Democracy.

cn

The web 2.0 and its "surrogate democracy function" in China

MA Chinese Studies
Final paper

Andrea Fenn
0818747
 Introduction

Civil society. Political expression. Democracy. Philosophers and academics have debated these
terms for centuries, but none have come to a decisive definition of what these concepts really mean, or
how they should be concretely applied to a political system. Nonetheless, there seems to be a certain
consensus among western scholars around the idea that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) lacks a
developed civil society and platforms for free and comprehensive political expression, and therefore
cannot be considered as a “truly democratic country” like its western counterparts.
Since the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping, China has undergone radical economic and social
transformations, which have substituted the former planned system with a relatively unrestricted
market, where goods and services are priced through the relation between demand and supply;
consequently, a middle class has emerged, composed of private entrepreneurs and white-collar
employees of the companies operating in this new market. Despite these enormous transformations,
the political configuration of the country has not changed significantly throughout the years, and the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is still solidly in power as the only legitimate force in a monocratic
political system; apart, perhaps, from a brief parenthesis during the demonstrations on Tiananmen
Square in 1989, it never seemed that the authority of the CCP suffered serious challenge from any
external political or social force.
To explain this political persistence in times of socioeconomic ferment, students of China in the
west have normally referred to the fact that China’s government, while liberalizing the market and
allowing free economic enterprise, has maintained strict control over political expression, information,
and private association, and that this has constituted the key to the CCP’s endurance in power1. For
this reason, when the Internet entered China for the first time in 1994, it was not just regarded as a
technological breakthrough: it seemed clear to the west that connection to the web was to bring an
inevitable transformation of the country’s communication and information systems, and perhaps have
a consequent impact on the CCP’s power maintenance in China2.
As a consequence, starting from the latter half of the 1990s, western scholars have debated
vivaciously about the advent of the Internet in China, and on the effects that this new information

1
Saich (2001)
2
Bi (2001)
 technology would have on its political system. The first reaction to these changes was of enthusiastic
optimism, as many scholars expected that the potential of market liberalization and communication
expansion connected to information technology and Internet usage would naturally promote
democracy and freedom. This is what Milton Mueller and Zixiang Tan defined as the expectation of
convergence: the idea that “as countries like China modernize and reform, their political and
economic institutions will naturally converge toward Western-style democracy3”. Among the various
modernization policies adopted by China at the end of the 20th century, the introduction of Internet
information was though to have a particular importance in encouraging democratization of the
country, thanks to the market liberalization and political liberation that the web was thought to
provide4. Besides, others observed the substantial transformations that the Internet was bringing about
in the world of Chinese mass media, introducing a gradual loosening and marketization that would
diminish the importance of ideology and the effectiveness of governmental control on information,
hence resulting in democratic change in the country5. Some, as for instance Jianhai Bi, went even
further in asserting the imminence of an “Internet revolution” in a democratic sense in China6.
After the initial wave of enthusiasm subsided, abated by the fierce repression of the Falun Gong
movement and its online activities in 1999, observers realized that the Chinese government had
started implementing strategies of regulation and control towards the web, and that the link between
Internet and democracy might not be so direct. Some scholars underlined the policy of controls of the
web and suppression of political dissent online operated by the CCP, and the consequent limits that
such controls posed on democratic change in the country7. On one hand, governmental control on the
Internet was thought to slow down, but not to entirely quell, democratization in China: as Chase and
Mulvenon suggested, "the Internet [...] will probably not bring 'revolutionary' political change to
China, but instead will be a key pillar of China's slower, evolutionary path toward increased
pluralization and possibly even nascent democratization”8. On the other hand, scholars became more
disillusioned about democratic evolution in China, and skeptical about the effects of the Internet on

3
Mueller & Tan (1997), p.7
4
Gompert (1998)
5
Zhao (1998)
6
Bi (2000)
7
Chase & Mulvenon (2002); Kalathil & Boas (2003); Shie (2004)
8
Chase & Mulvenon (2002), p. 90
 the Chinese political system: in the words of Kathleen Hartford, "as Internet use and applications
expand in China [...] we may well find that its greatest impact lies in intensifying existing social
contradictions"9.
Western academic debate about the Internet in China has mostly developed around these two
standpoints, which focused either on the democratic potential of the Internet within the political
system, or on the controls and filters operated by the government, which has frustrated political
opposition and systemic change in the country. Alas, up to now it seems that none of these two
positions has been proved right by historical facts. In fact, after fifteen years of Internet connection in
the country, the Chinese political system has not undergone any substantial institutional
transformation in a democratic sense: the Communist Party is still firmly in power as the only
authorized political force, and there have been no notable reforms for the introduction of institutions
and representational mechanisms that should be present in a western-style democracy. On the
contrary, some analysts have noticed how the diffusion of online mass media has helped the Chinese
government broadcast and propagate unifying messages and nationalist sentiments, thus reinforcing
the notion of an “imagined Chinese community”, linked economically to, but separated politically and
culturally from, the global world10. Also thanks to the Internet, authorities have managed to create a
“nationalist glue”, which ultimately reinforces the position and the legitimacy of the Communist
Party11. In this sense, the expectation of convergence has proven false.
Notwithstanding this, those who foresaw increasing suppression of usage and freedom of the
Internet in China have also been contradicted by events. Internet access has kept growing at fast-paced
and constant rates since its first appearance in the country12; besides, the diffusion of the Internet
among the population has been encouraged and stimulated by the government, which has
progressively attempted to eliminate technological and economic barriers to web access13. Even the
darkest predictions concerning control and censorship of the Internet by the authorities have not been
realized. As a matter of fact, it has been documented how the government has progressively loosened
its ideological and political claims regarding new media, and how direct control of online information

9
Hartford (2000), p. 19
10
Weber (2003)
11
Li, Xuan & Kluver (2003)
12
CNNIC (2009)
13
Zhang (2006)
 flows that was exercised in the first period of the Internet has been substituted by a subtler and less
invasive form of indirect guidance of the web by the political actor, and by mechanisms of self-
regulation by websites14. Lokman Tsui has pointed out how the Soviet-like idea of censorship that
westerners have concerning China’s policy towards the Internet leads to blind spots and shortcomings
in understanding the real situation of the Internet, and neglects the fact that Chinese netizens are often
given the freedom to communicate and to create information outside the grip of the state15. All this is
to say that the Chinese government has not at all been able to control and repress information flows on
the web, and that the Internet has increasingly grown as a powerful force of freedom outside the
domain of the state.
My research is situated at this stalling point of the western academic research about the Internet
in China, and aims at rejoining the two extreme positions of the debate on Chinese democratization,
trying to make sense of the previous research, historical evidence and the latest phenomena and
developments of the online world in China. Hence, the question I intend to answer in my paper is: if
the Internet has not brought democracy in a strict sense, and on the other side has not tightened the
grip of the state on the Chinese people, what has it actually brought?
The hypothesis I will try to prove is that the Internet is currently fulfilling a “surrogate
democracy function” within the Chinese political system16. By “surrogate democracy function”, I
mean an action of expansion of the freedom of individuals vis-à-vis the state, which renders the
political system more democratic. This democracy function develops out of the institutional
framework that is generally deemed as quintessential of a western-like democratic political system –it
does not stem from representational organs or mechanisms, but rather from a technological
instrument, the Internet, that was not necessarily envisaged for that purpose. In this sense, it cannot be
defined as “institutional”, but is to be regarded as “surrogate”. Despite being surrogate, Internet
platforms lead to transformations –such as a greater influence of public opinion on political actors, the
creation of a less monopolistic and more multilateral information system, the development of interest

14
Xu (2005), Weber & Jia (2007)
15
Tsui (2008)
16
The concept of “surrogate democracy function” has been borrowed from Chan & So (2005), in Romano &
Bromley (eds.), who have used it to refer to the function fulfilled by the relatively free media system within the
authoritarian political framework of Hong Kong
 groups with political agendas– that have substantial democratic characteristics, and thus have a
concrete impact on the Chinese political system.
According to my model, the surrogate democracy function of the Internet is unlikely to give way
to further “non-surrogate” democratic transformation, but rather helps the formation of a socio-
political equilibrium in the country. This equilibrium is a direct consequence of the positive
democratic –yet surrogate– effects the Internet has on the political system; in this sense, it can be
defined as a surrogate democratic equilibrium, or equilibrium with quasi-democratic characteristics.
The three major fields of impact of the Internet on the Chinese political system are: 1) the
creation of a public sphere in a western sense; 2) the erosion of the monopolistic media and
information system, and the creation of more multilateral, state-independent channels of information
diffusion; 3) the creation of a space for different interest groups with political agendas and opinions to
coexist and fight for attaining the support of Chinese netizens. For each of these points, which will be
treated separately in three different chapters, I shall analyze the surrogate democracy function the
Internet fulfills within the socio-political apparatus, and point out the way it contributes to a socio-
political equilibrium –an equilibrium with quasi-democratic characteristics.
In this essay I attempt to analyze the Internet as a phenomenon in its entirety, yet I will have
particular regard for the effects that the web 2.0 has on China. In order to elucidate the concept of web
2.0, I borrow the definition given by Tim O’Reilly on his weblog: web 2.0 is the revolution in the
computer industry caused by the move to the Internet as an interpersonal platform for sharing,
cooperating, collaborating, exchanging information. It makes use of collective intelligence, i.e. it is
based on “applications that harness network effects to get better the more people use them”17.
In China, the most manifest and successful utilizations of the web 2.0 are bbs –bulletin boards or
forum platforms where users can leave their comments about a selected topic and join an open
discussion with the other participants– and weblogs –or blogs, personal web pages that show a
chronological record of all the posts written by the keeper, and of the comments made by the readers.
Since their first appearance on the Chinese web, forums and blogs have been a stunningly popular
phenomenon, and communication and information based on these interpersonal platforms has gained

17
O’Reilly (2006)
 large recognition within society, by the media and even by the political actor18. In light of the
importance of these phenomena, I will consider the content of forums and blogs as a more or less
faithful reflection of the trends and opinions of Chinese netizens. In this essay, the words web 2.0,
interpersonal platforms and interpersonal networks are used as synonyms.
In order to prove my hypothesis, I employ the core literature produced in the West and in China
about the Chinese Internet and its socio-political effects –which, as I have previously noticed, has
been quantitatively abundant and qualitatively diverse– as well as original research on the Chinese
web. In fact, between September 2008 and May 2009, I have constantly followed the mechanisms of
functioning and the dynamics of the Internet in China, and monitored hundreds of forum pages and
personal blogs; when not footnoting other studies, comments and analyses are based on the results of
my personal investigation. In particular, the beginning of my research coincided with the outbreak of
the Sanlu incident in September 2008, which allowed me to witness in real time the evolution of the
scandal and the reaction on the Chinese web; details about the Sanlu case will be given in the second
chapter.
This article is composed of three main chapters, each of which focuses on one particular effect
the Internet has in fulfilling a surrogate democracy function and maintaining a socio-political
equilibrium. The first chapter deals with the emergence of a public sphere on the web, the second
chapter describes the impact of the Internet on information diffusion and traditional media, while the
third pays attention to online interest groups in the country. At the end of the essay, a short conclusion
will summarize the conclusions reached throughout this article, albeit recognizing how this can only
be considered as an exploratory paper, and that further studies can and should be conducted on this
matter before clearly comprehending the intricate relation between the Internet and democracy in
China.

18
Tian (2008)
 The Internet and the public sphere in China

In this chapter, I intend to show how the Internet –with particular regard to interpersonal networks–
contributes to the creation and efficiency of a public sphere in China, and how the online public sphere
fulfills a “surrogate democracy function” within the socio-political system. Since the Chinese reform of
the end of the 1970s, western scholars have been widely discussing about the emergence of a public
sphere and of a consequent civil society in China. Most of the studies produced in that early period took
account of the dissenting opinions that intellectuals and students had been raising throughout the reform
era and, comprehensibly, paid particular attention to the students’ demonstrations at Tiananmen Square
in 1989, which was elevated to the foremost demonstration of the existence of opposition within and
against the Chinese regime19. Other scholars, instead, focused on the structural consequences of Deng
Xiaoping’s reforms: despite being designed for easing tensions within the system, these reforms were
thought to open up spaces for opposition, thus facilitating the emergence of an embryonic public sphere
and civil society in urban China20.
It was only after the acceleration of socio-economic reforms, and the concurrent arrival of Internet
connections in China, that scholars became bolder in claiming the existence of a western-style public
sphere within the authoritarian framework of the PRC. Despite the concerns about the undemocratic
features of the state, it is nowadays generally acknowledged that the Internet has had –and is still
having– a pivotal role in shaping a public sphere in China.
According to the classical definition by Jürgen Habermas, public sphere is defined as “a domain of
our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open
in principle to all Citizens”21. The public sphere should present the following features: (1) publics
composed of autonomous individuals that engage in rational debate; (2) spaces where publics may freely
assemble for such debate; and (3) media of communication, such as newspapers and books22. By making
use of this theoretical perspective, several scholars have argued how the Internet and participation based
on it have contributed to the creation of a public sphere conforming to Habermas’ definition.

19
For a general overview of the 1970s and 1980s studies on the public sphere in China, see Xin Gu (1993), pp.
38–52
20
Whyte (1992)
21
Habermas (1989)
22
Habermas (1989, 2)
 Firstly, the Internet has offered a new platform where netizens can communicate in a free and
autonomous way, and at the same time can access an unprecedented amount of information coming from
more and more diverse sources. This has substantially augmented the degree of social and political
awareness of Chinese Internet users, because the public has increasingly been able to compare different
views and news in order to attain a personal understanding of facts; as a consequence of deeper political
understanding, netizens find it easier to engage in a rational debate about political issues. As noted by
Zheng and Wu, surveys comparing civic participation in various countries have shown how Chinese
Internet users have acquired greater interest and knowledge about politics thanks to the web. The
incidence of this beneficial effect decreases when analyzing netizens of countries with a more long-
standing and institutionalized public opinion –first South Korea, then Japan, and finally the United
States: this demonstrates how the Internet has been used by many Chinese as a means to give way to
political needs that did not have a channel of expression in the past23.
Secondly, the Internet has considerably increased the opportunities for citizens to assemble in social
organizations not under the direct control or influence of the state. As a matter of fact, prior to the arrival
of the Internet, some scholars had already noted a timid resurgence of private associations in China, as
the government progressively opened spaces for non-governmental organizations during the 1990s, and
this was thought to produce a stimulus to civil society in the country24. Nevertheless, in order to escape
the control of the State, these organizations were forced to engage in wearisome strategies of negotiation
and circumvention with the authorities, which limited the visibility and the impact these private
associations had on public life and on the social fabric25.
The connection of China to the web has reinforced this trend, providing an incentive for private
association and social participation, and at the same time has increased visibility for non-governmental
organizations, providing new channels for promotion and publicity. Guobin Yang has indicated how the
number of NGOs has increased in China since the advent of the Internet, and how most of these NGOs

23
Zheng & Wu (2005)
24
In China, the term “non-governmental organizations” (NGO) includes both social organizations (shehui tuanti),
which have long existed under the system of social organization of the PRC, and private non-enterprise entities
(minban feiqiye danwei), which instead have been legally recognized only in 1998, and respond more precisely to
the western definition of non-governmental organizations. For a more accurate definition of private non-enterprise
entities, see www.ln.gov.cn/wsbs1/wsbsbgxz/qybsbgxz/slbgbgxz/200801/P020080131512241038499.doc
25
Saich (2000)
maintain stable websites, or even base their entire activity on the web26. Official statistics indicate that
since the end of the 1990s, whereas the number of social organizations has remained practically
unchanged over time, private non-enterprise entities have increased steeply, and that the Internet has
been a driving factor in this increase27: this, in a sense, shows the growth of private organizations
outside the scope of the state, and their use of the Internet as the most prominent channel of action.
Access to the Internet does not intrinsically mean that NGOs have a more pervasive impact or following,
but it certainly makes it easier for them to acquire visibility and avoid the control of the state28.
Virtual private assembly on the Internet has not only taken the form of legally recognized
organizations but, most importantly, it has also developed through spontaneous debates that have given
space to opinions of individual citizens. The innumerable bbs platforms have offered a new space for
netizens to engage in discussions on political themes, to structure mobilization, and even to develop
public protest. Internet forums –as well as blogs, interpersonal networks, and all the different Internet
platforms that fall under the labeling of web 2.0– have been acknowledged as a fundamental part of the
public sphere, because they enlarge the possibilities for the public to assemble, and to take part freely in
public discussion. Giese suggests that Internet platforms, being places where individuals meet aside
from their family and professional life to discuss and exchange information in an informal setting, are
not much different from the other “third places” defined by Oldenburg in his milestone work on
community hangouts29. In sum, just like cafés, coffee shops or bookstores, forums and blogs provide a
comfortable and relaxed space for social interaction, laying the foundation for public discussion and
democracy at the grassroots level30.
Initial studies have been skeptical about the effects of the Internet on the shaping of a public sphere
and on civic engagement. Putnam, for instance, has underlined the increased isolation of Internet users,
who tend to spend hours in front of the screen instead of with family and friends, reducing time devoted
to community activities and to civic engagement31. In addition, Lynch has doubted that the web could

26
Yang (2003, 2)
27
See the “Bulletin on the Development of Civic Institutions 2007” (latest available), at http://cn.chinagate.cn/
reports/2008-05/05/content_15072719.htm
28
Zheng & Wu (2005)
29
Oldenburg (1999)
30
Giese (2005)
31
Putnam (2000)
actually bring a real public sphere in reformed China: according to his view, the Internet emphasizes
chaotic and a-political discussion, which is unlikely to benefit an independent civil society32.
Nonetheless, further research on the issue has shown how these positions are actually unfounded. In
an exhaustive empirical study on digital citizenship in the United States, Mossberger et al have come to
the conclusion that the Internet enhances civic participation. Firstly, because the bigger and more diverse
quantity of information Internet users are exposed to increases awareness, political interest and, as a
consequence, political participation; and secondly, because online discussions have proved to be more
egalitarian than face-to-face ones, reducing the risks that gender, race, age, or economic discrimination
could exclude certain social groups from the public discussion33. Similar empirical findings, albeit in
different national situations, have been reached in the specific case of China: according to the reports of
the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), there is an increasing consensus among the
populace that the Internet leads to a better understanding of political life; besides, the majority of
Chinese citizens thinks that the Internet will allow them to better raise their opinions, and force public
officials to be more aware of the common people’s views34.
I have so far illustrated the beneficial effects the Internet has had in shaping and developing a
public sphere that adheres to Habermas’ model. The interrelation between the web and public sphere has
been recognized by a large group of scholars, who have recognized the similarity of online debates on
the Internet with discussions conducted in the traditional “third places” of western democracies.
Furthermore, the Internet seems to have an even more pronounced effect in China, where an online
public sphere that hosts an active and relatively free public opinion moderates the lack of conventional
platforms of democratic expression –political parties or free traditional media that are present in western
countries.
The Chinese online public sphere greatly responds to the prerequisites set by Habermas in his

32
Lynch (1999)
33
Mossberger et al. (2008)
34
In this study I avail myself of the CNNIC reports on Internet usage in China, edited by Gao Liang (editions
2003, 2005 and 2007), and of the 2009 CNNIC Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China.
According to the surveys, the percentage of people who agreed with the statement “Thanks to the Internet people
like you can understand more about politics” grew from 71,7% in 2003 to 75,1% in 2007. Agreement with
statements like “Public officials will care more about what people like you think” and “People like you will have
more say about what the government does”, although in slight decline since 2003, is still widespread. The reports
are available at http://www.markle.org/.
definition of the public sphere. Firstly, it is open to virtually all citizens, who find it increasingly easy to
access the Internet and to take part in online discussion, as is demonstrated by the astonishing growth of
the Chinese Internet market and of the number of Chinese websites and blogs35. Secondly, it presents the
features suggested by Habermas: a considerable number of well-informed, politically aware citizens
who engage in the public discussion; spaces –such as forums, blogs, interpersonal networks– where
these individuals can meet and interact for such discussion; a new, dynamic and multiform means of
communication, the Internet, which interacts with the traditional media, influencing them and rendering
communication freer and more varied36.
In Habermas’ view, a developed public sphere is an important precondition and stimulus for a free
and mature public opinion, and fulfills a democratic function within a political system37. As I have
described, in China a western-style public sphere is mostly developed on the Internet, on communication
platforms taking the place of institutions –traditional media, political groups etc.– that in western
countries are purposely designed for giving voice to the public. Because of its non-institutional
character, the democracy function that the online public sphere fulfills is to be regarded as “surrogate”.
Let us now analyze what kind of “surrogate democracy function” the Internet fulfills in China, and in
what way it produces an equilibrium within the socio-political system.
Lagerkvist has noted the increasing importance that forums, and online public opinion based on
them, have in setting the public agenda: in his words, “when a significantly large critical mass of upset
chat room postings makes something an issue for everybody to take seriously, it enters the traditional
media as well”38. In a sense, the Chinese Internet has overturned the mechanism of agenda setting
usually found in the west –where the efforts of traditional media to seek the truth often precede the
attention given by public opinion. In China, state-controlled media are unable to engage in missions to
seek the truth, and this often paralyzes their willingness and efforts to give voice to opinions of citizens;
for this reason, Internet platforms have replaced traditional media as an alternative means of agenda-
setting, spontaneously defining the priorities of public discussion, and influencing traditional media with

35
According to CNNIC, the average yearly growth of the Chinese Internet market since 1997 has been more than
41% (CNNIC 2009, p. 2)
36
Gillmor (2004)
37
Habermas (1989; 1989, 2)
38
Lagerkvist (2005), p. 127
their choices and opinions39.
Setting the public agenda through the online public sphere has clear “surrogate” democratic
implications. It remedies the shortcomings of the traditional public opinion –the one based on state-
controlled or state-influenced media– reducing the distance between the public debate and the issues that
are of real concern for the people; besides, it conveys an image of a more responsive and more caring
government, because participation in public debate seems to have a more direct effect on governmental
choices. As I have mentioned, the majority of Chinese believes that thanks to the Internet, “Public
officials will care more about what people think” and “People will have more say about what the
government does”40. Participation in online public opinion, thus, increases the degree of satisfaction
towards the government, and it is likely to ameliorate the relationship between the public and officials,
creating a political equilibrium within the system.
Another democratic factor that the online public sphere brings into the Chinese system is the revival
of channels of contact between citizens and public officials. Scholars have called attention to the fact
that since the first diffusion of the Internet at the end of the 1990s, most local governments through out
the country have availed themselves of Internet sites, where they provide useful information for citizens,
online bureaucratic services, and a window of contact with local authorities; some local governments
have even introduced live reporting of official meetings on their websites41. These websites, although
mostly promoting the official stance and official discourse about China and its polity, have been
progressively reliable in the information released, and increasingly open to sound out the positions and
demands of the populace42. According to some, e-government could be seen as a sign of e-democracy,
because it increases the information of the citizenry, and allows free dialogue between population and
officials43; at the same time, it improves openness, accountability and effectiveness of the political
actors44. Even those who have been more wary in claiming the possibility of e-government to bring e-
democracy to China have recognized the positive effects that online bureaucracy has in fighting

39
Lagerkvist (2005)
40
CNNIC Report (2003, 2005, 2007)
41
Zhang (2008)
42
Xia (2006)
43
Watson & Mundy (2001)
44
Xia (2006), Zhang (2008)
corruption, and in improving the image of local governments in the eyes of citizens45.
It has been documented how, thanks to e-government, citizens have been able to express their
protest against abuse of power by local officials, and how in several cases such spontaneous action on
the Internet has received prompt response by the State. Most sites of local governments in China feature
“Governor’s boxes”, mail boxes where the citizens are encouraged to express their judgment towards the
governmental machine, and towards the performance of single officials; it is not rare that protests of
citizens in “Governor’s boxes” could lead to punishment of corrupt officials or in substantial
adjustments of public policies46. The first and most renowned case of successful communication
between netizens and public officials occurred in September 2002, when the Internet user “crazy for
her” published an article on a governmental website, in which he condemned the mismanagement of the
city of Shenzhen in southern China, as many institutions and productive units were being transferred to
Shanghai, with considerable loss of occupation and prestige for the city. The article in question,
“Shenzhen, who are you being abandoned by?”, attracted the attention of traditional media, and the
matters treated in it soon became subject of discussion in the local public opinion; as a response, the
mayor of Shenzhen publicly invited “crazy for her” to sound out his opinions in detail, and even
included some of his suggestions in the new governmental policies47. At that moment, the Internet had
allowed a breach in the formal protocol of Chinese politics unimaginable before; after that, similar cases
of contact between citizens and politicians through the online public sphere have become increasingly
frequent48.
Communication between online citizens and public officials has also taken place through Internet
interpersonal platforms, such as blogs and forums. Starting from the end of 2005, most governmental
offices have begun keeping collective blogs as an important means of communication with the public49;
in addition, an increasing number of top-level politicians have opened personal blogs in the VIP areas of
blog-providing sites like people.com.cn, sina.com.cn or sohu.com, where they engage in regular

45
See, for instance, Blakely & Matsuura (2001) or Wong & Welch (2004)
46
Xia (2006)
47
!h!t!t!p!:!/!/!w!w!w!.!h!u!d!o!n!g!.!c!o!m!/!w!i!k!i!/深圳，你被谁抛弃？
48
For a list of successful communications between citizens and officials since 2002, see
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/21963/22062/2252447.html
49
Xie (2006)
dialogue with citizens and other politicians about political issues50. It would be hard yet interesting to
know how many of these politicians actually write their blogs in person; notwithstanding, it is
undeniable that single politicians have used the net more and more to establish direct contact with the
public.
At the same time, Chinese politicians have progressively acknowledged the importance of Internet
forums as mirrors of the emerging well-educated, well-off urban public opinion, and consequently have
started participating in forum debates and interacting with forum users. The apotheosis of this trend
occurred, of course, when in June 2008 the President of the PRC Hu Jintao took part into a forum
discussion on “Strong Nation Forum”, the forum of the party newspaper People’s Daily, one of the most
visited interpersonal platforms51. Albeit being a limited and highly monitored experiment of direct
democracy, Hu’s visit to an Internet forum mostly inhabited by youngsters and students undoubtedly
reflects the willingness of the government to establish contact with the Internet public opinion and its
netizens, and the increasing importance of forums in setting the agenda within the system. Given the
prominence of the “special visitor” of the forum, media have given ample coverage and reflection upon
the event; and yet, as a matter of fact, lower-level politicians were already starting to engage in online
discussions, even before Mr. Hu set the prestigious example52.
I have already noted that an effective communication between the ruling class and the subordinate
citizen has important democratic implications, because it makes the government more aware and more
sensitive to the will of the population, tangibly increasing its performance and its image in the eyes of
the people53. Online government-citizen communication not only instills a surrogate democracy element
in the Chinese system; it also contributes to maintaining a socio-political equilibrium, thanks to its
beneficial effects on governmental performance and on the relation between citizens and rulers. As
Blakely and Matsuura correctly point out, e-government has a critical impact on increasing transparency
of the bureaucratic machine and, as a consequence, on reducing the opportunity for corruption. With
corruption being a major source of frustration of citizens and a potential instigator of unrest and protest,
by reducing risks of corruption, e-government initiatives contribute to maintaining social order and

50
Wang (2007)
51
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/7406621.html
52
Hong (2007)
53
Watson & Mundy (2001); Xia (2006); Wang (2007)
preserving the current political system54. In addition, the new citizen-government interfaces created by
the Internet can be used by the ruling class to promote the standpoint of government on political issues
in a new and more appealing guise, to create consensus around public policies and decisions and thereby
reduce political discontent55.
The third and last manner in which the online public sphere fulfills a surrogate democracy function
is in favoring mobilization and protest with political purposes. The Internet naturally encourages
mobilization and collective action, because its interpersonal dynamics promote collective identity and
social interaction56. Furthermore, Chinese netizens perceive bbs, forums and blogs as places where
political discussions can be conducted in a more unrestrained way; for this reason, online platforms have
since their first appearance been the stage of a more radical form of public debate, often treating issues
that would be neglected by the official media in a bolder and more direct way57. Anonymity on forums
and blogs certainly incites more extreme standpoints, and risks to render discussions into loud and
confused skirmishes; nevertheless, as Giese has noticed, netizens increasingly tend to reveal their
identity while using the Internet, and have started regarding encounters on the web as real and effectual
experiences rather than occasions for unleashed rants58.
The most staggering potential of the Chinese online public sphere is the capability of translating
online protest into actual on-the-street mobilization. A representative case of this translation is the
incident of the PX chemical plant in Xiamen; thanks to sensitization campaigns and newsletters based
on forums and on the blog website Bullog, private citizens were able to mobilize thousands of city
inhabitants to protest against the opening of a chemical plant in the vicinity of the city59. Interpersonal
networks gave ample resonance to the event, and the effectiveness of the online public opinion and its
mobilization was proven by the fact that demonstrators achieved the political goal they were
campaigning for. In fact, the issue of the plant came to the attention of local politicians, and eventually
the construction plan was blocked in light of the strong opposition among the populace60.

54
Blakely & Matsuura (2001)
55
Wong & Welch (2004)
56
Zheng & Wu (2005)
57
Yang (2003)
58
Giese (2006)
59
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2007/06/01/china-liveblogging-from-ground-zero/
60
For a general overview of the episode, see http://www.infzm.com/content/trs/raw/32877
 Aside from the specific cases, umpteen other campaigns with political purposes have started from
online mobilization –for instance, the protest about the Maglev train in Shanghai, or protests against
unemployment at the beginning of 200961. Although located outside the scope of political institutions,
virtual public opinion has been able to give rise to concrete political protest, and this can be seen as one
of the most important “surrogate” democratic effects it fulfills62. In fact, the increasing ties between
online and offline experiences –the growing attention that traditional media pay to the new online public
sphere, the increasingly frequent cases of mobilization on the Internet leading to physical encounters– as
well as the concrete effects that online public opinion has on the social and political fabric has lead
Karsten Giese to define Chinese forums and blogs as “virreal places” –an integration between being
“virtual” and “real” that suggestively depicts the democratic impact brought about by the online public
sphere63.
It is natural to regard public protest as an element of instability, and therefore online-based protest
as a threat to the political system; and yet, despite this instinctive association, there is reason to believe
that it rather contributes to the maintenance of a socio-political equilibrium. Wu and Zheng have shown
how positive cases of collective action on the Internet have succeeded because they have made use of a
“cooperative strategy” as opposed to a “conflictual strategy”; in other words, protesting citizens have not
taken a stance of frontal opposition against the regime, but rather took collective action in order to
oppose a specific policy or obtain a precise objective. In this sense, they have been willing to come to
peaceful and constructive discussion with the political actor in order to achieve their goals. Politicians
have increasingly become aware of the positive effect of public protest, which acts as a release valve for
social tensions accumulating in China’s delicate transition period. In this sense, the protesting voices
raised have been accepted and, when possible, included into the process of policy construction, in order
to reduce the risk for the system and increase the degree of satisfaction of the public towards the State
and its policies64.
In this chapter, I have shown how the Internet contributes to the creation of a western-style public
sphere in China, which responds under most respects to the classical definition of Habermas’ public

61
For information about web-based middle class protests in China, see http://chinadigitaltimes.net/tag/maglev-
protests/
62
Yang (2003)
63
Giese (2006)
64
Zheng & Wu (2005)
 sphere. Interpersonal networks and communication platforms based on the web, thanks to their impact
on setting the political agenda, favoring contacts between citizens and rulers, and mobilizing protest
with political purposes, fulfill a “surrogate” democracy function, which is instrumental in maintaining
a socio-political equilibrium within the system; an equilibrium with quasi-democratic characteristics.
Of course, much can be said about the capability of the online public sphere of breeding a mature
democratic civil society, or about the necessity that a true public sphere should assume a more
institutionalized configuration, and therefore act as a “non-surrogate” democracy factor. Chris Berry
has noted how scholarly attention towards the Chinese public sphere has constantly availed itself of a
binary model, in which “freedom” was understood as the absence of state “power”, and the
dichotomized idea that a country either has a public sphere or does not have it. He instead suggests
that in the case of China power and public sphere could well coexist, and that the idea of public sphere
should be rather substituted by public space, a concept that comprehends “areas of public debate as
produced and regulated by power and appearing in a variety of forms65”. On the other hand, the
Chinese Internet expert Hu Yong has noted how, after enduring emasculation of the principle of
democratic participation by Chinese rulers, civil consciousness has deteriorated; in this sense, the new
online public sphere is only to be considered as an “unfinished public sphere”66. It is certainly hard to
disagree with Hu’s viewpoint, but it is also hard to disagree with the fact that a stronger and bolder
civil consciousness has emerged, and that the Internet has had a fundamental role in this evolution. As
suggested by Yang, the development of civil society and the diffusion of the Internet in China are two
processes that have been influencing and favoring each other since their first emergence67; it is thus
reasonable to think that they will continue advancing simultaneously in the near future, and that the
“unfinished public sphere” will soon assume a more finished and less “surrogate” configuration.

65
Berry (2009), in Zhu & Berry (eds.)
66
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20081221_1.htm
67
Yang (2003, 2)
 Web 2.0 and the Chinese media system: an analysis of the Sanlu incident

This chapter focuses on the effect that the web 2.0 has on the Chinese media system and on
information diffusion, i.e. the channels and the extent of circulation of public news among the
population. It is not hard to understand the impact that the Internet has on Chinese information: since the
beginning of 2008, China has become the world’s largest Internet population68, and among the almost
250 million netizens, an increasing majority regularly uses the net to look for news69. As a consequence
of the hunger for news and of the great economic appeal of this growing market, all the principal
national and local newspapers and magazines have opened a web-based issue; beside them, a multitude
of commercial websites has started providing news bulletins, competing with traditional media agencies
for the attention of Chinese netizens70.
In addition, the several interpersonal platforms that shape the web 2.0 have given further impulse to
the diffusion of information. Hundreds of websites provide bbs and blogs, where the 85% of netizens
who take part in online discussion can chat and debate recent news71. A sharply increasing number of
Internet users keeps or visits blogs to sound out information or opinions about current events; some
popular blogs can attract hundreds of thousands of visits every day, and thanks to the authoritativeness
they have acquired within the online world and to the large following they enjoy, they have obviously
become an influential channel for information diffusion72.
Notwithstanding, the impact of the Internet on Chinese information is not limited to these
impressive figures. It is the purpose of this chapter to show how information on the Internet, and
especially information based on interpersonal platforms like blogs or forums, can fulfill a surrogate
democracy function, which ultimately contributes to maintaining an equilibrium within the system. In
order to prove this hypothesis, I will make use of specific examples of web information dynamics, and I
will particularly focus on the Sanlu incident, which erupted in September 2008.
The arrival of the Internet has shaken the balance of the Chinese information system like no other

68
CNNIC (2009)
69
The CNNIC Internet reports show that the percentage of web users using the Internet for news browsing has
increased steadily since 2003; see CNNIC Report (2003, 2005, 2007). In 2009 78.5% of the netizens regularly use
the Internet as a source of news: CNNIC (2009)
70
Xu (2005)
71
CNNIC (2009)
72
CNNIC Report (2007)
revolution could have. In fact, the once foremost bastion of political restriction –the control of
information by the authorities– has suddenly started to be eroded, and a substantial number of western
scholars have suggested that this might have democratic implications for the political system.
The first moment in which the Internet manifested its full potential in challenging the existing
information system was during the SARS crisis at the beginning of 2003. In a time when authorities and
traditional media were still concealing information about the deadly disease, a spontaneous and
unprecedented information campaign on bbs and forums emerged: and thus, together with the pressure
of international health authorities, the online public opinion brought the SARS case out of the official
silence. Through Internet communication platforms, private citizens revealed the existence of the crisis
to the major public, mobilized prophylaxis activities, and eventually forced the government to loosen its
control on information, and to take a more cooperative stance on issues like prevention measures, and
assessment of behaviors of public officials73.
At least during the peak of the SARS crisis, the Internet managed to break the monopolistic control
that the CCP traditionally kept on information in China, and in that moment it seemed that web-based
communication would be able to liberate the information system, bringing it to a degree of freedom and
democracy comparable to the west. Despite the fact that after the end of the crisis much of the
governmental control was reestablished, the SARS case has been often idealized by many Chinese as a
golden peak of democratic participation, and it is still regarded by many policy-makers as a good
example of how China has become a more democratic and open country74.
In recent times, the Chinese government has substantially relaxed its policy towards media and
information; and the advent of Internet communication has had an important role in this policy shift. It
has been observed that from the end of the 1990s, the Chinese mass media have undergone a process
of progressive marketization and commercialization, which has diminished the effectiveness of
control imposed by the authorities on information, and also the importance of media as a tool for
propagating ideology75. Along with economic development and cultural opening to the world, the

73
For an overview on the SARS crisis and information diffusion on the Internet, see He (2003), Abraham (2005)
and Fenn (2009)
74
Zhang (2006)
75
Zhao (1998), Lam (2000), Wang (2009)
 audience has become more mature and less permeable to ideological content; this has favored the
emergence of new commercial media, and drove existing media to adjust their contents76.
The appearance of web-based media has accelerated this process of opening and marketization.
Thanks to the Internet, a multitude of news bulletins and information agencies has proliferated, and
this has swiftly modified the structure of the media system. In fact, the unipolar system of the media
previously present –under which only state-based information agencies were allowed to broadcast in
the country– has been substituted with a tripolar system, in which state media, commercial media and
regional-based media coexist, cooperate and compete. The greater variety of different media has
modified the system of information management: whereas in the past information was passed from the
central news agency to subordinated agencies according to a hierarchical system, now all the newly-
emerged media agencies receive and manage news at the same time. This has evident advantages for
the speed and the quality of information diffusion, as information becomes available to the public
more quickly, and different analyses from different sources increase the possibility of obtaining
objective interpretations of the ongoing events77.
In addition, the official policy towards the Internet has undergone progressive relaxation, and this
has led some to argue that the approach of the government towards the Internet is nowadays much
more liberal than the one towards any other media78. On one hand, the progressive commercialization
of the Internet has rendered online information more open, and penetrable to content that does not
comply with the ideological orthodoxy of the regime; this makes political control ineffective and
schizophrenic, because it often collides with the economic interests behind the Internet79. On the other
hand, the staggering expansion of the web, of its users and websites has made it harder and harder to
apply physical control and guidance to any piece of information that is produced or appears online.
As Zhang points out, control and supervision of the Internet has undergone major transformation
since its beginning. In the early period, authorities attempted to exercise direct and ideological control
on online information; nowadays, instead, governmental control has become indirect and management

76
Weber & Jia (2007)
77
Xu (2005)
78
Zhang (2006)
79
Harwit & Clark (2001)
 of the web has been downgraded to a merely administrative practice80. Significantly, the main tool of
control of the Internet and its content is now the “Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for China’s
Internet Industry”, a document which websites and web providers voluntarily sign, committing
themselves to control and report the content of their web platforms81. While physical control on the
Internet still exists –exercised for instance through the so-called “Great Firewall of China”– it has
been suggested that its extent is less pervasive and effective than generally thought in the west82.
In sum, in dealing with the Internet, the government seems to have put aside ideological concerns
–which have traditionally been the driving forces of policy making towards information and mass
communication in communist China– and it has rather prioritized economic and social development.
In this sense, the government has shown to be sensitive to the need of the people to expand their
communication networks, and to make use of the Internet in order to attain a more modern and
civilized lifestyle83. This does not necessarily mean that authorities have given up their control over
society, but rather that socioeconomic development has increasingly become a precondition for
political control; and, as we will see below, the potential political threat posed by online information
is well balanced by its positive stability effect.
Despite these positive notes, the Chinese information system is still far from being completely
free and open. As a matter of fact, the management of news is still under the control of a centralized
information agency, Xinhua agency, which has great discretion in deciding when and what kind of
information should be distributed to other media agencies and thereby revealed to the public84. As a
result of such centralization, the government is still able to exercise a certain control on media and on
the content of information they manage85. In sum, regardless of liberalization of the media, the official
position on the news market still remains tied to the idea that journalists should serve the party and
promote discipline among the population, and limit diffusion of information that opposes the orthodox

80
Zhang (2006)
81
“中国互联网行业自律公约”
Integral text available at http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/PIc/590141.htm
82
Tsui (2008)
83
Kluver (2005), Zhang (2006)
84
Zhao (2008)
85
Pan (2005), in Romano & Bromley (eds.)
 ideology and the current establishment. Changes in this old-fashioned conception of the media have
been slow and tortuous86.
Even when regarding new online media, traces of institutionalized control are well visible. The
main law regulating information on the Internet since 2000, the “Provisional Regulations on
Governance of Internet-based News Providers”, prohibits commercial media agencies online from
gathering news directly87. This means that, although many commercial media agencies have
progressively circumvented this regulation and obtained first-hand news on subjects like sport,
economics, or foreign news, information on sensitive matters such as politics or internal affairs still
remains solidly in the hands of centralized authorities, namely the online branch of Xinhua agency,
xinhuanet.com88. Western studies suggest that the strategies implemented by the government to
control and filter the Internet have been highly successful: in the first phase of direct control on the
Internet, Chinese authorities have been able to prevent detrimental information from appearing online,
to control the access of citizens to foreign websites, and to weaken online mobilization of dissident
groups89.
Even the recent strategy shift to indirect control and self-regulation does not seem to have
completely undermined the grip the government on the Internet. In fact, Weber and Jia conclude that
voluntary self-regulation creates an effect of “peer pressure” among websites, which feel compelled to
abide by the ethical and political standards set by the authorities, and actively contribute to control
and filter online information. Besides, through web-based information, the government has been able
to guide online public opinion, by promoting positive values that do not challenge the existing socio-
political order –the sentiment of uniqueness of the Chinese nation, nationalism, and the idea of
collective endeavor for the economic growth. By that means, Chinese authorities have managed to
maintain a “cultural control” on the Internet, which to a certain extent is just as effective as the
previously exercised physical control90.

86
Lam (2000)
87
“互联网站从事登载新闻业务管理暂行规定”
Integral text available at http://www.xinnet.com/Download/news.htm
88
Xu (2005)
89
Chase & Mulvenon (2002), Katathil & Boas (2003), Shie (2004)
90
Weber & Jia (2007)
 Despite the control imposed on Chinese media –or I should say because of it– information
diffusion through web 2.0 platforms has acquired a vital importance. In fact, forums, chat and blogs
have increasingly remedied the shortcomings of the institutional media system, opening up the market
of information and pushing traditional media towards a more transparent and objective attitude. The
pursuit of more free and open information has evident democratic implications; for this reason, it is
not hard to conclude that the Internet currently fulfills a democracy function within the system.
Because it develops outside the scope of institutionalized media, compensating the flaws of official
information, it is to be defined as a “surrogate” democracy function. To better understand the way
interpersonal Internet platforms can fulfill this surrogate democracy function, I shall here present the
case of the Sanlu milk powder incident, and the dynamics of information diffusion that have
developed around that event.
In the early morning of September 11, 2008, Xinhua agency for the first time released
information about cases of kidney stones occurring in babies in the province of Gansu, in western
China91. The tone of the report was very cautious, and the causes of and responsibility for the event
were not defined; it vaguely stated that “it seemed that all the babies had made use of milk powder of
the same brand”92. The name of the brand of milk powder, though, was not revealed. Media agencies
all over the country echoed such vagueness when reporting the fact, and published the news in
secondary sections of their newspapers; the morning news bulletin of CCTV –China Central
Television– reported the news with a mere statement by the anchorman93. The pithiness of the
accounts suggested that the investigation of the incident was still at a preliminary stage, and not much
information was available for journalists to offer the public; especially the name of the brand of
poisoned milk powder seemed to be still unknown.
In fact, the situation was rather different: babies poisoned with the tainted milk had already
started filling hospitals all over the country since the beginning of June, and procedures of inspection
had already been directed towards a specific milk powder producer, Sanlu Group. Although the facts
and responsibilities were clear, the authorities had decided to delay the revelation of information for

91
The analysis of the milk-powder incident is based on first-hand materials I was able to collect through daily
monitoring of the web right at the moment of the outburst of the scandal, and reflects general trends I could
observe through the material collected. Specific forums and blogs are cited in footnotes.
92
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/11/content_9924992.htm
93
http://vod.cctv.com/01/0000/index.shtml?today=2008/9/11
 more than three months, and even once disclosed to the public, news about the event was kept as
vague as possible94. The reason for this prudence is not hard to spot: it was, in fact, right in the midst
of the fervor for the Beijing Summer Olympics, a time in which huge media attention was directed at
China, and in which the government had been widely praised by politicians and observers all around
the world for the impeccable management of the sport event, for improvements made in
environmental and living conditions in the country, and even for the greater openness shown towards
the world. At such an idyllic moment, a dirty scandal about poisoned food, environmental pollution
and young victims would certainly disrupt the festive and celebrative atmosphere, and would even
jeopardize the international repute of China, building up the number of scandals –such as the Tibet
riots or the Hu Jia affair– that had preceded the Olympic Games and that were used by foreign media
for what in China was seen as a deliberate campaign of smearing the country95.
Comprehensibly, no politician would risk an international incident –and personal blaming– at
such a delicate moment; besides, it is an untold rule within the Chinese bureaucratic machine that
local authorities should limit the diffusion of detrimental information in periods of high sensitivity for
the central government and top-level politicians96. For these reasons, the scandal of poisoned babies
had been kept quiet during the peak days of the Olympics, and even once the news was first released,
politicians were still hoping that the event would not acquire excessive clamor. Unfortunately, things
developed in a rather different way.
At 3 a.m. Chinese time of September 11, xinhua.net released the first cautious report about the
case, and was soon followed by other traditional media, which published short accounts in secondary
sections of their websites. And yet, just few minutes later, Chinese blogs were already flooded with
information about the milk powder incident: at this early stage most bloggers merely copied the brief
official articles on their personal webpage, in order to let this underreported piece of news attain a
larger audience. Later on, local media started adding new information to the approximate scenario
depicted by the governmental agency, describing the cases of kidney stones occurring in local
hospitals. This news was already available to local newspapers, as they had already been monitoring
the cases of poisoning in the months preceding the explosion of the scandal, but was not disclosed

94
Brady (2009)
95
Ibid.
96
Wong & Zheng (2004)
 because of prohibition by local governments97. This emerging amount of information was appetizing
food for information-hungry bloggers: by 8.30 of the same morning, some blogs were already giving a
more accurate account of the kidney stone incident at a national level, which had been obtained by
putting together the fragments of information coming from different sources. Scrolling down the main
page of any Chinese blog provider, and reading the titles of the newest posts, it appeared clear to the
reader that the situation was much more serious than the one depicted by Xinhua agency.
Soon after, the attention of bloggers moved to disclosing the name of the brand of poisoned milk,
which at the time was still unmentioned by traditional media. Some local news agencies, such as
Oriental Morning Post98 and ifeng.com, had mentioned the brand name Sanlu in their reports and,
even though they had placed the article about the event in a secondary section of their website, the
piece of information fell inevitably in the hands of netizens, who started spreading the name of Sanlu
around the web. In an inflammatory article widely circulating on the net, “shangyu301” inveighed
against the cold-hearted “so and so” (as used in official reports about the “so and so” milk brand, not
revealing the name of the incriminated brand), blaming official newspapers for endangering the health
of other infants by not revealing which milk powder was dangerous, and praising Oriental Morning
Post for having the courage to oppose such criminal reticence99. In another popular post, “abyss of the
palm forest” attacked the shortcomings of the Chinese legal system, which prevented media agencies
from revealing information to the public in fear of repercussions by local governments and big
corporations, and ended the article with the name Sanlu in huge capital letters100. Already by 9.30, the
name Sanlu appeared everywhere in blogs and personal websites; the silence was overcome.
In the course of a few hours, bloggers had reset the information agenda in a way that went against
the interests and the expectation of authorities and official media. In fact, whereas traditional media
suffered from pressure of political and economic actors, thus underreporting the milk scandal,
netizens made use of their personal pages and networks in order to amplify and complement the
coverage of information they deemed as sensitive and important. The extent of “leaks” about the milk
poisoning was so vast that traditional media could not overlook the new agenda set by blogs. The

97
Brady (2009)
98
www.dfdaily.com
99
http://blog.sina.com.cn/shangyu301
100
http://yangshufa.blog.sohu.com
 more bloggers paid attention to the event, the more media agencies were pressured to feed the
“information hunger” of netizens, and to release further details about the incident: by midday, the
main pages of commercial websites like alibaba.com.cn and sina.com presented comprehensive
accounts of the facts available at the time, including the name of the implicated brand and number of
kidney stone cases. Users utilized these pieces of news on their blogs, trying to put together a coherent
assemblage of diverse information101. At 19.16, outpaced by any commercial website and hundreds of
blogs, even Xinhua revealed the name of Sanlu Group in its report of the event102.
Along with the increasing amount of details being revealed by official media, bloggers were able
to include more precise information in their posts: as a result of this, by the evening of September 11,
some blogs presented extremely exhaustive reports of the incident. In his blog, for instance, “William
Aben” looked back at a previous incident, which occurred in the United States in March 2007, in
which poisoned pet food imported from China had caused the death of thousands of dogs; “William
Aben” noted the striking similarities between that incident and the current one, and wondered how
such events could happen in just a year’s time103. The parallel with the pet food scandal was also
drawn by “small fish of the southern sea”, who posted a considerably comprehensive amount of
information about melamine –the chemical agent the milk powder was tainted with– and about the
effects that it could have on the human body104. At a time when the official media had barely revealed
the existence of the problem, this sheer amount of information had an extremely important
informative function, and many Internet users could not but turn to personal blogs for accurate news
about the incident. As an example, “Graduating Wanderer” left a message on “William Aben”’s
webpage, thanking him for the precious elucidations given; as “Graduating Wanderer” himself
conceded, William’s blog had been his main source of information about the Sanlu scandal105.
The dynamic of the event is remarkable: in less than a day’s time, Internet interpersonal networks
utterly transformed the agenda of newsmakers, forcing traditional media to give more space to an
event they were trying to keep suppressed. Bloggers remedied the partiality and incompleteness of

101
See, for instance, the collages made by “zhang120jing” (http://zhang120jing.blog.china.alibaba.com/), or “old
snow in June” (http://blog.sina.com.cn/zgc)
102
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/11/content_9926009.htm
103
http://william-aben.spaces.live.com/default.aspx
104
http://blog.sina.com.cn/szhocking
105
http://william-aben.spaces.live.com/default.aspx
 official news, giving more relevance to information they regarded as important to share with others,
and allowing news to have a considerably higher resonance. The great quantity of relevant posts on
blogs made news about the milk-powder scandal reach the main page of blog-providing websites and,
as a consequence, it exponentially enlarged the network of readers106.
Notwithstanding, it has to be noted how, in this first phase of the events, bloggers did not produce
any first-hand news: they rather gathered information from different original sources, pasting the
fragments together on their personal pages. This cut-and-paste activity, though, should be
undervalued: while traditional media were subjected to limitations and pressures from external actors,
bloggers could freely select interesting information, highlighting reports that seemed reliable, and
disregarding or even refuting biased and imprecise reports. By looking at official media, readers could
not obtain a clear overview of the event; on the contrary, blogs presented facts in an organic and
seemingly complete way.
In order to observe how interpersonal platforms can be used to produce information, instead of
merely gathering second-hand news, we have to wait just 24 hours, and analyze the happenings of
September 12. The day after the outbreak of the scandal, a document entitled “Suggestions for
resolution of public relations in Sanlu Group”, started circulating on dozens of blogs and forums all
around the country: this was an alleged internal communication of Sanlu, sent at the beginning of
August to top-level managers of the company. In the document, managers were called upon to take
advantage of the positive atmosphere and the media distraction created by the Olympic Games in
order to block news leaks about the kidney stone cases –which at the time had already started
occurring around the country– appeasing the victims with economic compensation not to make them
reveal the cause of the poisoning to the authorities and the media; at the same time, the letter
mentioned an agreement to be signed with the Chinese search engine baidu.com, in which Baidu
committed itself to not display negative news in the search result of the query “sanlu milk powder”107.
Shortly after its first appearance, copies of the document popped up in hundreds of forums and blogs
around the country, and within hours, the “Suggestions” had become the hottest topic of discussion of

106
For a complete chronological account of the first days of the Sanlu incident, see
http://www.haokanbu.com/story/112552/
107
In Chinese,“三鹿集团公关解决方案建议”
available, with some comments of the readers, at http://blog.sina.com.cn/wintor2008
 the online community. Along with the diffusion of the latest news, more information appeared:
netizens reported cases of kidney stones connected with the use of Sanlu milk powder that had already
occurred at the beginning of the summer108; many websites even posted the scan of the supposedly
original document in question109.
The realization of Sanlu’s behavior generated a wave of rage and indignation. Netizens posted
infuriated comments on blogs and forums, showing without hesitation their complete disapproval of
the behavior of Sanlu group, of Internet search engines, and even of the government. On a forum page
on tianya.cn, a netizen eloquently named “those responsible in Sanlu should be shot dead” advocated
the most severe punishment for those who allowed such a terrible disaster to happen110; on the
interpersonal network douban.com, “little rice” grumbled that baidu.com had just become a new
CCTV, being paid by local governments and big corporations to filter negative information, and just
displaying empty label news on their main page111. On the popular blog ROSE GARDEN, a n
anonymous reader bitterly noted how Sanlu had been recently given the status of “Golden Brand of
China”, and had been even awarded by the government with a gold medal for food safety; in this
sense, the government was also responsible for the tragedy112.
Facing the strong reaction of online public opinion, the government was forced to radically
change its approach in dealing with the incident. Already on September 13, the State Council
promulgated the “Six Resolutions about the Sanlu case”, which included two decisions that were
clearly directed at appeasing the public opinion: on one hand, the government provided free medical
treatment to the victims of the poisoning; on the other, it promised thorough and severe punishment
for all organs, politicians and managers implicated in the scandal113. Although these steps were formal
and symbolic, they can anyway be seen as a sign that the Internet can attract the attention of
politicians and effectively set the political agenda.
The Internet was the sole means of diffusion of the “Suggestions for resolution of public relations
in Sanlu Group”, as traditional media carefully avoided mentioning such a controversial document in

108
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_46e9d5da0100b088.html
109
Among many, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_50a223810100b02i.html
110
http://laiba.tianya.cn/laiba/CommMsgs?cmm=27320&tid=2622475168723029228
111
http://www.douban.com/note/18081084/
112
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_46e9d5da0100b088.html
113
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/13/content_9974780.htm
 their reports of the incident; in a sense, this shows the importance of interpersonal networks in
producing alternative news. Despite this, up to today it is still unclear whether the “Suggestions” were
an authentic document, or rather a fake made by netizens to acquire visibility, or even by competitors
in order to further discredit Sanlu Group and its activities. As a matter of fact, on September 13,
baidu.com published an official statement in which it refuted the existence of any agreement with
Sanlu, and that any attempt made by Sanlu to suborn baidu.com would be refused by the company114;
some days later, Baidu even accused a competitor of having deliberately diffused false rumors in
order to blacken the name of the search engine115. And yet, whether authentic or not, this episode
proves how the Internet is able to produce and diffuse original information outside the scope of the
state-controlled information system. Importantly, original Internet information can have concrete
repercussions on the social pattern and on the political agenda, as political and economic actors have
to acknowledge the reaction of online public opinion to this information, and sometimes even adjust
their policies to the public demands coming from netizens.
The third and last way in which interpersonal networks shaped the Chinese information system
during the crisis is by promoting debates and discussions about the Sanlu incident. In this regard,
blogs and forums fulfilled an especially important function, firstly because they often hosted topics
and opinions that were overlooked or even censored in official media; and secondly, because these
discussions were not just incoherent and emotional manifestations of public outrage –like the
comments summarily made after the first discovery of the scandal– but rather aimed at resolving
structural shortcomings of the industrial, legal and political apparatus of China. Many of these
attempts did not find a following and remained unrealized resolutions in the mind of upstanding
netizens. Some others, instead, had a much more pronounced impact on policy-making of the
government after the Sanlu scandal.
Once the initial wave of anger had dissipated, netizens engaged in more mature reflections about
the milk powder incident, and of the causes that could have provoked it. In fact, for months after the
eruption of the incident, the Sanlu scandal and related topics remained the most debated argument on
Chinese language forum platforms: from September 2008 to March 2009, popular forum providers
like tianya.com, sina.com.cn, ifeng.com and qq.com, hosted thousands of bbs with millions of hits
114
http://news.xinhuanet.com/internet/2008-09/15/content_10003918.htm
115
http://it.people.com.cn/GB/42891/42894/8058009.html
 altogether116. The debates regarded topics such as the abolition of the system of exemption from
quality control for top-brands (as Sanlu milk powder was)117; the shortcomings of the system of
quality control118; food security and its legal framework119. Many forums even involved interventions
of specialists who answered technical questions about how products could have been poisoned, how
consumers could protect themselves from tainted food, and who was to be held responsible for the
disaster120.
Most of the netizens participating in the online discourse were common people, but debates were
also joined by experts in relevant fields of the argument, such as lawyers, university professors and
local politicians, who wanted to share their knowledge with the online community. In addition,
relevant discussions about production fallacies, food safety and state-granted quality control
exemption were picked up by traditional media, allowing an even bigger audience to be sensitized and
to take part in the public debate. Critical standpoints on sensitive matters, which would have probably
been excluded from the official discourse, could find visibility thanks to the online debate, and
structural reforms in the country swiftly gained priority in the political agenda of top politicians121.
Once more, the government proved not to be insensitive to demands coming from the online
public opinion: on September 18, the State Council ordered the suspension of the system of exemption
from quality control for Chinese top brands, and instead implemented a stricter series of quality
control measures to be applied to any product of any Chinese company122. At the same time, it
promised a serious restructuring of the national system of food safety and quality supervision: this
effort culminated in the announcement of a new law on food safety on February 28, 2009. The new
law has reorganized every aspect of food production and processing, raising quality standards, and

116
Figures based on personal researches on the search engines of forum providers. In the period of time
considered, ifeng.com alone hosted 698 forum discussions, with a total of more than 700.000 visitors
(!h!t!t!p!:!/!/!b!b!s!.!i!f!e!n!g!.!c!o!m!/!s!e!a!r!c!h!.!p!h!p!?!c!=!5!&!q!=三鹿 )
117
http://qbar.book.qq.com/culture/7638.htm
118
http://bbs.ifeng.com/viewthread.php?tid=3368441&highlight=
119
http://s.bbs.sina.com.cn/pview-9-649304.html
120
For instance, see http://bbs.ifeng.com/viewthread.php?tid=3367991&highlight= and
http://laiba.tianya.cn/laiba/CommMsgs?cmm=49295&tid=2623749786167154139&ref=regulartopics
121
For an overview of the debate around law and food safety, see Hong (2008)
http://www.law-lib.com/LW/lw_view.asp?no=9786; for quality control exemption see Chen (2008)
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleId=44436
122
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/18/content_10076522.htm
 tightening regulations and controls on processing, transportation, import and export of edible
products; the apparatus of control and supervision has been rationalized and reinforced, and the
system of exemption from quality control has been definitely abolished. Furthermore, the new law
sanctioned the responsibility and accountability of local governments and supervision bodies in case
of ineffective controls, and recognized the role of “watchdogs” of media and civic organizations, in
monitoring and reporting fallacies in the control machine, or irregular behavior of governmental
organs and producing companies123.
In the course of the case study of the Sanlu incident, I have shown the impact of Internet
interpersonal networks on the Chinese information system. Blogs and forums play a role in 1)
promoting and diffusing information, thus enlarging the audience pool and influencing the agenda of
public opinion; 2) creating alternative sources of information that would not find space in traditional
media; 3) hosting public debates that aim at solving structural shortcomings in the country.
The Internet fulfills a democratic function within the Chinese information system, because it
increases plurality in the sources and means of distribution of information, and it contributes to
enhancing quality and objectivity of news, thanks to its supervision and censure towards traditional
media. Borrowing Xu Wu’s analysis of the Chinese media system that I mentioned above, it is
possible to argue that the web 2.0 has transformed the tripolar system of Chinese media –where
central, commercial and local media coexist and compete– into a quadripolar one –where online
interpersonal networks constitute the fourth pole of the information system124. Just like conventional
media, the Internet is able to sensitize the population, set the agenda of public opinion, and influence
the political actors with its demands and opinions; as noted by Gillmor, the presence of a grass-root
information system is a sign of greater freedom and democracy in a political system125. In addition,
with its informative function, the Internet has created new platforms for citizens to obtain knowledge
about the state apparatus and its functioning, making them more politically aware, and able to express

123
“中华人民共和国食品安全法”
Integral text available at http://www.chinacdc.net.cn/n272442/n272530/n272907/n272922/29613.html
124
Xu (2005)
125
Gillmor (2004)
 judgments and demands about state policies, and this generates a democratic effect outside the scope
of official institutions126.
Some western scholars have deemed the presence of more free and diverse sources of
information as a threat for a regime like the Chinese, which bases its power on the control of media.
Early studies about the information revolution in China predicted that the Communist Party would not
be able to maintain its grip on the liberalized online information, and that this would undermine the
very foundation of the power of the CCP, eventually leading to the fall of the regime127. And yet,
historical evidence –the fact that after 20 years of online information the CCP is still firmly in power–
and a closer look at online information show that the Internet, despite fulfilling a surrogate democratic
function, actually contributes to the maintenance of the existing political balance.
As a first thing, if we analyze closely the discourse developed on Internet interpersonal platforms,
we can see that it rarely aims at the radical overturning of the political system, and it often involves
elements and members of the political system. Looking back at the Sanlu case, the greater part of
debates and opinions fell within the acceptance of the political order: outraged and disapproving
comments filled the web, of course, but the disapproval was mostly directed at the mistakes and
responsibility of single economic or political actors, or at the shortcomings of specific governmental
policies, and not at the political status quo per se. Netizens who participated in the online debate did
so because they wanted to condemn what they thought was broken or rotten in the political machine,
and promote their opinions and suggestions on how to fix it. In a sense, by advancing political
demands to the political actor, netizens were communicating with the government; and this, needless
to say, implies that they fully recognize the position and role of their interlocutor.
The fact that many of these demands were effectively tackled by the government enhanced its
image in the eyes of citizens, and ultimately contributes to political stability. In fact, on one hand
citizens realize that the existing channels of political representation and communication are effective
and sufficient, and are less likely to pursue political campaigns in different, perhaps violent or anti-
systemic, manners; on the other hand, the government is able to gather consensus around itself and its
actions, and this lessens the risk of dissatisfaction and unrest among the populace. In this regard,
during my analysis of the Sanlu case I have observed that the wave of indignation of netizens calmed
126
Weber & Jia (2007)
127
Mueller & Tan (1997), Gompert (1998)
 down progressively as soon as the government started taking serious and convincing measures to
remedy the structural problems that the crisis had unveiled. A testimony of this is the generally
positive reaction of netizens to the recently approved law on food safety128.
To conclude, it is interesting to note that, in an important study on China after Jiang Zemin, Ding
Xiaoli listed the policy of sealing up information as the biggest threat to China’s future stability.
According to him, the commonly operated mismanagement and concealment of information in China
has severe political implications, because it starts with single politicians who hide the truth in order to
reduce their personal risk and cover their errors, but it can turn into a political issue, because the
population blames the political system rather than individual officials for failing to tackle the
problems. For this reason, in order to maintain a socio-political equilibrium without radically
changing the political system, it is necessary to create a more transparent and multilateral information
system129. As I have explained, the Internet is a constituting element of the more transparent and
multilateral information apparatus of post-Jiang China; in this sense, it contributes to the maintenance
of a democratic equilibrium, as it provides a release valve for demands of justice of people, and
avoids that problems are hidden to the irreversible point in which they become a political problem.
Perhaps, the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration has held on through the years of its reign also
thanks to the Internet, and the stabilizing effect that information based on it has within the system.

128
See, for instance, debates on http://bbs.cnr.cn/redirect.php?fid=286&tid=377642&goto=nextoldset
or http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/free/1/1513301.shtml
129
Ding (2002), in Wong & Zheng (eds.)
 Chinese interest groups and their action on interpersonal networks

This chapter focuses on mobilization of interest groups with political agendas on the Chinese
Internet. As I have mentioned in the previous chapters, interpersonal platforms provide a stage for
netizens to rally together when sharing common views and common purposes, and to advance
opinions and demands conflicting with the official stance of the Chinese government; in certain cases,
assembly on the Internet can even transcend the virtual dimension and evolve into concrete
mobilization of interest groups with political aims. The presence and activity of interest groups within
the Chinese political system is undoubtedly an element of freedom and democracy; and yet, because
these develop on virtual platforms without formal and institutional recognition, the democratic effect
online interest groups have in China can only be regarded as “surrogate”.
In this sense, the aim of this chapter is twofold: on one side, I will describe the importance and
activity of interest groups on the Internet, and the “surrogate democracy function” they consequently
fulfill; on the other hand, I will try to show how interest groups –especially those with aims that
conflict with the views, policies and values of the regime– ultimately act within the framework of
acceptance and recognition of the current political situation. These interest groups, representative of a
very small portion of the Chinese population –the urban, young and well-educated emerging middle
class– act for the attainment of self-serving objectives or, at most, for the resolution of specific
shortcomings of the political system they deem as detrimental or disadvantageous to themselves and
their own interests, and not quite for overthrowing the regime. For this reason, online interest groups
with political agendas ultimately contribute to the maintenance of a socio-political equilibrium.
Since its first appearance in China, the Internet has served as a means for broadcasting and
diffusing political heterodoxy130. One of the first blatant demonstrations of political action associated
with the web was the march of Falun Gong in Beijing in April 1999, when members used the Internet
and its interpersonal networks as the main means of communication and mobilization131. It was in the
aftermath of that event that western scholars and media started arguing about the possible democratic
effect of the Internet in China. As a matter of fact, at the time public sphere and online mobilization
were at a preliminary stage, and the event was perceived by the government as a political threat

130
Mueller & Tan (1997); Gompert (1998)
131
For further information about the 1999 demonstration and Falun Gong, see Ter Haar (2002)
 coming from an elite group, and for this reason repressed with force. Along with the diffusion of the
Internet and the emergence of a growing online citizenry, though, phenomena of political expression
on the web have become increasingly common and extensive, and authorities have kept an
increasingly lenient stance towards them132.
During the SARS crisis of 2003, the Chinese web was flooded for the first time with a profusion
of political satire and jokes directed against the government and single politicians; moreover, netizens
made extensive use of the Internet to advance demands to the political actor and express opinions
about the government and its actions133. Later on, Internet users campaigned against specific policies
of local or central governments: against the demolition of old neighborhoods in cities in the midst of
China’s contemporary urban renovation frenzy; against the magnetic levitation train in Shanghai; or
against the PX chemical plant in Xiamen134. The net has been the stage for citizens to target harsh
criticism at the Beijing Olympics, at the way it had been managed by the government, and most of all
at the campaign of mass indoctrination and distraction that some thought to be cloaked behind the
atmosphere of enthusiasm and brotherhood of the period135. Even long-term policies, like the plan for
the privatization of rural land released by the government at the end of 2008, have been subject to
attention by the web, and netizens have joined the political discourse with their positions and their
criticism136. Some Chinese web 2.0 platforms keep an overtly critical stance against the government,
the Communist Party and the regime in general, hosting blogs of political dissidents and forums about
sensitive political topics. The most famous and frequently visited of these is Bullog –recently renamed
Bullogger– a blog provider founded by the political activist Luo Yonghao, which keeps a very liberal
and edgy stance on political issues. Finally, political antagonism and campaigning for political aims
online have become so widespread that new English-language bridge sites have started monitoring the
sizzling political underworld of the Chinese Internet, gaining recognition among western media and
western sinologists –among others, Danwei, China Media Project, EastSouthWestNorth or
ChinaSmack. These bridge sites, although serving different purposes and adopting different stances

132
Zheng & Wu (2005)
133
Fenn (2009)
134
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/tag/maglev-protests/
135
Brady (2009)
136
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/02/14/virtual-land-the-opinions-of-chinese-bloggers-on-privatization-of-
rural-land/
 towards the web, are anyway representative of the big amount of political information on Chinese
interpersonal networks, and of the growing interest of the west.
In many of these phenomena that I have listed, we can identify dynamics of political lobbying
very similar to the ones occurring in the west –i.e. the organized attempt of the public to influence
political actors. In fact, behind the confused wrangle that is commonly identified with Internet debate,
some orderly and rational discussion takes place. Single citizens or groups present themselves on the
Internet with undisguised political objectives, trying to gather consensus among the online public
opinion around their point, and refuting the opposite argument. This is, for instance, the case in the
debate around the reform of rural land: soon after the release of the “Resolutions concerning the many
important problems in the development of reform in the countryside” in October 2008, netizens
opposing the privatization plan started a large-scale online campaign of sensitization around the issue
on forums and blogs, which aimed at attaining consensus and raising awareness in the public opinion
about the risks of the envisaged reform137. The anti-reform group has availed itself of prominent
voices, such as that of the journalist Wen Tiejun and of the village chief and countryside expert Li
Changping, who have published several attacks against the reform on their blogs and in traditional
media, and have thus become the “faces” of this political and ideological campaign138.
Whereas it is too early to measure the effects of this specific political campaign on the behavior
of the political actor, it is still possible to assert that online lobbying has recorded some successes in
influencing governmental policies. One among many, the campaign against the construction of the PX
chemical plant in Xiamen, which was prompted by the online public opinion, gathered so much
momentum that authorities were in the end forced to stop the plan and yield to the will of interest
groups139.
In sum, online interpersonal platforms have been beneficial to the creation and action of interest
groups with political purposes. Thanks to the Internet, netizens can organize themselves in a grouping

137
“中共中央关于推进农村改革发展若干重大问题的决定”
integral text available at http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/8194300.html; for an overview of the online
debate, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/02/14/virtual-land-the-opinions-of-chinese-bloggers-on-privatization-
of-rural-land/
138
For Wen Tiejun’s blog, see http://wtj.caogen.com/; Li Changping currently writes at
http://lichangping.qzone.qq.com/
139
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/zmzg/200705280624.asp
 and coordinate their actions in a way that was not possible before; besides, the communication
instruments offered by the web enable interest groups to better publicize their positions and their
objectives, so that they can reach wider recognition within the public opinion, and possibly even
among political actors140. And this is particularly true for the specific case of China: in fact, in the past
all political movements and protests were born from a certain degree of state initiation, because of the
penetration of the political machine in society, and also because the state relied on political campaigns
and mass mobilization to pursue political purposes or promote social and economic changes141.
Conversely, as I have amply indicated in the previous chapters, the advent of the Internet has
contributed to the decrease of state influence and of ideological mobilization on society, thus favoring
a more spontaneous assembly of private citizens. When the legitimacy and the endurance of the
regime is not at stake, interest groups and individuals have been able to initiate collective actions with
political purposes outside the scope of the state and its representation channels; by helping the public
formulate interests and demands to the state, the Internet has allowed the government to better discern
that the majority of these demands pose no threat to the political status quo, and that giving in to these
requests even produces a benefit for the current regime142.
The presence and effectiveness of interest groups proves the existence of the germs of an active
civil society, which is able to organize itself to achieve social objectives free from the influence of the
state, and therefore has democratic implications within the Chinese system. Although mainly acting
through the “surrogate” platforms offered by the Internet and its communication networks, these
interest groups are still able to attain recognition in the public opinion, to advance political demands
or campaign for political purposes, and sometimes even to influence the political actor with the
pressure they exert on the virtual public sphere and on the concrete social pattern. In this sense, it is
possible to assert that interest groups on the Internet fulfill a surrogate democracy function in China.
And yet, despite the “surrogate” democracy action of political mobilization, it is my opinion that such
interest groups, even those that keep a critical stance towards the government or that campaign for
specific political objectives that collide with governmental policies, do not jeopardize the Chinese

140
Mossberger (2008)
141
Zhou (1993)
142
Zheng & Wu (2005)
 political regime with their actions, but rather contribute to the maintenance of a socio-political
equilibrium. In the following pages I will attempt to prove this point.
Firstly, by advancing political requests to the political actor, interest groups recognize the
authority of the regime, and ultimately decide to act within the framework of the current political
system. Zheng & Wu have noted how collective actions in China have tended to adopt a cooperative
attitude towards authorities, and to campaign for a specific objective without trespassing the
boundaries of political authority143. This tendency can be observed in the case of the 2007 protests
against the PX chemical plant in Xiamen: in the course of this campaign, citizens made extensive use
of new media –Internet interpersonal networks but also SMS on cellular phones– in order to gather
consensus among the populace against the construction plan of the local government, and even
managed to rally in a public protest on the streets of Xiamen on June 1144.
Despite this, the PX campaign did not challenge the political power: it was rather opposing a
debated project that had not received the approval of the SEPA –the State Environmental Protection
Administration– and that was violating a directive of the State Council stating that projects with
environmental impact had to undergo public consultation before their realization145. Moreover, the
protesters had a very clear understanding of the rights the legal system was granting them, thus knew
exactly what they could fight for under the existing legislation. In a sense, protesters were
demonstrating for the system, not against it. The PX campaign involved large sections of the active
urban public opinion, as white collars, academics and even local politicians took part in the protest;
most were campaigning for a more environmentally-conscious management of their city, but many
were also driven by the fear that the chemical plant would diminish the value of their property, or
were worried about the health threat that the polluting structure would pose. Besides, even the on-the-
street manifestation of June 2007 was carefully contrived so that it would not step on the feet of
authorities: in fact, organizers did not openly define their rally as a political manifestation –because
that would have infringed on the prohibition of public assembly still in force in the PRC– but rather as

143
Ibid.
144
http://www.danwei.org/state_media/xiamen_px_sms_china_newsweek.php
145
“国务院关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的决定”
original text at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-12/13/content_125680.htm
 a “collective stroll”146. This formally “saved the face” of the local government in front of the dissent
mounting among the populace, and allowed protesters to take to the street without being accused of
provoking social unrest.
The dynamic of these events well shows how Chinese interest groups composed of different
social classes have campaigned for a common political objective, yet without challenging the
authorities and the political order. As Tang Hao, a Chinese scholar and environmental activist,
commented, interest groups have been successful because they did not frontally attack the government
or the system in its entirety; they rather “established a new type of activism, which focused on a single
issue in order to change governmental habits and the law”147. And, we must remember, interpersonal
platforms on the Internet have had a fundamental role in aggregating and mobilizing these interest
groups.
As I have described, the Chinese web offers a space for interest groups to encounter and
organize their protest, as well as to appeal to the political actor for the achievement of specific
demands. By amplifying the visibility and impact of these interest groups, the Internet puts pressures
on authorities to yield to their specific requests, thereby appeasing voices of dissent and increasing
consensus in the population148. Thanks to the Internet, the government has been more able to “de-
politicize” the issues at stake, i.e. to impede that these groups translate their dissatisfaction with a
peculiar situation or policy to the political system in general, therefore safeguarding the endurance of
the regime149. All this has facilitated what Russell Hardin called the politics of cooperation: the state
can keep its citizens under control through cooperation without going to Orwellian extremes, because
it can develop “conventions” to keep citizens from transgressing the boundaries and punish those who
attempt to transgress those boundaries150. By helping construct and develop these conventions, the
Internet contributes to a social balance in China.
Secondly, the Chinese Internet is mostly representative of a social class –the well-educated urban
middle class– that is unlikely to advocate revolutionary political change, and for this reason it is
improbable that political activism and dissent online could have anti-systemic effects on the Chinese

146
http://zonaeuropa.com/20070601_1.htm
147
Tang (2008)
148
Zheng & Wu (2005)
149
Ding (2002), in Wong & Zheng (eds.)
150
Hardin (1990), in Cook & Levi (eds.)
 political pattern. According to the CNNIC Report on Internet Usage in China, the profile of the typical
Chinese Internet user is unequivocal: young, male, living in a big city, holding a job as a white-collar
or a teacher with a relatively high income, or a student. Although gender and income divides have
decreased over time, it is still possible to draw a clear barrier between those who are likely to access
the Internet, and those who are unwilling or unable to make use of the new medium151.
Such a cleavage has important implications on political activism online. Young, highly educated
male netizens are those who have very high possibilities of achieving careers and social success
within the existing regime, and thereby are more bound to come to terms with the system rather than
attempting to modify the rules of the game152. In this sense, actions on the Chinese Internet rarely
degenerate into radical dissent, because the majority of the online population is reluctant to disrupt the
possibility of attaining social status and economic success in the current political system.
In addition, Giese correctly points out that the Chinese Internet is mostly inhabited by the middle
and upper-middle classes, social groups that are not on the losing side of China’s economic
transformation and its political system, and therefore are not dissatisfied with the status quo. In their
political activism online, these groups tend to defend and achieve their interests, instead of referring to
larger systemic problems that affect a majority of the population that is still excluded from the Internet
discourse153. A recent survey conducted by Wang shows that the middle class is the social group with
the highest degree of political participation and interest on the Internet, and yet this interest is more
connected with economic reforms, finance and job security, than with sensitive issues and structural
reforms. Although functioning as an important mediator between the state and citizens, the Internet
has weakened the political interest of middle class citizens, shying them away from politics and
encouraging them towards popular and consumer culture154.
These findings are supported by official data: whereas usage of the web among white and blue
collars has increased constantly in time, percentages referring to unemployed and laid-off workers
have not changed significantly in recent years155; although Internet usage in the countryside is

151
CNNIC (2009)
152
Harwit & Clark (2001)
153
Giese (2006)
154
Wang (2009)
155
CNNIC Report (2003, 2005, 2007)
 increasing, it is still substantially below urban usage156. This shows that the sub-proletariat and groups
with the highest potential for political antagonism do not have access to Internet mobilization,
reducing the risks of political unrest and systemic change.
Western scholars have claimed that, starting from Jiang Zemin’s time in office, the CCP has
increasingly adopted the strategy of enlarging the base of representation and of including different
social and economic groups into the political arena in order to maintain power and its legitimacy. In
this sense, campaigns such as Jiang’s “Three Represents” have attempted to establish an appeasement
and an equilibrium between the emerging urban middle class and the political class157. A similar
phenomenon seems to take place on the Internet, as the government increasingly yields to the requests
and the tendencies that stem from the new Internet population, in order to maintain legitimacy and
control over the political pattern.
Interest groups representing the urban middle class use the Internet to campaign for their specific
interests as opposed to the interests of the state, or aim at solving established problems of the Chinese
political apparatus, such as environmental degradation, corruption or political mismanagement. Even
though they represent but a part of the population, their political action has still democratic impact on
the system, because it promotes the general principle that the public can and should take part in
policy-making, setting an important precedent of democratic participation for the next interest groups
or social classes to come. On the other hand, though, with their online activism these groups do not
challenge the existing political order: if they are protesting for personal interest, they choose the state
as their interlocutor and ultimately recognize the authority of the political actor and the framework of
the current regime. Moreover, if they address structural problems of the political machine, they even
more contribute to its endurance, because they help eliminate shortcomings that could bring political
instability or even a collapse of the system, and increase the degree of satisfaction of the population
towards the political status quo. In this sense, it is truly possible to say that the Chinese Internet and
its interest groups fulfill a surrogate democratic action that supports a political equilibrium.
To conclude this chapter, I intend to remark how radical political opposition on the Internet,
which is constantly emphasized by western media and western scholar who adhere to the theory of
convergence, actually plays a marginal role within the total panorama of the Chinese web, and
156
CNNIC (2009)
157
Wong & Zheng, eds. (2002), Giese (2006), Fewsmith (2008), in Li (eds.)
constitutes just a small fragment of the information and of the discourse established by netizens on
online interpersonal platforms. As I have monitored the Chinese Internet constantly during my
research for this article, I have noted that anti-systemic positions are largely outnumbered by
comments that, although roughly critical and even fierce against the political power, fully recognize
the authority of the political actor and, by promoting change and improvement in the political regime,
ultimately act within the acceptance of the existing system. Besides, by monitoring interpersonal
platforms that normally host the most antagonist positions within the Chinese web –mainly Bullogger
and Twitter– I have observed that the circle of active political militants –those who write anti-
systemic posts on their blogs everyday, gathering considerable fame within the Chinese Internet– is
actually very limited in size, and that a large part of their readership is composed by western netizens
rather than Chinese politically-conscious web users. These findings are the fruit of personal
impressions rather than quantitative research, and deeper insight into this matter should be made
before coming to definite conclusions; nevertheless, if confirmed by future studies, this would
confirm my thesis that political mobilization on the Chinese Internet does not have anti-systemic
implications, but ultimately contributes to the maintenance of the current socio-political equilibrium.
 Conclusion

In the course of this essay, I have attempted to demonstrate how Internet interpersonal platforms
fulfill a “surrogate democracy function” in China. This democratic effect originates from the impact
the Internet has in shaping an online public sphere and an online public opinion, in enhancing and
diversifying the media and information system, and in mobilizing interest groups. According to my
model, positive democratic impact of the Internet on the Chinese socio-political system increases the
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, and contentment of the population towards the behavior
of the political actor; for this reason, the Internet contributes to the maintenance of the political status
quo.
Evidently, measuring the degree of democracy prompted by the Internet and the stability effect
that it induces is an arduous and problematic process, and during my research on the Chinese web, I
sometimes had to extrapolate general trends from specific cases or quantitatively limited samples. In
this sense, my investigation should not be considered as thorough and conclusive, and I warmly
welcome new studies to contribute to casting light to the puzzling issue of the Internet in China.
Notwithstanding, historical evidence and some further proof have come to corroborate my thesis:
since the arrival of the Internet in China, the political system has undergone important
transformations, which have enlarged the role of citizenry and public opinion in influencing the
political actor, and increased the responsibility and the consideration of the government in front of the
public will. On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party has maintained almost uncontested
authority in the country, and the current political regime has demonstrated to outlive the major
economic and social transformations that have occurred since the reform, and to be able to endure in
the years to come. In both these trends, the Internet seems to have had an important stimulating role.
Furthermore, the most recent Pew Global Attitude Survey in China has emphasized the
generalized sentiment of satisfaction that the population has towards the system and the political
actor. In 2008, a staggering 86% of the population was satisfied or highly satisfied with the direction
of the country and the way things were going; this makes China the country with the highest degree of
public satisfaction in the world –outpacing Australia, the second classified, by 25 percentage points.
Interestingly, the levels of satisfaction in the population have increased steeply since the beginning of
the century, as in 2002 only 48% of Chinese people considered themselves content about the
 country’s overall direction158. Since many of the societal and political transformations happened
between 2002 and 2008 have had a direct or indirect connection with the development of the web, it
seems reasonable to affirm that the Internet has somehow been a factor in the growth of public
satisfaction in the country. This would give further proof that the Internet, with its positive democratic
effects on the system, helps maintain a socio-political equilibrium in China.
It is surely legitimate to question the genuineness of this perceived satisfaction with the Chinese
regime, or to claim the necessity that those democratic mechanisms that have only appeared in the
surrogate context of the Internet could be upgraded to real, institutionalized western-style democracy.
And yet, students of China should always remember that it is impossible to comprehend the
innumerable contradictions of the political system unless we accept the social and cultural
peculiarities of China, and the enormous repercussions these peculiarities have on the relation
between state and society. For this reason, in order to understand the contradictory effect that the
Internet has on the political system, it is perhaps useful to restyle the quotation from Kathleen
Hartford used in the introduction of this essay and claim that as Internet use and applications expand
in China, we may well find that its greatest impact lies in intensifying China’s existing peculiarities.

158
Pew Survey (2008), p.14-15; available at www.pewglobal.org
 List of cited websites

• Alibaba China
http://china.alibaba.com

• Ant Internet Community

http://www.myust.com

• Baidu Search Engine

www.baidu.com

• Bullogger Internet Community

http://www.bullogger.com

• Caogen Internet Portal

http://www.caogen.com

• CCTV – China Central Television Website

www.cctv.com

• China Development Gateway

http://cn.chinagate.cn

• China Digital Times

http://chinadigitaltimes.net

• China Internet Portal

http://www.china.com.cn

• China Law Library

http://www.law-lib.com

• China Media Project

http://cmp.hku.hk

• China National Radio Webpage

http://www.cnr.cn

• ChinaSmack
http://www.chinasmack.com

• Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention Webpage

http://www.chinacdc.net.cn

• Danwei
http://www.danwei.org
• Douban
http://www.douban.com

• EastSouthWestNorth Blog
http://www.zonaeuropa.com

• Global Voices Online

http://globalvoicesonline.org

• Haokanbu Internet Portal

http://www.haokanbu.com

• Hudong Online Encyclopedia

!htt!p!:!/!/!w!w!w!.!h!u!d!o!n!g!.!c!o!m

• Ifeng Internet Portal

http://www.ifeng.com

• Leiden University Sinological Institute Webpage

http://www.hum.leidenuniv.nl/chinees

• Liaoning Province Government Website

www.ln.gov.cn

• Markle Foundation Webpage

http://www.markle.org

• Nanfang Daily Webpage

http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn

• O’Reilly Radar – Tim O’Reilly’s Blog

http://radar.oreilly.com

• Oriental Morning Post Website

www.dfdaily.com

• People’s Daily Website

http://www.people.com.cn

• Pew Global Attitudes Project

www.pewglobal.org

• QQ Internet Community
http://www.qq.com

• Sina Internet Portal

http://www.sina.com.cn
• Sohu Internet Portal
www.sohu.com

• Southern Weekly Webpage

http://www.infzm.com

• Tianya Internet Community

http://www.tianya.cn

• Twitter Social Network

http://twitter.com

• Windows Live
http://home.spaces.live.com

• Xinhua Agency Website

www.xinhuanet.com

• Xinwang Internet Portal

http://www.xinnet.com

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