Social Justice Society (SJS) vs.

Atienza; Police Power of LGU's

Facts:
Pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units. the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027. The said ordinance, in essence, reclassified portions of Pandacan and Sta.
Ana as well as its adjoining areas from industrial to commercial areas [reservoir of oils of big oil
companies are located in this area- this is called as the Pandacan terminals] and owners or
operators of industries and other businesses, of the Pandacan terminals are given a period of 6
months from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the
operation of businesses which are disallowed.
Subsequent to the approval of the ordinance, the City of Manila and the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in
which they agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and
practicable option and not total removal of the Pandacan terminals as demanded by Ordinance
8027. Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to scale down the oils reservoir and agreed that
the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the
common and integrated areas/facilities. The said MOU was adopted by a resolution of the
Sanggunian
Panglunsod
of
Manila.
Petitioners filed a mandamus compelling respondent in his capacity as Mayor of Manila to
enforce the said ordinance and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.
Atienza contended that Ordinance 8027 was superseded by the MOU, hence he cannot enforce
it.
Issue:
Whether or
Whether

not respondent
or
not

can
the

be compelled to enforce Ordinance

MOU
superseded
Ordinance

8027.
8027.

Ruling:
Yes, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to 'enforce
all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.' One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as
it has not been repealed by theSanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is
his ministerial duty to do so. The Court ratiocinated, "these officers cannot refuse to perform
their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for
this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were
to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing
duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the
government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it."
As to the second issue, assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance
No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly
gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.Thus, at present, there is nothing that
legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,530 SCRA 341 (2007)

Facts: PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass
Transport System for Greater Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila Council
of the MMDA cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Respondents, provincial bus operators who had bus
terminals that were threatened to be removed, alleges that EO should be declared
unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and
operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals
Issue: Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of police power
Held: Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has no police power, let alone
legislative power. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions,
the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the EO;
hence it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the
Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of the
respondents terminals.
Police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may bedelegated, as it
is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power
may be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as by the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government under an
expressdelegation by the LGC of 1991.
Measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the
thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the
exercise of police power.
On Constitutional Law, The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an
equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the
framework of the law and the laws are enactedwith due deference to rights.

Velasco vs. Villegas [G.R. No. L-24153 (120 SCRA), February 14, 1983]
Facts: Petitioners herein are members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association. This
is an appeal from the lower court's(LC) order dismissing their suit for declatory
relief. They are challenging theconstitutionality of Ord. No. 4964. They contend that
it amounts todeprivation of properties and their means of livelihood without due
process of law.
The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any
barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in
any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the
same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the
barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person."
Respondent in its reply, said that the Ordinance No. 4964 is constitutional and such
is just an exercise of the state's inherent power (police power).
Issue: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance violated the petitioner's right to
property and their means of livelihood.
Held: Ordinance is Constitutional. Petition is dismissed, LC decision affirmed.
Enactment of such (Ordinance) is a valid exercise of Police Power.
The objectives of the Ordinance are:
(1) To impose payment of license fees for engaging in the business of massage
clinics, and;
(2) To forestall possible immorality which might grow from the construction of a
separate room for massaging customers.
This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general
welfare clause. And for that reason, the petitioners rights were not violated and
they are not deprived of the due process of law.

Case Digest: Lozano v. Martinez

G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the
HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.
YAP, J:
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing
Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at
the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the draweebank for the payment
of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is
imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the
check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from
the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this
involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates aprima facie presumption of such
knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by thedrawee because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the
harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within
five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for
payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in
evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written
thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute primafacie proof of "the making or
issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ...
for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the
contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
ISSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.
HELD: No.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust

of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest.
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making
and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions.
ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.
HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful"
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that
checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day
and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and
therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
ISSUE: W/N it violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the
check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there
would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should
punish both the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of
individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no
unreasonable or arbitrary.

TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar
1992]
Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta.
Elena,Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the municipalityconcerning
the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside
petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal council,
and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the
warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the
people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal
council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article
694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioners
warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952,
prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the
poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from
said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Onthe
other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article
694 of the Civil Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is
unconstitutional and void.

Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under
the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13
was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is
valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not
contravene the Constitution or anystatute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3)
must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade,
5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be
unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and
life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower
court did not err in its decision.

People vs. Judge Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992
Facts:
Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged with violation of B.P. 22. He moved to
quash the Information of the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a
felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was
a memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil
in nature. Judge Nitafan, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was based was
unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence, the
appeal.
Issue:
Wether a memorandum check is within the coverage of B.P. 22
Held:
A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word
"memorandum", "memo" or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker
or drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder absolutely, without any condition
concerning its presentment. Such a check is an evidence of debt against the
drawer, and although may not be intended to be presented, has the same effect as
an ordinary check, and if passed to the third person, will be valid in his hands like
any other check.
A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank
payable on demand. A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally
accepted by the bank. Hence it does not matter whether the check issued is in the
nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued is
partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the
issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issuance.
The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or
even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum.
A memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not be
presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan fall
due. However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such understanding or private
arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by
the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of check be first
looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provision of B.P.
22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very
purpose for which the law was enacted to stem the proliferation of
unfunded checks. After having effectively reduced the incidence of worthless checks
changing hands, the country will once again experience the limitless circulation
of bouncing checks in the guise of memorandum checks if such checks will be
considered exempt from the operation of B.P. 22. It is common practice in
commercial transactions to require debtors to issue checks on which creditors must
rely as guarantee of payment. To determine the reasons for which checks are
issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the

faith the public responses in the stability and commercial value of checks as
currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation
phasing out taxicabs more than six years old on grounds that it is violative of the
constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila and
directed solely towards the taxi industry.
Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety
and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated
taxis.
ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than
six years old is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the safety and general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no
infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common knowledge that
taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use,
creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places.

DECS vs. San Diego

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Facts:
Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test)
three times. When he applied to take again, petitioner rejected his application
based on the three-flunk-rule. He then filed a petition before the RTC on the
ground of due process and equal protection and challenging the constitutionality of
the order. The petition was granted by the RTC therefore this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid and constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust
their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not
irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The right to
quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen has
the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements. It is not enough to simply invoke
the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show
that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. Petition was granted
and the RTC ruling was reversed.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987]

Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine.
However the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT).Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and
5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of
Medical Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine and
prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine" (Sec. 5
(a). Section 7 of the same Act requires fromapplicants to present a certificate
of eligibility for entrance (cea) to medical school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52,
s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a
uniform admission test called National Medical Admission Test as
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility.
Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Prohibition with a prayer Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME from enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224
and MECS Order no. 2 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as
condition for securing (cea).
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 violate
the constitution as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and
inequitable requirement
Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute
a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition
for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all
its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice
of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus,legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to
take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in
a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we
have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of regulation
of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the
student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process ofadmission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of
limitingadmission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need tomaintain, and the

difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and

medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic
development, are widely known.
The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe anadmission test
like the NMAT as a means of achieving its statedobjective of "upgrading the
selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of
medical education in the country."

G.R. No. 158793. June 8, 2006

James Mirasol, Richard Santiago, and Luzon Motorcyclists Federation,
Inc., petitioners, vs.Department of Public Works and Highways and Toll Regulatory
Board, respondents.
Facts:
On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction to nullity of
the following administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Act" enacted in 1957: (a) DPWH
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968; (b) DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series
of 1993; and (c) Art. II, Sec. 3 (a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities
promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 1 introduces an unreasonable classification by
singling-out motorcycles from other motorized modes of transport and violates the right
to travel.
Ruling:
No. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the limited access facility.
They are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on
how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners right to travel but merely
bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the
mode of traveling along limited access highways. There exists real and substantial
differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify
its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. A classification based
on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply
because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.