2/7/003:44PM

THIRDDIVISION
[G.R.No.132378.January18,2000]

ROGELIOJUAN,PEDRODEJESUS,DELFINCARREONandANTONIO
GALGUERRA,petitioners,vs.PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN,J.:
Unlawfulandunauthorizeduseofgovernmentpropertybyincumbentpublicofficersconstitutesfraud.
Thus,theprovisiononpreventivesuspensionintheAntiGraftLawappliestosuchofficersevenifthe
allegedviolationsareprimarilyconsideredaselectionoffenses.
TheCase
BeforeusisaPetitionforReviewunderRule45assailingtheOctober14,1997Decision[1]andthe
January26,1998ResolutionoftheCourtofAppeals[2](CA)inCAGRSPNo.43903.[3]Theassailed
DecisiondismissedthePetitionforCertiorarifiledbythepetitioners.InthatPetition,theyquestionedthe
April3,1997Order[4]oftheRegionalTrialCourtofQuezonCityinCriminalCaseNos.Q96645646,
directingtheirimmediatesuspensionfromoffice.Ontheotherhand,thequestionedCAResolution
deniedtheirMotionforReconsideration.Esm
TheFacts
TheproceduralandfactualantecedentsofthiscasearesummarizedinthechallengedDecisionas
follows:
"PetitionersRogelioJuan,BarangayChairmanandPedrodeJesus,DelfinCarreon,and
AntonioGalguerra,BarangayKagawads,ofBarangayTalipapa,Novaliches,QuezonCity,
wereseparatelyaccusedinCriminalCasesQ9664564to66,forviolationofSection261
(o)oftheOmnibusElectionCode,beforetheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch96,National
CapitalJudicialRegion,QuezonCity.BarangayChairmanJuan,andBgy.KagawadDe
Jesuswerecharged[with]willfulandunlawfuluseofVHFradiotransceiver,an
equipmentorapparatusownedbythebarangaygovernmentofTalipapa,Novaliches,
QuezonCity,forelectioncampaignorforpartisanpoliticalactivity.AndBarangay
KagawadsCarreonandGalguerrawerechargedwithwillfulandunlawfuluseofatricycle
ownedbythesamebarangaygovernmentintheirpoliticalcampaigns.
"RodolfoCayubitandRicardoGalguerra,representingthemselvesas"witnesses/private
complainants,"assistedbyAtty.LeonidesS.Bernabe,Jr.,representinghimselfas"Private
Prosecutor,"fileda"MotionforRemovalfromOffice,"datedDecember5,1996,forthe
removalofsaidlocalelectiveofficials,towhichhereinpetitionersfiledtheircomment,on
thegroundthatmovantshavenolegalstandingincourt,andneitherwasthepublic
prosecutornotifiedofthemotiontowhichhedidnotconform,andtherefore,saidmotion
shouldbeexpungedorstrickenoutfromtherecords,orperemptorilydenied.
"InaManifestationandCommenttotheaccusedpetitionerscomment,theCOMELEC

prosecutorstatedthathe"conforms"withthesubjectmotionofprivatecomplainants,
hence,respectfullysubmit[s]thesamefortherulingofthecourt,followedbya
SupplementtoMotionforRemovalfromOffice,datedFebruary28,1997,towhich
petitionersalsofiledtheiropposition.
"OnApril3,1997,respondentcourtissuedanOrder,directingthe"xxximmediate
suspensionfromofficeofalltheaccusedxxxforaperiodofsixty(60)daysfromservice
ofthisOrder."[5]
TheCARuling
InitsDecision,theCourtofAppealsupheldthetrialcourtsdiscretiontoorderpetitionerssuspension
fromoffice.Itruled:
"ThepreventivesuspensionofthoseofficialsisauthorizedunderSection13ofRA3019,
asamended,whichismandatoryincharacteruponthefilingofavalidinformationincourt
againstthem.Suchsuspensioncanbeissuedxxxinwhateverstageofexecutionand
modeofparticipation,ispendingincourtxxx(seealsoGonzagavs.Sandiganbayan,201
SCRA417,422,426).SaidcasesstressedthoughthattheConstitutionrejectspreventive
suspensionforanindefinitedurationasitconstitutesadenialofdueprocessandequal
protectionofthelaw.Nonetheless,preventivesuspensionisjustifiableforaslongasits
continuanceisforareasonablelengthoftime.Thisdoctrinealsofindsexpressionin
Lucianovs.ProvincialGovernor,28SCRA570,upholdingthepowerofcourtstoexercise
themandatoryactofsuspensionoflocalelectiveofficial[s]underSection13ofRA3019."
[6]
(underscoringfoundintheoriginal)Esmso
Hence,thisPetition.[7]
TheIssues
IntheirMemorandum,petitionersurgetheCourttoresolvethefollowingquestions:
"1.DoesSec.13ofR.A.No.3019(AntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct),orSec.60of
R.A.7160(TheLocalGovernmentCodeof1991)conferuponaRegionalTrialCourt,
beforewhichacriminalcaseforviolationofSec.261(o)oftheOmnibusElectionCodeis
pending,thepowerandauthoritytoorderthepreventivesuspensionfromofficeofthe
accusedthereinuponthefilingofavalidInformationagainsthim?
"2.InacriminalcaseforviolationofSec.261(o)oftheOmnibusElectionCode,where
theINFORMATIONdoesnotallegedamagessustainedbyanyprivatepartybyreason
thereof,hasaperson,representinghimselftobea"witness/privatecomplainant,"ora
lawyer,representinghimselftobea"privateprosecutor,"thelegalstandingorpersonality
tofileamotionforremovalfromofficeoftheaccusedinsaidcriminalcase?
2.1.Doesamotionsofiled,acquirelegalstandingbeforetheCourtbythe
subsequentadoptionthereofbytheCOMELECProsecutorinsaidcase?
Msesm

2.2.Doesamotionsofiled,withoutcomplianceofthenoticerequirements
prescribedformotionsunderRule15oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,
deservejudicialcognizancebythecourtvisavisDelCastillov.
Aguinaldo,212SCRA169,174,holdingthatsuchmotionis"auseless

pieceofpaperwithnolegaleffect"thatshouldnotbeacceptedforfiling
andiffiled,isnotentitledtojudicialcognizance?"
2.3.Istheresubstantialcompliance[with]suchnoticerequirementsbythe
merefactthat[the]adversepartyfiledanoppositiontosaidmotion,
preciselytoquestionitsnoncompliance[with]noticerequirements,
prescribedbyRule15,RevisedRulesofCourt?"
2.4.Notwithstandingtheforegoingdefectsofsaidmotion,isitproperfora
RegionalTrialCourttotakecognizancethereofandactfavorablythereon,
withoutsettingsaidmotionforhearing?"
CitingRA7691,[8]petitionerslikewiseassailtheauthorityofthetrialcourttohearthecasesagainstthem.
Forthesakeofclarity,thediscussionofthecasewillrevolvearoundthreepoints:first,thejurisdictionof
regionaltrialcourtsoverviolationsoftheElectionCodesecond,theproprietyofpetitionerssuspension
andthird,theallegedprocedurallapsesofthetrialcourt.
TheCourtsRuling
WefindnomeritinthePetition.
FirstIssue:JurisdictionoverElectionCases
PetitionersinsistthattheRTCdidnothavethejurisdictiontohearanddecidethecasesfiledagainst
them,becausethepenaltyfortheoffenseschargeddidnotexceedsixyears.Thus,theyclaimthatthe
authoritytohearthecasesisvestedbyRA7691inthefirstlevelcourts.Exsm
Theargumentdoesnotpersuade.ItisevidentfromSection32,BP129,asamendedbySection2ofRA
7691,thatthejurisdictionoffirstlevelcourtsthemetropolitantrialcourts,municipaltrialcourtsand
municipalcircuittrialcourtsdoesnotcoverthosecriminalcaseswhichbyspecificprovisionoflaware
cognizablebyregionaltrialcourts.Section32provides:
"Sec.32.JurisdictionofMetropolitanTrialCourts,MunicipalTrialCourtsandMunicipal
CircuitTrialCourtsinCriminalCases.Exceptincasesfallingwithintheexclusive
originaljurisdictionoftheRegionalTrialCourtsandoftheSandiganbayan,the
MetropolitanTrialCourts,MunicipalTrialCourts,andMunicipalCircuitTrialCourts
shallexercise:
(1)Exclusiveoriginaljurisdictionoverallviolationsofcityormunicipalordinances,
committedwithintheirrespectiveterritorialjurisdictionand
(2)Exclusiveoriginaljurisdictionoveralloffensespunishablewithimprisonmentnot
exceedingsix(6)yearsirrespectiveoftheamountoffine,andregardlessofother
imposableaccessoryorotherpenalties,includingthecivilliabilityarisingfromsuch
offensesorpredicatedthereon,irrespectiveofkind,nature,valueoramountthereof
Provided,however,thatinoffensesinvolvingdamagetopropertythroughcriminal
negligence,theyshallhaveexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionthereof.
PetitionerswerechargedwithviolatingSection261(o)oftheOmnibusElectionCode.UnderSection
268ofthesaidCode,regionaltrialcourtshaveexclusivejurisdictiontotryanddecideanycriminalaction
orproceedingforviolationoftheCode,"exceptthoserelatingtotheoffenseoffailuretoregisteror

failuretovote."Thesaidprovisionreads:
"Sec.268.Jurisdictionofcourts.Theregionaltrialcourtshallhavetheexclusive
jurisdictiontotryanddecideanycriminalactionorproceedingforviolationofthisCode,
exceptthoserelatingtotheoffenseoffailuretoregisterorfailuretovote,whichshallbe
underthejurisdictionofthemetropolitanormunicipaltrialcourts.Fromthedecisionof
thecourts,appealwilllieasinothercriminalcases."
WorthnotingalsoisthisCourtsdisquisitioninCOMELECv.Noynay:[9]
"WehaveexplicitlyruledinMoralesv.CourtofAppeals,thatbyvirtueoftheexception
providedforintheopeningsentenceofSection32,theexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionof
MetropolitanTrialCourts,MunicipalTrialCourts,andMunicipalCircuitTrialCourts
doesnotcovercriminalcaseswhichbyspecificprovisionsoflawfallwithintheexclusive
originaljurisdictionofRegionalTrialCourtsandoftheSandiganbayan,regardlessofthe
penaltyprescribedtherefor.Otherwisestated,evenifthoseexceptedcasesarepunishable
byimprisonmentnotexceedingsix(6)years,(i.e.,prisioncorreccional,arrestomayor,or
arrestomenor)jurisdictionthereonisretainedbytheRegionalTrialCourtsorthe
Sandiganbayan,asthecasemaybe.Kyle
"AmongtheexamplescitedinMoralesasfallingwithintheexceptionprovidedforinthe
openingsentenceofSection32arecasesunder(1)Section20ofBPBlg.129(2)Article
360oftheRevisedPenalCodeasamended(3)theDecreeonIntellectualPropertyand
(4)theDangerousDrugsActof1972,asamended.
"Undoubtedly,pursuanttoSection268oftheOmnibusElectionCode,electionoffenses
alsofallwithintheexception.
"AswestatedinMorales,jurisdictionisconferredbytheConstitutionorCongress.
OutsidethecasesenumeratedinSection5(2)ofArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,Congress
hastheplenarypowertodefine,prescribe,andapportionthejurisdictionofvariouscourts.
Congressmaythusprovidebylawthatacertainclassofcasesshouldbeexclusivelyheard
anddeterminedbyonecourt.Suchlawwouldbeaspeciallawandmustbeconstruedasan
exceptiontothegenerallawonjurisdictionofcourts,namely,theJudiciaryActof1948,
asamended,andtheJudiciaryReorganizationActof1980.R.A.7691canbynomeansbe
consideredasaspeciallawonjurisdictionitismerelyanamendatorylawintendedto
amendspecificsectionsoftheJudiciaryReorganizationActof1980.Hence,R.A.No.
7691doesnothavetheeffectofrepealinglawsvestinguponRegionalTrialCourtsorthe
Sandiganbayanexclusiveoriginaljurisdictiontohearanddecidethecasestherein
specified.ThatCongressneverintendedthatRA7691shouldrepealsuchspecial
provisionsisindubitablyevidentfromthefactthatitdidnottouchatalltheopening
sentenceofSection32ofB.P.Blg.129providingfortheexception."(Italssupplied)
Clearlythen,regionaltrialcourtshavejurisdictiontohearanddecidecasesforviolationoftheOmnibus
ElectionCode,suchasthosefiledagainstpetitioners.
SecondIssue:PreventiveSuspension
PetitionerscontendthattheircasesarenotsubjecttoSection13ofRA3019,theAntiGraftandCorrupt
PracticesAct,whichmandatesthepreventivesuspensionofindictedpublicofficials.Wedisagree.
Petitionerswereaccusedofusingbarangaypropertyforelectioncampaignpurposesandotherpartisan

politicalactivitiesduringtheirincumbencyasbarangayofficials,inviolationofSection261(o)ofthe
OmnibusElectionCode,whichreadsasfollows:
"Section261.ProhibitedActs.Thefollowingshallbeguiltyofanelectionoffense:
(o)Useofpublicfunds,moneydepositedintrust,equipment,facilitiesownedorcontrolled
bythegovernmentforanelectioncampaign.Anypersonwhousesunderanyguise
whatsoever,directlyorindirectly,(1)publicfundsormoneydepositedwithorheldintrust
by,publicfinancinginstitutionsorbygovernmentoffices,banks,oragencies(2)any
printingpress,radio,ortelevisionstationoraudiovisualequipmentoperatedbythe
Governmentorbyitsdivisions,subdivisions,agenciesorinstrumentalities,including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporations,orbytheArmedForcesofthePhilippines
or(3)anyequipment,vehicle,facility,apparatusorparaphernaliaownedbythe
governmentorbyitspoliticalsubdivisions,agencies,includinggovernmentownedor
controlledcorporations,orbytheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesforanyelection
campaignorforanypartisanpoliticalactivity."Kycalr
Ontheotherhand,Section13,R.A.3019,asamended,provides:
"SEC.13.Suspensionandlossofbenefits.Anyincumbentpublicofficeragainstwhom
anycriminalprosecutionunderavalidinformationunderthisActorunderTitle7,BookII
oftheRevisedPenalCodeorforanyoffenseinvolvingfraudupongovernmentorpublic
fundsorpropertywhetherasasimpleorasacomplexoffenseandinwhateverstageof
executionandmodeofparticipation,ispendingincourt,shallbesuspendedfromoffice.
Shouldhebeconvictedbyfinaljudgment,heshallloseallretirementorgratuitybenefits
underanylaw,butifheisacquitted,heshallbeentitledtoreinstatement,andtothe
salariesandbenefitswhichhefailedtoreceiveduringsuspension,unlessinthemeantime
administrativeproceedingshavebeenfiledagainsthim.
"Intheeventthatsuchconvictedofficer,whomayhavealreadybeenseparatedfromthe
service,hasalreadyreceivedsuchbenefitsheshallbeliabletorestitutethesametothe
government."
Interestingly,priortoitsamendmentbyBP195,[10]thesaidprovisionhadappliedtopublicofficerswho,
underavalidinformation,werechargedwithviolationsofRA3019orwithoffensescoveredbythe
RevisedPenalCodeprovisiononbribery.[11]Theamendatorylawexpandedthescopeoftheprovision
now,publicofficersmaylikewisebesuspendedfromofficeif,underavalidinformation,theyare
chargedwithanoffensefallingunderTitle7ofBookIIoftheRevisedPenalCode,orwithanyother
formoffraudinvolvinggovernmentfundsorproperty.
True,thecasesagainstpetitionersinvolveviolationsoftheElectionCodehowever,thechargesarenot
unidimensional.Everylawmustbereadtogetherwiththeprovisionsofanyothercomplementinglaw,
unlessbothareotherwiseirreconcilable.Itmustbeemphasizedthatpetitionerswereincumbentpublic
officerschargedwiththeunauthorizedandunlawfuluseofgovernmentpropertyintheircustody,inthe
pursuitofpersonalinterests.Thecrimebeingimputedtothemisakintothatcommittedbypublicofficers
aslaiddownintheRevisedPenalCode.Certainly,petitionersactsconstitutefraudagainstthe
governmentthus,thepresentcaseiscoveredbySection13ofRA3019.Calrky
Theaforementionedprovisoreinforcestheprinciplethatapublicofficeisapublictrust.Itspurposeisto
preventtheaccusedpublicofficerfromhamperinghisprosecutionbyintimidatingorinfluencing
witnesses,tamperingwithdocumentaryevidence,orcommittingfurtheractsofmalfeasancewhilein

office.[12]Preventivesuspensionisnotapenalty[13]petitioners,whoseculpabilityremainstobeproven,
arestillentitledtotheconstitutionalpresumptionofinnocence.
ThirdIssue:AllegationsofProceduralPrejudice
PetitionersassailthetrialcourtsOrderofsuspensiononthegroundthatitwasissuedpursuanttothe
initial"MotionforRemovalFromOffice,"[14]receivedbythetrialcourtonDecember6,1996.The
recordsshowthatthisMotionneithercompliedwiththenoticerequirementsprovidedundertheRulesof
Court,norwasitfiledbyonewhowasapartytotheircases.
TheCourthasheldtimeandagainthatamotionthatdoesnotmeetthenoticerequirementsofSections4
and5ofRule15oftheRulesofCourt[15]isproforma,andthatthetrialcourthasnoauthoritytoactonit.
Therequisiteslaiddownintheaforementionedprovisionsarecategoricalandmandatory,andthefailure
ofthemovantstocomplywiththemrenderstheirMotionsfatallydefective.[16]
TheRulesmandatetheserviceofacopyofamotioncontaininganoticeoftimeandplaceofhearing,in
ordertoaffordtheadversepartytimetostudyandanswertheargumentsinthesaidmotionbeforeits
resolutionbythecourt.
ConsideringthecircumstancesofthepresentPetition,however,webelievethattherequirementsof
proceduraldueprocessweresubstantiallycompliedwith,andthatsuchcompliancejustifiesaliberal
interpretationoftheabovementionedrules.Mesm
Inhis"ManifestationonCommentoftheAccused,"theCOMELECprosecutoradoptedtheassailed
MotionaswellastheFebruary28,1997"SupplementtoMotionforRemovalfromOffice."Thisaction
shouldbeconsideredtohavethuscuredtheproceduraldefectpointedoutbypetitioners.Moreimportant,
however,isthefactthatthetrialcourtheardpetitionersandconsideredtheirarguments.Intheirsixpage
Memorandum[17]filedpursuanttothedirectiveofthetrialcourt,petitionerswereabletoventilatetheir
argumentsagainsttheMotionforRemovalfromOffice.TheycontendedthatneitherRA3019nor
Section60oftheLocalGovernmentCodejustifiedtheirsuspensionfromoffice.Indeed,thepurposeofa
noticeofhearingwasserved[18]thepleadingsthatwerefiledforandagainstthemnegatedtheir
allegationsofproceduralprejudice.
UnderSection13ofRA3019,thesuspensionofapublicofficerismandatoryafterthedeterminationof
thevalidityoftheinformation,asenunciatedinSocratesv.Sandiganbayan[19]whichwequote:
"ThisCourthasruledthatunderSection13oftheantigraftlaw,thesuspensionofapublic
officerismandatoryafterthevalidityoftheinformationhasbeenupheldinapre
suspensionhearingconductedforthatpurpose.Thispresuspensionhearingisconducted
todeterminebasicallythevalidityoftheinformation,fromwhichthecourtcanhavea
basistoeithersuspendtheaccusedandproceedwiththetrialonthemeritsofthecase,or
withholdthesuspensionofthelatteranddismissthecase,orcorrectanypartofthe
proceedingwhichimpairsitsvalidity.Thathearingmaybetreatedinthesamemannerasa
challengetothevalidityoftheinformationbywayofamotiontoquash."
Inthecaseatbar,whiletherewasnopresuspensionhearingheldtodeterminethevalidityofthe
Informationsthathadbeenfiledagainstpetitioners,webelievethatthenumerouspleadingsfiledforand
againstthemhaveachievedthegoalofthisprocedure.Therighttodueprocessissatisfiednotjustbyan
oralhearingbutbythefilingandtheconsiderationbythecourtofthepartiespleadings,memorandaand
otherpositionpapers.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebyDENIEDandtheassailedDecisionoftheCourtofAppeals
AFFIRMED.Costsagainstpetitioners.
SOORDERED.
Melo,(Chairman),Vitug,PurisimaandGonzagaReyes,JJ.,concur.2/7/003:45PM

[1]Rollo,pp.5255.
[2]SpecialNinthDivisioncomposedofJ.ArtemonD.Luna,DivisionchairmanandponenteandJJ.BennieA.Adefuindela

CruzandDemetrioG.Demetria,whobothconcurred.
[3]Entitled"RogelioJuan,PedrodeJesus,DelfinCarreonandAntonioGalguerrav.Hon.LucasP.Bersamin,inhiscapacityas
PresidingJudge,RegionalTrialCourtofQuezonCity,Branch96,andPeopleofthePhilippines."
[4]PennedbyJudgeLucasP.Bersamin.
[5]Rollo,pp.5253.
[6]Rollo,p.54.
[7]ThecasewasdeemedsubmittedfordecisiononJune9,1999,uponreceiptbythisCourtofrespondentsMemorandum,
whichwassignedbySol.Gen.RicardoP.Galvez,Asst.Sol.Gen.FernandaLampasPeraltaandAsst.Sol.MarilouB.Dayao.
PetitionersMemorandum,submittedbyAtty.CenonC.Sorreta,wasreceivedbytheCourtonFebruary11,1999.
[8]Petition,pp.2843rollo,pp.3045.
[9]292SCRA254,July9,1998,perDavide,J.(NowCJ)
[10]"ANACTAMENDINGSECTIONEIGHT,NINE,TEN,ELEVEN,ANDTHIRTEENOFREPUBLICACT
NUMBEREDTHIRTYHUNDREDANDNINETEEN,OTHERWISEKNOWNASTHEANTIGRAFTANDCORRUPT
PRACTICESACT."
[11]Beforeitsamendment,Section13ofR.A.3019readasfollows:"Sec.13.Suspensionandlossofbenefits.Anypublic
officeragainstwhomanycriminalprosecutionunderavalidinformationunderthisActorundertheprovisionsoftheRevised
PenalCodeonbriberyispendingincourtshallbesuspendedfromoffice.Shouldhebeconvictedbyfinaljudgment,heshall
loseallretirementorgratuitybenefitsunderanylaw,butifheisacquitted,heshallbeentitledtoreinstatementandtothe
salariesandbenefitswhichhefailedtoreceiveduringsuspension,unlessinthemeantime,administrativeproceedingshave
beenfiledagainsthim."
[12]Pimentelv.Garchitorena,208SCRA122,April14,1992.
[13]Socratesv.Sandiganbayan,253SCRA773,February20,1996Bunyev.Escareal,226SCRA332,September10,1993
Gonzagav.Sandiganbayan,201SCRA417,September6,1991.
[14]Rollo,pp.6465.
[15]

Section4.Hearingofmotion.Exceptformotionswhichthecourtmayactuponwithoutprejudicingtherightsofthe
adverseparty,everywrittenmotionshallbesetforhearingbytheapplicant.
Everywrittenmotionrequiredtobeheardandthenoticeofhearingshallbeservedinsuchamannerastoensureitsreceiptby
theotherpartyatleastthree(3)daysbeforethedateofhearing,unlessthecourtforgoodreasonsetsthehearingonshorter
notice.
Section5.Noticeofhearing.Thenoticeofhearingshallbeaddressedtoallpartiesconcerned,andshallspecifythetimeand
dateofthehearingwhichmustnotbelaterthanten(10)daysafterthefilingofthemotion.
[16]Peoplev.CourtofAppealsetal.,GRNo.126005,January21,1999Tanv.CourtofAppealsandBloomberryExport
Manufacturing,Inc.,295SCRA755,September22,1998GoldloopProperties,Inc.,v.CourtofAppeals,212SCRA498,
August11,1992.
[17]Rollo,pp.8287.
[18]SeeVlasonsEnterprisesCorporationv.CourtofAppeals,GRNos.12166264,July6,1999.
[19]253SCRA773,February20,1996,perRegalado,J.