Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75112 October 16, 1990
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as
Judge of the Regional Trial Court,. Branch XIV, Roxas City and the late POTENCIANO
KAPUNAN, SR., as substituted by his heirs, namely: LEONA KAPUNAN TIANGCO, CICERO
KAPUNAN, JESUS KAPUNAN, SANTIAGO KAPUNAN, POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, JR., PAZ
KAPUNAN PUBLICO, SUSA KAPUNAN GENUINO and ERLINDA KAPUNAN
TESORO, respondents.
Aquilina B. Brotarlo for petitioner.
Rhodora G. Kapunan for the Substituted Heirs of the late respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 14 in Civil Case No. V-4222 which found petitioner
Filamer Christian Institute and Daniel Funtecha negligent and therefore answerable for the resulting
injuries caused to private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr.
Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher (now
deceased), was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged
employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the
evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for
which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days.
Evidence showed that at the precise time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of the jeep
was functioning. Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving after having
persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him. The two fled from the
scene after the incident. A tricycle driver brought the unconscious victim to the hospital.
Thereafter, Kapunan, Sr. instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone in the City Court of Roxas
City for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Kapunan, Sr. reserved his right to file
an independent civil action. The inferior court found Funtecha guilty as charged and on appeal, his
conviction was affirmed by the then Court of First Instance of Capiz. 2

Pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages 3 before the RTC of
Roxas City. Named defendants in the complaint were petitioner Filamer and Funtecha. Also included was
Agustin Masa, the director and president of Filamer Christian Institute, in his personal capacity in that he
personally authorized and allowed said Daniel Funtecha who was his houseboy at the time of the
incident, to drive the vehicle in question despite his knowledge and awareness that the latter did not have
the necessary license or permit to drive said vehicle. His son, Allan Masa, who was with Funtecha at the
time of the accident, was not impleaded as a co-defendant. 4
On December 14, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and
Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa, a non-party. Thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the averments in the complaint as supported by preponderance of evidence
to be reasonable and justified, and that defendants Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and
Allan Masa are at fault and negligent of the acts complained of which causes (sic) injury to plaintiff,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, namely: Daniel
Funtecha and Filamer Christian Institute, the employer whose liability is primary and direct, jointly
and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:
(1) to pay the sum of TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (P2,950.50) as medical expenses (Exh. "A");
(2) to pay TWO HUNDRED FORTY ONE PESOS (P241.00) as doctor's fee (Exh.
"C");
(3) to pay THREE HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (P390.00) as additional expenses
incurred for thirty-nine days at P10.00 a day, for remuneration of plaintiff's helper
while recuperating;
(4) to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) as Court litigation expenses;
(5) to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) as loss of earnings capacity;
(6) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages;
(7) to pay FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) as attorney's
fees;
(8) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)as insurance indemnity on the
policy contract;
and without prejudice to the right of defendant Filamer Christian Institute to demand
from co-defendant Daniel Funtecha part-time employee and/or Allan Masa a full time
employee reimbursement of the damages paid to herein plaintiff.
The defendant Agustin Masa as director of defendant Filamer Christian Institute has
also failed to exercise the diligence required of a good father of a family in the

supervision of his employee Allan Masa, being his son. However, the court absolved
defendant Agustin Masa from any personal liability with respect to the complaint filed
against him in his personal and private capacity, cause he was not in the vehicle
during the alleged incident.
For failure to prove their respective counterclaims filed by the defendant Daniel
Funtecha, Dr. Agustin Masa, and Filamer Christian Institute, as against the herein
plaintiff, same are hereby dismissed.
The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant has failed to prove that
there was a policy violation made by the defendant Filamer Christian Institute which
absolves them from liability under the aforesaid insurance policy. The record shows
that the defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said vehicle was having a
student drivers license marked Exh. "1" and accompanied by Allan Masa who is the
authorized driver of said vehicle with a professional drivers license as shown by Exh.
"3".
This Court finds that defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said vehicle is
considered as authorized driver in accordance with the policy in question marked
Exh. "2-Masa and FCI".
Finding the averments in the third party complaint filed by defendant Filamer
Christian Institute as supported by preponderance of evidence as shown by their
exhibits to be reasonable and justified, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
said defendant and third party plaintiff Filamer Christian Institute as against third
party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation.
The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant is hereby ordered to pay
in favor of the defendant and third party plaintiff, Filamer Christian Institute, the
following:
(1) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as third party
liability as provided in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy (Exh.
"2");
(2) to pay TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)as moral damages;
(3) to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) as Court litigation
and actual expenses;
(4) to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) as attorney's
fees;
The defendants Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and third party
defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation are hereby ordered jointly and severally, to
pay the costs of the suit. 5

Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation appealed the lower
court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and as a consequence, said lower court's decision became
final as to Funtecha. For failure of the insurance firm to pay the docket fees, its appeal was
dismissed on September 18, 1984. On December 17, 1985, the Appellate Court rendered the
assailed judgment affirming the trial court's decision in toto.6 Hence the present recourse by petitioner
Filamer.
It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it cannot be held responsible for the tortious act of
Funtecha on the ground that there is no existing employer-employee relationship between them. We
agree.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied).
The legal issue in this appeal is whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is
applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha.
In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has invoked the provisions of the Labor Code, 7 specifically
Section 14, Rule X of Book III which reads:
Sec. 14. Working scholars. There is no employer-employee relationship between
students on the one hand, and schools, colleges or universities on the other, where
students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of charge;
provided the students are given real opportunity, including such facilities as may be
reasonable, necessary to finish their chosen court under such arrangement.
(Emphasis supplied).

It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law, petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as
Funtecha's employer. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to
the school in exchange for free tuition Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days
a week. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with
sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court,
Funtecha was not included in the company payroll. 8
The wording of Section 14 is clear and explicit and leaves no room for equivocation. To dismiss the
implementing rule as one which governs only the "personal relationship" between the school and its
students and not where there is already a third person involved, as espoused by private
respondents, is to read into the law something that was not legislated there in the first place. The
provision of Section 14 is obviously intended to eliminate an erstwhile gray area in labor relations
and seeks to define in categorical terms the precise status of working scholars in relation to the
learning institutions in which they work for the privilege of a free education.
But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary
responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at
the time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the
scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours every
morning before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at
6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to
a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. In other words, at the time of
the injury, Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was
employed, but for some purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full
brunt of his tortious negligence. Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had
caused.
Private respondents' attempt to hold petitioner Filamer directly and primarily answerable to the
injured party under Article 2180 of the Civil Code would have prospered had they proceeded against
Allan Masa, the authorized driver of the Pinoy jeep and undisputably an employee of petitioner. It
was Allan's irresponsible act of entrusting the wheels of the vehicle to the inexperienced Funtecha
which set into motion the chain of events leading to the accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan, Sr.
But under the present set of circumstances, even if the trial court did find Allan guilty of negligence,
such conclusion would not be binding on Allan. It must be recalled that Allan was never impleaded in
the complaint for damages and should be considered as a stranger as far as the trial court's
judgment is concerned. It is axiomatic that no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a
stranger. 9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision under review of the Court of Appeals is hereby
SET ASIDE. The complaint for damages 10 is ordered DISMISSED as against petitioner Filamer
Christian Institute for lack of cause of action. No costs.
SO ORDERED.