Catharine MacKinnon in her article Mainstreaming Feminism in Legal Education

theorizes about both the rationality and benefits of including feminist studies in legal studies. She
explores this through discussions on the usefulness of feminism as well as the problems of
modern legal education. MacKinnons article while interesting, suffers from its brevity. It seeks
to create an argument of why feminism should be considered instrumental to legal education, but
she does not fully develop how broad feminist studies can be, especially in the areas of analysis
and theory, nor does she discuss the multi-faceted ways that male dominance is maintained, nor
how feminism can address these and other legal education issues for a multitude of audiences.
After understanding MacKinnons work through a thorough critique, this critique is still not
enough to neither dismiss her ideas nor reject her basic premises. Although the work is brief and
not comprehensive in any of the issues it tackles, it provides a framework for a theory about legal
education and the role of feminism and women in society and the legal process that cannot be
ignored. This framework creates a structure for future work and for a stronger view of feminism
in legal theory.
MacKinnon begins her article by pondering a question she was posed by the dean of the
first university to admit women into its legal program about what the role of feminism in legal
education should be (MacKinnon 199). First she muses about the gripe that feminism is the
close study of one subject. There is a worry that this connotation unnecessarily limits the scope
and influence of feminism by limiting it to the study of women. However, MacKinnon counters
this claim with many other subjects are studies of one thing such as law and mankind. The
problem is not the scope of feminist studies but the perception of feminist studies. Many critical
legal studies create lenses to view the frameworks of law. These lenses allow for new and
different perspectives on the same subject and can create objectivity and subjectivity through

seeing how social constructs of law can be understood through different lenses. However, in the
case of feminist studies, like other critical studies including race, it seems that only the lens is
seen (MacKinnon 200). The new perspectives are ignored, and all attention is paid toward the
novel, minor, or gimmicky new way to see the world. This becomes a way of diminishing
the academic power of these critical studies. Since no viewpoint can be neutral, using the lens of
women and gender is perceived as narrowing or skewing the understanding of structures and
reality, where ignoring these views is seen as ideal and non-exclusive (MacKinnon 203).
Since the concept of feminism is sometimes hotly contested, and it can be obfuscated in
rhetorical tactics MacKinnon presents her definition of feminism to provide clarity and a starting
point for her discussion. Feminism is critical of the social stratification that results from the
differences of gender. It is specifically manifested in male dominance and the enforced
submission of females. MacKinnon does, however, acknowledge the multiplicity of gendered
experience with some people being more tightly regulated in social expectations of behavior and
other people being able to act in non-conformity without fear of social sanction. This spectrum
allows for an acknowledgement of the difference in human experience regardless of gender, but
MacKinnon enforces the idea that even if gender stratification is not seen in one instance it is a
pervasive part of society, especially western society. The most important part of MacKinnons
definition of feminism is its purpose and structure. Feminism comes from social reality and
goes back into social reality (MacKinnon 203). By discussion social reality as the key part of
the theorization of feminist studies, MacKinnon makes it clear that the intent of feminism is not
to discuss or debate the ideals of society and equality but rather to take stock of how the world
currently is, to work from this position, and to constantly reevaluate theories in light of how they
perform in reality. Feminist studies is rooted in concrete experiences.

The point then of legal education in conjunction with feminist legal studies is to
understand the many problems that women face because they are women, and what role law can
play in solutions. On the surface level this seems to be a practical approach to law and feminism;
however, it is rooted in theories of equality, human rights, and theories of optimal states and laws
to achieve such. All of this theorizing creates a theory for the necessity of feminist studies in law.
MacKinnons argument rests on three main points. One, women are deprived of equality. Two,
men are given or create dominance. Point three is a question of how law can solve this
inequality. It searches how legal education can prepare lawyers to respond to these problems. It
asks how law can encourage feminist studies without marking it as different, or if this is even
possible. MacKinnons proposed solution to make sure the feminist studies are included in legal
education is include feminist courses, but there is a fear that this could create an artificial
dichotomy in legal studies between mainstream, and quirky feminist studies as a branch and not
a connected, integral part of legal education. MacKinnon desires an overall broadening of legal
education and a broader understand of the scope and included lenses in legal education. This
would include adding more discussion of diverse viewpoints in mainstream and required courses
in legal education as part of a theory that increased exposure to and understanding of diverse
views creates a better, more prepared legal system.
MacKinnon throughout the article also discusses the problems she finds within the legal
system. The legal system creates an artificial divide between public and private spheres,
according to MacKinnon. This is especially clear when considering the socially defined role of
women is within the home, so for women their public and private spheres could be nearly
identical. This artificial divide creates limitations, especially on the legal rights of women since it
is generally believed that laws should not infringe upon private rights. Because of this, legal

systems, especially western systems are not gender neutral. It is also problematic for MacKinnon
that women were not represented in legal systems when the current systems were created. This
creates questions both practical and theoretical about the creations of constitutions. Should
constitutions be created to represent current populations because although white, landowning
men were represented and present at the creation of the current American constitution, it is not
clear that the wishes of current white, landowning men are represented by this same constitution.
This relates to social contract theories about what makes a state valid both in its creation and
maintenance. MacKinnon also quarrels with current understandings of equality where some
people [favor] the notion that treating people the same is what treating them equally means
(MacKinnon). However, MacKinnon, acknowledges the biological and social differences of
genders and does not advocate for sameness, but rather for a lack of stratification and hierarchy
associated with the division of genders. Another qualm MacKinnon has is with the structure of
the legal system, namely the dependence on precedent. MacKinnon finds this practice antiquated
and oppressive. The reason that precedent is oppressive is that its use dates back to a time before
women had rights. The system of precedent does not adjust quickly, so antiquated justification
based on prior cases can be used to oppress because of the acceptance of antiquated ideas in
times past and the acceptance of precedence allows this acceptance of outdated ideas to continue.
Beyond the legal claims, MacKinnon also finds the issues in legal studies because of the
understanding of epistemology. Often what is taken as true in court cases is under strict scrutiny.
However, what can be and is accepted as knowledge by women and other groups does not
always meet this criterion. For MacKinnon, this does not mean that the women and others have
made improper judgments of validity and truth, but rather that the burden of truth is not accurate
in cases to judge the truth that does exist in the world. The burden of truth also questions the

qualifications, experiences, and genders of those who create knowledge, according to

MacKinnon. This creates an artificial dichotomy between true and false in court cases and
systems that do not mirror those definitions in reality.
MacKinnon points out several of these artificial dichotomies. This includes the split
between theory and practice. MacKinnon believes that the theory/practice split inherited from
male dominance has not served women conceptually or practically. I doubt it serves legal
education either (211). This split between theory and practice categorizes them as impossible to
be mixed and intertwined. This can lead to epistemological hierarchies that cement divides of
gender, class, and race in legal studies and academia. These hierarchies can also lead to a
silencing of epistemic diversity where members of faculty and students do not feel their opinions
are worthy or valuable. This can further reinforce stereotypes about the ability of these groups.
MacKinnon also criticizes the failure of the Socratic Method and how it has be twisted into a
means of instilling dominance and hierarchy into classroom structure. It rewards submissiveness
through a mean-spirited, oppressive approach to education.
MacKinnon concludes her article by creating an ideal, theoretical legal education. Her
ideal education would include an emphasis on listening to clients, and utilizing theory to apply to
practical experiences and social reality. By understanding her theory of the need for feminism in
legal education, mainly to combat many of the shortcomings she perceives in legal education,
MacKinnon creates this theoretically ideal legal education.
Although MacKinnon covers a broad range of issues relating to the intersectionality of
feminism and legal studies, her surface level examination of each leaves questions about the
topics and a general feeling of inadequacy. This is especially true when considering that some
may not feel feminist studies and perspectives should be included in legal education. The

audience of MacKinnons work is unclear. It is very critical of men and their actions, in almost a
scathing way that suggests that MacKinnon is not writing towards them. However, then it would
seem she is writing about why feminist perspectives should be included in legal education to an
audience of women. This would seem to be redundant or at least an essay preaching to the choir.
Marginalized or excluded groups tend to be aware of their marginalized status and they realize
that their voices are valuable. Writing about the value added of their own perspective to people
who already know the value added is redundant. If this is truly the case then this piece is not a
persuasive essay, and the intent of the article is then unclear. Part of the rational of why this piece
does not seem to be directed at men, is its overly critical tone about how male dominance is
spread and maintained. MacKinnon believes the best way to understand male-female relations in
society is through a system of dominance where acts are inflicted on women by men who,
socialized in masculinity, can decide to do them or not (202). The control of all social situations
then rest exclusive in the authority of males. Inequality of the sexes always, for MacKinnon,
results in male power and dominance. This assumes that men are knowing, willing participants in
the system.
MacKinnon does make some caveats about men who are effeminized or dominated by
other men, but the active voice when describe that all acts inflicted on women are by men
making conscious choices whether or not to do so gives men much more authority and control
than is reflected in some societies. MacKinnon does discuss some of this dominance relationship
in the context of domestic violence where the actions are almost exclusively done by men to
women (207). However, this sections lacks discussion on how men could benefit from feminist
theories, legally or otherwise. Feminist theories advocate for more egalitarian allocations of
power and resources; it also advocates for less concrete gender roles and expectations. Current

societal expectations enforce views of masculinity as necessarily violent, oppressive, and primal.
This is problematic for men too because it can force them into unwanted positions of dominance
and into unwanted societal expectations. By excluding such discussion MacKinnon does not
make clear the universal benefits of feminist theories, and she does not make room in her article
for male voices without villianizing them. MacKinnon also excludes discussion on how both
identities police gender conformity. She hints at men policing gender through dominating women
and applying this same treatment to men who do not conform to typical gender norms; however
she completely excludes women who reinforce gender roles and submission to men. According
to the United Nations Population Fund most female genital mutilations are performed by women,
often related to the victim. Female genital mutilation is a clear example of male dominance
striping women of their ability to have sexual autonomy and control over their own bodies.
However the maintainance of this system of dominance, especially in societies that do not utilize
medical professionals to perform the cutting, are performed by women. Both genders reinforce
gender identities through rigidly defined social norms, and by excluding this side of the
discussion MacKinnon is unnecessarily blaming men for all forms of oppression and dominance.
It would seem that a more complete understanding of male dominance is to understand it as a
self-maintaining structure that does not rely on individual actors to continue its effect. Men are
then unwitting participants in a society that enforces gender roles upon them, equally to its
enforcement of gender roles on unwitting female participants.
Another problematic point in MacKinnons article is the scope of the article. It attempts
to have a global discussion of the problems that women face in society and at the hands of the
legal system including domestic violence, female genital mutilation, domestic servitude, sexual
assault, rape as a military tactic, being sold into prostitution and sex slavery, and female

infanticide. Although all of these problems can and do happen in some form in all societies
globally, her discussion seems to focus on problems related to the global south. However, in her
discussion of legal education, it seems distinctly euro-centric with MacKinnons discussion of
the Socratic Method as a means of education and the structure of the legal education system.
These two discussions do not meaningfully relate to each other so the scope of the article is
confusing. It is unclear if MacKinnon is discussion the need for feminist legal studies in all legal
systems because of the problems that face women internationally, or if she is advocating for
adaptations to westernized legal education because of her focus on this style of education.
MacKinnon does not focus as much on the analytical aspects of law. There is some
discussions on creations of constitutions and social contracts. MacKinnon also begins her
discussion of feminist theory as a lens, yet she does not carry this discussion through. She fails
to mention the benefits of importance of presenting a multitude of lenses through which to
analyze law could provide in legal education. She largely ignores even the importance of adding
even one additional lens in the context of broadening the scope of legal education. Her
discussion circles, instead, around how feminism begins and ends in reality. While this is an
important part of feminist theory it can prove problematic because MacKinnon and the theory
tend to get bogged down in specifics. The attention throughout the article shifts between how
women are disadvantaged in society and what the legal recourse for these disadvantages could
be. This overstates the importance of current reality. While it may be important to change how
the world currently is, without a theory for continued improvement, fixing issues in current
society seems more like a stopgap measure than a solution. Theory and analysis leading to theory
create a long-term solution to these problems. By ignoring the importance of analysis in her
theory, MacKinnon proposes solutions that focus on immediacy instead of longevity. Theory is

not a final, complete work in its introduction. Theory, as its name suggests, is an editable,
malleable idea of how to change and improve or understand reality.
MacKinnon in her discussion of why feminist legal theory should be included in legal
education does specify the intent of this inclusion. MacKinnon acknowledges that adding
feminist classes to legal education often includes titles that mark them as different from the rest
of legal education. The paradox lies in the desire to include these theories and ideas into
mainstreaming legal education without marking them. This marking creates false dichotomy
between feminism in legal studies and mainstream legal studies. While MacKinnon, as stated in
her title, desires feminism to be taught in mainstream legal education, it is not clear what this
specifically entails. MacKinnon either assumes that the reader while understand the specifics of
including feminist theory in legal education, or she does consider the specific details necessary
on this issue to prove her point of the general necessity of feminist theory in legal education.
Another assumption MacKinnon makes is to presuppose the reader understands the value
of feminist theory generally. While the discussion centers around the fact that feminist theory
should be included in mainstream legal education, there is no discussion of the value that
teaching such theory would add to legal education generally. There is no discussion of why
feminist theory should be mainstreamed as opposed to other critical studies such as race theory.
While it is consistent with MacKinnons argument that all lenses should be included in legal
education to create a better perspective of the legal system, she does not make this assertion. Her
focus on feminism in legal education borders on exclusionary towards other lenses, even though
she does not argue for the superiority of it. MacKinnon does not even discuss the benefits of
having feminism in legal education besides for the sake of having feminism in legal education.
There is limited discussion on how feminist legal theory could encourage more emphasis on

listening to clients; however there is no discussion on how to achieve this, nor is their discussion
on why this would be the best method to achieve this.
Since in the case of feminist legal theory, practice begets theory, it is unclear where the
division between the two rests. It is hard to determine what is theory since it is rooted in current
reality. This leads to a muddling of practice and theory. This is problematic because it seems like
the universality of theory is limited because of the practical, current elements of reality that it is
rooted in, according to MacKinnon. This makes the theory less likely to be adaptable and it may
no longer hold true when times change, or the changes to society that feminists, like MacKinnon,
desire are met. The theory will then fall short of directing where the trends should continue.
Although MacKinnons article contains some shortcomings because of its broad focus
and brevity, it is able to regain some traction because of the qualifications that MacKinnon poses
in her article. MacKinnons overarching goal is to broaden the conception of necessary legal
education, and through this article is able to achieve such, even if it does fail to fully address
other issues. To address the concerns of muddling theory and practice, MacKinnon asserts that
the theory/practice split inherited from male dominance has not served women conceptually or
practically. I doubt it serves legal education either (211). Rather than trying to reconcile the
disconnect between MacKinnons view of legal theory and current practice, she argues for a
drastic restructuring of legal education to be more in line with how she imagines the ideal legal
education should act and educate. While it is not a fully developed idea, it does touch on the
concept that the current legal system does not benefit those whom it educates nor those who they
will in turn serve. This lends to a discussion on how a broader legal education would benefit all
genders and people because of a broader perspective with more lenses on the legal system. This
also leads to a discussion on the value of epistemic diversity.

MacKinnon does critique the legal epistemology of facts. Her argument rests on the
limitations that can be placed on the proof of facts that do not coincide with how people outside
of the legal system view proof of facts. This limits knowledge and facts to a limited definition of
both. MacKinnon wants to promote the value of multiple different epistemologies that would
allow for a greater amount of facts, outside of traditional definitions, this could lead to a broader
scope of what is and can be accepted as knowledge societally and give more trust to female and
non-male knowers who have different epistemological proofs of knowledge. Continuing her
critique of the legal system, MacKinnon addresses the problems of precedent. These problems
rest in how slow the legal system is to change, and how much of this rests on the precedential
system. Because the system relies on previous cases the outdated ideas and materials from those
cases can continue a system of oppression towards women and others. This makes it difficult to
enact change within the current system, which MacKinnon realizes and seeks to remedy.
In regards to legal education, MacKinnon seeks to reimagine how academia is perceived
and understood. Because of the divide between theory and practice, the idea seems to be that
[those with practical experience] are contaminated by mucking around in the real world instead
of inhaling the thin air of ideas (MacKinnon 210). MacKinnon advocates for an increase in
clinical experience as a part of feminist legal theory because of the empowerment that the legal
process can provide for those that are subjugated. This allows for a blending of theory and
application, the ideal for MacKinnon. She also desires to fix what she perceives as a perversion
of the Socratic Method. The way the Socratic Method is utilized appears to be a new form of
bullying and a way to establish a hierarchy and dominance. She promotes the return to the
original conception of the Socratic Method pioneered by Socrates that promotes equality and

guidance into learning through the work of the student rather than a guess what Im thinking
tactic that tends to be applied today.
Overall, through her critique, commentary, and projection of an ideal legal education, she
desires to create more understanding and empathy in legal education graduates. This relates back
to her thesis: What can legal education do to prepare lawyers to intervene in this situation
womens inequality to men in order to change it? (Mackinnon 203). MacKinnon believes the
solution relies lawyers who feel more responsible to their clients because of their increased
practical experience in clinics. She believes it entails more perspectives on the legal system
through different lenses to understand its shortcomings and strengths. She strongly endorses the
broader conceptualization of law, and a broader understanding of the legal system through more
and broader experiences in education.
Although MacKinnons work is caustic in its portrayal of men, and its exclusionary
description of how male dominance is maintained, it does seek to create at least framework for
understanding the role of feminism in legal education.
MacKinnon in her own words discusses the importance of studying just one thing, the
whole law library testifies to that. One ought to be able to accomplish at least as much by staying
focused on [women] (199). MacKinnon seeks to broader the conception of legal theory by
adding the additional lens of feminist legal theory not as a separate entity, but as deeply entwined
with law, as a mainstreaming of multiple lenses. She believes this will create more prepared
lawyers, and it will also create a more mainstream understanding of gender differences and the
importance of diversity of epistemic knowledge, experience, and social situatedness in legal
theory. While MacKinnon tackles a large, daunting facet of legal education, she creates a concise
article. This creates a disconnect between the need for a depth of discussion on each topic and a

short amount of space for such. Questions arise about the different topics she covers, simply
from lack of space accorded to each. However, her main point shines through. Her desire for a
broader theory of laws allows for an overall successful argumentation about the need for feminist
legal theory and a reimagining of the legal education. It should be noted that theory and practice
are so deeply intertwined in MacKinnons understanding of feminist legal theory that it is
difficult to extract the specifics. However, by understanding theory as being a result of practice
and reality, and that the goal of theory is to improve, critique, and respond to reality and create
better, achievable practices to improve reality, it seems less incoherent to discuss the way the
world is, in order to create a theory of feminism and law.