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corresponds to some extent to the loss of civil status which accompanies some convictions,
today.
The provisions relating to an attempt to escape from custody are contained in sections
224,225, and 225-B of the Pakistan penal code.
They provide punishment:
(a). for a person resisting or obstructing the lawful apprehension of himself for any
offence with which he is charged or of which he has been convicted, or escaping or
attempting to escape from legal custody. Imprisonment up to two years with fin or with
both.
(b). resisting or obstructing lawful apprehension of another person for an offence or
rescuing or attempting to rescue him from legal custody punishment up to two
years or with fine, but if the person to be apprehended is charged for an offence
punishable :
(1). with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years.
(2). or with death
The sentence provided is up to three years and seven years respectively and
(c). resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension or escape or rescue in cases not
covered by the above two provisions.. Imprisonment up to six months or with fine.
Harboring an offender
The word harbor according to section 52-A, includes the supplying a person with
shelter, food, drink , money, clothes, arms, ammunition or means of conveyance, or the
assisting a person by any means to evade apprehension.
The various provisions in the penal code relate to harboring or concealing a person
knowing him to be an offender with the intention of screening him from legal
punishment, harboring or concealing an offender having escaped from custody, or
whose apprehension has been ordered, and knowingly harboring any persons who are
about to commit or have committed Robbey or Dacoity.
The above provisions however, do not extend to the case in which the harbor is given
by the wife or husband of the person harbored, (sections212, 216, 216-A)
The above However presupposes that some offence has been actually committed and
that the harbored gives refuge to a person knowingly that thereby he helps to evade his
apprehension or screens him from legal punishment. It does not apply to the harboring
of persons, not being criminals, who abscond to avoid or delay a judicial investigation
Solitary confinement
Solitary confinement is a punishment or special form of imprisonment in which a
prisoner is denied contact with any other persons, excluding members of prison staff. It
is considered by some as a form of psychological torture. It is usually cited as an
additional measure of protection (of society) from the criminal. It is also used as a form
of protective custody.
Solitary confinement is colloquially referred to in American English as the hole,
lockdown, the SHU (pronounced shoe) or the pound, and in British English as the
block or the cooler
This is a kind of imprisonment which secludes the prisoner from any intercourse or
sight of, and communication with other prisoners. it may be accompanied with or without
labor.
Section 73 of Pakistan penal code provides that whenever any person is convicted of
an offence for which under the code the court has power to sentence him to rigorous
imprisonment, the court may by its sentence , order that the offender shall be kept in
conspiracy no matter who joins or leaves it, as long as there are at least two persons at
any one time acting in combination to achieve the same criminal
objective: R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450 at 458.
2. In a joint trial for conspiracy, the summing up must deal separately with the case
against each accused and the trial judge must separate the evidence properly relevant
and admissible against each of the accused: R v Cosgrove and Hunter (1988) 34 A Crim
R 299 at 303.
3. Before the co-conspirators rule can operate to permit acts and statements of others,
in the absence of a particular accused, to be evidence in the case against that accused,
the trial judge must have determined (on the basis of evidence admissible in the
ordinary way against that accused) that there is prima facie reasonable evidence of
participation of that accused in the alleged agreement. The jury is not to be told of the
trial judges finding in the summing up, or at all, and there need not be a formal
judgment or ruling to that effect, but the trial judge must indicate that he or she is
satisfied that there is such reasonable evidence of participation prior to the
summing up.
If there is evidence of reasonable participation, then acts or statements in the absence
of the accused will be admissible against him or her to prove the existence of the
conspiracy and the nature of it. If those acts or statements were done or made in
furtherance of the conspiracy, then they will also be admissible on the issue of the
accuseds participation in the alleged agreement. If, however, the allegation of the
Crown is that the accused joined the conspiracy after it had commenced, then acts
done or statements made prior to his or her joining the alleged conspiracy are
admissible only to prove the existence of the alleged agreement and the nature of it,
but not to prove his or her participation. See generally:R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR
450; R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153; R v Houlker (unrep, 19/03/93, NSWCCA).
4. Section 57(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 provides that if the relevance of evidence of
an act done by a person depends on the court making a finding that the person and one
or more other persons had, or were acting in furtherance of, a common purpose
(whether to effect an unlawful conspiracy, or otherwise), the court may use the
evidence itself in determining whether the common purpose existed.
This provision reflects the common law. See, for example, Ahern v The Queen (1988)
165 CLR 87 at 9394 and Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1 at 67. The admission
of this evidence does not offend the hearsay rule. Where evidence is admitted on a
provisional basis under s 57(2) of the Evidence Act 1995, even though its admissibility
is in issue, and it transpires that there was no other evidence of common purpose
involving the relevant accused, it will probably be necessary for the judge to exclude
the evidence at a later stage.
5. It is open to the trial judge in the exercise of his or her discretion, even where it is
found that there is reasonable evidence of participation against a particular accused, to
exclude evidence of the acts and statements of others from consideration in the case
against him or her (pursuant to s 135 or s 137 of the Evidence Act 1995) and/or to limit
the use to which the jury might put such evidence under s 136 of theEvidence
Act 1995.
6.Although a warning under s 165 of the Evidence Act 1995 is not required, the jury
should be told that they should scrutinise carefully before acting on evidence of the acts
and statements of others in the absence of a particular accused but which implicate
that accused: R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153. It should be pointed out to the jury that
the particular accused was not present when the relevant things were said and done by
his or her alleged co-conspirators, and was therefore unable to confirm or deny the
truth of what was said or done.
7.As to the significance of statements made after the arrest of an alleged conspirator,
see: R v Louden (1995) 37 NSWLR 683.
8.The common law rule that a husband and wife cannot be found guilty of conspiring
together has been abolished, see: Crimes Act 1900, s 580D.
9.As to indictments for conspiracy, see: Criminal Procedure Act 1986, Sch 3, cl 21.
10.As to conspiracy to defraud, the jury should be directed that to defraud is to
deliberately use dishonest means to deprive another person of his or her property or to
imperil his or her rights or interests. It involves the intentional creation of a situation by
one person to use dishonest means to deprive another person of money or property, or
to imperil the other persons rights or interests, knowing that he or she has no right to
deprive that other person of money or property, or imperil that other persons rights or
interests.
The summing up should also identify the dishonest means relied upon by the
Crown: Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 431; Spies v The Queen (2000) 113 A Crim
R 448. See also Defraud Intent to
11.Having regard to the definition of supply in the Drug Misuse and Trafficking
Act 1985, it is not open to the Crown to charge a conspiracy to supply a prohibited drug
where the accused agreed with another to supply a prohibited drug to that
other: R v Challita (1988) 37 A Crim R 175 at 184 and R v Trudgeon (1988) 39 A Crim
R 252. It is, however, open to the Crown to charge a conspiracy where the accused is
alleged to have agreed with another or others to supply drugs to the public generally, or
to another, or others not being conspirators with them:Tannous v The Queen (1989) 64
ALJR 141.
12.An accused may nevertheless be liable for conspiracies to do the factually
impossible: R v El Azzi (2001) 125 A Crim R 113.
Conclusion
Abetment is rightly declared a substantive offence for the purpose
very aptly defined by;
Terremy Bentham as;
The discovery of such preparatory offence with the object of
prohibiting them would reduce the level of the principal crimes
committed in consequence to them.