PERSONS

VICTOR RONDINA being then armed with a knife and by means of force, threat and intimidation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant
herein, AAA - a sixteen (16) year old lass, against her will. Hence, Victor was charged with the crime
of rape. He was convicted of the crime and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. During the pendency of
the proceedings and after about nine months from the date of the alleged incident, AAA gave birth
to a baby girl, CCC, on May 1, 1999. Whether or not Victor should exercise parental authority and
support over CCC?
The Court ordered Victor to acknowledge AAAs offspring CCC and give her support. Article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for three different kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the
offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him
from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the
classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and
they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of
the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua
automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no further positive act is
required of the parent as the law itself provides for the childs status. Hence, [Victor] should only be
ordered to indemnify and support the victims child. The amount [and terms] of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family
Code.(Rondina v. People, G.R. No. 179059, June 13, 2012)
Private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother
Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration, alleging that they are the
duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei (Rufino Guy Susim), who died intestate.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that private respondents should have
established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article
175 of the Family Code. RTC denied petitioners MTD. On appeal, petitioner argues that private
respondents do not have the legal personality to institute the petition for letters of administration as
they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of
the Family Code. Whether or not private respondents are barred by prescription from proving
their filiation?
No. Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought
by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it
may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear therefore that the resolution of
the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving
their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no
reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the
Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial. (Guy v. CA, G.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006)

What are the effects of Voidable Bigamous Marriage, Declaration of Nullity and Annulment of
Marriages:
BASIS
Status of children

Property Relations

Donations Propter
Nuptias

Insurance
Succession

VOIDABLE
BIGAMOUS
MARRIAGE (ART. 41)
Children of subsequent marriage
conceived before its termination are
LEGITIMATE

DECLARATION
OF NULLITY
ILLEGITIMATE
except Art. 36 and
Art. 53, Family
Code

ANNULMENT

Children
conceived
or
born
before
annulment
decree
are
LEGITIMATE
ACP/CPG shall be liquidated. The share in the net profits of community
property of the spouse who contracted the marriage in bad faith, shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or if none, children of the guilty
spouse by previous marriage or in default, the innocent spouse.
Shall remain VALID except:
If donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, donations propter
nuptias made to the done are revoked by operation of law
If both spouses acted in bad faith, donations propter nuptias made by
one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.
If one spouse acted in bad faith, innocent spouse may revoke his designation
as beneficiary in the insurance policy even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable.
If one spouse contracted the marriage in bad faith, he shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse both testate and intestate.

What is now the rule on the exercise of legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity
between spouses?
Family Code
Article 73. Either spouse may exercise any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity without the consent of the other. The latter
may object only on valid, serious, and moral
grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide
whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the
objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued
prior to the objection, the resulting obligation
shall be enforced against the separate property
of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the
rights of creditors who acted in good faith.

R.A. No. 10572

Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity without
the consent of the other. The latter may object only
on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide
whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the
objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued
prior to the objection, the resulting obligation
shall be enforced against the community
property. If the benefit accrued thereafter, such
obligation shall be enforced against the separate
property of the spouse who has not obtained
consent.

The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the

rights of creditors who acted in good faith.
Explanation:
The exception to the general rule under Article 73, second paragraph, item number 2 explained in the
preceding paragraphs, might not have been intended, though justifiable such exception may be. An
examination of the deliberations of this particular provision contained in the minutes of the 161st Joint
Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees on November 8, 1986, Pages 7 to 9 appears to
show an error in the printing of Article 73, second paragraph, item number 2
Considering that, what was printed in the final text relative to Article 73, second paragraph, item number
2 was completely different from that which was finally proposed during the committee deliberations and
considering that the printed text under the statute was the one contained in the Family Code when the
President signed the same into law, there appears to be no alternative but to apply Article 73, second
paragraph, item number 2 as it is printed in the law.(Sta. Maria, Persons and Family Relations Law 5 th
Ed., p. 412-415)
Danilo B. De Jesus and Carolina De Jesus were legally married and it was during their marriage
that they had 2 children, namely, Jacqueline and Jinkie Christie, both were acknowledged as
illegitimate in the birth certificate. When Danilo died intestate, they filed for partition of the estate,
presenting the notarized acknowledgement. The legitimate children of Danilo objected that the case
should be dismissed since it will be a collateral attack of the status of the children, and the same was
denied due to lack of merit. It was appealed to the CA, but was remanded to the RTC. The RTC
then ruled on the same issue, and dismiss the case contending that declaration of heirship can only
be made in a special proceeding seeking for the establishment of status or right. Whether or not
Jinkie and Jacqueline were Danilos legitimate children?
Yes. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) open and continuous possession of the status of legitimate child; or (2) any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court or other special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate
child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is in itself
a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child and no further action is required. Where instead a
claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity i.e. outside a
record of birth, a will, a statement before the court of court or an authentic writing, a judicial action
within the application of statute of limitation is necessary. A scrutiny of the records show that they are
born within a valid marriage, thereby they are legitimate children of Danilo. Jurisprudence is strongly
settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can
only be repudiated in a direct suit brought for such purpose. (De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan
Gamboa Dizon, GR No. 142877, October 2, 2001)
What is now the rule on mortgage, encumbrance, alienation or disposal of spouses exclusive
property under R.A. No. 10572?
The same rule applies. R.A. No. 10572 is only a curative statute that removed the superfluity in Art. 111.
Family Code

R.A. No. 10572

Article 111. A spouse of age may mortgage,

encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or
her exclusive property, without the consent of the
other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate
with regard to the same.

Art. 111. Either spouse may mortgage, encumber,

alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive
property.

Explanation:
Article 111 (of Family Code) is rendered superfluous by Article 234, as amended by Republic Act 6809,
which lowers the majority age to eighteen years which is also the age of emancipation and the age when a
person acquires the legal capacity to enter into a contract of marriage. Also, Article 236 of the Family
Code provides that emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the
child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established
by existing law in special cases. Thus, Article 111 should merely state that either spouse may mortgage,
encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property. (Sta. Maria, Persons and
Family Relations Law 5th Ed., p. 507-508)
Discuss the property regimes of the two kinds of unions without marriage.
ART. 147

ART.148
APPLICABILITY
1.
Capacitated to marry each other.
1.
With legal impediment to marry.
2.
Lived exclusively as husband and wife Adulterous relationships
without the benefit of marriage or under a void Bigamous or polygamous marriages
marriage (due to absence of formal requisites)
Incestuous marriages
Void marriages by reason of public policy
under Art. 38
SALARIES & WAGES
Owned in equal shares.
Separately owned by the parties.
PROPERTY ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVELY BY EITHER PARTY
Belongs to such party provided there is proof that Belongs to such party.
he/she acquired it by exclusive funds.
PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY BOTH PARTIES
Governed by the rules on co-ownership
Owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions.
PRESUMPTION (PRIMA FACIE)
Presumption of joint acquisition and equal sharing No presumption of joint acquisition. When there is
as to property acquired while they live together.
evidence of joint acquisition but none as to the
extent of actual contribution, there is a presumption
of equal sharing.
FORFEITURE
When one of the parties is bad faith his share in the If one of the parties is validily married to another,
co-ownership shall be forfeited:
his/her share in the co-ownership shall accure to the
a)
In favor of their common children;
absolute community or conjugal partnership
b)
In default of or in case of waiver by any or existing in such valid marriage.
all of the common children of their descendants, in
favor of the innocent party.
If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another or if both parties are in bad faith,
such share shall be fortified in the manner provided
in the last paragraph of Art. 147

Minori Fujiki, a Japanese, married Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the Philippine on 23 January
2004, but was unable to bring his wife to Japan, and eventually lost contact with each other.
Without the first marriage being dissolved, in 2008, Marinay married Shinichi Maekara, who
brought Marinay to Japan. After suffering abuse from Maekara, Marinay was able to reestablish
her relationship with Fujiki, who helped her obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan, in
2010, which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
Fujiki filed with the RTC a petition for the recognition of the foreign judgment, which the RTC
denied, as it considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. Whether Fujiki has personality to file the petition under Rule 108, Rules of
Court.
YES. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt
that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These
property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition
to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court. (Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)
PROPERTY
How shall be the period of possession computed in order that an easement may be acquired by
prescription?
In order that an easement may be acquired by prescription, the time of possession shall be computes thus:
In positive easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate, or the person who may
have made use of the easement, commenced to exercise it upon the servient estate; and in negative
easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate forbade, by an instrument
acknowledged before the notary public, the owner of the servient estate, from executing an act which
would be lawful without the easement. (Article 621, Civil Code)
Is determination of ownership material and binding to the resolution of accion publiciana?
No. The objective of the plaintiffs in an accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue
to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is
not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the
issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property.(Tolentino v. Laurel, G.R. No.181368, February 22, 2012)

What are the requisites for one to be entitled to legal easement of right of way?
The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
b.
Proper indemnity has been paid;
c.
The isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
d.
The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate (Quintanilla v.
Abangan, G.R. No. 160613, February 12, 2008)
a.

Discuss the nature of possession considered in ejectment cases.

The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical
possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not
even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for
resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts
may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication
is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. (Barrientos v. Rapal, G.R. No. 169594, 684 SCRA 74, October 11, 2012)
What are the two indispensable requisites so that an action to quiet title may prosper?
[F]or an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy. He need not be in possession of said property. It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting
of title to prosper, the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on the real property
subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid. (Eland
Philippines, Inc. vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010)
WILLS AND SUCCESSION
What is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation?
The rule that where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as to fairly raise
the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy
of the new disposition; and if for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is
inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remain in full force.
It is usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to
revoke a will with a present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old,
and the new disposition is not made of or fails of effect for same reason. (Testate Estate of Mariano Molo
v. Molo, GR No. L-2538, September 21, 1951)
Distinguish Preterition from Disinheritance

PRETERITION
Deprivation of a compulsary heir of his legitimate
is tacit.
May be voluntary but the law presumes that it is
involuntary
Law presumes that there has been merely an
oversight or mistake on the part of the testator
Omitted heir gets not only his legitime but also his
share in the free portion not disposed of by way of
legacies/devisees

DISINHERITANCE
Deprivation of a compulsory heir of his legitimate
is expressed
Always voluntary
Done with intent and legal cause
If disinheritance is not lawful, compulsory heir is
merely restored to his legitime.

What are the requisites for ReservaTroncal?

a.
That property was acquired by a descendant (praepositus) from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister by gratuitious title.
b.
That the Praepositus died without an issue
c.
That the property is inherited by another ascendant (reservista) by operation of law, and;
d.
That there are relatives within the 3 rd degree (reservatarios) belonging to the line from which said
property came. (Art. 891, NCC).
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same
testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will. Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss
the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court,
after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera.
Whether or not the illegitimate daughter of the brother of the testatrix may inherit by right of
representation?
NO. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother; Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have
no right to inherit. Here, Ana is the illegitimate daughter of the brother of the testatrix. The law does not
give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca
Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the
legitimate relatives of her natural father. (Teotico v. Del Val, G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965)
Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the RTC a Complaint against her son, Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for
"Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages. After Memoracion finished presenting her
evidence in chief, she died. The RTC was informed, albeit belatedly, of the death of Memoracion,
and was supplied with the name and address of her legal representative, Edgardo Cruz. Whether or
not Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is a purely personal action
which did not survive the death of petitioner?
NO. The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the
causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental. Here, the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves property and

property rights, and hence, survives the death of petitioner Memoracion. (Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. 173292,
September 1, 2010)
Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an illegitimate son of the deceased, by
incorporating a Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by the rest of the Borromeos. In
the waiver, of the nine (9) heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The
petitioners opposed this Waiver for reason that this is without force and effect because there can be
no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance
from the heirs who intend to transfer the same. Whether or not a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can
be executed without a valid acceptance from the heirs in question.
YES. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that the properties included in an
existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by
fiction of law continue the personality of the former. The heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of
death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter
into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the
death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion. (Intestate Estate of Late Vito Borromeo v.
Borromeo, G.R. No. L-55000, July 23, 1987)
The subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas, and the estate of
Florentino Manungas have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the
issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution. The trial court appointed as special administrator
Diosdado, illegitimate child of Florentino, revoking its earlier appointment of Parreo, the niece of
the decedent. Whether or not an illegitimate heir may be appointed as special administrator for the
distribution of estate.
NO. The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is
entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas. Diosdado, as an
illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to
receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator.
The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the
Estate of Manungas. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is
to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed as stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court. (Manungas v. Loreto, G.R. No. 193161, August 22, 2011)
PRESCRIPTION
Prescription is one of the modes of extinguishing obligations. Can it also be a source of obligation?
Discuss and give example.
Yes. Prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It is
concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession
is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can
show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in

the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the
essential elements of acquisitive prescription.
Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription, ownership
and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for
thirty years without need of title or of good faith.(Imuan v. Cereno, G.R. No. 167995, September 11,
2009)
Differentiate Acquisitive Prescription and Extinctive Prescription:
Acquisitive Prescription
Extinctive Prescription
(1) The acquisition of ownership and other real
The loss or extinguishment of property rights or
rights through possession of a thing in the manner
actions through the possession by another of a thing
and condition provided by law
for the period provided by law or through failure to
(2) May be ordinary or extraordinary
bring the necessary action
(a) Ordinary: requires possession of things in
good faith and with just title for the time fixed
by law.
(b) Extraordinary: acquisition of ownership and
other real rights without need of title or of
good faith or any other condition
Requires positive action of the possessor who is not Requires inaction of the owner out of possession or
the owner
neglect of one with a right to bring his action
Applicable to ownership and other real rights
Applicable to all kinds of rights, whether real or
personal
Vests the property and raise a new title in the Vests the property and raise a new title on the
occupant
occupant
Can be proven under the general issue without its Should be affirmatively pleaded and proved to bar
being affirmatively pleaded
the action or claim of the adverse party
Results in the acquisition of ownership or other real Merely results in the loss of a real or personal right,
rights in a person as well as the loss of said or bars the cause of action to enforce said right.
ownership or real rights in another

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

Can a single act or omission give rise to different causes of action?
Yes. A single act or omission does not always make a single cause of action. It can possibly give rise to
two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender 1) ex delicto or civil liability arising from crimes
and 2) independent civil liabilities or those arising from contracts or intentional torts. The only caveat
provided in Article 2177 of the Civil Code is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission. (Lim v. Kou Co Ping, GR No. 175256, August 23, 2012).
Distinguish Rescission or Resolution from Rescission by reason of lesion?
Art. 1191, CC Rescission or Resolution
Art. 1381, CC Rescission by reason of lesion
Applies only to reciprocal obligations, such that a Does not apply to reciprocal obligations, and
partys beach thereof partakes of a tacit resolutory therefore, action is not based on a breach of an

condition which entitles the injured party to

rescission.
The reparation of damages for the breach is purely
secondary.
Predicated on breach of faith
Principal action that is retaliatory in character

obligation.
The cause of action is subordinated to the existence
of an economic prejudice. Hence, where the
defendant makes good the damages caused, the
action cannot be maintained or continued.
Predicated on injury to economic interests of the
party plaintiff / lesion.
Subsidiary action

Article 1191, as presently worded, speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the
context of Article 1124 of the Old Civil Code which uses the term "resolution." The remedy of resolution
applies only to reciprocal obligations such that a partys breach thereof partakes of a tacit resolutory
condition which entitles the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the Old Civil Code,
contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to pursue, as principal
actions, either a rescission or specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in each
case. On the other hand, rescission under Article 1381 of the Civil Code, taken from Article 1291 of the
Old Civil Code, is a subsidiary action, and is not based on a partys breach of obligation.( Congregation of
the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. Orola, GR No. 169790, April 30, 2008)
Distinguish the following contracts; Rescissible, Voidable, Unenforceable and void Contracts;
BASIS
Nature

VOID
RESCISSIBLE
Absence
of Defect is in its
essential
effects, which is
elements of a either against one
contract
of the parties or a
third person
Consequences
No legal effects. Contract remains
Cannot
be valid if no action
ratified
is filed. Produces
legal effects.
Persons to raise Nullity can be Only parties may
the action
set up against rescind
the
any
person contract
asserting right
arising from it
and
his
successors
in
interest
not
protected
by
law
Prescription
Does
not Within four (4)
prescribe
years
What are the grounds for extinguishment of obligations?
a.

By payment or performance;

VOIDABLE
Consent
is
vitiated or there
is incapacity to
give consent

UNENFORCEABLE
There is a contract but
which
cannot
be
enforced

May be ratified

May be ratified

Nullity may only Cannot be assailed by

be raised by the third persons
parties to the
contract

Within four (4) Does not prescribe

years

b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

By the loss of the thing due;

By the condonation or remission of debt;
By the confusion of merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
By compensation
By novation.
Annulment
Rescission
Fulfillment of a resolutory condition
Prescription (Art. 1231, NCC)

Differentiate Alternative and Facultative obligations?

Alternative Obligations, Art. 1199, Civil Code
Facultative Obligations, Art. 1206, Civil Code
In alternative obligation, there is more than one In facultative obligations, only one prestation has
object and the fulfillment of one is sufficient, been agreed upon but the debtor may render
determined by the choice of the debtor who another in substitution.
generally has the right of election. (Arco Pulp
and Paper Co. v. Lim, GR No. 206806, June 25, The right to choose an alternative remedy lies
2014)
only with the debtor. (Equitable Insurance and
Casualty Company v. Rural Insurance and Surety
Company, GR NO. L-17436, January 31, 1962)
May be complied with by delivery of one of the May be complied with by the delivery of another
objects or by performance of one of the object or by the performance of another
prestations which are alternatively due.
prestation in substitution of that which is due.
Loss/impossibility of all object/prestation due to Loss/impossibility of the object/prestation due to
fortuitous event shall extinguish the obligation.
fortuitous event is sufficient to extinguish the
obligation
Culpable loss of any of the objects alternatively Culpable loss of the object which the debtor may
due before the choice is made may give rise to deliver in substitution is effected does not give
liability on the part of the debtor
rise to any liability on the part of the debtor.

What are the essential features of contract? (MARC)

Mutuality of Contracts The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or
compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them (Art. 1308,NCC)
b.
Autonomy of Contracts The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy (Art.1306, NCC).
c.
Relativity contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from
the decedent (Art. 1311, NCC).
d.
Consensual contracts are perfected by mere consent, and form that moment the parties are
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences
which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
Obligatory forces of contract obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. (Art. 1159, NCC)
a.

When does payment extinguishes an obligation?

In general, a payment in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper
person. Thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express or
implied, to receive the particular payment. Hence, absent any showing that the respondent agreed to the
payment of the contract price to another person, or that she authorized Cruz to claim the check on her
behalf, the payment, to be effective must be made to her. (Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Chief of the Philippine National Police vs. Thi Thu Thuy T. De Guzman, G.R. No. 175021, June 15, 2011)
Distinguish Expromission and Delegacion.
Expromission
Initiative for change does not emanate from the
debtor, and may even be made without his consent,
since it consists in a third person assuming his
obligation.

Delegacion
Debtor (delegante) offers or initiates the
change, and the creditor (delegatorio) accepts a
third person (delegado) as consenting to the
substitution. Consent need not be given
simultaneously.
(1) Insolvency of the new debtor revives the
obligation of the old debtor if it was anterior and
public,
and known to the old debtor.
(2) New debtor can demand reimbursement of the
entire amount he has paid from the original debtor.
He may compel creditor to subrogate him to all of
his rights

(1) Old debtor is released

(2) Insolvency of the new debtor does not revive
the old obligation in case the old debtor did not
agree to expromision
(3) If with knowledge and consent of old debtor,
new debtor can demand reimbursement of the
entire amount paid and with subrogation of
creditors rights.
(4) If without knowledge of the old debtor, new
debtor can demand reimbursement only up to the
extent that the latter has been benefited without
subrogation of creditors rights.
(Testate Estate of Lazaro Mota v. Serra, GR No. L-22825, February 14, 1925)
SALES AND OTHER SPECIAL CONTRACTS
What is Tacita Reconduccion?

If at the end of the contract, the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for 15 days with the
acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it
is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time
established in Articles 1682 and 1687 of the NCC. The other terms of the original contract shall be
revived (Art 1670, NCC).
Distinguish Contract of absolute sale from contract to sell
CONTRACT OF SALE
Has all the elements of sale: consent to transfer
ownership, determinate subject matter, and price
certain or its equivalent
The prospective seller thereby transfers the title
of ownership to the prospective buyer

CONTRACT TO SELL
Lacks consent to transfer ownership
The prospective seller explicitly reserves the
transfer of title to the prospective buyer

The seller agrees or obliges himself to transfer

ownership of the subject property for price
certain or its equivalent

The seller agrees or obliges himself to fulfill his

promise to sell the subject property when the
entire amount of the purchase price is delivered
to him
The full payment of the purchase price partakes
of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfilment of
which prevents the obligation to sell from arising

The non-payment of the purchase price partakes

a resolutory condition, i.e. by such occurrence
put an end to a transaction that once upon a time
existed
The vendor has lost and cannot recover the Ownership is retained by the prospective seller
ownership of the land sold until and unless the without further remedies by the prospective
contract of sale id itself resolved and set aside
buyer.
Sources: Paras(2008); Nabus v. Pacson, G.R. No. 161318, November 25, 2009

Distinguish Right of Pre-emption v. Right of Redemption

Right of pre-emption
Right of redemption
Owner of any adjoining land has a right or pre- If the resale has been perfected, the owner of the
emption at a reasonable price when:
adjoining land shall have a right of redemption,
a. Urban land is so small and so situated that also at a reasonable price
a major portion of it cannot be used for any Priority if two or more adjoining owners want to
practical purpose within a reasonable time; redeem: owner whose intended use of the land
b. Was bought merely for speculation;
appears to be best justified
c. Was resold
Arises before the sale
Arises after the sale
No rescission because no sale exists yet
There can be rescission of the original sale
The action is directed against prospective seller
Action is directed against buyer
PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY AND TRUST
Distinguish Capitalist Partner from Industrial Partner
BASIS
Contribution
As to prohibition to engage in
other business

Profits
Losses

CAPITALIST PARTNER
Contribute money and property

INDUSTRIAL PARTNER
Contribute industry (mental or
physical)
Prohibited from engaging in Cannot engage in other business,
business of same nature as that of otherwise; (a) he may be
partnership, unless there is a excluded from the partnership
stipulation to the contrary. plus damages; or (b) benefits he
Violation of this, he is required to obtained from the other business
bring to the common funds any can be availed of by the partners
profits derived by him from his plus damages
transactions. But he shall
personally bear all the losses.
Shares profits according to What is just and equitable under
agreement thereon; if none, pro the circumstances
rata to his contribution
First, the stipulation as to losses; Without
prejudice
to
if none, the agreement as to reimbursement against the capital
profits, if none, pro rata to his partners.
contribution

Distinguish between General and Special Agency

GENERAL AGENCY
SPECIAL AGENCY
SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
Usually authorized to do all acts connected Authorized to do only one or more specific acts
with the business in which he is engaged
in pursuance of particular instructions or with
restrictions necessarily implied from the act to
be done.
CONTINUITY
Conducts a series of transactions involving a Usually involves a single transaction or a series
continuity of service
of transactions not involving continuity of
service
EXTENT TO WHICH AGENT MAY BIND PRINCIPAL
Binds his principal by an act within the scope Cannot bind his principal in a manner beyond
of his authority although it may be contrary to or outside the specific acts which he is
his special instructions
authorized to perform
TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY
Apparent authority does not terminate by mere Termination effective as to third party unless
revocation of authority without notice to third agency was for purpose of contracting with that
parties
third party
CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUCTIONS OF PRINCIPAL
Statement of principal with respect to the Authority of the agent must be strictly
agents authority would ordinarily be regarded construed
as advisory only
What is the doctrine of marshalling of assets?
When partnership property and the individual properties of the partners are in possession of a court for
distribution:
(1) Partnership creditors shall have priority on partnership property; and
(2) Separate creditors on individual property, saving the rights of lien of secured creditors.
(3) Anything left from either shall be applied to satisfy the other.
(Express Investments v. Dayan Telecommunications, GR Nos. 174457-59, December 5, 2012)
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
Distinguish between equity or redemption and right of redemption.
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION
Right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish
and retain ownership of the property by paying
the amount fixed in the decision of the court
within 90 to 120 days after entry of judgment
or even after the sale but prior to its
confirmation.

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
Right granted to the debtor-mortgagor, his
successor in interest or any judicial creditor of
said debtor- mortgagor or any person having a
lien in the property subsequent to its mortgagor
deed of trust under which the property within 1
year from registration of the sheriffs certificate
of sale.

[U]nder Act. No. 3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale has, during the redemption period, only an
inchoate right and not the absolute right to the property with all the accompanying incidents. He only
becomes an absolute owner of the property if it is not redeemed during the redemption period. As a
consequence of the inchoate character of the purchaser's right during the redemption period, Act. No.
3135, as amended, allows the purchaser at the foreclosure sale to take possession of the property only
upon the filing of a bond, in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve (12)
months, to indemnify the mortgagor in case it be shown that the sale was made in violation of the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of the law.(Ermitao v. Paglas (G.R. No. 174436)
689 SCRA 158, January 23, 2013)
What is a dragnet clause?
As a general rule, a mortgage liability is usually limited to the amount mentioned in the contract.
However, the amounts named as consideration in a contract of mortgage do not limit the amount for
which the mortgage may stand as security if, from the four corners of the instrument, the intent to secure
future and other indebtedness can be gathered. This stipulation is valid and binding between the parties
and is known as the "blanket mortgage clause" also known as the "dragnet clause. (Ramona Ramos and
the Estate of Luis T. Ramos vs. Philippine National Bank, Opal Portfolio Investments (SPV-AMC), Inc.
and Golden Dragon Star Equities, Inc., G.R. No. 178218, December 14, 2011)
What is a continuing guaranty?
A guaranty shall be construed as continuing, when, by the terms thereof, it is evident that the object is to
give a standing credit to the principal debtor to be used from time to time either indefinitely or until a
certain period, especially if the right to recall the guaranty is expressly reserved. A continuing guaranty is
a recognized exception to the rule that an action to foreclose a mortgage must be limited to the amount
mentioned in the mortgage contract. (Bank of Commerce v. Spouses Flores, GR. No. 174006, December
8, 2010)
What is the prevailing legal interest in the absence of stipulation as to the rate of interest?
In the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest that would govern the parties, the rate of
legal interest for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments
shall no longer be twelve percent (12%) per annum - as reflected in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines
Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions, before its amendment by BSP-MB Circular
No. 799 - but will now be six percent (6%) per annum effective July 1, 2013. It should be noted,
nonetheless, that the new rate could only be applied prospectively and not retroactively. Consequently, the
twelve percent (12%) per annum legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013
the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest when applicable.
(Nacar v. Gallery Frames (G.R. No. 189871) 703 SCRA 439, August 13, 2013)
LAND TITLE AND DEEDS
Alegarbes was granted a 24-hectare Homestead Patent in 1952. In 1955 however, the land was
subdivided into three (3) lots Lot Nos. 138,139 and 140 as a consequence of public land
subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to Custodio, and Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Virtucio.
Both Custodio and Virtucio filed Homestead Application and were granted. Alegarbes filed protest
opposing the homesteads of Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered
the whole area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140, but was denied and he was ordered to vacate
subject land but he refused. In 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint for "Recovery of Possession
and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction" before the RTC. Alegarbes argued that the his

possession of Lot Nos. 138, 139 and 140 had been open, continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted in
the concept of an owner for more than 30 years and had acquired such lots by acquisitive
prescription. The RTC, in 2001, ruled in favor of Virtucio and ordered Alegarbes to vacate Lot No.
140. The CA, on the other hand, ruled that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 and,
therefore, entitled to retain possession of it,by reason of acquisitive prescription. (1) Whether or not
Alegarbes acquired ownership over the subject property by acquisitive prescription? (2) Whether
or not the period of acquisitive prescription was interrupted in 1961 or in 1954 when Alegarbes
filed the protest?
1. The SC ruled that "the CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of
Lot 140 entitling him to retain possession of it because he was in open, continuous and exclusive
possession for over thirty (30) years of alienable public land." Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in
relation to its Article 712, provides that prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through the lapse
of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. Under the same law, it states that
acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years, while extraordinary
acquisitive prescription requires uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years, without need of title or
of good faith.
2. Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor. When no action is
filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of
acquisitive prescription continues to run. Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of
prescription of actions. Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on the other hand, is found in Articles
1120-1125 of the same Code. Thus, Virtucios reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the period
of acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the period of
acquisitive prescription are natural and civil interruption. (Virtucio v. Alegarbes, G.R. No. 187451, August
29, 2012)
What is a writ of possession?
A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of
land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possession of it to the person entitled under the
judgment. It may be issued under the following instances: a) land registration proceedings under Section
17 of Act. No. 496, known as The Land Registration Act; b) judicial foreclosure, provided that the debtor
is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had
intervened; c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7, Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118, and d) in execution sales. The issuance of writ of possession is only proper in
order to execute judgments ordering the delivery of specific properties to a litigant, in accordance with
Section 10, Rule 39, Rules of Court. (LZK Holdings and Development Corp. v,. Planters Development
Bank, GR No. 187973, January 20, 2014; Sia v. Arcenas, etal. Gr Nos. 209672-74, January 14, 2015)
TORTS AND DAMAGES
When is an award of attorneys fees as part of damages considered just and equitable?
The award of attorneys fees as part of damages is considered just and equitable when a party is
compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other
party. (Ching Sen Ben v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 124355, September 21, 1999)
Discuss the following causes: Proximate, Remote, Concurrent, Intervening.

Proximate Cause
That which, in the
natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by
any efficient, intervening
cause, produces the
injury,
and
without
which the result would
not
have
occurred.
(Lambert v. heirs of Ray
Castillon,
GR
No.
160709, February 23,
2005)

Remote Cause
A prior and remote
cause cannot be made the
basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the
condition or give rise to
the occasion by which
the injury was made
possible, if there
intervened between such
prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of
the injury, even though
such injury would not
have happened but for
such condition or
occasion. (People v.
Villacorta, GR No.
186412, September 7,
2011.)

Concurrent cause
Several causes producing
the
injury, and each is an
efficient cause without
which
the injury would not have
happened. The injury is
attributed to any or all the
causes, and recovery may
be had against any or all
of the responsible persons
although
under
the
circumstances of the case,
it may appear that one of
them was more culpable,
and that the duty owed by
them to the injured person
was not the same.(Ruks
Konsult and Construction
v. Adworld Sign and
Advertising Corporation,
GR No. 204866, January
21, 2015)

Intervening Cause
If the intervening
cause is one which
in ordinary human
experience is
reasonably to be
anticipated, or one
which the
defendant has reason
to anticipate under
the particular
circumstances. The
defendant may be
negligent, among
other reasons,
because of failure
to guard against it.
There is an
intervening cause
combining with the
defendants conduct
to produce the result,
and the defendants
negligence consists
in failure to protect
the plaintiff against
that very risk.
(Phoenix
Construction v. IAC,
GR No. L-65295,
March 10, 1987)

When is contributory negligence a bar for recovery of damages?

Only when the proximate cause is on the part of the plaintiff. Where the plaintiff contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover.
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. To
prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate,
between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. (Anonuevo v. CA, GR No. 130003,
October 20, 2004)