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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
1.1

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY


Contrary to popular belief, free markets and noninterventionism are not remedies for corruption.
No system is entirely free of corruption. Furthermore, corruption exacerbates the already difficult
circumstances of States in conflict situations and those with economies in transition. It is widely
accepted that corruption is an impediment to development. If not addressed as a priority, it may
hinder all other efforts to effectively advance the development agenda, both at the international
and the national level. At a minimum, the fight against corruption requires unconditional
commitment from the political leadership and a corruption-free judiciary.
Ideal democratic orientation of any contemporary society presumes citizenry participation in the
governance of his or her society. In order to showcase adequate involvement of people in
decision making processes and belief towards governance in the context of democratic values
grassroots government was established. As a result of the complexity of corruption, its effects on
the systemic existence of its victims as does its prevalence through the efforts of its perpetuators,
its definition has continued to be shrouded by value preference and differences (Akindele and
Adeyemi, 2011).
The understanding of corruption connotes inappropriate act of people economically, politically,
socially and culturally. Irrespective- of the sectorial aspect of corruption enmeshed, its evaluation
could be underscored on the premise of societal prevailing orientation that mandated ones
behaviour socially, economically, politically or culturally. According to the World Bank and
Transparency International (TI), a leading global anticorruption watchdog, corruption is the
abuse of public office for private gains for the benefit of the holder of the office or some third

party. Viewed from these definitions, political corruption can be broadly understood as unethical
behaviour, which violates the norms of the system of political order (Heidenheimer and
Johnston, 1993). Nwabueze (2002) in his own contribution adopted a sociological approach to
the definition of corruption. Corruption according to Harsh (1993), is a practical problem,
involving the outright theft, embezzlement of funds or other appropriation of state property,
nepotism, and granting of favor to personal acquaintance. It has been argued that corruption
involves behaviors which deviate from the moral and constitutional requirements. Kalu (1991)
conceives corruption as the conscious and well planned act by a person or group of persons to
appropriate, by unlawful means, the wealth of another person or'' group of persons. Corruption
can also be seen as diversion of resources from the betterment of the community to the gain of
individuals at the expense of the community. Odey (2002) conceptualizes corruption in Nigeria
as the air which every living person breathes in and out, According to him, nobody makes any
effort to breathe in the air, it comes naturally. Corruption in Nigeria has become so naturalized
that' many of us simply become corrupt without making any effort and often even without
knowing it. Corruption, an ethical and moral problem which varies from place to place, time to
time, culture to culture and with the level of economic development (Aluko,2008), is a global
phenomenon that affects developed, developing and underdeveloped nations of the world.
Corruption is the major cause of poverty around the world. It occurs at all levels of governance,
that is, local and state. All over the world, the perception of corruption especially in public places
is very high. This is because, corruption undermines every aspect of national development
among which are, political development, economic development, social development and so on.

1.2

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Corruption has already marred Nigeria and the surviving strenght is slim because it has eaten
deep into the Nation's fabric and national life. It is more rampant in the public sector. The
political office holders both at the federal, State and local level engage in bewilding corruption.
A situation where this prevails, much will not be expected from the public-office holders and this
is detrimental to the survival of democracy in Nigeria. This problem has become so endemic on
the Nigerian populace that it calls for perpetual research to provide answers to some pressing
issues and questions arising from the menace of corruption using the anti crime corruption
agencies.
Despite the crusades of anti-corruption in Nigeria, its magnitude appears to be on the high side. It
has impaired hard work, diligence and efficiency. It has caused incalculable damages to the
social and political development of Nigeria. It subverts honest selection processes and distorts
prices. Furthermore, it weakens institutions, hampers investment and retards economic
development. More importantly the resources that should be used for developmental purposes
are being diverted from the society to private or personal use. This accumulation of the nations
economic resources for personal benefits had variously contributed to the leakage of capital from
Nigeria for illegal deposits abroad.
In other words, it has a crowding out effect on the development in Nigeria. Its contributing
effects on poverty and poor infrastructural development is the more worrying. Nevertheless the
extents of these negative effects are yet to be measured and quantified. It is against this
background that this study was inspired. The study intends to examine the extent and the
magnitude of corruption and the trend of development of Nigerian economy using only Nigeria
Fourth Republic cases. The paper will at the end provide answers to the following questions

What types of corrupt practices are noticeable in Nigeria during the fourth republic?

ii

What is the economic basis for these corrupt practices during the fourth republic?
iii

What are the extent and the magnitude of its impact on development of the Nigerian
economy?

iv

How can corruption be checked or eradicated in Nigeria?

1.3

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY


The broad objective of this research is to evaluate the overview of corruption and the trends of
development in Nigeria. (A case study of Nigeria fourth republic)
The specific objectives are;

1.4

The study will provide account of the type of corruption practices during fourth republic.

Examine the trend of development during fourth republic caused by corruption.

To examine corruption as the root cause under development in the history of Nigeria.

Examine the policies and strategies to eradicate corruption in Nigeria.


SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study will look into how corruption has been like since the period of Independence in
Nigeria especially in the Fourth Republic. It will cover corruption cases in Administration since
inception (from 1999 till date) in Nigeria.

1.5

METHODOLOGY
The methods of data collection is basically secondary data by using
1.

Document Analysis

Document analysis is a method of collecting data by looking at documents. Two basic types here
are:
1.

Historical/Library/ Archival and


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Generally, Document Analysis is the method by which we generate data from records and
documents whether in print or electronic forms, audio or visual, published or broadcast.
Historical method enables the researcher to reconstruct the past in an objective and systematic
manner as he or she set out to answer research questions, meet research object or test hypothesis.
Because data collected through this method have been recorded by others and not by the
researcher in the first instance, such data must be tested for the following: Authenticity, Accuracy
and Significance. It is as demanding and testing like any other social science method of
collecting data. The measuring instruments here include research notes, tapes, magazines,
journals, textbooks etc.
Content Analysis is about collecting data from documents.
1.6

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY


This study is a qualitative study; therefore all efforts will be generated to reading of articles,
document, journals, internet news, books and all anti corruption leftlet in other to document the
best informations. Also to subscribe for internet is costly in Nigeria, therefore money will be
involve in the project.

1.7

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY


The totality of this study will provide the reason for underdevelopment in Nigeria, using the trend
of development in Nigeria during the fourth republic. Because the issue of corruption is not only
found within the African continent alone, it encompasses all other continent. Corruption is endemic
everywhere, the costs of addressing corruption are prohibitively high, and the few resources that
exist should be spent on enforcement measures, such as high profile government watchdog
agencies.

But, in fact, there is increasing evidence that the economic costs of corruption are enormous; levels
of corruption vary widely among developing countries; controlling corruption is feasible, and
strategies to address corruption need to pay more attention to its root causes and thus to the roles of
incentives, prevention, and specific economic and underdevelopment nature it has caused.
1.8

CHAPTERIZATION
Against this backdrop, this paper is divided into six sections. The first section deals with
introduction; the second section focuses on conceptual clarification; the third section centres on
historical trajectory of corruption in governance in Nigeria; the fourth section discusses
corruption in the Fourth Republic; the fifth section examines financial corruption and national
development in Nigeria; while the sixth section is the conclusion.

REFERENCES
Akindele S.T. (1990). Corruption and Economic Retardation: A Retrospective Analysis of
Nigerians Experience since Independence. In: Readings in the Political Economy of
Nigeria since Independence. Ed. by Bamisaye, O. A (Lagos, Nigeria: Ventures Limited,.
Aluko M. A. O (2002). The Institutionalization of Corruption and Its Impact On Political Culture
And Behavior in Nigeria Nordic Journal of African Studies 11(3): 393-402.
Babalola A (1995) Corruption and Political Crisis in Nigeria: A Sociological Viewpoint the
Conference Proceedings of the Nigerian Anthropological and Sociological Association.
Babalola and Osoba (2011) On Corruption and Political crisis in Nigeria http//:www.corruption
watch.org/features/html accessed August 13.
Babatope Babalobi (2008) Causes of Corruption in Nigeria, Report of a Workshop for Civil
Society Organizations involved in the fight against Corruption, organized by Zero
Coalition, (ZCC) Lagos, December 11-12.
Bassey O.E. and Utre (2007), E.I. Corruption and National Development in Nigeria: The Way
Forward In Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy. 1.2 (2007).
Bassey Patrick (2011). The Culture of Corruption in Contemporary Nigeria: The Way out
Unpublished American. Journal Social Management Sciences, 2(1): 91-99
BBC News, November 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8322992.stm (accessed
August 17, 2013).
Coker, M. A. (2006). Corruption and Direct Foreign Investment in Nigeria in Sophia: An African
Journal of Philosophy.9.1.
Dahl, Robert. (1998) A On Democracy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Dike, Victor (2011). Corruption Control: A New Paradigm for Effective Control in Nigeria OnLine Publication Nigeria World.com/feature/article/corruption.html.
Human Rights Watch (2007), Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local Government
Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria, vol. 19, no. 2(A), January 2007,
http://www.hrw.org/node/11043.
Human Rights Watch (2007), Criminal Politics: Violence, Godfathers and Corruption in
Nigeria, vol. 19, no. 16(A), http://www.hrw.org/node/10661.
Ibrahim, Jibrin (2003) Corruption in Nigeria: Transition, Persistence and Continuity in The
Nigeria Social Scientist 6(2) 3 13.
Khan Mushtaq (1999): The new political economy of corruption, Department of Economics,
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, working paper.
Mauro, Paolo. 1995. Corruption and Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1995): 681712.
Ndiulor Tony (1999). Price Nigeria is Paying for Corruption The Guardian Newspaper On Line
March 17, 1999.
NORAD, (1997) ch.1, ch.2 & ch.4, Jan. 2000; Amundsen, 1997; Girling. Nye J.S. (1967).
Corruption and Political Development: A Case-Benefit Analysis The American Political
Science Review. (417-427).
Ochulor, Chinenye Leo, Metuonu Iheanacho C. and Asuo, Oduora Okpokam Corruption in
contemporary Nigeria: The way out American Journal of Social and Management Sciences
Science Hu, http://www.scihub.org/ 2011.
Osoba J. A.(1996); (2002) Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives Review of African
Political Economy.69. 23:371-386 (1996)

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Transparency International. Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

CHAPTER TWO
2.0
2.1

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK


LITERATURE REVIEW
Corruption is a disease, a cancer that eats into the cultural, political and economic fabric of
society, and destroys the functioning of vital organs. In the words of Transparency International,
Corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. It undermines good
government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms
the private sector and private sector development and particularly hurts the poor.
Corruption is found almost everywhere, but it is stubbornly entrenched in the poor countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa, it is widespread in Latin America, it is deeprooted in many of the newly
industrialised countries, and it is reaching alarming proportions in several of the post-communist
countries.
Corruption has been the subject of a substantial amount of theorising and empirical research over
the last 30 years, and this has produced a bewildering array of alternative explanations,
typologies and remedies. However, as an extensively applied notion in both politics and social
sciences, corruption is being used rather haphazardly. Corruption is understood as everything
from the paying of bribes to civil servants in return for some favour and the theft of public
purses, to a wide range of dubious economic and political practices in which politicians and
bureaucrats enrich themselves and any abusive use of public power to a personal end.
Besides, corruption is in itself a many-faceted phenomenon and the concept of corruption
contains too many connotations to be analytically functional without a closer definition. The
forms of corruption are diverse in terms of who are the actors, initiators and profiteers, how it is
done, and to what extent it is practised. Also the causes and the consequences of corruption are

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complex and diverse, and have been sought in both individual ethics and civic cultures, in history
and tradition, in the economic system, in the institutional arrangements, and in the political
system. The intention of this article is to classify the various forms of corruption, in order to
make corruption into an analytically useful concept for social sciences, and in particular political
science. First of all, some definitorial exercises will discuss the different forms of corruption, and
locate corruption as an element in a broader political and economic setting. The connection
between corruption strictly defined and a number of concepts related to corruption will also be
addressed in the first part of this paper. Secondly, the main of causes and effects of corruption
will be discussed, and the relationship between corruption and economic and political
developments. Finally, some references will be made as to the most relevant methodologies by
which studies of corruption can be carried out.
2.1.1

WHAT IS CORRUPTION?
The word corruption is originally from the Latin verb rumpere which means to break (AbdulIsmail, n.d.). Corruption means the breaking of a certain code of conduct for the personal benefit
of the perpetrator. Different scholars from social sciences, psychology, political sciences and
religious studies have attempted a working definition for corruption from their various
disciplines. However, all of the working definitions are interwoven. Firstly, defination will be
giving by World Bank, Akindele, Osoba and many others.
The World Bank (1997) defines corruption as:
The abuse of public office for private gains. Public office is abused for private gain
when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private
agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for
competitive advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal

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benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state
assets or the diversion of state resources.
Viewed differently, corruption is an anti-social behaviour committed by individuals
and/or social group, which entails conferring unjust or fraudulent benefits on perpetrators, the
behaviour is strictly inconsistent with the laid down rules and moral ethos of the land. The
repercussion of the behaviour is the likelihood of subversion of communal wealth thereby
leading to reduction of the capacity of the legitimate authorities, be it federal, state or local
government to provide fully for the material and spiritual well being of all members of society in
a just and equitable manner (Osoba, 2000, Agara, and Olarinmoye, 2009). Sen (in Aluko 2009:2)
defines corruption as the violation of established rules for personal gain and profit.
Akindele (1995) defines it as any form of reciprocal behaviour or transaction where both the
power/office holder can respectively initiate the inducement of each other by some rewards to
grant (illegal) preferential treatment or favour against the principles and interest of specific
organization (or public) within the society.
(Osoba 1998:378) defines corruption as an "anti-social behaviour conferring improper benefits
contrary to legal and moral norms, and which undermine the authorities" to improve the living
conditions of the people.
Corruption also describes the behavior of officials in the public and private sectors, involving
improperly and unlawfully enriching themselves and/or those closely related to them, or induce
others to do so, by misusing the position in which they are placed (Agbu, 2003).
Dike (2011) notes that though some of these definitions of corruption have been around for over
decades, the recent development in Nigeria where discoveries of stolen public funds run into
billions of US Dollars and Nigeria Naira, make these definitions very adequate and appropriate.

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He further observes that corruption is probably the main means of accumulating quick wealth in
Nigeria. It has contributed immensely to the poverty and misery of a large segment of the
Nigerian population. Corruption has become institutionalized in Nigeria.
Aluko (2002) notes, that. Corruption now appears to have become a permanent feature of the
Nigerian polity. It had become completely institutionalized, entered into the realm of culture and
the value-system; it is now a norm and no longer an aberration. The young ones are born into it,
grow up in it, live with it, and possibly die in it. The aged are not left out as they are re-socialized
and begin to conform to it. This observation by Aluko is quite true of the situation in Nigeria
where corruption has become endemic. The effect is noticed everywhere. The family is not left
out. When parent sends their wards on errand the children will expect some gratification from the
parent and some unsuspecting parent gratifying their wards with gifts. When the children grow
up, corruption becomes part of their daily life.
Corruption has come up as a thematic constituent of this renewed paradigm, in which
development necessitates economic reform, which is again dependent on political and
administrative reforms like good governance and civil service reforms (CRS), accountability,
human rights, multipartyism and democratisation. Besides, very high levels of corruption has
been observed where the government is regarded as illegitimate in the eyes of the population
(implying widespread disrespect for legal procedures), and in countries where the state plays an
interventionist role in the economy. The role of the state and of politics is therefore essential to
understand corruption.
2.1.2

THE STATE IS ALWAYS INVOLVED


The decisive role of the state is also reflected in most definitions of corruption. Corruption is
conventionally understood, and referred to, as the private wealthseeking behaviour of someone

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who represents the state and the public authority, or as the misuse of public goods by public
officials for private ends. The working definition of the World Bank is that corruption is the
abuse of public power for private benefit. In Colin Nyes classical and most widely used
definition, corruption is
behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of privateregarding
(personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence
(Nye 1967:417). A somewhat updated version with the same elements is found in the definition
by Mushtaq Khan, who defines it as behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of conduct
governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding
motives such as wealth, power, or status (Khan 1996:12).
In other words, corruption is a particular (and, one could say, perverted) statesociety relation. On
the one side is the state, that is the civil servants, functionaries, bureaucrats and politicians,
anyone who holds a position of authority to allocate rights over (scarce) public resources in the
name of the state or the government. Corruption is when these individuals are misusing the
public power they are bestowed with for private benefit. The corrupt act is when this responsible
person accepts money or some other form of reward, and then proceeds to misuse his official
powers by returning undue favours. For instance, it is an act of corruption when a state official
takes a bribe to render some public service that is supposed to be free of charge or demands more
than the official cost of it.
The involvement of state officials in corruption is also emphasised in an alternative definition,
where corruption is seen as a form of secret social exchange through which those in power
(political or administrative) take personal advantage of one type or another, of the influence they

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exercise in virtue of their mandate or their function (Mry cited in de Sardan 1999:49). In sum,
almost every definition (or rather conceptualisation) of corruption has a principal focus on the
state and politics (the corrupted), and a demand-oriented perspective.
On the other side of a corrupt act is nevertheless the supply side, and some theories and
conceptualisations exist that emphasise the corrupters, those who offer the bribes, and the
advantages they gain. These suppliers are the general public, or in other words the non-state
society. The counterparts to the corrupt officials are any non-governmental and non-public
individual, corporate and organisational, domestic and external.
Corruption also exists within and between private businesses, within nongovernmental
organisations, and between individuals in their personal dealings, without any state agency or
state official being involved. There is corruption also in the form of bribing, swindling, and
mafia-methods within and between private businesses, there are treacherous individuals and
disloyal employees also in private firms. This kind of corruption may even have repercussions
into the political system as it destroys the public morale, and it may be symptomatic for the
general economic and moral development of a society.
However, most definitions of corruption will exclude this intra-societal corruption, and
emphasise corruption as a state-society relationship. This is quite appropriate as long as the focus
is not exclusively on the personal, cultural and social aspects of corruption. Business-internal
corruption can and will normally be handled as a disciplinary problem within the firm, as a
judicial problem within a given legal framework, or as a moral problem within a cultural setting.
Therefore, in contrast to corrupt state-society relations, business internal corruption will not
necessarily have to consider the broader political and economic issues.

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2.1.3

Political corruption and bureaucratic corruption (grand vs. petty)


In the definition shared by most political scientists, political corruption is any transaction
between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately
converted into private-regarding payoffs (Heidenheimer et. al. 1993). This definition does not,
however, distinguish clearly between political and bureaucratic corruption. It establishes the
necessary involvement of the state and state agents in corruption, without any notion as to the
level of authority where corruption takes place.
In a more strict definition, political corruption involves political decisionmakers. Political or
grand corruption takes place at the high levels of the political system. It is when the politicians
and state agents, who are entitled to make and enforce the laws in the name of the people, are
themselves corrupt. Political corruption is when political decision-makers use the political power
they are armed with, to sustain their power, status and wealth. Thus, political corruption can be
distinguished from bureaucratic or petty corruption, which is corruption in the public
administration, at the implementation end of politics.
Even when the distinction between political and bureaucratic corruption is rather ambiguous as it
depends on the separation of politics from administration (which is unclear in most political
systems), the distinction is important in analytical and in practical terms. Political corruption
occurs at the top level of the state, and it has political repercussions.
Political corruption not only leads to the misallocation of resources, but it also affects the manner
in which decisions are made. Political corruption is the manipulation of the political institutions
and the rules of procedure, and therefore it influences the institutions of government and the
political system, and it frequently leads to institutional decay. Political corruption is therefore
something more than a deviation from formal and written legal norms, from professional codes

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of ethics and court rulings. Political corruption is when laws and regulations are more or less
systematically abused by the rulers, side-stepped, ignored, or even tailored to fit their interests
(Friedrich 1993). Political corruption is a deviation from the rational-legal values and principles
of the modern state, and the basic problem is the weak accountability between the governors and
the governed. In particular in authoritarian countries, the legal bases, against which corrupt
practices are usually evaluated and judged, are weak and furthermore subject to downright
encroachment by the rulers.
The formal legal framework of the state is therefore insufficient as terms of reference to assess
and judge the problem of political corruption. Moral, normative, ethical, and indeed political
benchmarks will have to be brought in, not at least because it will be necessary to discern legality
from legitimacy when it comes to political corruption. Besides, whereas bureaucratic corruption
normally can be dealt with through auditing, legislation, and institutional arrangements, the
degenerative effects of political corruption cannot be counteracted by an administrative approach
alone. Endemic political corruption calls for radical political reforms.
Political corruption (usually supported by widespread bureaucratic or petty corruption) should
furthermore be considered as one of the basic modes of operation of authoritarian regimes. It is
one of the mechanisms through which the authoritarian power-holders enrich themselves. Here,
corruption is rarely a disease that the responsible politicians are eager to avoid, it is a deliberate,
wanted and applied practice; it is one of the rulers modes of enrichment and economic control.
Political corruption is consequently a normal condition in authoritarian countries, although
showing a great variety according to the various forms of authoritarianism.
However, as demonstrated by a large number of corruption scandals in liberal democracies over
the years, political corruption is not restricted to authoritarian systems. Nevertheless, by

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maintaining the link between authoritarianism and political corruption, and a definition of
political corruption in terms of state prerogatives manipulated to serve the interests of the rulers,
one will see that the essence of the problem of political corruption differs much between
authoritarian and liberal democratic regimes. In democratic countries, the problem of political
corruption is more of an incidental and occasional nature, and can be dealt with within the
existing political system; by reforming, strengthening and vitalising the existing political
institutions of checks and balances.
2.1.4

Private corruption and collective corruption (individual vs. aggregated)


Observations as well as input from political theory have lead to a second analytically important
classification of corruption, namely between private and collective forms of corruption. The
degree to which the money or benefits collected through corruption is privatised, is varying. It
may be extraction for the benefit of an individual who will share nothing or very little of the
benefits with his equals, or it may be extraction for a particular group with some coherence and
unity.
The private, individual and intimate nature of corruption is repeatedly underlined because of
the illegal and surreptitious nature of corrupt transactions. The illegality and immorality of
corruption necessitates a collusion or conspiracy between individuals, or at least a certain
closeness and confidentiality. As noted, Mry called it a form of secret social exchange (Mry
cited in de Sardan 1999:49). Furthermore, corruption is regarded as private or individual also
because private benefits are sought and collected. Corruption holds some private benefit for the
corrupt actor, his family or his close friends.

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However, corruption may also be collective. First of all because corruption has a substantial
economic effect in aggregate terms, but also because corruption may in itself be a deliberate way
of resource extraction for the benefit of a larger group.
Some definitions of corruption also emphasises the point that the rulers as a group or class, or as
an institution or organisation, make unjustified use of their influence to extract resources for the
benefit of the group as such. Many well-known and well documented cases of grand corruption
has involved political parties (ruling parties in particular, but also prospective ruling parties),
entire administrative bureaux, and national governments.
Corruption has a strong inclination for collectivisation. To keep quiet and gradually take part in
the practice is usually much less costly than to blow the whistle, inform, and confront. A
conspiracy between individuals is easily extended into a larger practice involving colleagues,
partners, assistants, patrons and superiors. Instances of petty corruption may therefore develop
into larger networks, cliques and medium-sized brotherhoods, and finally into large-scale
institutionalised corruption if unchecked, if there is room for manoeuvre.
As corruption spreads, the social acceptance of it may also increase. When it is generally
understood that there is a climate of corruption, still more people will believe it is inevitable and
expected. In particular is corruption in high places contagious to lower level bureaucrats and
other state agents, as these will follow the predatory examples of, or even take instructions from,
their principals.
2.1.5

Redistributive and extractive corruption (from below vs. from above)


In whose interest does corruption take place, and who benefits the most from corruption? The
various definitions of corruption maintain that the state (or some state agent) is always involved,
and that corruption is basically a particular state-society relationship. It is furthermore

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maintained that this relationship is based on a mutual exchange of benefits, that it is an exchange
from which both the state (the state agent) and the society (the individual citizen, client or
businessman) will draw some immediate and private benefit. This relationship of mutual
exchange is rarely balanced, however. In aggregate terms corrupt practices will generate a flow
of resources either from the society to the state (extractive corruption, or corruption form above),
or from the state to the society (redistributive corruption, or corruption from below).
As noted by Heidenheimer, some researchers have made the distinction between corruption
initiated by the office-holder and corruption initiated by the favour-seeker (Heidenheimer et.al.,
1993). This is a useful distinction, but as the initiator takes the initiative to corrupt the
relationship presumably because he believes corruption will be to his benefit more than to his
disadvantage, this distinction overlaps with the distinction between corruption in the interest of
the state agents and corruption in the interest of non-state actors.
To complicate this a bit further, it should be noted that upward and downward flows can take
place simultaneously in different sectors and at different levels. Some ministries may for instance
be very efficient in illegal resource extraction while others may be vulnerable to external
influence and be extorted. Furthermore, the flows of resources differ much in quality. The
resources exchanged can be countables like money, wealth and fiscal privileges to the one party,
and uncountables like influence, identity and security to the other.
This implies for instance that the state as a group or elite may extract substantial resources in the
form of wealth and power from the nation or the society at large, while the society in return will
have only symbolic resources like protection and national identity. In many cases, corrupt
practices have established extremely well to do political and state-based elites (ruling classes)
amidst poverty and recession. On the other hand, businesses and other groups may be very

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successful in getting tax exemptions and other privileges from corrupt officials in weak states, to
the extent that the unity and coherence of the state and its policies are ruined, the policy
implementation capacity ravaged, and the resources of the nation depleted. In extreme
situations, the state may be held hostage to and torn apart by forceful groups in society.
The effect of the corrupted state-society relationship, and the direction the aggregated flow of
resources will take, is not given a priori. Only historical and empirical research into these
relationship in given countries can reveal its true character. The role of corruption within this
broader perspective of a state society relationship is, however, usually understood implicitly, and
in aggregate terms as either benefiting certain sectors of the society (like business interests and
emerging capitalist classes) or certain state elites (like juntas and single-party nomenclatures).
2.2

THE CAUSES AND EFFECT OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA


In his paper Corruption in Nigeria: A New Paradigm for Effective Control Dike citing a report
from Reuters a French News Agency notes the following organization and parastatal that were
recently affected by corruption. Some official of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) lost
their posts because they were found guilty of receiving bribes.
All the commissioners of the European Union (EU), resigned because they too, had been found
to be corrupt beyond acceptable limits. Corruption and mismanagement within local
governments in Rivers State have severely impacted access by ordinary Nigerians to basic health
care and primary education and how political violence and corruption have undermined Nigerias
electoral system and denied ordinary Nigerians their right to freely choose their leaders.
Nigeria has long held the unenviable reputation as having one of the worlds most corrupt public
sectors, in which corrupt practices including the theft of public funds, bribery, and kickbacks

21

pervade all levels of government. Between 1999 and 2003, Nigeria ranked last or second-to-last
on Transparency Internationals annual Corruption Perceptions Index.
In 2006, the then-head of Nigerias Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Nuhu Ribadu,
estimated that Nigeria lost some $380 billion to corruption between independence in 1960 and
the end of military rule in 1999.54 Nigerias corruption epidemic has continued since then. Exact
figures of its costs are impossible to determine, but some diplomats estimated that between 1999
and 2007, Nigeria lost a minimum average of $4 billion to $8 billion per year to corruption.
In Nigerias four leading oil-producing states, for example, where state budgets alone exceed the
total central government budgets of many West African countries, the state and local
governments have grossly failed to progressively realize the basic health and education needs of
their citizens. Instead, public funds that could have been used to improve the lives of ordinary
Nigerians have been squandered and siphoned off by the governing elite.
The level of corruption and accompanying lack of development in the major oil-producing states,
however, is by no means unique. The federal governments revenue totalled $45.4 billion in
2008, but 64 percent of Nigerians live on less than $1.25 a day and the maternal and infant
mortality rates in Africas largest oil-producing nation are among the worst in the world.
Corruption also lies at the heart of much of the political violence in Nigeria, as politicians use
stolen public funds to sponsor criminal gangs to rig elections, which are often marked by
violence. Corruption fuels and rewards this violence and contributes to the impunity enjoyed by
those responsible for such abuses, which both denies justice to victims and obstructs reform.
The causes of corruption are many and they have political, social and cultural variables. The
most common cause of corruption is poverty. Poverty is the main cause of corruption in third
world countries. Nigeria is rated among the most corrupt country in the world. Nigeria is rich in

22

different resources but because the leaders are corrupt, average masses do not enjoy the resources
the nation is endowned with. According to a report from the workshop organized by ZCC, Lagos
from Dec 11-12, 2012;
Babalobi notes these following as the cause of corruption in Nigeria.
1. Weak Government institutions
2. Poor pay incentives
3. Lack of openness and Transparency in public service
4. Absence of key anti corruption tools
5. Ineffective political processes
6. Culture and acceptance of corruption by the populace
7. Absence of effective political financing
8. Poverty
9. Ethnic and religious difference
Osoba (1995), Akindele (1995) and Dike (2008) add the following to causes of corruption;
1) Great inequality in distribution of wealth;
2) Political office as the primary means of gaining access to wealth;
3) Conflict between changing moral codes;
4) The weakness of social and governmental enforcement mechanisms; and
5) The absence of a strong sense of national community (Bryce, 1921).
2.2.1

THE EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION


The effect of corruption on the national polity cannot be overemphasized. Corruption usually has
negative impact on the socio-political and economic development of any nation. The menace

23

should be tackled before the cankerworm spread to every facet of the polity. Dike notes the
following effects of corruption on the nation.
1.

Reduction in public spending on education. The effect of corruption on education comes from
the fact that the government spends relatively more on items to make room for "graft" and
corrupt government officials would shift government expenditures to areas in which they can
collect bribes easily.

2.

Large and hard-to-manage projects, such as airports or highways, make fraud easy. In addition,
poverty and income inequalities are tied to corruption. Development projects are often made
unnecessarily complex in Nigeria to justify the corrupt and huge expense on it. The new national
stadium in Abuja, which is said to have gulped millions of Naira more than necessary, is a case in
point.

3.

The effect of corruption is noted on the poor state of infrastructure and road network. Most of the
infrastructures are not well built and the roads not well constructed. Barely the government
would open a road network that potholes and erosion will carry it away. The state of most roads
that have just been constructed is appalling. As a result of the poor state of the road, accidents are
common on this road.
Recently some buildings are collapsing in the country as a result of corruption. Those who
supposed to supervise and approve the building construction thoroughly would not do so once
they collect graft from the owner of such building. The shady job done by this contractor has led
to the untimely death of many people.

4.

Many of the leaders are still corrupt and amassing wealth to themselves. Worst still is the
security outfit that is saddled with the responsibility of securing the nation has been caught
aiding and abetting armed robbers to unleash terror on the masses. Poverty is the result of

24

corruption. Despite the huge resources the nature has endowed on the nation most people are still
languishing in penury and misery.
Corruption causes a reduction in quality of goods and services available to the public, as some
companies could cut corners to increase profit margins. Corruption effects investment, economic
growth, and government expenditure choices; it also reduces private investment.
2.3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.3.1

Theory of redistributive corruption


In what can be called the theory of redistributive corruption, the state is the weaker part in the
state-society relationship. Here, various social and economic groups, interests or individuals are
organised and powerful enough to draw more benefit from the corrupt practices they engage in
with the state as a counterpart, than is the state and the ruling elite. The main beneficiaries of the
resources extracted, privatised and consumed are not the political and state-based elite, but state
resources are depleted and distributed to various groups and interests according to the power
configurations in each country. (De Sardan 1999)
The theory of redistributive corruption is based on the experience of some of the most
fragmented states in the world, like Bangladesh where state degradation is largely due to the
relative power of clientelist networks, and Russia where there is an extreme growth in mafia
activity. The focus is mainly on the subversive groups and powers, and the degenerative effects
of this kind of corruption on state institutions and the national economy. Here, politically strong
and organised groups will for instance be able to challenge state authority from below through
corruption. Though corruption, alliances will be forced with functionaries who will deliver state
services and goods; politicians will be bought to tailor rights and regulations that will benefit

25

those who pay for it; and political influence will be bribed or extorted as the regimes mere
survival may depend on political support from these groups.
Who, in society, will benefit the most from this kind of corruption depends on the local
distribution of forces. It might be powerful ethnic or regional groups or clans who are strong
enough to extract much more from the state than their fair part of public investments,
development projects, international aid, regional autonomy and representation in national
institutions. It might be foreign or local corporate interests that are able to buy under-priced
national resources, concessions, preferential treatments, permissions, and tax exemptions. It
might be the general population, individuals who are able to buy benefits like tax exemptions,
subsidies, pensions, or unemployment insurance, or get preferential access to privileged schools,
medical care, housing, real estate or ownership stakes in enterprises being privatised.
The loser in this game is the state and its regulating capacity. When private citizens, commercial
businesses (local and international) and various interest groups (formal and informal, modern
and traditional) are able to buy national and public resources cheaply, to buy exceptions,
privileges, immunity and impunity through the use of kickbacks and mafia methods vis--vis
public officials, the state will be eroded.
The effect of redistributive corruption is that the state is rendered incapacitated and politically
impotent. The capacity of the state to extract taxes and render public services will be eroded; its
ability to implement coherent policies is destroyed, as well as the states ability to transform the
society and the economy according to political priorities and to execute rational development
policies.
Furthermore, redistributive corruption will particularly hurt the poor because resources are
privatised and redistributed according to the ability of groups to influence policies through

26

pressure and bribes, and not through the principle of one man one vote. Resources will not be
distributed according to universalistic or ideological considerations of needs and fairness.
Those in most need of political redistribution, in terms of basic public services like schools,
health, social services, and state protection, will suffer the most when the states capacity is
crippled.
Feudalisation is a term that has been used when weak states are manipulated by strong societies,
when the state is losing control to civilian forces. Feudalisation refers to the privatisation
and decentralisation of the state, and underlines the clientelist relationship involved.
Feudalisation occurs when entire geographical areas, economic sectors and/or military units are
taken over by private interests. In the short run, a ruler might benefit from deliberate
feudalisation in terms of loyalty (from local or regional strongmen, clientelist groups or vassals),
and in terms of an assured delivery of the votes for the ruling party in elections, but in the long
run the unity of the state is jeopardised.
The case par excellence is Russia, where the control of large tracts of the states prerogatives and
institutions like regional tax bases, military regions, security operations, and even legislation,
have been handed over as fiefs to private powers like bankers, private companies and military
leaders4. In Cameroon, in return for loyalty and the delivery of votes, the president and ruling
party have given certain regions ruled by ancient dynasties almost unrestricted powers5. The
president has bought their loyalty by giving them the exclusive right of local taxation, and the
palace guards of the have developed into paramilitary forces with unrestricted tribunals and
dreaded prisons. In both cases, the problem is that when the ruler or the state elite through
feudalisation is able to retain and secure its control of the central government and of important
regions, the everlasting faithfulness of the latter is never guaranteed.

27

2.3.2

The theory of extractive corruption


In the alternative view, in what can be called the theory of extractive corruption, the state is the
stronger part in the state-society relationship. According to this theory, the corrupted (the state or
some state agent) benefits the most from corruption and the corrupter is more or less a passive
player. Essentially, the ruling elite is the strongest force is society, this elite or class uses the state
apparatus as its instrument to extract resources from society, and it does so for the benefit of the
rulers. This theory is partly based on the operation of authoritarian countries in general, and on
the experience of the neo-patrimonial states in particular.
The theory mainly applies where the state is not only the strongest force in society, but also
where a ruling elite has developed into a dominant and ruling class in control of the powers of
the state. The theory also emphasises the well-known remark that all power tends to corrupt, and
absolute power corrupts absolutely. That is, the more political power is concentrated exclusively
in the hands of a few individuals, the greater the temptation for power abuse, selfish wealthseeking and primitive extraction.
The theory of extractive corruption in based on the mainstream political science notion of
authoritarianism, namely a rule basically in the interest of the rulers that is ultimately based on
force. Authoritarian rulers are using the power capabilities of the state in the struggle for power,
to attain, retain and increase their powers, and to accumulate resources from the nation and from
the ruled, for private benefit. This understanding of authoritarianism dates back to the classic
writings of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, who made the distinction between rule of law and
rule of force. The rule of law was democratic rule for the benefit of the entire population (all
citizens, the public or the nation as such), whereas the rule of force was an authoritarian,

28

perverted and corrupted form of rule for the advantage of the ruler (the tyrant or some oligarchy).
(Johnston 1996)
Authoritarian regimes have ever since usually been understood and portrayed in terms of some
ruling elite or class that uses and misuses the powers of the state primarily to safeguard their own
corporate or class interests, at the detriment of and usually in conflict with other groups and
interests in society. In political terms, the means available for authoritarian rulers range from
charisma and persuasion to the overt use of violence. They may use sophisticated institutional
arrangements like for instance presidential systems, single party systems, and the cooptation of
rivals in order to restrict participation and power sharing. They may use censorship and electoral
fraud, establish unjust laws and disrespect the laws they have made
themselves, and use human rights violations like political surveillance and intimidation,
imprisonment and torture. In economic terms, corruption, and in particular political corruption, is
only one of the many modes of economic accumulation and private appropriation applied by
authoritarian rulers.
The theory of extractive corruption is furthermore derived from the relatively stable and rather
flexible neo-patrimonial political systems found in most of Africa and in a few Latin American
and Asian countries. Neo-patrimonialism is a widely used concept in political science for this
sub-category of non-democratic and semi democratic regimes characterized by pervasive patronclient structures, the no distinction between public and private, and political weakness.
Neo-patrimonialism is defined as a political system where the chief executive maintains
authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law. As with the classical
or traditional patrimonialism described by Max Weber, the right to rule is ascribed to a person

29

rather than an office, and exercised more through the informal clientelist and nepotist practices
than through formal routes of authority. (Leys 1965)
What makes the neo-patrimonial system different from the patrimonial ones, is that the neopatrimonial regime maintains a faade of modernity, legality, rationality, and professional
bureaucratic structures. However, underneath what appear to rational and legal processes and
structures, the clientelist and patrimonial logics prevail.
Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade the formal and administrative structures, and
leaders occupy bureaucratic and political positions less to perform public services than to acquire
personal wealth and status (Bratton & van de Walle 1994:458).
In neo-patrimonial systems, there is no clear distinction between the public and the private
domain. Public office and position is seen as a personal asset and a personal right, and it is
treated as a private resource. Thus, the entire political system is characterised by a deep and
thorough privatisation and usurpation of public resources. Politics is to a large extent about
distributing resources in the form of jobs, contracts, scholarships, gifts and other public resources
to ones relatives, friends and political allies.
Furthermore, politics is about acquiring wealth and prestige through the system of prebendal
accumulation, which has also been called parasitism and kleptocracy. That is, public
authority is used by the rulers to extract resources from the ruled and from the nations riches.
Public office is used to enforce the collection of prebends and gifts of all sorts from the
dependent clients. Corruption, embezzlement, theft and extortion are used to make private
fortunes, and political power is used by power-holders to enter into profitable businesses (and to
establish monopoly rights, tax exemptions and other advantages for these). Nationalization,

30

indigenization, privatization, the allocation of monopoly rights, land entitlements, subsidies,


subsidized credits, import and export licenses and tariffs, and a number of other public resources
are likewise distributed according to the patrimonial logic.
Clientelism is a basic feature of the neo-patrimonial system. This is the sophisticated hierarchic
network of patron-client relationships through which the patrons grant services, positions, and
public support to his clients, in exchange for political and material support. These clientelist
networks of reciprocities or nets of interaction are used by patrons at different levels to build
support through the extraction and distribution of wealth and prestige, constructing a pyramid of
social differentiation. Villagers for instance relate as clients to landowners, traders, saints, local
administrators and others taking the roles of patronising middlemen. These low class clients then
offer electoral support, social prestige, religious support, labour and material and fiscal benefits
to their patron, in return for his protection, leadership and a sense of belonging. From the level of
the middlemen, the clientelist system extends all the way up to the president of the republic.
In most Sub-Saharan African countries, long lasting patrimonial and clientelist practices have
over the years established what has been called hegemonic elites, or ruling state-classes. These
are composed of a rather small elite of politically and economically dominating families. Studies
have shown that the countries like the Cte dIvoire and Cameroon is ruled and dominated by an
elite composed of some 50 families or approximately 1000 individuals who are controlling most
of the public as well as the private sector (Amundsen 1997).
In neo-patrimonial countries, political corruption is an integrated part of the clientelist system, it
is what is labelled in French la fraude rige en systme, institutionalised political corruption.
Political corruption is here one of the economic backbones of the state elite, its domination and
survival. The extractive capacity of a corrupted state apparatus is one of the raisons dtre of

31

holding power in neopatrimonial countries, and what various groups are fighting over. (Toulabor
1990)
Corruption in neo-patrimonial regimes is largely seen as collective because of the apparent
power of consumption of the rulers. Wealth is displayed to symbolize power, sometimes in
blatantly pretentious ways. In addition to the private use and display of the riches extracted,
public policies are tailored to benefit the ruling elites.
As demonstrated from a number of African countries, the public use of state funds in neopatrimonial regimes is biased to benefit of the upper echelons of the urban, educated elite
through for instance the systematic development of high-cost services, like university education
and tertiary health facilities in the urban centres (capitals), at the detriment of low-cost rural
services (Amundsen 1997).
Secondly, in neo-patrimonial states, corruption and patron-client relations overlap into a pyramid
of upward extraction. Note that patrimonial relations are not balanced. The flow of resources
benefits the patron more than in benefits the clients, because each patron has a large number of
clients in his web, and the patron accumulates more than he redistributes.
Neo-patrimonial regimes are not efficient, legitimate nor development oriented regimes. For
instance, the resources of the state are not redistributed to the needy or invested in production, it
is extracted, amassed, and consumed by the rulers.
Furthermore, in neo-patrimonial regimes, nominations and promotions in the public sector are
made according to family and loyalty criteria, and not based on capability or meritocratic criteria.
Commercial and corporate activities protected from market exposure and competition by
political connections are promoted, but politically independent economic activity is squeezed by

32

formal and informal taxation. Thus, state-protected extractive and primitive capitalism is
encouraged, while productive and industrial capitalism is discouraged.
Besides, according to a recent hypothesis in political science, the authoritarian, neo-patrimonial
regimes with the easiest access to resources will be extremely hard to democratise. In other
words, where the ruling elite has a relatively easy access to revenues, rents or spoils from oil or
mineral resources, or from other strategic resources or foreign support (so-called primitive
extraction or rentier states), the ruling elite will be relatively independent of the ordinary or
traditional economic activity in the country, as well as its overall economic development.
Furthermore, they will be quite immune to the sufferings and protests of the population, and be
able to defend themselves against internal rivals, because they will be able to purchase the
necessary security in the form of military hardware, personnel and services on the international
market.
In other words, the neo-patrimonial state-class will, via their control of the state apparatus and
the treasury, take control of the national resources. Several African civil wars, like the one in
Sierra Leone, Congo/Brazzaville, Liberia, and Somalia, should primarily be understood as warlords fighting over the single most valuable asset in Africa: the state apparatus and its exclusive
right to tax (or tap) the foreign companies which exploit the countrys mineral riches.
2.4

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Around corruption itself lies an array of related offences, and there is a confusing array of other
concepts and notions linked to and sometimes used interchangeably with corruption. However,
with the distinctions made between political and bureaucratic corruption and between extractive
and redistributive corruption, these various practices, and the related concepts, can be located
within a broader scheme.

33

Bribery is the payment of a fixed sum, a certain percentage of a contract, or any other favour
in money of kind paid to the state official in charge of making contracts on behalf of the state or
otherwise distribute benefits to companies or individuals, businessmen and clients. To pay or
receive a bribery is corruption per se, and should be understood as the essence of both extractive
and redistributive corruption. The bribery is the payment (in money or kind) given to or taken by
the state official in a corrupt relationship.
There are many equivalent terms to bribery, like kickbacks, baksheesh, sweeteners, grease money
and pay-offs, which are all notions of corruption seen from below, as redistributive corruption.
These are all payments needed or required to make things pass swifter, smoother or more
favourably through a bureaucracy, or to avoid some burden. By greasing palms many
corporations and business interests are for example able to buy political favours and escape the
full burden of taxation and environmental regulations, others are able to buy protected markets
and monopolies, import/export licences, etc.
Bribery, however, is also extraction. It is a kind of informal taxation when public officials
charge extra under-the-table payments or gifts from clients. It is an extractive form of bribery
when a party boss goes on a promotion tour, and fills the luggage compartment of his car with
donations and gifts from the devoted followers in his constituency.
Embezzlement is theft of public resources by public officials, and as such it is understood as
another form of misappropriation of public funds. The state official steals from the public
institution in which he his employed and from resources he is supposed to administer on behalf
of the state and the public. However, disloyal employees in private forms can also embezzle their
employers and firms, and several kinds of resources may be embezzled.

34

Embezzlement is not considered as corruption from a strict legal point of view. In legal terms,
corruption is a transaction between two individuals, one state agent and one civilian agent,
where the state agent goes beyond the limits of the law and regulations in order to secure himself
a personal benefit in the form of a bribe.
Embezzlement is therefore regarded as theft, because it does not involve the civilian side
directly. The general public is bestolen only indirectly when public funds are embezzled, and
individual citizens have no legal right to present themselves as forfeited.
This points to one of the dangers of embezzlement. There will have to be a political will as well
as an independent judiciary and a legal capacity in order to clamp down on embezzlement. In
authoritarian and semi-democratic countries, a system of embezzlement can develop in a closed
institutional and moral universe, independently of the public moral and with few possibilities of
public sanctions. Without a directly involved civil party in this, embezzlement is also
irrelevant to any understanding of corruption as redistributive (any Robin Hood can be
excluded). Within the theory of extractive corruption, however, embezzlement is seen as one of
the most important modes of economic accumulation. Embezzlement is a fundamental part of the
resource extractive capacity of the ruling elite, and may even be more important than extraction
through bribes.
In the early 1990s, the late president of the Cte dIvoire, Flix Houphout- Boigny, constructed
a basilica in his dusty little home-town of Yamoussoukro, to the cost of US$ 145 million
(officially; unofficially about twice as much). This Basilique Notre Dame de la Paix is indicative
for the amounts of funds possible to amass through embezzlement in a poor country. The costs
for this gilded replica of St. Peters cathedral in Rome were covered by the president privately.
However, investigations have concluded that this much money can only have been raised

35

through the systematic and institutionalised embezzlement of the Caisse de stabilisation, the
state marketing board for the Ivorian coffe- and cocoa export. This marketing board enjoyed a
monopoly situation for many years and siphoned off between 20 and 80% of the revenues
(Toulabor 1990).
It is a sort of embezzlement also when power-holders use their political office systematically to
enter into, secure and expand their private business interests. In some cases the political elite has
for instance nationalised foreign businesses and property rights, and redistributed this to the
members of the ruling families. In the name of privatisation, a large number of former state
enterprises and parastatals have been handed over to friends and family of ministers and
presidents, for symbolic sums of money. In Zimbabwe (ex-Rhodesia), ruling party bosses now
mostly own the formerly white farms. In the Cte dIvoire, the largest coffee-and cocoa
plantations are owned by the presidents family. In Cameroon and other African countries the
biggest breweries, sugar refineries, and other companies are owned by the president and his
family and enjoying monopoly rights.
Fraud is a crime that involves some kind of trickery, swindle or deceit, and it is a broader legal
and popular term that covers both bribery and embezzlement. It is fraud when for instance state
agencies and state representatives are engaged in the black and grey (informal) markets, and
when networks of forgery, trade in illegal goods and smuggling are propped up by official
sanction and involvement. While serious fraud is generally treated as cases of individual
enrichment, fraud can also be collective. Fraud is the swindle and deceit used by the ruling
group to make more benefits for the rulers, and as such the concept includes what has been
labeled extractive corruption.

36

Fraud was called dirty tricks politics by Bayart in the book The Criminalisation of the State in
Africa (Bayart et.al. 1997). Here, the fraudulent, illegal and immoral ways of money extraction
employed by African rulers and their backers are described in quite some detail. Dirty tricks
politics include cases of governments importing toxic and atomic waste from Western
countries (like the Central African Republic and Sierra Leone), cases of presidents who have
printed large amounts of national bank notes to pay civil servants and military men (who have
then forced these upon local traders, at gunpoint in the case of Zare), and state or
parastatal institutions that have persuaded private firms to give them loans, assistance and
services that will never be paid back (Cameroon, the Central African Republic and several
others). Many private banks have consequently gone bankrupt or withdrawn from the African
market, like BCCI and Banque Mridien.
According to this book, members of the ruling elites in Nigeria and Kenya have been involved in
the international drug trade, as ministers and top bureaucrats have been active in it or have taken
a share for closing their eyes on it. Money laundering and money flight is from these and other
countries passing through state banks and parastatals. Public agencies have been issuing falsified
certificates of country of origin and of brand names, enabling faked goods from Taiwan and
Hong Kong to reach the European and American markets. What is widespread and even
increasing, according to Bayart, is the role of the African state as an active mediator, facilitator
and partner in fraudulent and criminal business activities, in organised crime nationally and
internationally (Bayart et.al. 1997).
Extortion is money (or other resources) extracted by the use of coercion, violence or the
threats to use force. Protection or security money is resources extorted in the classical,
infamous mafia style. By creating an atmosphere of insecurity where individual citizens, private

37

businesses and public officials are harassed and intimidated (by the mafia itself), the mafia
blackmails and extorts some money in return for their kind of peace. Only those who pay this
protection money may be exempted from further harassment. Like bribery, blackmailing and
extortion is basically a corrupt transaction, but the money is more violently extracted and the
returns are meagre. The exchange of benefits is highly unequal because in return for millions in
protection money, the blackmailed may get no more than a negative freedom, a lax promise of
impunity. Corruption in the form of extortion is usually understood as a form of redistributive
extraction, from below. It is for instance when real mafias, like in Russia and Italy, are able to
impose their influence upon individual state officials and entire state agencies through threats
and intimidation and ultimately by assassinations. What they obtain in return may be preferential
business opportunities and privileges, and freedom from taxation, regulations, and legal
prosecution.
However, corrupt practices of this kind can also be from above, when the state itself is the
biggest mafia of them all. This is known for instance where the state, and in particular its security
services and paramilitary groups, extorts money from individuals and groups to protect them
from further harassment. One extreme situation of this was Mobutus Zare, as described by Mel
McNulty: The states only apparent function was the systematic exploitation of its people and
resources, while it offered nothing in return, not even security; instead, the state itself and its
agents were the principal sources of insecurity (McNulty 1999).
With more or less concealed threats, the rulers from private sector businesses also extract
resources. When exaggeratedly strict taxation, overtly delayed licenses, repeated and brutal
police inspections or other harassment are to be expected, private sector businesses rarely take
the chance of refusing state or ruling party officials what they demand. Presidential re-election

38

campaigns are for instance recurrently irrigated by private companies. When the ruling party
of Cte dIvoire held its national convention in 1997, party bosses also used the major hotel in
the capital city Abidjan without paying a cent, catering services were given free of charge, and
the citys recently privatised bus company placed all the citys buses to the service of the party
convention. This was upon request and against massive protests from the public.
Also the extortion made by military and police units in their many roadblocks can be understood
as extractive corruption. Over most of Africa, from Tunisia in the north to South Africa, these
roadblocks are widespread. Whenever you leave or enter a town, there is a checkpoint where
men in uniform expect a little fee for making the passage smooth. In some cases, these
checkpoints are used to restrict the movement of dissenters, but usually it is tolerated by
governments as a source of income for underpaid divisions, a sort of taxation of local travellers.
Favouritism is a mechanism of power abuse implying privatisation and a highly biased
distribution of state resources, no matter how these resources have been accumulated in the first
place. Favouritism or cronyism is to grant offices or benefits to friends and relatives, regardless
of merit. Favouritism is related to corruption insofar as it means power abuse in the form of a
corrupted (undemocratic, privatised) distribution of resources, whereas corruption strictly
defined is about the accumulation of resources. However, favouritism in the distribution of
resources is intimately related to corruption, in particular the collective and extractive corruption
of neopatrimonial regimes as discussed above.
Favouritism is quite simply the normal human proclivity to favour friends, family and anybody
close and trusted. In the political sphere, favouritism is the penchant of state officials and
politicians, who have access to state resources and the power to decide upon the distribution of
these, to give preferential treatment to certain people when distributing resources. Clientelist

39

favouritism is a basic characteristic of the neo-patrimonial societies, but in most societies it is a


rather everyday proclivity to favour ones kinship members (family, clan, tribe, ethnic, religious
or regional group). In most non-democratic systems, the president has for instance the
constitutional right to appoint all high-ranking positions. This easily ads up to several hundred
positions within the ministries, the military and security apparatus, in parastatals and public
companies and agencies, in the diplomatic corps and in the ruling party. This legal or customary
right, of course, extends the possibilities for (and intensifies) all kinds of favouritism,
Nepotism is a special form of favouritism, in which an office holder (ruler) with the right to make
appointments, prefers to nominate to prominent positions his proper kinfolk and family members
(wife, brothers and sisters, children, nephews, cousins, in-laws etc.). Many unrestricted
presidents have tried to secure their (precarious) power position by nominating family members
to key political, economic and military/security positions in the state apparatus. (Mny 1996)
When successful, deeply nepotist systems are getting closer to a mafia because of the shared
family values and loyalties. Other kinds of favouritism is for instance when certain people are
commissioned to buy privatised public property (cheaply), or given preferences, state guaranteed
or subventioned loans, or selected as entrepreneurs for public works, nominated to represent
corporate interests in various public councils and committees, and given other privileges through
various economic policies. Through such mechanisms, many politicians and bureaucrats have
been able to move from public position into private business, to transfer public power into
private wealth11. The kind(s) of favouritism that will be preferred in each instance is dependent
on the political and strategic needs of the day, and on cultural and social patterns. Favouritism is
not only a legal and procedural problem, but also a problem of flawed qualifications, lacking
skills and inefficiency.

40

REFERENCES
Akindele S.T. (1990). Corruption and Economic Retardation: A Retrospective Analysis of
Nigerians Experience since Independence. In: Readings in the Political Economy of
Nigeria since Independence. Ed. by Bamisaye, O. A (Lagos, Nigeria: Ventures Limited,.
Aluko M. A. O (2002). The Institutionalization of Corruption and Its Impact On Political Culture
And Behavior in Nigeria Nordic Journal of African Studies 11(3): 393-402.
Babalola A (1995) Corruption and Political Crisis in Nigeria: A Sociological Viewpoint the
Conference Proceedings of the Nigerian Anthropological and Sociological Association.
Babalola and Osoba (2011): On Corruption and Political crisis in Nigeria http//:www.corruption
watch.org/features/html accessed August 13.
Babatope Babalobi (2008): Causes of Corruption in Nigeria, Report of a Workshop for Civil
Society Organizations involved in the fight against Corruption, organized by Zero
Coalition, (ZCC) Lagos.
Bassey O.E. and Utre (2007), E.I. Corruption and National Development in Nigeria: The Way
Forward In Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy. 1.2 (2007).
Bassey Patrick (2011). The Culture of Corruption in Contemporary Nigeria: The Way out
Unpublished American. Journal Social Management Sciences, 2(1): 91-99
BBC News, November 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8322992.stm (accessed
August 17, 2013).
Central

Intelligence

Agency,

The

World

Factbook

2009,

https://ww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/ index.html (accessed May 2,


2010).

41

Coker, M. A. (2006). Corruption and Direct Foreign Investment in Nigeria in Sophia: An African
Journal of Philosophy.9.1.
Dike, Victor (2011). Corruption Control: A New Paradigm for Effective Control in Nigeria OnLine Publication Nigeria World.com/feature/article/corruption.html.
Human Rights Watch (2007), Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local Government
Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria, vol. 19, no. 2(A), January 2007,
http://www.hrw.org/node/11043.
Human Rights Watch 2010 Everybody on the game: Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by
the Nigeria Police Force August 2010 http://www.hrw.org/node/10442
Human Rights Watch, 2007 Criminal Politics: Violence, Godfathers and Corruption in
Nigeria, vol. 19, no. 16(A), October 2007, http://www.hrw.org/node/10661.
Human Rights Watch, Corruption on trial 2011: The Record of Nigerias Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission August 2011, http://www.hrw.org/node/12761.
Ibrahim, Jibrin (2003) Corruption in Nigeria: Transition, Persistence and Continuity in the
Nigeria Social Scientist 6(2) 3 13.
Khan Mushtaq (1999): The new political economy of corruption, Department of Economics,
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, working paper.
Mauro, Paolo. 1995. Corruption and Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1995): 681712.
Ministry

of

Finance

monthly

allocations,

published

online

at

http://www.fmf.gov.ng/FMF_Revenue_Alloc.aspx (accessed October 14, 2013).


Ndiulor Tony (1999). Price Nigeria is paying for Corruption The Guardian Newspaper On Line
March 17, 1999.

42

Nigeria

leaders

stole

$380bn,

BBC

News,

October

20,

2006,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6069230.stm (accessed October, 2013).


Nigeria Police Force (2008). Annual Report of the Nigeria Police Force, pp. 94 and 132.
NORAD, (1997) ch.1, ch.2 & ch.4, Jan. 2000; Amundsen, 1997; Girling. Nye J.S. (1967).
Corruption and Political Development: A Case-Benefit Analysis the American Political
Science Review. (417-427).
Ochulor, Chinenye Leo, Metuonu Iheanacho C. and Asuo, Oduora Okpokam Corruption in
contemporary Nigeria: The way out American Journal of Social and Management
Sciences Science Hu, http://www.scihub.org/ 2011.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Transparency

International,

Corruption

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http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009

2009,
(accessed

November 17, 2013).


Transparency International. Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
World

Health

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Maternal

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2005,

http://www.who.int/making_pregnancy_safer/documents/9789241596213/en/index.html
(accessed November 03, 2013).

43

CHAPTER THREE
3.0

CORRUPTION WAR IN NIGERIA BEFORE PRESIDENT GOODLUCK EBELE


JONATHAN

3.1

Corruption in Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999 2007)


At independence in 1960, many Nigerians believed their country was destined for greatness on
the world stage. Instead, more than 50 years on, the country largely remains a crippled giant
(Abati 1998).
The significant remark is that the power of incumbency makes it very difficult to expose the
corrupt acts being perpetrated by an incumbent political leader; particularly in Nigeria were the
provision in the 1999 constitution, specifically in its section 308, which inter alia provides for the
immunity from prosecution. This fact becomes glaring when we appreciate that the call for
amendment of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, especially and
particularly the cited section has been so contentious that it has raised so much dust in the polity.
This section according to those against it needs to be expunged or at least re-amended to go with
the current reality of the kind of leaders we have in our society. More so, this becomes glaring
when it is appreciated that if Abacha has been in office (and worst of all has not died), his corrupt
scandal would not have been terribly exposed.
Though his government pursued economic reforms that uphold transparency, public
accountability and good governance; for example the establishment of Anti-corrupt agencies:
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and Independent Corrupt Practices
Commission (ICPC). Yet, some attitudes of President Obasanjo, and some projects he embarked
upon indicates that he is not free of corruption; though his power of incumbency and some
provisions of Nigeria constitution affords him serious protection while in office. The fact that

44

some holders of offices protected under the said section cunningly hide behind it to perpetrate
crimes including those which attract criminal charges, make it the more reason why proponents
of its amendment felt it has outlived its usefulness.
Examples of serious indications that suggest President Obasanjo as probably corrupt during his
tenure was: The Library Launch at Abeokuta, Ogun State Nigeria that is the Obasanjo
Presidential Library (OPL) project. It can be argued that in the said launching, Obasanjo used his
position as President to extort billions of Naira from the masses.
In an editorial on Monday 16 May 2005, The Guardian could not hide its disgust of his library
launched in Ogun State. The library launch has been described elsewhere as executive extortion.
What has happened is perhaps more serious than that. It can be described as constructive
corruption where the construction is subtle, disarming and palpable negative. Knowing the
Nigerian mindset you cannot involve functionaries of government and its agencies and tell the
world that all their donations are coming from their salaries and private enterprise.
On his part, World Nobel Laureate in 1986, Professor Wole Soyinka, on May 16, 2005, at
Ibadan, described the launch thus: what happened in Abeokuta was an executive extortion and it
is a contradiction to the campaign against corruption it was transparent and open. The fact
that Obasanjo and even his deputy, Atiku Abubakar obtained licences to run private universities
in Nigeria is questionable. The Code of Conduct Bureau was expected to explain (and should
have explained) to the Nigerian masses the rationality in the then serving president embarking
upon private projects while still in office. Besides, almost all the states governors during
Obasanjos tenure were equally corrupt, particularly the 30 governors that supported Obasanjos
third term in office bid.

45

Joshua Dariye was arrested in London for alleged money laundering in 2004. He has been facing
EFCCs inquisition and is still haunted by the fear of prosecution by the EFCC since the said
controversial immunity expired. Dariye is among the 30 Governors that campaigned for
Obasanjo- 3rd term in office.
Good and weighty evidence is the case of Chief Joshua Chibi Dariye, the embattled governor of
Plateau State, who was caught in London when he was absconding with states money. Like
Dariye, the case of Alamieyeseigha, the Bayelsa state governor that was arrested for the same
alleged money laundering is still on records. Most of these state governors are still facing the
wrath of the EFCC since they left office.
One major resultant effect of the indication of political corruption in Obasanjos government is
the high level of poverty; the figure was above 70 percent when he left office in 2007 (FOS).
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) making recommendation for cancellation of Nigerias
debt notes; Over 70 percent of Nigerians live on less than $1 a day, 79,500 Nigerian children
die before age 5 every month, less than 60 percent of Primary-aged children attend school
And this high level of poverty during Obasanjos regime, led to protracted and intense conflicts
(e.g. the Niger-Delta, Ijaw and Aguleri conflicts) and a rise in the level of crime (high way
robbers, rise in vigilantism and the kidnapping of expatriates), which are constraints to
development in all ramifications. Obasanjo in his speech even pronounced the failure of his
government in addressing the problems of poverty, conflict and the rampant corruption in his
administration. In his Independence Day speech on 1 October 2001, the president conceded that
his administration had failed to lift Nigerians out of poverty, end violence, and solve other
obstacles (such as crime and underdevelopment) that the country confronts. Also that corruption
remained rampant, despite the adoption of anti-corruption legislation in 2000, distorting

46

economic management, corrupting law enforcement, and starving desperately needed public
services.
Damn it my feet, salaries and private money indeed! Was the N100 million donated by
Governor `Gbenga Daniel of Ogun State taken from his personal salary, or was any provision
made for that expenditure in the states budget? There is also the issue of N10 million donation
(better put levy) by each state governor said to have been pledged on their behalf by Gov. Victor
Attah of Akwa Ibom State, then Chair of the Governors Forum, and the vexatious donation of
one million US dollars from the Nigerian Ports Authority, a very sick and dying government
parastatal indebted to hapless contractors to the tune of billions of naira, to a project that has
been described as a totally private affair. The NNPC had also written to oil companies to
donate toward the project for which the seven major oil companies responded by donating $20
million (about N2.7 billion), the highest from the business community. Sources said since the
NNPC and the oil companies were in joint venture, part of their contribution was government
money. What about their unknown existing body Obasanjo Holdings that donated N100
million. The question is who owns this money and when was it incorporated? Nigerians are
aware of that Obasanjo ran a failed Farm in 1998, when he came out of prison. Some banks were
compelled to donate. For complete detail see Ejinkonyes piece, also Guardian Monday 16 May,
2005.
Ugochukwu, 2007 online. Yes, the money is for the masses, because if investigation is carried
out you will see that virtually all came from public coffers. Besides the Newspaper reports
already cited; stronger evidence has emerged since the time Obasanjo left office. This should be
a further ground for research, since the concentration of this paper is 1979 - 2007

47

3.2

Cases of Corruption in Nigeria during President Musa YarAdua


Corruption has turned what should be one of the countries strongest assets, its vast oil wealth
into a curse. Rather than lead to concrete improvements in the lives of ordinary Nigerians, oil
revenues have fuelled political violence, fraudulent elections, police abuses, and other human
rights violations, even as living standards have slipped and key public institutions have
collapsed. Former Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) chairman Nuhu Ribadu
has estimated that between independence and the end of military rule in 1999, more than US$380
billion was lost to graft and mismanagement. Endemic corruption has continued since then.
Human Rights Watch has documented the role of corruption and mismanagement in depriving
Nigerians of their basic human rights in several different contexts. This research showed how in
Rivers State one of Nigerias wealthiest states and biggest oil producers embezzlement and
mismanagement of public funds prevented tremendous resources from improving the dire state
of basic health and education services during the administration of former president Olusegun
Obasanjo. Human Rights Watch has also documented the role of corruption in fuelling the
political violence and electoral fraud that have plagued Nigeria since the end of military rule.
(Human Rights Watch). These twin problems have claimed hundreds of lives and produced
government institutions that are often ineffective and largely unaccountable to the people who
depend on them.
For example, Human Rights Watch research shows how corruption has helped transform
Nigerias national police force from protectors to predators. Widespread bribery and extortion by
rank-and-file officers, and a system of returns in which bribes are passed up the chain of
command, have fuelled abuses ranging from arbitrary arrests and unlawful detention to torture
and extrajudicial killings.

48

Bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of office by police officials have severely undermined access
to justice for ordinary Nigerians and left the force with inadequate resources to carry out
meaningful investigations (Everyones in on the Game).
Corruption is at the heart of many of Nigerias most serious human rights problems and Human
Rights Watch has repeatedly called upon the Nigerian government to do more to fight corruption
and bolster the capacity and independence of key anti-corruption institutions.
In December 2007, James Ibori was arrested, the powerful former governor of Delta State, in
the oil-rich Niger Delta. Ibori had presided over a state that had remained impoverished and
dysfunctional under his watch despite massive inflows of oil revenue. Although Ibori was not
seen as a close ally of Obasanjo, many Nigerians assumed him to be untouchable because of his
close relationship to both YarAdua whose campaign Ibori is widely believed to have financially
backed and YarAduas attorney general, Michael Aondoakaa (The Attorney Generals War on
the EFCC).The idea that a man as powerful as Ibori could sit in prison awaiting trial gave a
momentary new surge of excitement and legitimacy to the EFCCs anticorruption campaign
But the already beleaguered Ribadu had overplayed his hand, and the move against Ibori sealed
the end of his career at the EFCC. Less than two weeks after the EFCC charged Ibori, Ribadu
was temporarily relieved of his post and sent to attend a ten-month training course at Nigerias
National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies. Ribadus tenure at the helm of the EFCC was
in fact over, leaving him and many other EFCC officials apparently stunned. We did not
anticipate the reaction, one key Ribadu era official told Human Rights Watch. Either we did
not read the mind of the president very well or we were nave.
Tafa Balogun was the EFCCs first conviction of a nationally prominent political figure. Charged
to court in April 2005, just months after being forced to retire as Nigerias inspector general of

49

police, Balogun ultimately pleaded guilty of failing to declare his assets, and his front companies
were convicted of eight counts of money laundering. In November 2005 he was sentenced to six
months in prison and the court ordered the seizure of his assets reportedly worth in excess of
$150 million (BBC News Online 2005). The sentence struck many as light given the severity of
the allegations. He stood accused of financial crimes allegedly committed at a time when he was
serving as Nigerias chief law enforcement officer (Davidson et al 2007). Nonetheless, Baloguns
conviction was a profoundly important moment the sight of such a prominent public official
being hauled before a court in handcuffs to answer for corruption was something many Nigerians
had thought impossible (Pindiga 2005). Balogun has since reportedly retired to a luxury home in
a high end Lagos neighbourhood.
Diepreye Alamieyeseigha served as governor of Nigerias oil-rich but deeply impoverished
Bayelsa State from 1999 to 2005. In September 2005, he was arrested by British authorities in
London. The London Metropolitan Police found about 1 million in cash at his home and
charged him with money laundering (BBC News Online 2005).
Released on bail, Alamieyeseigha managed to flee the UK, the EFCC says disguised as a woman
and reappeared in his home state, claiming he had been transported there by God (Lydia Polgreen
2005). As a sitting governor he enjoyed immunity from prosecution in Nigeria, but three months
later he was impeached by his state legislature, and the EFCC charged him with embezzling
about $55 million in public funds (Tume Ahemba 2005). In July 2007 the former governor
pleaded guilty to failing to declare his assets, his front companies were convicted of money
laundering, and the court ordered his assets seized. He was sentenced to two years in prison and
released, for time served, the day after his sentencing (Mbachu 2007).

50

Alamieyeseigha was quickly welcomed back into the ruling party fold. In May 2008 senior
ruling party officials openly campaigned alongside Alamieyeseigha at a political rally in Bayelsa
State, just 10 months after his conviction (Oyebode 2008).
Former Edo State governor Lucky Igbinedion was charged by EFCC prosecutors in January
2008 with siphoning off more than $25 million of public funds. He ultimately pleaded guilty in
December 2008 to failing to declare his assets and his front company was convicted on 27 counts
of money laundering. But the trial judge in the case, Abdullahi Kafarati, deviated from the terms
of the plea agreement and handed down a very light sentence that included no jail time.
Igbinedion paid the equivalent of a $25,000 fine, agreed to forfeit some of his property, and
walked free on the spot. The EFCC appealed the light sentence. In early 2011, the EFCC raided
two of his palatial homes in Abuja and filed new criminal charges against the former governor.
But in May 2011 the court dismissed the case, ruling that the new charges would amount to
double jeopardy. (Ibileke 2011)
Olabode (Bode) George was a powerful figure within the ruling party under President
Obasanjo and was also chairman of the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) for a time. The EFCC in
August 2008 charged him with contract-related offenses dating back to his time at the NPA.
(Akintunde 2008)
In October 2009 he was convicted and sentenced to two and a half years in prison after a
surprisingly swift and efficient trial. This was the EFCCs first and so far only conviction at trial
of a major political figure an important accomplishment. The positive example of his conviction
was diminished, however, when he was treated to a rapturous welcome by key ruling party
figures upon his release from prison in February 2011. (BBC News Online, October 27, 2009).

51

Following our conception of corruption, one would assert that Nigeria is corrupt. This can be
accounted for by many and unabashed human behaviours in various sectors which do not fall in
line with what ought to be. In the year 2000, Transparency International ranked Nigeria the
worlds most corrupt country.
Mamadu augments this when he states that corruption has become a way of life for most
Nigerians (xi). And Dike declares that corruption is (endemic) in Nigeria the leaders as well
as the followers are corrupt (http://www.africanecnomicanalysis.org). All this clearly shows that
corruption is a serious problem in Nigeria as a result of total moral breakdown in the character
ethic of Nigerians. Hence, Fafowora of the Nation newspapers was led to ask a mind-bugging
question is it really possible now to eliminate, or reduce, public corruption in Nigeria. There
are many cases that can be cited to buttress this claim in the economic, political, bureaucratic and
social dimensions, etc.
Corruption has become a song. The over N100 billion Nigeria Ports Authority scam,
masterminded by Bode George. There is also the huge scam in the petroleum sector with oil
blocks being randomly allocated to the cronies of the PDP.
Ambassador Sam Edem as Chairman of NDDC was alleged to have embezzled nearly N300
million. The incidents in the power sector are no longer news. That of the agriculture is still fresh
where the 2007 budget for agriculture was diverted to take care of the luxuries of members of
parliament. What of the electoral process? People like Mrs. Ahmadu Ali who won election she
never contested just because her husband is the Party Chairman? What of contract awards? Most
of which are never meant to be executed.

52

But the high level of corruption is not limited to federal establishments. It is the same in the
states and local governments. Nor is it limited to the executive branch alone. The National
Assembly and even the Judiciary are deeply involved.
According to Fafowroa, when the judiciary is perceived as being corrupt, then the entire system
of justice breaks down completely (48). Yet when we look outside the government, we see an
awful rate of corrupt practices. Traders sell fake and substandard goods to the unsuspecting
consumer. Many Nigerians have taken vocation in internet frauds, 419 or advance fee fraud,
contract scam and so on.
Perhaps so outrageous and well-received is corruption in Nigerian that a popular artist Nkem
Owoh released a musical album entitled I go chop your dollar. BBC Radio network
demonstrated the high prevalence of corruption in Nigeria by playing the above song on its
programme Focus on Africa, where it treated corruption as an issue (BBC, 26th August, 2008).
Thus, we have shown with the above that Nigeria is corrupt. These must have inspired Ochulor
to characterized Nigeria as a Machiavellian Society (317) he goes ahead to declare;
"As a result of Nigerias current Machiavellian philosophy of wealth acquisition most
Nigerians today believe that moral uprightness and wealth acquisition are two parallel lines that
can never meet. Consequently, those who want to be morally upright have given up the ambition
of becoming wealthy, because they feel it is for the corrupt. And those who want to be wealthy
have given up the possibility of moral uprightness, because they think it does not promote
wealth" (317) therefore, the thesis that Nigerian is corrupt is a foregone conclusion.
The long time reign of corruption has come to leave a mirror factor in the life of the nation, to
the extent that what is true in reality can be made false in appearance and vice versa- the case of
the erstwhile Governor of Delta State Chief James Ibori is a strong case in point: A one-time

53

convict, turned out to be a non-convict, ironically from the same judiciary. But we do not want to
belabour this work with this type of discussion. It is one thing to acknowledge that corruption is
a bad practice and another to acknowledge that one is corrupt here Nigeria. Otherwise, most
political leaders and civil servants will willingly resign their posts and offices and turn up for
prosecution. But this will never happen because the corrupt man does not yet believe he is
corrupt. He sees himself as exploiting his opportunities, taking his own share of the national cake
and so on while corruption itself is a separate entity tormenting us all. Ochulor states; The
process of acquiring wealth in Nigeria has taken different dimensions as people now consider
wealth not as a means but as an end (318). As an end therefore, it does not matter what one does
and for how long. In short one can live a lifetime of corruption in so far as it makes him wealthy
and powerful it is acceptable by the society. He can never be the bad man. It is corruption who
is the common enemy of all. This is very obvious from what happens daily in the Nigeria
societies, where corrupt men are celebrated, regarded highly and often given chieftaincy titles
and coveted national awards. As Dike Writes, Nigerias reward system is perhaps the poorest in
the world. Nigeria is a society where national priorities are turned upside down; hard work is not
rewarded, but rogues are often glorified in Nigeria (http://www.africanecnomicanalysis.org).
This entire societal madness clearly shows the double face of corruption in Nigeria. At one end
people shout against corruption, pass bill in the National Assembly, establish anti-corruption
commissions and campaigns, but at the other end however, the same people carry out on daily
basis several acts of corruption, ranging from looting, embezzlement, favouritism, nepotism to
contract scams etc.
The cases of National Electricity Project, Ajaokuta steel project, roads, airports, and water
projects are some very good examples. Many political leaders have been fingered some of whom

54

are; Tony Anenih, Liyel Imoke, Bode George, Olusegun Agagu, Iyabo Obasanjo to mention just
a few. What about the ousted speaker of the House of Assembly, Mrs. Patricia Etteh who brought
international disgrace to Nigeria? What of ex-police IGs Tafa Balogun and Sunday Ehinderoh
whose corrupt acts are still reverberating. We cannot name them all! We saw late president
Yaradua boldly slapping the constitution severally. On one occasion he favoured Okiro instead
of Onovo as the I.G of police; he ignored for a reasonable length of time the plight of the people
of Niger Delta Region, he favoured the increment in the salaries of political office holders while
grudging civil servants of same. In short before he became the president he declared his assets in
hundreds of millions and we wish to ask; where did he get the money? He had been governor for
some years, and his salaries and entitlements during the period were not up to 30 million. Before
then, he had been a lecturer, and we all know what they lived on then; so where did he get the
excesses? The point we want to establish here, is that basically every Nigerian is corrupt or
atleast is exposed to various acts of corruption but ironically, would not admit it. And we all end
up as depicted in an African proverb, chasing the ghost that eats up our children. Corruption
which is portrayed as the common enemy of us all it is a being a monster but never one of us.

REFERENCES

55

Allan Ball. (1987). Modern Politics and Governement: in Remi Anifowose and Francis Enemuo,
Rep, Element of Politics Lagos: Sam Iroanusi Publication.
Michael. G. Roskin et. (2008). Political Science: an introduction, Prentice hall: Pearson
International Edition
F. C. Enemuo (2005). Approach and Method of the study of Politics in Remi Anifowose and
Francis Enemuo, Rep, Element of Politics Lagos: Sam Iroanusi Publication
Human Rights Watch 2010 Everybody on the game: Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by
the Nigeria Police Force August 2010 http://www.hrw.org/node/10442
Abati, Toke. (2009) Corruption, institutions, and economic development. Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, 25 (2): 271-291.
Ugochukwu

Ejinkonye,Is

Nigerias

Gen.

Obasanjo

An

Extortioner?

At

http://www.nathanielturner.com/isnigeriasgenobasanjoextortioner.htm (07/07/07).
African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (2007). Nigeria: Foreign Debts, Stolen
Wealth, IFIs and The West, A Case Study: AFRODAD.
Ejinkonye

Ugochukwu

(2007).

Is

Nigerias

Gen.

Obasanjo

an

extortioner?

http://www.nathanieltumer.com/isnigeriasgenobasanjoextortioner.htm (027/02/07).

CHAPTER FOUR
56

At

4.0

OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION A CASE STUDY OF THE NIGERIA FOURTH


REPUBLIC

4.1

TRENDS OF DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA


Corruption is a disease, which eats into the cultural, political and economic growth of any
country and as well destroys the functioning of various organs of the government. Transparently
international (2005) opine that corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary
world which undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the
misallocation of resources harms the private sector development and as well hurts the poor. The
need to study corruption and economic growth in Nigeria has continued to generate passionate
commentaries and academic interest due to the level of corruption in the country and its effect on
economic growth. In Nigeria corruption is one of the reasons for many unresolved problems that
have critically hobbled and reduce development (Ayobolu, 2006). It also remains a long-term
major political and economic growth challenge for Nigeria (Sachs, 2007). International Centre
for economic growth (1999) states that corruption is a canker worm that has eaten deep in the
fabric of the nation which ranges from petty corruption to political or systematic corruption.
Abiodem (2007) in World Bank studies put corruption at over $1 trillion per year accounting for
up to 15% of the Gross Domestic Product of nation like Nigeria.
Corruption is a canker worm that has reduced development in all sectors of the economy (EFCC,
2005). Corruption has been the primary reason behind the country difficulties in developing fast
(ICPC, 2006). Ribadu, (2003) states that this is the reason why transparency international has
consisted rating of Nigeria as one of the top three most corrupt countries in the world. Corruption
has been identified as one major obstacle militating against rapid growth and development of the
Nigerian economy. Nigeria is blessed with abundant natural and human resources to the extent
57

that some of these natural resources have never been extracted or tapped by the government e.g
gold, some natural resources are neglected by the government since the discovery of oil well,
such as cocoa, timber, etc, while only crude oil is enjoying the biggest attention and has been the
largest source of revenue to the government for over forty years. Since 1996 when Nigeria first
featured in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a research carried out by Transparency
International (TI), a Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) that assesses the level of corruption
in countries around the world. Nigeria have always been languishing in the bottom of the ranking
among countries evaluated and have more than once ranked as the most corrupt country in the
world. Despite having the worlds seventh largest reserve of crude oil coupled with other
resources in Nigeria, poverty and underdevelopment still ravage the country, this can be seen
from all indexes of development over the years. The major reason advanced for this is the
prevalence of corruption in governance, public and private places. Nigerian government officials
are well known for their self servicing style of governance.
According to ICPC Act section 2, corruption includes vices like bribery, fraud and the other
related offences. It also sees corruption as the abuse of power or position of trust for personal or
group benefit (monetary or otherwise). According to World Bank (2000), corruption can be
defined as the abuse of public office for private gains. By this connection, public office is
being abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits or extorts a bribe. It is equally
abused when private agent actively offers bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for
competitive advantage and profit. Besides, public office can also be abused for personal gain
even if no bribery occurs but when there is patronage and nepotism as well as the theft of state
assets and the diversion of state resources meant for an identified specific project. According to
Justice Emmanuel Olayinka Ayoola, former Chairman of ICPC, the commonest form of

58

corruption in Nigeria used to be bribery but in recent years this has been overtaken in level of
prevalence by embezzlement and theft from public funds, extortion, abuse of discretion, abuse of
public power for private gain, favouritism and nepotism, conflict of interest, extortion and illegal
political party financing. The above definitions of corruption show that corruption goes beyond
financial aspect. It includes moral, behaviour, electoral, disobedience and so on. Meanwhile, for
the purpose of our discourse, our major focus will be on financial corruption which is very
injurious to national development.
4.1.1

Financial Corruption: Financial corruption is essentially material, financial and economic.


Financial corruption is traceable to some of the enumerated aspects of corruption like diversion,
mismanagement and misappropriation of fund, embezzlement, theft from public funds, abuse of
discretion and abuse of public power for extortion or bribe. According to Aluko (2008), the
essence of financial corruption is bribery and illegal and greedy acquisition of public funds into
private pockets, which otherwise would have been invested for the public good. The Corrupt
Practices Decree of 1975, that described corruption by restricting it to bribery which means the
offer, promise or receipt on any gratification as inducement or reward is a good example of
financial corruption. In the pursuit of the efforts to reduce graft in the world, the Transparency
International embarked on an annual grading of countries according to their degree of financial
corruption, beginning from the most corrupt to the least corrupt. This was done by awarding
marks out of ten marks to each of the considered countries, the lowest marks being awarded to
the most corrupt and the highest marks awarded to the least corrupt (Aluko, 2008). Usually, huge
amounts stolen from various sources of financial corruption, which cannot be legitimately
explained as earnings, are siphoned and hidden across the borders to foreign banks especially in
the developed countries, regarded as safe haven.

59

4.1.2

Development: In the words of economists, development cannot and should not be mistaken for
growth. This is because; the problem in Nigeria is that the word development has been
couched in terms of material things rather than people. It should be such as conscious and careful
exploitation of nature to satisfy human needs. It should not be seen as an item to be possessed
like a new car but a sustained effort towards a clearly defined national goal (Raji, 1999). Seers
(1969) sees development in terms of a reduction in three variables- poverty, unemployment and
inequality. Seers definition was corroborated by Todaro (1977) when he says that: Development
must therefore be conceived of a multi-dimensional process involving changes in structures,
attitudes and institutions as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of
inequality and eradication of absolute poverty. Hodder (2000) also sees development as an
economic, social or political process which results in a cumulative rise in the perceived standard
of living for an increasing proportion of a population. This definition suggests that an increased
standard of living involves a social and political process as well as an economic one. This
improvement in the standard of living must be both cumulative and in the long duration rather
than just temporary. Development which must be seen as an overall qualitative improvement in
the lives of a people or a political community is expected to address the issues of social welfare,
equity and justice. According to the UNDP, the central purpose of development should be the
creation of an enabling and empowering environment in which all the individuals, including the
poor and the vulnerable can enjoy healthy and creative lives (UNDP, 1997).

4.1.3

National Development: National development is the ability of a county or countries to improve


the social welfare of the people such as providing social amenities like quality education, potable
water, infrastructural facilities, medical care, and so on (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). This means
that national development must involve the aggregation of national resources of the country for

60

the general well being of the citizenry in terms of their social and economic advancement
(Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). Raji (1999) conceptualised national development in terms of
progress in three major dimensions in the life of a nation. These dimensions are economic,
political and social or moral. Balogun (1972) makes the concept of national development more
vivid when he wrote that, national development entails producing more and better food to eat,
healthier and happier individuals, better living accommodation, improved transportation and
communications system, sound education and enlightenment among the populace, and generally,
more money floating around. The above definitions of national development centre on people
and their quality of lives in the society. This means that whatever kind of changes being
witnessed in the various sectors of the society should have positive influence on the people.
4.2

FINANCIAL CORRUPTION IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC


Before we begin to discuss various cases of financial corrupt practices inherent since the birth of
the fourth republic, it is imperative to briefly have a glimpse of various transitions that had taken
place since the republic began. Meanwhile, under this section, we are not so much concern about
the details of the political intrigues, deft manoeuvres and various electoral frauds and
malpractices that not only propelled Chief Olusegun Obasanjo to power through the vehicle of
the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in May, 1999 which marked the beginning of the Fourth
Republic, but also other successive administrations up till 2011. One basic fact remains that
power was eventually transferred after a virtually interminable military transition process that
began with Gen Ibrahim to democratic governance in 1999. Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar was
said to have brought the transition to a logical conclusion. And, thus, since 1999 till 2011 there
have been successful transitions from one civilian government to another, though occupied by
the same political party (i.e PDP), such as (1999 to 2007); 2007 to 2011; and 2011 2014.

61

One of the major challenges confronting the new democratic government since 1999 is endemic
financial corruption in every arm of governance (executive, legislative and judiciary) in the
country. In fact, considering various cases of financial corruption being perpetrated in
governance since 1999 till date, one can easily conclude that financial corruption has actually
been institutionalized in the country. This is noticeable in various ratings of the country since
1999 by Transparency International and others as either the most, second most or top ten most
corrupt countries of the world. Various issues of financial corrupt practices in the country would
be analysed under three major arms of government (executive, legislature and judiciary). It is
important to emphasize here that in our discourse on the cases of corrupt practices in governance
in the Nigerias fourth republic, attempt is not made to discuss all the corrupt practices that were
being done. Attempt would be made to cite cases of some major corrupt practices perpetrated by
political leaders at federal, state and local governments in the country.
4.3

FINANCIAL CORRUPTION IN THE EXECUTIVE ARM OF GOVERNMENT


A number of financial corrupt practices were carried out in the executive arm of government in
the country since 1999. This financial corruption was not limited to federal government alone.
Both the state and local governments were equally guilty of corrupt practices. The perpetration of
financial corruption at the executive arm of government involved embezzlement,
mismanagement and misappropriation of fund, diversion of fund, award and inflation of
contracts, and so on. For example, at the state government level, a number of ex-governors who
ruled between 1999 and 2007 were alleged by EFCC for financial impropriety when they were in
government within those years. Among them are Lucky Igbinedion of Edo State, Ayo Fayose of
Ekiti State, Peter Odili of Rivers State, Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu State, Saminu Turaki of
Jigawa State, Orji Uzor Kalu of Abia, James Ibori, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State

62

and Rev. Jolly Nyame of Taraba State. For instance, James Ibori, was arraigned on a 170-count
charge (Tell, 2012) of money laundering over N9.1 billion (Kofarmata, 2005); Orji Uzor Kalu of
Abia was arraigned on a 191- count charge of money laundary, criminal diversion of public fund,
official corruption of totalling #5.2 billion (Tell, 2012) and was also accused of using his loot of
N3.1 billion to fund SLOK Airline and two banks in the Gambia and Sierra Leone, in addition to
owning houses in London and the US (Kofarmata, 2005); Saminu Turaki of Jigawa State, who is
now a serving senator, was accused of spending N36 million of public funds to acquire oil blocks
from the Federal Government; Rev. Jolly Nyame of Taraba State was charged with stealing N1.6
billion belonging to the state; and Nnamani is standing trial for his alleged illegal diversion of
public funds totalling N5.6 billion, alongside two of his former commissioners, Peter Mba and
Sam Ejiofor and some companies linked to him; and Diepreye Alamieyeseigha was arrested on
40 counts of corruption and money laundering. In July 2006, British authorities returned about 1
million pounds (US$1.9 million) of the allegedly illicit gains that he stashed in British banks
(Kofarmata, 2005).
One important area where financial corruption was noticeable in the executive arm of
government, with special reference to the federal government in particular was in the area of
road infrastructure. Since the birth of the fourth republic, majority of federal roads across the six
geo-political zones were awarded by different successive governments at huge amount, up till
today none of these roads have been completed. For example, the report of the CBN on the
survey of Highways in Nigeria revealed the total number of roads to be constructed throughout
the six geo-political zones between 1999 and 2001 but was not constructed as a result of outright
embezzlement. The report showed that less than 10% of the funding request made by the Federal
Ministry of Works and Housing for road maintenance was appropriated. It reveals that despite

63

the total funds released for road maintenance across the country between the year which were
N509.29 million, N742.72 million and N779.84 million respectively, yet, most of the road in the
Southern area and Northern zones were in very poor conditions. Some of the poor conditions of
roads include; potholes, gullies, peel-offs, lack of gutters and so on. Among those notable roads
are Owerri-Onitsha roads, Enugu-Onitsha road, Owerri-Umuahia road (all the south-east zone):
Lagos-Ibadan road, Ibadan-Ife road, Benin-Lagos road and Ibadan-Ilorin road (all in the SouthWest); Kano-Kaduna road, Kastina-Funta road (all in North-West); Akwanga-Markurdi road,
Ayungba-Markurdi road (all in the North Central); and Bauchi-Gombe road, Bauchi-Ningi,
Bauchi-Tafa-Balewa-Langtang roads (all in the North-East) (CBN Report,2003). The above
report of CBN could be corroborated with the words of the former Auditor-General of the
Federation, Mr. Vincent Azie, which eventually led to its sack by Obasanjo administration. Mr.
Vincent, as reported in the Thisday Newspaper of May 14, 2003 cited in Iyoha & Enabunene
(2005) indicted the presidency and the National Assembly of corruption. He particularly indicted
the presidency of expenditure that cannot be accounted for, paying for jobs not executed, outright
stealing of over #23 million through over invoicing, double debiting, embezzlement and inflation
of contract figures (Iyoha & Enabunene, 2005).
Also, it was revealed that no fewer than 37 contracts awarded by the Federal Government for the
construction and rehabilitation of roads between 2002 and 2010 awarded by the Federal Ministry
of Works valued at N308.13bn were yet to be completed. The details of the contracts which are
contained in a document titled completed and substantially completed projects and projects
awarded under Appropriation states that 11 road projects valued at N131.13bn were awarded
between 2002 and 2009, while 26 projects with the total value of N176.6bn were awarded in
2010. Some of these projects include the N36.3bn Benin-Shagamu road project; N42.3bn

64

expansion of the Abuja-Abaji road contract awarded to three different contractors since 2006; the
N15bn contract for construction of the Kano Western Bypass awarded in May 2007; and the
N30.85bn contract for its expansion into dual lanes of the Onitsha-Owerri expressway and
Onitsha Eastern Bypass awarded in July 2002 (The Punch, Tuesday, August 2, 2011).

4.4

FINANCIAL CORRUPTION IN THE LEGISLATIVE ARM OF GOVERNMENT


At this arm of government, majority of financial corruption being carried out deals with cases of
bribery scandals which are being levelled against chairmen and members of probe panels of
different special commissions set up within the legislative body to investigate reported cases of
corruption committed in the country. It is very pathetic that some members of these committees
who are expected to investigate cases of corrupt practices also ended up in becoming corrupt. In
fact, there were several cases of this ugly incidence since the fourth republic began in the
National Assembly. Both the Senate and House of Representatives were guilty of this scenario.
In a bid to address cases of corrupt practices levelled against the National Electric Power
Authority (NEPA), the House of Representatives set up a committee known as Ndudi Elumelu
committee on Power probe in 2007. The committee started well by inviting both the former
ministers of power and other officials of NEPA but up till today, the report of the committee was
both disowned by some of the committee members and was drowned by counter-attacks.
Besides, the chairman of the power probe, Hon. Ndudi Elumelu was alleged to have involved in
corrupt practices during the hearing of the case.
Another noticeable area where the Federal legislatures have equally involved in financial
corruption is the recent allegations of bribery scandal levelled against the chairman of the House
of Representatives, Ad Hoc committee on fuel subsidy regime probe and other members of the

65

committee. Following the removal of subsidy on fuel in 1 st January, 2012 by the President, Dr.
Jonathan which led to the increase in fuel price from #65 per litre to between #138 and #200 per
litre across the country, the Nigerian Labour Congress, Trade Union Congress (TUC) and other
associations and civil society embarked on strike which lasted for more than a week. The strike
which was later called off by the NLC chairman after agreements had been reached with the
presidency resulted in the partial removal of subsidy on fuel and the reduction of fuel to #97 per
litre. The development that later followed was the investigation of how subsidy being paid on the
importation of fuel into the country was implemented. This was what made the House of
Representatives to constitute an Ad Hoc committee on fuel subsidy regime probe. The committee
was constituted and Hon. Farouk Lawal, former chairman, House committee on Education was
made the chairman of the committee. The committee also started well initially like that of power
probe committee (The Punch, Monday 9, 2012).
Having worked for some months, the committee was able to discover about 18 oil companies
that were not registered but collected subsidy on fuel illegally from the federal government. It
was in the process of listing the names of the oil companies that it became known that the
chairman of the committee had been bribed with $3 million by one of the oil markers, so that the
name of his company be removed from the list. In order to investigate the allegation of bribery
scandal levelled against Hon. Farouk Lawal, House of Representatives Committee on Ethics and
Privileges was set up. The chairman of Zenon Oil and Gas Limited, Mr Femi Otedola was
invited by the committee and thus testified before the committee that a sum of #620,000 was
given to Hon Farouk Lawal and the clerk of the committee, Mr. Boniface Emenalo, from agreed
$ 3 million as part payment for the clearance deal (Nigerian Tribune, Friday 22 nd, June, 2012: 12). In another media report, it was said that Hon. Farouk Lawal gave the said amount to Hon.
66

Adams Jagaba, chairman of House of Representatives committee on Drugs, Narcotics and


Financial Crimes. But Hon. Jagaba disproved the allegation levelled against him by Hon. Farouk
(Saturday Tribune, 23rd June, 2012:.9). Up till now, Hon. Farouk has not been able to prove his
innocence of the allegation.
Besides the above discussed examples of financial corruption in the Lower House of National
Assembly, evidences equally showed that there allegations of financial corruption against some
senators in the Upper House of National Assembly between 1999 and 2007. For example, In July
2000, an investigative panel found evidence of inflated procurement contracts in the National
Assembly, some awarded to companies in which legislators had a financial interest. High-level
officials are implicated, including Senate President Chuba Okadigbo and Senate Deputy
President Alhaji Haruna Abubakar. In August 2000, Okadigbo was impeached for corruption and
misappropriation of funds. After his impeachment, Okadigbo was indicted for spending public
money on cars and car furnishings and resigns in October. Also, in March 2005, Education
Minister Fabian Osuji was fired for allegedly bribing the National Assembly to secure more
funds for his ministry. He formally protested that such behavior is common at all levels of
government. In April, Senate Speaker Adolphus Wabara resigned after President Obasanjo
accused him of accepting Osuji's 51 million naira (US$400,000) bribe. In addition, the former
presidents daughter, Senator Iyabo Obasanjo-Bello, Chairman, Senate Committee on Health was
enmeshed in two different financial scandals. In December 2007, Iyabo Obasanjo-Bello, was
involved in a contract scandal amounting to N3.5 billion involving her and an Austrian firm.
According to the EFCC, the senator used her mothers maiden name, Akinlawon to conceal her
identity in the contract involving M.Schneider GMBH. She was also alleged of mismanaging a
fund allotted to the Ministry of Health. The scandal led to the resignation of Mrs. Adenike
67

Grange and her deputy, Gabriel Aduku. After a series of interrogation, she was eventually
arraigned in court over N300 million unspent budget scam the EFCC (Pogoson, 2009).
4.5

FINANCIAL CORRUPTION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIAS


FOURTH REPUBLIC: A DISCOURSE
There is a correlation between financial corruption and national development in Nigeria. The
essence of financial corruption is bribery and illegal and greedy acquisition of public funds into
private pockets, which otherwise would have been invested for the public good. Financial
corruption undermines democracy and the legitimate of the state, reduces the potential for
economic growth, and threatens the freedom and security of citizens, all together constitutes
hindrances to national development.
The high rate of financial corruption in Nigeria has affected her image in Africa and the world.
Since the birth of the fourth republic, the country has variously been rated by Transparency
International (TI) as among the most corrupt nations of the world on one hand; and by another
international organisation like Fund for Peace as one of the top failed states in both Africa and
the world on the other hand due to mass poverty, corruption, insecurity and unemployment. In its
2001 report on worldwide corrupt practices, Transparency International (T.I), considered Nigeria
to be the most corrupt, country, falling from the fifth position in 1998 to the first position, in
2001. In the 2003 corruption indices of 93 of the 193 member countries of the world, 191 of
which are members of the United Nations (excluding Taiwan and the Vatican City The Holy
See). Nigeria became the second most corrupt, country after Bangladesh, even though Nigerias
score fell from 1.9, in 1998, to 1.4, in 2003. Several of the countries x-rayed in 1998 were not
ex-rayed in 2003. No country scored 10 marks in 2003, the highest score, Finland, being 9.7,
indicating that every one of the 93 countries, including Denmark that was most clean in 1998

68

with 10 marks, had a degree of corruption. In 2004, T. I survey covered 146 countries. In that
report, Nigeria was rated the third most corrupt country, beating Haiti and Bangladesh to the
second and last positions respectively. (T.I. Report 2004). In the 2006 rating on the T.I
Corruption Perception Index, Nigeria moved to the eleventh (11th) position out of 50 selected
countries (Aluko, 2008)
Despite reduction in the rating of Nigeria from most corrupt in 2001 to the 11 th position in 2006
of which could be as a result of the few activities of EFCC and ICPC between those periods, the
rate of increase in the per capita incomes and human development indices was very low and very
small. The reason behind this was that the rate of corruption was still high. This was noticeable
her corruption perception index scoring 2.2. It would be very difficult for countries whose
perception index was below 5 to increase their per capita incomes. For example, most of the
countries that have more than 5 corruption perception index in 2006 Botswana (5.6), Barbados
(6.7), Denmark (9.5), Sweden (9.2), Finland (9.6), among others increased their per capita
incomes between 1998 and 2006 by over 50 per cent, in spite of their initial high incomes in
1998. These countries equally have the least incidence of corruption and the highest human
development indices, because they provide elaborate welfare facilities for their citizens from the
cradle to the grave. Their respective governments constitute the engine of growth of their
economies. They do not role back their governments as is the vogue in Nigeria. They do not
privatise public utilities and properties, nor do they enrich private people at the expense of their
citizens, and, income differentials among persons are reducing from time to time in order to
ensure national economic harmony (Aluko, 2008).
Corruption undermines the legitimacy of the state. It is the lack of legitimacy that creates fertile
soil for corruption to grow. It is a known fact that when the citizens of a state see how financial

69

corrupt practices continue to engulf every arm of governance, they are tended to lose faith in that
government, and thus conclude that such a government is incapable of working for the interests
of the majority of citizens. This could be corroborated by the submission of Eigen (2002). He
says that when this happens, the citizens have at least three choices to make. First, they could
force the resignation of the corrupt officials. For example, in 2002, protesters demanded the
resignation of President Estrada of the Philippines on allegation of corrupt practices when they
discovered that the legislature failed to act on evidence of his corruption (Eigen, 2002). Second,
they could find alternate avenues to gain the access needed to government such as creating an
underground economy. Third, they could accept the costs associated with a corrupt judiciary. For
example, citizens in Guatemala are discouraged from using the legal system because of the ease
with which criminals are able to benefit from the corruption (Scott and Welna, 2003). Therefore,
if the chosen avenue becomes too much of a threat to the government it will become politically
unstable.
Economically, financial corruption hinders economic development both internally and externally.
It is a major paralysis on the economy. Internally, corruption prevents competition and causes the
government to operate inefficiently. Externally, corruption inhibits foreign direct investment both
by diverting aid into corrupt hands and increasing the costs of doing business in the country
(Thurow, 2003). It is very pathetic when a certain Australian national who came to Nigeria for a
particular project was prevailed upon by his Nigerian principals who were then in government to
inflate a contract by an increase of a sum of N5.5bn. He however portrays Nigerians as a people
who hold down the horns of our parents cow for others to milk (Ekwueru & Daminabo, 2008).
Corruption not only contributes immensely to the problem of mass poverty and but have
rendered millions of Nigerian youth unemployed. The poverty profile of Nigerians has continued

70

to worsen year by year. For example, the UNDP Development Report 2001 places Nigeria at no
148 out of 173 countries surveyed. The situation worsened in 2003 report, which put Nigeria at
152 among the 175 countries covered. The Fund for Peace in 2012 report for the year 2011
ranked Nigeria as one of the top 10 failed states in Africa and the 14th in the world. The
computation of the 2011 ranking of about 178 countries in the world as revealed by this
international organization involves a lot of factors which are issues of poverty aggravation,
security, economic development, public services and so on. Meanwhile, in the 2011 report for the
year 2010 data, Nigeria was ranked 8 th considering heightened level of insecurity, corruption,
growing poverty and unemployment (The Punch, July, 2012). The report of this international
organisation can be corroborated with nations reports on the level of poverty in the country.
According to Federal Republic of Nigeria- Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan,
2008, about 70% of Nigerians are living below the poverty level. Also, Dr. Yemi Kale,
Statistician General of the Federation at a Press Conference in Abuja on the high rate of poverty
in the country as at December, 2011, he said that, North West and North East geo-political zones
recorded the highest poverty rate in Nigeria with 77.7% and 76.3% respectively, South-South
and South-East with 60%, while the South West recorded the least percentage with 50%
(Nigerian Tribune, Tuesday 14th February, 2012).
More importantly, corruption undermines democracy. It is a major factor responsible for the
failure of governance, democratic values, rule of law and the prevalence of poor leadership. This
view was supported by the former President of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. He succinctly
put it in a speech at the Public Procurement Bill Workshop (Abuja, July 12 2004) that evidently,
a corrupt economic arrangement can never produce a political system that is stable, just,
inclusive, and democratic.. According to Eigen (2002), corruption circumvents the workings of
71

democracy in three ways. First, many acts of corruption undermine human rights by fostering
discrimination; second, it undermines political and civil rights, such as free speech and fair
elections, which are important to the development and perpetuation of a democracy; and third,
democracy is more likely to be successful in a wealthy country. He asserts that corruption is
more likely to occur in underdeveloped countries. Aluko (2008) supported this view by saying
that where incomes are less unequally distributed (developed nations) the incidence of corruption
is lower than where there is a high degree of inequality in income distribution (underdeveloped
nations). Thus, more socialist and more welfarist economies tend to be less corrupt than capitalist
or market-oriented, individualistic economies like Nigeria. It therefore follows that corruption
will make it harder for a country like Nigeria to sustain her democracy.

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CHAPTER FIVE
5.0

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1

Summary
Corruption in Nigeria is institutional problems, and to address the problem an institutional
approach is needed. To curb and eventually eradicate corruption among children, youth and
adults, who must be given the power to distinguish right from wrong? All institutional sectors
(education, civil servant, government parastrastal) should return to the teaching of moral
education to empower children with the spirit of stewardship, while adults live exemplary lives,
reflecting truth, kindness, dignity of labour, and integrity. In order to prevent corruption from
happening at all, Nigerian should emphasis transparency, integrity, and accountability in all their

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private and public transaction. There Achanism Model is named for Achan who appears in the
Old Testament of the Bible. Achan in the scripture was avaricious (Joshua 7). He was caught and
his entire family was severely dealt with. His children, who might have expected to inherit the
proceeds of his illegal act, were not allowed to do so. The solution is as follows: Social
Transformation. Rransformation in education of the public is a necessary factor in social
transformation. There is need for formation and reformation, orientation and re-orientation of the
minds and heart of Nigerians, for them to see that corruption is the enemy of development.
Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Law: - The law should be enforced to its fullest and without fear
and favour.
Improvement of Socio-political and Economic Life: - This is another weapon against corruption
in Nigeria. The multiplying effects of this improvement will reduce the tendency of public
servants to demand and take bribes and get involved in other corrupt practices.

5.2

CONCLUSION
Democracy provides the foundation upon which a prosperous society can be built. If the
foundation is crisis-ridden, the entire superstructure is bound to collapse and this will undermine
growth. Studies have shown that developed economic institutions, including the rule of law,
cordial coexistence among tiers of government, protection of property, checks against corruption,
democratic accountability and peaceful political transition positively enhance improved
economic performance and prosperity and where this is not present, the reverse is the case. In
spite of attempts to check rampant corruption in public office, efforts are surreptitiously being
made by some vested interests to thwart such efforts. In essence, what should be the best way of
eradicating the menace of corruption so as to have a sustainable democracy in Nigeria?

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When corruption becomes systematically institutional, fighting it must go beyond implementing


liberal economic policies, enacting better laws, reducing the number and complexity of
regulations and providing more training, helpful though these steps may be. Fighting systematic
corruption require administering a shock to disturb a corrupt equilibrium. It might include such
steps as the following: formation of a national coordinating body thai is responsible for devising
and following up on a strategy against corruption, along with a citizen's oversight board;
identification of a few key agencies or areas on which the anti-corruption effort might focus its
efforts, in the hope of achieving some momentum-building successes. A capacity building
strategy within key ministries that takes the problems of incentives (including incentive reforms
and information seriously; and identification of a few major offenders whose cases will be
prosecuted).
Combating corruption should focus on the reform of systems. It requires an economic approach,
coupled with great political sensitivity. Corruption is a symptom of fundamental economic,
political and institutional causes. Addressing corruption effectively means tackling these
underlying causes. The major emphasis must be put on prevention-thai is, on reforming
economic policies, institutions and incentives. Efforts to improve enforcement of anti-corruption
legislation using the police, ethnic offices, or special watch dog agencies within government will
not bear fruit otherwise.
Also corruption is a human behaviour which stands opposed to what is right or what ought to be.
We have looked at its nature and characteristics, considered it from both Biblical and ethical
perspectives where we reached the following resolutions: that the Old Testament did not fully
uphold its stand against corruption; that the New Testament fully stands against corrupt practices;
and that corruption is opposed to uprightness, virtue and steadfastness and is therefore ethically

79

condemnable. However, in doing all this, an ample room was allowed for a proper philosophical
assessment of each position we came across, as a way of reaching a balanced resolution
Thus, the following are only some of the major economic policy changes that will
unambiguously reduce opportunities for corruption: lowering tariffs and other barriers to
international trade:- unifying market- determined exchange rates and interest rates; eliminating
enterprise subsidies; minimizing regulations, licensing requirements, and other barriers to entry
for new firms and investors; demonopolizing and privatizing government assets; and
transparently enforcing prudential banking regulations and auditing and accounting standards.
The reform of government institutions may include civil service reform; improved budgeting,
financial management and tax administration and strengthened legal and judicial systems. Such
reforms should involve changing government structures and procedures; placing greater focus on
internal and external checks and balances. As a complement to these broader reforms, the careful
and transparent implementation of enforcement measures, such as prosecuting some prominent
corrupt figures, can also have an impact.
5.3

RECOMMENDATION
The anti-corruption war in Nigeria and particularly EFCC as an institution responsible for
fighting the war, have to be align with the current realities, because public morals may loosen,
and the battle against corruption may well be lost if Nigerias anti-corruption war is continue to
be affected by controversies which are political in nature and EFCC continue to stick to its
current style of prosecuting it mission- The situation where EFCC slammed 120 count charges
on a person accused of being corrupt while in public office, and none of the charges can be
established, should be replace with an approach that is multifaceted, multidisciplinary and
knowledge-driven; an approach that would assist all institutions of government in re-establishing

80

norms and standards of governance, assists the public, NGOs and even the legislature in
monitoring of compliance with the standards; help in restoring social order especially in politics;
and promotes advocacies and capacity building among genuine whistleblowers, in short,
Nigerias anti-corruption war should not only be limited to arrests, arraignment of accused in
courts of law and unnecessary controversies. EFCC should explore the inter-nations technical cooperation on corruption, to develop mechanism that would help Nigeria have a system that
discourages outright stealing of public fund, and develop an anti-corruption war that relied on
forensic evidence, well-trained personnel and free of unnecessary controversies. EFFC should,
this time-around, effectively utilize the provisions in the National Assembly Act 2004,
establishing it. For instance, Part III, section 12, subsection 1(c) and subsection (2), which
provided for establishment of Research Unit; and any committee to assist the commission, are
good avenues for the commission to explore to bring itself at par with Nigerians expectations.
However, the best weapon the new helmsman of EFFC have, is, adherence to rule of law,
because with the current uncompromising stand on adherence to Rule of Law, by President
YarAdua, any disregard of Rule of Law will not only send one to kuru, it may send one to
Kirikiri.
Hope is very essential, in life we will surely continue to live in hope, even when we die in
despair. Barrack Obama talks of the audacity of hope so it will not be out of place to say that
there is hope of finding a way out of corruption for Nigeria; the rebranding project therefore,
becomes critical. Here we want to acknowledge that corruption is a vice and to purge a vice,
virtue is needed. Since moral depravity is what engenders corrupt practices, it follows therefore,
that an elevated moral life will quell participation in corruption. A morally sanitized individual
will be less vulnerable to the courtship of corrupt companies. Also, a man of virtue as Socrates,

81

Plato and Aristotle believe is a man of the mean (Aristotle, 410). This means that extreme
qualities as greed, covetousness and avarice will not be part of his nature. In this manner he is
less likely to be troubled or worried by his lack of abundance. He is most likely to be content
with what ever he has.
The virtues of hard work, dignity, integrity and honour should also be taught both at school and
at religious gatherings. And the nation should ban all forms of recognition, award, and titles for
men with questionable integrity. When all these are implemented and a veritable way of
honouring people with outstanding achievements that are ethically sound put in place; this
orientation and culture of corruption will die a natural death, as no one will want to be a social
outcast. So there is hope and there will continue to be hope. It was Napoleon Hill in his
forerunning book Think and Grow Rich who opined that people tend to shrink from crime on
their first contact with it. But that through the passage of time, as it sticks with them, they end up
embracing it and living by it (169).
Similarly, Nigeria has acquired many negative values which have come to replace the good ones
effectively overtime. To this day, most socio-cultural, political and economic evil originating
from Africa bear Nigeria Trade Mark.
Some of these negative values include ritual killing. Many now engage in all sorts of rituals, with
human body parts, blood etc., to acquire wealth. Others engage in all sorts of shoddy, obscene
and occult practices for the same reason.
Ochulor declares that To many Nigerians, the only thing that matter is money or wealth; any
how you get it is no bodys business (320). Also, many have taken vocation in dirty and
inhumane activities like prostitution, armed robbery, hired assassination and justice perversion.
Many prostitutes and judges have been known to defend what they do on the ground that it was

82

where they make their living. And many of them indeed end up acquiring enormous wealth and
big connections. These need to be portrayed in a negative light so as to deter culprits.
Furthermore, the values of adulteration, faking goods, substandard products and even piracy are
currently, giving means of livelihood to no fewer than 30 million Nigerians. This results on daily
basis to many Nigerians developing deadly diseases as cancer, liver and kidney problems from
the consumption of these products and fake drugs. We may not have a source for our claim here
but when we calculate the billions of naira worth of fake, substandard, pirated and adulterated
products which NAFDAC and the copyright commission destroy every now and then in many
markets, locations and sites across the nation and add it up to over ten times the number of those
that are either not discovered or offered bribes to officials, then we know that 30 million might
be a low figure after all.
Again, we cannot forget that practices such as favouritism, nepotism, blackmail, bribery, contract
scams, fraud, looting, rigging, embezzlement, forgery, impersonation etc., are also some other
vices which have taken root of acceptance in Nigeria. In order therefore that we may get rid of
corruption which is the mother of them all we must have to purge them away by finding ways of
replacing them with positive values.
In the last section, we have established that corruption is a vice and that to stop a vice, virtue is
needed. From this premise, we want to find out those moral virtues that are currently lacking
within the Nigerian system and discover a way of injecting them back into the system with a
view to purging the country of corrupt practices.
In the first place Ochulor advocates some values which this chapter believes will be very helpful
especially in changing the intrinsic qualities and behavioural patterns of Nigerians so as to enable
them give up the Machiavellian philosophy of wealth acquisition. He defends this thesis by

83

saying; in the face of the corrupt nature of the Nigerian society, there is still the possibility of
acquiring morally upright wealth in Nigeria (326). He went ahead to name the formula as
follows; self knowledge: here one undergoes a critical examination of his life in order to give it
focus and direction. Developing the mind: here, one seeks to develop the positive powers of his
mind which is the engine room of human development. Others include specialization and
education which give one an edge and qualification. Also, being at alert to notice opportunities
when they come; being diligent and persistence, knowing of course that nothing good comes
easy; and finally, imbibing to the full, the noble qualities of self discipline, positive attitude and
good communication skill.
Also, we know of course that Nigerians currently do not see morality as having any space within
the socio-political and economic life-wire of the nation.
Ochulor testifies to this when he said this about corruption, it has affected many Nigerians so
adversely that they now think of morality as a concept that cannot be found in business, politics,
religion and socio-cultural relationships (318). Therefore, we want to maintain that morality
should be restored to its rightful place within the nations life system, through campaigns,
speeches and programmes. The government should encourage non-governmental organizations
to spring up and re-culture Nigerians in this area.
Also, we know that Nigerians currently see politics as a way of making quick money from the
government treasury. Iwara and Effiong in their Essay, Corruption and National Development in
Nigeria: the Way Forward, gave an almost endless list of political office holders involved in
different lootings, embezzlements and scam (165). Thus, we have to make politics less
glamorous in order to curtail this.

84

Secondly, programmes should be developed aimed at making Nigerians patriotic at all level
this will make Nigerians put the nation first in everything they do.
Thirdly, Nigerians should be taught the virtue of altruism from childhood. This will drastically
reduce self-centeredness that encourages individual participation in corrupt acts. Fourthly, a
broad-based re-orientation should be carried out to sensitize Nigerians on the danger, the short
term and the long term negative impacts of corruption both in the life of the country, the
individual and the posterity at large. Fifthly, there is a need for a public motivated revolution
aimed at dismantling the stronghold and every citadel of corruption in Nigeria such that took
place in China, France, Cuba to mention just a few. Sixthly, radical changes or what Kuhn calls
paradigm shift should be encouraged and enforced in all the sectors of the nations life. This will
demolish all the ugly cultures and practices wherever they thrive and introduce a breath of fresh
air in all our systems
The seventh and the eightieth virtues to be considered here are reform-based. Serious reforms are
to be made in the education, judicial and the economic sectors. This will target at bringing an end
to favouritism, nepotism, bribery, sell of sub-standard and fake goods, indiscriminate escalation
of prices of goods, etc., in doing this, stringent legislative measures should be put in place with
appropriate ways of implementation to check any arbitrariness and Lopsidedness.
Finally and most importantly, there should be renewed interest and emphases for culture re-call.
The lost African values which got eroded in the wake of western modernization should be
brought back and instilled in Nigerians so that in their dealings and interactions they will never
get wind of the idea of morality. This will be a strong back-bone for the nation as it seeks
recovery from the dearth of corruption.

85

Therefore, in injecting these virtues into the Nigeria system, it is hoped that this vice, corruption,
will be stamped out of the nation or at least ameliorated. For where there is no corruption, there,
justice thrives. Justice in the society as Plato advocates may yet return to Nigeria when the
individual, the family and different strata of the Nigerian society play their parts in cultural reorientation and rebranding programmes as promoted by the ministry of information and public
orientation in Nigeria.

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