Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol.

41(2), 151163 Spring 2005

Published online in Wiley Interscience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002 /jhbs.20080
2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

THEODOR LIPPS AND THE SHIFT FROM SYMPATHY TO EMPATHY

GUSTAV JAHODA

In the course of extensive philosophical debates on aesthetics in nineteenth-century Germany,

Robert Vischer introduced the concept of Einfhlung in relation to art. Theodor Lipps subsequently extended it from art to visual illusions and interpersonal understanding. While Lipps
had regarded Einfhlung as basically similar to the old notion of sympathy, Edward Titchener
in America believed it had a different meaning. Hence, he coined the term empathy as its translation. This term came to be increasingly widely adopted, first in psychology and then more
generally. But the lack of agreement about the supposed difference between these concepts
suggests that Lipps had probably been right. 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

From the seventeenth to the early part of the twentieth century the notion of sympathy
held undisputed sway. It was not only part of everyday language, but from the eighteenth century onward, it was also used as a quasi-technical term. Then the term empathy made its appearance and gradually conquered much of the ground previously occupied by sympathy, especially, but not only, in the psychological literature. The story of how this came about is part
of a wider history ofmainly Germanphilosophical and psychological ideas from
Immanuel Kant onward. Hence, what will be presented here should be understood as particular threads in a highly complex web.
Most psychology texts now have something to say about empathy, but far fewer even
mention sympathy. It is widely assumed that these labels refer to distinct psychological
processes, and those familiar with the history of the terms usually believe that this had been
the position of Theodor Lipps (18511914), who introduced the concept of Einfhlung (later
translated as empathy) into psychology. However, matters are less straightforward, and in
this connection, it will be useful to recall Kurt Danzigers (1997) illuminating analysis of the
manner in which psychological categories came to be named and reified. He showed how
such naming has to be understood within particular sociocultural contexts that influence
would-be scientific discourse. Moreover, the categories one meets in psychological texts are
discursive categories, not the things themselves (Danziger, 1997, p. 186), and this is particularly important to keep in mind when considering the problem of sympathy versus empathy.
In relation to such notions as intelligence or attitudes, Danziger argued that it was the
technology of measurement that created the illusion of their concrete existence, when in fact
they were the outcome of a set of assumptions or judgements.
This applies a fortiori to empathy and sympathy, which constitute rather fluid categories.
There are scales intended to measure each of them, but their content depends on prior notions about the nature of the categories. This case is a rather unusual one, as may be indicated
by comparison with another pair of wordsnamely, recall and recognition. As Alan
Baddeley (1997, p. 197) noted, The question of how [they] are related is one of the oldest in
the study of memory. It is also one that remains complex and controversial. Nevertheless,
they are clearly differentiated in everyday speech and are used in the same sense by psychologists as technical terms. What is at issue here are the psychological processes underlying the

GUSTAV JAHODA is Emeritus Professor of Psychology at the University of Strathclyde. He carried out
pioneering cross-cultural research in West Africa in the areas of perception, cognitive development, and
social psychology. Toward the end of his active career in empirical research, he switched from cultural to
temporal differences, pursuing a long-standing interest in history.

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phenomena. In the case of sympathy versus empathy, consensus is lacking concerning their
respective meanings and the difference between them, and this is reflected in the voluminous
literature on the topic. One can illustrate this with two examples. Jorgen Hunsdahl (1967)
published a paper on the origins of the concept of empathy, based largely on the writings of
Lipps. While acknowledging variations in the interpretations of the concept, he took it for
granted that empathy is a distinctive category, and there was no mention of sympathy. By contrast, Gerald Gladsteins (1984) paper, which also purported to trace the historical origins of
the concept, ranged far and wide quite indiscriminately. After a brief outline of Lippss approach, focused on the roots of the concept of Einfhlung in aesthetic theory, a whole range
of other writings dealing with sympathy were reviewed. They include, among others, Charles
H. Cooley, William McDougall, George Herbert Mead, and such unlikely candidates as Jean
Piaget and sociological role theorists. Apparently, Gladstein regarded sympathy as more or
less identical with empathy. That, it will be argued, was also broadly the position of Lipps.
The general aim of this article is to describe the movements of thought that led to the current
state of uncertainty, if not confusion, in this sphere.
HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONCEPT OF SYMPATHY
The term emerged in roughly its current sense during the seventeenth century in English,
French, and German. Initially, its meaning was wider, referring to some kind of affinity between not only people but also things. The latter related chiefly to a medical context, such as
the sympathy regarded as linking a medicament with a specific disease (e.g., Digby, 1669),
or different parts of the body, or people when illnesses were said to be passed on sympathetically (Whytt, 1765). The psychological meaning of sharing the feelings of another person
or being affected by their suffering existed in parallel. An early example is cited in the Oxford
English Dictionary (Simpson & Weiner, 1989): Out of faithful and true simpathy [sic] and
fellow-feeling with you (1662).
During the eighteenth century, the concept began to be extensively discussed, and theories of its function were put forward. David Hume was one of the moral philosophers who expounded what we would call the psychological nature of sympathy; his analysis was elaborated and refined by Adam Smith (1790/2002). Both Hume and Smith regarded sympathy as
a crucial determinant of social behavior, with Smith going so far as to claim that it constitutes
the bond that holds society together. In France, the noted physiologist Georges Cabanis proposed that signs, be they gestures, facial expressions, voices, ways of looking, and so on, constitute a kind of universal language enabling us to gauge the feelings of our fellow humans.
As the capacity for such communication increases, we exist no less in the others than in ourselves. [nous nexistons gure moins dans les autres que dans nous-mmes.]1 He stressed the
fundamental importance of sympathy, since from it alone the faculty of imitation is derived,
and on that in turn all human perfectibility depends [ . . . comme delle seule derive la facult dimitation, dou dpend toute la perfectibilit humaine] (Cabanis, 1802/1985, p. 97).
This notion of imitation has long served as an explanatory tool, and continues to do so (e.g.,
Jahoda, 2002).
While eighteenth-century writers had taken sympathy merely as a given, during the second half of the nineteenth century, it came to be viewed in an evolutionary context by Charles
Darwin (1871) and Herbert Spencer (1872). Their aim was to indicate its adaptive function,
without basically questioning its character as described by Adam Smith. Much the same ac1. Translations are my own.

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count of sympathy was given by McDougall (1908), and neither in that nor in subsequent editions over three decades did he indicate any awareness of the rise of a new and rival concept.
As already mentioned, that concept had initially been named Einfhlung, and later became
known as empathy in the English-speaking world.
ON THE ORIGINS OF EINFHLUNG
In nineteenth-century Germany there was an intense interest in theories of aesthetics,
which began with abstract formalism, followed by a countermovement focusing on content,
symbolism, and emotion. It is from the latter that the concept of Einfhlung was derived (for
a comprehensive account of the early origins, see Mallgrave & Ikonomou, 1994). In the early
part of the century, Johann Friedrich Herbart (1831) had written on the representation of
space in art. Gustav Fechner (1897), inspired by Herbart, conducted experiments on aesthetic
preferences for shapes, with a view to confirming the notion of a golden rectangle whose
proportions were said to be most pleasing. Rudolf Lotze (1884), who succeeded Herbart in
the chair at Gttingen, also wrote about art. Another Herbartian, Robert Zimmermann (1865),
shortly afterward sought to develop a science of forms based on mathematical relationships
underlying surface irregularities, which made for aesthetic appeal.
During the latter part of the century, a reaction set in. Adherents of the Romantic
Movement found such an approach to art arid and empty, leaving out content and the feelings
it evokes. Appropriate ways of describing mental states were supplied by Wundts (1873) systematic terminology distinguishing sensation [Empfindung], feeling [Gefhl], and affect
[Gemtsbewegung]. A key figure in that change of direction was Robert Vischer
(18471933), son of the more widely known Friedrich Theodor Vischer (18071887), who
occupied a newly established chair of aesthetics and German literature at the University of
Tbingen. The elder Vischer had been suspended from the university for two years for expounding his unorthodox political and religious ideas in the course of his inaugural lecture,
and the son displayed a similarly determined independence of mind. The father was a prolific
writer, and his major work dealt with aesthetics (F. T. Vischer, 18461854). Over several
years, he was involved in a controversy with Zimmermann, opposing the latters view that the
appeal of a work of art depends entirely on its formal structure, content being irrelevant (for
details, see Schneider, 2001).
Vischer became a student of philosophy at Tbingen, where his father had taken up the
chair again, and was advised on his dissertation by Karl Kstlin (18191894). Kstlin was professor of literature and aestheticsa relatively minor figure, whose biography damns him with
faint praise.2 Hence, it is likely that Vischers forceful father exerted a considerable influence
on the shaping of the dissertation. Robert Vischer embarked on it in the early 1870s, choosing
as his dissertation topic the problem of what became known as emotional projection or
Einfhlung, literally feeling oneself into (R. Vischer, 1873). It was not altogether a new term,
having occasionally been used previously in literary contexts. But Robert Vischer pioneered its
application to psychological aspects of the appreciation of art. He also employed the common
expression Mitfhlung (literally feeling with, dictionary translation sympathy or fellow
feeling), but also invented a whole series of neologisms, such as Anfhlung, Ausfhlung,
Nachfhlung, and Zusammenfhlung, for different kinds of feelings or sensations. He put for2. His biographer in the German dictionary of national biography mentioned that he treated his subject so exhaustively that he was never able to finish his lectures on time. The few students who stayed the course till the end of the
semester were not allowed to leave the lecture room for several hours!

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ward an elaborate theory of different levels of perception, from simple unconscious taking-in
of visual stimuli to an intricate involvement of representational and imaginative functions. At
that higher level, which incorporates the self, our response was said to be saturated with feelings or, as he put it more dramatically, our mental-sensory ego is projected into the object.
Vischers theory owed much to German Romanticism and at times took off into pantheistic flights, but there were also quite specific influences, only one of which I shall note because
it also became a significant source for Sigmund Freud. In his introductory literature review in
The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud characterized Karl Scherners (1861) book on the life of
the dream as the most original and far-reaching [previous] attempt to explain dreaming as a
special activity of the mind (Freud, 1900/1953, Vol. 5, p. 83). For Vischer, Scherner provided
the idea of a direct fusion of representation and the form of an object [ . . . eine direkte
Verschmelzung von Vorstellung und Objektsform . . .] (R. Vischer, 1873, p. VI). He further
noted that Scherners passage dealing with symbolic aspects of bodily stimuli was relevant for
aesthetics: Here it was demonstrated how in dreams the body responding to certain stimuli
objectifies itself in spatial forms. So this constitutes an unconscious displacement of ones own
bodily formand thereby also of the soulinto the form of the object. From this, I arrived at
the concept which I call Einfhlung [Hier wird nachgewiesen, wie der Leib im Traum auf
gewisses Reize hin an rumlichen Formen sich selber objektiviert. Es ist also ein unbewusstes
Versetzen der eigenen Leibform und hiemit auch der Seele in die Objektsform. Hieraus ergab
sich mir der Begriff, den ich Einfhlung nenne] (R. Vischer, 1873, p. VII).
Although I have translated Seele literally as soul, it should be noted that in German it
does not necessarily evoke the spiritual connotations of the English term, and was often used
by Wilhelm Wundt in psychological discussions. Hence, it is reasonable to describe the process
of aesthetic appreciation conceived by Vischer as the projection of the self into the object of
beauty. It is worth mentioning that long before the term Einfhlung had become fashionable, a
somewhat similar idea had been expressed by Johann Gottfried Herder in terms of sympathy
when discussing the appreciation of sculpture: The more a limb signifies what it is supposed
to signify, the more beautiful it is; and only inner sympathy, i.e., feeling and transposition of
our whole human self into the form that has been explored by touch, is teacher and indicator
of beauty [Je mehr ein Glied bedeutet, was es bedeuten soll, desto schner ists, und nur innere Sympathie. d.i. Gefhl und Versetzung unseres ganzen menschlichen Ichs in die durchtastete Gestalt, ist Lehrerin und Handhabe der Schnheit.] (Herder, 1778/1969, Vol. 3, p. 125).
But after Vischer, the term Einfhlung prevailed and was highly salient in the then frequent and lively discussions of aesthetics. Among the main participants was Lipps, who published extensively in this sphere over several decades.
LIPPS ON EINFHLUNG IN ART
One of the few German psychologists of the period who did not work in the shadow of
Wundt, Theodor Lipps became in 1894 the successor of Carl Stumpf in the chair at Munich.
His work was praised by such prominent figures as Freud, William James, and Wundt; he influenced Edmund Husserl and generally played a significant role in the rise of phenomenology. Here, only certain key ideas can be outlined.
A relatively concise version of his theory is contained in an article (Lipps, 1903a) entitled Einfhlung, Inner Imitation, and Organic Feelings; it is concerned with the source of
aesthetic pleasure. He began by describing at length a process whereby the contemplated art
object fuses, as it were, with the observer: Einfhlung is the fact described here that the object is ego and thereby the ego object. It is the fact that the contrast between myself and the

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object disappears . . . [Die Einfhlung ist die hier bezeichnete Tatsache, dass der Gegenstand
Ich ist, und ebendamit das Ich Gegenstand. Sie ist die Tatsache, dass der Gegensatz zwischen
mir und dem Gegenstand verschwindet . . . ] (Lipps, 1903a, p. 188). The question he himself
asked was how that is possible, and there followed a lengthy disquisition about the act of raising ones own arm and then witnessing such an act by another person. In the latter case, one
imitates the movement, either deliberatelywhich has nothing to do with Einfhlungor unconsciously, and then one experiences a striving, a feeling of effort without actually moving.
What this implies is phrased somewhat dramatically by Lipps:
In a word, I am now with my feeling of activity totally in the moving figure. I am also
spatially, insofar as there can be question of a spatial extension of the ego, in the place
of that figure. I am transported into it. As far as my consciousness is concerned, I am totally identical with it. While I feel myself active within the perceived figure, I feel myself to be at the same time free, light, and proud. That is aesthetic imitation, and it is at
the same time aesthetic Einfhlung. (Lipps, 1903a, p. 191)3
Lipps must already have had some qualms about such a radical proposal, for he explained later in the same article that the ego involved in such imitation is an ideational [ideell]
but nonetheless real one, although not the same as the real practical ego.
Lipps was not alone in postulating inner imitation. A decade earlier, Karl Groos (1892)
had suggested in a work on aesthetics that inner imitation satisfies our deeply rooted play
drive, leading to the creation of an ideal world for oneself. August Schmarsow (1903) proposed that organic feelings were responsible for inner imitation, a view rejected by Lipps,
who regarded such feelings as irrelevant for Einfhlung. His ideas must have been in flux, for
in a larger work whose first volume appeared in the same year (Lipps, 1903b) he had changed
his mind about inner imitation. He wrote: I described Einfhlung also with the name inner
imitation. This naming we must . . . completely abandon [Ich bezeichntete die Einfhlung
auch mit dem Namen innere Nachahmung. Diese Benennung mssen wir nach obigem
endgltig fallen lassen] (Lipps, 1903b, p. 126). The reason was, he explained, that there can
only be imitation if there is a model to be imitated, but there can be no such model in ones
consciousness. Yet this does not mean that he dispensed with inner imitation, as will be seen
in connection with his theory about our knowledge of other minds.
FROM APPRECIATION OF ART TO UNDERSTANDING OTHER PEOPLE
While the notion of Einfhlung had been introduced in the context of art, it was gradually extended beyond that context. Johannes Volkelt (1905) commented in his work on aesthetics that Einfhlung is by no means confined to the sphere of art, but happens all the time
in everyday life. At the same time, he suggested that the process of Einfhlung in ordinary life
is relatively weak and superficial, though without going beyond mere assertion. By contrast,
Lipps (1907) regarded it as the key to a problem that had long concerned philosophers and
later psychologistsnamely, how we come to know other peoples minds.
At the outset, Lipps sought to refute existing theories, notably that of inference by analogy most favored at the time. The argument, grossly simplified, runs as follows: I know that
3. Mit einem Wort, ich bin jetzt mit meinem Gefhl der Ttigkeit ganz und gar in der sich bewegenden Gestalt. Ich
bin auch rumlich, soweit von einer Rumlichkeit des Ich die Rede sein kann, an ihrer Stelle. Ich bin in sie hinein
versetzt. Ich bin, fr mein Bewusstsein nmlich, ganz und gar mit ihr identisch. Indem ich so in der gesehenen
Gestalt mich ttig fhle, fhle ich mich zugleich in ihr frei, leicht, stolz. Dies ist sthetische Nachahmung. Und diese
ist zugleich sthtische Einfhlung.

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my own feelings, such as joy or anger, are accompanied by external manifestations like facial
expressions or gestures. So when I perceive them in others, I infer that they have the same
kinds of experiences. Lipps wanted to demonstrate that an association between an external expression of an emotion and our inner experience cannot justify an inference from someone
elses overt expression to the nature of their inner feelings. It should be noted that he was not
concerned here with deliberately misleading cues. In order to illustrate the general character
of analogical inference, Lipps gave the example of smoke signalling fire. He argued that if on
another occasion I see smoke, I shall think again of fire. Now supposing I associate a gesture
of my own with anger, and then perceive such a gesture made by someone else. It will merely
make me think of my own anger and provide no grounds for attributing such an experience to
another self absolutely different from me. The critical questions for Lipps were: How does the
me, or the self, which is the only one I could find, become a self? How does what, according to its nature, is something uniquenamely, the mebecome transformed into the
generic self ? His answer was that the generic self arises in my consciousness through encounters with the other self. But, of course, this immediately raises the further question as to
how this occurs, not only analogy being ruled out, but experience as well. His answer to that
further question was simply thats just how things areand Lipps was led to postulate an
Einfhlung-instinct, which, he suggested, was bound to become a fundamental concept in
psychology and also sociology. The instinct is composed of two different parts. One is the instinctive drive as such, and the other is imitation.
Einfhlung is described as an irreducible and wonderful fact, involving no inference
whatsoever. An attempt to render the gist of the argument in a free translation is made below:
In the perception and comprehension of certain sensory objects, namely, those that we
afterward represent as the body of another individual (or generally as the sensory appearance of such), is immediately grasped by us. This applies particularly to the perception
and comprehension of occurrences or changes in this sensory appearance, which we
name, for example, friendliness or sadness. This grasp happens immediately and simultaneously with the perception, and that does not mean that we see it or apprehend it by
means of the senses. We cannot do that, since anger, friendliness, or sadness cannot be
perceived through the senses. We can only experience this kind of thing in ourselves.
(1907, p. 713)4
Lipps maintained that perception and inner excitation constitute two different processes
and stem from separate sources. The object of the sensory perception comes from the external world, while the inner excitation comes from within ourselves. He elaborated this further
by considering, first, the relationship in ourselves between an emotion such as anger and the
corresponding facial expression. The (mental) activity of creating a facial expression or gesture constitutes an immediate conscious experience, unmediated by any reflectionit is instinctive. How then can the angry gesture of someone else produce in me the activity that generates the gesture in my consciousness? The answer is that I do not see that activity, or
perceive it through my senses, but experience it directly when witnessing the other persons
4. Es ist nun einmal so, dass in der Wahrnehmung und Auffassung gewisser sinnlicher Gegenstnde, nmlich derjeningen, die wir nachtrglich als den Krper eines fremden Individuums oder allgemeiner als die sinnliche
Erscheinung eines solchen bezeichnen, das insbesondere in der Wahrnehmung und Auffassung von Vorgngen oder
Vernderungen an dieser sinnlichen Erscheinung, unmittelbar von uns etwas miterfasst wird, als wir beispielswiese
Zorn oder ein andermal Freundlichkeit oder Trauer usw.nennen. Wir erfassen dies unmittelbar in und mit der
Erfassung des sinnlich Wahrnembaren, dies heisst nicht, wir sehen es oder nehmen es gleichfalls sinnlich wahr. Dies
knnen wir nicht. Zorn, Freundlichkeit, Trauer ist nun einmal nicht sinnlich wahrnehmbar. Sondern was diese Worte
bedeuten, wissen wir nur aus uns selbst. Nur in uns knnen wir dergleichen erleben. Nur als unsere eigenen
Erlebnisse also kennen wir dergleichen unmittelbar.

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gesture. But how does this come about? The answer lies in the second component of
Einfhlungnamely, imitation. There follows a disquisition on the infectiousness of yawning, and this kind of automatic imitation is supposed to explain how the angry gesture of the
other person triggers a tendency for a corresponding activity in me.
Added to this is now another drive, that of expression, which leads to the external manifestation of inner events. This tendency is said to be integrated with, and part of, the affect
itself. The affect, in turn, is said to be located within the gesture, and is experienced within it,
as shown in the passage below:
One can also formulate [the process] in the following way: the affect is being represented
or thought into [hineingedacht] the perceived gesture. . . .
When I see a gesture, there exists within me a tendency to experience in myself the affect that naturally arises from that gesture. And when there is no obstacle, the tendency
is realized. Then the idea of the affect in the others gesture, or the thinking of the affect
into the gesture, has then become the experience of the affect, has become fellow-feeling [Mitfhlen] or sympathy. (1907, p. 719)5
Lipps asserted that there is a general psychological law of sympathy, and if it is not always manifest, then that must be accounted for in terms of countervailing tendencies. Hence,
it is the absence of sympathy that calls for explanation, as does the failure of a body to fall
it being implied that thereby the law of gravity is not invalidated. The introduction of sympathy in conjunction with Einfhlung may seem surprising, but in fact, Lipps had used the
concept consistently over a long period.
LIPPS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN EINFHLUNG AND SYMPATHY
In the lengthy accounts of Lippss thesis over the years, the frequency of the Einfhlung
terminology was undoubtedly dominant. It is therefore understandable why it came to be believed that he had introduced a new concept quite different from the traditional sympathy, but
that was a serious misconception. In 1897, he had published The Aesthetics of Space and
Optical Illusions, and in his foreword referred to his new idea. This was the notion that the
optical and aesthetic impression we gain from geometrical forms are only two sides of the same
thing, both having their common root in mental representations of mechanical activities
[dass der optische und der sthetische Eindruck, den wir von geometrischen Formen gewinnen, nur zwei Seiten ein und derselben Sache seien, und ihre gemeinsame Wurzel haben in der
Vorstellungen von mechanischen Ttigkeiten] (Lipps, 1897, p. V). He himself placed the
word activities in quotes, suggesting an unusual, perhaps metaphoric meaning. However, in
the subsequent discussion of the case of a Doric column, he stated, The self-raising of the column is its proper activity. Thereby, the term activity is meant in its full sense: exertion, effort,
use of force; a use of force that achieves something [Das Sichaufrichten der Sule ist ihre
eigentliche Thtigkeit. Dabei ist das Wort Thtigkeit im vollen Sinne gemeint: als
Anstrengung, Bemhung, Kraftaufwand; zugleich als Kraftaufwand durch den etwas geleisted
wird] (Lipps, 1897, p. 3). What we immediately and unreflectively perceive as its achievement,
he alleged, is the carrying of its own weight and that of the wall it supports. In other words, we
5. Und dies kann man auch so ausdrcken: Der Affekt ist von mir in die gesehene Gebrde hinein vorgestellt oder
hinein gedacht. . . . Es besteht also in mir allerdings, wenn ich eine Gebrde sehe, die Tendenz, den Affekt, aus
welchem dieselbe naturgemss hervorgeht, in mir zu erleben. Und diese Tendenz verwirklicht sich, wenn kein
Hindernis besteht. Das Vorstellen des Affektes in der fremden Gebrde oder das Hineindenken desselben in die
Gebrde ist dann zum Erleben desselben geworden, zum Mitfhlen, zur Sympathie.

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involuntarily arrive at a mechanical interpretation, and this, in turn, constitutes an analogy

based on our personal experience of acting on our environment. The result is that I sympathize
with the manner the Doric column behaves or testifies to an inner liveliness, because I recognize therein a natural mode of behavior of my own that gives me happiness. Thus, all pleasure
produced by spatial forms and, we can add, any kind of aesthetic pleasure, is a feeling of sympathy that makes us happy (Lipps, 1897, p. 7; emphasis in original).6
Lippss subsequent development of his theory of aesthetic experience led Oswald Klpe
(1900) to carry out an experiment in which he attempted to test the theory. He exposed various art objects for three seconds each and questioned his subjects about their experiences. He
concluded, What Lipps describes as the essence of aesthetic pleasure, namely, full and sympathetic Einfhlung, was, however, entirely lacking (Klpe, 1900, p. 227). As one contemporary critic of the experiment (Volkelt, 1905) pointed out, given an exposure time of three
seconds, that could hardly have been expected. But in the present context, the use of the
phrase sympathetic Einfhlung is noteworthy.
While Lipps generally preferred to refer to Einfhlung, he made it repeatedly and abundantly clear that, with one exception, he saw no real difference between the concepts. The
slightly odd exception is mentioned in the following quotation: The word sympathy appears to be only another word for Einfhlung. This is indeed the case, as long as we take
Einfhlung in the positive sense . . . i.e., as free inner participation [Nur ein anderesWort fr
die Einfhlung scheint das Wort Sympathie. So verhlt es sich in der Tat, solange wir die
Einfhlung in dem positiven Sinne nehmen . . . , d.h. als freies inneres Mitmachen] (Lipps,
1903b, p. 139). Lippss negative Einfhlung is rather an elusive concept, whose general
character may be tentatively summarized as follows: It is the effect of someone behaving in
an offensive and hurtful way, which Lipps still regarded as eliciting a kind of Einfhlung response. Although the unpleasant behavior is said to penetrate the observer or victim, it produces inner rejection. Since this brief formulation fails to cover all the subtleties, the less convoluted of two examples offered by Lipps will be cited in full.
I see . . . a person looking, not proudly but arrogantly. I experience within myself the arrogance contained in that look. It is not just that I imagine this inner conduct or inner
condition; it is not just that I know about it; rather, it obtrudes, forces itself into my experience. But within myself I work against it. My inner being objects; I feel in the arrogant look a life-denial or life-inhibition affecting me, a denial of my personality. Because
of that, and only because of that, the arrogance can hurt me. My feeling of discomfort
rests on that negative. (Lipps, 1903a, pp. 139140)7
In the later volume, Lipps returned to the theme in a passage in which he also explained
what he meant by sympathy, and so it will be cited in full:
Positive Einfhlung is the experience of that harmony, negative the experience of discord. We can also describe that harmony as sympathy. Indeed, sympathy is nothing else
6. Ich sympatisire mit der Weise der dorischen Sule sich zu verhalten oder eine innere Lebendigkeit zu bethtigen,
weil ich darin eine naturgemsse und mich beglckende eigene Verhaltungsweise wiedererkenne. So ist alle Freude
ber rumliche Formen, und wir knnten hinzufgen, alle sthetische Freude berhaupt, beglckendes
Sympathiegefhl.
7. Ich sehe . . . einen Menschen nicht stolz, sondern hochmtig blicken. Auch den in diesem Blick liegenden Hochmut
erlebe ich in mir. Ich stelle mir dies innere Verhalten oder diese innere Zustndlichkeit nicht nur vor; ich weiss nicht
nur davon; sondern sir drngt sich mir auf, drngt sich in mein Erleben ein. Aber ich arbeite innerlich dagegen.
Mein inneres Wesen widersetzt sich; ich fhle dem hochmtigen Blick eine eigene innere Lebensnegation oder
Lebenshemmung, eine Verneinung meiner Persnlichkeit. Darum und nur darum kann mich der Hochmut verletzen.
Mein Gefhl derUnlust is begrndet in dieser negativen Einfhlung.

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than a psychic, an ego-experience; it is tied within my consciousness to an object different from myself that penetrates me and is freely accepted by me. It is the harmony between a life that is foreign to me and my own drive, need, or desire for life. Hence, we
may also call positive Einfhlung sympathetic Einfhlung. (1906, p. 21)8
Such statements leave no doubt that he regarded these concepts as more or less synonymous. However, his accounts of the nature of sympathy appear to be inconsistent. Lippss
somewhat prolix style, typical of German academic writing of the period, coupled with the
rather imprecise use of categories, makes it hard to be certain. But if one compares the formulation in the above passage with that cited earlier from Lipps (1907, p. 719), it would seem
that the former implies a move from other to self, and the latter the reverse. This, of course,
does not alter the fact of his equation of Einfhlung with sympathy, but it does perhaps go
some way to explain the varying interpretations of his arguments.
It should be added that subsequently Lipps (1913) published a book-length piece entitled
On Einfhlung. Unfortunately, it fails to throw any further light on the issues discussed here.
The reason is that, as stated in an introductory paragraph, he was not much concerned in that
work with what he called the specially important kind of Einfhlung on which I had usually
put special emphasis, namely that related to the sensory appearance of other people [bemerke
ich noch dass die Einfhlung in die sinnliche Erscheinung des Menschen, diejenige also, die
ich sonst als eine fr uns besonders bedeutsame Art der Einfhlungen speziell herauszuheben
pflege, im folgenden vorerst wenigstens nicht besonders in Frage kommt] (1913, p. 112).
Generally, the piece is rather rambling and repetitive, no doubt as a result of his disabling
illness; Lipps died in the year after its publication.
ON SOME DIFFERENT OR DISSENTING VOICES
The concept of Einfhlung was widely debated, and the ideas of Lipps were not always
accepted. Within the sphere of aesthetics, Konrad Lange (1901) dismissed it altogether. He regarded it as a mere metaphor because, in his view, the notion of feeling oneself into another
person or object was sheer nonsense. Antonin Prantl (1910) believed in Einfhlung but disagreed with the analysis offered by Lipps, in particular his account of the role of imitation.
According to Prantl, Einfhlung arises as a consequence of a so-called law of association and
reproduction in the course of the earliest stage of infant development, whereby an awareness
of the mother as a feeling body emerges. That is not the whole story, but it is the gist of it.
The position of the distinguished philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey needs to be considered in
more detail, because the expression hineinversetzen [putting oneself in the place of someone or something] he employed could be construed as an equivalent of Einfhlung. For example, in the Hermeneutics Reader (Mueller-Vollmer, 1994) it is always translated as empathy.
Demonstrating fully why this is inappropriate would involve explicating Diltheys thought,
which is, of course, not possible here. However, one can at least give some indication of the
grounds for the objection.
First of all, it should be noted that Dilthey used the expression in the context of what
he called higher Verstehen, a term usually but not quite accurately translated as under8. Positive Einfhlung ist das Erlebnis jenes Einklanges, negative das Erlebnis jenes Missklanges. Jenen Einklang
knnen wir auch als Sympathie bezeichnen. In der Tat ist die Sympathie nichts anderes als Dies, dass ein
Psychisches, ein Icherlebnis, das fr mein Bewusstsein an einem von mir verschiedenen Gegenstand gebunden ist,
in mich eindringt und von mir frei aufgenomment wird. Es ist der Einklang zwischen dem mir fremden Leben und
dem eigenen Lebensdrange oder Lebensbedrfnis, der eigenen Lebenssehnsucht. Darnach drfen wir die positive
Einfhlung auch die sympathische Einfhlung nennen.

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GUSTAV JAHODA

standing, when actually it has wider connotations (for a fuller discussion, see Abel,
1953). In seeking to show how such Verstehen comes about, he referred to
Hineinversetzen, but significantly stated that it could also be called Transposition. Two
other terms Dilthey coupled with Hineinversetzen were those of Nachbilden [reproduce]
and Nacherleben [re-experience]. He explained, On the basis of this Hineinversetzen, of
this transposition, there arises the highest form in which the totality of mental life effectively produces Verstehennamely, reproducing or re-experiencing [Auf der Grundlage
dieses Hineinversetzens, dieser Transposition, entsteht nun aber die hchste Art, in
welcher die Totalitt des Seelenlebens im Verstehen wirksam istdas Nachbilden oder
Nacherleben] (Dilthey, 1958, p. 214). Later, he posed the question of what this
Nacherleben consists of, declaring that he would not give a psychological explanation and
then went on as follows: So we do not discuss the relationship of this concept to those of
sympathy and Einfhlung, although their connection is clear insofar as sympathy strengthens the energy of re-experiencing [So errtern wir auch nicht das Verhltnis dieses
Begriffes zu dem des Mitfhlens und dem der Einfhlung, obwohl der Zusammenhang derselben darin deutlich ist, dass das Mitfhlen die Energie des Nachlebens verstrkt] (p.
215). Dilthey seldom employed the term Einfhlung, and in a passage from an unpublished
piece cited by Ermarth (1978, p. 258), he explicitly dissociated himself from both Lippss
Einfhlung and Karl Grooss inner imitation.
While Dilthey remained guardedly detached, Max Schelers (1922/1970) famous work The
Nature of Sympathy (Wesen und Formen der Sympathie), which ranges over a wide area of philosophy and psychology, was sharply critical. From his extensive discussion of what he called
the theory of empathy, just two key arguments will be singled out. Scheler challenged the view
that we feel ourselves into someone else and thereby come to understand their mental processes.
He wrote, When all is said, the theory of empathy offers no grounds for assuming the existence
of other selves . . . For it can only serve to confirm the belief that it is my self which is present
all over again, and never that this self is other and different from my own. . . . nothing is more
certain than that we can think the thoughts of others as well as our own, and can feel their feelings (in sympathy) as we do our own (Scheler, 1922/1970, pp. 242, 245).9 The assumption underlying the theory, Scheler further argued, is that our mental life is basically private. So Lipps
believed that we start out with a knowledge of our own self, and only later become aware of
other selves. Scheler described that as a fiction, citing psychological studies showing that
knowledge of others develops pari passu with that of self.
Edith Stein (18911942) wrote a thesis on Einfhlung with the guidance of Husserl.
Although completed in 1917, it was not published until half a century later in translation
(Stein, 1964). While in agreement with Lipps on some points, her views diverged on others.
The one of special interest here is her attempt, as against Lipps, to differentiate between sympathy and Einfhlung. She accused him of failing to distinguish between primordial and
non-primordial acts or experiences, sympathy belonging to the former and Einfhlung to
the latter. I must confess to being unable to adequately understand her exceedingly convoluted
argument, and what I think I do understand seems to me unconvincing. Some of this is probably due to the unsatisfactory translation, which retains the German grammatical structure. In
any case, the above examples are indicative of the extensive debates to which the notion of
Einfhlung gave rise in German intellectual circles.
9. Although this quotation is from the English translation of the second edition, in the preface to that edition, Scheler
stated that the relevant sectionnamely, Chapter 3 of Part IIIhad been an appendix to the first (1913) edition and
was retained in essentially the same form.

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161

THE ADVENT OF EMPATHY

Most prominent American psychologists active at the beginning of the twentieth century
were steeped in German psychology, many having obtained their doctorates in Wundts laboratory. This applied to Edward Titchener (18671927), who, though English by birth, worked
in the United States and was at that time highly influential.
Lippss reputation was great abroad as well as in Germany, and Titchener had read his
work. However, it is not easy to read Lippss writings, for two main reasons. The first may
perhaps have been gathered even from the extracts presented above: his style was typical of
his generation of German academicsdense and rather long-windedso that repeated scanning is often needed to grasp a crucial point. Second, both his terminology and manner of formulating theoretical issues tended to be somewhat loose and to change as his ideas developed.
The concept of Einfhlung had originally been confined to the appreciation of art, and when
Lipps began to apply it to interpersonal relations, he continued to use the then-popular term,
only occasionally noting its near-identity with sympathy.
It may be surmised, therefore, that Titchener believed that the new name implied a new
concept, overlooking the less frequent mentions of its equivalence to sympathy. This makes it
understandable why Titchener seems to have gained the impression that while Einfhlung
does have something in common with sympathy, it is nonetheless quite distinct and sui
generis. It is an intriguing question how Titchener came to undertake a translation, and I have
been unable to find the answer.10 One thing is certain, however: he did not borrow the term
from Vernon Lee, as might be suspected from the entry on empathy in the Oxford English
Dictionary. This gives the date of its first appearance as 1904, based on a diary entry for
February 20 of that year reproduced in Lee (1912, p. 337); the passage refers to aesthetic empathy (Einfhlung). What must have happened is that Lee changed the entry retrospectively,
since Lee twice (pp. 20 and 46) explicitly attributed the translation to Titchener.11
In the early part of a book on experimental psychology dealing with kinaesthetic imagery, Titchener wrote the following:
Not only do I see gravity and modesty and pride and courtesy and stateliness, but I feel
or act them in the minds muscles. This is, I suppose, a simple case of empathy, if we may
coin that term as a rendering of Einfhlung; there is nothing curious or idiosyncratic
about it; but it is a fact that must be mentioned. (Titchener, 1909, pp. 2122)
Thus, the very first mention of the new term was slipped in quite casually. In a later
chapter on organic attitudes, Titchener used the expression emphatic experiences
(Titchener, 1909, p. 181), while in his notes reverting to the German original when referring
to a sort of logical and aesthetic Einfhlung (Titchener, 1909, p. 205). In a text published a
year later, he invoked empathy as an explanation of the Mller-Lyer illusion: So we read ourselves, or feel ourselves, into the lines of the figure (Titchener, 1910, p. 333). Although he
did not actually use the term empathy in that passage, he directly stated in a later footnote that
10. It is presumably to be found in the Titchener Archive at Cornell University. One reviewer suggested that Titchener,
who was extremely well read in the literature, might have come across a passage in Urban (1902) mentioning that it is
difficult to find an English term for Einfhlung. This seems a plausible speculation. It is perhaps worth noting that
Urban also said, Not all Einfhlung is aesthetic, for it is present in the ethical and social relations of sympathy as well
(p. 435). Once again, one finds the two concepts coupled.
11. Violet Paget (18651935), who used the pseudonym Vernon Lee, was a remarkable woman. A personal friend of
Groos, Klpe, and Ribot, she declared herself an enthusiastic disciple of Lipps (p. 65). It is worth noting in the present context that she regarded empathy as analogous with moral sympathy (p. 20) and also stated that empathy necessarily precedes sympathy (p. 47). While she did not equate the two, she clearly saw a very close link between them.

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it had been what he had meant: Empathy (a word formed on the analogy of sympathy) is the
name given to the process of humanising objects, of reading or feeling ourselves into them,
which we described on p. 333 (Titchener, 1910, p. 417).
It is far from clear precisely what Titchener meant by empathy because he was so inconsistent in his usagea point that has been documented in Wisps excellent account (1987)
of Titcheners ideas within their contemporary context. By 1932, Gardner Murphy was able
to write, The term Einfhlung (empathy) has in fact come into general psychological use
(Murphy, 1932, p. 181).
CONCLUDING OBSERVATION
It has been shown that Titchener misinterpreted Lippss Einfhlung as being a concept
quite distinct from that of the old sympathy. Yet, in the psychological literature, sympathy and
empathy are usually treated as being different. Could this mean that Lipps had unwittingly
helped to introduce a significant new concept, which reflects a real difference in the manner in
which we relate to others? This is a theoretical possibility, but seems rather unlikely, and there
is no supporting evidence beyond the verbal usage of the two terms that has become customary.
Moreover, while there is widespread consensus that empathy differs from sympathy, one finds
very little agreement on the precise nature of that difference. This is perhaps not surprising, in
view of the fact that both terms refer to unobservable internal processes.
Probably the only way in which the matter could be resolved is by neuro-psychological
studies. These would entail presenting people with others in situations liable to evoke sympathy and/or empathy, and recording brain responses. If these occurred in different locations,
it would be justified to postulate distinct processes. In recent years, such an approach has become feasible, and while the work is in its early stages, the indications so far are that only a
single location becomes activated. Finally, if one translates Lippss attribution of Einfhlung
to instinct as referring to an innate neurological device triggered by other peoples expressions of their feelings, then he was also not far off the mark.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks are due to Bernd Krewer and the Saarbrcken University Library, who enabled me to get access to original
sources. The study was supported by a grant from the Nuffield Foundation.

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