

man/woman

etc);

any

communication is primarily oriented to a form marking the meaning of information


produced in other communications: I define communication as a unity of utterance
and understanding (true/false), How much is it? (paying/ not paying) etc.
Furthermore, there are always social forms that concerns the meaning of
contributions, marking the meaning of individual participation in communication
(utterances). The speaker (or writer) may be a parent, a teacher, an economist, a
politician, or any other role; the speaker (or writer) may also be Paul, Beth or any
other person. The role or the person speaking are further orientation for
communication. From the perspective of functional-structuralism, both social forms
that concern the meaning of information and social forms that concern the meaning of
utterance are social structures: structures select among possible communications and
permit connections among communication. For instance, a communication can refer
to another communication because the latter is indicated and distinguished as true or
false, said by Paul or Beth, by the teacher or Dad. During participation in
communication, Ego necessarily understands social forms; in understanding utterance
and information, Ego necessarily understands their social forms. Structural coupling
means first of all that a system presupposes specific forms in another system (in its
environment) and relies on them.
Social forms are the viable structures that allows a psychic system to penetrate into
communication; the consciousness need of social forms does not mean that
communication controls the psychic system; Ego thinks autonomously when he or
59

she participates in communication; perturbations of social forms are psychic


constructions. The socially formed perturbation of thought is just the first step of
structural coupling: individual thinking continues beyond the event of understanding,
in an autopoietic network of thoughts. The simultaneity happens only in a single
event, and is immediately followed by the differentiation of systems. Therefore, a
thought has assumed a narrated truth, and this is the starting point for autonomous
construction in further thoughts referring to it.
When penetration vanishes, consciousness can construct the meaning of social forms.
Ego thinks about what he or she has understood in a specific and unique way, in his
or her autopoietic process. In fact, in his or her participation in communication, Ego
autonomously thinks of true and false, as they are narrated in communication and
thinks of Paul, Beth, the teacher or Dad who is narrating them.
The second step of structural coupling is the differentiation of psychic and social
systems. Differentiation means that the coinciding single communication and thought
follow their own connections in different systems.
Social influence can be explained only through structural coupling, that is, through a
sequence of constructions: first perturbation (coincidence) and then meaningful
information (difference). The effects of socialization come not from the length of
penetration but from the quality of the psychic forms. The construction of psychic
individuality, of a consciousness, occur through autonomous representations that
follow these events of communication because any consciousness is not a trivial
machine that internalizes social forms (von Foerster, 2002). Communication
cannot determine the psychic forms because it cannot happen inside the psychic
system; a common mistake to avoid is the confusion between a simultaneity in an
event and a passage of lasting meaning (information) from environment to system.
The basic psychic operations permitting structural coupling are a first-order
construction (understanding of perturbation) and a second-order construction or
construction of a construction (construction of information). The first-order
construction happens in the coincidence of a communication and a thought: in the
60

psychic system a reality appears as perturbation in consequence of penetration. The


second-order construction is a construction of the meaning of this perturbation, which
is transformed into information. Ego constructs a meaning thinking of his or her
previous thought (coincident with communication). This second-order construction
happens with the differentiation of consciousness and communication, that is, of
individual and society (Baraldi, 1993).

3.5. The evolution of media, the evolution of improbabilities


Thus, a topic of a theory interested in the relationship between individuals and
communication would be how psychic structures are coupled with the perturbing
social structures; the sociological systems theory of Niklas Luhmann offers a theory
explaining the function of media in realizing this social dimension.
Consciousness systems and communication systems, the individual and the social, are
operationally closed systems; however social systems must be linked to
consciousness and nothing else: while communications cannot perceive and needs to
be irritated by consciousness. For its part, consciousness could work without
communication, but only if it has experienced communication and has socialized
itself.
Luhmann's theory explains that the structural coupling between consciousness and
communication is an improbability made possible by the improbable evolution of
media of communication. In particular, Luhmann includes three different media of
communication, seen as improbable evolutionary developed answers to the main
sociological improbability, that is, the formation of society on the basis of
autonomous and operationally closed consciousnesses.
Starting from a zero point of evolution, Luhmann (1995: 158) notices that it is
improbable that ego understands what alter means, given that their bodies and
minds are separate and individual (first improbability), It is improbable for a
communication to reach more persons than are present (second improbability),
61

Even if communication is understood by the person it reaches, this does not


guarantee that it is also accepted and followed (third improbability).
The answer to the first improbability is language: it is through the same use of signs
Alter and Ego can be reinforced in the apprehension that they mean the same thing.
Language is not meaning but has the function to generalize meaning with the help of
symbols (Luhmann 1995: 94). The connection between Alter and Ego at the level of
psychic meanings of social perturbations is only possible because of language. The
medium of language is the first type of medium that evolved to help overcome
obstacles that impede communicative connectivity. Language makes it probable that
understanding will occur, in spite of the fact that communication involves the
participation of isolated, operationally closed psychic systems. Language helps the
structural coupling between consciousness and communication. With language, both
communication and consciousness become much more complex: communication
learns to communicate about communication and consciousness learns to form
episodes through the use of linguistically formed thoughts. The ability means that the
consciousness can differentiate and discontinue operations.
Figure 3.1, below, shows the media/form ladder from which emerged the medium of
language. From the medium of acoustic perturbations (sound), language makes it
possible to produce the form of meaning (which requires a structural between
communication and consciousness). A form always demands a medium, and what is a
form in one medium can itself be a medium for further formation. An analogy offered
by Lars Qvortrup (1998, cited in Taekke, 2003) sees plastic as the medium of the
form Lego and Lego as the medium for the form Lego-house.

62

Sound (media)
Phoneme (form in the media of sound, media for the form of)
Morpheme (form in the media of phoneme, media for the form of)
Word (form in the media of morpheme, media for the form of)
Sentence (media for the form of meaning through structural
coupling between communication and consciousness)
Fig. 3.1

The evolutionary success of language increases complexity, generating new


improbabilities; in particular, language makes it possible the structural coupling
between consciousness and communication by means of symbols (forms in the media
of sound), generating a second level of improbability, that requires a second
improbable evolution of a new medium: the improbability of reaching people outside
the present physical sphere.
The answer to this second improbability consists of by the media of dissemination:
writing, printing and electronic broadcasting.
With the first dissemination media, the optical medium of writing it was possible to
differentiate between interaction and society: the physical compresence of
participants ceased to be a presupposition of understanding. With writing, the storage
capacity increased and the social units enlarged too. As disseminating media evolved,
they strengthened the potential of communication to reach and involve more and
more participants. Media of dissemination make it probable that communication
reaches an absent audience of addressees. After writing, the printing press, radio,
television and the Internet are familiar media of dissemination. With regard to the
firsr medium of dissemination, writing, figure 3.2 illustrates the media/form ladder
that, from the medium of visual perturbations (light) leads to the form of meaning
(which, once more, requires a structural between communication and consciousness).

63

Light (media)
Letter (form in the media of light, media for the form of)
Word (form in the media of letters, media for the form of)
Sentence (form in the media of word, media for the form of)
Text (medium for the forms of meaning)
Fig. 3.2

When communication is limited to those who share time and space, it is typically
bounded by narrow social controls, memory of context, normative expectations and
cultural pressures. However, advances in dissemination media invite communication
to escape these bounds. The evolution of media makes the structural coupling
between individuals and society more complex, generating new improbabilities that
require new improbable evolutions. In particular, as the possible range of
communication increases, the chances that specific contributions will be accepted
decreases.
The new improbability consists in the acceptance or success of increasingly
differentiated communication, and success media, the third type of communication
media, are the answer to this improbability. Success media answer the question of the
improbability of the acceptance of the premises of communication, describing how
communication has effect in a more complex and differentiated society. To do this,
they have to solve problems with combining selection and motivation by employing a
semantic matrix intimately connected with the reality of personal experiences, that is,
employing social forms that can perturb consciousness whose meanings, however, is
an individual psychic construction.
In this way, language, artifacts for dissemination, and social, semantic structures can
be seen as different kinds of media influencing the social; we have reached a crucial
step, where the evolution of media and social complexity interacts with digital
technology.
64

Language emerged and makes possible the storing of knowledge. With language
humans began emancipation from biologically determined social behavior and started
to structure co-operation dependent on meaning. However, in an oral culture,
knowledge has to be constantly repeated or it will be lost; with optical medium of
writing it was possible to differentiate between interaction and society and
alternatives could be presented. The storage capacity increased and the social units
enlarged too.
With electronic media, which are the most complex type of dissemination media, the
production and the consumption of media is easier than it is with writing, or the
printing press, because with electronic media, for instance television, it is as there
was no code at all except from the code of language itself.
Electronic media gives the ability to be in a parallel space even if, with the first
electronic media, radio and television, being in media space is rather passive: you can
change the channel but you cannot alter the forms in the medium, just watch them.
With digital technology, on the contrary, it becomes possible to create, store and
share both acoustic and optic constructions in and through the digital media. Figure
3.3, shows the capability of digital media to absorb and reconstitute other
communication media (language, writing, images), creating the possibility of more
complex forms of meaning.

Absorbed communication media (language, writing, images),


encrypted and decrypted in a digital code (media for the form of)
Multimedial forms (medium for the forms of meaning)
Fig. 3.3

65

3.6. Social networks

3.6.1. Social networks as forms in the digital medium

While speech takes form within a medium of acoustic energy that structurally couples
speaker and listener, while writing takes form within the medium of light that
structurally couples author and reader, Web 2.0 uses electricity and the digital
medium to structurally couple computers that operate according to programs that
reproduce communicative utterances.
Among these programs, social networks are networking programs designed to make
friends and influence people, supporting selective online interaction between matched
participants; social networking software contributes to the differentiation of social
networks, that we may define, using the distinctions of the media/form theory
outlined in section 3.4, as forms in the technological medium of digital
communication.
Social networking software instruct new participants to create a profile, writing
themselves to being, associating his or her person with cultural icons, celebrities,
places and popular media resources. The profiles list their names, ages, geographic
locations, interests, relationship status, and other details that can easily be inserted
into a form or template. Profiles, that is, online persons, represent an output of the
social networks and the elements of the social networks. Individuals, what is behind
the profiles, are in the environment of the social networks. The social network
observes a unity in difference that is represented by all of the users, while non-users,
without any reference to their condition as individual in society, are meaningless.
The social networks exist as bounded autopoietic systems that operate within the new
ether of interactivity supported by Web 2.0 and its technical innovations, producing
themselves by meaningful organizing its own elements.

66

3.6.2. Persons in the social network


If we use the distinctions of media/form theory, we may say that the incredible
impact of social networking sites appears to be related to the capacity of networked
computers to selectively organize tight couplings of information from loose elements
that are available within a constantly expanding digital medium of virtual data.
Participants in a social network site, and sociologists, may observe the system
identifying and organizing its elements (profiles), selecting them and relating them to
other elements to make temporary and contingent assemblies (friends).
Regardless of the type of communication medium, participants in society are able to
make meaning with communicative forms because they recognize the selectivity of a
tight coupling and know that it could have been different. As they read, type and click,
online persons/profiles reveal that the digital medium of Web 2.0 has changed their
ability to organize the complexity of communication, to reach and be reached by
others, and to inform themselves with the self-reference of society; when profiles
construct order (meaning) out of noise, distinguishing between friends and (online)
persons, they demonstrate the cultured ability to differentiate information and
utterance.
Profiles establish and manage connections, creating friends out of profiles. However,
from a social constructivist perspective, persons, and online persons, are not "things";
rather, they are the outcome of the establishment and manage of social connections.
Luhmann suggests that while persons, their consciousnesses and their bodies, are a
condition for communication, it is communication that creates persons (and profiles),
by providing addresses from which they may participate in society (Luhmann, 1995).
A person is constituted for ordering behavioral expectations that can be fulfilled by
his/her and his/her alone, and so it is a profile. Being a person requires that one draws
and binds expectations to oneself with the help of ones psychic system and body,
including expectations about oneself with regard to others.
Thus, persons, and profiles, are collages of expectations, functioning as points of
reference for further selections within the social system, also when the system is a
67

social network; when we refer to profiles who use communication to locate and
contact one another, we presuppose that communication has already raised reciprocal
expectations of personhood. As they do in their social worlds, with regards to
different social contexts, profiles learn to expect that different context within the
social network will include specific kinds of persons who participate in specific kinds
of communication.
The most successful social network sites are comparable in terms of their
functionality: they support selective online interaction between matched participants,
instructing new participants to create a profile, that is, their online personhood. The
profiles list their names, ages, geographic locations, interests, relationship status, and
other details that can easily be inserted into a form or template.
Making use of the ability of the digital medium to absorb and reconstitute other
communication media, a profile may attach collections of photos, music and video
clips to a page. In this manner, an individual user associates his or her online
personhood with cultural icons, celebrities, places and popular media resources. The
work of assembling artifacts builds up the complexity of a profile page, increasing
the selectivity and variety of expectations that may be attributed to the online profile
by others.
As she or he creates a profile on the social network, an individual becomes a person
in the sense that she or he may begin to practice digitally mediated friendship. Going
beyond Luhmanns observations, not only do participants claim personhood by
gaining an address from which to participate in communication, they also confirm
and make evident the personhood of profiles with whom they are networked. Thus,
we may describe the form of a friend in the social network as the difference between
friend and person, and we may say that the meaning of friendship is produced in the
processing of this difference. A click produces friendship by bringing a specific
person to the surface, up from the digital depths of available people.

68

3.7. Web-based groups in the social network


3.7.1. Content-centered groups

Digital medium both increases and reduces the complexity of communication,


destroying variety with variety. Every Ego with a profile exists as a person for
unknown Alters, lurkers included. The system stands by, waiting for participants in
the network to be motivated by their own projections of differences between people
and their communicative utterances. In fact, the more a social network is able to
recognize every one of its profiles as an available participant in communication and
every archived utterance as a potential piece of information, the more a social
network site is attractive for actual, or potential, users.
Digital technology is the prerequisite for the ability of any social network to create
the complexity which, for its part, is the evolutionary prerequisite for the emerging of
networks of friends. However, technology is also used to selectively reduce the
complexity it creates, with unparalleled speed and reliability: steered by the clicks of
users, the invisible machine transforms input into output according to a networking
program designed to make friends and influence people.
It emerges a three-tiered picture: 1) the social network as a form in the medium of
society differentiated by the technological medium of digital communication and
social networking software, 2) Ego-centred networks of friends as a forms in the
medium of the social network differentiated partly by the digital technology, and
partly by the networks border of meaning and, 3) the single communication as a
form in the medium of the network of friend, producing networks border of meaning,
which is its precondition, as its output.
If we examine the larger social network, Facebook, which borders are reaching the
borders of society (with the exclusion of areas still without electricity and telephone
lines), networks of friends are not the only form that may emerge in the medium of
the social network; another social formation are web-based groups.

69

Differently from networks of friends, web-based groups are not Ego-centred but
content-centred: profiles gather in a group attracted by a specific issue, a popular
person, a stream of discussion, creating bounded social system within the medium of
profiles.
It is widely acknowledged that web-based groups represent a crucial social system in
our society; for instance, the use of web-based groups to spread information, to coordinate protest activities, to debate on protest issues, to integrate or disseminate
mass media coverage of protest events seems to characterize todays political
participation

(Segerberg&Bennett,

2011).

Developing

Mark

Granovetters

sociological concept of weak ties networks (Granovetter, 1983), scholars in the


field of new media suggest that, if web-based groups are likely to lack strong
networking patterns, they can become channels for opinion making and public
reasoning within online active audiences (Honeycutt and Herring, 2009; boyd et al.,
2010).
As any other type of social system, web-based groups produce, and are produced by,
a single operation, that is, communication. Joining or leaving the group, launching
new topics of discussion, criticizing or praising the contributions of other members,
all of these operations represents events of communication, as soon as an Ego
(another member of the group) observes them understanding information and
attributing motives for utterance.
For this reason, our discussion on the web-based groups as social systems will focus
now on the operation which represent the output and at the same time the input of
web-based groups: communication. In particular, we look at any single
communication in the web-based groups as a form in the medium of the group, either
producing the border of meaning as it is or trying to modify it by new meaning
proposals, hoping to get them conditioned (making it a condition for further
communication). When a group is born, it is differentiated in the factual dimension
communicating something separated from something else; its borders are condensed
by actualizing and confirming proposals of meaning, but also by refusing them: to
70

annul a proposal of meaning is to create memory of it as not part of the system. Seen
from the temporal dimension, it is the past that gives the horizon of possibilities for
actual selection of understanding and for the expectations for the future.
The social network is the wide-ranging concept for all the groups; it is a form in
society differentiated out by the technology; the single group is a form in the medium
of the social network, differentiated party by the technology and partly by the group's
border of meaning. Figure 3.4, below, explains through a media/form ladder, the
process of self-referential distinctions that, starting from the medium of society to
communication processes as forms within web-based groups.

Social networks are forms in the medium of society,


differentiated by the technological medium of digital
communication and social networking software
Web-based groups, are bounded social systems that operate
within the medium of social networks, supported by Web 2.0
and its technical innovations and differentiated by events of
communication (profiles' choice to join and contributions)
Web-based groups are media for the form of the single
communication. The single communication is a form in the
medium of the web-based group (difference between actual
and possible communication)
Recursive communication is the output, but also the input of
the web-based group, producing the systems border of
meaning: 1) condensing what has been said before, actualizing
and confirming it and/or 2) negating a new proposal of
meaning, creating memory of it as not part of the system
Fig. 3.4

71

3.7.2. Web-based groups as social and temporalized system

For autopoietic social systems, the environment is necessarily a source of irritation,


because it can't be controlled by the operation of the system; in a more accurate way,
we should talk of self-irritation asthe environment, which is produced by the system,
becomes informative as it is observed by the system, by means of the re-entry of the
distinction between system and the environment in to the system.
Autopoietic social systems are unstable, they produce their own instability, which is a
presupposition for their evolution. This is also true for web-based groups, which are
continuously irritated by the environment they produce, condensing their border
communication after communication.
The environment of a web-based groups consists of society, including its members;
indeed, the most important source of irritation for a web-based group is the
observation of its members. While the group and its members are structurally coupled,
they represent two different forms of autopoietic systems; the groups is a social
system of communication, the single member is a psychic systems of thoughts.
Since the group penetrates in the consciousness of its members, that is, since the
meaning of the group is created by one or another of its members, the conditions for
the irritation of the group are created. Consciousness produces meaning out of
communication, drawing the distinction between what has been done by a specific
Alter and what else could have be done in that situation by the same Alter, or by
another Alter; this is a self-referential process in which, after the initial coupling with
the event of communication, thought follows thoughts in a way that is opaque to
group. The group cannot control the difference it makes for consciousnesses of its
members; thus it cannot control their reactions.
When, following the penetration of the group in a consciousness, this
consciousnesses produces the meaning of this irritation and communicates about it,
consciousness penetrates the group; a contribution is uttered, understood and reacted
72

to (or not reacted to, if a reaction of many kind was expected): all of this events
represent irritations, and the group must produce new semantics to cope with it, that
is, defining it in relation to everything else, which frequently is a rather
confrontational process.
In particular, a web-based group needs to preserve its borders, otherwise the
distinction between the group and the environment, therefore the group itself, would
vanish. In particular, while, in the ordinary activities of the system its border of
meaning is implicit, if somebody tries to get a meaning proposal in opposition to it,
this border will be defended strongly, making it explicit.
It is of the greatest importance to notice that, if we observe the empirical social
processes in the media of the social network, it is possible to recognize that webbased groups may reach (and indeed reach, otherwise they would perish), a level of
internal complexity that allows them to produce self-irritation, to actualize and
confirm the borders of meaning: in complex web-based groups, there are very
unpopular members who are not thrown out permanently, giving other members the
possibility to reproduce the border, getting identity out of it.
When an unpopular member offers a proposal of meaning i opposition with the
semantic of the group, the group irritate itself, and such irritation is the condition for
the re-entry of the distinction, separating the system from the environment, into the
system that appears by producing it (Spencer Bronw, 1969): when a member says
something in opposition to the border of meaning the others gets the possibility to
defend it, making it explicit.
Thus, alongside factual and temporal differentiation, a distinction is produced also in
the social dimension, between an environment that consists of what does not
communicate, for instance psychic systems, or stones, and the group as a system of
communication. With self-irritation and re-entry, this difference is copied into the
system, as a distinction between self-reference and other-reference.
Now, we can see how the web-based group is differentiated on the basis of a single
operation, communication, in a factual, temporal and social dimension, becoming an
73

autopoietic systems that reproduces itself by means of the output of its own
operations. Figure 3.5, below, illustrates the process of self-referential autopoiesis of
a web-based group in the Facebook social network. From the perspective of the
media/form theory, the group is understood as a form in the medium of the social
network.

Fig. 3.5

The process documented by figure 3.5 is the re-entry of the distinction that separates
the system (the group) from the environment into the same system (the group), that
appears by producing the distinction. The distinction between the system and the
environment, that is, its border of meaning, is copied into the system by the system,
when a member says something in opposition to the border and the others gets the
possibility to defend that border, making it explicit.
Thus, we see how the autopoietic web-based group is differentiated by means of its
own operations (communications). Iteration of communication produces decisions,
conditionings and semantics, that is, the condensation and confirmation of the group
as a form in the medium of the social network.

74

With the operation of re-entry, the distinction between self-reference and otherreference provides with reference which embodies the unity of the system. Yet, this
distinction also embodies the closure of openness, since reference keeps coming back
to itself while constantly having to account for the other. As shown in figure 3.6,
when the distinction between self-reference and other-reference is crossed by the
distinction between before and after, you end up with temporalized systems, that take
into account their history while they operate.

Fig. 3.6
However, web-based groups, as all complex autopoietic systems may forego their
complexity; evolution is not necessarily a one way process from low complexity to
high complexity; indeed the other way round is possible: 1) when a system sticks to
its unity without paying attention to the other side of the distinction, the environment,
2) when a system becomes seemingly static by assuming events of all kinds not to
change a before into an after.
Web-based group tends to condense their border of meaning, which represent the
basic operation for their reproduction as a unity in the environment; while this
operation preserves the autonomy of the system, it exposes the system to the risk of a
drive which could lead not to reflection but, rather, to generalization and abstraction.
We think that this risk a serious one, which consequences cannot be underestimated:
generalization and abstraction imply that all the details and specifics, the distinction
of which from other details and specifics would be nothing less than the condition to
develop intelligence, are lost. In fact, as illustrated by figure 3.7 below, for a subject
(included a web-based groups in Facebook), it takes the distinction from an
environment to be able to reflect on itself; the system as whole tends to lack
intelligence since it fails to reflect on an environment.

75

Fig. 3.7

3.8. Conclusion

Intelligence starts when an entity is able to take its own lack of knowledge into
account and to search for the knowledge lacking in other entities which presumably
are in a better position to bring forth the knowledge sought. That, too, presupposes
the distinction from an environment which becomes the search space for the
knowledge lacking. This leads to the surprising conclusion that when a web-based
group produces an environment that is generalized and abstract, the difference
between a before and an after become less informative, and the system become less
intelligent than any of its parts.
A conclusion (among many possible others) we would like to propose about the
differentiation of autopoietic web-based groups in the social networks is the
following: even in the functionary differentiated society with its millions of social
possibilities, even in the space of electronic media, there is always a concrete
communication situation that determines the border for what can be said if you want
to make a social inclusion. However, the invention of a border is a process that is
necessary and dangerous at the same time: it brings about the possibility that the
reproduction of the system becomes a pathology of the system itself. Web-based
76

groups offer an instance of the paradoxical relationship between differentiation,


complexity and time.

References

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Aspects of Retweeting on Twitter. IEEE Kauai: HICSS-43.
von Foerster, H. (2002). Understanding understanding. New York: Springer-Verlag.
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Lumann, N. (1992). What is communication? Communication Theory, 2 (3): 251-259
Luhmann, N. (1995). Social Systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Maturana, H., Varela, F. (1979). Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the
Living. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Qvortrup, L. (1998). Det hyperkomplekse samfund. Copenhagen: Gyldendal.
Segerberg, A. and Bennet, W.L. (2011). Digital Media and the Personalization of
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Luhmann Conference, Copenhagen.

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Varela, F. (1988). Connatre: Les Sciences Cognitives, tendances et perspectives.


Paris: Editions du Seuil.

78

CHAPTER IV
RETHINKING ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARIES VIA LUHMANNS
THEORY OF ORGANIZED SYSTEMS
by Maria Pilar Opazo and Dario Rodriquez

4.1. Introduction

Over the years, organizational scholars have supported their analyses in wide variety
of questions. What factors determine organizations efficiency (rational theorists)?
Why do some organizations survive while others fail (natural theorists)? Why are
there so many kinds of organizations (population ecologists)? Why do organizations
come to resemble each other? (neo-institutionalists)? Overall, these approaches
consider different guiding principles in explaining organizations function and form.
We claim here that a fundamental concern for the role of organizational boundaries is
at the core of all these analytical approaches.
The construction and endurance of the identity of an organization depends on its
capacity to maintain its boundaries. Accordingly, the boundary-work (Gieryn 1983)
performed by organizations is key for understanding their functioning and
development. Lamont and Molnar (2002) pointed out that the notion of boundaries
has become one of the most fertile thinking tools in our understanding of social
entities. Based on this work, the present analysis attempts to rethink organizational
boundaries in the field of organization studies. To do this, we explore how Niklas
Luhmanns theoretical framework affords opportunities to deepen our understanding
of the boundaries of organizations. We discuss central components of Luhmanns
theory and examine its salient points of divergence and correspondence with
contending theoretical approaches.
Developed in the last decades of the twentieth century, Luhmanns work represents
79

one of the most comprehensive and insightful sociological theories of contemporary


society. Luhmanns analysis of organizations specifically, was largely developed in
his book Organisation und Entscheidung which, up to now, has not been translated
into English. Perhaps for this reason, Luhmanns theory of organized systems
remains to a large extent under-explored and under-exploited by organizational
scholars outside Germany.18 In an attempt to contribute to expansion of this valuable
theory into larger communities of scholars, we base our analysis of organizational
boundaries on what we consider to be the central claims of this line of Luhmanns
work.
Our article is structured in the following manner. First, we introduce Luhmanns
theory foundational distinction of organization versus environment. Second, we
consider Luhmanns notion of autopoietic systems and examine its departure from
predominant paradigms used in theories of organization. Third, we explore the ways
in which Luhmanns focus on communications and decisions can deepen our
understanding of the limits of organizations. Finally, we examine the role of conflict
and disorder in constructing the boundaries of organizations. In the concluding
section, we discuss the opportunities for Luhmanns theory to shed light on
contemporary analysis of organizations.

4.2. Organization versus Environment


Building upon Spencer-Browns Laws of Form (1979), Luhmann argues that every
observation draws a distinction that differentiates between what is being observed
and what is left unobserved. This operation enables social systems to construct,
interpret, and describe their surroundings. Luhmann identifies three main social
systems: interactions, organizations and society. Here, we base our analysis on
organizations.
18

A notable exception of this is the collection of scholarly articles edited by Seidl and Becker (2005).

80

According to Luhmann, organizations emerge and reproduce by establishing their


difference with their environment. They do this by distinguishing between what
belongs to them (e.g. members, structures, programmes, plans) and what does not, i.e.
everything else. Luhmann explains that a distinction is a form of two sides in which
one side is indicated and the other side remains unmarked. Both sides, however,
cannot be observed simultaneously. When an organization distinguishes itself from
its environment, it cannot observe itself directly but only through this distinction.
Hence, the only way an organization can observe itself is by reintroducing a new
distinction into its original (re-entry), in other words, by becoming a second order
observer (von Foerster, 1981).
As a consequence, every further observation made by organizations will necessarily
be a reintroduction (re-entry) based upon this original distinction organization
versus environment. Since organizations cannot escape from this first distinction it
will remain as its blind spot, as an unmarked space (Spencer Brown, 1979). Put
simply, social systems cannot directly see themselves, they need the social mirror
of others to know about themselves.19 Here, it is important to note that this is not a
problem for organizations but it is in fact the only way in which their self-observation
is possible (Luhmann, 2000).
This illustrates an irresolvable paradox that lies at the heart of Luhmanns theory: the
unity of any distinction is the unity of its distinction. The two sides are one and the
same thing. Applied to the study of organizations, this means that both organization
and environment cannot be understood without each other because they represent two
sides of the same distinction (Luhmann, 1994, 1995, 2000). In Luhmanns words,
The system is neither ontologically nor analytically more important than the
environment; both are what they are only in reference to each other (Luhmann,
1995: 173).
The fact that organizations can only describe themselves as second-order observers
implies that the unity of organizations can only be conceived as oscillation, namely,
19

From a social psychological perspective, Mead (1934) was among the first to point out the relevance of
third-parties in the construction of identities, specifically, with his notions of me and self.

81

as continuous processes of revealing and concealing. As in Batesons metaphor of a


map and a territory, the map allows to us see the territory, yet we cannot see but the
map (Bateson, 1979). An organizations unity and endurance, then, consists of
continuous creation and recreation of its boundaries. This premise has significant
repercussions for the study of organizations as it entails that the establishment of the
organizations boundaries is not merely one aspect of organizations operation, but
rather, the essential process through which organizations construct their identity and
are able to endure.
For Luhmann, therefore, an organizations identity is crystallized and sustained
through processes of drawing boundaries. Explicitly, he stresses that the
organizations unity does not depend on their stability but on their capacity of
connection (Luhmann, 2000). This resonates with Abbot (1995: 868) call for studies
that look for boundaries as simple locations difference, rather than as demarcations
between pre-existing social entities. Another sociological approach that places
fluctuation as the basis for the formation of identities is Whites theory of Identity
and Control (White, 1992, 1998, 2008). According to White, identities, ranging from
individuals to organizations, emerge from turbulence by seeking control over fellow
identities. From this premise, White points out that identities can only achieve
robustness and a social footing through switching. Thus, like Luhmann, he reminds
us that stability and instability are two sides of the same distinction. Both coupling
and decoupling, determinacy and indeterminacy, play an equally important role in
defining an organizations identity.
Overall, Luhmanns conceptualization has important implications for the study of
what Coleman (1974) identified as corporate actors, that is, organizations or
populations of organizations. Distinct to theoretical approaches that support their
analysis of organizations on specific variables such as rationality, efficiency,
formality, managerial performance, and so on, Luhmanns framework invites us to
shift the attention to the production of differences as the key characteristic of
organizations. By doing this, Luhmanns theory calls for investigations centred on the
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processes through which organizations establish their boundaries, regardless of the


specific features of organizations (e.g. size, power, age, degree of institutionalization,
flexibility, etc.).
Luhmann argues that experience has taught us that statements that turn to the
nature of things only produce theoretical dead-ends, where differences of opinion
become endless. Hence, his proposal for organizational theory - and for sociology in
general - is to move from questions of what to questions of how, thus
transforming ontological searches into contingencies (Luhmann, 1994, 1997, 2000).
Following this line of reasoning, an important contribution of Luhmanns theory of
organized systems is that it allows us to leave aside presumed notions about
organizations functioning and, consequently, it opens the possibility for
complementary and conflicting interpretations to nourish one another. Consistent
with this, Luhmann proposes his own theory as a contingent description among many
others and as such capable of contributing to the field of organizational studies
(Luhmann, 2000).

4.3. Openness and Closure: Organizations as Autopoietic Systems

Recent literature reviews describe the emergence of open systems theory during the
late-1960s as one of the most important shifts in organization studies (Scott & Davis,
2003; Scott, 2004). In such accounts, the history of this field of research appears as if
it were divided in two: an earlier period in which studies were based on closed
models of organizations, and a later period in which environments and the boundary
work performed by organizations figure most crucially in our understanding of how
organizational identities endure.
Most of the early rational scholars did not pay attention to the environment of
organizations. Taylors (1970) time and motion studies were conducted within the
factories walls, not allowing for anything exterior to interfere. Fayols emphasis on
discipline, control and management was also restricted to the internal functioning of
83

organizations; no external commands or information appeared to play a role within


his analyses. And while the unexpected results of the Hawthorne experiments developed within the tradition of the Human Relations School - turned attention
toward the influence of norms and sentiments upon organizational productivity, these
studies also remained confined within organizational walls (see Homans, 1941). This
is not to say, however, that these studies necessarily grasped organizations as
hermetic-like containers, but only that they took for granted what was happening
within their surroundings.
We witnessed some of the first attempts at theorizing organizations in a way that
ventured outside their boundaries with Selznicks notion of cooptation, which he
described as an external mechanism affecting internal processes of decision-making
(Selznick, 1953: 259-262). Within the contingency theory approach, Burns and
Stalker (1961) also moved towards an open notion of organizations with their
concepts of mechanistic and organic systems; the former, being more suitable for
stable environments, and the latter for changing environments. Also in the 1960s,
Stinchcombe inverted the direction of the analysis by examining the effect of society
outside organizations - social structure - in the internal life of organizations
(Stinchcombe, 1965). Moreover, Parsons concern with the environment is apparent
in his very definition of organizations, which he characterized as functionally
differentiated subsystems of a larger subsystem, i.e. society. In this account not only
does he consider the environment but he proposes that a system cannot be understood
without it.
The rise of Ludwig von Bertalanffys general systems theory in the late-1960s
activated major changes within the field of organizations studies and, as he
envisioned, in many other disciplines as well. Based on the second law of
thermodynamics, Bertalanffy pointed out a decisive distinction between closed and
open systems: while the general trend in closed systems is toward increasing disorder
or entropy, open systems have the capacity to import energy from their environments
and maintain themselves in steady states. Steadiness, however, is not the same as
84

order. As Bertalanffy stresses, the entropy imported by the system could be either
positive or negative (negentropy), actively transforming the systems towards
preservation or change, control or internal conflict (Bertalanffy, 1968). The impact of
Bertalanffys theory on the study of organizations appeared to be such that all
previous work based on the idea of closed systems needed to be revised (Scott &
Davis, 2003).
Even though subsequent theoretical developments in organizations include the
environment and boundary-building processes as crucial factors in their analyses,
they have done so in different ways. We can examine this in light of classical studies
of organizations. Economic approaches centered their explanations in the
organizations ability to manage transactions in cost-effective ways, thus emphasizing
the internal decision-making of organizations (Williamson, 1981; Williamson &
Ouchi, 1981). Institutional approaches, instead, focused on the opposite side of the
distinction by turning to the ways in which organizations are shaped by the
categorical rules or myths that operate in the environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
DiMaggio & Powell 1993). Similarly, while power-dependency theorists argued that
what mattered most was the control held by organizations over limited resources
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), population ecology approaches proposed the capacity of
organizations to compete for resources as the main determinant of an organizations
unity or survival (Hannan & Freeman, 1977).
Since its emergence, the open systems theory has been widely used, and it seems
that it continues to be the central paradigm employed by organizational scholars to
explain the way in which organizations develop their boundaries and relate to their
environment.
Luhmanns theory of organized systems, we suggest, goes beyond the open systems
paradigm in the theorization of this problem by incorporating the concept of
autopoiesis. The notion of autopoietic systems was originally developed by the
scientists Maturana and Varela (1998) for the study of biological systems and later
introduced by Luhmann into the analysis of social systems. Autopoietic systems are
85

defined as systems that in their operation produce the elements that constitute them
(Maturana & Varela, 1998). In other words, these systems are characterized by
operating in a self-referential manner. Poiesis means the production of a piece of
work; autopoiesis means the production of a system as its own product (Luhmann,
2000: 23-24). In the case of organizations, as we will see in the next section,
communications are, at once, the constituting and constituted elements of
organizations, or more specifically, communications in the form of decisions.
We maintain that Luhmanns understanding of organizations as autopoietic systems
constitutes a significant step forward in the theorization of the boundaries of
organizations. From Luhmanns framework, the organizations process of
organizing their environment acquires a new level of complexity as it is seen as
simultaneously open and closed. We base our argumentation on two of Luhmanns
central concepts: operative closure and structural coupling (Luhmann, 1995, 2000).
The closure feature of organizations is related to Luhmanns concept of operative
closure and their openness to the concept of structural coupling.
Operative closure
As mentioned in the previous section, systems self-descriptions are possible only if
the system is able to distinguish itself and its own operation from everything else.
Systems differentiate themselves by a gradient of complexity, described by Ashby
(1958) as the law of requisite variety. The system is always less complex than its
environment. Therefore, to reduce variety the system must increase its own
complexity through selecting some inputs from its environment. This does not imply
that a system, in our case organizations, has at its disposition all the elements needed
for its self-reproduction or that it can command its environment as it pleases. Quite
the opposite, it means that if the organizations purpose is not only to survive but also
to reproduce based on its own products, it needs resources from its environment. In
the course of reinforcing and exploiting its difference with its environment, thus, the
organization defines its identity and autonomy. Without going through this process of
reducing complexity, the organization would simply not be able to operate (Luhmann,
86

1995). According to Luhmann, this is the way in which an organization draws its
boundaries that are limits amenable to change.20 Yet during these boundary-building
processes organizations map their environment in a particular way: organizations
only see what they have noted and fail to see what they have left unmarked. In other
words, the organization cannot see what it cannot see and it fails to see this as well
(Luhmann, 1981: 137). This remains as its blind spot or its unmarked space. An
important corollary of this is that the environment observed by an organization is a
result of its own operation, a picture that the organization itself creates and constantly
re-creates. Hence, from Luhmanns framework, the construction of an organizations
identity can only be conceived as fractional processes of revealing and concealing.
This bring us back to Batesons (1979) distinction between map and territory: the
picture of the environment allows an organization to function, but the organization
can only be sensitive to that picture of the environment and nothing else, unless it
decides to select new information that it had left suspended in previous selection
processes (Luhmann, 2000). From this last argument it follows that there are as many
environments and maps of environments as there are organizations.
With the concept of operative closure, notions proposed by organizational scholars
such as the learning organization (Senge, 1990) or organizational deviance
(Vaughan, 1999) take a novel and interesting turn. If we take into consideration that
organizations picture their environment according to their own boundary delimitation
in order to make sense of it, then a quite different explanation is given to why
organizations often misinterpret their environment or fail to react promptly to given
situations.
We claim here that without the concept of operative closure the open systems
paradigm falls short in acknowledging the importance of organizational boundaries as
well as the agency of a system in drawing those boundaries, that is, its capacity to
produce and reproduce its own identity, to shape its environment and be shaped by it.
20

An organization can expand its boundaries by increasing its complexity while nonetheless remaining less
complex than its environment. This can only happen because the environment is not a system, i.e. it has no
limits, only horizons.

87

It also fails to account for the systems construction of its own picture of the
environment in order to be able to interpret it.
To better grasp Luhmanns conceptual framework, we will contrast it with Weicks
enactment theory, which has been highly influential in organization studies. From a
social psychological perspective, Weick argues that the environment of an
organization is built through processes of sensemaking enacted by individuals. The
boundaries of organizations are then created on the basis of peoples actions. People
act and in doing so they create the elements that become part of their own
environment (Weick, 1979, 1995). Like Luhmann, Weick also stresses systems
agency in drawing their boundaries. Nevertheless, these two theorists diverge on a
fundamental aspect that is important to point out: whereas Weick proposes
individuals as a constitutive element of organizations, Luhmann positions individuals
in the environment of organizations.
To be more precise, Luhmann regards human beings (psychic systems) and
organizations as two different kinds of systems, not reducible to one another.
Organizations consist only of the communications between its individual members,
not of these individuals per se. This does not mean to diminish the individuals
importance in the organizations development but to recognize each type of system in
its distinctive complexity (Luhmann, 1995, 200; Rodriguez & Opazo, 2007: 120).
Hence, Luhmanns point of departure in examining the organizations boundaries is
not the individuals who enact them but the system itself. In fact, as stated above, for
Luhmann nothing but the system is responsible for the creation of its boundaries.
Accordingly, counter to Weick, Luhmann suggests that considering individuals as the
principal medium responsible for the environments enactment stops short in
recognizing an organizations agency in its full potential.
In the last section, we will discuss some of the implications of Luhmanns analytical
shift from individuals to systems to empirical studies of organizations.

88

Structural coupling
The concept of structural coupling is critical for understanding the openness feature
of Luhmanns autopoietic systems and, more specifically, of organizations. Structural
coupling describes an ongoing process in which environment and system act as
mutual sources of irritations that trigger changes in each another. Phrased differently,
it refers to the history of recurring interactions leading to the structural congruence
between the organization and its environment (Maturana & Varela, 1998: 75). This
concept presupposes that the system is structurally determined. Changes in the
system cannot occur at random but only if the systems structure is determined to
allow these changes to happen. It is important to note, however, that although the
system needs to acquire resources from its environment for its own operation, nothing
from the outside can directly become part of the system. The system can only inform
itself. Changes in the environment become changes in the system only if the system
recognizes them as information and includes them in its own operation. In their
relationship, both system and environment maintain their autonomy and selfidentification.
To explain this, Maturana and Varela use the term natural drift, which they illustrate
as a water drop falling down a hill. The hill represents the environment; the water
drop, the system. During their interaction both are transformed due to continuous
irritations triggered by one another. The water drops natural drift is therefore not the
result of haphazard variations but a concrete and coherent process in which both
system and environment undergo structural transformations determined by their
previous states (Maturana & Varela 1998: 111-116).
From the outside, observers may be tempted to describe the evolutionary path of a
system in terms of optimization, reaching conclusions such as an organization is
well or maladapted to its environment. This is, for instance, what several natural
theorists did in their studies of organizations. Luhmanns point, however, is that in
evolution there is no progress or optimization of the use of the environment, but only
conservation and autopoiesis of systems. In short, there is no such a thing as the
89

selection of the fittest but simply selection of the fit. The structural coupling between
an organization and its environment is defined in binary terms: nothing or everything.
It is misleading, hence, to speak in terms of well or maladapted organizations.
Organizations are either structurally coupled with their environments or they are not.
To assume that an environment selects ignores the fact that it is dealing with
structurally determined organizations, capable of reacting to its irritations or to
trigger new transformations (Maturana & Varela, 1998).
This might explain why many organizations continue to exist even though they are
not effective or profitable enough to operate, or why some organizations endure even
if they are far from being the fittest of their kind. Examples can be found, for instance,
in some minor league sports organizations. Although it may be that such
organizations lack suitable facilities, pay out low wages to team members, or have a
less than stellar record of winning, players continue to play and fans continue to
watch their matches (even if they are disappointed by yet another loss). Despite all of
these difficulties, the persistence of such organization owes itself to principles that
are different from profitability or even effectiveness (Rodriguez & Opazo, 2007: 108109). An opposite case could be that of famous banks, apparently very welladapted organizations, that were highly profitable and occupied an important
position within their field, but that crashed shortly after the global financial crisis of
2008. Which one of these two examples of organizations is better adapted? There is
no way to tell, Luhmann would say.
This characteristic of organizational systems has been previously pointed out by
Leifer in his book Making the Majors (1995). Here, Leifer explains how the
phenomenon of the major league sports organizations, which we could think of as the
fittest of their kind, does not derive from the intrinsic appeal of the sports activities
themselves but from their ability to sustain the involvement of publics in addition to a
continuous reorganization of competition. In the authors words, Major leagues in
the past and even in the present have thrived with a far from perfect product (Leifer,
1995: 13).
90

In sum, with the notion of autopoietic systems Luhmann explicitly addresses an


organizations capacity to preserve its boundaries (operative closure) and to exploit
its relationship with its environment (structural coupling). In this line, we argue that
the notion of organizations as autopoietic systems entails a significant shift from the
open systems paradigm in our understanding of organizational boundaries. In fact, it
represents a shift of paradigms in systems theory. From Luhmanns analytical
framework, the environment is not only seen as crucial for the conservation of
organizations (for the import of energy, as it is specified in Bertalanffys general
systems theory) but it is a condition of possibility for the organizations existence. As
we mentioned in the previous section, organization and environment cannot be
understood without each other since they represent two sides of the same unity (unity
which is itself a distinction).
We claim that the open systems paradigm is in a disadvantageous position in
comparison to Luhmanns theory of autopoietic systems when dealing with the
relationship between the environment with the system or the system with the
environment (Luhmann, 2000). For more than four decades, the open systems
framework has encouraged us to account for the external circumstances of
organizations. However, our keenness to incorporate the environment into our
analyses seems to have paved the way for blurring organizational boundaries or,
whats more, to deem them as unimportant in explaining organizations behavior.
As distinct from the open systems model, Luhmanns model of organizations as
autopoietic systems asserts that it is precisely because organizations are operatively
closed that they can be open to their environment and therefore structurally coupled
with it. Operative closure is a prerequisite for openness. From this view, then, the
boundaryless organization metaphor is unfeasible. If an organization fails to
preserve its boundaries, that is, its difference with its environment, it simply ceases to
exist as such. As claimed by Luhmann, boundary maintenance is system
maintenance (Luhmann, 1995: 17, italicized in the original).

91

Closed systems
model
The environment is
left unnoticed

Open systems models of organization


Survival against
environment

Organization of the
environment

Autopoietic systems model


model
Openness and closure

Most importantly, Luhmanns theory restores the weight of organizational boundaries,


albeit from a completely new angle. Seeing organizations as autopoietic systems does
mean to shift from an open systems model to its contrary, a closed systems model, in
which organizational boundaries were not even considered a subject of inquiry. From
Luhmanns framework, organizations are seen as being simultaneously open and
closed. Therefore, this analytical model demands that we question the role of
systemic boundaries in our analysis of organizations

Figure 4.1: Systems Models of Organizations21

21

Note: Each illustration shows the difference between a system (a given organization or population of
organizations) and its environment, i.e. everything else. From left to right: the first illustration represents the
closed-systems paradigm. The boundaries of the organization are fixed and the environment of the
organization is grey because it is left unnoticed. The second illustration represents the idea of passive
organizations that in their operation struggle to survive amidst hostile environments. In this case, the
environment is grey not because it is being overlooked by the organization, but because it is regarded as
pure noise. The third illustration shows the advent of the concern for the organization of the
environment, from which the environment is recognized as a crucial factor in the organizations operation.
Furthermore, organizations cannot only be shaped but they also actively manage their environments. The
fourth and final drawing shows the notion of autopoietic systems proposed by Luhmanns theory of
organized systems. The main and fundamental difference is the moving and self-producing boundaries of
organizations. This illustrates: (i) the organizations operative closure, i.e. delimitation of the systems
identity and autonomy and (ii) structural coupling, i.e. continuous mutual irritations triggered between the
system and its environment.

92

4.4. Where are the Boundaries of Organizations?: Action, Communication and


Decisions

Organizational scholars have consistently referred to the notion of action to examine


how organizations place their boundaries. Perhaps, this was primarily driven by
Webers analysis of bureaucracy, which constituted a pioneering effort in the study of
organizations within sociology. In his analyses, Weber turned to the notion of
instrumental action as a type of action that considers means, ends and consequences
and that is capable of attaining the most rational forms of organization (Weber, 1978).
To name other examples, Taylor (1970) proposed that organizations could be reexamined as a sum of individual actions that could be disassembled for their
examination and subsequent control. Parsons (1968) distinguished organizations from
other types of social systems because of acting primarily oriented towards the
attainment of specific goals (Parsons, 1950, 1968). And Weick (1979) too supported
his arguments on a notion of action, but unlike Parsons he focused upon the
pervasiveness of chaotic action in delineating organizational behavior. More
explicitly, Thompson (1967) spoke about organizations in action to examine the
organizations of his time, which he described as complex and open systems faced
with uncertainty but at the same time subject to criteria of rationality and hence
needing determinateness and certainty (Thompson, 1967: 10).
We argue that using action as a key term in our analysis influences the way in
which we set the limits of organizations, namely, on how we distinguish which kind
of social formations will be considered organizations as well as the elements that will
be regarded as part as part of the organizations workings. Therefore, we contend, the
use of the term action in examinations of organizations cannot be taken for granted.
In light of Luhmanns theory, we examine the theoretical and empirical implications
of this statement.
Luhmann points out the drawbacks associated with the use of theories of action in
analyses of organizations. He states that the notion of action may well refer only to a
93

given individual. That is why it requires the distinction between individual and social
action, as Parsons did in his conceptualizations.22 The term action, Luhmann argues,
is not sufficiently abstract in its understanding of sociological phenomena. During the
course of the 20th century sociologists deployed the concept of social role as an
intermediate term suitable to connect the analysis of individuals with larger social
systems such as groups, organizations or society. This concept, however, continues to
be bounded to an individual or a group of individuals who perform certain roles
(Luhmann, 1995, 2000; Rodriguez & Torres, 2008). We know from Durkheim (1982)
that social facts are not reducible to the actions of individuals. Their level of
emergence is different in nature. Following the same line of reasoning, Luhmann
looked for a concept that could be genuinely social in its examination of social
systems, and of organizations specifically. In his theory, he proposed communication
as the basic operation of organizations.
Social systems are constituted by communications and only communications.
Communication is that autopoietic operation that recursively refers to itself and in
this process produces and reproduces social systems. 23 But, what kind of
communications is produced in and by organizations? It must be a particular type,
which in its recursive development reproduces its own products, that is, organizations.
According to Luhmann, organizations emerge and are reproduced by the
communication of decisions. As part of the organizations operative closure, each
decision in the system can be connected to further decisions, promoting its
autopoiesis. Thus the communication of decisions is what constitutes the boundaries
of organizations. Yet communication is not the same as decisions. To recognize a
decision it is necessary to understand what could have been decided otherwise, i.e. a
22

Parsons (1968) used the term social action to refer to that type of action that has as its object a relationship
between two or more individuals, alter and ego.
23
This bold statement derives from Luhmanns understanding of communication. He defines communication
as the synthesis of three selections: (i) selection of the unity of information, (ii) selection of utterance and
(iii) selection of understanding by a receiver. The fact that communication exists only to the extent that it is
understood by a receiver implies that it cannot be regarded merely as transmission. Thus, according to
Luhmann, communication cannot be understood as action or as a chain of actions, as it comprises more
selective events rather than just the act of communicating.

94

decisions alternatives. This distinction is important since organizations cannot be


merely organized by communications. An organization that only communicates
without being able to make decisions is likely to dissolve into loose interactions
between individuals. Thus, for organizations to develop, communications need to be
recognized and communicated as decisions (Luhmann, 2000: 19-36). For Luhmann,
every component of organizations, such as their formal or informal structure,
opportunities for efficiency or effectiveness, internal hierarchy or heterarchy,
embeddedness or disembeddedness in network systems, organizational conformity or
deviance, are all the result of decision-making processes performed by organizations.
Important for the purposes of this article, Luhmann points out that different to
interaction-systems or society, organizations are the only kind of social system
capable of communicating outside their boundaries as collective personas. Society
comprises all possible communications and, therefore, no communications can exist
outside its boundaries. And even though interaction-systems such as protests or
demonstrations may reach sufficient levels of consensus to communicate their claims,
these systems communications will be difficult to remember, trace or connect to
future communications (Luhmann, 2000). Organizations, instead, are able to
communicate with their environments since they are endowed with the memory
necessary to connect past decisions with future decisions and to visualize new or
unforeseen alternatives. By inscribing their communications in recursive processes of
anticipation and retrospection, organizations are capable of communicating on their
own account. In this sense, Luhmann claims, organizations are unique in that they
perform an essential function in society: they serve as a medium for aggregating
elemental communications in loosely coupled ways.24 He goes on by saying that it is
because of the existence of organizations that society can count with communications
organized in more or less sensible ways, able to be comprehended and connected to

24

The term loosely coupled is commonly used to describe complex systems whose elements are only
weakly connected, that is, they interact in diverse ways and are capable of more autonomous actions (Weick
1979, Perrow 1999). The term tight coupling, in contrast, refers to highly interconnected parts in which the
malfunctioning of some parts might have major consequences for the system.

95

future communications. However, society cannot decide how organizational


communications will be organized. Only organizations can decide which
communications will be realized and the ways in which these communications
couplings will be configured (Luhmann, 2000).
Early studies of organizations also focused on decisions in order to explain their
ability to endure. March and Simon (1993) model of bounded rationality is an
example of this. This model points out that rationality can only be understood relative
to a frame of reference that is exercised by individuals in the form of choice.
Considering that we only have partial knowledge of situations, in order to make
decisions, choices are selected within a simplified model that we construct. Based on
this, March and Simon conclude that organizations are concerned with the selection
of satisfactory alternatives rather than with the discovery of the optimal one (March
& Simon, 1993: 141). Along the lines of March and Simons account, Luhmann
suggests that the interconnection of decisions in organizations does not follow a
single logic or rational principles, but simply generates connections and opportunities
for further connections. Yet again, his focus is not on individuals who make decisions
on behalf of organizations (as in March and Simons model) but on the organizations
themselves. In brief, Luhmanns analytical focal point is the organization, not the
individuals that compose it.
Luhmann describes the dynamics of organizational decision-making as follows: to
make decisions, an organization selects some alternatives and disregards others. The
possibilities that are neglected are not eliminated by the organization but are left
suspended. They remain in the background for future selections, allowing the
connection of past and future decisions and contributing to the evaluation of present
decisions. These are the processes through which organizations demarcate their
boundaries and thus construct their identity. Without these processes of decisionmaking, organizations would be condemned to take incoherent decisions,
unconnected to one another. Furthermore, organizations would not be able to
reconsider their past nor to construct their own memory (Luhmann, 1995, 2000).
96

This premise implies that in their decision-making organizations must presuppose a


permanent state of uncertainty about themselves and their relationship with their
environments so as to be able to produce and manage this uncertainty, transforming it
into self-produced certainty. As said by Luhmanns, organizations need to remember
to forget (Luhmann, 2000, chap. 10). Again, this coincides with March and Simons
(1993) idea of limited and intended rationality, which suggests that the
certainty involved in decision-making is produced by the organizations themselves.
Moreover, Luhmanns states that organizational decisions are processes of recursive
development, not of repetition or substitution. Decisions produced by the system are
not replaced by one another but are linked to new decisions (Luhmann, 2000).
According to this, then, the criteria of what counts in building the organizations
boundaries could vary depending on the contingency of each situation. Something
can be regarded as meaningful in one context and meaningless in another. And
what is more, something that in the past was considered meaningless could be recognized as meaningful in subsequent evaluations. Thus multiple principles for
making decisions can coexist within, across and between organizations.
Like Luhmann, several analyses of organizations call attention to the malleability of
the organizations boundaries. From the early 1960s onward, contingency theorists
(e.g. Stinchcombe, 1959; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Hirsch, 1972) have claimed that
the delineation of organizations depends, or is contingent on, identifiable factors in
the organizations environment. However, the determinants believed to shape
organizational forms vary widely across studies, including production routines,
environmental uncertainty, technological considerations, size, etc. Williamsons
economic transaction-cost approach (TCE), instead, proposed the formality of
exchange as the principal criterion. And, from the opposite perspective,
institutionalists suggested that the unreflective cultural norms and values of the
external environment were the main factor in shaping organizations (Meyer & Rowan,
1977; Di Maggio & Powell 1993).
The emergence of network-analytic approaches offered additional ways to understand
97

the flexibility of organizational boundaries. In the mid-1980s, Granovetter introduced


the notion of embeddedness to challenge predominant views that conceived human
action either as atomized utilitarianism (an under-socialized view) or as mere
reactions to environmental circumstances (the over-socialized view). Contrary to
these views, Granovetter claims that human activity is necessarily embedded in social
structures of relations. At a broader scale, this approach allows us to see
organizations and networks of organizations as dynamic and loosely coupled
webs of relations that are dependent and independent at the same time (Granovetter,
1985; Ferrary & Granovetter, 2009). Powell (1990) further stated that networks have
the capacity to be complex because they embrace neither the paternalistic character of
hierarchies nor the formal criteria of markets. Over the last decades, the greater
flexibility of this kind of social formation has been associated with several
advantages, including a greater ability to preserve and search for knowledge, access
to more reliable information, legitimacy and status (Powell, 1990; Podolny and Page
1998).
We argue that Luhmanns account brings new light to the analysis of organizational
identity and endurance in comparison to the alternative approaches reviewed above.
For Luhmann, neither formality nor informality plays a special role in the
construction of organizational boundaries. Rather, organizational communications are
recognized even without having a legal connective effect. Therefore, the formality of
exchanges has no primacy in determining an organization capacity of connection, as
Williamsons TCE approach would predict. Also, counter to institutional theories,
Luhmann claims that there is no reason to consider the taken-for-granted cultural
practices and values as the principal factor in explaining the connection of an
organizational system with its environment (Luhmann, 2000).
We have mentioned that Granovetters embeddedness approach, and network
approaches in general, provide a suitable framework for understanding organizations
that are in constant flux and more complex in structure. Contrary to contingency
theorists or institutionalists, these approaches do not fix the organizations form
98

according to particular predictions (Mark Granovetter. Graduate Seminar.


Distinguished Scholar Series. Columbia University, New York, NY. April 6, 2011).
However, while network approaches allow us to overcome these analytical barriers,
they do not seem to resolve another decisive question: what belongs to an
organization and what does not? Where are the boundaries of organizations? From
this analytic-approach, anything can become part of an organizational network.
Unlike Luhmanns theory, the boundaryless organization metaphor can be
sustained from a network perspective.
Let us examine Luhmanns claims further to see how this can be so. Luhmann defines
organizations as a chain of communicated decisions, conveyed by those entitled to
make decisions. The organization assigns the responsibility to decide to certain
individuals, specifying the extent and scope of their jurisdiction. Nobody from
outside the organization can make decisions concerning the organization, but only
irritate the direction or form that those decisions will take. In this sense, the
organizations boundaries are defined as a web of ongoing decisions connected to
new decisions. As we will see in the next section, this does not mean that
organizations operate based on consensus. In fact, precisely because conflicts are
integral to their functioning, organizations must be able to determine who their
members are and their decision-making capacities so as to be able to manage conflict.
We will extend one of Luhmanns empirical examples to show how his theory helps
us to draw the limits of organizations. If one enters an organization without being part
of it, say, a hospital, supermarket, school, art gallery, virtual association, and attempts
to initiate any type of work such as performing a service, using a machine, changing
the display of material or virtual artifacts or participate in a meeting, one would have
very limited success. Regardless of the intrinsic characteristics of the organization, it
will soon become clear that one does not belong to it and, therefore, cannot directly
interfere in its operation (Luhmann, 2000: 167). Luhmanns definition of
organizational

boundaries

based

on

decision-making

also

illuminates

our

understanding of loosely coupled and complex arrangements of organizations. An


99

example of this is the case of modern multinational companies that operate primarily
through outsourcing. Although numerous organizations may ultimately contribute to
the growth of a major firm, only the latter is capable of making decisions with
regards to its operation (and, in the same way, only its external providers can decide
whether they want to comply with the requirements of their holding company and to
what extent).
To be sure, in our view, the embeddedness framework offers an insightful avenue
for our understanding of complex and flexible forms of organizations. However, we
contend that this framework oversimplifies the role of organization boundaries in the
maintenance and reproduction of organizational systems. If we instead consider
Luhmanns thesis of autopoietic systems as our analytical point of departure, we will
notice that the formation of networks extends across the organizations limits since
each system is a distinct agent with the capacity to support its own reproduction. The
fact that organizations seek a symbiotic relationship with other organizations by no
means reduces the relevance of the organizations boundaries. Organizational
systems are simultaneously open and closed. To restate, boundary maintenance is
system maintenance (Luhmann, 1995: 17, italicized in the original). Accordingly,
organizations are able to communicate with their surroundings precisely because they
are unities distinguishable from one another, no matter how complex or malleable
they are. Luhmanns basic distinction between system and environment does not
consider the organizations surroundings as fuzzy and unarticulated, as the concepts
of market or cultural norms or values seem to suggest. Quite to the contrary,
from Luhmanns theory of organized systems, the environment that an organization
encounters is articulated on the basis of the distinction systems vis--vis systems
(Luhmann, 2000: 166-167).

100

Embeddedness Approach

Luhmanns approach

Fig 4.2. Network approaches versus Luhmanns Autopoietic Systems25

As depicted in Fig.ure 4.2, we propose that Luhmanns theory offers an improved


analytical platform in comparison to the embeddedness approach in particular or
network approaches in general, in recognizing the limits of organizations, that is, the
point at which organizations begin and end. This is particularly relevant in
contemporary society considering that the boundaries of organizations have become
more flexible and consequently more difficult to distinguish. In contemporary society,
changes are accelerated and with them the need of organizations to redefine their
boundaries. Yet the fact that complex and loosely coupled organizational forms are
gaining predominance need not mean that the systems limits are gradually erased or
that the organizations boundaries are losing their importance. Now more than ever,
organizations need to sustain their boundaries so as to be able to organize and
anticipate changes in their environment. Therefore, we suggest that the tendency in
organization studies to see connections in the form of networks as largely beneficial
needs to be considered more cautiously and critically.

25

Note: The figure on the left illustrates the embeddeness approach or network approaches in general,
fundamentally consisting of nodes (e.g. individuals, organizations) connected by edges. The figure on the
right, illustrates Luhmanns account, from which the boundaries of organizations cannot be taken for granted.
Unlike Luhmanns approach, the boundaryless organization metaphor can be sustained from a networkanalytic approach.

101

4.5. Conflict, Contradictions and Coordination

In the history of organizational studies consensus in its varied forms has played a key
role in understanding the organizations identity, integration into environments and
their ability to endure. During the early the 20th century, Taylor envisioned that his
theory of scientific management would enhance the harmony between workers and
managers by prompting them to find arrangements from which all would benefit.
Later, Barnard described organizations as cooperative systems inevitably leading
people to collaborate and to follow common goals (Perrow, 1986: 63-65). Selznick
also highlighted the role of consensus by stressing the importance of organizations
legitimacy in resisting the influence of their external environment. Perhaps, Parsons
emphasis on consensus and integration has been one of the most contested. In
Parsons AGIL scheme there seems to be no space for conflict or even deviant
behavior. Social systems, and therefore organizations, are described as having an
inherent tendency towards self-regulation. Equilibrium appears as a natural result of
the systems adaptation (Parsons, 1968). In the 1950s and 1960s, studies developed
by theorists of conflict Dalton (1950), Gouldner (1954), Dahrendorf (1959),
among others arose precisely as a reaction to this overemphasis on stability and
consensus that had dominated organizational theorizing (Handel, 2003; Scott & Davis,
2003).
One of Luhmanns principal aims was to shift sociological analyses away from the
nave assumption that progress was either a good thing or even inherently possible.
Accordingly, conflict and contradictions play a major role in his theory of organized
systems. As mentioned earlier, Luhmann suggests that the main operation by which
organizations reproduce is communication. This argument entails that the
organizations evolution consists of an ongoing process of accepting or rejecting
communications. Hence, every selection of a communication includes its
contradiction. In the same way a system can accept a communication, it can later
accept its negation. And every time that a communication is contradicted, conflict
102

arises. Therefore, conflict and contradictions are always latent in the organizations
operation.
Perrows (1986) arguments appear as most analogous with Luhmanns general
theoretical proposal. In his classic book Complex Organizations, Perrow points out
that theory should see conflict as an inevitable part of organizational life stemming
from organizational characteristics rather than from characteristics of the individuals
(Perrow, 1986: 132). He emphasizes that goals within organizations are multiple and
tend to be in conflict with one another (Perrow, 1986: 131-140). Thus, like Luhmann,
Perrow proposes conflict as a pervasive aspect of organizations and, hence, critical
when examining their operation.
Luhmann states that the fact that contradictions open the possibility for conflict, does
not mean that conflict is negative for organizations. In fact, conflict is just as capable
as consensus in connecting previous decisions with subsequent decisions and thus
assuring an organizations maintenance. The organizational system can either
develop by the amplification of order or disorder. The former, strengthens the
systems structure based on its previous states (morfostasis) and the latter leads to an
alteration of the systems structure into new forms (morfogenesis) (Maruyama, 1968).
There is no reason to think that consensus is better than conflict for the systems
evolution. They simply lead to different outcomes. It could be that disorder opens
novel opportunities that an organization would otherwise have not seen. And it could
also be the case that an excessive reliance upon consensus makes an organization too
dependent upon stability and hence extremely fragile to external shocks. Overall, this
conveys a central argument of Luhmanns theory of organized systems: consensus or
conflict, agreement or disagreement, order or disorder, conformity or deviance, are all
equally valid ways to support an organizations self-reproduction. What matters for
the organizations boundary-maintenance is not harmony, agreement or consensus
but coordination.
Moreover, Luhmann contends that contradictions are necessary for the systems
survival since they serve as the immune system of organizations. Contradictions
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activate signs of alert that allow the system to protect itself and to support its
preservation. This implies that the destructive power of conflict does not lie in itself
but in the inability of an organization to develop strategies to face it and take
advantage of it. For this reason complex organizations must develop ways of
regulating and exploiting conflict, which equipped them with the flexibility needed to
maintain their structural coupling with their environment.
This notion of the organizations development as a continuous process of
stabilization and transformation emphasizes important aspects of the construction of
organizational boundaries. In Luhmanns theory, the environment that organizations
face is not seen as inevitably turbulent or unpredictable, as the open systems models
of Thompsons or Parsons suggest; neither is the environment seen as necessarily
evolving towards greater stability and order, as institutional theories seem to predict.
These accounts, Luhmann argues, fail to recognize how organizations manage to
mobilize and exploit conflicting values so as to be able to place their boundaries and
endure. Luhmann states that values are essentially propositions of meaning that
organizations consider in order to select among alternatives and make decisions. In
this process, values can (and must) be accepted or rejected by organizations. Thus,
the adoption of a particular value-orientation performed by organizations at any given
moment necessarily includes conflict across different value orders (Luhmann, 2000).
Order is generated in and by organizations, but order at the edge of chaos (Fontdevila,
Opazo & White 2011).
The importance that Luhmann assigns to conflict and contradictions in enabling the
organizations functioning is aligned with a number of contemporary studies of
organizations. In The Sense of Dissonance, Stark (2009) claims that one of the main
challenges of contemporary organizations is to shift from shared understandings to
coordination through misunderstanding. Along the lines of Luhmanns thoughts, he
argues that organizations need not only to manage the dissonance and uncertainty
present in each situation but also find ways to exploit it so as to be able to produce
new situations. Through ethnographic research in New Yorks Silicon Alley firms,
104

Stark shows how multiple legitimating principles (orders of worth) simultaneously


coexist in organizations and how these different orders are being constantly
rearranged within organizations according to their external circumstances. At a
broader level, Uzzis (2000) finds that in the inter-organizational network of apparel
firms in New York the reasons for linking with others can vary significantly across
organizations. Diverse logics operate within the firms exchange system. Firms may
decide to join a network based on different or even contradictory principles such
as increasing their chances of survival, acquiring fine-grained information, achieving
higher status or securing greater profits.
Consistent with these empirical studies, Luhmanns theory of organized systems
offers an analytical scheme that allows competing normative claims to be part of the
construction of organizational boundaries. This line of argument, we contend,
proposes a solution to the incommensurability of institutional logics that are at play
within and across organizational systems. Luhmann focus on coordination, as
opposed to agreement or consensus, reminds us that even if more or less stable metavalues coincide across organizational systems, many different competing values
necessarily operate in an organizations definition of its boundaries. Thus, counter to
institutional approaches, Luhmann highlights that the basis for legitimacy may vary
widely from one organization to another, as well as from one organizational-network
to another, depending on each situation (Luhmann, 2000). This argument may help us
to tackle the question of how coordination is achieved in, by and across organizations
in the face of the multiplicity of value-systems that function in modern society.
To conclude, it is valuable to examine the recently developed theories of
organizational deviance in light of Luhmanns analytical proposal. In our view,
studies of organizational deviance represent a significant attempt within organization
studies to continue to problematize the role of conformity and consensus in
explaining organizational behavior. In line with Luhmanns account, Perrow (1998,
1999) and Vaughan (1996, 1996) stress how deviance is systematically produced and
reproduced by social systems. In this respect, Perrow coined the term normal
105

accidents which describes accidents not as the result of small events, but rather as an
intrinsic characteristic of organizational systems themselves. In a similar vein,
Vaughan describes nonconformity in organizations as socially organized phenomena
that may be a by-product of the characteristics of the system itself (Vaughan, 1999:
274).
As we know from Luhmanns theory, the deviant behavior of an organization,
whether it is in the form of processes or outcomes, does not necessarily mean that it is
suboptimal, just as conformity does not necessarily bring about optimal results. In
fact, deviance and even the amplification of deviance may well be advantageous for
an organization. For example, deviance may enable novel outcomes that could have
never been discovered by exclusively following expected paths. It could happen that
following an organizations normative expectations leads it to become tremendously
successful. But it could also be the case that the normal functioning of a system
could lead it to its collapse, as Marx would say with respect to the capitalist system
(Tucker, 1978). In Luhmanns view, contradictions, nonconformities and dissonances
are all integral parts of organizations, especially complex ones. Organizations cannot
survive without them and they are critical in supporting their development.
In line with Luhmanns theory, Weick (1993) and Vaughan (1996; 1998) study how
organizational deviance can lead to either favorable or unfavorable outcomes. In his
study of the Mann Gulch Disaster, Weick shows how in an organization of
smokejumpers the ability of its members to improvise and reassemble rules in
innovative ways allowed them to escape from catastrophe. Conversely, in her study
of NASAs decision to launch the Challenger shuttle, Vaughan illustrates how
following organizational rules what she describes as normalization of deviance
had catastrophic effects for the organization. Through empirical studies, then, these
two scholars manage to portray deviance in organizations as two sides of the same
coin.
Given that Luhmanns theory proposes that an organization can reproduce through
the amplification of order and disorder, conformity or deviance, from his approach
106

the organizations normal functioning cannot be taken for granted. Considering this,
Luhmanns conceptual framing can help us grasp the role of conflict in the boundarybuilding processes that enable an organizations endurance. In addition, Luhmanns
account could illuminate studies that examine organizational deviance as the result of
an organizations incapacity to maintain its boundaries, that is, its systemic identity.
Exploring the ways in which organizations are able or fail to maintain their
boundaries may contribute to understand the ways in which mistakes, misconduct or
disasters are produced in and by organizational systems.

4.6. Discussion

We have argued that Niklas Luhmanns theory has the potential to deepen our
understanding of organizational boundaries. We have tried to show the value of
Luhmanns analysis of organizations by positioning it in relation to contending
analytical approaches. To further appreciate the significance of Luhmanns
theoretical proposals, we now outline what we see as key theoretical and
methodological contributions of his framework to our examinations of organizations.
From a theoretical standpoint, an important insight of Luhmanns theory of organized
systems is that it focuses on examining organizations in terms of how they occur,
rather than in terms of what they are according to preconceived ideas. This focus on
dynamism and change is most clearly reflected in Luhmanns refusal to define his
object of study (i.e. organizations) through assumptions relative to its essence.
Instead, he chooses to support his analyses with a circular definition: an organization
is a system that produces itself as an organization. As we mentioned, this description
of organizations opens avenues for moving beyond classical distinctions used to
examine organizations, e.g., formality versus informality, efficiency versus
inefficiency, vertical versus networked organizational forms, order versus disorder,
and so on. In our view, the fact that Luhmanns theory does not seem to point
towards specific mechanisms that shape organizations by no means reduces the value
107

of his conceptual framework. Most studies of organizations many of which strongly


influenced Luhmanns work have instead devoted considerable effort to exploring
the mechanisms that might explain the organizations function and form. In fact,
since the emergence of the field of organizations studies a multiplicity of such
mechanisms has been identified (as suggested in the article, ranging from
environmental circumstances to power relations, to size, age, etc.). Unlike research
that focuses on specialized niches, Luhmanns theory offers a holistic view to analyse
the organizations functioning. Thus, the strength of Luhmanns framework stems
from its capacity to illuminate macro-level questions regarding the maintenance and
development of organizational systems. However, we believe that extensive empirical
research is needed to assess the extent to which Luhmanns work might help to tackle
these questions. Next, we call attention to two ways in which Luhmanns theory
could shed light on empirical investigations of organizations.
From Luhmanns view, organizations are seen as communicational agents that
reproduce themselves in a self-referential manner, specifically, by the communication
of decisions. By proposing communications as the unique component of
organizations, Luhmanns conceptual framework is particularly well-suited for
analyses that seek to examine an organizations function and survival on the basis of
its communications, rather than through the real-life activities, objectives and
routines of an organizations individual members. This is the case for many empirical
studies of organizations conducted in retrospect, cases in which researchers do not
have the possibility to follow the organizations members in action but instead can
only have access to the organizations life through the communications conveyed
in and by the organization. Examples of such type of study are Vaughans (1996,
1998) investigations of the NASA organization and Anteby and Molnars
(forthcoming) study of Snecma aeronautic organization. In both cases, the authors
use organizational communications as the main source of data for understanding
specific aspects of an organizations life. While Vaughan draws on historical
archives as the principal window to see how the Challenger launch decision took
108

place at NASA, Anteby and Molnar focus on Snecmas internal bulletins in order to
examine the companys survival over a period of 50 years. We claim that Luhmanns
sharp focus on communications and decisions to understand how organizational
identities endure can prove to be very helpful for this type of historical analysis of
organizations.
In this connection, the importance of the dynamics of interacting systems (structural
coupling) for the maintenance of organizations presupposed in Luhmanns theory
may offer insightful alternative possibilities to the study of power relations, a subject
that has repeatedly proved to be central in the study of organizations. Luhmann
describes organizations as complex social systems endowed with the capacity to
demarcate their boundaries from their environment (other organizations). Building on
this, one way in which Luhmanns framework can orient the study of power
dynamics is in the form of simple communicated decisions (production of
differences) that operate at a discursive level in the course of the organizations
development. The dynamics of organizational decision-making described by
Luhmann are informative and detailed. Qualitative studies could explore these
dynamics within and across organizations, for instance, by treating one organization
as the focal system and looking at the relations in its environment in regard to
relevant independent variables. This approach would allow us to leave aside all
preconceived ideas about the forces that might be driving the relations between
organizations. It would also encourage investigations that open the opportunity for
novel and unexpected guiding factors to emerge from the analyses themselves.

109

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CHAPTER V
SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO THE ASSESSMENT OF E-LEARNING
MANAGEMENT
by Irina Dudina

5.1. Introduction

When we consider manageability of open e-learning we address the complexity of


interdependence of goals we set, the existing environment and the entropy of
participants interests. Thus we become aware of possible reasons of our inability to
receive expected output and increase the effectiveness of our purposeful actions in a
range of situations. Therefore it is important to add to the well-known systemic
elements of knowing, learning and thinking the ways of skill development through
the merger of methodology, creation of learning context, process management and
assessment.
If there is no agreement about learning interests all the other elements of the system
appear to be faulty despite the fact that there may be no shortage of experts,
organizations, agencies and governments engaged in the definition and derivation of
targets, principles, indicators and standards of education. With the intensive use of elearning

systems

student

performance

assessment

requires

reviewing

our

understanding of the purpose of the systems themselves and the ways we need to
assess them. Otherwise we observe the failure of the collective action both in terms of
systems performance, performance evaluation, monitoring and auditing, and continue
to rely on helpful frameworks.
The frameworks do exist. The IT + human communication merger described by
Gallant L. M., Boone G.M. and Almquist G. as a communicative organizational
informatics framework (Gallant et al., 2004) and Rogers five-step model of the
adoption and diffusion of innovations (Rogers, 1969), as well as Goodfellow,
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Hewlings negotiated perspective of e-learning ( Goodfellow, Hewling, 2005)


provide a platform for our understanding of the actual impact of information
communications technologies (ICT) upon tertiary learning and teaching practices.
However, the worldwide dissemination of ICT tools in higher education since the mid1990s has failed to produce the fundamental changes in learning and teaching that
educationalists expected to see ( Kirkup, Kirkwood, 2005). While demand for elearning is formally embraced by professors and university administrations, there is
much debate about the outcome of existing virtual learning projects in terms of their
efficiency, viability and especially integration with traditional learning and teaching
methods.
One of the reasons for the situation is lack of understanding e-learning as a number
of social self-organizing systems that may produce knowledge and create meaning
intensifying borderless communication within closed and open groups of learners. A
learning group involves bringing a lot of background knowledge and tends to reduce
the complexity of learning by constructing its own meaning, frequently putting off
other possibilities. An e-learning group as an alternative to traditional closed group
learning provides numerous opportunities for communication practice as well as open
and prompt exchange of meaning, but leaves the organization of knowing aside. Thus
academic environments today host and blend at least two types of confronting
learning systems multiplied by the complexity of embracing correlation of specific
cultural and organizational settings. (Luhmann, Eberhard, 2000). Therefore managing
e-learning in such a way that students are able to organize knowing is critical for elearning systems.

ses

5.2. The e-learning process as a hierarchy


For the purpose of this paper we view e-learning as a means to improve the
experience of everyone involved in the learning process (Davis, A 2009) that must be
seen in the synergy of specific methodology and learning management tools and
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processes. Any existing e-learning system is meant to maintain itself and function as a
whole for supporting different types of relationships between its academic and
administrative elements. In terms of management outcomes we need to reveal the
interconnection of the purpose of e-learning processes and their external effects on
learning systems and their boundaries as this interconnection gives e-learning systems
their unique character.
Only if we embrace the complex interrelation of being-knowing-thinking-learningassessing circle with its many subcomponents we will stop thinking about e-learning
as an end in itself. Thus, the idea of improving the learning experience for
everyone along with the provision of financial incentives for the learning
management teams provides reasons to include e-administration aspects into learning
systems. Such expanding of the system boundary may result in better understanding
of the process and even transformation of the administrative part of e-learning
experience.
Another issue that comes into play is the inevitability of organizational culture
change as a prerequisite for e-learning management. Integrating e-learning systems
into the education process does not automatically guarantee efficient feedback. To
make this happen the learning process needs to be understood as an expression of
the prevailing culture that reflects the organizational structure, shapes learning
processes, methodology and learning tools. In line organizational structures
deploying and using e-learning will focus on products and how they can be improved
unlike ad hoc structures where the processes will be much looser. However, in
practice every education institution is a combination of organizational structures and
cultures, which makes e- learning processes management and assessment even more
challenging (Bruner, 1985).
The hierarchical nature of the construction dictates a range of e-learning tools to
help us with process development. The tools may include the use of open learning
resources and open resource organization, for example, the use of Google Sites as an
alternative to the well-established Moodle or Whiteboard. The choice of tools
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depends on how we understand the hierarchy of the process as well on how we add
value and reduce waste in learning processes .

Fig. 5.1 The interdependence of organizational culture, learning processes and methodology

In Russias higher education system with its increasing teaching workloads, the task
of making the life of both academic and support staff less stressful and more
manageable dictates the demand for profound understanding of the e-learning
possibilities to forecast system effects of ICT application. Given the complexity of
the task the appropriateness of systemic approach combining systemic thinking and
practice in the application of innovative models of learning and teaching is being
widely discussed in the Russian computer-enhanced higher education communities.

5.3. Managing complexities of e-learning


There are two main interrelated reasons that explain ineffective use of modern
technology in our learning systems: (1) underestimation of the strategic vision and
practice of design, supervision, regulation and coordination of e-learning systems and
(2) lack of shared institutional and individual responsibility for learning goals, course
content and selection of teaching tools.
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Thinking strategically about the outcomes of e-learning requires planning every online
project as well as supporting the holistic nature of academic and administrative
processes in e-learning system with guided communication of human interaction. As
a mediating device for such an interaction organizations use formal and informal
institutional arrangements which prescribe management standards as well as certain
norms of behavior.
The well-known pitfall of e-learning environments is the difficulty of combining
information processes and human communication at workplace. People are likely to
disguise information, distort data or deliberately distort issues. Therefore
organizations use particular rules and channels of communication that people learn
and apply to accomplish various job tasks. However, while technology transfers data
and information, people may interpret them rather opportunistically to their benefit
with the help of technology. Hence, the goal of systemic thinking in constructing
e- learning models is to manage the rapidly growing complexity of the academic
world and the world of technology. The task of e-learning system designers and
process managers is to create a sensibly structured model that enables students and
professors to achieve higher productivity and greater competitive advantage using
established rules and norms.
For example, many of us are struggling with the options of improving feedback as the
most important part of the learning experience. We do this both for educational and
strategic reasons. While students need worthy and prompt feedback, academic staff
look for systems to help them do this with minimum overheads. Pursuing both the
goals simultaneously requires systemic vision of incentives for both the groups;
otherwise there is a risk of making feedback a burden in itself.

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5.4. Constructing e-learning contexts

Given the ambiguity of the latest Russian Federation quality assessment standards in
higher education it is critical to map institutional systems innovative e-learning
management. It is also essential to be able to forecast the outcome of e-learning
integration into the learning practice in each particular case. If the utilization of
virtual learning environment is viewed as an essential element of an academic
excellence system, its result will be holistic involvement of all the university
stakeholders. Otherwise the e-learning process will be disconnected from the
competency-based education standards. Unfortunately this often occurs in terms of
design and dissemination of e-learning content, building up and assessing
professional competences acquired with the help of e-learning management systems.
In her keynote speech at the 10th ICICTE conference in 2010 R. Luckin from the
London
Knowledge Lab of the Institute of Education specified how the learning context
dictates the circumstances in which ICT can support learning (Luckin, 2010). Context,
in her opinion, is both complex and local to a learner. Understanding the complexity
of context is a challenge and a prerequisite for us to start using it to better
support the development of technology-enhanced learning activities. To address
this challenge the researcher suggests that educationalists use the Ecology of
Resources model as an interpretation of Vygotskys theory that characterizes
learners interactions as learners contexts (Vygotsky, 1999), such as knowledge and
skills, tools and practices. Exploring the potential of the model usage one can
conclude that it represents the learning context holistically with respect to the
context interactions. However, adding institutional arrangements and teachers
personality is critical for learning management components to work efficiently.
In Luckins model a learner is characterized in terms of the interactions that form
the learners context. Assistance options available to a learner make up the resource
content with which that learner interacts. However, the model is a simplified
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representation of the set of elements that describe a learners zone of assistance. In


terms of evaluation tools that would give us the model efficiency feedback it is
important to enhance the zone by design and practice of interactive assessment
components that would support communication in virtual environments.

Fig 5.2. The Interdependence of learning context and learning environment derived from R.
Luckings Ecology of Resources model (L Learner)

The e-portfolio project via Google Sites technology completed at Volgograd State
University is an example of systemic and constructivist approaches to e-learning
processes based on the synergy of learner-centered and collaborative use of online
resources. The e-learning system designed especially for the English Terminology
course is equipped with well-structured levelled simulation and problem-based portfolio
tasks. The tasks focus on feedback as well as reflective online and offline analysis, which
allow students to construct their own meaning of the learning process.
This does not mean that the entire complexity of technology application can be taken
into account within only one e-learning system. Rather, understanding of the complexity
enables to organize constructive e-learning activities, more effectively incorporated
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into the open learning environment in any field. In particular, the design process
supported by the Ecology of Resources framework identifies the ways in which
technology, staff and the learners themselves can best support learning.
The choice of e-learning tools remains with the actors of the process which requires
organization of collective action involving faculty and students. The collaborative
building of instructional, academic, contextualized and competence-based meaning
occurs both within and outside the e-learning system. For example, since the Google
Sites project at Volgograd State University involved the use of the Web open
resources its implementation required substantial effort aimed at the removal of
common sense restrictions that traditional free-riders behaviors in the Russian
academic setting.
We realized that using open resource websites systematically necessitated
development of a concept of ethical behavior within the virtual education community
(Cisler, 2010). The rules and norms of such behavior are vital for collaborative
online learning, be it quality of content, pedagogies or overall impact of the
technology on the institution. As Anderson and Simpson pointed out, online sites
support complex discourses and multiple relationships; they cross physical, cultural
and linguistic boundaries (Anderson, Simpson 2007).
This perspective is totally different from the efforts that have been so far undertaken
in Russian universities to establish an administrative framework for academics
contributions to the university e-learning platforms. The use of such platforms has
not proved to be fruitful when there is little incentive for faculty to participate in a
prescribed collective action. There is even less enthusiasm on the part of learners
who experience dated methods of teaching applied to innovative e-learning
environment. To solve the problem of the transition to effective online cooperation
as well as to any blended purposeful interaction, universities need to create an
institutional framework for the e-learning environment, in which performance would
be guided with something more than administrative prescriptions (Boucouvalas,
2003).
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5.5. Assessment of e-learning via Google Site technology


When Google Sites technology was discussed as a tool for creating a sensible and
manageable blended learning system we at Volgograd State had to answer several
questions concerning its adaptation to the Russian academic setting with its traditional
resistance to extra efforts that may not pay off in the near future. How is the Google
Sites tool different from the university e-learning platform? In which kind of courses
may we use this technology? How will the site technology change our working
practice? What benefits will it bring for students and professors?
The Google Sites project enthusiasts at Volgograd State University were instructors
who volunteered to test the effectiveness of the use of Google Sites in their Economic
Terminology classes taught in English and German. They hoped that the integration
of the site technology into the regular curriculum activities would enable those
working with large student cohorts to guide the students learning practice more
efficiently by providing interactive, problem-based learning opportunities and
eliciting adequate preparation for classes (Ozkan, 2010). The learning activities were
based on weekly e-portfolios, office hours through Google Talk and Google Chat,
sharing and editing documents via Google Reader or Google Docs. These activities
were expected to result in a personalized formative response on part of students and
in more meaningful and student-oriented educational pedagogical interaction.

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Fig 5.3. The four- stage e-learning assessment model

The project was based on the 4-stage e-learning assessment model:

Stage 1 creating learning resources by identifying learners needs and specifying


possible trouble spots in learners backgrounds; exploring learners modes of learning
and possible filters;
Stage 2 organizing and levelizing learning resources;
Stage 3 monitoring interactive learning processes;
Stage 4 assessing and reflecting on students feedback.
Going through all the 1 stage is necessary to understand if resources for learning
correspond to learners needs, modes of learning and backgrounds and levels. It is
extremely important to be able to predict students learning modes as this may have a
critical impact on the selection of technologies and learning materials.
Levelizing learning resources provides more opportunities for students to make
connections between the possible range of activities at their level of proficiency
and technologies used to support them. Thus we create a link between learners,
content and e-tools that support the learners and help them design their own meaning
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of what they learn.


Monitoring interactive activities, such as teamwork and teacher-student collaboration
via Google Disc, Chat and other instruments helps us to answer the question of
potential and existing restrictions (filters) of learning, such as ability to make or take
notes, present in public, speak a foreign language with confidence, manage time,
solve problems, etc.
Finally, the assessment and reflection stage allows us to evaluate the choice of
resources and the learning process organization as seen both by professors and
students, who can now reflect on how technologies help them learn most efficiently.
What students experience at the first stage is normally reinterpreted as new
understanding and meaning of learning context emerged. Then they are asked to
negotiate and ascribe a purpose to what they do, as well as analyze different
perspectives of doing on different levels and improving from level to level. The
most complex task for the teacher participants of the project at this point is to
differentiate between systems thinking where purpose is a contested notion attributed
by us to a system and systems practice, which views purpose as a creative and resultoriented learning process.
Further on we are looking for the emergence of purposeful behavior within the elearning system, which Checkland (1993) describes as voluntary and conscientious as
opposed to purposive behavior to which teachers attribute purpose because they
believe that the system is well constructed. So thinking in terms of learning and
holistic vision of what they are doing (Senge, 1998) may result in experiential
learning cycle. The assessment of the outcomes will be based then not on the amount
of accumulated knowledge, but on the leveled skills acquired by students and
improvements that they evaluate along with teachers. In this case the systems
approach will prove to facilitate the learning context as well as learners
purposefulness.
The competencies that students will acquire though experience-based learning will
lead to purposeful action that will create new learning experience and hence new
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knowledge based on the student-constructed meaning. If the learning system provides


for establishing such basis for understanding the learning context it doesnt mean that
it is fully self-organizing and has no constraints. But, as P.Allen and J. Boulton
point out, the impossibility of having full knowledge and the inevitability of
uncertainty, are both the result of, and the driving force behind, evolution and
change (Allen, Boulton, 2011).
The report on the results of the Google Sites use at Volgograd State University is
based on relevant data grouped according to the four criteria: accessibility, interactive
capacity, problem solving facilities and feasibility of online tasks, as well as on a
teachers questionnaire where page creation potential, interactive capacity, problem
solving facilities, and task formulation options were assessed. The findings
demonstrated that teaching with Google Sites may considerably support instructors
of undergraduate courses in their efforts to motivate students communication for the
purpose of formative learning. However, the other project data showed that economic,
institutional incentives and ethical considerations of faculty that contribute to
university e-learning systems require further detailed study (Dudina 2012).
Engagement in learning activities and assessment of learning outcomes is indeed the
key concept for those who use Google Sites technology. It allows instructors to
display a variety of information and provide a set of interaction modes in one place
including videos, slideshows, calendars, presentations, attachments, and texts.
Findings: pros and cons
Students. The interaction via the Google Sites technology stimulated better
engagement even of those very reluctant to learn and had been demonstrating
opportunistic behavior by not doing their homework ever since they entered the
classroom. 83% of students evaluated accessibility of Google sites as excellent, 69%
thought that the sites provided excellent interactive capacity, 56% were strongly in
favor of the sites problem solving facilities and 77% fully approved the excellent
feasibility of online tasks.
The students were also asked to provide feedback on how the use of Google Sites
127

contributed to their personal and professional development. In their comments


approximately 75% of students gave highly positive feedback and acknowledged
that the Google Site technology reduced power distance in classes, removed
uncertainty from the instructors requirements and helped them to communicate with
each other more effectively. They also agreed that the portfolio assignments from the
Google Sites they used tested their knowledge appropriately and trained their time
management skills.
About 11% of students remained indifferent to the use of the Google Sites, because,
as they wrote in their comments, they learn better by reading a course book and not
by communicating with other students. Almost 15% of the group considered
electronic portfolio assignments to be inefficient because, as they confessed, they
copied answers from their group mates.
The findings demonstrated that on the one hand, the e-learning system based on
Google Sites interactive tools may considerably support teachers of undergraduate
courses in their efforts to make course materials more attractive for students. On the
other hand, the survey results showed that 25% of students tend to be either freeriders who prefer to copy from others or those who resist collective action because
they learn better by themselves.

Teachers. The evaluation proceedings included a questionnaire for 40 teachers who


enjoyed the Google Sites advantages, such as 10 GB of storage, sharing settings
across classes, easy use within the selected student group, and variety of tools that
may be used with Google Sites. The teachers were asked to assess the Sites page
creation potential, interactive capacity, problem solving facilities and task
formulation options.
All the teachers agreed that they liked the integration between Sites, Docs, and
Calendar, as well as the sharing access. However, they indicated that Google Sites
are definitely designed for everything to be done at the Google Applications level,
and not pulled back and forth between the offline and online settings. Hence, since
128

the problem solving curriculum activities in the second year required constant
guidance on the part of the instructors, they were not very enthusiastic about using
Google sites for this purpose. Therefore the technology was not approved as a fully
suitable problem solving aid option for undergraduates unless their offline
communication with the instructor was organized on a regular basis (McKinney et al,
2009).
Besides, since the launch of Google Sites requires what 30% of instructors called
extra unpaid work they were reluctant to enhance the interactivity of their
Economic Terminology course in addition to their regular workload. In general
instructors look on the integration of Google sites into the teaching practice as a
source of systemic interactive approach that may improve students learning context
and potential. However there are concerns that given the situation with lack of extra
work financing it will be hard to provide a university setting where the technology
will be used appropriately, consistently and regularly (Lareki, A., et al, 2010).

5.5. Conclusions and recommendations


Systemic approach to e-learning with leveled content embracing learning needs and
modes may be used for monitoring and assessment especially in large groups of
students because it provides interactive learning practice for all the system users
making them collectively responsible for guided actions rather than pretending that
all their actions are controlled institutionally.
For the purpose of this paper the integration of e-learning systems into the learning
environment is understood as a complex system meant to combine learning and
socializing processes through a range of interactive and communication channels with
face-to-face learning.
Schools are rethinking their assessment of e-learning management systems,
looking for ways that can further student collaboration and emphasize content and
learning and not just administration of competence acquisition. Many of them base
129

their approaches on a set of major learning theories, (Ardito et al., 2006) gaining
more and more popularity thanks to their easy application to e-learning processes. In
terms of systems approach it is important to emphasize that all interactive activities
organized within the e-learning systems should be aimed at searching for and
constructing meaning of the learning context with the help of certain learning
environment models. The models stipulate the use of simulation and problem-based
activities with a very strong focus on feedback and reflective analysis of both
learners and teachers. Assessment in such models is embraced by means of formative
evaluation of learners products and implies learners engagement into the evaluation
process.
The reality is that while each university is to develop, manage, regulate and control
systemic technological change based on educational goals and standards, the decision
about what contexts to develop and improve and how to regulate e-learning processes
institutionally will greatly depend on individuals. In terms of systemic approach to
e-learning management assessment the relationship between institutions and
individuals is bound to produce a consensus.

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132

CHAPTER VI
CONDITIONS OF PARTNERSHIPS IN THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN
MONARCHYS PRESS SOURCES
by Edit Fab

The main purpose of my lecture is to present possibilities of historical sociologys


examination with one of my current research.
Previously I dealt with a lot of press and social history in the age of dualism, so I
found two newspapers which were definitely specialize in newspapers acquaintance
and marriage advertising. Very interesting historical sources, since their pages
remained that the common people thought about marriage, relationship, dating
options. The our view has been developed so far mostly famous peoples diaries,
correspondence, literary works supplied. Both of them were published under the title
of Hymen, the one in 1874 and the other in 1881. Theses magazines besides their
opportunities of partnership search as a literary forum cultural role also undertook
and even theatrical events have been reported. Also common were they that at the
beginning of the year, in January at the start of the carnival season began, and lived
only four or five months, because in April, May disappeared. Their short life
indicated that they had claim but not meant much demand, which would have been
enough to survive.
The editor and publisher of the earlier newspaper was a same: the Viennese Josef
Anton Massanetz, and he operated office to his business in Vienna and in Pest also.
Hungarian language advertisements were published in the German journal. The later,
Hungarian language press owned by brothers were journalist: Geza and Joseph
Szentirmai, they had editorial office only in Pest, but adopted requests from all of
Monarchy.
Not only calls for marriage appeared in the marriage column, but there were just as
for intrigue, mistress such for starting or helping stuck businesses. The advertisers
133

presented factually their property, which set financial expectations. Interesting to see
whether there were men or women, what they wanted rather, calculated any religion,
place of residance and age. The first rough exploring of the 1881 Hymen finished.
The statistical analysis turned out what conditions they undertook the marriage, or
any other relationship. Now the 1874 Hymens processing is finished. Further aspects
of the analysis will be the change between two press advertisements. Two
hypotheses can be anticipated: 1. likely ongoing enbourgeoisement at that time will
occur and 2. suspected acquaintances were initiated rather by men. Finally, I like to
call attention to similar source in France and their exploration as soon as possible.
The complex approach is important in examination of the present and planning for
the future, but also useful understanding of the history. The example of this sociohistorical research such a case, because the historical source is a neglected in terms of
research, contemporary press type, which in addition suitable for statistical analysis.

6.1. The advertisements and their senders


In 1874 the advertisements were similar formularization as in 1881. The gentlemen
called to targeted persons the following way: This is serious. In a first-rate
provincial town, appointed state officer with 800 Fts annual salary able to pension, 35
years old, obliged to anybody, debt-laden, he should be able to idolize his pretty wife,
absence of acquaintance in this way he should desire to begin acquaintance by letter
with a meek, educated, expert in domestic work things out, and having adequate cash
assets girl or widow without children, who may be of any nationality or denomination,
regardless of the beauty of the face itself for marriage, which can happen in three or
four months. Under promise of the deepest secrecy and word of honor photo
equipped offers will be addressed under this slogen who that seeks, finds 266. no. to
this news editorial office in Pest, where previewing my photo addition more
informations can be obtained. (Hymen 1874:149)
134

Shortage of capital came more often in the case of women: Lonely, young women
beautiful but propertiless, she getting bored with her freedom wants to be slave of
Amor, and she wishes to correspond with serious intentioned gentlemen for this
purpose of preparation. Applications for "Cupido motto. (Hymen 1874:58.) The
beauty sending this advertisement was popular, because she had to resort to another
bulletin: For all those, who honoured me with their offerings, I am pleasure to
inform them that I have chosen. (Hymen 1874:95) Like an impatient, vehement,
dating younger man was declined to order even as former around 24 years old, called
Klmn Buday, Christian, 1300-1400 Ft years paying officer, who inquired after the
girls between the age of 17-20: K By, Budapest, Slowly walk further you get!
What you hope for, its impossible because Im a 23 years old husband was not
going to choose? You have been looking for a wife a long time ago etc. Well, this
young man has been long etc. Do not hurry! T. (Hymen 1874:143)
The ads were sent with three well separated purposes which were intention to marry,
other partnership creation and searching for pen pal. The first meant a classical legal
relationship, the second could contain every other, different from the former contact
(love affair, shared fun, dating, business to start or flourish, solving finacial problem,
concubine), and the third promoted a more orientation in general, or simply
intellectual, emotional friendship. The men and the women had similar aspects but
very different conditions and emphases in finding of the three common goals. Both
genders specific selection criteria were the age, the religion, the place of residence,
the child, the financial position, the appearance, the culture, the main characteristic in
philosphy and personality. In the second half of the 19th century mens livelihood,
cultural, educational opportunities were clearly more favorable than that of women,
because they had only limited way in these areas. In all forms of to be installed
relationships the economical, cultural, educational advantage was defintily in the
hands of men. While women could able to perform with a potential only which all of
this supplemented, increased their relatives social status, prestige (beauty, music
education), and that more comfortable in everyday life (home education).
135

Both journals launched in January in the middle of winter, lasted until the end of
spring: the 1874 appeared until middle of April, the 1881 existed until May. In the
former 244 advertisements were published, in the latter 518 were gave up. So, seven
years later, more than twice used this form of dating. However, advertisers of the
earlier news were much steady, since only one-tenth (10.24 %) were satisfied with a
single statement, and much more (22.95-13.93-15.98-14.34 %) thought to the 2-3-4-5
times repetition expedient, or even had one who ordered notice 13 times. Over three
quarters (77.60 %) of the later magazines partner seekers waived repetition, the two
publications were requested hardly by one in five (17.76 %), while the 3-4-5 times
appearance just a tiny fraction (3.66-0.38-0.19 %) paid. (See the Fig.. 6.1 below.)

Fig. 6.1

Proportions of the advertising purposes have significant difference between the two
periods. In 74 more than three quarters (77 %) of the senders, barely two-thirds
(57 %) of 81 were married. In the previous period over one and a half tenth
undertook the partnership (18 %), the correspondence (16 %), while later, this rate
136

increased in excess of one-third (34-39 %). (See the Fig. 6.2 below.)

Fig. 6.2

The divisions three quartes and quarter rate of the advertisements from men and
women broadly similar. In 1874, still fewer men (71 %) and slightly more women
(29 %) took advantage of advertising newspaper, than in 1881, when the partner
seekers three quarters (74 %) were men and one quarter (26 %) were women. (See
the Fig. 6.3 below.)

Fig. 6.3.

The 1881 senders had average age 2-3 years younger than the 1874 partner seekers,
as the indicated age about themselves and regarding desired expected age. The 74
137

almost 33 (32.93) years old gentlemen looked for around 28 (27.83) years old ladies,
while the ladies aged 28 (28.28) required for nearly ten years older (38.57) gentlemen.
Seven years later, involving 30-year-old (29.73) men desired around 27 (27.21) aged
women, and over 26 (26.54) years old women thought about almost ten years older
(35.70) partners also. So it seems, that the men wanted 3-5 years younger, and the
women adopted up to ten years aged. (See the Fig.. 6.4 below.)

Fig 6.4.

The communication of the religion, denominational affiliation was more important to


customers of the earlier news, because nearly one-third (27.86 %) gave such
information, but later occasion their hardly one and a half tenth (14.28 %) mentioned.
The propotion of religious affiliations declarations roughly similar to restriction that
in 74 somewhat more claimed themselves as Christians (38 %) and Isrealites (34 %)
than in 81, when fewer did by the Christians and the Israelites (30 %), but at this
time more people (35 %) belonged to the Catholic than before (22 %). (See the Fig
6.5 below.)

138

Fig. 6.5

In marking of the family status one quarter (24.18 %) of the previous periods
advertisers and later their less than one fifth (18.91 %) were communicative, and in
which more women were in the lead. The dating men as if it would have been clear
that this field are independent and certainly the phenomenon can perceive as a sign
of their greater movements freedom. In earlier period the gentlemen had more than
one tenth (13.79 %), while the latter just a small fraction (3.13 %) said in this matter,
but in 74 among them nine times (96 %) declared that many widowers compered
to 81-ers (10 %). Nevertheless only the men undertook the divorced status, altough
both times very small propotion (4-2 %). Formerly half (50 %), later two thirds
(63.70 %) of women informed the marital status. They said their maidenhood both
times in similar rates (69-70 %), while in 74 one third of women surviving their
husbands proportion (31 %) shrunk half as much (16 %) in 81. (See the Fig 6.6.
below.)

139

Fig 6.6.

Very few with children were trying to partner search. In earlier occasion good halftenth of advertisers (6.96 %), while later half of them (2.89 %) did not take to it.
Although in 74 more widowed man with kids (7 %) were than in 81 (2 %), but
fewer (1 %) have accepted child of the other then and later (2 %). Futhermore, a
similar proportion (6-7 %), mostly women with children were twice as accepting
previously (10 %) than later (4 %). (See the Fig. 6.7 below.)

Fig. 6.7.
140

Experiments of the making contacts experiments were marked feature of the place of
residence, because one-third (32.37 %) of sender in 74 and nearly two fifths
(38.99 %) of 81-ers reported geographic information. Both periods at least half (5158 %) of them identified any area of the Monarchy. In the previous period among
residents of the two capitals were a little more the Viennese (26 %) than the
Budapester (23 %) subsequently this ratio shifted considerable from Budapester
(35 %) in favor to the detriment of Viennese (7 %). (See the Fig 6.8. below.)

Fig. 6.8

The property was a very important aspect of the datings, and change is observed
between the two periods. Good four-fifth (80.32 %) of the earlier advertisers
indicated some form of income (had it or calculated it, etc), and later just barely twothirds (59.65 %) of them made use of this possibility. In 74 mens and womens
endowments and expectations of wealth is much more balanced against each other,
than in 81, when the ladies were more modest than the gentlemen their
vulnerability conspicuous. Over four-fifths (86 %) of the gentlemens referring to
property of the previous period had own property, and they expected income a similar
proportion (81 %), and about half of them have been identified numerical own
finacial situation (55 %) and expected income conditions (49 %). It can be
experienced broadly among the ladies, except that just hardly one tenth (8 %) of them
141

qantified their hopes. In the next time barely two thirds (59 %) of the gentlemen
mentioning financial stated an arranged financial background and asked for some
income, and one third did not reach those who have quantified their property (28 %)
and needs (30 %). A little more than one and a half tenth (17 %) of the women
concerning income had a secure financies and calculated same by their future
partners, or less than one tenth (9 %) quantified financial situation, and only a tiny
fraction (2 %) gave exact requirements. (See the graph 6.9 below.)

Fig 6.9.

Aspects of the selections extended to the other properties. Candidates of the two
periods claimed a similar rate (25-24 %) themselves to be advantageous appearance
and expected same of their future partners, as well in the next occasion they became a
little more demanding (28 %) in this area. One in five (20 %) of the advertisers
considered themselves educated, and later one and a half tenth (15 %) of them
declared themselves such an opinion, or nearly their one third (29-27 %) posed such a
condition. In the earlier period the positve wiew of life (14 %) and the relaibility of
solid character (12 %) mentionig rate exceeded the tenth, which later the reporting
optimism reaches exactly a decimal (10 %) value, and the communicating solid (7 %)
falls below it. (See the graph 6.10 below.)
142

Fig 6.10

Proportions of the advertising aims a significant change between the two periods.
In 74 over three quarters (77 %) of the senders and barely two thirds (57 %) of
the 81-ers wanted to get married. In the previous period more than one and a half
tenth tried partnership (18 %), correspondance (16 %), while later, this ratio increased
more than one third (34-39 %). (See the graph 6.11 below.)

Fig 6.11

Aspects of gender, intentions


A more accurate picture can be obtained with grouping gender and some of the
conditions, requirements, intentions results.
So the first step mens and womens intention be seen difference in comparison
143

between two periods. The 1874 marriage-oriented gentlemen and ladies clearer than
later, because more than three quarters (79 %) of the men and a little less than three
quarters (73 %) of the ladies aimed at the legal cohabitation. Roughly one fifth of the
women wold have engaged in partnership (21 %) and correspondence (19 %), while
slightly more than one and a half tenth (16-17 %) of the men wanted the same thing.
Later the marriage has been reduced primacy, and space was given other
collaborative social relations, or the more prudent orientation providing
correspondence got a greater role. In 1881 less than two thirds (58 %) of the men
wanted engagement, and a little over one third (36 %) of them looked for other
acquaintances and its introducing correspondence. Somewhat more than half (53 %)
of the women hoped for marriage at first, and rather more cautiously almost equal
proportion (49 %) initiated a correspondance, as well as hardly one third (27 %)
planned another type of partnership. (See the graph 6.12 below.)

Fig. 6.12

Age

Parameters of the average age different in both periods, each of other three
intentions categories also. The 74 generally slightly older average 33 years old men
144

called for marriage and correspondence, and they claimed to around 27 years old
women in the first case, 30 years old ladies in the second case. The 36-year-old men
suggested a correspondence with 31 to 32 years old women. The 28-29 years old
women has been adopted in marriage 10, in correspondence up to 27 years older men.
Seven years later, the 29-year-old gentlemen wanted one year younger women in
marriage and correspondence, while they were satisfied with same age in the partner
relation. In the first step the girls in the age of 22 prefered correspondence with at
least ten years older men than themselves, and women aged 26-27 hoped for in
marriage 8, in other acquaintances up to 12 years older men. (See the graph 6.13 and
6.14 below.)

Fig. 6.13

145

Fig 6.14

Residence

Among the residence communicating advertisers of the earlier period Viennese


(81 %) and provincial (80 %) people were more committed to marriage than
Budapesters (72 %); less than one third proportion (28-29 %) chosen partnership
from all three place; approximately one and a half tenth (14 %) of the Viennese,
fraction of the rural (3 %) suggested correspondence. Later marriage-centered of the
Viennese (93 %) left outstanding also, and just over a tenth (13 %) corresponded; the
provincial still mind were a marriage (82 %), however, the mail (38 %) became more
important and the other forms of relationships (9 %) pushed into the background;
over half (53 %) of the Budapesters looked for other acquaintance, and fewer than
half (41 %) saw own future int he marriage, and more than a third (37 %) suggested
correspondence. (See the Fig. 6.15 below.)

146

Fig 6.15

By gender analysis the men seeking marriage of the 74 almost three times as many
rural (16.66 %) compared to the Viennese (6.89 %) and the Budapesters (6.32 %);
fraction of the men communicating their residences place were represented in
partner relation and correspondence. The rate of hopeful Viennese women in the
marriage approached the tenth (7.14 %) and Budapesters (2.85 %) and rural (4.28 %),
or women giving geographical information loooking other partner connection
appeared also a tiny fraction (1.42-4.28%). The high one fifth (20.10 %) of the
provincial men desiring marriage seemed to catch up with one and a half tenth
(14.07 %) of the womens proportion. Also worth mentioning is around one tenth of
the males from Budapest proposing partnership (8.09 %), the rural gentlemen
(7.31 %) and ladies (8.14 %) asking correspondence, as well as the Budapester
women corresponding (11.85 %). (See the Fig 6.16 and 6.17 below.)

147

Fig 6.16

Fig 6.17

Religion, denomination

All of their religion confessing people unquestionably pro-marriage in both times


with some noticable changes. The 1874 Jewish (100 %), Catholic (93 %), Chistianity
(92 %) of advertisers searched spouses especially, while Protestants (75 %) thought
easier imaginable other relationship (25 %) and correspondence (25 %) in
148

comparison with the other three religious groups (4-9 %). However in 1881 the other
acquaintance binding (18 %), corresponding (27 %) Israelites took over the groping
tactics of the Protestants, and partly this was followed by the Christians (23-27 %)
and the Catholics (15-23 %) but the Protestants (100 %) tried only marriage. (See
the Fig 6.18 below.)

Fig 6.18

In the previous period the above general trend represented by Christian (11.49 %),
Jewish (11.49 %), Catholic (6.32 %) and Protestant (1.72 %) males wishing to marry,
or partnership and correspondence initiating small number (0.57 to 1.14 %) of all
their denominations declaring gentlemen, or Christian (5.71 %), Catholic (4.28 %),
Jewish (4.28 %) women seeking legal relationship. In the later era prevailing cautious
approach was chosen by the fraction number (0.74 to 2.22 %) of Christian, Jewish
men and women and Catholic men searching for a partner and corresponding. (See
the Fig 6.19 and 6.20 below.)

149

Fig 6.19

Fig. 6.20

150

Children

The having child advertisers had primary purpose the marriage in both periods.
Actually in the earlier period people with children were opened at least one tenth
proportion to other partnership (18 %) and correspondence (12 %) in addition to
marriage (100 %), but they were less accepting children of the future spouse (89 %)
than later (100 %). In the next era the marriage no longer monopoly (87 %), and even
fewer intended looser partnership and correspondence (7 %). (See the Fig. 6.21
below.)

Fig 6.21

The above mentioned is nuanced by the gender indicators. Seventh (1.14 %) of


the 74 men wanting to marry with child (7.47 %) and fifth (0.85 %) of the women
(5.71 %) belonging to the same group would have been toleranted future
companions kid, and only half (0.57 %) of the other acquaintance and
correspondence making men (1.14 %) were tolerant, while the partnership taking
women (1.42 %) fully (1.42 %) were accepting. The adopted child rejecting mentality
changed later. The 81 men (1.82 %) and women (4.44 %) planning marriage, and the
men other acquaintance binding (0.26 %) already held natural their companions
151

child (2.34, 4.44, 0.26 %) except for a few ladies mailing (0.74 %). (See the Fig
6.22 and 6.23 below.)

Fig 6.22

Fig 6.23

152

Property, income

The most important information of the datings of the 19th century was property and
income. However, change can be detected between the wealth endowments and
intentions of the two periods. While the 74 wealth mentioning vast majority (87 %),
while two thirds (65 %) of the 81-ers targeted by marriage. But in both times the
majority (86-93 %) of the income having and financial supplement hoping people
wanted to choose lawful life partner. In the previous period, with a plenty of one
tenth (8-15 %) of them tried partnering connection, and only half of those (4-8 %)
asked for correspondence. Later it have been reversed because determined one fifth
(17-23 %) portion of the other acquaintance initiating women (7-19 %) wanted to
correspond, which certainly meant more carful interact. (See the Fig 6.24 below.)

Fig 6.24

This phenomenon is repeated by gender. In the earlier period the difference between
the wealth endowment of the men and women more conspicuous: more than three
quarters (78.62 %) of the gentlemen wishing to marry, while less than half (48.57 %)
of the women intending to marry had a financially secure, whom at least half (men
42.52 %, women 28.57 %) quantified own situation. In addition the men had more
153

definite vision for their future material needs in comparison with the women: two
thirds (60.34 %) of the men calculated some kind of income and one third (33.90 %)
of them quantified it, but only a third (30 %) of the ladies expected income and
hardly half a tenth (4.28 %) of them gave specific needs. More modest order of
magnitude, but the same trend is visible by matchmaking and corresponding ladies
and gentlemen. Later, interesting way, as if the material endowment of both genders
approached to one another: similarly two fifths part of the men (39.68 %) and women
intending to marry (37.03 %) had organized the financial backround, and the same
rate of them disclosed numerically income (men 20.62 %, women 20.74 %), and two
thirds (32.59 %) of the women financial security expecting nearly reached that of
men (39.42 %), although their concrete aspirations were not as bold. The
phenomenon can be found in the group of the ladies and gentlemen corresponding.
While low income indicators (0,74 to 4.44 %) of the women in partnership are
srtiking compared to men (3.13 to 13.83 %). (See the Fig. 6.25 and 6.26 below.)

154

Fig 6.25

155

Fig 6.26

In both times quantified income averages of all three purposes categories in terms of
the previous periods marriage (42 %) and partner relation (43 %) are clear the capital
needs of dating people (57-58 %), but the corresponding advertisers possessed capital
surplus (59 %), but still had to be added (41 %). Later they undertook statutory
coexistence with more stabile (53 %) financial background, but it also had to be
supplied (47 %) to maintenance of the houshold, the wealthy correspondents with
their favorable endowments (64 %) already accepted candidates with modest
economic background (36 %) and in other acquaintances the missing (75 %) capital
had a decisive role compared to the remaining (25 %). (See the Fig. 6.27 below.)

156

Fig. 6.27

In adverisements published their own and expected average of total amount more
detailed picture can be given. In the former period material endowments of datings
varied by categories according to goals: people considering marriage had an average
income (96 %) and the sums of imposed condition roughly agreed (143 %) with
expectations of the others. Likewise, one and a half of average of the announced
amounts owning partnership (153 %) initiators requirements (143 %) showed similar
trends in the sums claimed. But in correspondence the advertisers had far more than
average (137 %) and they asked two thirds (68 %) of the targeted materials average.
Later, it seems that more favorable financial situation group appaered as a little bit
better than average situations (104 %) of those wishing to get married usually have
caught up with two thirds (63 %) of the sought for income. The typical shortage of
capital striving for partnership wanted to receive the average of total target amount
(100 %) to the one and a half tenth of the average (16 %). (See the table 6.1 and 6.2
below.)

157

1874

Own

Required

year
Intention Marriag Partnersh

Average

Corresponden Marriag Partnersh

Corresponden

ip

ce

ip

ce

7953

12713

11375

11004

16800

8000

96

153

137

93

143

68

(Ft)
Differen
ce (%)
Table 6.1.

1881

Own

Required

year
Intention Marriag Partnersh

Average

Corresponden Marriag Partnersh

Corresponden

ip

ce

ip

ce

12836

1925

10337

6696

10696

7530

104

16

84

63

100

71

(Ft)
Differen
ce (%)
Table 6.2.

The numerical average of income portrayed the advertisers more precisely. The 74
gentlemen seeking marriage (9248 Ft) would have asked roughly the same amount
(9813 Ft) from wives, but the women seeking husband had only three times less
(3225 Ft) capital and they would claim at least for tenfold (34833 Ft) their own
capital. The wealthier (13814 Ft) men searching for a companion (17889 Ft) would
have been needed one and a half times the money, but the same intentioned women26
would have liked to complete only with one third (5000 Ft) of the mens material
with its one and a half times (7000 Ft) The even richer (20000 Ft) gentlemen mailing
26

An extremly rich lady was among the female advertisers in 1881 and her value made more difficult the
analysis, so she got the womens average financial value of the comparative measurement.

158

also expected at least one third (8000 Ft) of their own from the other, however, much
more modest (2750 Ft) ladies letter-writing waived the concrete material conditions.
Later, men getting married (12316 Ft) calculated a dowry which approximated to
theirs (11341 Ft), compared the previous period, this time, women getting married
with much better (even that of men too) financial situation (14304 Ft) satisfied with
one and a half tenth of theirs (2050 Ft). The men invested third as much (3850 Ft) to
the other acquaintances compared to the marriage, and they would have like to make
up almost with three times (11392 Ft), while in this respect the women did not cover
up their cards, but they asked for dowry at least five times (10000 Ft) of the expected
amount. The wealthy (8406 Ft) men mailing contented with two thirds (5059 Ft) of
their own, and the even wealthier (12267 Ft) ladies tied up again five times (10000
Ft) of the marriage requirements. (See the table 6.3 and 6.4 below.)

1874
year
Intentio
n
Male
Female
Total

Own (Ft)
Marriag
e
9248
3225
7953

Required (Ft)
Partnershi
p
13814
5000
12713

Corresponden
ce
20000
2750
11375

Marriag
e
9813
34833
11004

Partnershi
p
17889
7000
16800

Corresponden
ce
8000
0
8000

Table 6.3.

1881
year
Intentio
n
Male
Female
Total

Own (Ft)
Marriag
e
12316
14304
12836

Required (Ft)
Partnershi
p
3850
0
1925

Corresponden
ce
8406
12267
10337

Marriag
e
11341
2050
6696

Partnershi
p
11392
10000
10696

Corresponden
ce
5059
10000
7530

Table 6.4.

159

Appearance

The attractive appearance could raise value of the financial endowments, or it could
compensate scantiness of the material. Difference can be observed in aesthetically
demanding of both era.
In the previous period, as if the attractive appearance had more important role in the
marriage (75 %) than later, and there also rather like requirement (87 %) occured; the
attractiveness had significant by one fifth (21 %) of the advertisers in partner relation,
where barely more one tenth (13 %) of them imposed as a condition of the act, and
the beauty came up tenth part (13 %), or not so much (8 %) in the correspondence.
Later barely three quarters (73 %) of the partner searchers describe themselves as
attractive focused on marriage and they imposed condition about same quantity
(70 %), two fifths (40 %) of them proposed correspondence, in which was
requirement only the third part (34 %), and about one in five (23 %) opted for
partnership, but in that case more people (30 %) required the preferred look from the
prospective companion. (See the Fig. 6.28 below.)

Fig 6.28

It can be seen more realistically in the breakdown by gender that over one and a half
tenth (16.66 %) of the 74 men getting married considered themselves charming, and
160

almost one third (30.45 %) of them desired nice wife. Quarter (24.28 %) of the
women offering themselves as a brides gave about themselves positive aesthetic
features, but very small proportion (1.42 %) of them looked handsome fianc.
Aesthetic informations and requirements were occured by the fragment (1.42 to
7.14 %) of the men and women undertaking other partnerships and wishing to
correspond. In the 81 less than one and a half tenth (13.57 %) which fewer than
they were in the previous era of the men wanting to get married announced
themselves as attractive, and a quarter (24.54 %) of them wanted specially pretty wife.
More than the earlier over one quarter (28.14 %) of the ladies longing for spousal
role communicated themselves as nice, and only half a tenth (5.18 %) of them would
take their smart bridegrooms arm. The beauty was important for fifth (20 %) of the
women corresponding, and a good half a tenth of them (5.92 %) sought for handsome
gentlemen, as well as the half a tenth (5.92 %) of the promising partnership beauties
wished attractive men in similar proportion (4.44 %). In addition, about half a tenth
of the nice men looking for other acquaintances (5.48 %) and correspondence (6 %)
twice as many (9.66 to 10.70 %) desired to beauties. (See the Fig. 6.29 and 6.30
below.)

Fig. 6.29

161

Fig 6.30

Educated

The literacy like an external attractivenes was an important factor in the partner
searching. The indicators developed similarly above in the intentions of the examined
two periods. In the previous period more than three quarters (78 %) of all the
advertisers thought about themselves as educated wanted to get married, and this
attitude was assumed about cultured spouses. The other acquaintces (16 %) and
correspondence (14 %) were important to informed one and a half, and approximately
they expected the same commitment of the partner (14 %) and even more addressed
others (20 %). A little bit decreasing rate than before later a good two thirds (68 %)
of the learned advertisers opted for the legal cohabitation, and they waited for same
(70 %) decision from their future spouses. Roughly one third proportion of the
peolple choosing other two intentions categories wanted to search for a partner
(27 %) and write letters (38 %), and they thought of the partner one fifth (22 %) and
of the addressee two fifths (40 %) rate in common dating goal. (See the Fig. 6.31
below.)

162

Fig 6.31

More interesting is image by details of gender and intentions. In the earlier era the
men looked for their educated mate rather than women. A good one tenth (11.49 %)
of the gentlemen wishing to marry were proud of their cultured, and even more than
one quarter (27.58 %) requested from wives, as well as aspect of twice as many as
small number of educated men were willing to make other acquaintances (2.29 %)
and to corresepond (2.87 %) was culture of the partner (4.59 %) and of the addressed
(5.74 %). One quarter (25.71 %) of the ladies planning marriage announced
themselves as cultured, and only one tenth (10 %) of them needed a clever husband,
but just half as many (2.85 %) as a half tenth (5.71 %) of the the learned women
wishing other partnership were important a qualified companion, but twice (5.71 %)
as fraction (2.85 %) of the cultured ladies proposing correspondence sought for their
spiritual partner. Later, culture of the other clearly better calculated by both genders.
One tenth (9.66 %) of the gentlemen emphasizing knowledge, getting married similar
rate (10.84 %) sought for witty wives, and about half a tenth of the men suggesting
partnership (4.96 %) and correspondence (5.22 %) would have liked a little bit more
educated mate (6.26 %) and mailing partner (8.61 %). Far more (17.03 %) than one
tenth (11.11 %) of the women relying on their own culture, being wife calculated for
qualified husband, and although fewer (6.66 %) planned correspondence but three
times as many (18.51 %) hoped for spiritual companion, and multiples (5.18 %) of
163

small number (1.48 %) of the striving for partnership requested informed applicant.
(See the Fig 6.32 and 6.33 below.)

Fig 6.32

Fig 6.33

Other skills

The advertisers mentioned occasionally that exactly what kind of skills expect from
the applicants. The other skills meant tipically musical education, or knowledge
164

needed to operate smaller enterprises, estates, or domestic training, that is expert in


household chores. The latter was the most popular among the three.
Some noticable shift in emphasis in cultural demand in both periods. The 74
advertisers communicating other skills mainly (85-98 %) targeted marriage, and they
considered necessary at least one tenth (11-15 %) in the partnership, even less (45 %) in the correspondance. In 81 already the domestic training seekers would have
liked to marry almost exclusively, but over one quarter (27 %) of them intended to
write letter, and about half a tenth (6 %) of them gave chance to other acquaintances.
People insisting on economic knowledge did not think about lawful cohabitation,
because only two thirds (60 %) of them imposed such a condition to spouse, one in
five (20 %) liked to correspond on it, and two fifths (40 %) had mostly partner with
some kind of adequate experience to enterprise. Those who had a condition imposed
musical skills, sure they sought for marriage (100 %), third (33 %) met through
correspondence with pleasure, and one tenth (11 %) would have maintained friendly
relations as well. (See the Fig. 6.34 below.)

Fig 6.34

A more realistic image may be outlined in the breakdown by gender. In the previous
period significant other skills were formulated by getting married. A half tenth
165

(15.51 %) of the gentlemen wanting to marry calculated on domestic trained wife,


and more than half a tenth demanded economic knowledge (6.89 %), musical
qualification (5.74 %). One quarter (24.28 %) of the women wanting to be wife
published their domestic trained, and approximately one tenth stated about
themselves that they possessed economic experience (7.14 %) and musical skill
(8.57 %). The advertisers representing fraction values of other two intentions
categories shown above attitude. Also fraction numbers of the earlier period can be
interpreted by intentions rather. A good one and a half tenth (17.23 %) of the
prospective husbands they were more than in 74 imposed condition the domestic
training, and only a very small proportion asked for economic knowledge (0.78 %),
music education (1.56 %). One fifth (20 %) of the women candidating to be wife
reported themselves to have domestic training, and a small fraction (2.22 %) showed
a musical proficiency. (See the Fig. 6.35 and 6.36 below.)

Fig. 6.35

166

Fig. 6.36

View of life, character

A positive outlook on life reflects charity, cheerful, jolly and reliability meant meek
were futher important aspect of the partner searchers. Change of the view of life and
character is striking by intentions between two periods. Majority (89 %) of the 74
optimistic advertisers were pro-marriage, and less than one tenth (9 %) of them gave
chance to partnership, or even less (6 %) saw future in correspondence. Also the
marriage was the first (87 %) for them prefering meek character, and about one and a
half tenth of them thought important it in the other acquaintance (17 %) and
correspondence (13 %). Generally the 81 advertisers with positive view of life could
be more opened. The optimism was only half as important in the marriage (49 %),
and almost as much in the correspondence (45 %) as well, and it increased third part
(33 %) in the partnership. The meek a less varied than before outstandingly
(83 %) remained prominent role in the marriage, and it represented about one fifth
part in the correspondence (17 %) and partner connection (20 %). (See the Fig. 6.37
below.)
167

Fig. 6.37

In above image futher nuances can be found in the breakdown by gender. In the
previous period a good tenth (10.91 %) of the optimistic gentlemen undertook the
marriage, and only a small part of them sought for other acquaintance (1.72 %) or
correspondence (0.57 %). Over one and a half tenth (17.14 %) of the more optimistic
ladies hoped for happiness in the marriage, a very small proportion (1.42 %) of them
wasted time on correspondence, and they avoided the partnership. Both sexes (male
10.34 %, female 11.42 %) represented meek caracter similarly in one tenth rate, and a
tiny fraction (1.14 to 2.85 %) of them mentioned it in the other acquaintance and
correspondence. In the later period the prospective husbands were much less
optimistic, because only a small fraction (3.91 %) of them hoped for marriage, same
such few (3.12 %) attracted to the mail, and maybe a little bit more (4.17 %) saw
possibility in other acquaintance. That time even more optimistic women selected
approximately the tenth the correspondence (8.14 %) and marriage (7.40 %), and
almost hardly (0.74 %) the partnership. The meek character reminds of the former
period, though it compared to that time half as many men (5.48 %) and women
(5.92 %) wanted lawful cohabitation, and also a fragments of them initiated other
acquaintance (1.82 %) and correspondence (0.52 to 2.69 %). (See the Fig. 6.38 and
6.39 below.)
168

Fig. 6.38

Fig. 6.39

Conclusions

Although only seven years passed between two examined times, still as suggested
by the first hypothesis fulfilling of the research after the 67 compromise effect of
social changes taking place and (great) urbanization can be detected in significant
changes.
169

The 2-3 years older advertisers of the earlier period were half as many, but they were
more persistent. Their intentions aimed mainly at the marriage. This explains, why
many people told their religious, denomination affiliation. However, partner
searchers of the later period were more receptive outside the marriage to other
partnership, and they preferred to acquaint by (longer) correspondence, which was
required less religion or same denomination. Majority of the 74 partner searchers
made at least reference to situation of income and wealth and related expects, while
somewhat less 81-ers stated that, because slightly larger proportion of them ignored
legimate coexistence. (A little more of the 81-ers gave their place of residence,
whom at least half were rural in both times, and while in preciously they came in
broadly similar proportion from Vienna and Budapest, but later the Budapesters
dominated of the single publishers seat.) There were no very large differences
considering of the other properties, still a little more among advertisers of the earlier
time announced about themselves as educated, and they would be better taken care of
prospective partners beauty and reliability, and perhaps they would have regarded
with larger confidence to the future.
Dominant of men formulated as second hypothesis of the analysis also prevailed.
Although according to the distribution of gender the previously slightly more women
in the ad than men. However, in the first major separations the freedom of men
greater than womens and their self-confident also no doubt in their readiness of
initiative and manifestation. In 74 the marital status was marked by somewhat more,
the ladies were definitely more communicative about this area both times, while the
men did it int hat case, if they were widowed or divorced. That is, everybody thought
self-evident about the dating man that he had certainly the (lawful) freedom of
partner searching, while at least two thirds of the women clarified own situation in
both periods. Since getting marriage was the main goal previously, proportionally
more widow gentlemen looked for new and beautiful wife. The men publicated more
decisively the specific sum of money, which they claimed they needed, while the
women were much more modest and shyest. But they annouced bolder the exist of
170

aesthetical criteria about themselves, especially the 81 future wifes and


corresponding misses. Twice as many among the ladies of earlier period wishing
husband thought themselves as educated than later, when they demanded almost
double clever head of a family and multiple craved for witty pen pal. In this time,
however, the mens demand for trained spouse descreased by half compared to
former. Generally, few of people with child met, if so, they sought for the marriage,
and the 74 women seemed to accepting with brought child(ren) of the prospective
mate.
Finally, last but not least, research data make it obvious that the marriage was like
then was the important method of livelihood and community of life started to
change, and other partnerships received a greater role as well. The results should be
follow, where it is possible, for example it can be seen in diaries, memories,
correspondence of contemporary celebrities, or literary works. But the studied
numbers, attitudes can motivate the man of the 21st century to rethink the traditional
roles and values, in order to create a harmony between sexes as (also useful for
society) a condition of required long-term marriage or cohabitation.
The complex approach is important in examination of the present and planning for
the future, but also useful understanding of the history. The example of this sociohistorical research such a case, because the historical source is a neglected in terms of
research, contemporary press type, which in addition suitable for statistical analysis.
Many matrimonial ads published in French newspapers provide opportunity for
similar studies.
Moreover it is generally well known that the results of comparison between old and
nowadays advertisements can show us the future

171

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Pictures

The passenger: Tell me, Mr. Guard, there is still so much time to say goodbye to my
wife?
The guard: That depends on how long your lordship married. (Dezs Br: Before
departure, the East Railway Station, Kakas Mrton, 29 May 1904, p. 16.)

174

Wedding fashion plate (Csaldi Kr, 22 February 1874)

Ball fashion plate (Csaldi Kr, 11 February 1874)

175

Gentleman: I should mention, sweetie, its about one million in my possession.


Lady: Oh, its no matter, then I will save a little bit. (Opportunist, stks, 21
August 1898, p. 403.)

The marriage broker: Well, Doctor, how do you like this baby?
Doctor: Too beautiful. Ten to twenty thousand could be uglier. (Dezs Br: At the
176

marriage broker, Kakas Mrton, 4 December 1904, p. 11.)

Wife, you behaved yourself very much stikingly at the ball.


Oh, forgive me, Joe! Just say that you do not mind.
Hm! All you! Why do I just tell you?
(Season picture, After Anna Ball, stks, 4 August 1901, p. 369.)

But it only recognizes the captain that a married men live longer than bachelors?
177

You are wrong, madame! The married men find the life only longer. (Jnos Garay:
The secret of long life, Kakas Mrton, 6 August 1905, p. 7.)

178

CHAPTER VII
THE RELATIONSHIP IN THE SYSTEM: A COMPARISON OF DONATI
AND LUHMANN
By Simone DAlessandro

7.1. The relationship that includes the form of distinction

Scientific paradigms are immeasurable, because they rely on different conceptions of


the world. While starting from this assumption made by Kuhn in 1962, we cannot be
blind to points of contact and points of divergence between schools of thought. In
particular, in this essay, we compared the concepts of relationship and human in
Niklas Luhmann and Pierpaolo Donati. Luhmann uses the theory of systems not as a
super theory with universalistic pretensions, but as a guiding difference or as a
container of distinctions that guide the theorys ability to process information.27
Donati builds his theoretical foundation starting from the concept of relationship:
suspend the relationship with one another and you have suspended relationships
with the self28 is the definition underpinning sociological thinking in relational
theory.
Luhmann, on the heels of Ludwig Bertanlaffy, replaces the traditional whole/parts
difference with the system/environment difference, highlighting the relationship
between the theory of living organisms, thermodynamics and the theory of evolution.
In theoretical description Luhmann addresses the difference between open and closed
systems. Closed systems are defined as a limiting case, as systems for which the
environment is meaningless or assumes meaning only through specific channels.
Differentiation of systems is merely a replication of the system/environment
difference within the system. The global system uses itself as the environment to
27
28

In N. Luhmann, Social Systems, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 68.


In P. Donati, La societ dellumano, Marietti, Genova, 2009, p. 153.

179

form its own subsystems and in so doing can withstand high levels of improbability,
strengthening the effectiveness of filters against an environment that is ultimately
uncontrollable. The environment is a necessary interrelationship for self-referential
operations since these cannot be carried out under the premise of solipsism, because
everything that plays a role in it, including self, must be introduced through a
difference from something else than itself. Such a theory needs formal concepts
placed at the level of creation of relationships between relationships, as Luhmann
himself argues (Luhmann, 1990: 74).
Donati uses the concept of relationship differently, objecting to reductionisms and
more generally to those who: believe it is too burdensome to try to read and manage
social relations29, preferring to treat dysfunctions like a fault in a purely mechanical
system, therefore repairable using technical solutions.
It is not accurate to say that sociology studies the relations between social facts ()
but rather it studies social facts as relationships.30 This statement constitutes the
second pillar of Donatis relational theory, which goes beyond Luhmann systemenvironment functionalism. The relationship includes and enhances Luhmanns
concept of form of distinction.
The relationship constitutes the principle of social causality: meta-scientific postulate
without which a scientific foundation would be impossible, the axiom to accept, from
which everything else becomes feasible in terms of verifiability and falsifiability.
Observing relationships, thinking by relationships, understanding and explaining
through relationships: these are the rules of Donatis sociology, which has the
courage to re-start from an ontological statute that is able to find the founding (sic
ontological) principle in the relationship as stated in La Matrice Teologica della
Societ (Donati, 2010). Ontology becomes the necessary even if insufficient
factor for ensuring that the relationship with transcendence may even be just
observed31. Donati applies the relationship concept even in the mechanisms of

29

Ibidem, p. 153.
Ibidem, p. 155.
31
In P. Donati, La matrice teologica della societ, Rubbettino, Catanzaro, 2010, p. 14.

30

180

reflexivity and it becomes, in practice, a social relationship by going beyond the


reflexivity of modern subject (Donati, 2011), trying to understand a society that is no
longer modern or post-modern, but after-modern (Donati, 2011).
Moreover, after Gdels theorems it was inevitable, even from a scientific point of
view, that the fact that there are real things whose truth is unprovable would be
accepted. As with Heisembergs uncertainty principle, we are inevitably led not only
to negation of knowability [foundational principles], but to negation of determinism
()32 and thus to the negation of predictability of the future state of the world. In
this sense, even the hard sciences reintroduce metaphysics and ontology, because in
reality they establish the boundaries of human knowability in an absolute sense.
Donatis approach33 welcomes transcendence, stating that it is not possible to go
beyond the category (universal and foundational) of relationality. Starting from
relationality, Donati rejects both methodological individualism and methodological
collectivism, involving network intervention34 at operational level.
At the same time in Teoria relazionale della societ and in La Societ dellumano,
which is an organic and systematic attempt to exit the ford of the duality mentioned
above, there are several principles of Foersters constructivism and systemic
philosophy of the third type, those proposed by Luhmann.
Donati argues that the social is a relational property of the relationship between the
observer (or agent) and what they observe (or acted upon).35 From this initial point
of view, the relational theory accepts the assumptions of the constructivist
paradigm.36
Moreover relational sociology starts from the assumption that societys problems are
generated by social relationships and seeks to understand and, if possible, resolve

32

In E. Severino, Legge e caso, Adelphi, Milan, 1980, p. 54.


In this article we will speak generally of relational theory, without going into detail with regard to other
concepts like the relational approach, paradigm and method. For these, see Donati, Introduzione alla
sociologia relazionale, Franco Angeli, Milan, 1985, in particular Chapter 1.
34
P. Donati, op. cit., 2009, p. 147.
35
P. Donati, op. cit., 2009.
36
See H. von Foerster, Comprendere il comprendere, in P. Alferj and A. Pilati, (ed.), Conoscenza e
complessit, Teoria, Rome-Naples, 1990, p. 127-148.
33

181

them, not using purely voluntary/individual factors, nor in collective-structural terms,


but through new social relationships and new relation relationships (Donati, 2009).
The meaning of meaning is a relationship (Donati, 2009) and relationships have the
characteristic of referring to other relationships. Therefore they can exist only
through collective representations. With this second point of view, Donati accepts the
concept of social phenomena recursiveness, finding points in common with systemic
philosophy and Abbotts fractal sociology.37
Finally, the principle of relationships may exist not only socially, but also in the
interconnections with other levels of reality: biological, psychological, ethical,
political, economic.
From this third perspective, Donati includes in his theory, the concepts of
differentiation and emergence developed in the general theory of systems, where each
system is made up of relationships between parties able to create something different
from the sum of its parts, and where each system can interact with other systems in
turn composed of sub-systems, and so on, recursively generating additional
complexity that needs to be controlled and reduced. At the same time Donati seems to
keep the necessary distance from the excesses of functionalist derivations of systemic
thought, claiming an autonomous, unique status of relational theory.
While incorporating the keywords of systemic philosophy in his thinking, Donati
tends to emphasize its diversity and accepts functionalist instances without falling
into the universality of binary semantics. However, in hindsight, Luhmann also has
his own ontology an irreducible premise from which everything begins: the
difference.
What is difference if not a process that correlates an ego with an alter, a possibility
with other possibilities? The form of distinction develops identity, but what is the
form of distinction if not an irreducible ontological principle?
Donati and Luhmann restart from the relationship to try to understand the system
behavior. But Donatis relationship becomes Luhmanns form of discrimination.
37

See A. Abbott, I metodi della scoperta. Come trovare delle buone idee nelle scienze sociali, Bruno
Mondadori, Milan, 2007.

182

Over and above terminology, the two authors start from a very similar ontological
postulate.
7.2. Donati-Luhmann: for a possible coexistence between the human and the
non-human

How do Donati and Luhmann deal with the human concept? To establish a correct
comparison in this sense it is necessary, we must first establish agreements denoting
the definitions of human, non-human, dis-human.
For Donati human is what is distinctive of human beings (...) non-human is what is
not specific to humans, and un-human denies the human and (...) social is what is
found between individuals as such.38
If, as Donati says, post-modern society (...) becomes increasingly subject to the risk
of being non-human (meaning non-human as the other side of the distinction from
human),39 functionalism would seem to be the bridge along which there might be a
non-human and a un-human society, which denies the most significant instances of
human. But if it is possible to be certain of what is meant by non-human (for instance,
a robot is non-human), it is more difficult to understand the term dis-human, as well
as combinations of human and non-human, which generate post-human, not to
mention the ethical issues inherent in the improvement of human evolution in hyperhuman key40 (on this subject, see the work of Harris, 200741 and Pitasi, 2011).
Can a man with prostheses or a woman who uses chemicals to become sterile be
considered post-human subjects or are they humans evolved in a non-human direction,
or in the case of rejection by the remaining human part are they humans who have
evolved in a dis-human sense?

38

P. Donati, op. cit., 2009, p. 79.


P. Donati, op. cit., 2009, p. 247.
40
The concept of hyper-human was recently introduced by Pitasi during the Lo sguardo sistemico workshop,
held on 6 October 2010, at Chieti-Pescara University and repeated in Pitasi 2010 and Pitasi 2011.
41
The theme of improvement of human evolution is extensively discussed by John Harris in Enhancing
Evolution, Princeton University Press, NJ, 2007. He believes it is a moral duty to desire to improve human
evolution in all its forms.
39

183

To improve the human race by projecting it towards longer life expectancy and
hyper-human cognitive abilities, is a dis-human choice to Fig.ht, or a human duty to
pursue, or a beyond-human option to experience?
From this point of view, Luhmanns systems philosophy (open to all options) can
intervene within Donatis thinking, resolving some problematic issues.
For Luhmann, the human/non-human distinction was part of the system/environment
differentiation paradigm: the social system needs to differentiate between what is
human (made up of the context of social relations and meaning) and what is not
(institutions, symbolically generalized media).
Compared to prevailing contemporary sociology that places the individual at the
centre of the sociological problem, Niklas Luhmann focuses his theory around the
social system. While admitting that social phenomena should be studied in
connection with the role they play in the maintenance of the system, he criticizes
classic functionalist theories because they have failed to distinguish the concept of
cause from that of function: the same need in the framework of a system may evolve
in various ways, so the relationship between the presence of a particular need and its
being met is not a causal. This is a criticism in terms of functional equivalence. For
the German sociologist, the world of reality and humanness is the infinite variety
and complexity of what is real. The environment is the delimitation of realizable
possibilities that may be given in a particular situation, while the system is the actual
selection and realization of certain opportunities offered by the environment (if the
human individual is the system, the environment is given by its social context; if the
system is society, the human individual is its environment). Since the world is
infinitely complex, it is impossible to navigate without a reduction in complexity and
this is the fundamental concept of Luhmanns theory that takes us back to Webers
idea of culture as a finished section taken from the infinity of a meaningless world.
The problem of reducing complexity is not just a theoretical problem but also a
practical problem because humanity is forced to reduce complexity in order to
survive. In this perspective, the concept of dis-human depends on the individuals
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circumstances and mutual expectations. What is considered dis-human today (for


example: someone working 14 hours a day) may not be so tomorrow (if this is person
is enhanced by biotechnological devices that can change the perception of stress to
avoid disease). However, this reasoning involves a constant and contingent
redefinition of the concept of human.
Conversely, for Donati, human, non-human and dis-human are immutable categories
that are not subject to contingency. From this point of view the systemic paradigm
shows itself to be more open: it applies no permanent classification systems but only
continuous differentiation processes.
Luhmann died before he had a chance to understand how biotechnology has changed
the concept of human. Nonetheless, his theory predicted that the human would evolve
through processes of differentiation that generate post-human, hyper-human, hypohuman, trans-human and other entities.
Donati seems to argue for fixed categories, but his theory predicts relationships of
relationships that generate the same categories proposed by Luhmanns
differentiation method.

7.3. The relationship in the system: insider or outsider?


Paraphrasing Donati we could say: discontinue the relationship with the environment
and you will have discontinued the relationship with the system. The relationship is
what allows the system to order and reduce complexity, creating more complexity.
The relationship, in reality, is a differentiation process. In Luhmanns thought,
relationship and differentiation are functional equivalents.
Yet Donati prefers the diversity of the relational paradigm to Luhmanns
functionalism because, in his words, the relationship is meant as a ubiquitous thirdinclusive rather than as a necessary excluded outsider.

185

According to Donati, the relationship promotes a new theory of understanding as it


does not rely on Verstehen the act of understanding through interpretation or on
the individuals subjective states, or even on structural arrangements, but on their
reciprocal action,42 as he says in his La Societ dellUmano.
Donati further clarifies this thought in La matrice teologica della societ when he
states that there cannot be a relationship between two terms their radical separation
or separability is stated.43
Now we ask: can we say with certainty that the relationship according to Luhmann is
the outsider? In Luhmanns Theory of Society, updating and in some ways rewording
what he had said in previous works, especially in Social Systems, he assigns the
expression outsider to the concept of observation and not specifically to the word
relationship.
The German scholar, examining the concept of observation, states that it has to do
with both the act of distinguishing and with that of indicating. He says: Formulated
in terms of traditional logic, which stands in relationship to the parties it distinguishes,
the distinction is always the outsider (...) considering that observing is always an
action that must be performed by a self-poietic system and which shows that this
system in this function as an observer, which leads to the statement that the observer
is the outsider in their observation.44
Observation is the outsider and not, as we shall see, the relationship.
Indeed, in his Theory of Society, Luhmann again introduces a concept borrowed from
George Spencer Brown, 45 that of form of discrimination. For Luhmann the
relationship is the process (in reality continuous and unfathomable but which
scientific observation needs to make discrete and analyzable in binary terms) that
allows a relationship to be built between ego and alter through the act of
distinguishing self from what is not self.

42

Ibidem, p. 246.
P. Donati, op. cit., 2010, p. 15.
44
N. Luhmann, R. De Giorgi, Teoria della societ, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2003, p. 23.
45
G. Spencer Brown, Laws of forms, Allen and Unwin, London, 1969.

43

186

Moreover, Bateson had already argued and after him the great scholars of
neuroscience that knowledge is nothing more than a cognitive process of
discrimination in the denotative sense of the word. In other words distinguishing
one thing from another, by identifying all of what distinguishes that thing from the
other. For example, we see the colour green because we know what is not green!
The relationship is, therefore, an act of distinction which obviously makes a meaning
in itself and has a meaning in itself. The relationship is, therefore, an insider for
Luhmann as it is Donati, and is defined as a form of the distinction (of forms), a
catalyst of every social and symbolic value that occurs immediately after observation
which is, however (though not always), the outsider. Moreover, in La Societ
dellUmano, Donati also says that Social is, in the human sphere, the identity of
what is, really and truly, distinguished by connecting or connects distinguishing,
using the reference to something other than itself in a context of relationships.46
Reading Donati, I interpret his vision as not so far from the systems philosophy, but
ameliorative with regard to concepts of distinction in connection and connection
in distinction, already present in Bateson, Spencer Brown and Luhmann. The form
of the distinction of forms in a systemic sense is contained in Donati in his
formulation of distinction in connection and connection in distinction.
If anything, the ameliorative force of Donatis theory lies in its ability to purify
systems theory of its aporias: in Luhmann, in fact, there is something wrong and he
is content with his system/environment, true/false, one/zero semantic binary so he
cannot reconcile the concept of functional differentiation with the concept typical
of what is complex of emerging social changes in progress without falling into
contradiction.
Donati, however, resolves the paradox with relational semantics.
It is not possible to conceive evolution as an infinite process of functional
differentiation and at the same time accommodate the concept that the combination of

46

P. Donati, op. cit., 2009, p. 142.

187

several phenomena creates an emerging phenomenon that is more (or less) than the
sum of the preceding phenomena.
It is not possible to accept the basic lack of communication between Ego and Alter,
dismissing system stimulation coming from the environment as a mere disruption.
It is not possible to conceive knowledge only as an act of distinction, we must also reestablish the act of connection and con-fusion.
Whenever a phenomenon creates new varieties, it endows them with hybrid and
combined elements already present in the previous phenomenon.
Whenever a theory creates one or more antitheses, they also contain the subject of the
theory. Then, in the separation, there is also fusion and re-acquisition.
In this sense, the concept of relationship is more comprehensive than the concept of
form of distinction because it retrieves the analogy: in other words knowing and
becoming are processes that are neither simply repulsive nor simply attractive, but
both attract and repulse.
We cannot only know from what makes us different, but also from what unites us.
Reality is not digital and discrete, but analog and continuous.
Obviously when creating science there is a need for the continuous to be made
discretized: it is important to be aware that this is a simple abstraction of reality that,
in fact, is continuous and analogue.
Donati brings back the reading of complex social relationships in reality and from the
applicative point of view suggests a methodology that attempts to produce a change
that allows players to manage their significant (actual or potential) relationships by
activating material, manifest or latent human resources present context of the
reference.
At this point I think everyone will agree with Donati, as well as the fact that
interdependence cannot always be a circular idea as Tam47 (whom Donati himself
quotes) would say. Otherwise it would be useless: in this sense, Luhmanns systems
theory has limits.
47

In T. Tam, Demarcating the Boundaries Between Self and the Social: The Anatomy of Centrality in Social
Networks, Social networks, vol. 11, n. 4 (1989), 300-400.

188

However problematic issues remain.


Who determines the degree of significance of the relationships and hierarchies of
interdependencies?
Who determines what is important to change or keep unchanged?
Who determines which relationships deserve to be observed: the subject or the
observer of the subject?
In the first case the sociology should build a symbiotic relationship with long-term
analytical self-observation, as in a collective psychoanalytical path. In the second
case, the subject should be guided by a series of sociologistsleaders able to establish
beforehand the hierarchy of meaningful values but which, in reality, are constantly
changing their meaning and value over time.
To settle the matter there is still much to be done in terms of research and, in this
sense, Luhmanns philosophy may be useful for Donatis thinking.

7.4. Relationship and form of Distinction: functional equivalents?

From the comparative analysis previously elaborated, we can say that Luhmanns
form of distinction appears as a digital version of Donatis relationship concept.
Luhmann and Donati are closer than we think. One of the most significant
aphorisms of the German sociologist was that we do not live in the best of all
possible worlds, but in a world full of better chances. 48 This is an absolutely
humanist thought and disrupts Poppers vision, raising the issue of individual selfemancipation through an attempt at rational governance of complexity of/in systems.
Luhmann argues for functional equivalents, but he does not forget humans and their
humanity. The differences between Donati and Luhmann are measured on other,
more operational, planes.
Luhmann hopes for a steady increase of varieties generated by continuous
differentiation processes that rationally he would have governed by the reduction of
48

In J. Habermas and N. Luhmann, Teoria della societ o tecnologia sociale?, Etas Libri, Milan, 1973.

189

complexity appropriately managed by symbolically generalized media (money,


religion, law, love) that serve as catalysts for this reduction. It should be remembered,
indeed, that he says that love is not a sentiment but a code of communication,
according to which rules can be expressed, formed, sentiments simulated,
subordinated, others denied with all the possible consequences that can be had when
adequate communication is created.49
Donati says, however, that the reducer of the complexity of reality is reality itself.
Luhmann looks at the disorder aware that there is an order that the system is not yet
capable of seeing. Donati says that the amount of disorder present can never be
totally cleared up by any system.
Luhmann is satisfied with a binary relationship between agency and structure that is
simply more organized, in favour of a society that is not only human, but open to
post-human and non-human flows, certainly not dis-human. Donati, however,
sacrifices structure and agency in favour of recovering the human via relationships.
Luhmann argues the need for the randomness of need. Donati re-affirms the need for
randomness. Donati solves Luhmanns aporias and is not content simply with the
semantic binary, giving an explanation to the emergence of sociality in a more
convincing way than Luhmann, as mentioned above.
Luhmann, however, grants the post-human and hyper-human the same opportunities
as the humans. It would seem desirable to achieve a synthesis between these two
philosophies: why not try a via Luhmann-Donati route for dealing with the posthuman frontiers?
References
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Alferj P. e Pilati A, (ed.) (1990) Conoscenza e complessit, Teoria, Roma-Napoli.
Bateson G. (1976) Verso unecologia della mente, Adelphi, Milano.
Donati P. (1985) Introduzione alla sociologia relazionale, Franco Angeli, Milano.
49

N. Luhmann, Amore come passione, Bruno Mondadori, Milano, 2006, p. 11.

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Donati P. e Terenzi P. (ed.) (2005), Invito alla sociologia relazionale, Franco Angeli,
Milano.
Donati P. (2009) La Societ dellumano, Marietti 1820, Genova.
Donati P. (2010) La matrice teologica della societ, Rubettino, Padova.
Donati O. (2011) Sociologia della riflessivit, Il Mulino, Bonogna.
Habermas J., Luhmann N. (1973) Teoria della societ o tecnologia sociale?, Etas,
Milano.
Harris J. (2007) Enhancing Evolution, Princeton University Press, NJ.
Herrera-Vega E. (2006) Trafic de Drogues et Capitalisme. Un paradoxe
contemporain, lHarmattan, Paris.
Kuhn T. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago University Press,
Chicago.
Luhmann N. (1990) Comunicazione ecologica, Franco Angeli, Milano.
Luhmann N. (2000) La realt dei mass media, Franco Angeli, Milano.
Luhmann N. (2001) Sistemi Sociali. Fondamenti di una teoria generale, Il Mulino,
Bologna.
Luhmann N. e De Giorgi R. (2003) Teoria della societ, Franco Angeli, Milano.
Luhmann N. (2006) Amore come passione, Bruno Mondadori, Milano.
Pitasi A., Ferone E. (2009) Il Tempo Zero del Desiderio, McGrewHill, Milano.
Pitasi A., (2010) Teoria sistemica e complessit sociale, Aracne, Roma.
Pitasi A., (2011) Le monde hyperhumain. Systmes juridiques et changement social,
LHarmattan, Paris.
Severino E. (1980) Legge e caso, Adelphi, Milano.
Spencer Brown G. (1969) Laws of forms, Allen and Unwin, London.
Tam T. (1989) Demarcating the Boundaries Between Self and the Social: The
Anatomy of Centrality in Social Networks, Social networks, vol. 11, n. 4, pp. 300400.

191

CHAPTER VIII
PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEMIC APPROACH IN RUSSIAN CORPORATE
EDUCATION
by Loktyushina Elena

8.1. Introduction

Nowadays due to the numerous reforms in economy and education and entering
Russia the WTO, corporate education in our country has gained a special significance
and attraction. Its not a secret that knowledge and experience of labor force are the
most valuable resources of business, and they demand attention and talented
management. Solving the tasks of estimating and developing personnel, training is
considered to be not only a means of rising qualification but also a means of
developing business, accumulating managerial experience and improving corporate
management. In this context the necessity of establishing different forms of corporate
educational bodies aimed at regulating the market of educational services and
consolidating the knowledge is becoming evident.
The main reason of setting up corporate universities was the intention to connect the
theoretical bases of professional training to the real needs of business. Changes
started in Russia in the beginning of 90-s have been so profound that they placed
entirely new demands on business education. The other reasons that encouraged the
renovation of the Russian system of professional education were: the shift to a market
economy which caused the urgent necessity of altering the old methods of conducting
business, the lack of managerial and professional skills of the labour force of 90-s,
the growing demand in specialists of a new type.
The first corporate universities in Russia appeared in the 90-s of XX century and
were organized as a department in western companies operated on the Russian
market. The peculiarities of work of transnational corporations allowed them to
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accumulate a significant experience in human resources management taking into


account national and cultural differences.
But what is it a corporate university?
In the modern context a corporate university is a system of internal development and
staff training which is closely connected to the strategies of organizational operating.
It is an organizational structure of the company with four basic functions:
- training employees at all levels;
- knowledge management, which means a system of consolidation the staff
experience and its distribution;
- a united centre of corporate culture and companys values;
- a centre of innovations.
The main objective of a modern corporate university is to provide training in the
required time by the most effective methods to that category of personnel who needs
it. A corporate university has a wider range of objectives than an ordinary personnel
training. These objectives have not only an applied character (teaching the methods
of work and providing the information required for current activities), but also a
strategic one (it is a basis for solving different managerial tasks, closely connected
with business plans and strategies of the company).
The present Russian corporate universities are basically organized as an independent
structure or as a branch of a parent company. They tend to have business relations
with foreign and Russian educational establishments, business schools, grant modern
methods of training with the help of information technologies including e- learning.
Their objectives, principles and content of training correspond to the strategical
priorities of business development of the company. The most famous examples of
corporate universities on Russian enterprises are Severstal, Avtovaz, Norilsky Nikel,
Rosgosstrah, Gasprom and others.

193

8.2. Implementing the Systemic Approach in Russian Corporate Education


The modern Russian corporate education goes through the period of intensive growth
and searching the approaches to the most rational forms of its organizing taking into
consideration the specific features of Russian market and Russian mentality, the
peculiarities of conducting business in Russia. Despite the differences in activities
and strategies of the company management, professionals tend to think that it is
necessary to create a unique model of a corporate university with a clearly formulated
system of competencies, evaluating system and handling effectiveness.
Under these circumstances Russia needs a systemic approach to the corporate
education. It is one of the basic approaches on which the system of corporate training
is being projected. According to this approach the object is considered as a complete
set of items in relations and connections between them, that is, consideration of the
object as a system. While constructing the educational process all aspects: purpose,
content, structure, main course, the technique of all types of lessons, the content of
teaching materials are interconnected and interdependent with the ultimate goal of
corporate education, namely, the preparation of an expert to solve professional
problems according to the mission of the company.
Systemic approach supposes that it should be a system of conceptual teaching
programs which influences the strategy of the company, encourages its further
development, and distributes corporate values and culture. The systemic approach
integrates the analytic and the synthetic method, encompassing both holism and
reductionism and supposes that it should be:
- a system of corporate training closely connected with the strategy and the current
goals of company development,
- a tool of strategical management, an integral part of business processes in the
company,
- a systematic process united by a common concept,
- based on the principle of continuity for all levels of employees. The systems
thinking approach incorporates several tenets:
194

Interdependence of objects and their attributes means that all the components of
educational system exist and function independently having their own goals and
internal structure.
Holism means that elements of the system at the same time form a complex unity
which strives to achieve a final goal.
Goal seeking is seen as a systemic interaction resulting in some goal or final state
such as mapping and developing corporate knowledge of personnel of a company.
Regulation method provides a feedback that is necessary for the system to operate
predictably.
Transformation of inputs into outputs supposes the process by which the goals are
obtained, i.e. practical needs through the system of knowledge exchange and special
organizational forms transform into new competencies of employees of that company.
Differentiation denotes that specialized units of educational system perform
specialized functions with the intention to achieve a particular goal.
Hierarchy ensures that complex wholes are made up of smaller subsystems as system
and ways of knowledge exchange, organizational forms, IT-structure, research and
consulting activities, system of training and development that build a whole system of
a corporate university.
Such approach is being introduced in the corporate university Severstal. The
company Severstal is a complex diversified business whose enterprises are located
all over the country. The largest enterprise of the holding is Cherepovetsk Iron and
Steel Works. These enterprises have different levels of development, different culture,
different traditions and different system of management. The rapid growth of the
holding encourages the management of the company to find the answer to the
question how to make this heterogeneous conglomerate of some measure of
uniformity which could contribute to the growth of its manageability and
effectiveness, how to make this diversity not to become a burden to manage, such an
internal headache but a benefit to the company. In this case its possible to talk about
synergistic effect of addition the brightest and the strongest sides of the various
195

enterprises of holding. One of the answers to this question is that a common business
culture can and should become a unifying systemic mechanism for all this diversity.
Thats why the professional activity of the corporate university Severstal cant be
compared with the training courses of traditional universities and refreshing courses
on enterprises. The main priority of the corporate university is the strategy of
company development which determinates teaching programs and the content of
training. The research activity of corporate university is closely connected with the
need of business. On the one hand the corporate university fulfills the reflexive role
monitoring the performance in the holding; on the other hand it has the task of
searching new opportunities for perspective development of business for each
enterprise of holding in accordance with the principle of interdependence.
Interdependence of objects and their attributes means that all the components of
educational system exist and function interdependently having their own goals and
internal structure but following one mission. Since 2002 the corporate university
Severstal has become a separate legal entity that provides services in teaching,
consulting and researching for internal and external customers, holds HRconferences. At the same time the mission of the corporate university Severstal is
to be an instrument of supporting management decision of top management of the
company and also to be a research, informational, educational, methodical and
consulting center of Severstal holding.
There are two tasks that should be solved by the strategical group Severstal. The
first one is to overcome the difference between its own effectiveness and the
effectiveness of international competitors, and the second one is to respond to the
challenge of globalization. Under these circumstances a corporate university is
becoming a tool that can help find, form and spread rapidly within the holding
companies advanced management experience, management practices aimed at
solving these two problems. The corporate university Severstal is supposed to use
the principle of holism to help the holding companies to establish the common view
on management, common language, rules of business, common approaches to solving
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constantly reproducing and fundamentally new problems, common standards of


management and in this way - a common culture.
The strategical function of the corporate university Severstal is solving the problem
of strategical business planning on many enterprises. The reason is that these
enterprises dont have unique approaches, system of aims projecting on high level
and that is an obstacle for perspective business development. It causes a triple task.
First is to study the situation with business planning, then on the basis of advanced
experience to work out a definite standard, after that to launch it into the real practice
of holding companies in order to spread the successful practice among them. It is the
work that is being performed together with the management of strategic planning of
Severstal company and its corporate university. These two structures working
together study the problem, create an appropriate methodology, train a group of
managers directly involved in the process, create a system of communications, and
make a consulting support. And on the basis of this work all companies prepare
business plans. This triple task is being solved by transformation of inputs into
outputs when practical needs are obtained through the system of knowledge exchange
and special organizational forms that are transformed into new competencies of
employees of that company.
Besides, it is necessary to create a structure which could help the company to launch
new models of behavior and corporate culture, new HR processes. Using the
principle of goal seeking through the development of effective HR instruments,
through building up a system of talents management, in-company teaching of HR
managers, supporting executives in using these instruments the corporate university
helps top managers be more effective and achieve business plans set by the Board of
Director of the company.
This work is organized in the format of Center of Expertise of the corporate
university. This is a classical model of effectively functioning service. Considering
the fact that this process can take a long time the corporate university Severstal
focuses on the developing communications systems. A system of electronic distance
197

learning is being created inside it. It also includes the system of live
communication and the system of searching and problem solving. They are the
powerful data bases that formulize the advanced practices, experience, technologies.
The data bases are a specific e-library where managers, specialists who search
problems solving can find the necessary information. And in case this practice is
becoming accessible, the process of finding an answer to the burning question is
sharply reduced. It also provides a regulation feedback that is necessary for the
system to operate predictably. Maintaining this kind of virtual competence centers for
various business functions is the task of the corporate university.
An equally important task for the holding which requires a decision today is working
out a common management system in a huge number of enterprises the total number
of which exceeds one hundred twenty. For this purpose more than 20 management
standards should be developed. Among them are the standard in the field of strategic
business planning, standards of financial control, standards in the field of personnel
management, information technology, and social activities. It is done through
implementation of projects based on the principle of differentiation when specialized
units of educational system perform specialized functions in projects support with the
intention to achieve a particular goal.
This task is performed by the Centre of Internal Consulting which deals with
consulting services within the company particularly for each project creating the
system of strategical business planning, organizational diagnostics of the company,
setting up human resources services and other projects which ensure positive changes
in the company. This Centre is also involved in the process of establishing the human
resources system in the holding for it not only effectively to represent standard HRservices but to become a business partner for top management in achieving strategical
goals. They are also the projects of key management development and creating the
system of strategical leadership (Talent Pool, Perspective a program for young
specialists, Top - 100 a program of training the core worker of the company).

198

In 2010 a new structural unit Department for Attracting and Staff Developing was set
up. This department encompasses all the PR processes concerning talent management
in the modern sense: attracting, selection, adapting, performance management,
research and development, succession management. All these have direct connection
with the strategy of the holding.
It was also decided to reallocate an internal consulting because many strategical
projects within the company in which consultants of the corporate university are
involved are being developed now. Department for Attracting and Staff Developing
is not a separate unit but an internal structure of the company. It produces a
psychological effect as the department has a complex matrix structure. It means that
being a Center of Expertise the Department is responsible for setting corporate targets
for which the divisional structures adopt corporate instruments and processes. The
department has the close interaction with these divisions and gets feedback at the end
of the year. It is a major change in the system of corporate training as earlier divisions
themselves set targets for the corporate university.
In Severstal the process of integration, united around a common center of all
divisions, distribution and service companies according to the principle of hierarchy
is aimed at creating competitive advantages in the changed business area after the
crisis of 2008. The role of a corporate university had become a key and strategic
again as the company was reorganized from decentralized to a centralized company.
Hierarchy ensures that educational complex is made up of smaller subsystems as
systems and ways of knowledge exchange, organizational forms, IT-structure,
research and consulting activities, system of training and development that build the
whole system of a corporate university Severstal.

199

8.3. Conclusion

Thus, in the last decade Russian corporate education has experienced a spectacular
development. It has grown both quantitatively and qualitatively adapting itself to new
Russian economic and social realities. And the corporate university Severstal is a
bright example of such growth.
Nowadays we observe a tendency of global moving and the interest of American and
European corporate universities to each other, and also their vital concern about
Russian market and penetrating in it. It is evident that we need to create the united
platform for mutual cooperation and informational enlargement based on the
systemic approach with the aim to develop the corporate education in the world. Such
platform will help to connect education with different forms of business and create
fruitful relations among three major participants of this market: business companies,
educational establishments and state.

Literature:
1 .. .. :
. / . Alma Mater. 3 2009
2 Mechitov A. Moshkovich H. Specifics and Dynamics of Russian Business
Education. http://www.westga.edu/~bquest/2004/russia.htm
3 Systems thinking. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_thinking

200

CHAPTER IX
HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE
by Jiri Subrt

In this paper I will work with the terms historical consciousness and collective
memory. These concepts are closely related, but not interchangeable, at least not
permanently. Better known and more elaborated in literature is the topic of collective
(or "social") memory.50 In this text, I will pay more attention to the other, less
analyzed, problem of historical consciousness. My intention is to show how both
concepts can be interconnected and captured within the of systems theory.

9.1. Memory and Media


First, it must be remembered that the problem of memory was delineated from the
system perspective in the sociology of Niklas Luhmann, and following him, Elena
Esposito (2002) paid great attention to it. The system approach of both authors shows
an interesting aspect which it is appropriate to mention: while memory is generally
associated mostly with the storage of information, paradoxically the key operations of

50 In recent decades French scholars especially have set the tone of research on collective memory (2010).
Some of the research that has been conducted by the historian Pierre Nora, known for his project Les lieux de
mmoire (1984 1992), also extends into sociology. Tzvetan Todorov (1998) in France, known for his
studies on peoples behaviour in extreme situations during the Second World War, draws on the method of
oral history. In sociology, Grard Namer (1987, 2000) has been instrumental in rediscovering and finding
contemporary applications for the work of Maurice Halbwachs, and he emphasises the plurality of forms of
collective group memory and shows how this concept can become the subject of sociological research.
Danile Hervieu-Lger, the author of La religion pour mmoire (1993), departs from the premise that every
religion encompasses in itself a specific activation of collective memory. The philosopher Paul Ricur, in
his The book La mmoire, l'histoire, l'oubli (2000), examines from a historical-philosophical perspective the
relationship between experience and historical memory, responsibility for the past, questions of guilt, and the
space for forgiveness. In German-speaking countries, the subject of social and cultural memory has been
most notably addressed in the work of Jan Assmann (2001, 2007) and Aleida Assmann (2006, 2009). In the
U.S., Jeffrey K. Olick (2007, 2011) in particular is currently developing the topics of research and the
politics of memory.

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memory are selection51 and deletion. Our sense organs permanently capture a large
number of impulses. Most of these are not significant for us, but the brain is capable,
from this stream of mostly unimportant information, of setting aside those that
deserve our attention and should be stored in memory. In subsequent recollections
from memory all the information does not appear at once, but selectively. Bergson
(2003) attributes this selective attention to practicality and usefulness; remembrance
is updated if it suits the situation, serving in dealing with current or future problems.
In a similar vein French researcher Tzvetan Todorov points out that memory is by no
means in opposition to oblivion. Memory is always the interaction of two poles that
form deletion (i.e. forgetting) and storage. Full restoration of the past is
absolutely impossible because memory is necessarily a specific choice (Todorov,
1998b: 93 - 94)52.
Systems theory, including among its leading representatives the German sociologist
Niklas Luhmann, allows us to understand these mechanisms. The basic life strategy
of systems, according to Luhmann, is the reduction of complexity (1984). For every
social and psychological system the world appears extremely complex and systems
can exist in it only because they reduce this complexity. From the perspective of
systems theory, complexity means mainly that there are always more options than can
be realized. Systems cannot utilize everything that is potentially possible to use or
process, and they must, in order to maintain their existence, reduce the number of
options. Complexity is therefore always associated with a selection that allows
something and at the same time excludes something. Memory cannot keep everything.
On the contrary it must act selectively to reduce complexity and stabilize only what
was selected.
51 In psychology, it is assumed that within this selection at the individual level, the principle of economy is
applied (limited memory capacity is utilized to store the most important information) and a tendency to
maintain balance and clarity (people better remember information that corresponds with their experience and
attitudes).
52 The fact that human memory does not record information in a fixed way like computer memory, has,
despite its apparent disadvantages, a great importance. If our memory were too solid, it would not be
adaptable enough. Because we live in a world that is constantly changing, we have to record these changes
and to store them in memory. Therefore the memory is so equipped that if necessary the stored information
can be modified and changed.

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From the perspective of the systems theory of social (or collective) memory that is
applied in contemporary sociology, it can be stated that the relationship between
forgetting and remembering is historically evolving and corresponds with the
evolutionary development of society. The development of media extends the
possibilities and range of communicated topics, which also means a change in the
structure of memory. Before the invention of writing, the themes of communication
were limited and all had to be remembered. The invention of writing and later on the
printing press, for example, required (but also triggered off) more discreteness and
less contextually bound themes. When we read a book, we are in a different context
than its author and thus we need more "redundancy" to understand the content. At the
same time, because we do not have to know all the subjects thoroughly - they are
stored in books - we can forget more. We are even able to talk about topics about
which our knowledge is scanty, because we can look them up in books. Writing
therefore conditioned the extension of the variety of our topics (Esposito, 2002: 3235); the more the ability to save, the more can be forgotten. In addition to writing and
the printing press another milestone is the development of computer memory. At the
present time of computerization it is possible to trace anything, and so we can forget
many things. Memory complexity is thus directly proportional to the extent of
forgetting and the computer can be considered as a new form of memory (ibid., 2002:
30).
The relationship between media and memory was dealt with in the 1990s by Aleida
and Jan Assmann. The key role in the development of social memory, according to
these authors, is played by media evolution, in which phases of oral transmission,
writing, and audio-visual media can be distinguished. Phased transformations of
social memory in terms of media evolution are shown in Table 9.1., in which aspects
of encoding, storing and circulation are differentiated.

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Oral

Writing

Electronic
Media

Encoding

Symbolic codes

Alphabetic codes

Nonverbal
codes,
Artificial
languages

Storage

Bounded

by

the Transferred through Boundless

human memory

the speech to text

documentatio
n possibilities

Circulation

Celebrations

Books

Audio-visual
media

Table 9.1 Social Memory in phases of media evolution ((Assmann Assmann, 1994: 139)

Inspired by the Assmanns, Andr Donk later tried to revise this scheme to distinguish
in it the periods of written and printed writing. In Donk's summary (Table 9.2.) there
are also dimensions of circulation and social consequence, which can take into
account contemporary globalization trends.

Orality

Literacy

Print

Electronic
Media

Storage

Personal

Scripture

Book

Digital Media

Recitation,

Solitary reading

Globalized

Holders
Circulation/

Rituals

Communication

Lecturing,

Media Networks

Collective
reading
Social Effects

Small

Standardization

Communities,

of

Village

Education

Broad

Transnational

Knowledge; Transmission of Communities

Enlarged

of Knowledge

in

National States

Communities
Table 9.2 The media, memory and social change (Donk, 2009: 17)

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Similarly, Elena Esposito (2002) identifies, in connection with media development,


four types of memory. However her definition is less based on the phenomenal aspect
of the problem and tries to look deeper into the transformation of memory from the
perspective of its internal functioning. Esposito distinguishes four types of memory:
divinatoric memory, rhetorical memory, memory as a culture and memory as a
network.
Divinatoric memory, prophetic memory, is strongly tied to context, which was made
possible by the media of non-alphabetic writing. The organization of archaic societies
would not have been possible without this writing, but at the same time it is also true
that the development of non-alphabetic writing was accelerated by the development
of a given method of social organization. This type of writing does not differentiate
between a subject and a wildcard symbol, which are seen as identical. Non-alphabetic
writing can express all that one knows, but however not new and unknown things
(ibid. 44-47).
In system theory an essential feature is the process of structuring the relationship
between system elements, where the system (in an observable way) is bordered by its
environment. This allows the basal operations of the system, which have the
character of observation. Following up the concept of British mathematician and
logician George Spencer-Brown (1969), Luhmann (1984: 100) defines basic
operations such as differentiation and labelling. In principle therefore the functioning
of the system is carried out by the basic operation, which is observation; the way the
system observes, that is to say differentiates and identifies its options, creates identity
and difference: identity is marked, difference unmarked. Each subequent observation
can either confirm a previous observation, or correct it. The meaning of divinatoric
memory lies in the fact that remembering enables the system to structure its
observation and control the relationship between what is essential and what is
unimportant, between contingency and necessity, between things changeable and
eternal.

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Rhetorical memory was developed in Ancient Greece, but reached its peak in the late
Middle Ages. The medium of this memory is alphabetic writing, which offers the
opportunity to learn from information which the reader did not know before.
Alphabetic writing is also able to express all differences and nuances. Movement in
memory is similar to procedures in rhetoric. Memory is associated with a variety of
techniques and rules for storage, organized on the principle of mnemonics. The
mnemonic method is usually based on the concept of localization of memorized
information in certain imaginary spaces of a building with many rooms. In these
rooms, not whole memories but just images are stored. In mnemonic culture books do
not serve as a memory, but only as a mnemonic support. To find the appropriate
memory, we have to find its room in our mind. According to this idea memory holds
all images, but they are sometimes just misplaced (ibid.156-159). If we cannot
remember something, it does not mean that we have forgotten it, but only that there
was a saving error.
Using the term Culture Memory Esposito refers to the next phase in the development
of memory, which occurred with the development of the letterpress. Printed books
then are widely available and used as a secondary memory. That which we do not
need, we can forget. Letterpress also changes communication. There is asymmetry:
the source is not available to the recipient and vice versa. There is also a
standardization of communication, which is now the same for all recipients, and
respectively it is addressed to standardized recipients. The recipient then becomes an
increasingly more active participant in the text, because he interprets standardized
text (ibid. 191-194). The idea of memory moved from the ancient model of a
repository to an archive model. The archive differs from the repository in the fact that
we store material in it in such a way that we are able to find it later. Its focus is
organization and accessibility (books are no longer arranged mnemonically as in the
ancient times; their arrangement does not correspond to the principles of memory;
they are arranged for example alphabetically). It raises the possibility of 'oblivion' - if
we can trace everything, we do not have to keep everything in our head.
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Network Memory is a new kind of memory originating at the time of postmodernism.


Memory abandons the idea of the archive in which documents are stored, and along
with that also the idea of the document as an information carrier in general. The
change also applies to communication media. While the mass media was addressed to
everyone anonymously, in the case of new media personalization re-emerges. Now
we can frame the information that we receive exactly according to our needs. One can
talk about mass customization, with a medium that even in mass production can adapt
to the customer (ibid. 300-301). There comes a time of virtual information, namely
information existing only in the virtual world. The best analogy for this kind of
memory is a network - a non-hierarchical model that holds the individual nodes
together. In this type of procedural memory connections mean more than content
(ibid. 339-342). This new type of memory allows forgetting completely. Memory is
now a performative model; it is virtual memory in which not information but
individual decisions are stored. A typical example is the so-called search engine, or
rather search machines such as Yahoo or Google, which when entering a query,
create a search and a memory structure according to the users command.
9.2. Historical Consciousness

The concept of historical consciousness has been used and elaborated in a number of
professional contexts. The first was in German philosophy, where the concept
Geschichtsbewutsein appeared. In the 19th century it appeared in the philosophy of
life of Wilhelm Dilthey (1910/ 1981), followed in the 20th century by Hans Georg
Gadamer (1979) in his hermeneutical philosophy. Geschichtsbewutsein in this
concept is seen as a prerequisite for the understanding and interpretation of past
events. It is a consciousness able to judge the past according to itself, not the
standards and prejudices of the present time.
In the 1970's some German experts on the issue of teaching history began to work
with the concept of Geschichtsbewutsein (Bodo von Borries (1988,1990, 1995),
Karl - Ernst Jeismann (1988), Hans Jrgen Pandel (1987), Jrn Rssen (1994, 2001)
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and others), but in a somewhat different context than that presented by philosophical
hermeneutics. In their approaches, the term is associated primarily with the question
of educative activities, and meaningful connections between the idea of the past and
orientations towards the present and the future.
Other suggestions then came in the 1980's from the area of narrative psychology,
which developed particularly in the U.S. (Jerome S. Bruner (1990), Theodore R.
Sarbin (1986)), but which also found expression in Germany (Jrgen Straub (1998,
2005)). This psychological direction, working with the concept of Historical
Consciousness (Historisches Bewutsein)53, emphasized that people view their lives
as stories whose versions they present to others, adapted to current life situations.
Jrgen Straub combines historical consciousness with historical narrative
construction and historical meanings in the field of the human mind (Straub, 2005:
48-49). Peter Seixas defines historical consciousness as well as individual and
collective understandings of history, which are influenced by cognitive and cultural
factors (Seixas, 2004: 10). It is essential that part of historical consciousness is a
historical understanding of the present and the future. Jrn Rsen characterizes
historical consciousness as a specific mode of orientation which is used in solving
current situations (Rsen, 2004: 66). So already we can see that historical
consciousness is to be understood not only as a complex of knowledge, perceptions
and ideas about the past, but primarily as an awareness of certain specific contexts (or
continuities, discontinuities and changes) between the past (stored in the collective
memory), the present and the future; as a consciousness which has contributed to
shape people's attitudes towards the present and the future.
In our approach, historical consciousness can be defined as an entity shaped by the
interplay of certain components. One of these components is lived historical
experience (lived personally, eventually transmitted through interpersonal contact).
Another is ideology, particularly state ideology, as states and their regimes use
ideological interpretations of history for their legitimation; a certain role is
53The term Historisches Bewutsein gradually pushes next to the term Geschichtsbewutsein even in
Germanenvironment. See,e.g. (Straub 1998, Georgi-Ohliger, 2009).

208

undoubtedly played by the ideology of political parties. The third component (not in
terms of importance) is the knowledge produced by historiography and historical
science. The fourth is what is called collective memory. In addition to these
components other influences can be considered- for example the ways that culture,
family, school, religion, art and media express themselves. These effects, however
can be considered under the above-mentioned four headings, as through them comes
knowledge from lived historical experience, ideological or scientific knowledge, and
collective memory.
It is worth adding that the four mentioned essential components (lived historical
experience, the ideological interpretation of history, and pieces of knowledge of
historiography and historical science and collective memory) are not completely
separate. The boundaries between them are not clearly drawn but rather blurred;
individual areas overlap. Nevertheless for clarity of thought it is useful to distinguish
them.
Experience has the character of a knowledge which is different from the knowledge
acquired by learning, reading or studying, and it can sometimes be in sharp contrast.
Historical experience, unlike other types of experience - often of a partial or specific
nature -, is a quite comprehensive category close to what is regarded as life
experience; both types of experience overlap, but they cannot be declared identical.
Various individual experiences are frequently transferable and communicable with
difficulty. By contrast, historical experience is a conception logically related to the
content of collective (group, generational, social or national) character in two senses:
first, because large groups of people have been exposed to certain historical events,
and then because these lived-through events become the subject of collective
reflection and interpersonal communication in which the experiences and lessons
learned from them are transferred to others, including members of subsequent
generations, especially by language tools.
Ideology represents a relatively complete set of views, ideas and values, based on the
formulation of the interests of a certain group, class or state. Ideologies are above all
209

associated with areas of policy, but also impact other spheres of social life. In the
social sciences they used to be considered double-edged: positively they act as a kind
of social glue integrating the collective body; negatively they are criticised as part of
a false consciousness (Marx), imposed upon people to justify or legitimize certain
forms of social organization, power manipulation or oppression.
Dealing with historical consciousness, it is necessary to pay special attention to state
ideology. Many inspiring ideas on this subject have been formulated by Pierre
Bourdieu, who speaks of symbolic order and symbolic violence where the
education system and compulsory public education have become its instrument. This
is how the state instils common forms and categories of perception and thinking,
understandings of the social framework, cognitive structures and the "state form of
classification, thereby creating the conditions for common habits (mental structures)
which are prerequisite for achieving a specific type of social consensus (Bourdieu,
1998: 88-89). Thus the state contributes to the formation of what is called the identity
or national character.
Historiography, as the systematic recording of events and processes occurring in the
past, is the predecessor of today's historical science, which tries by means of
professional methodology to obtain, critically analyze, systematize and explain
findings related to history. Contemporary historical science has many sub-disciplines
which focus on exploring the history of the world, national history, territorial history,
the history of human culture, politics, economy, everyday life, etc.
Collective memory is composed of contents which can be mythical conceptions,
legends, memories of historical events and personalities, traditions or customs.
Maurice Halbwachss concept of collective memory assumes that collective life is a
source of both memories themselves, and also the terms which these memories
embody. Different communities of people as subjects of collective memory constitute
the social frameworks in which the specific contents of this memory are located.
Individual memory is a place of specific interconnection of collective memories of
various social groups. By contrast, in terms of the group the key issue is the
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distribution of knowledge among its individual members. Someone who participates


in the collective memory thereby certifies his or her group affiliation.
In contemporary humanities, great attention is paid to the relationship between
history as science, and collective memory. Similarity and continuity in the standing
of the group is emphasized by collective memory, according to Halbwachs, while
history perceives discontinuity and difference. Group memory has a tendency to
emphasize its own distinctness from its environment, which means what
differentiates the group's history from those of other groups, and what is considered
unique to it. History, meanwhile, levels out all such differences and reorganizes its
facts in a homogeneous historical space (Halbwachs, 1950: 74-75).
Pierre Nora talks about the situation in Western countries. The separation between
collective memory and history, which for a long period overlap, comes when a
spontaneous national memory, representing the transfer of memories from generation
to generation, begins to be replaced by a deliberate and tactical construction of
national history within the framework of history. Today, due to this separation,
memory and history may contradict each other (Nora, 1984: XIX).
Paul Ricoeur (2000) believes that while history primarily concerns verification and
finding truth, the main ambition of memory - involved in the construction of identity
of individuals and groups is to maintain loyalty to roots. In Ricoeurs eyes both
goals are legitimate, but need to be balanced, restricting neither memory nor history.
History, which views the past detachedly, seeking an objective view on past events,
enables the memories of individual groups to lose their exclusivity and opens the way
to dialogue. We have seen that the lived historical experience, (state) ideology and
the findings of historians and collective memory, represent mutually interacting
components of historical consciousness.

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9.3. Historical Consciousness and Collective Memory in the systemic Perspective

For a further shift in our thinking we were inspired by the American sociologist
Talcott Parsons and his AGIL scheme, which we will use as a kind of heuristic model.
Prerequisite for the application of Parsons' approach is the notion that historical
consciousness can be regarded as a social system. Social systems consist of
communications in which certain meanings are communicated; in this case specific
meanings with historical content.
Any social system, according to Parsons, can endure only if it ensures the
implementation of four basic functions, which are: adaptation (A), achieving goals
(G), integration (I) and maintenance of latent cultural patterns (L) (Parsons, 1971: 55).
In Parsons systematic models each of these four basic functions were associated with
a certain functionally specialised sub-system.
In our case function (A) can be identified with lived historical experience, (G) with
the ideological interpretation of history, (I) with historical scientific knowledge and
(L) with collective memory. Adaptation (A) we understand as (re)definition of a
current situation resulting from a specific historical event. Goals (G) can be
associated with the selection of historical subjects serving legitimization mechanisms.
Integration (I) is brought about by individual conceptions of historical science
conceiving a coherent, internally integrated and logically organized complex.
Maintaining latent cultural patterns (L) is a matter of collective memory, whose task
is to transfer the most important contents from the past to the present.
A point to note is that Parsons considerations do not end with a simple breakdown of
four basic functions and subsystems, as two other important systemic aspects are
highlighted. The first is that systemic differentiation occurs within the individual
subsystems and again has the form of the AGIL scheme. 54 The second is that,

54 The problem we are dealing with leads to the fact that I focus our attention on the application of the AGIL
scheme in relation to historical consciousness and collective memory. In this note, however, I suggest that
such a scheme can be applied to other subsystems.

212

between these functionally differentiated subsystems, mutual communication and


interpenetration take place.

The possibility of looking through the prism of the AGIL scheme at historical experience I would like to
outline in a hypothetical way, freely inspired by interpretive sociology: (A) processing of new experience;
(G) ascription of importance of this experience with regard to the choice of the optimal strategy for action;
(I) placement of experience within the framework of a stock of knowledge; (L) transfer of experience to
others, especially in intergenerational transmission and education.
The AGIL of the ideological system can be outlined so that we come out with a generally shared assumption
of the four functions which ideologies perform: (A) ideological explanations of social events; (G)
establishing criteria for evaluating past and future events (in the sense of "good" and "bad", "desirable" and
"undesirable"); (I) consciousness connecting a particular ideology with some collective body and its
program; (L) the maintenance, defense and reproduction of the fundamental ideological principles in the
framework of propaganda, media and educational activities, and ideological polemics.
How AGIL may be applied to the system of historical science I am suggesting, again only hypothetically:
(A) explanation of some historical event, or adoption of a new concept or paradigm shift; (G) design of
research programs, the application of research methods to gain sources and knowledge; (I) the theoretical
and methodological anchoring of historical research in a shared paradigm; (L) the publishing of achieved
knowledge in professional, popular and educational ways.

213

Historical Consciousness
A

Lived historical
experience

Ideological
interpretation of
history

Collective memory

Historiography

Collective Memory
A

Reproduction and
upgrading of memory

Selection of the
dominant elements of
memory

Transfer of traditions

Construction of the
social frames of
memory

The relationship between historical consciousness and collective memory may be


apprehended by analogy with the world of computers. Historical consciousness and
collective memory are interrelated; the relationship can be described as
interdependent. This interdependence is similar to that between computer programs
on the one side and a computer memory and databases on the other. Computer
programs are dependent on computer memory, where they are stored. Even though
these programs can exist without data, if they get some content, the data stored in
databases are necessary. The same is true in reverse: data stored in the databases of
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computer memories may also exist independently, but to work with them a certain
program is needed.
In the case of collective memory, we can identify four types of operation which
correspond to the basic system functions expressed in the AGIL scheme. The
adaptation of the system of collective memory (A) can be looked upon as
reconstruction and memory up-date in its capacity for the constant remaking of
representations of memories on the basis of present requirements. The image of the
past is constantly changing according to the events, priorities and interests of present
society. The setting of memory dominants corresponds to the achievement of goals
(G). The collective memory works selectively. At each moment, it is based only on
those memories that are useful for the legitimizing interpretation of the past,
contributing to the strengthening of collective identity. The function of integration (I)
corresponds to the structure of what Maurice Halbwachs calls "the social framework
of the memory." These frameworks represent a kind of organization of memories or
some structure of representations, providing individuals with orientation points in
space and time and allowing them to remember and localize evoked memories.
Maintaining latent cultural patterns (L) is represented by the transmission of tradition,
rules and customs that have existed from- so to speak- time out of mind, and their
transmission from generation to generation.
Maurice Halbwachs has given his opinion on the issue of the adaptation of the
collective memory to the present. He attributes to collective memory the ability of
constant reconstruction and therefore the continual re-actualization of reference
frames according to the current situation (Halbwachs, 1994: 279). The past is not
maintained as such in any memory, but in the form in which the society captured it at
any particular time and specific social context. To keep the memory alive, it must
conform to the current needs of existing society. Therefore the image of the past must
be repeatedly reproduced in accordance with the priorities, interests and requirements
of the present.

215

Determination of the dominants of memory is related to the difficulty once pointed


out by Henri Bergson (1896/ 2003). Human life, according to the author, is associated
with the continuous creation of memories. In our mind these memories are given
varied weight through selective retrieval. The French philosopher attributes this
selectivity to the practical aspect of usefulness; the memory is updated if - so to
speak- it comes in useful. Reflections on dominant memories are found even in
Halbwachs (1994: 290); the collective memory in his conception selects those
elements from the past which shape the identity of the given group partly by
emphasizing the uniqueness of the group, and partly by arousing feelings of time's
passage. The theme of selectivity is also one of the central problems of Paul
Ricoeurs concept of "work of memory" (Ricoeur, 2000). Even for him, memory is a
means of selecting what should not be forgotten, and the intellectual construing of the
past.
As for integration memory, according to Halbwachs, constitutes, makes functional,
and reproduces, in social frameworks created by people living in society; within these
frameworks our memories are evoked and fixed; the weighted recollection of
something is determined by them. These frameworks are not rigid but dynamic
structures formed by elements that represent and organize our recollection. They
include orientation points in space and time: historical, geographical, biographical;
political concepts, common experience and familiar perspectives (Kvasnickova,
2005: 35).
Tradition ensures the maintenance of latent cultural patterns. Tradition usually means
a cultural heritage transmitted from generation to generation. The contents of this
heritage are diverse and consist of cultural patterns, religious beliefs, myths, rumours,
legends, rules, instructions, recipes, traditions, customs, manners and rituals. Social
groups constitute themselves on the basis of common recollection; they protect and
guard their traditions. Important in relation to this are the uniqueness resulting from
differentiation from the surrounding world, the consciousness of identity, and the
time duration ensured by carefully memorised facts and their selection. Anthony
216

Giddens (2000: 52) points out that much of what we think of as traditional, and
steeped in the mists of time, is actually a product at most of the last couple of
centuries, and is often much more recent than that. Some traditions, the author claims,
were faked-up or artificially manufactured. From ancient times, there has been a
tendency to modify and complement the past, which is evidenced by, inter alia, a
number of historical forgeries.
The AGIL scheme describes theoretically how historical consciousness and collective
memory function as systems that handle a particular type of human knowledge (this
processing takes place in a way that is inherent in individual subsystems and their
mutual cooperation). But this scheme does not constitute the only structure which
must be taken into account; other structures can be observed in historical
consciousness and collective memory. One of the essential characteristics of both
concepts is that they have vehicles, which are individuals, groups, classes, strata,
generations and, after all, society as a whole. Both systems have certain means of
institutional support and information. Another essential feature is also the processing
of certain information with regard to its time-space and factual subject matter. It
follows that at least six structures in historical consciousness and collective memory
can be identified, which mutually intersect and influence each other:
- Systemic Structure (described using the AGIL scheme);
- Institutional Structure (educational system, archives, institutes, museums,
memorials, holidays, memorial ceremonies);
- Structure of information resources (literature, education, media);
- Stratification Structure (differentiation of classes, strata and social groups);
- Generational Structure;
- Content Structure (differentiation of information in time, space and substance).

217

The shaping principles of these structures produce different types of discourse55


which may come into mutual confrontation. The essential thing is that the individual
systems process history uniquely, which generates a certain polycontextuality: one
historical event (e.g. liberation in the year 1945) is viewed in different contexts, and
thus looks different with respect to lived experience, ideological interpretation,
historical science or collective memory; in addition, the approach can be
differentiated to reflect social classes, groups and generations, and can be classified
into different content frames (temporal, spatial and substantive). As a result, there can
be various disagreements, and even attempts to acquire the dominant position in
relation to other systems and discourses, which may be the goal of ideology or
historical science. The passionate polemics which have taken place in this field
indicate that the matter of historical consciousness and memory is not just an
academic problem, but also very serious political issue.

References
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Geschichtspolitik. Mnchen: Beck.
Assmann, A. (2009) Erinnerungsrme: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen
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Assmann, J. (2001) Kultura a pamet: Pismo, vzpominky a politicka identita
v rozvinutych kulturach staroveku. Praha: Prostor.
Assmann, J. (2007) Religion und kulturelles Gadtnis. Mnchen: Beck.
Baron, S. et al. (2006) Les petites patries. Histoire et mmoire dans les journaux de
ville: fabrique de lidentit collective. Mmoire de licence en Sciences de lducation.
Universit Paris XII, UFR SESS STAPS. Sous la direction de Bndicte Goussault.
55 Discourse of historical experience e.g. manifested most clearly in inter-individual communication; the
discourse of ideological interpretation in political argumentation; the discourse of historians on the pages of
professional books and magazines, and the discourse of collective memory in imaginative literature, film,
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CHAPTER X
FROM OBJECTS TO SYSTEMS. FROM SYSTEMS TO NETWORKS?
by Fabio Introini

10.1. Sociology and complexity: which relationships?

This article will be focused mainly on complexity. Or, better, it tries to answer a
question: how to think of a sociology of complexity? It could be quite surprising to
rise such a foundational question in front of the very long history of complexity and
sociology relationship and, mainly, in front of the current and widespread fashion,
among the social sciences, for complexity (Urry, 2003 and Urry, 2005). Our
impression is, however, that this re-discovering of complexity entails some
paradoxical consequences, for example the oblivion of its implications at the
sociological
foundational level, that made of it a central epistemological matter in the sociology of
the Classics.56
At the present, we have in fact two discourses about complexity which sociology
tries to incorporate in its domain. The first one, that I will call neo systemic and
which is the dominant, and the second one, that I will call anthropological, which is
as well widespread but in a less evident way. The first one is represented by the so
called Complexity Sciences and it may be considered the more cutting edge
version, via Chaos theories and Prigogines dissipative structures, of Cybernetics and
Systemics. The second one is the re-presentation under the complexity umbrella, of
the most famous statements of Postmodernism. I call it anthropological and not
postmodernist for several reasons: first, because in the field of Sociology, Systems
56

This oblivion, sometimes, extends even towards the most ambitious attempt to re-write sociology under
the sign of complexity, that is Luhmanns theory. At this regard it is worth stressing the fact that important
and recent writings on Social Sciences and Complexity refer to Luhmann only in a very hurried and critical
way (see for example Urry, ed. 2005 and Urry, 2003).

222

theorists such as Luhmann are considered as postmodernist and the same Luhmann
used to define himself as a postmodernist sociologist; second, because the discourse I
call anthropological funds its arguments and turns its attention mainly on culture and
cultural differences; third, because it reminds the most radical outcomes of Geertz
(postmodernist) anthropology; fourth, because it is more sensitive to philosophical
anthropology; last, it may be considered as the follow-up of the so called Linguistic
Turn in the humanities and in the social sciences and, as it is well known,
Linguistic Turn has ist roots in the dialogue between anthropology and philosophy57.
The thesis I want to enhance in this paper is twofold. First: none of these approaches
can fund a full sociology of complexity because telling in advance my conclusion
in the first one complexity does too much, but starting from a restricted definition
that entails an excessive closure of that radical epistemological openness entailed by
complexity itself. In the second one, instead, complexity gets a much wider and
comprehensive definition, but does too little, from the point of view of its
sociological employment. Complexity, in other words, becomes no more than a
simple hint and a reminder of the relativeness of human knowledge and of the
structural openness of the world against our attempts to force it into our rational
schemes and categories. As such, complexity represents nothing more than a scenery,
a landscape, always present in our analysis of the social but at the same time
methodologically unhelpful and unable to produce authentic innovation58. Second:
the question of complexity is the same foundational question of sociology but the
57

Last but not least because Cilliers (2005) puts inside the postmodernist galaxy even those intellectual
positions he calls modest first of all Derridas Deconstruction that, according to his perspective, are
nearer to our third way. A modest position is, very shortly, a theory which, even recognizing the limits of
human knowledge, avoids mere relativism. So Cilliers believes that postmodernism is a too broad category,
including bad that is too vague weak and open theories and good ones such as Deconstruction (cfr.
2005: 256). So he seems to get near our distinction identifying a systemic complexity, bad (vague)
postmodernism and good postmodernism (the third way). But even if he is afraid that an ideological and
adical refusal of postmodernism could cause the dismiss of the good postmodernism too, he doesnt offer
a part from the concept of modest theories other labels in order to distinguish them from
postmodernism tout court. This shows, however, how much the discourse on complexity and a more general
philosophical tradition are linked.
58
Such a generic reference to complexity is for example used as a background definition of
contemporary society when scholars want to legitimate their recourse, at the empirical level, to qualitative
research techniques.

223

present fashion for complexity hinders sociology from setting its relationship with
complexity at this deeper level.
So a path into sociology of complexity should be placed side by side with a
sociology of sociology trying to explain and deconstruct the current way this
dialogue is carried on. Even if this is not the place to delve into that question, we
can outline that many of these reasons are linked to the ability of complexity
sciences to monopolize the discourse about complexity and to present themselves
in a very seductive way - on the scientific stage as a kind of new science. Some
scholars such as Thrift (1999) and Suteanu (2005) have also stressed the
capability of complexity sciences to seduce not only scholars but also the common
people and the pop imagery by means of their very suggestive words and
concepts such as Chaos and the wide use of a peculiar kind of new images and
illustrations (such as Lorenzs Strange Attractor). According to Thrift, this
happens mainly because complexity reveals itself first and mainly as a kind of
new sensibility 59in the widespread western awareness.
Lets start our recognition from the reasons for which sociology is turning its
attention to complexity, re-discovering it. It is quite easy to find them in
globalization. Globalization, and its radical release of differences, has vanished the
epistemological and ontological premises of our idea of (social) order, jeopardizing
the traditional criteria that made our social world intelligible. This unintelligibility
has increased, at the phenomenological level, the impression of chaos (in the
mere, ordinary meaning of lack of order). It is in front of this loss and of the
consequent sense of dismay and uncertainty, that Sociology turns its attention to
complexity and the ways it has been conceptualized and that, as already stated, can be
reduced to the neo-systemic and the anthropological path.
In facts, the first way to react to this intelligibility crisis consists in following
complexity and chaos sciences, which represent the more tempting and easier way to

59

The existence of such a sensibility was acknowledged also by Hayles (ed, 1991).

224

overcome it60. The mere existence of them sounds like a promise of solution, as if the
key to control and manage complexity were already available and simple, as a
readymade and furthermore still fully scientific paradigm. According to this
approach, complexity is not the revenge of chaos over order, of the irrational
against science. On the contrary, it is possible to find the laws of chaos (as stated
years before by Prigogine), it is possible, and no more oxymoronic, to come to a
science of chaos. If we see chaos it is only because we are still involved in the
modern idea of science, its idea of order funded on linear determinism (Bertuglia
and Vaio, 2003 and 2011) and on an objectualistic idea of objectivity (Montuschi,
2006). Sciences of complexity, instead, open up to a new, dynamic vision of order,
free from its metaphysical assumptions and rooted mainly in the idea of non-linearity
and emergence.
To follow the anthropological path, instead, means to assume complexity as a
general term, a shortcut to express and accept without sufferance as in a kind of
skepsis all the structural limits of human knowledge and its impossibility to bring
back this overwhelming chaos to any intelligibility. According to this perspective,
complexity is not something we can resolve, or domesticate, neither with a paradigm
shift or the invention of a new science. Complexity, rather, is the final destination
of science, an invitation to limit our observations, always idiosyncratic, to the most
local and contingent dimensions. To the high formalism of neo systemics and the
way in which even admitting a fundamental role for the observer it overlooks
subject as a concrete human being, this approach contrasts an ideology of
concreteness, giving also way to all those components of human subjectivity
sacrificed in the name of science. So its constructivism is really different from the
(neo)systemic one, because it is rooted in a peculiar idea of subjectivity. Subjectivity
must be considered, in this context, as the epistemological consequence of human
finiteness and the limits it puts to rationality. In other words, the observer is thought
of as a man in flesh and bones and his un-rational dimensions are redeemed from
60

Or, at least, this seems the situation in 2005, when a group of scholars, mainly from social sciences, wrote
the special issue of Theory,Culture&Society edited by J. Urry.

225

their confinement imposed by Modernity which conceived them of as obstacles to


remove in order to obtain true access to objective knowledge, that is the pure vision
of the object per se, according to a realistic epistemology. In this perspective, as
already told, the reference to complexity doesnt add much to the post-heideggerian
philosophy and the already known linguistic and hermeneutic turn. Obviously a
discourse on complexity shares several of these ontological and epistemological
statements, and, even more, a discourse on complexity must reconnect to this stream
(Cilliers, 2005), because here it has its roots (Ceruti, 2005).
As we already stated, the re-discovery of these origins is fundamental to avoid quick,
partial and superficial references to complexity, mainly in the social sciences. But
we can also ask: may the reference to complexity say something more or, better,
something different from both the systemic reaction and the anthropologic
acceptance of the limits of our knowledge? Are there authors and theories trying
to re-start their analysis from western science crisis but gaining other outcomes? In
a certain sense, the perspectives we have sketched above can still be considered as
dependent on the cartesian dualism of subject and object, with the systemic
complexity more oriented towards the objective side and the anthropological one
more oriented to the subjective one. In other words, there is still to delve into the
genesis of western science to take into exam its foundations. Not only to deconstruct
it, but also to renew it and to give complexity another chance and another perspective,
a third way. The authors I find very helpful along this path are Edgar Morin and
Bruno Latour, because both set the question of complexity not with direct and abrupt
connection with the contemporary world and its provocations, but with the
necessity to overcome the classic idea of object and nature as defined inside the
discourse of modern or classic science, that is Newtonian Mechanism. But they
also agree in denouncing the persistence that classic science still maintains inside the
scientific community notwithstanding the clear appearance of its crisis during the
first half of the XX Century. A persistence that neither systemics (according to
Morin) managed to avoid.
226

Morin is more at ease in the systemic milieu. In a sense, his gigantic work of La
Methode could be defined as the attempt to redeem systemics from systemics by
bringing in the foreground the idea of organization at the expense of that of system.
Besides, from Le paradigme perdu to La Methode, Morins intellectual production
has an explicit commitment to complexity concept. Latour, instead, doesnt speak of
systems; he prefers to talk about networks. Even the proposal here we make to
position him under the wide umbrella of complexity is actually quite heterodox. It
is worth, as a starting point, summing up, very synthetically, the reasons legitimating
this comparison:
1. Both the authors relate the question of complexity to the emergent crisis of
western science; in particular their first move into the complexity question is to
deconstruct the modern idea of object;
2. Both propose a way of thinking that tries to go beyond the modern, cartesian
dualism.
3. Both are interested in creating new links between epistemology and anthropology;
4. Both develop a peculiar theory of emergence, similar and at the same different
from the one worked out by systemics and complexity sciences;
5. In both the authors this theory of emergence shows very deep implications for
sociology, mainly as regards the old question of the relationship between the
micro and the macro, the local and the global, structure and agency
6. Both are engaged in drawing and proposing a new way to think of the nature,
going beyond its Mechanistic conception.

10.2. Why objects?

As outlined above, Morin and Latour find a common ground in their critic toward the
idea of object as defined inside the classic/modern science discourse61. Obviously, as
the modern object defines itself against the idea of subject and vice-versa, their critic
61

For Morin, see in particular 2001; for Latour see in particular 2005b, 1999 and 2000.

227

of the object opens also a new way to think of the subject. Both Morin and Latour
will end their recognition with a new onto- epistemology62 in which object and
subject are deeply and inextricably interwoven. But this strong relation of coproduction and inter-definition, in the end, radically transforms the old, traditional
idea of them. In their perspective, the idea of object has to be set in very close
relation to the modern idea of nature, that is the product of the modern need to find a
correspondence, in the structure of the real, to that very features stability and
immutability that are the brand of the true and authentic knowledge that is
scientific (Gembillo et alii, 2008). In other words, according to Morin and Latour,
during Modernity objects replace essences63 as grants of order and, consequently, of
intelligibility and objectivity still thought in terms of adaequatio rei et intellectuus
according to a realistic perspective (Ceruti, 2005). Nature begun to be seen in terms
of objects because modernity needed to find an ontological foundation to its idea of
objective science. Sharing this point of view Latour and Morin join the broader
perspective particularly widespread among complexity scholars that describes the
constitution of the Mechanistic Paradigm65 as a manipulation of the real in the name
of science (Prigogine and Stengers, 1999) that transforms nature in that close and
deterministic realm (we still are used to thinking of) and in which its becoming
capability and its processuality is reified in a system of to play with Deleuzes
language repetition without difference68 (cfr Morin, 2001 and 2004; cfr. also
Balandier, 1991). This perspective reached its climax with the Cartesian Dualism that,
in turn, can be considered as the ontological and epistemological basis of Newtonian
Mechanism and the impoverished vision of subject and nature descending from it,
both deprived of the characteristics of the other. If nature has to be close,
deterministic and so repetitive, objects are the best means to transform it that way.
62

I understood the legitimacy of this expression thanks to professor R. Zimmerman.


Latour stresses this equivalence in Latour (2000) and (1999); Morin in the first volume of La Methode
(2001).
65
For a history of Mechanism and an illustration of its principles see Bertuglia and Vaio (2003 and 2011).
68
Cfr Ceruti, (2005 and 2000). According to Ceruti and Prigogine-Stengers this is the reason for which
classic science wasnt able to grasp the authentic nature of becoming, that is a process always open and
always able to produce novelty. In other words, for classic, mechanic science it was impossible to grasp that
mix of deterministic laws and innovation production that is the main characteristic of nature.
63

228

They are in fact self-contained beings69, defined by clear-cut borders71 and to use a
Remotti metaphor (2011) compact and totally full as Parmenides Being. All
features depending on and at the same time granting their autonomy from the subject.
So the problem of gaining a true that is objective knowledge becomes the
problem of the right access73 complicated but possible by the subject, to the
objects74.
According both to Latour and Morin, the end of this objectual perspective is a
consequence of the same scientific progress. More in details: for Morin it is the
consequence of the scientific discoveries and innovations ripened inside some
particular fields of study such as thermodynamics, biology, cosmology, quantum
mechanics: different revolutions sharing, as a common denominator, the abolition of
the idea of (a first) element (Morin, 2001) and the challenge to the classical idea of
order as stability and immutability. For Latour, the end of the object and the
Cartesian Dualism instead has to be linked with the by now impossibility to hide
away what he calls hybrids or, in other words, entities produced by science
itself that we cannot help thinking if not in terms of mix between object and subject
(2009; 2005b). These hybrids show, against the vision of science as a mere,
theoretical gaze, that science has to be understood as a bundle of practices involved
in the production of the reality it studies. It is not by chance that Latours
intellectual career as a sociologist of science begins with the ethnography of

69

For this reason and to differentiate them from his personal idea of object, much more similar to a groovy
network Latour calls them bald objects (Latour, 2000).
71
This discreet view of nature, made of independent objects obeying to eternal rules is the basis of
reductionism, that Morin interprets as the way in which (modern) science can apply to the world its
procedures and methods. But according to him, these procedures and methods dont describe the world but
build the world science needs. Morins critic to reductionism is widespread in his intellectual production. See
in particular Morin (2005, 2000, 2012) and, obviously 2001.
73
This is, in other words, the question of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities (or
properties) that lies at the heart of the Mechanistic view of the world (cfr. Vanni-Rovighi, 1990 and 2007).
74
Latour underlines how this access to the real is the same principle enabling modernity to stress the
epistemological superiority of science with respect to all other forms of human knowledge, because it entails
the possibility to proclaim science extra-territoriality from culture. So, superiority of science becomes the
basis of West superiority towards all the other cultures, that are nothing more than just cultures (see
Latour, 2009). Besides Latour (2000: 45), directly reconnects his critique of modern science with the
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. According to Morin, modern, deterministic science, for
its need of objectivity, dumped all the obstacles to an objective knowledge on the subject (1982: 91)

229

scientific laboratories (1979, 1998)75.


This difference in the approach already shows and let us foresee that Morin and
Latour will choose different paradigms to develop their theories: the latter will
connect more directly the question of science, and its transformation, to an ontoepistemology of the network and will also delve much more into the relationship
between science and politics in a genealogical perspective. The former will join, as
already outlined, with the systemic and cybernetic tradition to reform it.

10.3. Morins meta-complexity

The intellectual trajectory of Morins thought, from the publication of Le paradigme


perdu (1994) forward couldnt have been developed without his encounter with
systemics and cybernetics. Without the works of Bertalanffy and Von Neumann
Morin could not have found his way to join together the epistemological and the
anthropological questions that are at the basis of La Methode. But, in Science avec
conscience (1982) and in the first volume of La Methode, he criticizes, as already
stated, the wasted opportunity represented by the first cybernetics and systemics. In
his opinion, systemics had but at the same time wasted the chance to overcome
the idea of a science built on objects. But this revolution did not take off and, instead
of beginning to treat objects as systems (2001: 112), systems themselves were treated
as objects. This is particularly evident in the field of the social sciences, where the
potentially revolutionary idea of system was still confused, according to Morin, with
the old idea of structure. In particular, according to Morin but Luhmann had still to
develop his social systems theory it is true that sociology following the path
Comte- Pareto-Parsons tried to describe society as a system; but no sociologist
managed to fully develop the consequences, for society itself, of being treated like a
75

Of course even according to Latour new discoveries in science are fundamental for his discourse. But
mainly because they are related to a change in the laboratory practices they required to occur. In particular
for Latour the discovery of the built nature of objects found an important catalyzer in the growing relevance
of the technological sets inside the laboratory.

230

system (2001: 113). At the same time, in cybernetics the idea of system flattened to
that of machine, at its turn conceived of in mechanical terms. Cybernetics was also
too focused on homeostasis and its maintenance and forgot homeorhesis, or, to say it
with the language of complex adaptive systems, negative feedbacks are
overemphasized at the expenses of positive ones. Maybe it is not by chance that
sociology again was mainly attracted by that cybernetics, as we can see in Parsons
Social System.
Anyway, neither the most recent versions of systems theory, such as Adaptive
Complex Systems Theory and the way it is developed at the Santa F Institute is
satisfying. Even if contemporary Adaptive Complex Systems theory is more
concerned with positive feedbacks (Gandolfi, 2008) that put complexity beyond
homeostasis this version of complexity fails at another level. In this highly
specialized field of studies, systems are not (always at least) treated as objects, but
we bump into another epistemological mistake: complexity is considered as a
property of a specific and restricted class of systems that are the so called
complex systems. This is the reason for which Morin calls this approach broadly
diffused in the Santa F Institute restricted complexity (2005). Restricted
complexity is, behind the appearances, too committed to the old, modern idea of
science. According to Morin, instead, every system must be considered as complex,
even his theory can put itself out of human construction horizon. But in this case,
and contrary to what happens in the postmodernism, human construction is not
synonym of total discretion, because the same subject that builds and shapes reality
belongs, via the body and the brain, to that same reality he knows and interprets. This
is, in according to Morin, the gain obtained having broken the human sciences ghetto
and having consequently enhanced a new anthropology rooted in physics and biology
(Morin, 1994).
The radical openness of complexity, taken into account by Morin assuming the

231

anthropological76, postmodernist instance, serves firstly in deconstructing modern


dualism of subject and object but must be extended also to systemics and restricted
complexity to avoid the reification they produce and to eliminate their illusion to
have found a new grammar of the real. At the same time systemics, that Morin,
not by chance, ran into by means of biology, offers the chance to break an insular
concept of man and to root his existence in cosmos and nature (1994). As we learn
from the first pages of Le paradigme perdu, cybernetics unveiled the possibility to
break the borders which separated the physical from the biological and the
anthropo-social domains. For the first time, thanks to the organizational principles
offered by cybernetics, a new (philosophical) anthropology becomes possible: a postdualistic anthropology in which even knowledge and the mental life of the subject
can be understood in continuity with human embeddedness in cosmos and nature.
This because the organizational principles and the new idea of order they disclose,
make possible to think of a different nature that, far from being static, stable,
rigid and immutable becomes able of self-organization so that natural, biological and
human evolution, cognition and social systems organization become very similar and
nested to each other because even if very different in their concreteness
become understandable by virtue of the same organizational principles. Besides,
the dualism subject/nature blurs with the end of the modern idea of nature and with it
came to an end also the necessity to explain, in metaphysical or spiritual terms, all
the subjects highest faculties. It must be stressed that this embedding of
anthropology in biology avoids determinism and physicalism just by virtue of
the new morinian concept of nature as physis (Morin, 2001) and biological life as
auto-eco-organization (Morin, 2004). In this perspective, we dont have determinism
because in the hominization process, culture and nature are not opposite and noncommunicating domains but inextricable and co-producing dimensions: the brain
produces the culture which, in turn, shapes and produces the brain. The result as

76

We are making reference, in this context to the anthropological perspective on complexity as opposed to
the systemic one.

232

underlined by the Italian anthropologist Remotti (2011) is that the brain, culturally
shaped, is, per se, open, making man an incomplete being. It would be helpful, at
this point, to make a comparison, as suggested by Remotti (ibi: 155-156), between
Geertzs and Morins idea of incompleteness. According to Remotti, Morin and
Geertz both share a deep idea of biological incompleteness of man. But while in
Geertz it is possible to find a clear distinction between biology and culture, in Morin
this same distinction blurs. According to Geertz, culture becomes a fundamental
resource in mans life because of his biological incompleteness and consequent
vulnerability: so that culture becomes the first alley of man in his need to shape with
order his world. But culture starts after biology, filling up its lacks. In Morins
anthropology, instead, biological incompleteness is the consequence of the role
played by culture in the same hominization process. That is to say: culture doesnt
add to biology; culture is already inside biology.
At this point systemic and anthropological perspectives on complexity can
exchange each other their respective features, innovating each other. Radical
openness of anthropology becomes a constant reminder of sciences epistemological
limits, even when science proclaims itself, as in systemics, a complexity science. But,
at the same time, it becomes possible to apply the categories of systemics to human
subject giving way to a new anthropology in which, differently from the
postmodern version, all the components of human being rational and un-rational,
spiritual and biological are not merely juxtaposed but in a deeper, circular relation
of co-production.

233

10.4. Latours networks

Even Bruno Latour and his contribution to Actor Network Theory77 funds his
reflections about the necessity to re-overcome subject-object dualism and the modern
idea of science built on it. In a certain sense, the whole ANT may be considered as an
attempt to put into another relationship openness and closure.
The first move by Latour is to deconstruct the idea of object or, more precisely, the
platonism under which objects were still thought in modern science and that put
the stress in their total and firm closeness (1999; 2000; 2009). In this attempt Latour
takes part, with other scholars, in the deleuzian project to substitute to use De
Landas words (2006) assemblages to totalities and essences. And this move is,
first of all, the introduction of a new ontology and epistemology aimed to overcome,
starting from the one opposing subject and object, all the dualisms built on it, such as
society versus nature, society versus technology, humans versus non-humans, local
versus global, micro versus macro.
We dont live in a world of pure and independent realms or domains closed and
unchanging because funded on immutable essences (Latour, 2000, 2009); this is
rather that inheritance of modernity which we have to deconstruct. A world of
assemblages is, to use Latours own words, a world of associations (2005a), hybrids
(2009) and collectives in which the elements we have always tried to keep apart in
those domains are mixed up and interwoven. So collectives are heterogeneous and
are to be thought as the provisional closure and stabilization of hybrid networks
because no essence is aprioristically given to drive as a blueprint their
composition. This is true even for that ones looking so different, at the
phenomenological level, from our common idea of network.
So, exactly how, according to Morin, we have to put disorder before order and to
derive the second from the first, according to Latour we have to put the network
77

On the convergence between complexity theory and ANT see Thrift (1999). In particular he finds the
reasons of this convergence just in the way ANT invites us to an anti-essentialistic way to think of things
(1999: 57). Other important suggestions about this relationship could be found in Urry (ed. 2005).

234

before the objects (and subjects) and to derive them from it. This doesnt mean that
networks substitute objects. We have and need both. We have to go from objects to
networks and back from the network to objects.
This helps us in reminding that objects have always their production conditions. In
our (sociological) analysis, to quote Latours own words, we have to start from
the middle (2009)78, that is from the network, and being able to see objects not
as absolute presences, but as a product, the consequence of an act of production.
We have to recognize how they look, but also ask why they look so, who has
made them look so and how.
Latour speaks of complexity rarely and randomly (for example in 2009 and 1999).
But Latours complexity is contained, in my opinion, in this idea of collectives built
without foundations and metaphysical grants (2000 and 2008), without essences that
can close, once and forever, our need to compose and recompose the collective. It is
worth stressing, from a sociological point of view, that even the modern and
commonsense idea of society, that still inhabits our way to think of the social, was
like an essence and now we have to think of it only as a peculiar way the modern
way to compose a collective, funded on the need to distinguish and drift apart
culture from nature, society from technology, humans from non-humans.
In Latour and in ANT, objects are not denied or cleaned up as meaningless. We have
to take them into account and be able to analyze their genealogy. Complexity, in the
end, is just the assumption that everything may undergo a genealogy: essences firstly,
but also hierarchies, often funded on them. This is fundamental, in sociology and
entails a totally different way to think of the relationships between micro/macro,
local/global. Starting without presupposing any essences or hierarchies means to
quote Latour (2005a) to keep the social flat, to explain the global as if it were
local and vice versa. This is the most relevant consequence of an onto-epistemology
78

In Pandoras Hope Latour writes: I want to situate myself at the stage before we can clearly delineate
subjects and objects, goals and functions, form and matter, before the swapping of properties and
competences is observable and interpretable. Full-fledged human subjects and respectable objects out there
in the world cannot be my starting point; they may be my point of arrival (1999: 182, emphasis in the
original text)

235

built on the idea of network.


The ontology of network entails also a theory of emergence and this is the point in
which Latours ANT gets nearer systemics. In a certain sense, it is as if Latour
suggested us to take into account a whole system and the thick texture of the
relationships between its elements79. But he prefers speaking instead of translation
and mediation (1999). Maybe to avoid at the root to fall into holistic and
structuralistic reductionisms by excessively stressing (systemic) closure instead of
openness. In fact, talking about translation and the re-distribution of action means to
preserve room for agency and to remind that a network in its wholeness is an
actor, but also that an actor is actually a network (Callon, 1991). The key, here, is
the oscillatory perspective that maintains even emergence processes horizontal and
flat, without allude to any upper level. Besides Latour avoids the risk of
hypostatization that in my opinion still characterizes, notwithstanding its
constructivism, systemics.
Last but not least, Latour and ANT (e.g. John Law) are also critics of formalism, a
very important brand of systemics. In Science in Action (1998) Latour examines
Formalism in his discourse on what he calls calculation centers to show how, even
behind its strong appearance of neutrality and independence from (material)
production conditions there are a lot of networks made by people, technologies,
power relationships and so on. This is the reason for which Latour also says that
almost nobody has been so brave to undertake a serious anthropological study of
Formalism so far. John Law fifteen years later makes such an analysis,
examining the equation establishing which shape should have the wings of a
particular kind of aircraft (the P.17A) to guarantee the safety of its flight. Formalisms
are so elegant and apparently neutral that make even easier to forget or to hide
networks of production behind them, to forget or to hide choices that is: decisions
about inclusions and exclusions that have been made, for example that of
79

As he states in one example taken from the large amount he makes: Flying is a property of the whole
association of entities that include airports and planes, launch pads and ticket counters. B-52 do not fly, the
US Air Force flies (1999: 182).

236

overlooking the corporeal i.e. the pilots sweat for fears. But, as Law concludes:
there is no room for sweat in formalisms. (Law, 2002: 123)
We could say it that way: even if complexity may be found in mathematical
equations as in adaptive complex systems studies the ordering power of
mathematics brings in the background complexity as disorder or to quote Law, as
heterogeneity in favor of a certain idea of order that, so to speak, shines from
numbers and mathematical functions.
To sum up, Morin and Latour/Ant manage to translate systemics into a language
that pays much more attention to agency, heterogeneity, incoherence, joining
together the anthropological and the systemic dimensions of complexity. In their
work openness and closure are bounded together and the reasons of openness are
always taken into account against low price and definitive closures. In doing that,
they dont vanish science, but invite scientists to be more aware and reflexive about
their work and their procedures.

10. 5. So what? Sociology and the question of complexity

In this context there is no room to expose Morins and Latour sociological theory.
But the aim of this contribution was to find a perspective able to reconnect the
question of social complexity with the question of epistemological complexity and
we hope that this necessarily synthetic and quite assertive recognition has been
helpful for that purpose. Morin, in our opinion, has a very comprehensive stile of
thought and the value of his theory is to redeem systemics and complexity sciences
from themselves, offering them a wider epistemological frame able to make them
more respectful of complexity and its hint to the radical openness that is its cipher.
Morins sociological theory cant be isolated from that millennial process preceding
the appearing of man. But his appearing makes things even more complex because
man, as an observer and a constructor of theories and real systems as the social
ones, has the faculty to add or reduce complexity. And this is, per se, a factor of
237

further complexity. Theories of emergence even with the epistemological


correctives Morin adds can shed light on processes happened from the cosmos
origin to the hominization process, but with the emergence of man and the subject
another history begins. I find topical, for the comprehension of Morins complex
sociology not so much the distinction he makes between simple, linear societies and
complex ones (La Methode V), but the distinction he makes between insects
societies and human societies (La Methode II). If there is still a need to reaffirm the
difference separating Morin from to complex systems theories, here we find a very
clear answer. Insects societies are the best example of complexity as selforganization processes as thought in complexity sciences. A quasi-automatic
process clearly showing how organization can be produced even in the absence of
blueprints and pacemakers (see for example Johnson, 2004). But according to Morin,
even the simplest human society is more complex than social insects ones because
man brings always with him a high potential of openness (Morin, 2004). This
discourse is also very clear in putting a radical difference between a
phenomenological social complexity according to which we are used to talking
of more or less complex societies and the complexity at the onto- epistemological
level that makes complex every kind of society. So, from a sociological point of
view, complexity is not, firstly, a descriptor of societies and a criterion for making
typologies; it is instead helpful in drawing a different vision of social change. Mainly
remembering us that, in societies, we are in front of two contemporary, overlapped
typologies of order: the conscious one, built by man and its institutional will, but
also the unconscious or less conscious one that emerges from disorder that, as we
have told, is the matrix of every order. In this sense, as Remotti efficaciously says
(2011), is always in ambush.
Even in Latour the sociological question is deeply connected with the relationship
and the conflicts between two different kinds of order. The first one, set by classical
sociology and Durkheim in particular, and the second one to which we can open to
only abandoning the first. Durkheimian order is thought in fashion of the modern
238

natural order (Latour, 2005a). But, paradoxically, this modern natural order exists
only because moderns kept separated nature and society from the beginning,
depriving society from natural elements and nature from social elements. So the
same idea of society is too much compromised with this idea of order: they are
almost synonymous. Latour then proposes to substitute the same term society with
the term associations, distinguishing a sociology of the social (or society) from a
more correct sociology of associations (Latour, 2005a). And, as already told,
associations are hybrid, heterogeneous and without essences founding them. And
sociology must become a socio-logic, trying to trace the logics that govern the
convergence of elements, factors and connections behind the formation of an
association (1998), while the old idea of society was a readymade solution to that
problem saying nothing more than the associations depend on social forces (2005a).
Even society is, in this perspective an association unaware to be such. Because
associations are not protected, funded by any essence their borders are only partially
and provisionally closed because are the consequence of a contingent choice. So that
we are responsible for that closure and we are called to account for it. The question
that always haunts us is: why this assemblage? Why not another one? What did we
choose to let outside to enable it to exist? (Latour, 2000). This is the reason for
which Latourian discourse ends in radical cosmopolitanism or, as he prefers to say,
in cosmopolitics.
This onto-epistemological absence of essences, anyway, dont delete them and their
effects from history and ANT imposes us to analyze them (and their genealogy)
because they have been and still are real, to say it with the famous Thomas
statement, in their social consequences. Starting from these premises, another
sociology of the global become possible, as well as a different way to set the
relationship between the micro and the macro80
At the beginning of this recognition we were looking for authors reconnecting the
relationship between sociology and complexity to the epistemological level, where
80

Herein we cannot delve into this topic. For an illustration of how Latour categories and his way to
complexity entail a peculiar way to study the global see Introini (2013, forthcoming).

239

the question of complexity must be firstly set. We found authors that bring
epistemology at the foundational level and that, in the end, say that for sociology
epistemological questions cant be resolved once and for but must be faced
continuously.

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CHAPTER XI
A TRANSACTION BYTE PARADIGM FOR RESEARCHING
ORGANISATIONS
by Shann Turnbull

11.1 Introduction

This paper introduces a methodology grounded in the natural sciences for


undertaking empirical research into the control and communications systems in any
creature and/or their social system. The methodology is described as Transaction
Byte Analysis (TBA) as bytes provide a common unit of analysis for any signals
within and/or between creatures.
The potential for TBA to test organizational theories and the efficacy of various
complex organizational architectures are illustrated by the development of hypotheses
in the concluding Section.
No signal can be created, transmitted, received and acted upon without perturbations
of energy and/or material. Any such perturbation that creates a difference that makes
a difference (Bateson 1972) can today be represented in a binary unit described as a
bit even when the difference may arise in an analogue form. Eight bits are
described as a byte.
Humans can receive at least five different types of signals from their environment.
These are the five senses of sight, sound, smell, touch and taste. While The age of
neural implants has already started (Kurzweil 1999: 127) in the last century this
possibility will be ignored in the following discussion.
Humans possess limited ability to transmit signals by consciously making changes in
their taste and smell. In practice conscious transmission of signals is limited to sound,
touch and other body movements. As the technology of neural implants is not yet
widely adopted they can be neglected in current planning for empirical research. At
243

the end of the 20th Century it became technically possible to measure the
physiological operating limits of humans to transmit and/or receive signals through
their five natural senses. It has also become possible to identify the neurological
limits of humans to process and store signals in their brains. The physiological and
neurological limits of humans to process bytes are set out in Figure 11.1.

Figure 11.1.

Visual information can provide data inputs four magnitudes higher than sound. Sound
can provide data inputs one order of magnitude greater than touch, taste and smell.
Human communication out-put channels are limited to only 100 Kilobytes per second.
However, unlike even the most elementary personal computer today the ability of
humans to sequentially process data is just 200 calculations per second (Kurzweil
1999: 103). Personnel computers at the time of writing can sequentially undertake
millions of calculations per second. However personal computers are only just
obtaining the ability to reliably recognize speech and faces. Unlike simple personal
244

computers the human brain can process a massive number of bits of data in parallel
rather than just sequentially. The number of neurons in the human brain is estimated
at approximately 100 billion, with an average of 1,000 connections per neuron, for a
total of 100 trillion connections (Kurzweil 1999: 119). This allows the human brain
to out perform simple computers in recognizing patters that make up speech and
images.
It is through pattern recognition rather than by logical sequential data processing that
allows humans to currently compete with personal computers. Young children, or a
dog, can undertake a complex task like catching a ball. Robots currently have
difficulty in achieving this task. This is because a robot would need to be
programmed with complex differential equations to anticipate the trajectory of the
ball with manifold data inputs such as the initial trajectory of the ball, the weight and
size of the ball, air temperature, air density, the co-efficient of friction of air with the
ball, spin of the ball, wind speed and direction, the force of gravity, etc. Pattern
recognition allows children and animals without such knowledge and data to catch
balls. Pattern recognition provides one rationale for the case study method of teaching
MBA students.
While the volume of data transmission and storage can be measured or estimated
within and between creatures it is not possible to quantify information, knowledge
and wisdom. The word knowledge is used in the sense to mean information that is
useful for a human brain to use for either thinking or taking action. The word
wisdom is used to describe a person who obtains the knowledge of when best to
use knowledge. Because information cannot be physically quantified neither can
knowledge or wisdom. However, the crucial point remains that no change in the
quantity or nature of information, knowledge and wisdom can occur without the
transaction of bytes. This makes bytes a fundamental unit of social analysis.
The non-commensurability of information arises because it represents data that
provides meaning to a recipient. In the case of humans, the conversion of data into
meaning depends upon the circuitry of the brain. Even identical twins have different
245

neurological architecture because this is a product of both nature and nurture. While
twins may have a shared DNA the way their brains develops is dependent upon
random external stimuli. The need to occupy different physical positions is sufficient
to generate different changes in the development of their neurological circuitry.
However, in practice, cultural conditioning of quite different individuals can lead to
the same data generating a shared meaning among many individuals.
So in practice it may become accepted that specified patterns of data can also indicate
a specific volume of information even if it cannot be measured. Morse code is an
example where conditioning allows humans with quite different cultures to learn to
recognize specific patterns of dots and dashes. The patterns represent letters of the
alphabet to create words that may possess a common shared meaning. For example,
the letters SOS can be transmitted in Morse code with a pattern of six dots, three
dashes and eight spaces. The letters SOS is a way of expressing an urgent need for
assistance as originally the letters were used to communicate the phrase Save Our
Souls.
Because shared meaning of words is commonly assumed, the word information is
used as if it can be quantified. A common example is references to information
overload. This ambiguity in the use of the word will be accepted without
qualification to allow the citation of scholars. For example, Williamson (1985: 283) a
2009 Nobel Prize winner in economics stated: The problem of organization is
precisely one of decomposing the enterprise in efficient informational processing.
Williamson recognized the economic importance of using data as a unit of
organizational analysis. He stated: But for the limited ability of human agents to
receive, store, retrieve, and process data, interesting economic problems vanish
(Williamson 1979: note 4). Notwithstanding this insight Williamson adopted the
social construct of cost as his unit of analysis to establish a methodology for the
analysis of firms that he described as Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). However,
not only are costs a social construct not subject to physical measurement and
evaluation, they vary in nature between being an initial fixed set up cost and a
246

variable operating component. The allocation of costs between those considered fixed
and variable can be a matter of discretion for the analyst.
Evidence that TBA fills a methodological gap in organizational analysis is next
considered in outlining the Science of Governance (Turnbull 2002; 2008). The third
section introduces the architecture of complexity in physical, biological and social
structures and how TBA provides a methodology for testing hypothesis concerning
complex organizational structures. The fourth section provides examples of complex
organizations and related concepts. Suggestions for investigating complex
organizations with TBA are provided in the concluding section five.

11.2. Science of Governance


This section provides evidence of how TBA makes a methodological contribution by
grounding social analysis in the natural science of cybernetics to establish a science
of governance.
Norbert Wiener (1948) defined cybernetics as the Science of control and
communications in the animal and the machine. Stafford Beer (1966) pioneered the
application of cybernetics principles to management that became described variously
as operations research, management cybernetics, management science or
system science. As the President of the World Organization of System Science and
Cybernetics in 1996 Beer informed me that neither he nor his colleagues had applied
the science of control and communications to the governance of organizations. This
advice was given after reading a Toronto conference paper that was later published
with the seminal contributions of scholars as Turnbull 2000a.
From 1970 to 1973 Beer had worked for President Allende in Chile to establish a
system of control and communications to operate a socialist economy using Teletype
printers. So while Beer had applied the principals of cybernetics to coordinating firms
this had been organized through a top down control and communication system as
247

found in socialist economies and hierarchical firms. As Beer (1966: 263) points out:
viable systems cannot be entirely regulated from outside. For this reason,
centralized hierarchical command and control systems are not found in nature. Our
brains do not possess a Chief Executive Officer neuron (Kurzweil 1999: 84).
One widely known contribution of Beer was his concept of organizing units of a firm
into viable systems to efficaciously manage complex tasks. This contribution was
based on conceptual rather than quantitative cybernetic analysis and was limited to
operations within a firm below the level of the board of directors.
Quantifying the ability of humans to receive, store, process and transmit data was
only achieved at the turn of the last century. The then head of the British Telecom
Research Laboratories Peter Cochrane (2000) quantified the physiological limits of
individuals to receive and transmit data in terms of bytes as is set in Figure 1. MIT
based voice recognition scientist Ray Kurzweil (1999: 103) reported the limitations
of the human brain to sequentially process data in terms of bytes as noted in the
centre of Figure 1.
In the current century the digitization of communication is becoming ubiquitous. The
quantification of organizational communications becomes automatic as they are
recorded, transmitted, processed and stored in various electronic devices. This
provides a basis to utilize TBA to investigate how individual and organizations
manage complexity. However, this opportunity has not yet been developed by social
scientists even though many are dissatisfied with their current intellectual tools and
methodologies.
For example, Radner (1992: 1384) stated: I know no theoretical research to date that
compares the relative efficiency of hierarchical and non-hierarchical organizations
within a common model. While Demb & Neubauer (1992) expressed concern that
there was no way to compare systems of corporate governance within and between
cultures. TBA provides a way to overcome both limitations because bytes are not
dependent upon organizational architecture or culture.

248

In regards to firms, Winter (1991: 179) referred to the, present theoretical chaos.
Chaos was noted by Kuhn (1970: 77) as a ...precondition for the emergence of novel
theories... Williamson (1991: 11) stated: Winter, like Demsetz, also emphasizes the
importance of knowledge acquisition and its utilization in future work on the theory
of the firm. Williamson (1990: xi) supported the suggestion by Simon (1984: 40)
that theorists should, find techniques for observing the phenomena at a higher level
of resolution. He then poses the question, How micro is micro? TBA provides and
answer to this question and also answers the concern of Demsetz. Demsetz (1991:
159) saw the need for: a more complete theory of the firm must give greater weight
to information cost than is given either in Coases theory or in theories based on
shirking and opportunism which have not gone far enough.
While TBA does not measure costs, costs in Coases theory arise from price
discovery for a businessperson to undertake make or buy a decision. In other words
Coase posits that firms exist because of the cost of getting information to buy a
component instead of making the item. Williamson (1979) developed a theory of a
firm and its internal structure as an authority system using TCE. In modern complex
information and knowledge intensive firms costs become a proxy for bytes. In the
words of Kuhn (1970: 80) TBA involves the same bundle of data as before, but
placing them in a new system of relations with one another by giving them a different
framework.
Price discovery has little meaning unless data is also transacted to associate the price
with the many qualitative factors describing the type of goods and/or services and
other costs involved. As bytes require perturbations in matter and/or energy the
existence of firms could be explained by TBA as a way of minimizing the transaction
of bytes and so the need for energy and/or materials (Turnbull 2001).
Jensen (1993: 873), an author of agency theory widely used in corporate governance
analysis observed: we're facing the problem of developing a viable theory of
organizations. While the emergence of network firms led Zingales (2000) to state in
regards to existing theories of the firm that: they seem to be quite ineffective in
249

helping us cope with the new type of firms that are emerging. Some network firms
are not based on control hierarchies on which theories of the firm are based. Network
governed firms are subjected to a division of powers to provide checks and balances
and a variety of independent control and communication channels. Some networked
governed firms have adopted an ecological form of governance architecture as found
in nature. These are described in the following section.
TBA not only provides a methodology for analyzing any type of firm but any type of
social organization within and/or between specie. It makes possible an analysis of
corporate governance that is fundamentally concerned with issues of communication
and control within control centers/boardrooms and between firms and their
stakeholders.
The word governance is derived from the Greek word to steer. It is the same Greek
word that Wiener (1948) used to coin the word cybernetics. TBA provides
methodology for extending the science of cybernetic from the control and
communication in the animal and machine to include organizations. The science of
governance can be defined as being concerned with the control and communications
in the animal, machine and social systems.
The science of governance provides a new way for explaining how complex living
things arose in nature as articulated by Simon (1962) and how to evaluate, design
and/or regulate complex organizations. These issues are developed in the following
section that introduces the architecture of complexity.

11.3. The architecture of complexity

This section uses TBA to provide insights into the architecture of complexity found
in nature and to explain the operating advantage of social organizations adopting
ecological forms of governance rather than command and control hierarchies.

250

Henry Simon (1962) in his seminal lecture on the architecture of complexity used
probability analysis to explain how nature could create the complexity of life. Simon
explicated how nature creates and controls complexity by what he described as: subassemblies (1962: 472) or stable intermediate forms (1962: 473) to create nearly
decomposable systems, in which the interactions among the sub-systems are weak,
but not negligible (1962: 474). These sub-assembles, forms and sub-systems
were given the name of Holons five years later by Koestler (1967).
While the name Holon has been widely accepted by many scholars, others have used
their own terminology. This has held back development of the concept that was first
noted perhaps by Jan Smuts (1926) a former Prime Minister of South Africa and a
Field Marshal who described them as wholes. Biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy
(1955) used the term systems, Ralph Gerard (1957), a neurophysiologist used the
term org while Stafford Beer (1966) described them as a viable system. David
Bohm (1980), a quantum physicist referred to relatively independent subtotalities,
Czech engineer Joseph Hatvany (1985) used the word entities, Duffie (1990),
another engineer refers to heterarchical cooperation in computer-controlled
manufacturing. The founding CEO of the credit card company VISA international,
Dee Hock (1999) combined the words chaos and order to create the term the
term Chaord. Harvard Business School scholars Carliss Baldwin & Kim Clark
(2006) used the terms module and capsules.
Arthur Koestler describes a hierarchy of holons as a holarchy to distinguish it from
a hierarchy where there is a direct boss (Simon 1962: 468) in a command and
control system. Beer (1972: 69) used the term metasystemic to describe a group of
viable systems. As Mathews notes (1996: 47), Once attuned to the structure of
holonic architecture we see them everywhere. They are ubiquitous in biological
structures and are now used in the design of complex object orientated software and
robotic control systems.
In reporting on the design of Japanese robots, Mathews (1996: 30) reported: The
reduction in data transmission, and in data complexity, achieved by the holonic
251

architecture is prodigious. Moreover the advantages accumulate as the robotic device


gets more complex. The prodigious reduction in data quantity and complexity
provides one compelling explanation of the operating advantages of complex social
organizations that adopt holonic architecture. TBA provides a methodology for
investigating data complexity and variety in any type machine, creature or social
organization.
Examples of complex firms that have adopted ecological forms of governance are the
credit card company VISA International in the US, The John Lewis Partnership that
is one of the largest retail stores in the UK and the nested networks of network
governed firms in Northern Spain that are collectively known as Mondragn
Corporacion Cooperativa (MCC). The geographical diversity of these three largescale examples proves that special laws are not required for organizations to adopt
constitutions to introduce a holonic organizational architecture.
The operational advantages of ecological forms of governance do not just arise from
reducing data overload for individuals of the organization. Strong holonic structures
also generate a rich variety of control and communication circuits to manage/monitor
complexity. The ability of ecological governance to generate a requisite a requisite
variety of control (Ashby 1956) and communication (Shannon 1948) circuits arise
from holonic structures possessing Centralization and decentralization of control
(Mathews 1996: 41). Buckminster Fuller (1961) described physical structures made
of up components with such contrary characteristics as possessing tensegrity.
Fuller coined the word tensegrity from contracting the words tension and
integrity. He was inspired by the structures created by artist Kenneth Snelson
(Hearney 2009) that led Fuller to design geodesic domes and other structures. Fuller
described tensegrity structures as islands of compression in an ocean of tension'.
Ren Motro (2003: 12) defined tensegrity as: systems in a stable self equilibrated
system comprising a discontinuous set of compressed components inside a continuum
of tensioned components.

252

Donald Ingber (1998) described tensegrity as The architecture of life because


biological structures depend upon materials with contrary properties. An example is
the human body constructed of bones that function as compression components and
muscles that function as contrary tensional components. Complexity in the
architecture of the universe arises from the emergence of more complex components
from simpler components with contrary properties. For example electrons with a
negative charge combine with protons with a positive charge to create a new more
complex structure called an atom. Atoms are created with various numbers of
electrons to allow atoms to combine in numerous combinations to create various
molecules that in turn produce emergent properties not found in their components.
Table 11.2 reveals how the complexity of the universe arises form simpler
components with different properties. Humans and entities of the MCC are shown to
be part of this universal process in rows 8, 10 and 11.

Tab 11.2
253

Philosophers have long recognized that humans have contrary ying/yang type of
behavior. Contrary approach/avoidance behavior is commonly observed in animals.
Humans can also be suspicious/trusting, competitive/cooperative, selfish/generous,
self-interested/altruistic and so on. In this way humans can generate a requisite
variety of responses to learn how to sustain their existence in unknowable complex
environments.
If humans were not hard wired by their DNA to possess contrary behavior, their DNA
would need to be much more complicated to program their behavior to take into
account

countless

combinations

of

unknowable

complex

life

threatening

environments. Behavioral tensegrity can be seen as an evolutionary strategy for the


amplification of variety through a process that Ashby (1956: 231) describes as
supplementation.
In other words, contrary behavior is a way for evolution to provide creatures with a
requisite variety of responses to reproduce their DNA while minimizing the size of
their DNA. Likewise, Buckminister Fuller explained that geodesic domes constructed
of materials with contrary characteristics could cover the largest area with the
minimum quantity of material. In organic structures Ingber (1998: 32) explained the
role of tensegrity as providing a maximum amount of strength for a given amount of
building material. Turnbull (2000b: 134) put forward the hypothesis that social
tensegrity provides a maximum amount of control (strength) for a given amount of
bytes (building material). TBA provides a methodology for empirically testing this
hypothesis. Another related hypothesis is that social tensegrity provides a requisite
number of responses to manage uncertainty while using minimum energy and/or
materials to transact bytes (Turnbull 2000b: 134).
In other words social tensegrity in organizations maximizes their ability to selfcontrol/self-regulate/self-govern with the minimum transaction of bytes (Turnbull
2000b: 118). Minimizing bytes means minimizing perturbations in matter and energy
and so costs. This in turns explains how network governance can provide competitive
254

advantages and resiliency compared with hierarchies that create information overload,
and a lack a requisite variety of communication and control channels to reliably
control/regulate complexity. The operating and/or competitive advantage of network
organizations increases as activities increase in complexity (Craven, Piercy & Shipp,
1996; Jones, Hesterly & Borgatti, 1997).
Jones et. al (1997: 914) limited their definition of network governance to a network
of firms. Their definition excluded distributed control within a firm or between a firm
and its controlling shareholders. The concept of a compound board defined in
Turnbull (2000b: 1) allows network governance to include firms controlled by more
than one board internal and/or external to a firm. As a majority of listed corporations
possess a controlling shareholder (Porter, Lopez-de-Silanes & Schleifer 1999) the
majority of listed corporations have network governance with a compound board.
However, this phenomenon is ignored by scholars undertaking normal science that
does does not "call forth new sorts of phenomena: indeed those that will not fit the
box are often not seen at all" (Kuhn 1970: 24).
Hierarchies depend upon obedience and conformity. In this way hierarchies inhibit
the ability of individuals to act in a contrary manner as encouraged by their DNA.
Hierarchies inhibit the ability of individuals to consider a requisite variety of
responses required to mitigate risks and exploit opportunities. This problem was
identified by Hock (1995: 4) who stated:
Industrial Age, hierarchical command and control pyramids of power, whether
political, social, educational or commercial, were aberrations of the Industrial Age,
antithetical to the human spirit, destructive of the biosphere and structurally contrary
to the whole history and methods of biological evolution. They were not only archaic
and increasingly irrelevant; there were a public menace.
Hock (1999: 6) observed before the financial crises of 2008 that:
We are experiencing a global epidemic of institutional failure that knows no bounds.
We must seriously question the concepts underlying the current structures of
organization and whether they are suitable to the management of accelerating societal
255

and environmental problems and, even beyond that, we must seriously consider
whether they are the primary source of those problems.
The US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report concluded that a key cause of
of the 2008 crisis was a failure of corporate governance (FCICR 2011). Turnbull &
Pierson (2012) provided evidence that the failure of governance arises because of top
down centralized hierarchies deny systematic feedback channels between individuals
who have knowledge of risks who are also connected with individuals with the
incentive and power to act to mitigate risk. In short, centralized pyramids of power
have created a form of high risk alienating disconnected capitalism. Network
governance can be designed to fill in the disconnections. TBA with the science of
governance provides design criteria for designing the connections and testing the
results. Alternative forms of governance that provide opportunities for operating and
social advantages are next considered.

11.4. Ecological governance

The section provides an example of ecological governance, which is a special form of


network governance that follows the architecture of nature. The example is used to
suggest how TBA could be used to investigate and compare complex forms of
governance with firms that have simpler centralized command and control
architecture that is dominant in modern societies.
The eye glazing mind numbing complexity of the MCC control and communication
architecture illustrated in Figure 1 decomposes decision-making labor into simpler
elements that are widely distributed through all members of the firm. This also
introduces a greater variety of control and communication channels to increase their
accuracy and resilience while providing distributed intelligence to harvest and act on
knowledge of risks and opportunities on a decentralized basis. Governance and
management functions become so highly distributed that they become merged and
256

shared by all members. Figure 1 was developed for a MCC case study (Turnbull
1995) and has been updated with comments to the left and right of the Figure.
Additional detailed discussion of Figure 11.1 is provided in Turnbull (2000b: 199225).

Fig. 11.1

It is by increasing organizational complexity that counter intuitively the data


processing workload of individuals can be simplified to allow ordinary individuals to
achieve extraordinary results with impressive resiliency in both favorable and
adverse conditions (Thomas and Logan 1982: 127). Ballantyne (2011) updates the
sustainable success of the MCC by reporting that after the 2008 Global Financial
Crisis that: Mondragn worker co-ops ride out global slump.

257

Figure 1 shows that the MCC system is composed of almost 200 primary
cooperatives with each firm having the ability to exist independently of the whole
system. Only a few firms have left the system but that they can proves the point and
shows that there are persuasive advantages of being in the MCC system. Primary
coops represent what Simon (1962) described as: sub-assemblies, stable
intermediate forms and meet the other tests of being a holon. That is they possess
Relative automony, system dependence, concatenation: recursivity and no
part of the system will possess complete information about any other part (Mathews
1996: 39-40). The existence of this last point was confirmed in VISA by Hock (1994:
7) who stated VISA: "has multiple boards of directors within a single legal entity,
none of which can be considered superior or inferior, as each has irrevocable
authority and autonomy over geographic or functional area".
The MCC system grew by creating new firms and from larger member firms spinning
off part of their operations into a supplier or customer organization. Most of the
expansion was from this process that mimics an amoeba. The 200 firms in the MCC
are controlled in 12 groups with each group having its own ecological governance.
The groups are governed by a meta-level holon at the top of the holarchy created by
the MCC system.
Besides the primary cooperatives there are lateral second order cooperatives that
service the primary cooperatives and their members. The support firms provide
banking, insurance, social security, research and development, education and retail
services. Each of the lateral support firms adopts the ecological form of governance
of the primary cooperatives. The holon concept allows the complexity of the whole
complex MCC system to be parsimonious presented as shown in table 11.3.

258

Tab 11.3

Recursivity economizes the transaction of bytes by providing a common template for


constructing new components. Highly complex fractal structures can be generated
from simple process information (De Vany 1998: 3) that may take only a dozen or
so bytes. This is illustrated by common fractal formulas like Z=Z squared plus C that
lead to highly complex patterns. But the bytes required to describe the result with
state information (De Vany 1998; 7; Simon 1962: 479) can be many orders of
magnitude greater.
The ability of ecological governance to economize the transaction of bytes is
illustrated by considering the workload on individual members of a centralized
governed organization with a unitary board with the workload of individuals on the
many boards in a Mondragn firm. The roles of directors of a unitary board are
shown in Table 11.4.
259

Tab. 11.4.

Tab 11.5.

Table 11.5 shows how decision-making labor is decomposed and distributed to all
members of the firm by having a different control centre/board for each of the five
segments shown in Table 11.4. An X is used to indicate how many bytes are required
260

to undertake each function of Table 11.4 is distributed through the five boards in
Table 11.6. TBA provides a way of quantifying X for each person in each MCC
board so as to compare the number with data processing load with directors of a
unitary board.

Table 11.6

Given the limited ability of humans to process data as shown in Table 11.1 the ability
of individuals to cope with their data processing load in each situation could also be
estimated. Content analysis of the data could be used to estimate the amount of
information related to the data processing load of members of the various control
centers and/or boards. In this way the operating conditions of ecological governance
and management could be compared and evaluated with the dominant centralized
systems of governance and management. Another parameter that could be measured
and compared is the variety of data sources used in the control and communication
systems of both types of governance architecture.

261

11.5. Concluding remarks

To attract researchers and/or their PhD students to pioneer quantitative investigation


into ecological forms of governance some hypothesis are suggested below. The
hypotheses are based on using TBA to quantitatively evaluating and comparing firms
with a dominant form of centralized governance and management with those with
ecological forms of governance and management.
H1. Decision makers in network governed/managed firms like The John Lewis
Partnership in the UK or the Mondragn Cooperative system in Northern Spain
obtain a greater variety of information on their Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities
and Threats (SWOT), than firms organised as command and control hierarchies as
listed on stock-exchanges.
H2. The simplification of data/information processing by members of an organization
requires an increase in its organizational complexity from increases in the number of
independently established decision-making centres and channels of communications
and control (i.e. creation of network governance).
H3. Individuals in network-governed firms share a greater variety of contrary
information than those in command and control hierarchies.
H4. The operating and competitive advantages of network-governed firms increases
with the variety of its undependably established decision-making centres,
communication and control channels.
H5. Social tensegrity creates the greatest variety of communication and control
channels with the least energy and/or materials.
As the dominant form of modern social institutions in the public, private and nonprofit sectors are centralized command and control hierarchies, application of the
insights of governance science would introduce a profound change in the power
structures of society. The need for such fundamental changes is steadily increasing
with the accelerating complexity of society.
Not only are large complex corporations becoming too big to fail they are also
262

becoming too big to manage, govern and/or regulate as investigated by Turnbull and
Pirson (2012). The manifold benefits of introducing a resilient and sustainable
ecological form of governance are set out in Turnbull (2013) for shareholders,
governors, directors, management, auditors, regulators and stakeholders. The
impossibility of amplifying control without supplementary regulators as identified by
Ashby (1958: 265) should force governments to require corporate constitutions to
make provision for sharing corporate powers with the stakeholders that governments
makes laws and establish regulators to protect. In other words the license for firms to
exist should depend upon firms becoming responsible for their own regulation and
social responsibilities.
The test of good governance would then depend upon the degree that firms could
reduce the need for complex laws, regulators, lawyers, courts, listing rules and codes
of behavior. In other words good governance would be achieved by maximizing selfgovernance to minimize the role of role of government. Good governance would then
depend upon adopting ecological forms of governance. This would not only reduce
the role of government but also enrich democracy because good governance would
depend upon the active engagement by firms with a requisite variety of their
stakeholders.

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267

CAPTHER XII
BASIC ARCHITECTURAL ALTERNATIVES IN DESIGNING SOFTWAREINTENSIVE SYSTEMS
by Gerard Chroust

12.1 Introduction

12.1.1 Essential Difficulties in Engineering Software-intensive Systems

Initially software was a set of stand-alone applications and alternative for wellunderstood and well-established manual tasks like book keeping, warehousemanagement, ledger, etc. Software was merely a dedicated tool for faster data
processing. Gradually more sophisticated and challenging tasks were tackled because
users (especially business users) invented increasingly sophisticated applications of
the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Internet and global
commerce provided even more (software-supported) business opportunities, calling
for increasingly sophisticated intelligent software-intensive systems (e-commerce,
e-business, e- learning, etc.).
At the same time software has also made dramatic in-roads into all kinds of technical
equipment, replacing conventional mechanical and electro-mechanical subassemblies.
Software turned from pure data processing to automation and control. Market
research predicted that 90 percent of innovation in the automotive industry is
expected to come from electronics by 2010 [IBM-05]. These applications are usually
summarized by the term embedded systems or software-intensive systems. They
are special-purpose computer-controlled electro-mechanical systems in which the
computer is completely encapsulated by the device it controls or completely
integrated in its environment (hidden computing). The next evolutionary step was
characterized by putting intelligence (machine perception, situation awareness,
268

computer vision, machine learning) on top of networks of embedded systems in order


to enable them to behave autonomously as a system, we speak of embedded
intelligence, ambient intelligence of software-intensive systems. The failure of
these systems can have and often has considerable financial, social and health
consequences since more and more safety related and safety critical tasks are
assigned to these embedded systems (Broy-06). In case the embedded ICT systems
achieve a very strong integration and interaction of hardware, software, networks
with their environment by sensors, actuators, where the physical world in its
unpredictability as well as humans play an important role they are called Cyberphysical Systems (Schoitsch-10). The latest evolution is that originally designed
stand-alone systems (legacy systems) are networked with newly designed systems
and/or integrated into super systems which are then becoming systems-ofsystems. One important property of these systems-of-systems are (critical)
unforeseen side-effects of their behavior, called emergent behavior. Systems must
be robust to cope with these problems in an adaptive manner (resilient systems),
which is an ever increasing challenge for system design, verification, validation and
deployment, and system risk assessment and evaluation has to take into account the
holistic system view more than ever before (Schoitsch-12). In cyber-physical systems,
and even more in systems-of-systems, security and trust are becoming major issues
besides safety, reliability, availability and maintainability.

12.1.2 A Hierarchy of System Complexity

The increase in complexity of software-intensive systems seems to be inherent in the


software industry. It is caused by the wish to enhance/improve systems by adding
more features and new business functionality in an evolutionary way (Noppen-02,
Lehman-96). All simple systems (S-type (specification-type) and largely also Ptype (problem- solving-type)) have already been implemented many times over.
Imaginative solutions for new problems (e.g. e-business, artificial intelligence,
269

sophisticated control in many domains, ambient assisted life systems, smart systems
at home, in health care, transport, manufacturing and production, power grid, but also
infotainment, etc.) and globalization pushes us to more complex solutions. Based on
M. Lehmans original complexity hierarchy of systems (Lehman-85, Lehman-96,
Kopetz-97, Chroust-05t) we can define:
S-System (Specification system): the software addresses problems that are formally
defined and specified. Based on the specification the system can be implemented
correctly. An example is the allocation of number plates to cars.
P-System (Problem-solving system): software is supposed to solve a not wellunderstood or precisely stated problem. A system is acceptable if it approximately
solves the problem. Traffic simulation is a typical P-system: it should predict the
traffic within an acceptable margin of error.
E-System (Environment system): This system operates in or interacts with the
outside (real) world, the environment. Since the system influences and induces
changes in the environment it must itself continuously be evolved and adapted
(Lehman-05, p. 3.)(Schoitsch-10). It often causes changes in the behavior of the
elements in the environment. A typical example is the pro-active control of traffic
according to the traffic forecasted by simulation. Immediately drivers try to beat the
system by changing routes.
W-Systems (Wicked systems): This system shows (beyond the properties of ESystems) the following disturbing properties: isolating the problem from the
environment causes the problem become invisible, there is no termination rule and
always a better solution, there are sufficient possibilities for the system to fail due to
the mutual interactions and influence with the environment. Additionally the problem
cannot be specified without some concept of its solution (Kopetz-97). The use of the
outcome of the traffic simulation (a P-system) for suggesting (or enforcing) routing
of cars in order to reduce both route length and fuel consumption would be a wicked
system. This is typical for so-called Cyber-physical Systems.
SW-Systems (Superwicked systems): These systems have the following additional
270

characteristics: Time is running out, no central authority, those seeking to solve the
problem are also causing it, policies discount the future irrationally. Systems-ofSystems with emergent behavior belong to this class of system

12.1.3. Development of Wicked Systems

The development of wicked systems is not essentially different from other systems,
see ISO/IEC 15288 [ISO15288-06] except that the initial concept phase [IEC6150810] is of special importance since here one has to assess and understand the
stakeholder needs and the hazards and risks to decide on the Basic Architectural
Alternatives for the future system. This implies a need for early-up understanding of
the available Basic Architectural Alternatives, their influences and consequences. A
proposed viable solution has to consist of a set of compatible, adequate Basic
Architectural Alternatives. The selection has to be based on the desirable properties
of the system to be implemented, which are a consequence of the Basic Architectural
Alternatives and their cross-influences.

12.1.4. The need for a System Architecture

A key to high quality systems is their system architecture (Brooks-62, Zemanek-80b)


(Keisler-05), in a nutshell, states that later changes to the basic architecture as defined
at the beginning of a project can only be done with great effort and cost. The need for
a well-designed architecture as the basis of a complex system is further emphasized
by by ISO/IEC 9126 [ISO9126-1-01] definition of design quality: the quality
represented in the core parts or backbone of the software design. For the safety and
dependability point of view systems and software architectures are essential
according to functionale safety standards such as ISO/IEC 61508: 2010 [IEC 61508-

271

10], and certain architectures are recommended or highly recommended as


requirements for higher safety integrity levels.
12.2. Basic Architectural Alternatives

12.2.1 The Notion

(Lucky-06) states that in the field of engineering the essence ... is making intelligent
trade-offs between conflicting parameters. Many trade-offs between opposite, often
incompatible alternatives for a design have to be made, e.g. you can design a system
for extreme flexibility or for extreme resistance to change. Each has its advantages
and disadvantages. A prototypical example of such a basic alternative is the popular
saying: You cant keep the cake and eat it. In software engineering an essential
decision is whether to design a new language for being compiled or being interpreted.
We suggest to call these basic conceptual decisions Basic Architectural Alternatives
(Chroust-04c, Chroust-05t) because they often identify diametrically opposite ends of
a spectrum of alternatives (eat or keep, interpret or compile).
In comparison to the approaches provided by other authors, e.g. (Bass-07, Hordijk04, Mehta-05, Maruyama-77, Wood-05, Zdun-05) we concentrate on the
identification of the truly basic underlying patterns. Following (Keisler-05) they
would be conceptual patterns. These Basic Architectural Alternatives can be seen
as an analogy to architectural patterns (Alexander-77, Keisler-05) and software
patterns (Gamma-95, Laplante-06).
We believe that by isolating and describing these alternatives together with their
essential properties, implications, consequences, and interactions, a system designer
(both newcomer and seasoned) will be helped and guided to make better initial
conceptual decisions by clearly understanding the different Alternatives available,
their interaction and interdependence, providing support for the necessarily intuitive
decisions by the designer. We understand that describing these alternatives in their
272

abstract, essential form is only part of the real-world design process where trade-offs
and modifications are often possible and needed.

12.2.2 Dimensions of Basic Architectural Alternatives

With respect to software-intensive Systems we have identified five dimensions along


which one can characterize different Basic Architectural Alternatives (Fig..
Each dimension

12.1).

establishes a continuous spectrum between two opposite extremes

but sometimes only the extreme end points are possible/feasible/reasonable. In


section 3 we will provide several examples for Alternatives and their mapping onto
the dimensions. Enactment time (reactive -pro-active): WHEN should aforeseen
action be performed, either pro-actively when the necessary action is known (or
expected) or when the actual need arises (see section 12.3.1)?
Location (local-remote): WHERE should needed data, and programs (and
functionality) be placed (see section 12.3.2)?
Granularity (coarse-fine): HOW MANY/MUCH of functionality or data should be
accessed/handled in one step (see section 12.3.3)?
Control (central-distributed): WHO or WHAT has the responsibility for leading the
interaction? WHERE should control be located (see section 12.3.4)?
Human-Computer Task Distribution (human - automatic): TO WHAT DEGREE is
a task automated (see section 12.3.5)? This includes the question whether a certain
task is to be performed by a human being or by a computer.
Above dimensions have been isolated from a wealth of candidates. Some of the more
interesting candidates were: optimistic/pessimistic approach (interpreted to be rather
a general strategy when choosing alternatives), project and technical risk (this is
considered as a pervasive concept and strategic guideline for making choices)),
synchronicity (this was regarded as a consequence of the choices for the Control
Alternative), and resource constraints (this can be considered as a project constraint).

273

12.2.3 Properties of Basic Architectural Alternatives

We have identified 4 relevant properties (see Fig.. 12.2).

Fig 12.1

Fig 12.2

Elasticity: It is important to know at the start of a project how elastic a certain choice
is with respect to later modifications. It indicates whether in between positions (a
compromise) is possible or not. We distinguish:
Dichotomic: In this case the alternatives are strictly either-or, there is no possibility
for a compromise in the middle. One cannot be 30% pregnant. It is a partition of
a whole (or a set) into two parts (subsets) that are
jointly exhaustive: everything must belong to one part or the other, and
mutually exclusive: nothing can belong simultaneously to both parts.
Flexible: In some instances an initial choice can be relaxed by bringing in some
aspects of the other alternative. This flexibility can be complete in the sense that one
274

can completely reverse the situation or only to a limited amount. You can eat a third
of the cake and keep the two thirds.
Reversibility: Can a decision be changed/taken back later. We distinguish:
Reversible: The choice can be taken back and another choice made. Such a change,
however, induces certain costs e.g. you may decide to keep the cake for tomorrow,
but a few hours later you may decide to eat it.
Irreversible: Once made, the choice cannot be taken back Once the cake is eaten, the
option for keeping does not exist anymore.
Semi-reversible: Very often we find the case that one of the two extreme positions
can be taken back but the other not. Keeping the cake is reversible, eating the cake is
not.
Uniformity: Do we need to have the same choice for all elements in a certain set or
not? We distinguish:
no uniformity: There is no necessity for different subsystems to follow the same
alternative as any other subsystem. If one owns two cakes, they can be treated
differently with respect to eating and keeping
scope uniformity: Within a certain scope (domain) of a system for all elements the
same alternative has to be chosen. If you bake several cakes in one stove at the same
time you have to treat them the same.
peer-level uniformity: (Webster-96, peer) defines a peer as one that is of equal
standing with another. All subsystems or elements considered equal in some respect,
be it hierarchical level, same source, same owner, etc., have to use the same
Architectural Alternative. Two carriages of the same train have to go in the same
direction, but other carriages may take different routes.
complete uniformity: The same alternative has to be chosen for all elements (as far
as applicable) of the system. All cars have to drive on the same side of the road.
Method Applicability: In some instances the method to be applied to an element can
stay the same between changes within a Dimension, in other cases the method has to
change. Alternatives are (but there could be more!):
275

same method applicable: You may use the same method, but dont have to.
different method necessary: Inherently a different method has to be taken. If you eat
the cake in a years time (not now) you have to use a different method, e.g. grinding it
to crumbs.

12.2.4. Observations on Basic Architectural Alternatives

Looking at the different Alternatives (see section 12.2.2) several observations can be
made.

1. The choice of an alternative has strong, often irreversible influence on the


properties of the final system, e.g. once eaten, the cake is gone!.
2. Many of the alternatives are not symmetric; choosing an alternative at one time
may preclude a change later, e.g. you can keep the cake today and eat it tomorrow,
but not vice versa.
3. If circumstances change, a different choice could be better, e.g. if one is not hungry
one might keep the cake, but suddenly might become hungry.
4. The extreme end points of a dimension are usually not practical and/or feasible, a
compromise (trade-off) could be the best; but usually a bias towards the originally
chosen Alternative remains, e.g. eating a complete birthday cake might not be wise.
5. Drastically changing the alternative at a later time might necessitate a different
method or technology. One can cross the frozen lake in winter, but has to swim half a
year later
6. Alternatives are often neither orthogonal to one another nor independent from one
another. Thus the choice has to be done with considerations of other choices.
Deciding on swimming through the lake and choosing to eat the cake at the same
time probably does not work.

276

7. Choosing a Basic Architectural Alternative is a certain committment to a certain


behavior of the system. The wrong choice will often result in a suboptimal or even
unusable system. One has to understand the amount of commitment an Alternative
implies. This committment depends on the specific chosen instance of the Alternative.
The key properties are elasticity and uniformity (section 12.2.3).
8. When considering modifying a chosen Basic Architectural Alternatives one has
also to consider the cost of doing so.

12.3. Examples of Basic Architectural Alternatives

For each Alternative discussed in section 12.2.2 an example is shown. For further
examples see (Chroust-08a).
12.3.1. Example: Enactment Time

Search vs. Systematic Archiving


Retrieval of archived information and documents is one of the major problems of
administrations. In the past solutions were to establish elaborate, time consuming
indexing systems (often several of them) and hoping that - when need arises - the
information can be found efficiently using these indices. Today often electronically
readable information can be stored essentially unordered (chaotic) and un-indexed.
Elaborate search engines will waste some (unnoticeable) extra time for retrieval but
will also find items for which no index has been generated. A typical example is
chaotic storage management (e.g. the Amazon Company).

Fundamental Properties of this Alternative:

dichotomic (it only makes sense, if the whole store is indexed or searched)
semi-reversible (one can always perform a search)
complete uniformity
277

different method necessary

12.3.2 Example: Location

Linear vs. Parallel Execution


A task can be executed in a linear fashion or alternatively (if possible) split into
several parallel streams to be executed in parallel (Chen-71), often in a networked
fashion. The advantages from Parallel Execution are a major decrease in elapsed time,
permitting larger computation tasks in reasonable time (e.g. grid computing [IBM04]) but at the cost of increased complexity and at the price of having to handle
synchronization (Kuck-77).

Fundamental Properties of this Alternative:

flexible (the amount of parallelism can be chosen)


reversible (the amount of parallelism can be changed)
no uniformity (each potentially parallel code can be handled differently)
same method applicable

12.3.3. Example: Granularity

Lock size (small - large)


Granting unique access rights to a collection of data (Fig.. 12.3) can either be done in
a coarse-grained fashion easing administration, but increasing the chances of creating
a bottleneck situation and preventing many other users from access (Kemper-97).
Alternatively access rights can be granted for single elements, making both
administration and simultaneous access to several elements more complicated and
increasing the danger of deadlocks [Silberschatz-02, p. 217], see also the transaction
concept [Silberschatz-02][Kemper-97].
278

Fig 12.3. Size of Locked Area

Fundamental Properties of this Alternative:

flexible (the lock size has to be handled in a flexible way)


reversible (the algorithms to define the lock size can easily be changed)
no uniformity
same method applicable

12.3.4. Example: Control

Centralized vs. Networking


In todays distributed, often global networks, control can either be located in a single
location or distributed over many. Different properties are associated with these
choices: e.g. typically ease and speed of control and update. Lower access costs favor
distribution, while problems of consistency, synchronization and networking costs
favor centralized solutions. As catastrophes (like 9/11 in New York) have proven,
highly decentralized systems are more likely to survive, a consideration which
already stood at the beginning of the DARPA-network, the predecessor for the World
Wide Web (Plasser-05). On the other hand, security is more difficult to implement in
a widely distributed system with many access points.

Fundamental Properties of this Alternative:


279

flexible (the amount of (de)centralization can be chosen and changed)


reversible (all decisions can be reversed)
scope uniformity (makes sense, although not strictly necessary)
different method necessary (with respect to communication, cooperation etc.)

12.3.5. Example: Human-Computer Task Distribution

Control of Car Driving


The Vienna Convention 1968, Art. 8, 13 on the design of automotive devices
requires the driver to be able to overrule the coach to have full control of the vehicle.
This legal restriction is still a barrier to autonomous vehicles usage in public road
traffic.
The automatic system may take over control only under the condition that based on
timing and environmental conditions the driver is unlikely to reach a safe state. Street
traffic seems to be far more complex than track oriented systems (trains, airplanes!),
and there are examples in which control systems in prototype cars failed dramatically.
Fundamental Properties of this Alternative:

flexible (sharing of tasks can be changed easily)


reversible (the sharing can easily be changed)
peer uniformity (similar functions should have similar types of control)
different method necessary

280

12.4. Interdependence of alternative dimensions

12.4. Basic Architectural Alternatives in the design of real Systems

12.4.1. Interaction of Dimensions

Designing a complete system means to take many decisions and requires the
consideration of many Alternatives and their interaction. The properties of a chosen

281

Alternative as reflected in the dimension has influence on other dimensions, be it


reinforcing or diminishing. The tables below show some of the influences.

The following observations can be made:


The individual choices are not independent from one another but have considerable
cross-influences, impacting other choices. Some of them enforce one another, others
diminish the effect of them, a typical situation which is described in (Senge-90).
Each of these choices with respect to Basic Architectural Alternatives directly or
indirectly influences several high-level system parameters (development time,
execution time, development cost, future orientation, sustainability, usability, etc.).
The totality of Basic Architectural Alternatives has to be chosen in the light of
optimization of the total system (section 12.4.2).
Any optimization has always to take into account the whole system and avoid suboptimization.
Beyond the influence on measurable technical parameters the designed systems
have also to be understood (intuitively!) and operated by humans. An effort must be
made for similar choices to be made in a consistent manner in order to allow the
human users to make their mental models of the total system.

12.4.2 The Influence of Alternatives on overall system parameters

The success of a system is dependent on a large number of factors, some of which are
not effectively measurable due to emergent properties (Baas-97, Chroust-02a)
(Pessa- 98).
In the early concept phase probably only a few key parameters at the system level are
of immediate importance since they will be critical for the system. Product properties
as described in many different publications, most prominently in ISO/IEC 9126
[ISO9126-1-01] and its successor ISO/IEC 25010 [ISO25010-06], dependability
criteria can be found in IEC 61508 Ed. 2.0: 2010 [IEC61508-10, Laprie-92, Redmill282

88, Schoitsch-03b, Sonneck-03]. We introduce a reduced set of a few properties


which we believe can be estimated early in the concept phase and are helpful and
influential with respect to the final product. They are:
complexity : Despite the lack of a precise definition it is often taken as a measure for
a system with many strongly-coupled degrees of freedom [Wikipedia-e,
keyword=complexity], similar (Doerner-96, Laird-06). Complexity is taken to be the
source of many problems in systems design and usage.
flexibility:

The

quality

of

being

adaptable

or

variable

[Wikipedia-e,

keyword=flexibility] is desirable in that the system design does not unduly preclude
later changes and modifications.
dependability: This is "the capability of the softwareproduct to maintain a specified
level of performance when used" [ISO25010-06, clause 6.2], but more holistic and
precise it is a system property (not only of software!) meaning the ability to perform
as and when required (including safety, reliability, maintainability, reliability,
security, recoverability, sustainability etc.) see also [IEC61508-10, IEC 60300-1:
CDV 2012, Laprie-92, Schoitsch-03].
survivability: In the context of this paper we mean the many ways a system

has

to survive in awkward situations. Strictly speaking dependability and survivability


describe different aspects of related properties.
The common denominator is that the system can survive dangers and attacks
(external as well as internal ones). A related term is resilience (including
adaptability of a system) [Schoitsch-10].
time consumption : ISO/IEC 25000 defines time consumption as the capability of
the software product to provide appropriate response and processing times and
throughput rates when performing its function ... [ISO25010-06, clause 6.4.2].
resource utilization: The capability of the software product to use appropriate
amounts and types of resources when the software performs its function under stated
conditions. [ISO25010-06, clause 6.4.1].

283

ease of use: This is a highly fuzzy, user oriented notion and can only be estimated
intuitively. Ease of use is of key importance with respect to quality in use, see
ISO/IEC 9126 [ISO9126-1-01].
It should be noted that the property functionality and the project oriented properties
(like development time, difficulty, etc.) are not included in the lists above. They are
considered to be constraints for the total project. They relate to a different concern,
the engineering of the total system.
Given the above key system parameters, we can discuss the influence of the
Architectural Alternative on them. It is obvious that only rather general statements
can be made. As an example we show the presumed impact of the Architectural
Alternatives on complexity and time consumption of the total product. More details
can be found in [Chroust-08a].

284

285

12.4.3 Aggregated Contributions to Global System Properties

In a real system the Basic Architectural Alternatives affect various properties, their
individual contributions superimpose one another and interact in an not easily
predictable way (see Fig.. 12.5 and Fig.. 12.6) to yield the final properties of the
system. Some of them show synergetic influences while others show contradictive
effects. Complexity and ease of use are ambivalent, often synergetic, often
contradictive. For example an increase of ease of use usually implies increase of
resource utilization.
286

In the simplest case (Fig.. 12.5) we have two contributing Alternatives (Ra and Rb)
which both depend on an independent variable P, the essential parameter of this
scenario. Actually this could be any parameter and it is not necessarily directly
connected to the system. Typically "module size" is a by-product of some other
considerations: For a given functionality of a system smaller modules mean a larger
number of modules and thus more interfaces, whereas larger modules imply a fewer
number of modules and thus fewer interfaces. P = number of modules in the system
Ra = aggregated complexity of the individual modules

Rb = aggregated complexity of the interfaces in the system

R = total complexity (Ra+Rb)

Fig. 12.5: Balancing Effects of Architectural Alternatives (Type MIB: middle is best)

An example would be the effect of advanced driver systems on road safety: ABS
(Anti-lock braking systems) and ADAS on the one hand improve road safety by
287

taking over control, on the other hand drivers tend to adapt to the situation by more
risky driving (Fig.. 12.6). Over-reliance on safety measures therefore can lead again
to increased risk of accidents!

Fig. 12.6: Road accidents: ABS/ADAS perfection vs. increased human risk taking

The scenarios depict idealized cases. In a practical situation any complicated curve
can result, even for seemingly innocent monotone increasing/decreasing functions
(see Fig 12.7) with reasonable assumptions concerning their behavior.

288

Fig. 12.7: Non-monotone sum of monotone properties

An overview of cross-effects of fundamental properties provides Fig. 12.8

Fig. 12.8: Cross-effects of Fundamental Properties

289

12.5. Summary

The dynamics of the ICT-technologies, the high demand on sophisticated systems


supporting a growing global business and global communication together with the
need for both time-to-market in largely unknown new application fields, especially in
the area of software-intensive embedded systems, will bring new challenges to the
system development community (Broy-06, Schoitsch-05, Schoitsch-10).
The future will introduce more and more wicked systems. The reason is that less
complex systems evolve into more complex systems (evolutionary systems) and
also that the applications domains we engage in today are by their very nature more
complex and involved. The challenges are additionally exacerbated by the growth in
international, global interaction and business and the reduced time-to-market for
competitive reasons.
Thus systems engineering will encounter more and more wicked systems and at the
same time will be given less time for reflection and evaluation.
As a consequence the need for having to start with some concept of the solution is
rising, but demanding ever better initial approximations for the final solution.
In this paper we have introduced the concept of Basic Architectural Alternatives for
systems design as an aid to make early architectural decisions. They become
increasingly important in the very early conceptual phases of systems design,
especially for so-called wicked systems (Kopetz-97). It is therefore important for the
designing engineers to know about available alternatives, intuitively understand their
system consequences (Mehta-05) and choose them accordingly.
We have attempted to identify Basic Architectural Alternatives along five dimensions
in order to show commonalities between groups of alternatives and differences
between alternatives belonging to different dimensions: Enactment time, Location,
Granularity, Control, Human-Computer Task Distribution. For each dimension we
have listed an example from the domain of software-intensive systems and with a
290

twinkle in the eye also the consequence of the proverb "you cant keep a cake and eat
it", It is quite helpful for pointing out some consequences.
For the future we see a need for further theoretical investigations of the dimensions of
Basic Architectural Alternatives including an attempt to study their general
properties in more detail, together with their interaction and cross-dependencies. On
the practical side we need clearer identification and better explanations of the
described Basic Architectural Alternatives and very likely the identification of further
ones. Providing an initial catalogue of such Basic Architectural Alternatives, we
believe, would in itself be useful in providing students and novices in the systems
field with initial ideas and concepts.
Special attention must be put on the cross-influences of multiple Basic Architectural
Alternatives with respect to enforcing (synergetic) or reducing (contradicting) effects.
Of special interest would be an Alternative clash analysis, identifying forbidden or
unfavorable combination of different Basic Architectural Alternatives, similar to the
ATAM-methodology [Kazman-00]. We have to take into account, that often certain
Architectural Alternatives are ruled out by boundary conditions of cost, safety
requirements, security requirements and the like.
This research would bring us nearer to the old engineering dream of property driven
system design, i.e. deriving a high-level system architecture based on the desired
properties of the system to be created.
We believe that this paper is a small step in bringing to system engineers a broader
view of system design, taking holistic approaches to solve real-world problems with
all their fuzziness in a dependable manner and to create resilient systems.

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296

CHAPTER XIII
THE SIMULATION MODEL OF A COMPLEX SYSTEM: THE NEURAL
SYSTEM
by Demetrio Errigo

13.1. The Authors Research Path

From the social system, which is one of the many sub-systems of the system-universe,
I have extrapolated one only Individual, which is one of the social sub-systems and I
have analyzed one of his many sub-sub-systems, namely the nervous system. Fig.
13.1.

Fig. 13.1

What I have done is not restrictive as we can assume that the other sub-sub- systems
behave in the same way, now that we know, basing on the P-N-E-I theory /Fig. 13.2),
that they are all inter-connected, so they must use the same communication codes.
And therefore, analogous behavioural keys.

297

Fig. 13.2

In Figure 3 we represent the hypothesis:

of the neural segmentation;

of the operative frequencies set choice.


The Figure above follows the actual traditional approach.
The set of octaves keys on a pianos keyboard is the set of frequency intervals of the
waves used, obviously with the appropriate associations, combinations, permutations
and dispositions.
Either for assonances and for dissonances.

Fig. 13.3

298

This Figure 13.4 represents the fortuitous intuition that allowed me to build the new
model of neural transmission: the sax-neural coupling analogy.

Fig. 13.4

And this is the new neural transmissions model. Tab. 13.1.


As you can notice it is much more extended than the current in use, because it
considers the inertia in reception and in transmission of what is natural versus the
artificial.
If you want to simulate reality, which is analogical, and not digital, we must adapt to
its needs.

299

In Figure 13.5 I have represented the key tools to perform the simulation:

the Cubic Matrix algebra [for zero (only one element) -one-two-three
dimensions];

the De Morgan Plus' Theorem (for circuits simplifications);

the Plasma-Jet Cone flux.


HOPFIELDS MODEL

NEW MODEL

1. The time and neural activity are 1. The time and neural activity are nonnon-continuous.
continuous.
2. The neurons are geometrically 2. The set of 2n neurons is subdivided
arranged in a reticule form and are into two subsets: n transmission (j
connected to each other.
neurons), n reception (m neurons).
Both neuron subsets are connected
between them by unidirectional reticule
connections.
-th
3. To the m neuron a variable m =
+1 is assigned if the neuron is active 3. To each neuron a variable j = +1 is
or m = -1 if it is passive.
assigned if the neuron (of subset j) is
active (in transmission) and m = +1 if
the neuron (of the subset m) is active
(in reception). To each neuron a
variable j = -1 is assigned if the
neuron (of subset j) is passive and m =
-1 if the neuron (of subset m) is passive
(in reception). The reception frequency
is determined by induction from the
transmission frequency.

Tab. 1 - NEURAL TRANSMISSION (see Fig. 13.6)

I had to formulate the Cubic Matrix algebra for solving systems of systems of
equations.
It shows an interesting characteristic about the Heisenbergs uncertainty Principle.
This may also allow in general to deal with undetermined problems in the macro.
300

The De Morgan Plus Theorem is my implementation of the main theorem.


The Plasma-Jet Cone flux comes from my studies on magneto-fluid-dynamics.
As you can notice, the construction of a model is always math.

Fig. 13.5

The simulation (Fig. 13.6) was achieved following the hypothesis of an in-put/out-put
model among sets of neurons in communication.

Fig. 13.6

The intersynaptic space (Fig. 13.7) is here very simplified and doesnt show the
presence of mediators of communication, such as the astrocytes, glial cells.

301

Fig. 13.7

These cells are schematized in their behaviour by a mathematical simulation in the


space-time.
The space-time choice was made because in this research we cant pass over neither
the theory of relativity nor (above all) the quantum mechanics. Fig. 13.8.
The ball that you can see on the right is the astrocyte.

Fig. 13.8

The new explanatory model (Fig. 13.9) for the neural communication is the one
represented in this Figure n, in which I show the various levels of physicalmathematical study.

302

Fig. 13.9

In Figure 13.10 I show what I have obtained, that is the elementary circuit and the
structural-functional neural analogy.

Fig. 13.10

Whose heart is represented here. Fig. 13.11.

303

Fig. 13.11

Another step was to obtain this other analogy: the Axon-Linear Accelerator analogy
(non-relativistic case). We can see in the Figure the strict analogy either as a structure
and as a function between the L-I-N-A-C and a neuron. Fig. 13.12.

Fig. 13.12

A further step was to make a geometric simulation and a hypothesis of a brains


behaviour following an internal or an external stimulus: the brain-ellipsoid of rotation
analogy. Fig. 13.13.
In the central Figure deriving from my simulations, we can see the ellipse that is run
304

through by a stimulus involving a range of areas of the brain. We have to notice that
the ellipse is the projection, in the three-dimensional space, of a straight line in the
space-time, which is run over in a not-uniform way.

Fig. 13.13

This shows how the various areas of the brain can receive an informative
communication in relatively different times and so also assimilating and reacting in
different times. Fig. 13.14.

Fig. 13.14

We can consequently think valid, in particular human bodys areas, the non-local
principle and not the possibility of entanglement (but not the certainty of this nonpossibility). This may be because Life works at negative entropy (or negentropy), just
as an adrift of Schrdingers statistic thermodynamics. Fig. 13.15.
305

Fig. 13.15

And this is the first mathematical model obtained for the study of the whole neural
communicative behaviour. Fig. 13.16.

Fig. 13.16

Thanks to all this, I built this final model that is really complicated which has to be
solved with a system of differential equations at partial derivatives. Fig. 13.17.
I tried to overcome this difficulty including a semi-empirical formula that I had made
for other.

306

Fig. 13.17

This final model, as I found out later, in its preliminary hypotheses, can also make
possible the study of the performances of the Power Management in social systems.
Fig. 13.18.
In fact, the interiority of each individual influences and is influenced by its external
environment.

Fig. 13.18

In the end, this neural study is focused on the first outcomes presented, on the
distribution of circuits to be analyzed and on this summary card (on the left), with the
goal of a bionic simulation. Fig. 13.19.

307

Fig. 13.19

The outcomes can be easily seen.


Here I show the striking coincidences among the intra-cellular signals.

Fig. 13.20

308

And in this Fig. 13.21, those among the extra-cellular signals.

Fig. 13.21

Ultimately, I simulated a series of prototypes, and in all the previous models, the
essential work is in accordance with these assumptions:

we have the configuration of balance for the Na-K pump;

we can insert in it switches and replace the generic resistances with appropriate

resistors, which run in fixed frequency-fields;

opening and closing the circuits, we can create the conditions of disequilibrium, that give different productions of currents, which, each in turn, generates
various signals in transmission.
The various signals must then be put together, placed, enlarged and transmitted. Fig.
13.22.

309

Fig. 13.22

I can describe this very simplified prototype model which consists of a single substratum among 80 (40 + 40) sub-strata, that at its turn becomes a single element of an
hexagonal Fig. 13.23 group, and this single element has 5 signals instead of 27.
I have obtained an almost perfect correlation between the signals that are generated in
nature and those that I have artificially produced. Analyzing the data, I have noticed
that equal signals obtained among the signals generated in nature and those that I
have artificially produced can be compared, either for values and for development, to
the pre and post-synaptic ones.
In fact, the presented bionic simulated structure proves to be analogous to a set of
staminal cells, and moreover, with the opportune modifications of the resistance
elements, it is even analogous to a set of glial cells.

310

Fig.13.23

An example of simulated artificially analogical signals. Fig. 13.24.


Using the Fouriers analysis, in series, we can demonstrate that, for every sequence of
bionic emission, there are various harmonics which are similar to those from natural
neurons.
My results concerning the third component (the condenser):
This third component is a particular component in which all the other simple
intracellular signals, defined by their resemblance to physiologic intracellular signals,
are combined in order to produce extra-cellular signals.

Fig. 13.24
311

In Figure 13.25 we can see the potential and intensity current development and the
development of the Fourier series, of the same component. The frequency distribution
is clearly optimal for the bionic dialogue among, not only the neuron (the signal
target), but also among all the other cells nearby, creating, in this way, synchronicity
among the interconnections.
If up to some years ago we believed that the neural information transmission occurred
through the pre-post-synaptic connection between two neurons and that nothing was
interposed, we have later noticed that in reality it seems to occur in presence of glial
cells that not only incorporate the pre of a specific neuron considering the post of
the following neuron, but also they are interconnected with many others that surround
them.

Fig. 13.25

I had to notice this when in my simulations I evaluated the upper harmonicas of a


transmission, and I could calculate the quantitative of energy that was apparently
dispersing, looking redundant considering a single neuron-target.
It was then that I understood that the apparent dispersion was like a cloud, that I
simulated like the cone of a plasma-jet, which collides with a neural surround, and in
this way all what was considered the boundary was informed of what happened on
and about the fundamental neuron-target.
I can demonstrate that, at present, I am able to:
312

build signals similar to physiological ones;

have a bionic dialogue;

build "three-D" structures, ever more and more complex. Fig. 13.26.

Fig. 13.26

13.2 Concluding Considerations

As we can see the object of this study has a highly complex systemic content and
contributes to Systemics in general and, in particular, to the following sectors:

Cybernetics, Automata, Robotics;

Systemics and Medicine.


The object of this study was to simulate an elementary electronic circuit which could
produce signals that were similar to those produced
by intracellular and extra-cellular circuits.
I planned and simulated a new type of neural transmission model that considers every
single neuron as the receiver of n signals and as the generator (in answer) of nk
signals partly in traditional logic and partly in fuzzy logic.
The results, obtained in the course of several experiments of computerized circuit
simulations, are comparable to those produced by neural circuits that are described in
the literature.
313

Based on these results I think that we can create bionic (artificial) cells which can
functionally act like stem, glial, or other kinds of biologic cells.
I have at last obtained a fusion between Neurosciences and Robotics that lead to
Cyberneurophysiology and from this to Bionethics (i.e. Bionics and Ethics).
Stated the outcome of this work, even if with an extremely simplified model of a
single circuit of a single form-circuit, the theoretic bases are, at the moment, the most
completely possibly conFigured. Im also convinced that today the technological
research can easily supply the instruments to assemble and use it.
We know that the mass is one of the ways to be of the energy that is constantly
connected to those processes that, at a microscopic level, occurs among abstract -at a
dual character- separated entities that show a tendency to find themselves in a
determined place with a certain tendency to happening.
This occurs with the waves of probabilities which represent the possibility of
interconnections. There are no separate nor even separable fundamental bricks, but
there is only a complex net of relations among the different parts. We are moving
within the world of the relational complexity.
But we have also the problem of the non-linearity which is a characteristic of the
chaotic world. It often happens that deterministic simple equations can produce
unexpected behaviours. And also that a complex and apparently chaotic behaviour
can give origin to ordered structures.
In an unstable system, little changes can produce strange effects for feedback, selfreinforcement and self-powering processes. The non-linear equations do not allow
making exact predictions, but not even linear equations can give exact result and the
measurements that need for the conditions at the limits, are subject to measurement or
reading errors.
From the quantitative analysis and from the measure, we have to move to the
qualitative analysis and to the topologic characteristics. Resolving all the problems in
a structural analogy with the space or the space-time is for sure a good measure of the
knowledge of the relationship with the truth.
314

Just in the sense that a unitary research in the world of the physics must start from
chaos and complexity to go back (in a narrower range) to the quantum and relativistic
classic conceptions till analytical mechanics.
With the simulations described in this Paper, I give a plain or at least partial answer
to some of these questions.
The human system is an autopoietic highly complex system. It is self organized in a
way that the totality is more of the sum of the parts as it provides a myriad of
potentialities offered by the different relations and, at the same time, the totality is
also less of the sum of the parts, as it concretizes only one of the potentialities offered
by the different relations.
Probably it partially activates them serially, i.e. modifying itself temporarily in
parallel. It is a system whose study needs three epistemological connotations: an
absolute time doesnt exist, an absolute space doesnt exist nor an absolute centre
which can be the source (that irradiates) or the sink (that absorbs).
A system in which everything is interconnected, interrelated, depending from (i.e.
perturbed), and influential on (perturbing). A system rich in several different complex
and chaotic subsystems. It is the system of our life that continuously moves towards
and into the chaos just to order it.
The future consists of probabilities and only the present choice carry out a specific
one and the scenario is purely dynamic. In this myriad of opportunities and solutions,
Chaos is no more that a summary of dynamic equilibriums sequences.
When a system lacks of balance, tends to get a new configuration at a different
energetic value. We can notice this in the self-regulating biological system.
The organism, just for its structure, is a self-regulating system. It has a feed-back
control system at least of the second order. In my researches I assumed the human
body as a geometric structure with the same morphology of the universe. The
communicative biological signals move inside it essentially like the photons outside.
We know for example that the intersynaptic exchange occurs through matter, energy
and information.
315

My neurons set neither can create matter nor can receive or transmit it, and so it bypasses this type of exchange, i.e. it is planned for immediately clutching informations
and energy just before the source of the transmitter-neuron and for giving
informations and energy just after the reception-sink of the receiver-neuron.
Biologically the neuron [whose axon works in an analogous way to the LINAC
(linear accelerator)] is characterized by an enormous surface in order to facilitate the
exchanges.
Artificially this can be carried out only increasing the number of the probes in
reception or in transmission, articulating their mutual relationships and the most
possible facilitating the coding.
The cards, that I planned, completely simulate the different types of circuit (i.e. from
the divergent to the convergent, from the recurrent to the parallel).
They can also be connected with other similar cards, forming regular polygonal
groupings (from 3 till 8 sides) which can be combined linearly, planarly and spatially.
In this paper, the physical objects, like the biological ones, are substituted in the
simulation with other physical (specifically artificial) devices.
As we can easily notice, there is a remarkable coincidence with the real situation if
we consider the paths that link the nervous centres. Obviously we cant yet transform
the different neuro-states (which are still increasing and the more and more specific)
in psycho-states. That is why we arent able to generating, as an example, the
conscience.
Personally and for the moment, I have only obtained the possibility to create an interconnectible hardware with similar elements, that works without any software
introduced from the outside but that is self-controlling and self organizing.

316

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330

EPILOGUE
THE FOURTH PARADIGM
REDESIGNING EVOLUTIONARY COMPLEX SYSTEMS OF
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION
by Andrea Pitasi

14.1 Prologue

In any event, we have changed our own evolution but not ended it. (Barash 2008:
25)
Some increase in plasticity is to be expected []. It represents the extrapolation of
a trend toward variability already apparent in the baboos, chimpanzes and other
cercopithecoids what is really surprising however is the extreme to which it has been
carried. Why are human societies this flexible? (Wilson, 2000: 548)
The papers presented in this book depict the diverse systemic paradigms that have
been developed so far.
In this conclusion I will try to provide a comprehensive systemic paradigm map and I
will focus on the new pardigm that I call fourth paradigm.
The paradigm shifts which featured the systemic thinking from the 1980s to the end
of the last century and the very beginning of the 21st lead to some radical
epistemological changes at the crossroads between communication sciences and
sociology. This paper on one side reconstructs the key paradigm shifts in system
theory from the whole/part one (P1) to the system/environment one (P2) and then to
the autopoietic paradigm shift (P3). Kuhnian normality was rather unlikely in systems
theory and still the key global economical, technological, social challenges of our
times required revolutionary shifts. The other side of this paper is essentially focused
on theorizing a fourth paradigm shift which selects the fragments of the late XX
century epistemological debate turning them in a systematic (in the Mertonian
meaning of the term) redesign of the concept of system itself.
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14.2. Systems as Immaterial Constellations

Organizations in the 21st century have to increase their ability to manage their
viability; the complexity of the social and business environment calls for continuous
advances in the fields of communication and knowledge and the management of
complexity in order to keep the viability o of the social system. To manage complex
organizations, the systemic approach has been pivotal in opening up new lenses and
the understandings of the inner dynamics of living systems. In recent times, we have
witnessed the growth of the strategic role of communication for the governance and
sense making of complex organizations of any kind and the emergence of fluctuating
communication flows as a governance with very little control and extremely open to
the Heideggerian Gegnet. Starting from the 1980s, a paradigm shift has taken shape
in the managerial approach from the whole/part model to the systemic-environment
approach and then the autopoietic turning point as a spin off of the
system/environment paradigm. This shift has generated the epistemological frame of
the systemic approach to social sciences in the fields of sociology and
communication studies.
The social and economic turmoil of our time calls for new paradigms to manage
complexity. The systemic approach is open to interdisciplinary contributions that may
also provide chances for Kuhnian revolutions that can undertake the current
evolutionary challenges of complexity. The present global scene offers a wealth of
thresholds and bifurcations; when faced with such opportunities, the most tragic and
dangerous decision would be to not make any decision.
As outlined by Luhmann The term complexity is meant to indicate that there are
always more possibilities of further experience and action than can be actualized
(1990: 26).
Systems theory (ST) can provide a consensual domain for, among others, the
following reasons:
a. It is currently the only field of knowledge which can offer an analytic, deductive
332

system that is unified syntactically and semantically over all the sciences from
biology to economics and from mathematics to sociology.
b. It is able to create an interface between science and humanities within the neoRenaissance perspective of a Third Culture (as theorized by the Edge Foundation,
www.edge.com)
c. It is able to decline this analytical, deductive and multidisciplinary system as an
evolutionary theory of global society and is able to grasp the flow of communication.
d. The Systems Theory of global society therefore becomes the systems theory of
communication flows in global society itself. Global society could be represented as
the relationship between an operating system (Globus) and its related software
(Mundus).
e. It has an interdisciplinary methodological and technical toolkit that can model and
simulate alternative and other possible scenarios (Terna, 2006) to invent viable
futures.
f. It is able to develop an embodied mathematics (Lakof & Nunez, 2005) that
enhances the application range of science-based and knowledge-intensive
policymaking.
Broadly speaking, the systemic approach embodies many different conceptions of
system deriving from different disciplines and scenarios since the end of the 19th
century or even earlier. In the field of systemic sociology, starting from the 1980s, a
paradigm

shift

has

emerged

from

the

whole/part

82

paradigm

to

the

systemic/environmental one. This shift has generated the epistemological frame of


the systemic approach to social sciences in the fields of sociology, management and
economics.
From a sociological perspective the paradigm shift is significantly represented by the
evolution of systemic thinking from Parsons to Luhmann; this implies the change
from the vision of systemic organizations such as structures to that of systemic
organizations as communication flows, hence a change of focus from tangible to
82

Conceptualized by Talcott Parsons (1951) and even better by Ervin Laszlo (1998) and the Hungarian
school that introduced a higher level of complexity when compared to the rigid variant of Parsons.

333

intangible assets. We define the whole/parts paradigm as Paradigm 1 (P1), the


system/environment paradigm as Paradigm 2, its autopoietic variant (P3), and the
systemic perspective of Globus/Mundus Constellation as Paradigm 4 (P4).
This essay has been developed at a theoretical level, focusing on reframing the
systemic approach for the analysis of complex organizations as intangible portfolios.
The shift reframes the concept of system itself by describing two pivotal Turning
Points:
1. P1 was based on the idea that a system is basically a structure provided with some
key/vital functions83. Despite their differences, Parsons and Stafford Beers systems
in some way consider functions (F) as functional (f) to the system intended as a more
or less rigid and homeostatic structure (S); so that F= (f) S. Does the Kuhnian
revolution of P2 focused on a key upside down of this perspective so that S=(f) F. A
system has, in some way, a structure, but it becomes softer and softer, more and more
dematerialized. The power of functional equivalents easily and dramatically reshapes
these soft and very flexible structures. An artificial heart works because it is a
functional equivalent of the human heart and not because it is shaped and made of the
same material of a human heart. The Autopietic P3 variant dramatically emphasized
P2 upside down revolution.
2. The P1 idea of system is not complex. Even if the term complexity is sometimes
used by the P1 thinkers, their conception of system is not complex at all given that
they think complexity may be controlled, in spite of the fact that by definition
complexity cannot be controlled. P1 theories attempt to cope with the chaotic, fuzzy
and complex order from noise logic of complexity.
Parsons (1951) undoubtedly attempts to shape the borders of social order, rules and
values though a normal/deviant pattern where normality was the only way to exist for
the system. Stafford Beers control system asserted that a system might organize
and structure its relationships with the environment keeping everything under control
by controlling the parts and their relations.
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Parsons LIGA pattern and Stafford Beers Viable Systems are typical examples of this perspective.

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Paradigm 4 is the Globus/Mundus, that will be discussed below. P4 represents a


step forward from P3 and is based on a platform/catalog logic.
Moving from the Viable System Model (VSM) of Stafford Beer (1966; 1969; 1973;
1979) to value constellations of Norman (2001), the paradigm shift in systemic
science in general has been smoother that in sociology in particular, Sociology
dramatically anticipated though Luhmanns works that a general theory of systemic
organization, a general theory of economic/business/religious/political/scientific/legal
or of, broadly speaking social systems is nothing more or nothing less than a general
theory of communication systems. Luhmann can be challenged and someway
considered obsolete only by those systemic theories and paradigms which empower
and radicalize the convergence of organization, business and society into
communication. Theories and paradigms which try to revise Luhmann by reentrying structures, relations an culture are merely cheating as they call something
old with a new name pretending its a new vision.
Today, the immaterial assets have overcome the material ones and business turns into
communication. When we buy a product, we choose it according to its perceived
differentiation; perceived differentiation is based, in the large majority of cases, on
the judgments of the observer about the intangible, immaterial characteristics (i.e.
brand, image, etc.) of the good. Firms networks plan and produce products in more
than one plant; it is the network of communication and exchange of knowledge that
produce them, since the physical plant is a secondary and contingent aspect.
We shall focus on how and why complex organizations need to be considered as
value constellations of intangible assets. This implies that 21st century enterprises
depend much more than in the past on their portfolio of intangible assets; the value of
intangible assets is strongly dependent on communication, that consequently becomes
crucial for the existence and viability of the organization.
We shall illustrate the taking over of intangibles in complex organizations
considering a structural-cultural conception of organization reconfigured as a
constellation created by a continuous flow of memetic re-combinations.
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We sketch the shift from P1 to P2 and P3 in social sciences, reframing the


evolutionary, chaotic system of the 21st century organizations, in order to propose a
fourth paradigm

14.3. Luhmanns Theory and the Paradigm Shift in Sociology

The increase of connectivity and abstraction has become more and more powerful
through the paradigm shift from the whole/part logic (Parsons, 1951; Laszlo, 1998;
Mintzberg, 1992) to the system/environment one (Luhmann, 1995; 1997; Normann,
2001). In spite of the Kuhnian revolution, this paradigm shift represented, it took its
time and gradually removed obsolete knowledge along a smooth continuum which
can be represented as follows: Parsons Alexander Laszlo Stafford Beer
Mintzberg Normann Luhmann.
In P1, Ervin Laszlos conceptual model of whole/parts is based on substantive
integration and synthetic holism, inspired by a logic of interdependence and
interconnectivity through which the evolutionary system adapts to the external
environment by recombining ideas and thought patterns in a very informative manner,
even if sometimes it verges on less scientific, new age statements.
A great evolutionary leap was achieved with P2, thanks to the monumental work of
Niklas Luhmann.
In the system/environment logic of P2 integration is a purely methodological model
in terms of functional equivalents. In this sense, P2 is not strictly holistic, but rather
it aims at a viable and functional unitas multiplex between differences that make a
real difference. The evolutionary power of P2 and then of its turning point to P3 is
based more on autopoiesis rather than interdependence, more on recursive and selfreferential adaptation, rather than adaptation to a presumed external environment. Its
organizational logic is software/hardware, therefore devoid of syncretism with a
strong contingency of selective encoding and decoding. In P2 the software program is
blind, therefore the future is elusive it is a horizon that moves away the closer
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you try to get to it. The paradigm P3 shares with P2 the conceptual, organizational
and heterarchical model even if this heterarchy is so nuanced and fragmented as to
create mere space-time contingencies, where social change almost always proves an
illusion of perspective. The knowledge capability is considered at the technical level
of communication and information for self-organization.
That is why he Paradigm 3 is a step forward from P2; it is based on autopoiesis
within the system/environment coding while P4 redesigns the system/enviromnent
coding into a platform/catalog logic, an evolution of the system/environment
paradigm. Nevertheless, it shares with P2 and P3 the modal reproduction for
functional equivalents and the idea of unitas multiplex as well as the
hardware/software organization. However, it hypothesizes selective self-referential
codes (as in P2 and P3) that are able to understand the differences that make a
difference (as in P2 and P3 again), but it does this by tracing the trajectories of great
evolutionary bifurcations (as in Laszlos variant of P1). In terms of policymaking, P4
presents a reconfiguring evolutionary strategy that reveals how the future is to be
neither predicted (as in P1) nor considered elusive (as in P2), but it is to be seen as an
invention for creating models. P4 shares with P2 and P3 the heterarchical
organizational model, while the space/time proves to be a platform/catalog paradigm
that is active in zero time of desire, where if V=R/W, then V is the maximum
viability because W is reduced to a minimum. Social change is, therefore, understood
primarily as the maximization of V, and the epistemological model is the third culture.
P4 shares with P2 the concept of the horizon of otherwise possible, but unlike P2,
P4 treats it as a catalog from which different strategic problem-solving solutions can
be selected.
V= evolutionary Velocity of the process; R= diffusion of innovation according to
Rogerss model (1956) as adapted by Pitasi (2003); W= Williamsons Costs.
It is also important to underline the main frame of the theoretical evolution of the
shift up to the Globus/Mundus variant that characterizes the platform/catalog
paradigm, which is evolving from P2 through functional differentiation, in the light
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of the theory of global society conceptualized by Luhmann (1997).


This conception of systemic science applied to social issues reveals its full-heuristic
epistemic power in scenarios where it is clear that the more radical the renewals are
from a scientific-technological viewpoint, the higher the proportion of social
knowledge must be if society is to be put in a position to appropriate them
culturally and thus transform them in a way that gives them sense and meaning
(Nowotny, 2008: 134).
In this sense, systemic sociology is the constellation (Normann, 2001) in which social
knowledge is generated and evolves. It is also the constellation that prompts Rogerss
complex cycles and accelerates the V in the formula V=R/W. It recombines and
reconfigures the boundaries of sense of the social system by activating codes,
procedures and programs that select sense (Luhmann, 1990; 1993), considered as a
memetic recombinant (Jouxtel, 2010), and enable the system to distinguish between
systemic communication (the memetic reconfiguration cycles of V=R/W) and
ambient noise.
In essence, a third culture is revealed as the institution qualified to issue Scientific
Citizenship (Nowotny, 2008) of the Knowledge Based Economy Society in which
science and technology cross the border between the present and future by bringing
them closer, and the present no longer dominates over a future that has become
repetitive, monotonous, dictatorial and eternally present, but rather it is the future that
will bring immobility crashing down and thus expand the horizons, which are
otherwise possible so that reality will eventually imitate theory (cfr Ivi: 114; 132).
After so many futile debates about the limits to growth (associated with a nave idea
of the predictability of the future), systemic sociology argues that there is no limit to
systemic evolution (biological, psychological, social, etc.) as in finding and
producing the new, the process between the not-yet and the no longer (which cannot
be given precise temporal limits) always points beyond itself (Nowotny, 2008: 68)
and opens to the idea that the future is uncertain and not without risks, yet at the same
time full of amazing opportunities that could facilitate ever more complex logics of
338

evolution. This idea of the future is the very best game (Atlan, 1986) from an
indefinite recombination of all the memes circulating on the Globus as presented by
the Mundus catalog, which demonstrates how memetics functions well as an
algorithm of deconditioning (Jouxtel, 2010). In this sense, sociology as a systemic
science proves to be a memetic recombinant and reconfigurator of algorithms that
have evolved through differentiation of the autopoietic cycles V=R/W and, therefore,
a chaotic laboratory for the invention of an ever growing and open range of futures
in which memes interact.

14.4. The Systemic Paradigm Shift

As we have outlined in the previous paragraphs, the paradigm shifts from P1 to P3


are pivotal to understand global change mostly though communication autopoiesis.
The most prominent theorist of the system/environment paradigm is Niklas Luhmann,
while Richard Normann can be considered as the one who implicitily used a
Luhmann-like paradigm for the analysis of the organizational change. Normanns
idea of the firm fits perfectly with Luhmanns approach in spite of the fact that
Normann never quoted Luhmann in his works. The P1 theories describe the systems
as (rigid or flexible) structures with a hierarchical configuration (macrosystems,
microsystems, subsystems, etc.), and they state that a system interacts with its
external environment. The paradigm shift toward the system/environment vision
denies both these pillars of the P1.
Theories belonging to P2 and P3 affirm there is no meaningful hierarchy among
systems. Each system (educational, economic, juridical, political, scientific, religious,
etc.) has its own binary code and its own program to evolve within its semanticconceptual-logical boundaries (with no physical ones).
As each system has its own code and program to communicate, and the environment
does not, the environment is not a system, and thus cannot communicate but merely
produce noise. According to this view, the environment is simply a meaningless and
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noisy world from which each system can selfreferentially select meaningless noise to
be turned into meaningful communication. The competence of a system to: observe
the variety of noise; select the noise which can be self referentially turned into
meaningful communication according to the systems self referential coding and
programming; and stabilize long lasting operative-organizational situations framed
within the conceptual status of contingency represent the systems effective power
to evolve self referentially and by self reproduction. The system always evolves
either by expanding or by imploding. The boundaries of this expansion/implosion
are not physical.
If for instance we consider the brand value of a firm, we can observe how the
increasing value of intangibles leads to dematerialization. In the same way, we can
observe the liquefaction of the concept of organized system and structure that turns
into a dematerialized intangible. Normann pointed out how high density, conceptual
and abstract ideas need to be communicated beyond any kind of border.

Fig. 14.1. Drivers promoting density overview (Normann, 2001: 30)

A firm is essentially the intangible networked system which goes through the cycle,
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reproducing its self reference through communication which is the shape of meaning
and its value constellation is metaphorically better described by the stock exchange
organizational logic than by the industrial and boundary, based on the whole/part
paradigm.
Probably the key challenge for systemic sociology is to create a consensual
epistemological domain within the Globus/Mundus paradigm (Paradigm 4) for
several reasons.
The first reason is that by saying that the physical borders are obsolete doesnt mean
that organizations are obsolete. Stating that organizations are made of intangible
assets doesnt mean that it doesnt exist. Making a parallel with hard sciences, and
physics in particular, we can see the origin of this paradigm shift: quantum physics
found that the atom is empty; there is no matter inside the matter but just energy,
vibrations, etc, depending on the different theories. So if even the material world is
made of intangibles, there is no reason why a firm cannot be made of intangibles to
create value inside a self referential and autopoietic value constellation..
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AUTHORS

Chroust Gerhard
Em. Univ.-Prof. Dipl.-Ing. Dr. Gerhard Chroust; M.Sc
Johannes Kepler University Linz (JKU), Austria, Professor Emeritus
International Federation for Systems Research (IFSR), Secretary General
1966-1991 IBM Laboratory Vienna: (Software Research and Development ):
1992 -2007 Professor for Systems Engineering und Automation, JKU: (Software
and Systems Engineering)
Since 2007 Professor emeritus: Systems Thinking and Engineering (especially
Human and Cultural Aspects

DAlessandro Simone
Simone DAlessandro, has a Ph.D in Social Science in G. dAnnunzio University in
Chieti-Pescara. He is also a copywriter, journalist, consultant and trainer. His main
area of research involves creativity in institutions and organization. His academic
publications include the following: The welfare state, weak legal framework,
communication, and unemployment; Globalization: construction and deconstruction
of a phenomenon, published in Rivista Italiana di Comunicazione Pubblica, edited by
Franco Angeli. Fiction: routine outline of creative processes, an anachronistic tool for
the renegotiation of norms and values, in Andrea Pitasis, Rules and falsehoods. The
legal system of film and television fiction, Franco Angeli, Milan, 2010; Advertising
creativity as a strategy of difference: the metameme of intangibility that generates
revenue, in Andrea Pitasis, The tangible value of intangibles, McGrew Hill, Milan,
2010. Among his monographic research series: Creativity: an extremely normal
improbability? For a sociological dialogue between problem and solution, Aracne,
Rome, 2010 with preface by Domenico De Masi. He is one of the founding partners

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of the World Complexity Science Academy (WCSA), a member of the Italian Public
Communication Association and Creative Persons Club.

Dudina Irina
Irina Dudina is an Associate Professor of the Professional Communication
Department and Director of the Examination Centre for LCCI International
Qualifications at Volgograd State University, Russia. She is Candidate of Economic
Sciences (PHD equivalent, 2003) conducting research on institutional issues of ITsupported university teaching and organizational communication as well as designing
professional training courses in the Management Training Program for the National
Economy of the Russian Federation. Department of Professional Communication
Volgograd State University, Prospect Universitetsky 100, Office 2-18 , Volgograd
400062, Russia
E-mail: dudina777@gmail.com

Demetrio P. Errigo (dpe@cyberbrain.eu).


After obtaining the A Level Certificate at the Italian classic High School, he
graduated in Chemical Engineering (magneto-fluid-dynamics researches and
applications) and later in Speculative Philosophy (as the foundation of Gnosiology,
Epistemology, Sociology, Politics, Ethics and Religion). He is an expert in Robotics,
Laser, Cybernetics, Plasma-Jet Propulsion, and in many other scientific and
humanistic fields such as High Polymers, Neurophysiology, Biochemistry, Language
Philosophy and Science Philosophy. He is member of the Italian Ex-Parliamentary,
Cultural Affairs. Musician, journalist, lecturer, he is joint owner and editor of
New Atlantis (periodical newspaper on the theory systems and complexity. He is
the author of different scientific publications and papers, scientific communications
and some patents.

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Farini Federico
Federico Farini is a researcher at the School of Health and Education of Middlesex
University. After obtaining his Ph.D. in Language and Culture Sciences (University
of Modena and Reggio Emilia, 2008), he has developed an interest on the role of
digital media in the public debate around social and political issues and also in
polycentric collective action. He has published a number of articles in international
journals and chapters in edited books on communication theory and sociology of
education.

Introini Fabio
Fabio Introini is researcher in Sociology at Universit Cattolica of Milan, where he
teaches Sociology of Change and Qualitative Research Methodology and takes part in
the research activities of the Department of Sociology. His research topics and
interests concern Social Sciences Epistemology, Science and Technology Studies,
Social Complexity. He has a ten-year experience as a field qualitative researcher .
After having studied the relationship between technologies and political participation
he is now writing on the dialogue between Social Sciences and Complexity theories
comparing Edgar Morin and Bruno Latour.

Loktyushina Elena
Loktyushina Elena was born in Volgograd city, Russia on 10 August 1961. In 1983
she graduated with honours from Volgograd State Pedagogical Institute with the
Diploma of a Teacher of English and German languages. In 1998 she got a PhD
degree in Pedagogy. Currently she has a position of Associate Professor of Foreign
Languages and Economics Department of Volgograd State Social-Pedagogical
University.

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Nafra Jos Mara Daz


Nafra Jos Mara Daz (Doctor in Telecommunication Engineering by the Technical
University of Madrid and graduated in Philosophy by the National University for
Distance Education, UNED) is currently Scholar at the Univerity of Len, Spain, and
at the Hochschule Mnchen, Germany. Between 1997 and 2009, he was associate
professor at the University Alfonso X el Sabio. He worked as researcher at the
Technical University of Vienna (in 1996), and at the Technical University of Madrid
(1997-2002). He has been visiting Professor at several universities in Germany,
Austria and Sweden. He coordinates the BITrum research group for the
interdisciplinary study of information (http://bitrum.unileon.es) and belong to the
board of several international institutions and scientific journals in the field of
information studies and systems science.

Pitasi Andrea
Andrea

Pitasi

(www.andreapitasi.com)

is

systemic

sociologist

and an

international scholar who wrote several books, novels, and newspaper articles about
sociology and other systemic sciences plus some high concept fictional and creative
works. His key writings appeared in Italian, English and French and other works he
authored appeared in German and other languages.
He is a tenured associate professor at the Dept of Business Administration of the
D'Annunzio University, Chieti-Pescara.

Ruzzeddu Massimiliano
Massimiliano Ruzzeddu is tenured researcher in Sociology at university Niccol
Cusano in Rome and vice-scientific director of the association World Complexity
Science Academy. He is author of several essais on Complexity Theories, Social
Theory and Political Sociology

347

Turnbull Shann
Turnbull Shann BSc (Melb.), MBA (Harvard) founded a number of enterprises with
three being listed on the stock exchange. He participated in the acquisition of a dozen
firms and reorganised them as chair, CEO or an advisor. He co-founded the first
educational course in the world for company directors in 1975 and his PhD
established the science of governance grounded in natural science.

Ji ubrt
(b. 1958) studied sociology and economics in the 1980's at Charles University in
Prague. Since 1990 he has lectured at this university at the Faculty of Arts. In 2009,
he founded and has since been leader of the Department of Historical Sociology at
the Faculty of Humanities. He is the author and editor of several books published in
the Czech language, which mainly deal with the theme of contemporary sociological
theory, particularly with regard to issues of action, structure and social systems. Over
the longer term he has also paid attention to the issues of time and memory, recently
implementing a three year project focused on the empirical research of the historical
consciousness of the Czech population. In the area of historical sociology he has
focused on the problems of the civilization process, civilizational comparative
analysis, social change and multiple modernities.

Rainer Zimmermann
Studied physics and mathematics at the university of technology as well as Free
university of Berlin and as DAAD scholar at Imperial College London. Did his first
PhD in mathematics and his second PhD in philosophy. Did his habilitation at the
university of Kassel on Schellings philosophy of nature. Is professor of philosophy
at the university of applied sciences in Munich from 1995 onward. Was guest
professor in Cambridge (where he is a life member of Clare Hall), Bologna, Salzburg,
and Berlin. Is elected member of both iascys (Vienna) and the societas Leibniz
348

(Berlin). Is co-founder and scientific director of the Munich institute of design


science. Works on a holistic system of his own called transcendental materialism.
Has published about 350 works, among them 25 books.

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