FAMILY LAW

Annulment of Marriage
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code. In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient. (Grace J. Garcia v. Rederick A. Recio, GR No. 138322,
October 2, 2001)
Annulment of Marriage on the ground of Psychological Incapacity
From their submissions and the Courts own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable,
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be

perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason
that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. This is
one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church -- while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other -- shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the

case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 108763,
February 13, 1997; Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos, GR No. 136490,
October 19, 2000; Leni O. Choa v. Alfonso C. Choa, GR No. 143376, November
26, 2002)
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. (Brenda B. Marcos v.
Wilson G. Marcos, GR No. 136490, October 19, 2000)
Capacity to Marry
The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code
would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a
marriage license. (Grace J. Garcia v. Rederick A. Recio, GR No. 138322,
October 2, 2001)
Civil Status
The action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was
allegedly void ab initio. (Teofista Babiera v. Presentacion B. Catotal, GR No.
138493, June 15, 2000)
Conjugal Property
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As a conditio sine qua non for
the operation of this article in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who
invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during
the marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if
there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical
and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership
of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
(Spouses Go v. Leonardo Yamane, GR No. 160762, May 3, 2006; Milagros
Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, GR No. 154645, July 13, 2004)

The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not
destroy its conjugal nature. (Spouses Go v. Leonardo Yamane, GR No. 160762,
May 3, 2006)
Property is conjugal if acquired in a common-law relationship during the
subsistence of a preexisting legal marriage, even if it is titled in the name of the
common-law wife. In this case, a constructive trust is deemed created (Milagros
Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, GR No. 154645, July 13, 2004)
The sale of conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and
the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while
the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can
ratification cure the defect. (Sps. Guiang v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 125172,
June 26, 1998)
Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only
when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or when she
borrows money for that purpose upon her husbands failure to deliver the needed
sum; when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by
the courts or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity. (Spouses Go v. Leonardo Yamane, GR No. 160762, May 3, 2006)
Custody of Children
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be
separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of minor
children for their mothers loving care. (Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V, GR Nos.
154994 & 156254, June 28, 2005)
The principle of best interest of the child pervades Philippine cases
involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict with
the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in
choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors should
always be the paramount consideration. Courts are mandated to take into
account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the childrens
well-being and development. (Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V, GR Nos. 154994
& 156254, June 28, 2005)
The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family
Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness.
The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one
or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity or affliction with a communicable disease. (Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto
V, GR Nos. 154994 & 156254, June 28, 2005)
The award of temporary custody, as the term implies, is provisional and
subject to change as circumstances may warrant. (Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto
V, GR Nos. 154994 & 156254, June 28, 2005)
Donations
The prohibition against donations between spouses must likewise apply to
donations between persons living together in illicit relations; otherwise, the latter would
be better situated than the former. (Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, GR No.
154645, July 13, 2004)

Family Home
Under the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject
property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in Article
153 of said Code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the
Family Code does not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3,
1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed for a family
home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that the subject
property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows
that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner. Since the debt
involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior
to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions
of the Family Code. (Manacop v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 97898, August 11,
1997)
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the
owner thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is
actual is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely
possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. (Manacop v.
Court of Appeals, GR No. 97898, August 11, 1997)
Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house
specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries
enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code. Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a
family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the
head of the family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the
family home and who depend upon the head of the family for lead support. This
enumeration may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly
by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers.
They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. (Manacop v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 97898, August 11, 1997)
Filiation
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially
established. It stands to reason that children born within wedlock are legitimate.
(Voltaire Arbolario v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 129163, April 22, 2003)
Questions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of
filiation, and the determination of the estate of a decedent and claims thereto
should be brought up before the proper probate court or in special proceedings
instituted for the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil
action for the recovery of ownership and possession. (Voltaire Arbolario v. Court
of Appeals, GR No. 129163, April 22, 2003; Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,
GR No. 154645, July 13, 2004))
Illegitimate Children
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an
illegitimate child. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have
been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children
-- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Joey
D. Briones v. Maricel P. Miguel, GR No. 156343, October 13, 2004)
David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by
the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not
custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental
authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father
assume custody and authority over the minor. (Joey D. Briones v. Maricel P.
Miguel, GR No. 156343, October 13, 2004)
Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took
effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right
to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four
years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken
away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors
who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative
parents. The minor must be given his day in court. (Ernestina Bernabe v.
Carolina Alejo, GR No. 140500, January 21, 2002)
Indeed, it is hardly fair to stigmatize and create social and successional
prejudice against children who had no fault in nor control over the marital
impediments, which bedeviled their parents. They are the victims, not the
perpetrators, of these vagaries of life. Why then should they suffer their
consequences? In the final analysis, there are really no illegitimate children; there
are only illegitimate parents. And this dissent finds its philosophy in this: that
children, unarguably born and reared innocent in this world, should benefit by
every intendment of the law, particularly where as in this case their parents,
who originally suffered from a marital impediment, would now want to overcome
the improvident social and successional consequences of such condition.
Therefore, it is most unfair that these innocent children should be suffering the
consequences of the consequences of the impediment they did not cause, when
the very impediment itself has disappeared. (Dissent in De Santos v. Angeles,
GR No. 105619, December 12, 1995)
Marriage License
It has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to this effect was executed
by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in
character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. (Tomasa Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 135216, August 19,
1999)
Natural Child
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not
disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each other. (Ernestina
Bernabe v. Carolina Alejo, GR No. 140500, January 21, 2002)

Parental Authority
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness to
exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority
and the award of custody to someone else. In the past, the following grounds
have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with
a communicable disease. (Joey D. Briones v. Maricel P. Miguel, GR No. 156343,
October 13, 2004)
Paraphernal Property
Properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal.
However, this prima facie presumption cannot prevail over the cadastral courts
specific finding, reached in adversarial proceedings, that the lot was inherited
(Jessie V. Pisuea v. Heirs of Villar, GR No. 132803, August 31, 1999)

Property Relations
Under Article 145 [of the Civil Code of the Philippines], a conjugal
partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage and lasts until the legal
union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of
property. Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband and
wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of the
Code.
Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage,
unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to
belong to the CPG. (Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, GR No. 154645, July
13, 2004)
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man
and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which
the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It does not apply to a
cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful wife. (Guillerma Tumlos v. Spouses
Fernandez, GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000; Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,
GR No. 154645, July 13, 2004)
The nature of a property -- whether conjugal or paraphernal -- is
determined by law and not by the will of one of the spouses. Thus, no unilateral
declaration by one spouse can change the character of a conjugal property.
(Spouses Go v. Leonardo Yamane, GR No. 160762, May 3, 2006)
When a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only the
property acquired by them -- through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry -- shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. (Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, GR No.
154645, July 13, 2004)
Psychological Incapacity
Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the

parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is

essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
108763, February 13, 1997)
Status of Persons
W]here the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the
status of a person from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted
in summary proceedings. (Republic v. Labrador, GR No. 132980, March 25,
1999)
Corrections involving the nationality or citizenship of a person were
substantial and could not be effected except in adversarial proceedings.
(Republic v. Labrador, GR No. 132980, March 25, 1999)
Visitorial Right
In Silva v. Court of Appeals, the Court sustained the visitorial right of an
illegitimate father over his children in view of the constitutionally protected
inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Even when the parents
are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and
feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow
this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of
the child. (Joey D. Briones v. Maricel P. Miguel, GR No. 156343, October 13,
2004)