1.

HEIRS OF CANDIDO DEL ROSARIO and HEIRS OF GIL DEL ROSARIO

Vs MONICA DEL ROSARIO,
G.R. No. 181548
June 20, 2012
FACTS:

The subject land was owned by Lazaro tenanted by Spouses Del Rosario.

Spouses Del Rosario had three children: Monica, Candido and Gil. Petitioners claimed that when Spouses Del Rosario died, only
they continued to tenant and actually till the subject land.

Monica and Gil agreed that the latter would facilitate the application for an E.P. over the subject land in the name of the former. In
exchange, Monica agreed to cede to Gil one-third of the said land.

DAR issued to Monica E.P. Despite repeated demands, Monica refused to cede to Gil the one-third portion of the subject land.

Petitioners filed with Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) a complaint against Monica for amendment
of TCT and partition of the subject land.

PARAD rendered decision in favor of the petitioners. (Monica was not the bona fide tenant-farmer of the subject land and that she
had continuously failed to cultivate or develop the same).

Monica appealed to Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

DARAB reversed decision of PARAD. (Subject land is not part of their inheritance. Tenants are not the owners of the land holding
they cultivate. Right to cultivate by Spouses Del Rosario as tenants was passed to Monica as the eldest child. Agreement between
Monica and Gil is contrary to law as P.D. No. 27 prohibits the transfer of parcels of land given to qualified farmer-beneficiaries
other than by hereditary succession or to the government).

Petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA.

CA denied petition. PARAD and the DARAB had no jurisdiction. (There being no agrarian dispute or tenancy relations between the
parties. The petitioners are bound by the decision of the DARAB declaring Monica as the bona fide holder since they participated
in the proceedings before the PARAD and the DARAB without raising any objection thereto). Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON PARAD and DARAB have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petitioners complaint for amendment and partition?
2. If the PARAD and the DARAB have no jurisdiction over the complaint for amendment and partition, whether the petitioners are
bound by their respective dispositions.
HELD:
1. NO. The Complaint for amendment and partition does not involve any agrarian dispute, nor does it involve any incident arising
from the implementation of agrarian laws. The petitioners and Monica have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that will bring this controversy within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB. Further, the instant case does
not involve an incident arising from the implementation of agrarian laws.

2. NO. Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. The active
participation of the parties in the proceedings before the DARAB does not vest jurisdiction on the DARAB, as jurisdiction is
conferred only by law. The courts or the parties cannot disregard the rule of non-waiver of jurisdiction. Likewise, estoppel does not
apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently
held that an order or decision rendered by a tribunal or agency without jurisdiction is a total nullity.
2. DAR vs. TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 173386 February 11, 2014
FACTS: The following facts are common to the three cases under consolidation: Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al.
are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental. The landholding consists of a total area of 641. 7895 hectares
- about 200 hectares thereof are devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. The DAR placed 479.8905 hectares of the said landholding under
the coverage of RA 6657 between March 1995 and July 2000. Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) were subsequently issued in favor of the agrarian reform beneficiaries.
After the protest of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation against the coverage of its landholding under CARP was dismissed
by the DAR Regional Director and such dismissal was affirmed by DAR OIC Secretary (Ponce), Trinidad Valley et al. filed before the RTC a
special civil action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which was subsequently amended with leave of court, changing the nature of the
action to an ordinary action of annulment of land titles. Subsequently, The RTC on Oct. 2005 declared as unconstitutional and void the
administrative issuances of the DAR and the LRA, Executive Order No. 405, and other related issuances. The RTC also annulled the CLOAs
issued by the DAR and issued a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining private defendant beneficiaries, DAR defendants and other
entities from exercising acts of possession, dispossession or ownership over any portion of the subject property, and preventing the DAR
from subjecting the landholdings of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. under the coverage of agrarian reform
through the implementation of the administrative orders and issuances.
The CA reversed and set aside the Order of the RTC and ruled for the second time that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to try the case.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the original and amended petitions.
HELD: No, the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the instant case. Section 54 of RA 6657 provides that decisions, orders, awards or rulings of the
DAR may be brought to the CA by certiorari and not with the RTC through an ordinary action for cancellation of title. Moreover, Section 50
of RA 6657 substantially reiterates Section 17, of EO No. 229, vesting in the DAR exclusive and original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform. In addition, Sections 56 and 57, thereof provide for the designation by the Supreme Court
of at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court within each province to act as a special agrarian court. The said special court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction only over petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of
criminal offenses under said Act.

The case at bar deals with acts of the DAR and the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of RA 6657 - issues which do
not involve the "special jurisdiction" of the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court. Hence, when the court a quo heard and decided the
instant case, it did so without jurisdiction.
Consequently, it did not have authority to perform any of the following: order the admission on the amended petition of Trinidad Valley
Realty and Development Corporation, et al., decide the amended petition on the merits, or issue a permanent prohibitory injunction. In any
case, such injunction issued by the RTC is a nullity in view of the express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Court's Administrative
Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002 enjoining all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657.
The Supreme Court denied the herein petition, affirmed the CAs decision and annulled & set aside the said Decision of the RTC.
3. G.R. No. 176838

June 13, 2013

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by Fritzi C. Pantoja, in her capacity as the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer,
DAR-Laguna, Petitioner,
vs.
PARAMOUNT HOLDINGS EQUITIES, INC., JIMMY CHUA, ROJAS CHUA, BENJAMIN SIM, SANTOS C. TAN, WILLIAM C.
LEE and STEWART C. LIM, Respondents.
DECISION
DAR vs. Paramount Holdings G.R. No. 176838 June 13, 2013
FACTS:
The case stems from the petition docketed as DARAB Case No. R 0403-0009-02, filed with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator
(PARAD) by the DAR through Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Felixberto Q. Kagahastian. The petition sought to nullify the sale
to the respondents of several parcels of land which was argued that the properties were agricultural land yet their sale was effected without
DAR Clearance as required under Republic Act No. 6657 (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL).

On October 16, 2002, Provincial Adjudicator Virgilio M. Sorita (PA Sorita) issued a Resolution7 dismissing the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) reversed the decision of the of the Provincial Adjudicator. A new judgment is
rendered nullifying the Deeds of Sale in question dated September 5, 1989 and ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel the
aforesaid

CA again reversed the decision of the DARAB thus this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the dispute that seeks the nullification of the subject properties sale.

HELD:
The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited under the law, as it was created under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-A specifically to assume
powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A. Significantly, it was
organized under the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The limitation on the authority of it to mere agrarian reform matters is only
consistent with the extent of DARs quasi-judicial powers under R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 229 which reads The DAR is hereby vested
with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

Specifically, the PAROs petition failed to sufficiently allege any tenurial or agrarian relations that affect the subject parcels of land. Although
it mentioned a pending petition for coverage filed with DAR by supposed farmers-tillers, there was neither such claim as a fact from DAR,
nor a categorical statement or allegation as to a determined tenancy relationship by the PARO or the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. It is also
undisputed, that even the petition filed with the PARAD failed to indicate otherwise, that the subject parcels of land had not been the subject
of any notice of coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Clearly, the PAROs cause of action was merely
founded on the absence of a clearance to cover the sale and registration of the subject parcels of land, which were claimed in the petition to
be agricultural.

Given the foregoing, the CA correctly ruled that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the PAROs
petition.

As to the nature of the subject lands, the tax declarations of real property, the annual receipts for real estate taxes paid, and zoning ordinance,
providing for the Town Comprehensive Land Use Plan of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, have always classified the lands as "industrial". Moreover, as
certified by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, there is no record of tenancy or written agricultural leasehold
contract with respect to the subject lands, nor are the same covered by Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27. Thus, for being industrial
in nature, the subject lands are outside the ambit of existing agricultural tenancy laws. Thus, the respondents correctly argued that since the
subject properties were already classified as "industrial" long before the effectivity of the CARL, their sale could not have been covered by
the CARP and the requirement for a clearance.
4.AGUSTIN RIVERA et. Al vs NEMESIO DAVID,

G.R. No. 157307 February 27, 2006

RIVERA vs. DAVID
G.R. No. 157307 February 27, 2006
FACTS: Respondent Nemesio David, with the other heirs of Consolacion Suarez David, owned in common 5 hectares of land covered by
TCT No. 47588-R in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner Agustin Rivera occupied 1.8 hectares of the land. The Davids demanded that
petitioner vacate the property. Rivera refused and instituted a complaint with an application for injunction to maintain peaceful possession
before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) and insisted that he was a tenant of respondents predecessor-ininterest.
The PARAB held that David was guilty of laches or estoppel since he and his predecessors-ininterest had allowed petitioner to retain the
property thus, maintaining petitioner Rivera in peaceful possession of the property without prejudice to his claim as qualified beneficiary of
the agrarian reform program. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) affirmed the PARABs finding . The Court
of Appeals reversed the decisions of both the PARAB and the DARAB. It reasoned that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) no longer
had jurisdiction over the case because by petitioner Riveras own admission, the tenancy ended in 1957. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the DAR have jurisdiction over the dispute.
HELD: Yes, the DAR has jurisdiction over the case even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an incident
arising from the landlord and tenant relationship. The existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship characterizes the controversy as an
"agrarian dispute" which is under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. (Sec. 21, RA No. 1199)
The SC find that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Agustin Riveras complaint, not because the DAR had no jurisdiction over the
case but because his complaint lacks merit. Respondent Nemesio David and his fellow heirs of Consolacion Suarez David are declared
owners of the contested land covered by TCT No. 47588-R.
5. G.R. No. 123417. June 10, 1999.
JAIME MORTA, SR. and PURIFICACION PADILLA, petitioners, vs. JAIME OCCIDENTAL, ATTY. MARIANO BARANDA, JR.,
and DANIEL CORRAL, respondents
FACTS: Jaime Morta and Purificacion Padilla filed a suit against Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, and Daniel Corral, for allegedly
gathering pili nuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their respective land and destroying their banana and pineapple plants. Occidental
claimed that he was a tenant of the actual owner of the land, Josefina Baraclan, and that Morta and Padilla were not actually the owners of the
land in question. The trial court ruled in favor of Morta and Padilla. Occidental, et al. appealed, contending that the case was cognizable by
the DAR Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). Thus, the RTC reversed the lower court and ruled in favor of Occidental, stating that the case is a
tenancy-related problem which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. The CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the cases are properly cognizable by the DARAB.
HELD: NO. Since there is a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, the issue is clearly outside DARABs jurisdiction.
Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. At any rate, whoever is
declared to be the rightful owner of the land, the case cannot be considered tenancy-related for it still fails to comply with the other
requirements. Assuming arguendo that Josefina is the owner, then the case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the
landowner, Occidental cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to
comply with the requisites, the issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to
take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:
1.That the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2.The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3.That there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4.That the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5.That there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6.That the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee
6. G.R. No. 154112. September 23, 2004
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, petitioner, vs. ROBERTO J. CUENCA and Hon. ALFONSO B. COMBONG JR., in His
Capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, La Carlota City, respondents

FACTS: Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota City and
devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane. On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La
Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the above-described landholding under the
compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The NOTICE OF
COVERAGE also stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) will determine the value of the subject land pursuant to Executive
Order No. 405 . Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab initio and Executive Order No.
405 dated 14 June 1990 be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner contends that by virtue of the provisions Sec. 55 & 68, all lower courts, such
as the court presided over by respondent Judge, are barred if not prohibited by law to issue orders of injunctions against the Department of
Agrarian Reform in the full implementation of the Notice of Coverage which is the initial step of acquiring lands under R.A. 6657. Petitioner
also contends that the nature and subject matter of the case below is purely agrarian in character over which the court a quo has no
jurisdiction and that therefore, it had no authority to issue the assailed injunction order. The CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had
jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also had the power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect
the rights of the parties.
ISSUE: WON DAR has original and exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657).

HELD: The DAR has original and exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) on
the issues involving the implementation of agrarian reform. SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture [DA]
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].
Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that the RTC of La Carlota City was devoid of authority
to issue the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity. Such nullity is particularly true in
the light of the express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Courts Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002. These
Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, which reads: Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from
Undue Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.
7.

DEL

MONTE

PHILIPPINES,

INC.

EMPLOYEES

AGRARIAN

REFORM

BENEFICIARIES

COOPERATIVE

(DEARBC), petitioner, vs. JESUS SANGUNAY and SONNY LABUNOS,respondents.

DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES INC. EMPLOYEES AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES COOPERATIVE
(DEARBC),vs. JESUS SANGUNAY and SONNY LABUNOS, G.R. No. 180013
Facts:
The property subject of this case is a portion of an entire landholding located in Bukidnon. The said landholding was awarded to DEARBC,
an agrarian cooperative and beneficiary under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Subsequently, DEARBC leased a
substantial portion of the land to Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI).
In July 7, 1998, DEARBC filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Specific Performance with Damages with the DARAB Region
10 Office against several respondents, among whom were Jesus Sangunay (Sangunay) and Sonny Labunos (Labunos).
Essentially, DEARBC claimed that both Sangunay and Labunos illegally entered portions of its property called Field 34.
Both respondents refused to return the parcels of land notwithstanding a demand to vacate them. This illegal occupation resulted in the
deprivation of the proper and reasonable use of the land and damages.
On December 11, 1990, the Adjudicator ruled in favor of DEARBC on the ground that the respondents failed to present proof of ownership
over the subject portions of the landholding. According to the Adjudicator, their bare allegation of possession, even prior to the award of the
land to DEARBC, did not suffice as proof of ownership. Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the DARAB Central Office before
which Sangunay filed his position paper.He claimed that the subject property was located along the Maninit River and was an accrual deposit.
He inherited the land from his father in 1948 and had since been in open, public, adverse, peaceful, actual, physical, and continuous
possession thereof in the concept of an owner. He cultivated and lived on the land with the knowledge of DEARBC.In sum, Sangunay
asserted that, as a qualified farmer beneficiary, he was entitled to security of tenure under the agrarian reform law and, at any rate, he had
already acquired the land by prescription.
For his part, Labunos reiterated the above arguments and added that the subject portion of the landholding was previously owned by one
Genis Valdenueza who sold it to his father, Filoteo, as early as 1950. Like Sangunay, he asserted rights of retention and ownership by
prescription because he had been in open, public, adverse, peaceful, actual, physical, and continuous possession of the landholding in the
concept of an owner.
The DARAB dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the issue of ownership of the subject land classifies the controversy as a
regular case falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts and not as an agrarian dispute. DEARBC challenged the DARAB Decision in the
CA through a petition for review filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue: Whether or not the case at bar falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
Ruling:
The court rules in the negative. All matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform are within the DARs primary, exclusive and
original jurisdiction. At the first instance, only the DARAB, as the DARs quasi-judicial body, can determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the CARP. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
8.[G.R. No. 125202. January 31, 2006.]ERNESTO INGLES, MAXIMO CANOY, ISMAEL BONTILAO,CONRADO BONTILAO,
SERGIO CANOY, ZALDY CANOY,REMITSOR CANOY, ROBERTO CANOY, RODULFO NABLE,GUILLERMO BORRES,
ENRIQUE BORRES, LOBERTABONTILAO, and NESTOR PIALDA, petitioners,vs. MANUELCANTOS, DAR SECRETARY
ERNESTO GARILAO, and DAR VIIREGIONAL DIRECTOR ELMO BANARES, respondents. (JURISPRUDENCE)
FACTS: By virtue of Proclamation No. 2052,[1] former President Ferdinand Marcos declared the barangays of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag
and Sirao in CebuCity and the municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete as tourist zones under the administration and control of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA). On a spanningthe barangays of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag and Sirao in Cebu City is the Kang-Irag Sports
Complex . Part of the Complex is Lot No. 16306, situated at Barangay Sibugay, measuring approximately 568,878 square meters and owned
by private respondent Manuel Cantos. Herein petitioners, mostly residents of Barangay Sibugay, are farmers occupying portions of the
Complex. private respondent Cantos filed a petition with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the exemption of his landholding
from the coverage of the comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP). Petitioners opposed the petition on various grounds. DAR
Secretary Ernesto Garilao ordered the exclusion of the landholdings within the Complex from the coverage of the CARP and operation land
transfer program of the government. In a subsequent Order[, the DAR Secretary amended the Order by declaring only 808 hectares of the
1,500 hectares of Complex as excluded from the CARP since the PTA identified only 808 hectares as ideal for tourism purposes.
Petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the subject property had been utilized for the interest of private
respondent and not for public purpose.Private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution contending that petitioners
supplemental motion did not toll the running of the reglementary period for appeal. Accordingly, DAR Regional Director Elmo Banares
issued an Order of Execution, directing private respondent to effect the immediate relocation and payment to each petitioner of disturbance
compensation. it also awarded each petitioner 200 square meters of land, although no relocation site was provided.

Petitioners moved to quash the Order of Execution, arguing that the order to be executed was ambiguous as it did not provide for an area
where the farmers affected would be relocated and no hearing or survey was conducted. The DAR Secretary, however, affirmed the Order of
Execution. Petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, questioning the Order of Execution via a petition for review. According to
petitioners, the DAR Secretary had no authority to issue the Order of Execution since it was equivalent to a writ of demolition and since it
was issued without notice and hearing. CA denied petitioners petition.
ISSUE: 1. WON AN ORDER OF EXECUTION PROMULGATED BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CAN STAND AS VALID
WITHOUT NOTICE AND HEARING CONDUCTED IN CONNECTION THEREOF
2. WON AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, SUCH AS THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM CAN ISSUE AN ORDER
WHICH HAS A FORCE AND EFFECT OF A WRIT OF DEMOLITION
HELD: The Court finds that the Order of Execution issued by the DAR Regional Director suffers from jurisdictional and procedural defects
as it directed the relocation of petitioners without first conducting a hearing or survey to determine the portion of the subject property
excluded from the CARP.
In issuing the questioned Order of Execution, the DAR Regional Director overstepped the limits of his office and crossed the realm of
adjudication. While the orders sought to be implemented merely directed the survey of the areas to be excluded from the CARP, the Order of
Execution, however, included the search for a relocation site for the benefit of farmers who would be affected by the order of exemption and
the determination of appropriate disturbance compensation. Thus, the DAR Regional Director turned what was supposed to be an
administrative process into an adjudicatory proceeding. The relocation of occupants is normally conducted with the issuance of a writ of
demolition, an act which is within the competence of the DARAB.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37333 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Order of
Execution issued by the DAR Regional Director on December 22, 1994 is likewise NULLIFIED. Costs against private respondent.

9. Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro, as represented by Maximino dela Cruz vs. Heirs of
Alberto Cruz, as represented by Benedicto U. Cruz
G.R. No. 162890 (November 22, 2005)
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines acquired the De Leon Estate in Nueva Ecija for resale to deserving tenants and landless farmers,
conformably with Commonwealth Act No. 539, as amended by Republic Act No. 1400. The property was under the administration of the
Land Tenure Administration and later the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). In 1950, the DAR allocated a portion of the property in
favor of Julian dela Cruz who was a tenant thereon.
By virtue of an Agreement to Sell, the DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) in his favor as the qualified allocatee of the
landholding. Julian bound and obliged himself to pay the amortizations over the land in 30 annual installments. He cultivated the property
and made payments to the government for a period of almost 20 years. He died in 1979 and was survived by his wife, Leonora Talaro-dela
Cruz and their 10 children, including Mario and Maximino dela Cruz. Mario administered the landholding, until their mother executed a
private document declaring that, with the consent of her children, she had sold the land in favor of Alberto Cruz.
Alberto took possession of the landholding and cultivated it over a period of 10 years without any protest from Leonora and her children.
He then filed an application to purchase the property with the DAR. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) recommended that the
landholding be declared vacant and disposable to a qualified applicant and the approval of Alberto's application to purchase the property.
On November 16, 1990, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Order approving the recommendation of the MARO.
He directed the cancellation of Julian's CLT and declared that his rights be forfeited in favor of the government under the agreement.
The PARO endorsed the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to the DAR Secretary, copy furnished the Regional Director. The
DAR Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution reviewed and evaluated the records and recommended that the PARO's recommendation
be affirmed. On June 27, 1991, the DAR Secretary signed and issued CLOA over the property in favor of Alberto Cruz, and the certificate
was registered with the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
Sometime in early 1996, Maximino, one of the surviving children of Julian, discovered that the landholding had already been registered in
the name of Alberto Cruz. On October 10, 1996, Leonora and her 10 children, with the assistance of the DAR Bureau of Legal Assistance,
filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the nullification of the order of the PARO, CLOA and TCT
issued in favor of Alberto Cruz. The petitioners declared, inter alia, that they were the surviving heirs of Julian dela Cruz and had no
knowledge of the sale by Leonora and Mario of their right as beneficiaries of the property; not being privies to the said sale, they were not
bound by the private deed executed by Leonora; and such sale, as well as the issuance of the CLOA and the title over the property in favor of
Alberto, was null and void, inasmuch as they violated agrarian reform laws and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1980. They
insisted that they were deprived of their rights as heirs of the beneficiary without due process of law.
After due proceedings, the PARAD granted the petition in a Decision declaring the petitioners as the rightful allocatees of the property,
and directed the MARO to cancel CLOA and issue another in favor of the petitioners. Alberto was ordered to vacate the property. The
PARAD also directed the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the said title and issue a new one over the landholding in favor of the
petitioners.
Issues:
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over matters involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of registered CLOAs.
Whether the petitioners were denied of their right to substantive and procedural due process.
Held:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

 It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject
matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of
whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.
Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to
challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB's lack of
jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses
or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not
only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. If the issues
between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such dispute must be
addressed and resolved by the DARAB. The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and
void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.
However, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that the dispute between the petitioners and the respondents over the validity of the
November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 and the cancellation thereof is not agrarian in nature.
The petitioners themselves categorically admitted in their pleadings that there was no landlord-tenancy relationship between them and
Alberto over the landholding. Nor did they have any tenurial, leasehold, or agrarian relations whatsoever when petitioners Leonora and her
son Mario executed the deed of sale in May 1980 in favor of Alberto, nor when the petitioners filed their petition with the DARAB. The sole
tenant-beneficiary over the land holding was Julian dela Cruz. There is no showing that before the execution of the deed of transfer/sale,
Alberto was a tenant or farmer, or that he was landless.
The Court agrees with the petitioners' contention that, under Section 2 (f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has
jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were "registered" with the LRA. However, for
the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have
been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the
administrative eimplementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within
the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB.
In the present case, the DAR Secretary approved CLOA No. 51750 in the name of Alberto in the exercise of his administrative powers and
in the implementation of the agrarian reform laws. The approval was based on the Report of the MARO, the November 16, 1990 Order of the
PARO and the recommendation of the DAR Director of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, over whom the DAR Secretary has
supervision and control. The DAR
Secretary also had the authority to withdraw the CLOA upon a finding that the same is contrary to law and DAR orders, circularsand
memoranda.
10. Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals, The Secretary of DAR, DARAB, Davao City and Land Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 132767 (January 18, 2000)
Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao which were taken by the Department of Agrarian

Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the
valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and the DARAB, petitioner filed a petition for determination of the just compensation for its
property with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao on January 26, 1994. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it
was filed beyond the 15-day reglamentary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. The Decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Hence, this Petition for Review.
Issue: Whether or not the Special Agrarian Courts are considered appellate courts in the determination of just compensation
Held: No. To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly Section 50 thereof, Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure provides: "Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the adjudicator
on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought
directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any
party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration."
As we held in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, this Rule is an acknowledgement by the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation
cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the Courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original
and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an
appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the
DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as
the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of
the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the
legality of administrative action.
Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of
Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
12. HACIENDA LUISITA INC vs LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP, GR. 171101
FACTS:
On 1989, some 93% of the then farm worker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their
acceptance of the proposed HLIs Stock Distribution Option Plan (SODP). The SDOA was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the
5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the basis and mechanics of HLIs SDP,

which was eventually approved by the PARC after a follow-up referendum conducted by the DAR, in which 5,117 FWBs, out of 5,315 who
participated, opted to receive shares in HLI.
On 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA
6657. The DAR approved the application subject to payment of three percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLIs
continued compliance with its undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.
On 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks of Centennary, ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the
latter. Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares for PhP750 million to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which used
it in developing an industrial complex. Later, LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels to RCBC in payment of LIPCOs PhP431,695,732.10 loan
obligations. LIPCOs titles were cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC. Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were
later detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired by the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex.
Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer in lieu of outright land transfer, unconstitutional?
HELD:
There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the
agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the farmers should
always own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that the farmers will have a clear
majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved, strict scrutiny of the proposed SDP must always be undertaken by the DAR and PARC,
such that the value of the agricultural land contributed to the corporation must always be more than 50% of the total assets of the corporation
to ensure that the majority of the members of the board of directors are composed of the farmers. The PARC composed of the President of the
Philippines and cabinet secretaries must see to it that control over the board of directors rests with the farmers by rejecting the inclusion of
non-agricultural assets which will yield the majority in the board of directors to non-farmers. Any deviation, however, by PARC or DAR
from the correct application of the formula prescribed by the second paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6675 does not make said provision
constitutionally infirm. Rather, it is the application of said provision that can be challenged. Ergo, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the
constitutional policy of ensuring control by the farmers.
13. SORIANO vs. REPUBLIC, GR 184282
FACTS:
Spouses Soriano were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land located in Hijo, Maco, Compostela Valley Province. The first
parcel had an area of 5.2723 hectares and was covered by TCT No. (T-8935) T-3120, while the second parcel had an area of 4.0887 hectares
and was covered by TCT No. (T-2906) T-749. In October 1999, the two parcels of land were compulsorily acquired by the government
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. The LBP made a preliminary determination of the value of the subject lands. Petitioners, however,
disagreed with the valuation and brought the matter before the DARAB for a summary administrative proceeding to fix the just
compensation.
On September 30, 2000, the DARAB rendered its decisions affirming the LBPs preliminary determination. Notices of the decisions were
duly received by counsel for petitioners. But petitioners belatedly filed a petition before the RTC acting as SAC, for the fixing of just
compensation. Thus, the DAR moved to dismiss the petition arguing that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
On June 27, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and declared that the "DARAB Rules of Procedure must give way to the laws on
prescription of actions as mandated by the Civil Code."The DAR sought reconsideration of the order, but its motion was denied. Thus, the
DAR lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The CA granted the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action to fix just compensation for lands placed under R.A. No. 6657 is outside the purview of the ordinary rules on
prescription as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in hastily dismissing said refiled Petition. Accordingly, the Petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals assailing the dismissal should be granted.
Under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land
reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR
makes an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD),
the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid
for the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in
essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondents
case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of 57, the
RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation
to landowners." It would subvert this "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in
compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts,
it is clear from 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction
to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 and therefore
would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid
to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.
14. LANDBANK vs. ARANETA, GR 161796

FACTS:
At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land with an area of 1,645 hectares, more or less, which was originally registered in the name
of Alfonso Doronilla (Doronilla) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 7924 of the Rizal Registry.
On June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation 1283, carving out a wide expanse from the Watershed Reservation in Antipolo,
Rizal and reserving the segregated area for townsite purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be.
In 1978, the OSG filed with the then CFI of Rizal an expropriation complaint against the Doronilla property. Meanwhile, on 1979, Doronilla
issued a Certification, copy furnished the Agrarian Reform Office, among other agencies, listing seventy-nine (79) "bona fide planters" he
allegedly permitted to occupy a portion of his land. On 1987 or nine (9) years after it commenced expropriation proceedings, the OSG moved
for and secured the dismissal of the expropriation case.
Earlier, or on March 15, 1983, J. Amado Araneta, now deceased, acquired ownership of the subject Doronilla property by virtue of court
litigation. A little over a week later, he had OCT No. 7924 canceled and secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N70860 in his name.
ISSUES: Whether or not the disputed lots are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
HELD: The primary governing agrarian law with regard to agricultural lands, be they of private or public ownership and regardless of
tenurial arrangement and crops produced, is now RA 6657. The provisions of RA 6657 apply only to agricultural lands under which category
the Doronilla property, during the period material, no longer falls, having been effectively classified as residential by force of Proclamation
1637. It ceased, following Natalia Realty, Inc., to be agricultural land upon approval of its inclusion in the LS Townsite Reservation pursuant
to the said reclassifying presidential issuance.
Before Proclamation 1637 came to be, there were already PD 27 tenant-farmers in said property. In a very real sense, the "private rights"
belong to these tenant-farmers. Since the said farmer-beneficiaries were deemed owners of the agricultural land awarded to them as of
October 21, 1972 under PD 27 and subsequently deemed full owners under EO 228, the logical conclusion is clear and simple: the township
reservation established under Proclamation 1637 must yield and recognize the "deemed ownership rights" bestowed on the farmerbeneficiaries under PD 27. Another way of looking at the situation is that these farmer-beneficiaries are subrogated in the place of Doronilla
and eventual transferee Araneta.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial agreement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act
and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm
this limitation. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands. "Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands
previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR.
15. GALOPE vs. BUGARIN, GR 185669
FACTS: Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, while petitioner farms the land. Parties respective
contentions are as follows: (a) respondent complained that she lent the land to petitioner in 1992 without an agreement, that what she receives
in return from petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants to recover the land to farm it on her own; (b) petitioner countered that respondent
cannot recover the land yet for he had been farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging from P4,000 to P6,000 or 15 cavans of
palay per harvest.
Respondent filed a petition for recovery of possession, ejectment and payment of rentals before the DARAB, claiming that respondent lent
the land to petitioner in 1991 and that the latter gave nothing in return as a sign of gratitude or monetary consideration for the use of the land.
It was also claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose Allingag who allegedly possesses the land
After due proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant entitled to security of tenure. On
appeal, the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled that petitioner is not a de jure tenant. The DARAB ordered petitioner to pay
rentals and vacate the land. Petitioner appealed, but the CA affirmed DARABs ruling that no tenancy relationship exists; that the elements of
consent and sharing are not present; that respondents act of lending her land without consideration cannot be taken as implied tenancy; and
that no receipts prove petitioners payment of rentals.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties.
HELD: The court found the petition impressed with merit and held that the CA and DARAB erred in ruling that there is no tenancy
relationship between the parties.
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2)
the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6)
the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondents act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving rentals
therefore indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit
provisions of a written contract alone. Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement
Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present. Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The subject
matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm land.
They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring
about agricultural production. After the harvest, petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash. Respondents motion to

supervise harvesting and threshing, processes in palay farming, further confirms the purpose of their agreement. Lastly, petitioners personal
cultivation of the land is conceded by respondent who likewise never denied the fact that they share in the harvest.