CASE NO.

41
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against
his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men
who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was
deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends
his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time
in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living,
the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought
to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic]
justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28,
1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of
offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision.
Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse
counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said
motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of
proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the
appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendantappellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the
reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed
record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of
time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support

of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417,
decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement
thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of
the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and
that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636,
June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant
further states that in the latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966,
decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion,
the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26,
1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the
Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza
case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's
restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza
the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior
decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the
Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the
matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his
petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him
after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until
he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer.
No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he
manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs.

Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did
not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17
resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require
Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral
argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe
his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has
no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file
a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being
contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with
abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you
judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall
be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's
eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can
thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and
behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out
the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out
the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to
them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his
petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his
lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But
he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the
CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the
noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the
highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this
matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE,
what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in
simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court
in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on
your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with
any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to
face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way
of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is
current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the
Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have
told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the
Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack
the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled
by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We
waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed
your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your
Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional
right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we
sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam
Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy
name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more
appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who
would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public
opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and
dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense,
that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human
defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of
things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court
and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was
intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must
end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold
the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice,
we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have
been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We
have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who
tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected
by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a firstimpression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role
of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide
"only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond
the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for
denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of
the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms
the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same
three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give
reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be
required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons
not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular
case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this
Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter.
There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of
the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the
facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating
its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein
petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress
such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory
jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party
another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right but
of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring
the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call
for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his
appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the
"accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court
in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought
to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the
movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify
the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15,
Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time,
and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three
days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted
upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a
case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v.
Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45
Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing
the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to
the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves
do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally,
is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a
"whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to
surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We
know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely
believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice
their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions
and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press
and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see
fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery
of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence
and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have
been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in
such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice.
Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The
reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a
fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary,
has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects
with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that
flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice
Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a

correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and
to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an
able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those
in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under
such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his
demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him
"to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of
legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration
take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient
to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all
insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts.
(Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted
with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as
incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration
of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times
be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the timehonored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of
the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring
into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his
conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless
declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of
justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency
and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial
system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice
the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet
entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error,
of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a
group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took
Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that
the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of
an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election
to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement
that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the
courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann
Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by
an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of
such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than
those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which
requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest
observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their
criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of
justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re
Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who
had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the
judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and
others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is
protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of
the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people.
Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law
into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted.
The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in

the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together
with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court
into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that
the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with
unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the
court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with
the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only
when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an
independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil
rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was
taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from
practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the
affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties,
and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that
judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court,
as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the
authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or
act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an
inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties
devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable
inferences,
will
be
encouraged,
and
the
person
making
them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided
against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts,
or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial
officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against
the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the
community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such
charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the
administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional
misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor
against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case
of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and
who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his
client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article
in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of
having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court
suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the
public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements
of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public
officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all,
could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts
or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in
such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a
polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the
judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal
with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a
pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"

"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of
a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude
should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer
wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the
intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain
appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court
acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short
of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank,
or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of
bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can
formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require
fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every rightminded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered
its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have
found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the
insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and
his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never
subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an
angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever
enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an
exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any
reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to
assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult
otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have
no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or
libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication."
18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of
this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the
accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised
the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations
of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from
the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were

paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When,
however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no
right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation
to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it
includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally for their official acts."Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355,
20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved,
between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official
act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct
wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was
recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown,
fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are
ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in
that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it
in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because
of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the
building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the
people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil
example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded,
manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has
been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a
personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his
integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter
of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1
N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused
attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in
which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common
sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such
conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the
attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says
the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of
judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as
principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they
may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be
anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the
same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to
the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not
holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a
cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the
attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him

[the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As
recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case,
we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State,
22 Ark. 149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237,
244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to
make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a
suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a
gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official
acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for
criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the
court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a
period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved
such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered,
even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their
judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public
confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by
the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of
the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have
generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on
different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal
abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding
that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and
never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding
without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason
for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without
such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of
its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in
utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to,
the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the
source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement
expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once
more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and
his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from
the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa,
Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He
there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in
contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this
Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the
press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court
with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as
to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to
his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of
justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in
favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party
and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided
during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or
degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of
the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees
the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken
from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586,
594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to
its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of
Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the
sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of
one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this
Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It
makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute
governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this
Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it
has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation.
It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements
of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into
question the capability of the members and some former members of this Court to

render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel
labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity,
need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the
protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious
innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty.
Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to
his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof,
however, came when, inPeople vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the
holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A
complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt
proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an
editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the
question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this
was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that
them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in
any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to
administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the
punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct
calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the
first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision
which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the
contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is
the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them
is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during
the pendency of the said appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such
post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty.
Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in
the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and
ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy
disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is
altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn
duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who
have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge
of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct
of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the
right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this courthas the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them
from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy
of their confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of
the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right,
but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege
of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally
held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one
is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of
right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and
sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of
whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object
of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's
part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere
offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as

a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile
insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the
justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated
acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members
as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in
the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a
calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called
upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually
tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for
itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of
an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its
members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and
completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a
critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last
resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and
requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to
attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and
judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion,
not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to.
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy

to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the
Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office.30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as
well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at
grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit
to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power
to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this
Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally
invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one
entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being
neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded
and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction
would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the
sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do
disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added
glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us
no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree
that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence
grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of
law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded
as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that
it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall
last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once
again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of
Appeals for their information and guidance.

CASE NO. 42
G.R. No. 112869. January 29, 1996
KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, petitioners, vs. HON. PAUL T. ARCANGEL, as
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 134, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders dated December 3, 1993 and December 17,
1993 of respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 134 of Makati, finding
petitioners guilty of direct contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for
five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co.,
brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the
annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs claimed they
had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later
sold by the latter to codefendant Jose Poe. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to
Branch 134 formerly presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by respondent
Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wickers counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion
seeking the inhibition of respondent judge from the consideration of the case.[1] The motion alleged in
pertinent part:
1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able to
maneuver the three (3) successive postponements for the presentation for cross-examination of Mrs.
Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she was not presented;
2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In
one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing,
counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did
not likewise appear while other counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by
Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and
Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said
case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos
relief;
4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and to give a fighting chance
for plaintiffs to prove their case, since this will be the last case to recover the partnership property,
plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit himself and set this case for re-raffle;

5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the first instance that a litigant
doubts the partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he should immediately move for his inhibition.
The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker.
Considering the allegations to be malicious, derogatory and contemptuous, respondent judge
ordered both counsel and client to appear before him on November 26, 1993 and to show cause why
they should not be cited for contempt of court.[2]
In a pleading entitled Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt
Directed Against Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel, Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the
motion did not necessarily express his views because he merely signed the motion in a representative
capacity, in other words, just lawyering, for Kelly Wicker, who said in a note to him that a young man
possibly employed by the Court had advised him to have the case reraffled, when the opposing counsel
Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new judge both failed to come for a hearing, because their absence was
an indication that Atty. Santos knew who the judge may be and when he would appear. Wickers
sense of disquiet increased when at the next two hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos and the
latters witness, Mrs. Remedios Porcuna, were all absent, while the other counsels were present.[3]
Finding petitioners explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an order dated December 3,
1993, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days
and to pay a fine of P100.00.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in
his order of December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent judge directed petitioners to appear
before him on January 7, 1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their sentence.
In their petition[4] before this Court, Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them for contempt. They argue
that when a person, impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner, asks a
judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, he does not thereby become guilty of contempt.
In his comment,[5] respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93 dated
September 2, 1993 of this Court and not because, as petitioners alleged, he was personally recruited
from the South by Atty. Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos; that he assumed his new
office on October 11, 1993 and started holding sessions on October 18, 1993; that when all male
personnel of his court were presented to petitioner Kelly Wicker he failed to pick out the young man
who was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the filing of the motion for inhibition; that he was
not vindictive and that he in fact refrained from implementing the execution of his order dated
December 3, 1993 to enable petitioners to avail themselves of all possible remedies; that after holding
petitioners in contempt, he issued an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil
Case No. 14048; that Atty. Rayos claim that he was just lawyering and acting as the vehicle or
mouthpiece of his client is untenable because his (Atty. Rayos) duties to the court are more important
than those which he owes to his client; and that by tendering their profuse apologies in their motion
for reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order, petitioners acknowledged the falsity of their
accusations against him; and that the petitioners have taken inconsistent positions as to who should try
Civil Case No. 14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition dated November 18, 1993 they asked that
the case be reraffled to another sala of the RTC of Makati, while in their petition dated November 29,

1993, which they filed with the Office of Court Administrator, petitioners asked that Judge Capulong be
allowed to continue hearing the case on the ground that he had a full grasp of the case.
In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge, petitioners claim that although they wanted a
reraffle of the case, it was upon the suggestion of respondent judge himself that they filed the petition
with the Court Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the case.
What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly
containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. The former has been
held to be equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of Court and,
therefore, direct contempt.[6]
It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or constructive contempt, the
contemnor may be punished only [a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to
the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, whereas in case of direct contempt, the respondent may
be summarily adjudged in contempt. Moreover, the judgment in cases of indirect contempt is
appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt only judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and
MeTCs are appealable.[7]
Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence even if
petitioners are right about the nature of the case against them by contending that it involves indirect
contempt, they have no ground for complaint since they were afforded a hearing before they were held
guilty of contempt. What is important to determine now is whether respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding petitioners liable for direct contempt.
We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked
to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail.[8] The contempt power
ought not to be utilized for the purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for
showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court.[9]
Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court
sustains Judge Arcangels finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of the allegations
in petitioners motion for inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs thereof:
2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In one
hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing, counsel
for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not
likewise appear while other counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by
Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and
Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said
case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos
relief;

leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing counsel in the
case, Atty. Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge owed his transfer to the RTC of
Makati, which necessitated easing out the former judge to make room for such transfer.
These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and constitute an
unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in this country. They suggest that lawyers, if they
are well connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage. The truth is that the
assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative
Order No. 154-93, precisely in the interest of an efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec.
5 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution.[10] This is a matter of record which could have easily been verified by
Atty. Rayos. After all, as he claims, he deliberated for two months whether or not to file the offending
motion for inhibition as his client allegedly asked him to do.
In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been bidden to do
by his client of whom he was merely a mouthpiece. He was just lawyering and he cannot be
gagged, even if the allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed were false
since it was his client who verified the same.
To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos was that he had been told by an unidentified
young man, whom he thought to be employed in the court, that it seemed the opposing counsel, Atty.
Santos, knew who the replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos did not show up in court on the
same days the new judge failed to come. It would, therefore, appear that the other allegations in the
motion that respondent judge had been personally recruited by the opposing counsel to replace Judge
Capulong who had been eased out were Atty. Rayos and not Wickers. Atty. Rayos is thus
understating his part in the preparation of the motion for inhibition.
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is
not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in the
representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set by his
responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep.[11] Even a hired gun cannot be excused for what
Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his
client.
Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins him to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and [to] insist on similar conduct by others[12] and not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported
by the record or have materiality to the case.[13]
After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners profuse apologies and
indicated that he would let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence, petitioners served on
respondent judge a copy of their instant petition which prayed in part that Respondent Judge Paul T.
Arcangel be REVERTED to his former station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati where more
complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City. If nothing else, this personal attack on the judge
only serves to confirm the contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence first evident in
petitioners motion for inhibition belying their protestations of good faith.
Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v. Masaquel:[14]
Numerous cages there have been where judges, and even members of the Supreme Court, were asked
to inhibit themselves from trying, or from participating in the consideration of a case, but scarcely were

the movants punished for contempt, even if the grounds upon which they based their motions for
disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is only when there was direct imputation
of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant,
belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in contempt of court.
It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this case.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the power to cite for
contempt must be exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle we think that the jail
sentence on petitioners may be dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court. In the case of
petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater reason for doing so considering that the particularly offending
allegations in the motion for inhibition do not appear to have come from him but were additions made
by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in years (80) and in failing health (suffering from angina),
a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. Wicker may have indeed been the recipient of such a remark
although he could not point a court employee who was the source of the same. At least he had the
grace to admit his mistake both as to the source and truth of said information. It is noteworthy Judge
Arcangel was also willing to waive the imposition of the jail sentence on petitioners until he came upon
petitioners description of him in the instant petition as a judge who cannot make the grade in the RTC
of Makati, where complex cases are being filed. In response to this, he cited the fact that the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines chose him as one of the most outstanding City Judges and Regional Trial Court
Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and that he is a 1963 graduate of the U.P. College of Law.
In Ceniza v. Sebastian,[15] which likewise involved a motion for inhibition which described the judge
corrupt, the Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt, removed the jail sentence of 10
days imposed by the trial court for the reason that
Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the conclusion, considering the
background of this occurrence that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was not duly
mindful of the exacting standard [of] preservation of the dignity of his office not indulging his sense of
grievance sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. It is the view of the Court that under
the circumstances the fine imposed should be increased to P500.00.
The same justification also holds true in this case.
WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of
imprisonment for five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P 100.00 to P200.00 for each of the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Puno, JJ., concur.

CASE NO. 43
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC

March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors1 in
response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to
show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an
administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno)
to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded
on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show
Cause Resolution and the present decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds that
with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another who manifested he
was not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or
tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more
urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law professors, who are members of the
Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil
rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities
only.
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds, they
must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession, and in
particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter,
for a decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such decisions
reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real issue here
but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyones attention from the actual concern of
this Court to determine by respondents explanations whether or not respondent members of the Bar
have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules
of Court through improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily,
it should be stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on
their Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen),
for the Courts proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic
freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the
past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against
lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to
respondents invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not
merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that
respondents own non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly
motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents actuations, it is apropos to revisit the factual
antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya,
et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for

Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising
solely the following grounds:
I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts (sic)
assertion that the Executives foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under
the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by
international human rights and humanitarian standards, including those provided for in the
relevant international conventions of which the Philippines is a party.4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if fundamental,
responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its citizens especially where the rights
asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.5
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel
Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230,
where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration
of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURTS JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28,
2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005
AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENTS ARGUMENTS FOR
DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A
STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITIONS CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive
plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit
the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were
namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decents article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2)
Christian J. Tams book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis
article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010,
journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of
ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News
TV website also on July 19, 2010.13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roques column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila
Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors
purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored
with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddles response to the

post by Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog,
Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Kus blog entry in this wise:
The newspapers16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday with
the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Courts decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that are
identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent).
Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners [plagiarism] allegations until after the
motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the courts jus cogens discussion is that it implies that
the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms.
Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Courts decision is available
here:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the
charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark
Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question of the
integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take
exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an international crime in
your esteemed Courts Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No.
162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine chapter
of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media
Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of
the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court may have
misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic
since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the
time to carefully study the arguments I made in the article.

I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on Ethics
and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010
letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter
of Justice Del Castillo.21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreaks website22 and on
Atty. Roques blog.23 A report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such
as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at
the University of the Philippines College of Laws bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at
said colleges website.27
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the Philippines
College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief
Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Chief Justice
Subject:

Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary

Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight
(38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be considered by
the Supreme Court en banc.
Respectfully,

(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual signatures of
the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.)
appearing beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is
reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse
and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their
own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial
recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had
these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the
Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views the
charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the
individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious
threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, plagiarism is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another persons work
as ones own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of
someone elses ideas and expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into committing
such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions were
originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism
in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to
allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently,
this is a complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente merely
copied select portions of other legal writers works and interspersed them into the decision as if they
were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Courts and no longer just the ponentes. Thus
the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original
writers names and the publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.

So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the spokesman of
the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a reference to
the primary sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable, because the original
authors writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are
precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together with portions of their
writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a
deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors work of organizing and analyzing those primary
sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal and
scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more
demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of
diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan
Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that
the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have
attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its
aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the contrary
conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works without attribution
by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State liability and
responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured
parties home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely
have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort
women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World War made it incumbent on the
Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the
Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners
seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and
plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme
Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive
Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false
sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of
decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine
legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot accept
excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench
and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic
society. Given the Courts recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the
charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only further erode
faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest
for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the

horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice
to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own
conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes
ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are
credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not casually
cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It
is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of professional care and
practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of administration
of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as
the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely
above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as
teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine
College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire
Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system by
allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal precedents
through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the
primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all
those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners
therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to
save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for
the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to
any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it
conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a
recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and
Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in pleadings,
practice, and adjudication.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Dean and Professor of Law

(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN

Dean (1978-1983)

(SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN

Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA

Dean (1995-1999)

(SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of Law

REGULAR FACULTY
(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON
Professor

(SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL

Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR DAWAY

Associate Dean and Associate Professor

(SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD

Assistant Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN

Associate Professor

(SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA

Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE
Assistant Professor

(SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY

Assistant Professor

(SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor
LECTURERS

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY

(SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA
(SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA
(SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO
(SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA
(SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG
(SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO
(SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA
(SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA
(SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(Underscoring supplied.)
Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his sentiments on the
alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams letter here:

Glasgow, 18 August 2010

Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)
Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice
Your Excellency,
My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of Glasgow. I
am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-mentioned judgment of
your Honourable Court.
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Courts Judgment, in the section
addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter shows, the
relevant sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book
Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that
there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as this is in relation to a
citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive passages
reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of referencing.
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgments cautious
approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my books central thesis
is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm
place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he present study
attempts to demystify aspects of the very mysterious concept and thereby to facilitate its
implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding section notes that "the preceding chapters
show that the concept is now a part of the reality of international law, established in the jurisprudence
of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have been cited
to support as it seemingly has the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in
which your Honourable Courts Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging
it.
On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court.
I remain
Sincerely yours
(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31
In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares exhibits during the August 26, 2010
hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy
of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain faculty

members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to
present the signed copy of the said Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing.32
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed UP
Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law
Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was that
only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual
signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean
Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the
Statement although his name was not included among the signatories in the previous copies submitted
to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having been
formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under consideration by the Court.33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations regarding
the UP Law Faculty Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a
truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he cited
the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the
authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as
areprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Courts alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.34 x x x.
(Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must

"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than objective comments
except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Courts honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite
resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their
obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority
of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F.
Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J.
Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch,
Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G.
Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days
from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.37
Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through
his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before
the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and
faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.38
In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed the
following pleadings:
(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents, excluding
Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11
and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in relation to the
same charge in par. (1);

(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to the charge
of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and
(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common compliance
which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said
Common Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in the
discharge of the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law, and
as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to
them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out that
"none of them was involved either as party or counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note
with concern" that the Show Cause Resolutions findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment that
respondents indeed are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of
the Court, and have violated Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:
(a) Respondents alleged noble intentions
In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes42 and the
courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the Court44 in the
issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the Court
but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal
system. Their noble motive was purportedly evidenced by the portion of their Statement
"focusing on constructive action."45 Respondents call in the Statement for the Court "to provide
clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal
research and writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining
lawyers to participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts
in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice" (under Canon 4 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal processes"
(under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest and
duty to vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome
occurrences have a profound impact in the academe, especially in our law schools."47
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity Statement
as an institutional attack x x x on the basis of its first and ninth paragraphs."48 They further
clarified that at the time the Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to
them the Court "was not going to take any action on the grave and startling allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation."49 According to respondents, the bases for their belief were
(i) the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court
Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would
not order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo
which they claimed "did nothing but to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and

misrepresentation charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the Courts
indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo that
impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents position that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism and
should be held accountable in accordance with the standards of academic writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits of
respondents charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the
Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence,
respondents essentially argue that their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice
Del Castillo is the correct view and that they are therefore justified in issuing their Restoring
Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance included, among others: (i) the
letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona
through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted without proper
attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the
Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and from an International Court of Justice decision;
and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity
and International Human Rights Law" by Michael OFlaherty and John Fisher, in support of their
charge that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper attribution,
but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54
(c) Respondents belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have likewise
spoken on the "plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and
misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public issues."55 They identified various published
reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on the
issue of plagiarism, specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero;56
(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24,
2010;57
(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010;58
(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine Star on
July 30, 2010;59
(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr.
published in the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60
(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer on August 8, 2010;61

(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinans call for the resignation of Justice
Del Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July 31,
2010;62
(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de
Manila University School of Law on the calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo
published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on August
11, 2010;63
(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former dean of
the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional Association, the
Judges Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Bulacan
Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16, 2010;64 and
(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65
In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for sanctions
and the charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they may have
violated specific canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair and without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their position
that in issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be performing their duties as
members of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a
democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free speech."66 In support of
this contention, they cited United States v. Bustos,67 In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In
the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales
v. Commission on Elections.69
(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement was also
issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They
relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he
national university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise
adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology70 which they claimed
recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy discussion and
communication of a faculty members field of study without fear of reprisal. It is respondents view that
had they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised
[their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and generation
of students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research
and pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and
misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or
relevance to ones conduct."71

In closing, respondents Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following portion of
the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the bench
than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or
injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and
courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and
the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by
the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case.73
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common Compliance
stated, thus:
WHEREFORE:
A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and officers
of the Court, respectfully pray that:
1. the foregoing be noted; and
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause Resolution,
including its conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b]
committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility."
B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents
respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that before final
judgment be rendered:
1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the findings
and conclusions of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including especially the finding
and conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that connection, that appropriate
procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted and defined that will allow them the
full and fair opportunity to require the production of and to present testimonial,
documentary, and object evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation
issues in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the
Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC); and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts, reports
and submissions in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses who were or could have been called in In The Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74

Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista

Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. JuanBautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted
the allegations in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.
Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the findings
and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can
be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be
punished only after charge and hearing."75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the best
intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. JuanBautista intimated that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were
what motivated her to sign the Statement.
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence77 which in her view
highlighted that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such
that schools have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be taught, how
lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere
in the schools exercise of discretion in these matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She
claims the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of the University of the Philippines and other
universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents constitutional
right to freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to
public safety, public morale, public health or other legitimate public interest.78
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by registered
mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances
surrounding his signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of
conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it
reportedly contained citations not properly attributed to the sources; that he was shown a copy of the
Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and that, agreeing in principle with
the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good faith.79
In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the
right, like all citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the
attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he
"never had any intention to unduly influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or should
influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case"83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the
Court] was the farthest thing on respondents mind when he signed the Statement."84 Unlike his

colleagues, who wish to impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what
constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused the view
that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element of the same. Others, like
respondent, were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the
perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair
topic for academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that plagiarism
presupposes deliberate intent to steal anothers work and to pass it off as ones own.85 (Emphases
supplied.)
Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have been remiss
in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and could have been more
careful."86 He ends his discussion with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully
complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner
violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 in relation to his
submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty
Statement, which he described as follows:

its signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of
the Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan
on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)".
A copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in the UP College of Law on 10
August 2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was also officially received by the Honorable
Court from the Dean of the UP College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before
the filing of Restoring Integrity I.

serves as the official file copy of the Deans Office in the UP College of Law that may be signed
by other faculty members who still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty- seven
original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their printed names and the notation "(SGD.")
and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight (8) other members of the faculty above their
handwritten or typewritten names.87
For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant since
what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these
two documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.

On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean Leonen
alleged, thus:
2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the faculty on a
draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it among the
faculty members so that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded the
law faculty roster to serve as the printed drafts signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of
the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was unaware
that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Courts Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the Honorable Court
was in the process of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-717-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonens staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the faculty.
Some faculty members visited the Deans Office to sign the document or had it brought to their
classrooms in the College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still other faculty members
who, for one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time,
nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they would sign as soon as they
could manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been
circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a style
and manner appropriate for posting in the College of Law. Following his own established
practice in relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to reformat the signing
pages so that only the names of those who signed the first printed draft would appear, together
with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring Integrity II thus came into
being.88
According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of nonsignatories in the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic
considerations as to secure the integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting
statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters."90
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendozas name as among the signatories in Restoring Integrity
II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a
miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted signing
pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)"
signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed Restoring
Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his staff to the
inclusion of the Justices name among the "(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice Mendoza
over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized

the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally with its
contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the Restoring
Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving for the United States the following week. It would
later turn out that this account was not entirely accurate.91 (Underscoring and italics supplied.)
Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and so placed
full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed other faculty members who had also authorized
the Dean to indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time unable to affix their
signatures physically to the document."93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the
circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendozas signature. It would turn out that this
was what actually transpired:
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the deans staff talked to Justice Mendoza on the
phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement as
he fundamentally agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say that
he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could
authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was about to leave for the United States. The deans
staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the Restoring Integrity
Statement to him.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the
Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.
2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he went to the
College to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice
Mendoza declined to sign.94
According to the Dean:
2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received from
Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy
of the Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he
declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time, he predicted that the
Court would take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and under those circumstances, he
wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a former Associate Justice and not wishing
to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the Statement.95(Emphases supplied.)
With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovits name in the signature page of Restoring Integrity II when
he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonens
August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38
members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated to him.
However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonens staff in the reformatting of the signing
pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in the reformatted

signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38 members of the law
faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the Statement that
was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the main body of the
Statement was unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This
purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statements] essential nature as a live public manifesto meant
to continuously draw adherents to its message, its signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic
x x x many other printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each one reflecting the same
text but with more and more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen claims
that "this is not an instance where it has been made to appear in a document that a person has
participated in an act when the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent which
members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement
proper and/or had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01
and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the
identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be signatories
to, the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the
Statement] through the appropriate channels by transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice
Corona for the latters information and proper disposition with the hope that its points would be duly
considered by the Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v.
Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required quantum of proof has not been met in this case and
that no dubious character or motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative
sanction for violation of the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.102
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the Common
Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records, evidence and witnesses
allegedly relevant not only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving
Justice Del Castillo.
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of the
Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as
a visiting professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010.
He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court
of the United States, that [d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to speak means the right to
speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v.
Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make
the intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of
repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and selfassertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the
Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections,108 Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or

present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e.,
referring to the constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that he "has read the
Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring
Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110
ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the material
issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents academic freedom as law professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be disciplined
as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should not be
disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in relation
to such hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or presentation of evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the
records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been
presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?
DISCUSSION
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.
It is respondents collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has
interfered with respondents constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears
that the underlying assumption behind respondents assertion is the misconception that this Court is
denying them the right to criticize the Courts decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to
"silence" respondent law professors dissenting view on what they characterize as a "legitimate public
issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither
the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its
members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case,
have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper
disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution
painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under

the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP
Law facultys Restoring Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo
was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but
a truth"111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that
there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution
made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be
"constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no
stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as
areprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Courts alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x.
(Underscoring ours.)
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents freedom of expression when it
stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than objective comments
except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Courts honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite
resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their
obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority
of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice.115 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring
supplied.)

Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents submissions, this Court has held that
the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial
concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In
cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly
affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and
fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common
decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco both
guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his second motion for
reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce,
as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that
erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily
consider unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice.117 (Emphases supplied.)
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and further held
that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his
argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were
sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is
highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has
done, because both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction them by reason of their
natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly
in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or
less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which
the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the
purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim;
and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the
reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious
in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the
administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few
days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the
authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so
devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error

notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from the minority view
of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a
case, unlike the respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and
therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting
respondents theory, Salcedo is authority for the following principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in
duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has
conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what
he now is: a priest of justice(In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he
neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining
the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved
turn for protection and relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his pleading, by
accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents Statement goes way beyond merely
ascribing error to the Court.
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty. Vicente
Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where
the Courtindefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to
Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great injustice to his client
committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas
for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's
"unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same
breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying
"that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the
people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs
and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney
and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we
regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession."121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a
lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers,
including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts,
whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case

engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To
quote from that decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly remind him
"to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of
legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and
laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation
is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for
their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted
with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may
tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and selfrespect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and
the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl.
481)
xxxx
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into
scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed that:

[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has
always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects
such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried
fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a
profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by
the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision
of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may
enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken
and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision.
x x x.
xxxx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many
blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the
law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to
lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is,
under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he
owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.124 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned even
from more recent jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of a fine,
for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative complaint and
held, thus:
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show
respect to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we stated
in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the
courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right.
Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).
xxxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
xxxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a
corresponding obligation.Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. x
x x.
xxxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts,
creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to
undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the
administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive
language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs.
Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious
statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing
the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No.
76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for
remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly
unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under his
duty of fidelity to his client. x x x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for using
intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does
not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities
for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.128
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair
comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for
Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press.
The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press
for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial
independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on
judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and
Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media
statements grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny
him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and
of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly

functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. x x x.132 (Emphases supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents133 that the Statement presents
no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.
The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents academic freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic
freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how they
will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not
inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a
party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity
as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any previous case
before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic
freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure
the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Courts past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline
cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling
in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of
members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the
courts and to uphold the publics faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the
reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force
to the academic freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v.
Monsod,134 lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike
professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by
their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors
must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members
of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are
lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents proposition in the Common Compliance that their
issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of
justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have
fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal
processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar

cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason
that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions
thereof.
The Courts rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents main arguments of freedom of expression and academic freedom, the
Court considers here the other averments in their submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their
position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur
this Court to take the correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents staunch belief that Justice
Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the
Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyers conviction in the righteousness of his cause
there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put
the courts and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in
such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with more reason, as
the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision
therein, in a public statement using contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently
submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."
That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was one
of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of
women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times
of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.
xxxx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial
function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left
without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
Whether or not respondents views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was
wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate
matters to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly
inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the compliances
arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as to
attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in the
present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the filing of respondents submissions in this

administrative case. As respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics
case, it is not proper procedure for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially
when it has no bearing on their own administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for
effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen."136 One
wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others,
callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to
see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send a signal to their students that the
only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in full in
the narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters
and the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who
would expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are
beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a
deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not do the
same. These foreign authors letters underscore the universality of the tenet that legal professionals
must deal with each other in good faith and due respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who
can express his opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive
recriminations.
As for the claim that the respondents noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive action"
on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily
meant for this Courts consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first before
it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by
the general public and designed to capture media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in
the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case
by Atty. Roque, who is respondents colleague on the UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to
the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya
decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statements issuance, were still
both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On
this point, respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did
not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under the
belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still,
there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010
and its publication and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had already
been convened. If it is true that the respondents outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference
on the part of the Court then, when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was
nothing to prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into
account in the interest of fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents reliance
on various news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof that they are
being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance show

that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary137 or
contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and weighs the possible
repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside the
profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other
interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However,
when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary
and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for
such silence would have a grave implication on legal education in our country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this appears to
be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court
is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the
issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and
contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this
Court expounded in Salcedo:
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the court or to
be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further
comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions and practice as
those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is
the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is
not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced." (In
re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of
liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to
him when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order
to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following the bad example, from taking the
same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it
deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of
good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the
courts and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on
pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance compared to
his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who showed true candor and
sincere deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to sign
the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his agreement to the Statement was in principle and
that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the
promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought
about by a division of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate intent was an element of
plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the
effect of the language of the Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having to
retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed
below) and without baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all
that this Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that they

recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We commend
Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true import of the Show
Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquezs Compliance
satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota
and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused from these
proceedings. However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine
law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even
without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional
Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal professionals of any
nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of decency and fairness.
The Courts ruling on Dean Leonens Compliance regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a
"dummy" that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a true and faithful
reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body,
there were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the discrepancies in the signature
pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by
claiming that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and
more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not administratively liable
because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the
Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories
thereto."140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonens implied view that the signatures in the
Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally
submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that
point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of the
persons who have signed it, since the Statements persuasive authority mainly depends on the
reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent from
respondents explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of their positions as UP law
professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya
case.
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonens predicament is the fact that he did not from
the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and,
instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn
out, according to Dean Leonens account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages
due to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed administrative officer in the deans office gave the
dean inaccurate information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the
signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the name of Atty.
Armovit when encoding the signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed
Restoring Integrity I.

The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a signed
document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is
not unusual. We are willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate
blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a signed document for
the Courts consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is
the original signed document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of the
actual signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from this
practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing
to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks and unsigned
portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court submissions for court
employees are accountable for the care of documents and records that may come into their custody.
Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not contain the actual
signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonens explanations yield the answer. In the course of his explanation
of his willingness to accept his administrative officers claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated
as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only authorized him
to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around the time
Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory
thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean Leonens proposition, that is precisely
tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person or persons participated in an act when such
person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent
standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no misrepresentation
when he allowed at least one person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all he
had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was
only hearsay information that the former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly
determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he
could not have waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in
fact signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly
impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad,
then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual signatures before
submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to nor
counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement was neither a
pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary submission
that Dean Leonen could do at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonens Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court is willing
to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his
objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonens professed good intentions, the Court deems it
sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with
the Court as required under Canon 10.

Respondents requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism
and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records
of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the Court
find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for
that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the
plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of,
and evidence that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed
in Dean Leonens separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautistas Compliance, she similarly expressed the
sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing."141 It is
this group of respondents premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due
process.
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs largely
from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the
majoritys purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground
for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.
However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and
Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show
Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in
other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in
which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save
that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to the
specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the
Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be
followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type
hearing. We have held that:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be
heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to
present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due
process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)
In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio143 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining
to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or
a prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)
In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court Br. 81, Romblon On the Prohibition
from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law,145 we further observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal
investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their
administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after
considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast
dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and
welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and
his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees
for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for
further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is required
before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the facts
on record.
xxxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of
an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long

as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty.
Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query
and Manifestation filed before this Court.146 (Emphases supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their reservation of
a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings
any justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically stated
what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will
necessitate a formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the
assumption that the findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were
made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that
case. This is the primary reason for their request for access to the records and evidence presented in
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No. 107-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the
Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from that fact,
it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the respondents
issued a Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the
Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than the
four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news reports/columns (many of which
respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their Common Compliance) and internet sources that
are already of public knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the Statement
and the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various
versions, the Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo
could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents
and if there is any evidence on these matters the same would be in their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonens Compliance he narrated how as early as September 2010,
i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and
before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the Court would
take some form of action on the Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a
reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statements principles, could
foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as
worded, is not a matter this Court should simply let pass. This belies respondents claim that it is
necessary for them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases
for the Show Cause Resolution.

If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective compliances or
chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because they were counting on being granted a hearing,
that is respondents own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be aware of
the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They
should bear the consequence of the risk they have taken.
Thus, respondents requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence presented in,
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any
subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their
points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly
not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and
courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they
are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have
voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct
themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law
professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his
Compliance to be satisfactory.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan
M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison,
Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.
Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose
Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R.
Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel
S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua,
Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law
professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate
and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the
Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty,
as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full
candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings.
However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he
should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even
without the threat of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-717-SC are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
See Dissenting Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Please see Dissenting Opinion

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

On leave
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA*
Associate Justice

I certify the Mr. Justice Brion left his

concurring vote
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

(No Part)
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO**
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

Pls see Separate Opinion

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

I dissent and reserve the right to issue a Separate Opinion

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I find the Compliance of the 37 legal scholars1 satisfactory and therefore see no need to admonish or
warn them2for supposed use of disrespectful language in their statement3 commenting on a public issue
involving the official conduct of a member of this Court. The majoritys action impermissibly expands the
Courts administrative powers4 and, more importantly, abridges constitutionally protected speech on
public conduct guaranteed to all, including members of the bar.
First. The matter of Justice Mariano del Castillos reported misuse and non-attribution of sources in his
ponencia in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary5 is an issue of public concern. A day before
the Vinuya petitioners counsels filed their supplemental motion for reconsideration on 19 July 2010
raising these allegations, a national TV network carried a parallel story online.6 On the day the pleading
was filed, another national TV network7 and an online news magazine,8 carried the same story. Soon,
one of the authors allegedly plagiarized commented that the work he and a co-author wrote was
misrepresented in Vinuya.9 Justice del Castillo himself widened the scope of publicity by submitting his
official response to the allegations to a national daily which published his comment in full.10 Justice del
Castillos defenses of good faith and non-liability11 echoed an earlier statement made by the Chief of the
Courts Public Information Office.12 These unfolding events generated an all-important public issue
affecting no less than the integrity of this Courts decision-making its core constitutional function
thus inexorably inviting public comment.
Along with other sectors, the law faculty of the University of the Philippines (UP), which counts among
its ranks some of this countrys legal experts,13 responded by issuing a statement,14 bewailing what the
professors see as the Courts indifference to the perceived dishonesty in the crafting of
the Vinuya ponencia and its aggravating effect on the Vinuya petitioners cause, refuting Justice del
Castillos defenses, underscoring the seriousness of the issue, and calling for the adoption of individual
and institutional remedial measures.15 This is prime political speech critical of conduct of public officials
and institution, delivered in public forum. Under the scheme of our constitutional values, this species of
speech enjoys the highest protection,16 rooted on the deeply-held notion that "the interest of society
and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs."17Indeed, preceding
western jurisprudence by nearly five decades, this Court, in the first score of the last century, identified
the specific right to criticize official conduct as protected speech, branding attempts by courts to muzzle
criticism as "tyranny of the basest sort."18
Second. In testing whether speech critical of judges and judicial processes falls outside the ambit of
constitutionally protected expression, spilling into the territory of sanctionable utterances, this Court
adheres to the "clear and present danger" test.19 Under this analytical framework, an utterance is
constitutionally protected unless "the evil consequence of the comment or utterance [is] extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high."20
It appears that the evil consequences the UP law faculty statement will supposedly spawn are (1) the
slurring of this Courts dignity and (2) the impairment of its judicial independence vis--vis the resolution
of the plagiarism complaint in Vinuya. Both are absent here. On the matter of institutional degradation,
the 12-paragraph, 1,553-word statement of the UP law faculty, taken as a whole, does not exhibit that
"irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and their members"
typical of unprotected judicial criticism.21 On the contrary, the statement, taken as a whole, seeks to

uphold the bedrock democratic value of keeping judicial processes free of any taint of dishonesty or
misrepresentation. Thus, the UP law faculty statement is far removed from speech the Court has rightly
sanctioned for proffering no useful social value, solely crafted to vilify its members and threaten its very
existence.22
On the alleged danger of impairment of this Courts judicial independence in resolving the plagiarism
charge inVinuya, this too, did not come to pass. In the Resolution of 8 February 2011 in A.M. No. 10-1717-SC,23 the Court denied reconsideration to its earlier ruling finding no merit in the Vinuya petitioners
claim of plagiarism. Not a single word in the 8 February 2011 Resolution hints that the UP law faculty
statement pressured, much less threatened, this Court to decide the motion for reconsideration for
the Vinuya petitioners. Thus, the 8 February 2011 Resolution gives the lie to the conclusion that the UP
law faculty statement posed any danger, much less one that is "extremely serious," to the Courts
independence.
Third. The conclusion that the UP law faculty statement disrespects the Court and its members is valid
only if the statement is taken apart, its dismembered parts separately scrutinized to isolate and highlight
perceived offensive phrases and words. This approach defies common sense and departs from this
Courts established practice in scrutinizing speech critical of the judiciary. People v. Godoy24 instructs
that speech critical of judges must be "read with contextual care," making sure that disparaging
statements are not "taken out of context."25 Using this approach, and applying the clear and present
danger test, the Court in Godoy cleared a columnist and a publisher of liability despite the presence in
the assailed news article of derogatory yet isolated statements about a judge. We can do no less to the
statement of the members of the UP law faculty, who, after all, were impelled by nothing but their
sense of professional obligation to "speak out on a matter of public concern and one that is of vital
interest to them."26
On the supposed unpleasant tone of the statement, critical speech, by its nature, is caustic and biting. It
is for this same reason, however, that it enjoys special constitutional protection. "The constitution does
not apply only to sober, carefully reasoned discussion. There may be at least some value in permitting
cranky, obstreperous, defiant conduct by lawyers on the ground that it encourages a public culture of
skepticism, anti-authoritarianism, pluralism, and openness. It is important to remember that the social
function of lawyers is not only to preserve order, but also to permit challenges to the status quo."27
Supreme Court Justices, as public officials, and the Supreme Court, as an institution, are entitled to no
greater immunity from criticism than other public officials and institutions.28 The members of this Court
are sustained by the peoples resources and our actions are always subject to their accounting.29 Thus,
instead of shielding ourselves with a virtual lese-majeste rule, wholly incompatible with the
Constitutions vision of public office as a "public trust,"30 we should heed our own near century-old
counsel: a clear conscience, not muzzled critics, is the balm for wounds caused by a "hostile and unjust
accusation" on official conduct.31
Fourth. The academic bar, which the UP law faculty represents, is the judiciarys partner in a perpetual
intellectual conversation to promote the rule of law and build democratic institutions. It serves the
interest of sustaining this vital relationship for the Court to constructively respond to the academics
criticism. Instead of heeding the UP law facultys call for the Court to "ensur[e] that not only the
content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible and beyond
question," the majority dismisses their suggestion as useless calumny and brands their constitutionally
protected speech as "unbecoming of lawyers and law professors." The Constitution, logic, common

sense and a humble awareness of this Courts role in the larger project of dispensing justice in a
democracy revolt against such response.
Accordingly, I vote to consider respondents explanation in their common and individual Compliance as
satisfactory and to consider this matter closed and terminated.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Consistent with my dissent from the Courts October 19, 2010 Resolution, I maintain my position that, in
the first place, there was no reasonable ground to motu proprio initiate the administrative case, in view
of (1) the therein discussed injudiciousness attending the Resolution, anchored on an irregularly
concluded finding of indirect contempt with adverse declarations prematurely describing the subject
Statement of the UP Law Faculty that could taint the disciplinary action, and (2) the Courts
conventionally permissive attitude toward the "expression of belief" or "manner of criticism" coming
from legal academics, lawyer-columnists, and civic circles, in a number of high-profile cases, most
notably at the height of the "CJ Appointment Issue" during which time the motion for reconsideration of
the Courts decision was similarly pending.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
The history of the Supreme Court shows that the times when it emerged with strength from tempests of
public criticism were those times when it valued constitutional democracy and its own institutional
integrity. Indeed, dangers from pressure and threat presented by what is usually constitutionally
deemed as free speech can arise only when the Court allows itself to be so threatened. It is unfortunate
when a tribunal admits that its core of independence can be shaken by a twelve-paragraph, two-page
commentary from academia. By issuing the Show Cause Order, and affirming it in the current Decision,
the Court puts itself in the precarious position of shackling free speech and expression. The Court, which
has the greater duty of restraint and sobriety, but which appears to the public to have failed to
transcend its instinct for self-preservation and to rise above its own hurt, gains nothing by punishing
those who, to its mind, also lacked such restraint.
I join the dissents of Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, and Martin S. Villarama. To be
taken together with this Opinion is my earlier Dissenting Opinion dated 19 October 2010. The effect and
intent of the "Restoring Integrity" Statement must be examined in the context of what this Court has
done to contribute to the controversy as well as the reception by the public of the pronouncements of
this Court on the plagiarism charges in connection with the Decision in G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya, et al v.
Executive Secretary, promulgated on 28 April 2010.

A few days after the Malaya Lolas (petitioners in G.R. No. 162230) filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the Vinuya Decision, the Acting Chief of the Courts Public Information Office
informed the media that the Chief Justice had no plans of inquiring into the plagiarism charges against
Justice Mariano C. del Castillo raised in said motion. He stated further that: "You cant expect all justices
in the Supreme Court to be familiar with all these journal articles."1 Justice del Castillo defended himself
by submitting his official statement to the Philippine Star, which published it on 30 July 2010. In the
meantime, Dr. Mark Ellis, one of several authors whose works was allegedly plagiarized, sent a letter
dated 23 July 2010 to the Court, expressing concern about the alleged plagiarism of his work and the
misreading of the arguments therein "for cross purposes."
On 31 July 2010, the Daily Tribune, the Manila Standard, and other newspapers of national circulation
reported that Senator Francis Pangilinan, a member of the bar, demanded the resignation of Justice Del
Castillo in order to "spare the judiciary from embarrassment and harm." On 25 July 2010, the Philippine
Daily Inquirer discussed the plagiarism issue in their editorial entitled "Supreme Theft." On 5 August
2010, another member of the bar wrote about plagiarism in his column entitled "Whats in a Name?"
published in the Business Mirror.2 On 8 August 2010, the Philippine Daily Inquirer published former Chief
Justice Artemio Panganibans opinion, to the effect that the issue "seeps to the very integrity of the
Court." That same opinion also raised the question of whether the justices who concurred in the Vinuya
ponencia were qualified to sit as members of the Ethics Committee.
Dean Marvic M.V. F. Leonen of the University of the Philippines College of Law transmitted to the Court
a statement entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement By The Faculty Of The University Of The
Philippines College Of Law On The Allegations Of Plagiarism And Misrepresentation In The Supreme
Court," the cover letter of which was dated 11 August 2010. Shortly thereafter, several schools
published their own declarations on the matter.
A week after the UP Law Facultys statement was transmitted to the Court, Professor Christian Tams
expressed his own views. In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice3, Professor Tams said: "I am at a loss
to see how my work should have been cited to support as it seemingly has the opposite approach.
More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your Honourable Courts Judgment has drawn on
scholarly work without properly acknowledging it." Other authors soon followed suit, articulating their
own dismay at the use of their original works, through internet blogs, comments and other public fora.4
Thus, the negative public exposure caused by such acts of plagiarism cannot be attributed solely to the
UP Law Faculty. That the Court was put in the spotlight and garnered unwanted attention was caused by
a myriad of factors, not the least of which was Justice Del Castillos own published defense entitled "The
Del Castillo ponencia in Vinuya" pending the resolution of the complaint against him by the Ethics
Committee, and the categorical statement made by the Acting Chief of the Courts Public Information
Office to the media that the Chief Justice had no plans of investigating the plagiarism charges. These
twin acts attracted negative reaction, much of which came from the legal profession and the academe.
The issue itself alleged plagiarism in a judicial decision, including the alleged use of plagiarized
materials to achieve a result opposite to the theses of the said materials resonated in the publics
consciousness and stirred a natural desire in the citizenry to raise calls to save an important public
institution, namely, the judiciary. The responses published by different sectors constituted nothing more
than an exercise of free speech critical commentary calling a public official to task in the exercise of his
functions.

The respondents herein, who were not parties to any pending case at the time, forwarded the
"Restoring Integrity" Statement as a public expression of the facultys stand regarding the plagiarism
issue. Such an open communication of ideas from the citizenry is an everyday occurrence as evidenced
by dozens of letters of appeals for justice received regularly by this Court from a myriad of people, and
the placards displayed along Padre Faura Street every Tuesday. The commentators and participants in
the public discussions on the VinuyaDecision, both on the Internet and in traditional media, included
legal experts and other members of the bar, with even a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
numbered among them. Yet only members of the UP Law Faculty were deemed to be the cause for the
majoritys trepidation that the Courts honesty, integrity, and competence was being undermined. The
Show Cause Order went so far as to hold the respondent faculty members responsible for threatening
the independence of the judiciary.
Despite the assertion that the present case is merely an exercise of the Courts disciplinary authority
over members of the bar, a closer look reveals the true nature of the proceeding as one for indirect
contempt, the due process requirements of which are strictly provided for under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. The majority attempts to skirt the issue regarding the non-observance of due process by insisting
that the present case is not an exercise of the Courts contempt powers, but rather is anchored on the
Courts disciplinary powers. Whatever designation the majority may find convenient to formally
characterize this proceeding, however, the pretext is negated by the disposition in the Resolution of 19
October 2010 itself and its supporting rationale.
The majority directed respondents to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the
Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar. Yet the substance therein
demonstrates that the present proceeding is one for indirect contempt, particularly in the following
portions:
We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court,
the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to
influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.5
xxx

xxx

xxx

Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible
attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary.6
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than objective comments
except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Courts honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion for reconsideration.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The jurisprudence adverted to by the majority dwell on contempt, foremost of which is In re Kelly, one
of the first and leading cases discussing contempt. Citing Ex Parte Terry, the Supreme Court in that case
held that acts punishable as contempt are those "tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of
their authority."8 Significantly, before he was cited for contempt, Respondent Amzi B. Kelly was first

given the opportunity to appear before the Court, submit a written Answer, and present his oral
argument.
The footnote citation in Footnote 4 of the 19 October 2010 Resolution, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, refers to
"In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in
Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007," a case for indirect contempt lodged against the
publisher of a national daily.
In this case, the Court not only gave respondent a chance to explain himself, but also created an
Investigating Committee regarding the subject matter of the alleged contemptible act:
From October 30, 2007 to March 10, 2008, the Investigating Committee held hearings and gathered
affidavits and testimonies from the parties concerned.
The Committee invited respondent Macasaet, Daguilan-Vitug, Delis, and ACA Marquez to a preliminary
meeting, in which they were requested to submit their respective affidavits which served as their
testimonies on direct examination. They were then later cross-examined on various dates: respondent
Macasaet on January 10, 2008, Daguilan-Vitug on January 17, 2008, Delis on January 24, 2008, and ACA
Marquez on January 28, 2008. The Chief of the Security Services and the Cashier of the High Court
likewise testified on January 22 and 24, 2008, respectively.9
This approach of using jurisprudence on contempt to justify adverse findings against herein respondents
is continued in the current Decision. The majority cites the 1935 case Salcedo v. Hernandez10 which
identified the proceedings specifically as contempt, even though the respondent was a member of the
bar. The 1949 case of In Re Vicente Sotto11, from which the majority quotes heavily and which the
majority states is "still good law" is explicitly identified as a proceeding for contempt of court. In
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and Gonzales, the Court issued a Resolution "to require respondent Gonzalez
to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for
contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions"12 only after a Motion to Cite in
Contempt was filed by the petitioner. Even as the Court discussed its exercise of both its contempt
powers and disciplinary powers over the respondent attorney in the said case, it still gave him ample
time and opportunity to defend himself by allowing him to file an Omnibus Motion for Extension and
Inhibition, a Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibit, a Motion to Transfer Administrative
Proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and an Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of
Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam.
The case of In Re Almacen13, also cited in the current Decision, was in the nature of a contempt
proceeding even as it adverted to duties of members of the bar, as can be gleaned from the following:
So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked
only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not
after the conclusion thereof, Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge
by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only
after this Court had written finis to his appeal.
Atty. Almacen filed with the Court a "Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title," after his clients
had lost the right to file an appeal before the Court due to his own inadvertence. And yet, the Court still

gave him the "ampliest [sic] latitude" for his defense, giving him an opportunity to file a written
explanation and to be heard in oral argument.
All of the above negate the claim that this is not a contempt proceeding but purely an administrative
one.
The central argumentation in the Show Cause Order is evidence of the original intent of the proceeding.
The allegation and conclusion that the faculty members purportedly "undermine the Courts honesty,
integrity, and competence," make it clear that the true nature of the action is one for indirect contempt.
The discussion in the Resolution of 19 October 2010 hinged on the tribunals need for self-preservation
and independence, in view of the "institutional attacks" and "outside interference" with its functions
charges which more appropriately fall under its contempt authority, rather than the authority to
determine fitness of entering and maintaining membership in the bar.
The Show Cause Order failed to specify which particular mode of contempt was committed by the
respondents (as required in the Rules of Court). Its language and tenor also explicitly demonstrated that
the guilt of respondents had already been prejudged. Page three (3) of the Order states: "The opening
sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead." Page four (4) makes the
conclusion that: "The publication of a statementwas totally unnecessary, uncalled for, and a rash act of
misplaced vigilance."
The Order also violated respondents right to due process because it never afforded them the
categorical requirements of notice and hearing. The requirements for Indirect Contempt as laid out in
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court demand strict compliance: 1) a complaint in writing which may either be a
motion for contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear and
explain his conduct, and 2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his conduct.14
The essence of a courts contempt powers stems from a much-needed remedy for the violation of lawful
court orders and for maintaining decorum during proceedings, as an essential auxiliary to the due
administration of justice.15 It is not an all-encompassing tool to silence criticism. Courts must exercise
the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard
not for the judges but for the functions they fulfill.16 It must be wielded on the preservative, rather than
on the vindictive, principle.17 So careful is the approach ordinarily taken by the Court in cases of
contempt that it places a premium on the conduct of a hearing, to such a point that it administratively
sanctioned a lower court judge for issuing a Show Cause Order sua sponte and finding the respondent
guilty of criminal contempt without the benefit of a hearing. In the case of Castaos v. Judge Escao,
Jr.,18 the Court held:
It is an oft-repeated rule that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve
order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice. Judges, however, should
exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in
view of utilizing their contempt powers for correction and preservation, not for retaliation or
vindication.
It is true that, in the case at bench, respondent judge, after having received a copy of Agapito's affidavit
in connection with the petitioner's administrative charges against him, directed Agapito to show cause
within three days from notice why he should not be held in contempt of courtbut, without the benefit

of hearing required in Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, respondent judge, in an Order, dated
February 22, 1993, sentenced Agapito guilty for contempt of court on account of the allegations he
made in his affidavit, dated November 18, 1992. Such failure to afford Agapito the opportunity to be
heard as a matter of due process of law deserves administrative sanction.
In finding Judge Escao, Jr. guilty of grave abuse of judicial authority, the Court stated:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position
and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith
and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. After all, faith
in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench
cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. Moreover, witnesses against
erring judges cannot come out in the open to help the Judiciary in disrobing its inept members if we
allow judges to abuse their judicial discretion, more particularly with respect to the exercise of their
contempt powers.
As Justice Carpio Morales finds in her Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution of 19 October 2010, this
action of the Court is tainted with injudiciousness precisely because:
"the Resolution is not what it purports to be. Ostensibly, the Resolution is a show cause order that
initiates what would become a newly docketed regular administrative matter. There is more than meets
the eye, however. When stripped of its apparent complexion, the Resolution shows its true colors and
presents itself as a pronouncement of guilt of indirect contempt without proper recourse left to the
parties."19
Thus, Justice Carpio Morales reiterates in her Dissenting Opinion to the current Decision her belief that
this proceeding is in essence one for indirect contempt:
"Consistent with my dissent from the Courts October 19, 2010 Resolution, I maintain my position that
there was no reasonable ground to motu proprio initiate the administrative case, in view of (i) the
therein discussed injudiciousness attending the Resolution, which was anchored on an irregularly
concluded finding of indirect contempt with adverse declarations prematurely describing the subject
Statement, that could taint the disciplinary action."
The power to cite for contempt, as well as the power to discipline, are mechanisms to be exercised
solely towards the orderly administration of justice. Such powers must be weighed carefully against the
substantive rights of the public to free expression and academic freedom. In this critical balancing act,
the tribunal must therefore utilize, to the fullest extent, soundness and clarity of reasoning, and must
not appear to have been swayed by momentary fits of temper.
Instead of regarding criticism as perpetually adversarial, the judiciary would do well to respect it, both as
an important tool for public accountability, and as the only soothing balm for vindication of felt injustice.
Judicial legitimacy established through demonstrated intellectual integrity in decision-making rightly
generates public acceptance of such decisions, which makes them truly binding. William Howard Taft,
who served as a federal appellate judge before becoming the President of the United States, understood
the weight of public evaluation in this wise: "If the law is but the essence of common sense, the protest

of many average men may evidence a defect in a judicial conclusion though based on the nicest
reasoning and profoundest learning."20
We who occupy this august chamber are right not because our word is accorded legal finality on matters
that are before us. We are right only when we have been proven right. There must always reside, in the
recesses of our minds, the clear distinction between what is merely legal and what is legitimate.
Legitimacy is a "tenuous commodity, particularly for unelected judges,"21 and it can only be maintained
by a sustained perception of fairness, as well as by the retention of the moral authority of individual
judges. This required characteristic of the Court is diminished when its members do not act through the
rational strength of their decisions, but are instead perceived to have done so in the misunderstanding
of the Courts disciplinary powers.
"To maintain not only its stature, but also, more importantly, its independence, the judiciary must
adhere to the discipline of judicial decision-making, firmly rooting rulings in the language of the
documents in issue, precedent and logic. That is, the strength of the judiciary's independence depends
not only on the constitutional framework, but also on the extent to which the judiciary acknowledges its
responsibility to decide according to law"22
Furthermore, as one American Federal Supreme Court decision said:
"Secrecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the
competence and impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute
to public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire
criminal justice system, as well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting it to the cleansing
effects of exposure and public accountability."23
The Code of Judicial Conduct prescribes the standards for a judicial response to free speech which,
highly-charged though it may be, is necessarily protected. Rule 3.04 in particular states that: "A judge
should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants,
witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the
attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants." The
Supreme Court has itself, on occasion, demanded of lower court judges that they be "dignified in
demeanor and refined in speech, [and] exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and selfrestraint"24
Nothing can be gained from the Courts exercise of a heavy hand in a matter which has originated from
the Court itself. On the contrary, there is much to lose in imposing penalties on the outspoken merely
because the outspoken have earned the ire of the Courts members.
They who seek to judge must first themselves be judged. By occupying an exalted seat in the judiciary,
judges in effect undertake to embrace a profession and lead lives that demand stringent ethical
norms.25 In his dealings with the public, a judge must exhibit great self-restraint; he should be the last
person to be perceived as a tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain,26 and must demonstrate to
the public that in the discharge of his judicial role, he "possess[es] the virtue of gravitas. He should
bedignified in demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character[H]e must exhibit that hallmark
judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint a judge should always keep his passion
guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason."27

In my view of a constitutional democracy, the judiciary is required to demonstrate moral authority and
legitimacy, not only legality, at all times. It has often been said that the rule of law requires an
independent judiciary that fairly, impartially and promptly applies the law to cases before it. The rule of
law requires a judiciary that is not beholden to any political power or private interests, whose only
loyalty is to the people and to the Constitution that the people have ordained as their fundamental
governing precept. It requires integrity, independence and probity of each individual judge. To be
independent, the judiciary must always remember that it will lose public support and in a certain sense,
its legitimacy, if it does not demonstrate its integrity in its judicial decisions. It must show a keen nose
for the fundamental importance of upholding right over wrong.
To maintain a life of intellectual integrity, those of us in the judiciary must be buffeted by the winds of
healthful criticism. Direct and informed criticism of judicial decisions strengthens accountability. As Taft
is noted for writing: "[n]othing tends more to render judges careful in their decisions and anxiously
solicitous to do exact justice than the consciousness that every act of theirs is to be subject to the
intelligent scrutiny of their fellow men, and to their candid criticism .... In the case of judges having a life
tenure, indeed, their very independence makes the right freely to comment on their decisions of greater
importance, because it is the only practical and available instrument in the hands of a free people to
keep such judges alive to the reasonable demands of those they serve."28
This is where academic freedom, when exercised in appropriate measure, is most helpful. Milton
encapsulates free speech as simply the right to "argue freely according to conscience."29 The value of
academic freedom, as a necessary constitutional component of the right to freedom of expression, lies
in the ability of the common man, aided by the expertise available in the academe, to hold a magistrate
accountable in the exercise of his official functions, foremost of which is the issuance of written
decisions. Paragraph 23 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers30 states:
Lawyers like other citizens are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly. In
particular, they shall have the right to take part in public discussion of matters concerning the law, the
administration of justice and the promotion and protection of human rights and to join or form local,
national or international organizations and attend their meetings, without suffering professional
restrictions by reason of their lawful action or their membership in a lawful organization
The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers "have been formulated to assist Member States in their task
of promoting and ensuring the proper role of lawyers," and these "should be respected and taken into
account by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice and should be
brought to the attention of lawyers as well as other persons, such as judges, prosecutors, members of
the executive and legislature, and the public in general." Thus, faced with the duty of balancing lawyers
fundamental right to free speech which has now been expressly recognized in the international arena,
against this Courts desire to preserve its exalted role in society by disciplining for offensive language,
this Court must examine whether it has already encroached into constitutionally-prohibited interference
with the basic rights of individuals. The realm of public opinion is where the academe, especially our
schools and universities, plays a most crucial role in ensuring judicial legitimacy. Not by blindly
legitimizing its acts, but by constantly reminding the judiciary of its presence as a helpful but critical ally.
The academe is not to be an applause machine for the judiciary; it is to help guide the judiciary by
illuminating new paths for the judiciary to take, by alerting the judiciary to its inconsistent decisions, and
by identifying gaps in law and jurisprudence.

In this regard, the law school has a special place. Phoebe Haddon writes: "[t]he value and preservation
of academic freedom depend on an academic environment that nurtures, not silences, diverse views.
The law school faculty has a special responsibility to maintain a nurturing environment for diverse views
because of the importance of the marketplace of ideas in our teaching and the value we theoretically
place on the role of persuasive discourse in the quest for knowledge. Faculty autonomy takes on
significance because it can protect freedom of inquiry."31 In a certain sense, therefore, because the law
faculty can discharge a most meaningful role in keeping the judiciary honest, there must be recognition
given to the special role of the law faculty in upholding judicial independence.
The testing ground for integrity in judicial decision-making is provided in large measure by the legal
academe, when it probes, tests and measures whether judicial decisions rise up to the definition of just
and well-reasoned decisions as they have been defined by centuries-old norms of legal reasoning and
legal scholarship. If we have a legal academe that is slothful, that is not self-disciplined, that covets the
closeness to the powers-that-be which an unprofessional relationship with the judicial leadership can
bring, then this refining role of the legal academe is lost. The legal academe is the preserver of the noble
standards of legal reasoning and legal scholarship. It must itself demonstrate strength and
independence and not be punished when doing so.
Those who occupy the most powerful positions in this country must always be ready to hold themselves
accountable to the people. I believe that the tradition of deference to the judiciary has limits to its
usefulness and these times do not call for the unbroken observance of such deference as much as they
call for a public demonstration of honesty in all its forms.
I dissent from the Majority Decision admonishing Dean Marvic M. V. F. Leonen and issuing a warning to
the thirty-five faculty members in connection with the "Restoring Integrity" Statement. I find the
Common Compliance of the thirty-five faculty members, dated 18 November 2010, as well as the
Compliance submitted by Professor Rosa Maria T. Juan Bautista on 18 November 2010 and by Professor
Raul Vasquez on 19 November 2010, to be satisfactory. I also find the separate Compliance of Dean
Leonen dated 18 November 2010 and of Professor Owen J. Lynch dated 19 November 2010 similarly
satisfactory, and vote to consider this matter closed and terminated.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice
SEPARATE OPINION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This treats of respondents compliance with the Courts Resolution dated October 19, 2010, which
required respondents, who are professors of the University of the Philippines College of Law, to show
cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the bar for having published a Statement
entitled, "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" which appeared to
contain statements that were disrespectful to the Court. The Courts directive reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A.
Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante

B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De
Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea,
Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel,
Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta,
Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L.
Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty
of the University of the Philippines College of Law, are directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days
from receipt of a copy of this Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violation of Canons 11, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of
this Resolution, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01,
10.02 and 10.03 for submitting, through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R.
No. 162330, Vinuya v. Executive Secretary and of the investigation before the Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards, for the consideration of the Court En Banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful
reproduction of the purported statement, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation
in the Supreme Court." x x x
In their Compliance, 35 of the respondents, excluding Professors Owen J. Lynch and Raul V. Vasquez,
take common defense that the statements contained in Restoring Integrity were mere expressions of
their opinion, dispensed in accordance with their duties as members of the bar and as professors of law.
They aver that they acted with the purest intentions, guided by their duty of candor, fairness and good
faith to the Court, and deny that it was their intention to malign the Court as an institution for its
decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.2They claim that any reference to Vinuya in their statement was
made only to establish and accent the grave consequences of the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation allegedly committed by one of the Courts members. Indeed, they claim that the
Statement was intended "to defend the integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court" and
ensure continued confidence in the legal system and the Judiciary by calling on the Court to take
constructive action in the face of the damaging allegations. They also add that the Statement was meant
to address what they perceived as indifference on the part of the Court owing to certain statements
reportedly made by Supreme Court Administrator and spokesperson, Atty. Jose Midas P. Marquez (that
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona would not take any action on the charges) and their reading of Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillos letter replying to the allegations.
Respondents affirm their loyalty and respect for the Court and claim that as professors of law, they have
a special interest in guarding against plagiarism and misrepresentation to ensure intellectual honesty
among their students. They allegedly released the Statement in support of "efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating
information regarding law and jurisprudence." Citing similar commentaries on the issue, they likewise
invoke freedom of speech and academic freedom to justify the publication of their stand on the matter.
Finally, respondents argue that the Resolution amounted to a prejudgment of their liability for contempt
and breach of Canons 1, 11, 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus, they invoke their right to due process and plead for an opportunity to present evidence relative to
the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC entitled In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.

Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista, in her separate Compliance and Reservation, reiterates the above
reservation of her right to due process and request for hearing. She likewise supplements the above
submissions with additional arguments in support of her assertion that she signed the Statement in the
exercise of her freedom of expression.
As to Prof. Owen J. Lynch, Prof. Lynch filed a Manifestation invoking freedom of expression and
asserting that the statement did not pose a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State
has a right to prevent. He also manifests that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar as he is an
American citizen who is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota.
Prof. Raul V. Vasquez, for his part, likewise submits that he never had any intention of maligning the
Court and alleges that he signed the Statement as he was fundamentally in agreement with its contents.
He further states that he might have been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of the language
employed in the Statement and says that he could have been more careful.
As regards the charge of violating Canon 10 and Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting to the Court
a copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction thereof, Dean
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen submitted the following explanations.
Dean Leonen denies misrepresenting the contents of the Statement or which faculty members signed
and/or signified their intention to sign the same. He avers that there are actually three versions of the
Statement, all with the same contents, but with different signature pages. Two versions were submitted
to the Court: one with the signature pages containing the full roster of faculty members and the actual
signatures of the signatories (which version he calls Restoring Integrity I) and the other with the retyped
signature page containing just the names of the members who signed, with the notation "(SGD.)" beside
their names. This second version he referred to as Restoring Integrity II. According to him, these two
copies arose because after the original version containing the full roster of faculty members was
circulated for signature, he had the signature pages re-typed to eliminate the blanks prior to posting in
the bulletin board. (He alleges that the practice of re-typing the signature pages was meant to ensure
the integrity of the public issuance as posting the Statement with blanks would open it to vandalism.)
When the re-typed signature page was presented to him by his staff, he noticed that the name of retired
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza was indicated as a signatory even though the latter did not sign the
Statement. He asked his administrative staff about the inclusion and the latter claimed that she spoke to
Justice Mendoza on the phone before the latter flew for the United States. According to his staff, Justice
Mendoza allegedly authorized him to sign on behalf of Justice Mendoza since the latter agrees with the
contents of the Statement but was just unable to personally affix his signature because he was leaving
for the United States the following week. Dean Leonen claims that he did not have any reason to
disbelieve his staff because there were indeed other faculty members who authorized him to sign the
Statement for them. Thus, he placed full faith and confidence in his staffs claim and allowed the
inclusion of Justice Mendozas name as one of the signatories in Restoring Integrity II which he later
submitted to the Court. Because of this information, also, he believed that the total number of
signatories to the Statement was already 38.
Dean Leonen adds that in September 2010, he received a call from Justice Mendoza, who said that he
will no longer sign the statement "considering that it had already become controversial and that he did
not wish to unduly aggravate the situation." On October 21, 2010, after receiving a copy of this Courts
Show Cause Resolution, he met with his staff and reviewed what had transpired in connection with their

efforts to secure Justice Mendozas signature. It was then that he learned that while Justice Mendoza
initially agreed to sign the statement, Justice Mendoza did not exactly authorize him to sign for the
latter. Rather, Justice Mendoza merely inquired "if he could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he
was leaving for the United States." He then realized the full import of the call he received from Justice
Mendoza in September.
As regards the omission of the name of Atty. Miguel R. Armovit in the re-typed signature pages of
Restoring Integrity II, Dean Leonen explains that the omission was due simply to inadvertence.
After a careful study of the respondents submissions, I respectfully submit that the above submissions
are SATISFACTORY in view of respondents claim of good faith and the fact that a re-examination of the
Statement indeed admits of such claim. Consistent with respondents claims, the tenor of the Statement
was to call the Courts attention to the grave allegations and its effects on the integrity and credibility of
the Court and the Judiciary. Indeed, the general wording of the Statement and its ending paragraphs
lend support to respondents averments that the Statement was prompted by the sincere and honest
desire to protect the integrity and credibility of the Judiciary, especially the Supreme Court. Given such
submissions, I am willing to afford respondents the benefit of the doubt as to their intentions
concerning the forceful language employed in certain portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement. This
is especially so considering that the subject statements present no clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent as to take it out of the protective mantle of the
freedom of speech and expression under the Bill of Rights. A reading of the Statement, with particular
focus on its final paragraphs, will not leave the reader with feelings of contempt for the Court but only a
feeling that the Court must champion the cause of integrity. Furthermore, it should be noted that our
society has developed to the point where critical analysis of information is not in short supply. The
public is nowadays not only more well informed, but it has access to information with which citizens
could make their own independent assessment of pending issues of public concern, including the fitness
and integrity of the members of this Court to render fair and impartial judgment on the cases before
them. However, given the fact that some isolated portions of the statement were arguably disrespectful,
respondents should be reminded to be more circumspect in their future statements.
As regards Dean Leonen, I likewise submit that his explanation is sufficient to exonerate him from the
charge of violation of Canon 10 and Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, all of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. While it appears that Dean Leonen mistakenly relied on hearsay information that Justice
Mendoza had authorized him to indicate Justice Mendoza as a signatory to the Statement, still, Dean
Leonens lapses appear more the result of overzealousness rather than bad faith or a deliberate intent
to do falsehood or to mislead the Court. Indeed, under the circumstances as they appeared to him, and
considering that there were other professors who had authorized him to indicate them as signatories,3 it
was not all too remiss on his part to indicate Justice Mendoza as a signatory to the Statement upon the
information given to him by his administrative staff. That he acted upon the wrong information given to
him, though telling of some degree of carelessness on his part, is not gross negligence that is
tantamount to bad faith. Hence, there being no intent or inexcusable negligence, there is no ground to
find him liable under Canon 10 and Rules 10.01 and 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Similarly, there is no cogent reason to hold him liable for violation of Rule 10.03 as it likewise does not
appear that Dean Leonen violated any rule of procedure or misused any procedural rule to defeat the
ends of justice. The submission of the Statement to the Court, it should be noted, was ad hoc.

I therefore vote to NOTE and CONSIDER the explanations submitted by respondents in their
Compliance/sSATISFACTORY with a REMINDER that they be more circumspect in their future
statements considering that the Court also has its own sensibilities.
I also vote to consider this administrative matter CLOSED and TERMINATED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

CASE NO. 44
A.C. No. 8920

September 28, 2011

JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
finding Atty. Melchor Battung liable for violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommending that he be reprimanded. The complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The respondent, Atty.
Battung, is a member of the Bar with postal address on Aguinaldo St., Tuguegarao City.
Background
Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment2 with the Commission on Discipline of the IBP against the
respondent, alleging that the latter violated Canons 113 and 124 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of Civil
Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone
down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would
be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, "Then cite me!"5 Judge Baculi cited him for direct
contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and shouted, "Judge, I
will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!"6 Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort
the respondent out of the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the second time.
After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the hall of the courthouse,
apparently waiting for him. The respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, "Judge, I will file gross
ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!" He kept on shouting, "I am not afraid of you!" and
challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building.7
Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he continued shouting and
punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court.8
Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil Case No. 2640, an ejectment
case.
Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which he modified on
December 14, 2007. After the modified decision became final and executory, the branch clerk of court
issued a certificate of finality. The respondent filed a motion to quash the previously issued writ of
execution, raising as a ground the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction. Judge
Baculi asserted that the respondent knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of
First Level Courts and the latter was merely delaying the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
The respondent filed his Answer,9 essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi who disrespected him.10 We
quote from his Answer:
23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law against him once inside the
court room when he was lambasting me[.]
24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not like that I just submit the Motion
for Reconsideration without oral argument because he wanted to have an occasion to just
HUMILIATE ME and to make appear to the public that I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he said
"YOU JUSTIFY YOUR NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS COURT" making it an impression to the litigants
and the public that as if I am a NEGLIGENT, INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING, and IRRESPONSIBLE
LAWYER.
25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.]
xxxx
28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the Motion, Judge Rene Baculi could
have just made an order that the Motion for Reconsideration is submitted for resolution, but
what he did was that he forced me to argue so that he will have the room to humiliate me as he
used to do not only to me but almost of the lawyers here (sic).
Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.
The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through Commissioner Jose de la Rama, Jr. In his
Commissioners Report,11 Commissioner De la Rama stated that during the mandatory conference on
January 16, 2009, both parties merely reiterated what they alleged in their submitted pleadings. Both
parties agreed that the original copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of the incident at the courtroom would be
submitted for the Commissioners review. Judge Baculi submitted the tape and the transcript of
stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.
Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows:12
At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was observed that the respondent was calm. He
politely argued his case but the voice of the complainant appears to be in high pitch. During the
mandatory conference, it was also observed that indeed, the complainant maintains a high pitch

whenever he speaks. In fact, in the TSN, where there was already an argument, the complainant stated
the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of voice Atty. Battung, we are very sorry if you do
not want to appear before my court, then you better attend to your cases and do not appear before my
court if you do not want to be corrected! (TSN, July 24, 2008, page 3)
(NOTE: The underlined words "we are very sorry" [ were] actually uttered by Atty. Battung while the
judge was saying the quoted portion of the TSN)
That it was during the time when the complainant asked the following questions when the undersigned
noticed that Atty. Battung shouted at the presiding judge.
Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure?
*
Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed because we were asked to present our evidence
ex parte. Your Honor, so, if should we were ordered (sic) by the court to follow the rules on summary
procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24, 2008)
It was observed that the judge uttered the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)
Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at the complainant.
Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at each other.
Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge that is why he shouted back at him. But
after hearing the tape, the undersigned in convinced that it was Atty. Battung who shouted first at the
complainant.
Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting for their cases to be called. They
must have observed the incident. In fact, in the joint-affidavit submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al., they
stood as one in saying that it was really Atty. Battung who shouted at the judge that is why the latter
cautioned him "not to shout."
The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN reads as follows:

Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of P100.00.

Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court for gross ignorance of the law.
Court: Yes, proceed.
(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)
Court: Next case.
Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.
(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)
Atty. Battung: But what we do not like (not finished)
Court: The next time
Atty. Battung: We would like to clear
Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in record. If you want to see me, see me after
the court.
Next case.
Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza vs. Teresita Narag, et al.
(nothing follows)
Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the courts and
judicial officers. The respondent also violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. The
respondents argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given due consideration
since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so, he created the
impression that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated. What the respondent should have done was to
file an action before the Office of the Court Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi did not act
according to the norms of judicial conduct.
With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Commissioner De la Rama found that the evidence submitted is insufficient to support a ruling that the
respondent had misused the judicial processes to frustrate the ends of justice.
Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
six (6) months.

On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that the respondent be
reprimanded.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBPs finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the
courtroom during court proceedings in the presence of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel.
The respondent even came back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses,
cannot be allowed. We note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi and acted in a
manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position even after the latter had cited him for contempt.
In fact, after initially leaving the court, the respondent returned to the courtroom and disrupted the
ongoing proceedings. These actions were not only against the person, the position and the stature of
Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted, and
brought to disrepute by the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to the courts,
cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.
We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.13 that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court, to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the
judicial institution; without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latters role, stature and
position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge
Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent
effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculis competence and
in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with
sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot
act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be reprimanded, while the Investigating
Commissioner recommended a penalty of six (6) months suspension.
We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the offense.
In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State Prosecutor,14 we suspended Atty.
Bagabuyo for one year for violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and for violating the Lawyers Oath for airing his grievances against a judge

in newspapers and radio programs. In this case, Atty. Battungs violations are no less serious as they
were committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial proceedings where the respondent was
acting as an officer of the court, and before the litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to
Judge Baculi and to the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the
judicial system itself.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Department of
Justice; and all courts in the country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 45
A.C. No. 7828

August 11, 2008

JUDGE ALDEN V. CERVANTES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JUDE JOSUE L. SABIO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Judge Alden V. Cervantes (complainant) was the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Cabuyao, Laguna until his optional retirement on November 23, 2005. Some of the cases lodged in his
sala were ejectment cases filed by Extra-Ordinary Development Corporation (EDC) against the clients of
Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio (respondent). It appears that respondent had filed motions for inhibition of
complainant "on the basis of the fact that EDC gave him a house and lot putting into serious doubt his
impartiality, independence and integrity." The motions were denied.
After the retirement of complainant, respondent, by Affidavit-Complaint dated April 6, 2006,1 sought
the investigation of complainant for bribery.
In support of the charge, respondent submitted a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 6, 2006 of Edwin P.
Cardeo,2 a utility worker in the MTC of Cabuyao, stating that, inter alia, orders and decisions of
complainant were not generated from the typewriter of the court but from a computer which the court
did not have, it having acquired one only on May 2, 2005; that there had been many times that a certain
Alex of EDC would go to the court bearing certain papers for the signature of complainant; that he came
to learn that a consideration of P500.00 would be given for every order or decision released by
complainant in favor of EDC; and that he also came to know that attempts at postponing the hearings of
the complaints filed by EDC were thwarted by complainant as he wanted to expedite the disposition
thereof.
By Resolution of August 30, 2006,3 this Court, after noting the July 20, 2006 Memorandum of the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) relative to respondents complaint against complainant, approved the
recommendation of the OCA to dismiss the complaint for lack of merit, "the complaint being
unsubstantiated and motivated by plain unfounded suspicion, and for having been filed after the
effectivity of his optional retirement" (underscoring supplied).
Thus, spawned the present verified December 18, 1996 letter-complaint4 of complainant against
respondent, for disbarment.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
From the Report and Recommendation5 of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Randall C. Tabayoyong,
it is gathered that despite the January 12, 2007 Order for respondent to file an answer to the complaint,
he failed to do so, prompting the Commissioner to declare him in default.

It is further gathered that after the conduct by the Investigating Commissioner of a mandatory
conference on May 25, 2007, the parties were ordered to file their respective position papers. In
compliance with the Order, complainant submitted his verified position paper.6 Respondent did not.
Defined as issues before the IBP were:
(1) Whether . . . the complaint filed by respondent against the complainant before the Office of
the Court Administrator in Admin Matter OCA IPI No. 06-1842-MTJ was malicious, false and
untruthful.
(2) If in the affirmative, whether . . . respondent is guilty under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
On the first issue, the IBP Commissioner did not find respondents complaint against herein complainant
false and untruthful, it noting that respondents complaint was dismissed by this Court due to
insufficiency of evidence which, to the IBP, merely shows a "failure on the part of respondent to prove
his allegations" against complainant.
Noting, however, this Courts August 30, 2006 Resolution finding respondents complaint
"unsubstantiated and motivated by plain, unfounded" suspicion, the Investigating Commissioner
concluded that respondent "knowingly instituted not only a groundless suit against herein complainant,
but also a suit based simply on his bare suspicion and speculation." (underscoring supplied)
On the second issue, the IBP found that by filing the groundless bribery charge against complainant,
respondent violated the proscription of the Code of Professional Responsibility against "wittingly or
willingly promot[ing] or su[ing] any groundless suit" including baseless administrative complaints against
judges and other court officers and employees.
The Investigating Commissioner thus concluded that
while the evidence on record is sufficient to show that the allegations in respondents affidavitcomplaint against herein complainant were false, the evidence nonetheless show[s] that
respondent had knowingly and maliciously instituted a groundless suit, based simply on his
unfounded suspicions against complainant;7 (Underscoring supplied)
and that he violated Canons 10,8 11,9 & 1210 and Rule 11.0411 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
under his oath of office.
He accordingly recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P5,000, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Notice of Resolution,12 informs that on November 22, 2007, it
adopted the following Resolution adopting and approving with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-

entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondents violation of Canons 10, 11 and 12 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of
Professional responsibility for filing a groundless suit against complainant, Atty. Jude Sabio is
hereby REPRIMANDED with Stern Warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely. (Emphasis in the original)
The Court finds the action taken by the IBP Board of Governors well taken.
Respondent ought to be aware that if a court official or employee or a lawyer is to be disciplined, the
evidence against him should be substantial, competent and derived from direct knowledge, not on mere
allegations, conjectures, suppositions, or on the basis of hearsay.13
No doubt, it is this Courts duty to investigate the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers. But it
is also its duty to shield them from unfounded suits which are intended to, among other things, harass
them.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio, is FINED in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000)
Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar questioned act will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 46
G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE
OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's
ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his
official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees
with the first part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would
restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his
certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and
inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT; REASON. However, We agree
with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches
into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING COMPLAINT AGAINST
JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter
of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected
the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a
determination . . . In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope
of their administrative duties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS PERSONNEL; REASON.
The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its
records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in
his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an
extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this

question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman
resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the
alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can,
whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique,
seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated
September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and
(2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing
petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent
Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of
Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on
or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been
rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent
Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of
February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to
September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety
(90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's
ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his
official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the
investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional
duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in
Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge
who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious
misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the
State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him
by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down
to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution
granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise
undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the
Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this
Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to
testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the question
before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases
before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with,
much less resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint
that requires the resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this
Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the
complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 47
A.C. No. 5054

May 29, 2002

SOLEDAD NUEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact for Complainant, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April 1999 by Soledad Nuez, a septuagenarian
represented by her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty.
Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave misconduct.
From the documents submitted by the complainant, it appears that sometime in October 1982 she
authorized respondent to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to
give respondent 10 percent of the price as commission. Respondent succeeded in selling the lots, but
despite complainants repeated demands, he did not turn over to her the proceeds of the sale. This
forced complainant to file against respondent and his wife an action for a sum of money before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-15052.
For his failure to file an answer, respondent was declared in default and complainant was required to
present ex-parte her evidence. On 29 September 1993, the court rendered its decision (Annex "C" of the
Complaint) ordering respondent herein to pay complainant the sum of P16,000 as principal obligation,
with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the action, i.e., 8 March
1993, until it is fully paid, and to pay the costs of suit.1wphi1.nt
Respondent and his wife appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal was
dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.
On 23 October 1995 complainant filed in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 a motion for the issuance of an alias
writ of execution, which the court granted on 30 October 1995. The next day, the alias writ of execution
was issued (Annex "B" of Complaint). It appears that only a partial satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment
was made, leavingP13,800 thereof unsatisfied. In payment for the latter, respondent issued four
postdated checks drawn against his account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City.
Upon presentment, however, the checks were dishonored because the account against which they were
drawn was closed (Annexes "D" and "E" of Complaint). Demands for respondent to make good the
checks fell on deaf ears, thus forcing complainant to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Annexes "F," "G," "H" and "I" of the Complaint).
In the "Joint Affidavit" of respondent and his wife filed with the Office of the Prosecutor, Quezon City,
respondent admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in favor of complainant.
Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already been encashed by complainant, he
subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said

four checks were drawn. He was not notified that the checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he
would have made the necessary arrangements with the bank.
We required respondent to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite our favorable action
on his three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so compelled
complainant to file on 10 March 2000 a motion to cite respondent in contempt on the ground that his
strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of time to submit the comment "smacks of a delaying
tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar and a law dean."
In our resolution of 14 June 2000, we noted the motion for contempt; considered respondent to have
waived the filing of a comment; and referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety days from notice of the resolution.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 12 September 2000, Investigating Commissioner Atty.
Milagros V. San Juan concluded that respondent had no intention to "honor" the money judgment
against him in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 as can be gleaned from his (1) issuance of postdated checks; (2)
closing of the account against which said checks were drawn; and (3) continued failure to make good the
amounts of the checks. She then recommends that respondent be declared "guilty of misconduct in his
dealings with complainant" and be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay the
amount of the checks issued to the complainant.
In its Resolution No. XV-2001-244 of 27 October 2001, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and
adopted Atty. San Juans Report and Recommendation.
We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board
of Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his
dealings with complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondents grave misconduct and notorious
dishonesty.
There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent
gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did
not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the
complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend
money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting
in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again,
bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state,
respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what
rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully done to
complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant
of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what
had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against
which the checks were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying
his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not
pay the obligation.
All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already
encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew
that there were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be
encashed before their maturity dates.
By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished
public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon,
337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up
to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).
Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment
rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good
the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued
defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent even had
the temerity of making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension
of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he
as well did not even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as
having waived the filing of the comment. To the Highest Court of the land, respondent openly showed a
high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders (Thermochem
Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76, 82 [2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28
June 2001).
Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers should avoid any action that would
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers,
after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so.1wphi1.nt
The penalty of suspension "for at least one (1) year" imposed by the Board of Governors of the IBP is
both vague and inadequate. A suspension may either be indefinite or for a specific duration. Besides,
under the circumstances of this case a suspension for a year is plainly very light and inadequate. For his
deliberate violation or defiance of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 12:03 and 12:04 of Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with his palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings
with the complainant, respondent deserves a graver penalty. That graver penalty is indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby INDEFINITELY
SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law, and is directed to pay complainant Soledad Nuez the amount
of P13,800 within ten (10) days from notice of this resolution.
This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record; the Office of the President; the Department

of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court
Administrator shall also furnish all lower courts with copies of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 48
A.C. No. 6252

October 5, 2004

JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant,

vs.
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are
impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and
requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to
those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was
filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office
under Section 27 of Rule 1382 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.033, Canon
54, and Canons 12.075 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the
complainant in this wise:
"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in
notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper
notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of
the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and
enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and
offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally,
Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited
for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm
and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats."6
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,7 Atty. Rafanan filed his verified
Answer.8 He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to
the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in
the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a
notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other
government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before
government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did
other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants
residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for
these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 1129 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply
or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring
the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on
behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of
justice." Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that
since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the
ends of justice."
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the
hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the
assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next
scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of
his allegations, he submitted Certifications10 from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit11 of
the two police officers who had assisted them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because
he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the
ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.
After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the
case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices12 of the hearing were sent to
the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant
appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June
8, 2001.13 The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply14 to the verified Answer of respondent. The
latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.15 It also received complainants LetterRequest16 to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order17 dated July 24,
2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be
deemed submitted for resolution.
The CBD received complainants Memorandum18 on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.
The IBPs Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-17219 approving
and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had violated specific
requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the
notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors
found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation20 of the
investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to "P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the
violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty."
The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03,
12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify
that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as
part of such certification.21 They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter
therein all instruments notarized by them; and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein]
the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded."22Failure to perform these duties
would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.23
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance
and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their
commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,24 the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows:
"The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts
a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument."
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office.
Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are
expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,25 which are dictated by public policy
and are impressed with public interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the
Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the
entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for
affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar
practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to
affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law
makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of
notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others
is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit
of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses Affidavits relative
to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants brother against the
aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to "certify that he has personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits." Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in
the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification
requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.26 They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.27 It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such
duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the
bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn
oath to obey the laws.28 No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for
their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent
exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of
his office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.29 Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should not be decreed.30 Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence

of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.
Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit
corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08
of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client."
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
"Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument
and the like;
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice,
in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another
counsel."
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,31 except only in certain
cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.32
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation
to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they
recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the
cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from
the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who
testify for their clients.
"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke
unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot
believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their
sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for
charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes
doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful."33
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for
a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have
to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.34
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of
his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized
by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latters life and
liberty are at stake.35 It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to

rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that
may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such
conviction is according to law.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus
expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to
present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that the
law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property,
except by due process of law.36
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it
pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence
and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit,
complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies
during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which,
as such, was merely inquisitorial.37 Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation
has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well
as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive
prosecutions.38 The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial
proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting
employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential
witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become
essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the
active prosecution of these cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not
supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated
with liability.39 It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more
credible, considering that the latters allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers
and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 49
A.C. No. 3731

September 7, 2007

MANUEL S. SEBASTIAN, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMILY A. BAJAR, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
On 18 October 1991, Manuel S. Sebastian (complainant) filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily
A. Bajar (respondent) for "obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding final decisions of
Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and of the Honorable Supreme Court, and also for submitting
those final decisions for the review and reversal of the DARAB, an administrative body, and for
contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics."
The Facts
Complainant alleged the following:
1. Respondent is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) of the Department
of Agrarian Reform who represented Fernando Tanlioco (Tanlioco) in numerous cases which
raised the same issues.1 Tanlioco is an agricultural lessee of a land owned by complainants
spouse and sister-in-law (landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment case against Tanlioco
on the basis of a conversion order of the land use from agricultural to residential. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment ordering Tanliocos ejectment subject to the payment of
disturbance compensation.2 The RTCs judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals3 and the
Supreme Court.4
2. Respondent, as Tanliocos counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to produce the
conversion order. The RTC dismissed the complaint due to res judicata and lack of cause of
action.5
3. Respondent filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board. The case raised the same issues of conversion and disturbance
compensation.6
4. Respondent has violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since she
misused the rules of procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the administration of
justice.7
On 18 November 1991, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondent to comment on the
complaint lodged against her.8

After a second Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Comment,9 respondent submitted her Comment
alleging the following:
1. Complainant is not the real party-in-interest. He is also not authorized to prosecute the
disbarment suit.10
2. Respondent has fulfilled allegiance to the "Attorneys Oath" and performed duties in
accordance with Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.11
3. Respondents client, Tanlioco, merely availed of all legal remedies to obtain benefits secured
for him by law.12
On 10 March 1992, complainant filed his Reply. Complainant alleged that respondent did not confront
the issues of her disbarment squarely but raised issues that were decided upon with finality by the
courts.13
On 25 March 1992, the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file a Rejoinder within 10 days
from notice.14
On 3 June 1992, complainant filed a Manifestation dated 2 June 1992 stating that respondent failed to
comply with the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution to file a Rejoinder.15
On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why she should not be subjected to
disciplinary action for failure to comply with the Courts 25 March 1992 Resolution. The Court also
required respondent to Comment on the complainants 2 June 1992 Manifestation.16
On 3 February 1993, respondent filed a Manifestation alleging that she had substantially complied with
the Courts orders relative to her defenses. She advised the Court that she had transferred to the Public
Attorneys Office and since she was no longer a "BALA lawyer," the cases involved in this proceeding had
become moot and academic.17
On 1 March 1993, the Court issued a Resolution stating that the administrative case against respondent
"has not been mooted and nothing set out in her Manifestation excuses her failure to obey this Courts
Resolutions of 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992."18 The Court had also resolved to impose a fine
of P500 or imprisonment of five days and to require respondent to comply with the 25 March 1992 and
7 October 1992 Resolutions.19
On 24 August 1993, complainant filed a Manifestation stating that respondent had not complied with
the Courts orders.20
On 29 September 1993, the Court issued a Resolution ordering the arrest of respondent for detention at
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for five days. The Court reiterated that respondent should
comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions.21
On 20 October 1993, the NBI arrested respondent. The NBI detained respondent for five days and
released her on 25 October 1993.22

On 10 November 1993, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for hearing and decision.23
On 11 November 1993, respondent filed a Rejoinder. Respondent claimed that complainant had no legal
personality to file this case.24 Respondent also alleged that she was merely protecting the interest of
Tanlioco as she was sworn to do so in her oath of office. Respondent contended that "she had
comported herself as [an] officer of the court, at the risk of being disciplined by the latter if only to
impart truth and justice."25
On 22 November 1995, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose (Investigating Commissioner Jose)
submitted his report and recommendation to the IBP. Investigating Commissioner Jose enumerated
respondents violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility that rendered her unfit to continue
the practice of law:
1. Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay which amounted to an obstruction of
justice.26
2. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. The duplication or multiplication of
suits should be avoided,27 and respondents acts were tantamount to forum-shopping which is a
reprehensible manipulation of court processes and proceedings.28
3. Respondent uttered disrespectful language and shouted at everybody during the hearing on
25 May 1995.29 The want of intention is not an excuse for the disrespectful language used.
On 4 October 1996, the IBP transmitted to the Court a copy of IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 dated 30
March 1996. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Investigating Commissioner Joses
recommendation that respondent be "suspended indefinitely from the practice of law for Unethical
Practices and attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible character to violate the basic tenets and
requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering her unfit to continue in the practice of
law."30 Governor Angel R. Gonzales recommended her "outright disbarment."31
In its 20 January 1997 Resolution, the Court noted the IBP Resolution suspending respondent
indefinitely.32
On 13 April 1999, the Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to
circularize the resolution of the IBP dated 30 March 1996 suspending respondent indefinitely from the
practice of law.33
On 7 June 1999, the OCA, through Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, issued Circular No. 30-99
informing all courts that respondent had been suspended indefinitely.
On 30 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Consider the Case Closed and Terminated.
Respondent apologized for her demeanor and prayed that the suspension be lifted.34
On 16 June 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for report and
recommendation.35

On 29 August 2003, Investigating Commissioner Demaree J.B. Raval (Investigating Commissioner Raval)
conducted a hearing. Respondent claimed that she did not receive any notice of the OCAs Circular on
her indefinite suspension.36 Respondent alleged that the Court Resolution which she received merely
noted the IBPs Resolution on her indefinite suspension.37 Respondent claimed that she only knew of the
suspension when she filed an application for a judicial position in Mandaluyong City.38
In the hearing, respondent admitted that she continued to practice law as a Prosecutor in Mandaluyong
City despite her suspension because she believed that a notation by the Court in the 20 January 1997
Resolution did not mean an implementation of the IBPs Resolution on her indefinite suspension.39
Due to the absence of complainant and his counsel, another hearing was held on 19 September 2003.
Complainants counsel asserted that respondent had been practicing law in the midst of her suspension
and this constituted a violation of the suspension order which she wanted to be lifted.40 Investigating
Commissioner Raval asked respondent to present a valid ground to lift the suspension
order.41 Respondent requested that her detention for five days at the NBI be converted into a five-year
suspension, one year for every day of detention such that she would have served five years of indefinite
suspension.42
Investigating Commissioner Raval then directed the parties to file simultaneously their Verified Position
Papers.43
In his Position Paper and Comment, complainant posited that respondents motion did not state valid
grounds to convince the Court to lift the suspension order. Complainant stated that by continuing to
practice law, "she is flaunting her defiance of the Supreme Court by showing that she can hoodwink
another branch of government."44Complainant also prayed for respondents disbarment due to the
gravity of her offense.45
In respondents Position Paper, she reiterated that complainant is not the real party-in-interest since the
property that was litigated was owned by complainants wife. She asserted that she never betrayed her
clients cause, she was never unfaithful to her oath, and it was complainant who filed this case for
harassment. Respondent prayed that the case be considered closed and terminated due to lack of
merit.46
Respondent also sent a letter to Investigating Commissioner Raval and attached a copy of a Resolution
in a Preliminary Investigation case which she handled. Respondent contended that in this Preliminary
Investigation case, she recommended its dismissal because the offended party was not the real party-ininterest.47
Respondent insisted that complainant did not have the personality to file the disbarment complaint
against her; hence, it should have been dismissed outright.48
After the parties filed their position papers, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004229 dated 16 April 2004. The IBP adopted Investigating Commissioner Ravals Report and
Recommendation that respondent be disbarred for her "manifest flagrant misconduct in disobeying the
SC Order of her Indefinite Suspension."49

As culled from the records, the Court had merely noted IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 which
recommended respondents indefinite suspension. "The term noted means that the Court has merely
taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberation or
rendering a decision on the matter it does not imply agreement or approval."50 Hence, the penalty of
indefinite suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors has not attained finality. Section 12 of
Rule 139-B provides:
Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.
xxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the
case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. (Emphasis supplied)
Necessarily, the Court will now give its "final action" on this complaint.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to support the
IBPs findings. However, the Court disagrees with the penalty imposed on respondent.
Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis51 and they belong to a class of their
own.52 They are neither civil nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct
of its officer.53 They involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.54
A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the administration of justice from the
misconduct of its officers. This Court requires that its officers shall be competent, honorable, and
reliable men in whom the public may repose confidence.55 "Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform
their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On
these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private
misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor or
to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court."56
Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or
suspension proceedings.57
The evidence presented shows that respondent failed to comply with the Courts lawful orders in two
instances:
1. In the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to file a rejoinder within 10
days from notice. However, she only submitted the rejoinder on 11 November 1993 after she
was detained at the NBI for five days for failure to heed the Courts order.

2. In the 7 October 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to comment on

complainants manifestation. She instead submitted a manifestation on 3 February 1993 or
almost four months thereafter. In her manifestation, respondent alleged that she had
substantially complied with the Courts orders. However, the Court in its 1 March 1993
Resolution stated that nothing set out in respondents manifestation excused her failure to obey
the Courts Resolutions.
These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27,
Rule 13858 of the Rules of Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondents
cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to
the judicial institution.59Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively."60 Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not
only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful
orders which is only too deserving of reproof."61
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is underscored
by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but
to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to
uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.62
Respondents failure to comply with the Courts directive to file a Rejoinder and to file a Comment also
constitutes gross misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as "any inexcusable, shameful,
flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice which
is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause." It is a "conduct that is
generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose."63
In Bernal Jr. v. Fernandez,64 the Court held that failure to comply with the Courts directive to comment
on a letter-complaint constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination, or disrespect. In Cuizon v.
Macalino,65 a lawyers failure to comply with the Courts Resolutions requiring him to file his comment
was one of the infractions that merited his disbarment.
Furthermore, respondents defenses are untenable. Firstly, respondent contends that complainant is not
the real party-in-interest since the property that was litigated was owned by complainants wife. The
Court is not persuaded with this defense.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest
must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of
the court to a lawyers misconduct "is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the
outcome."66 "A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an administrative complaint
against a lawyer."67
In Heck v. Santos,68 the Court held that "any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate
disciplinary proceedings." The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it
necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment
proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of
proof of the charges.69

Secondly, respondent avers that she merely availed of all the legal remedies for her client. In Suzuki v.
Tiamson,70 the Court enunciated that "while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their
clients and zeal in the defense of their clients rights, they should not forget that they are first and
foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice." Respondents act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite
the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds
of the law. "To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed
rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration of justice."71
Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanliocos counsel, filed
cases for Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the decision in the
Ejectment case which involves the same issues. The Court held that "an important factor in determining
the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the
filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.72 Indeed, "while a lawyer owes fidelity to
the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and administration of justice."73
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal but within the bounds of the law. It is evident from the records that respondent filed other cases to
thwart the execution of the final judgment in the Ejectment case. Clearly, respondent violated the
proscription in Canon 19.
The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In this case, respondent has shown
her great propensity to disregard court orders. Respondents acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as
an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession. However, the
Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior
court. Respondent also violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Her suspension is
consequently warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emily A. Bajar is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period ofTHREE YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 50
A.C. No. 7129

July 16, 2008

FIL-GARCIA, INC., represented by its President, Filomeno Garcia, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FERNANDO CRESENTE C. HERNANDEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Fil-Garcia, Inc., represented by its
President and General Manager, Filomeno T. Garcia, against respondent Atty. Fernando Cresente C.
Hernandez charging the latter of malpractice, gross misconduct and for violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The facts are of record.
Sometime in 1990, complainant entered into an agreement with Magdalena T. Villasi (Villasi) for the
completion of the construction of a condominium building owned by the latter located in Quezon City.
During the progress of the construction, controversy arose between complainant and Villasi regarding
the billing and payments. On March 11, 1991, complainant filed an action for recovery of sum of money
with damages against Villasi before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 77. At that
stage, complainant was represented by Atty. Bernardo F. Ligsay (Atty. Ligsay). On June 26, 1996, the RTC
rendered judgment in favor of complainant and against Villasi. The dispositive portion of the
Decision1 states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2,865,000.00 as actual damages and
unpaid accomplishment billings;
2. ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P500,000.00 representing the value of
unused building materials;
3. ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages
and P100,000 as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.2
Aggrieved by the RTCs decision, Villasi filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). On November 20,
2000, the CA granted Villasis appeal and reversed the decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the
Decision3 states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED and the appealed decision in
Civil Case No. Q-91-8187 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the plaintiff-appellee to return to defendant-appellant the sum of P 1,244,543.33 as overpayment under

their contract, and the further sum of P 425,004.00 representing unpaid construction materials obtained
by it from defendant-appellant. Plaintiff-appellee is likewise hereby declared liable for the payment of
liquidated damages in the sum equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the contract price for each day of delay
computed from March 6, 1991.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.4
On December 14, 2000, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration.5 This time, complainant
engaged the legal services of a new counsel in the person of respondent.
In its April 27, 2001 Resolution,6 the CA denied complainants motion for reconsideration and noted the
appearance of respondent as counsel for complainant in substitution of Atty. Ligsay. Respondent
received a copy of the resolution on May 8, 2001. Thus, he had until May 23, 2001 within which to file
an appeal in accordance with Rule 45 in relation to Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.
However, instead of filing an appeal within the reglementary period, respondent filed three (3)
successive motions for extension of time with the Court.
On May 22, 2001, respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari.7 In his
motion, he alleged that he was engaged as counsel by a mayoralty candidate and a senatorial candidate
which required his presence in the canvassing of votes. Due to the "enormous time pressure from these
commitments,"8 respondent prayed for an extension of thirty (30) days or until June 21, 2001 to file
complainants appeal.
On June 21, 2001, respondent filed a Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by
Certiorari.9 He alleged that "[he] fell ill"10 and that "[h]e sought medical consultation, which revealed
that he needs extended bed rest."11 He prayed for an extension of twenty (20) days or until July 11, 2001
to file the appeal.
On July 11, 2001, respondent filed a Third Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by
Certiorari,12 alleging that "[he] severely underestimated the time needed to complete the petition
because he had to work on other equally urgent legal matters, which were unattended to during his
illness."13 He prayed for an extension of ten (10) days or until July 21, 2001 to file the appeal.
Thereafter, respondent filed complainants Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 21, 2001.14
On August 6, 2001, respondent received a copy of the Courts Resolution15 dated July 2, 2001 denying
his first motion for extension of time, viz:
G.R. No. 147960 (Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc., represented by its President-General Manager Filomeno
Garcia vs. Magdalena T. Villasi).- Petitioners motion for extension of thirty (30) days from 22 May 2001
within which to file petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for petitioners failure to show that it has
not lost the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period within which to appeal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in view of the lack of statement of material dates of

receipt of the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals and of filing of the motion for reconsideration
of said judgment.161avvphil
Hence, on August 17, 2001, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of the above resolution.
On August 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution18 denying respondents second and third motions for
extension of time considering that the first motion for extension had already been denied in the
resolution dated July 2, 2001. On September 28, 2001, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration19 of the resolution.
On October 1, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution20 denying respondents motion for reconsideration of
the resolution dated July 2, 2001 and complainants petition for review on certiorari, viz:
G.R. No. 147960 (Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc., represented by its President-General Manager, Filomeno
Garcia v. Magdalena T. Villasi) Acting on petitioners motion for reconsideration of the resolution of 02
July 2001 which denied its motion for extension of time to file petition for review on certiorari for lack of
showing that it has not lost the 15-day period to appeal due to lack of statement of the dates of receipt
of assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals and of filing of motion for reconsideration of said
judgment, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion with FINALITY, no compelling reason having been
adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought. Respondents comment and opposition to said motion
is NOTED.
In accordance with Rule 45 in relation to Rule 56 and other pertinent provisions of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court, only petitions which
are accompanied by or comply strictly with the requirements specified therein shall be entertained. On
the basis thereof, the Court further Resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari for
petitioners failure to:
a) take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, in view of the denial of the first, second
and third motions for extension of time to file said petition in the resolution of 02 July 2001 and
20 August 2001; and
b) state the material date of filing of the motion for reconsideration of the assailed Court of
Appeals decision pursuant to Sections 4 (b) and 5, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5 (d), Rule 56.21
On November 21, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution22 denying with finality respondents motion for
reconsideration of the resolution dated August 20, 2001.
On November 27, 2001, the Court issued an Entry of Judgment23 rendering the decision of the CA final
and executory.
As admitted by respondent, he received a copy of the Courts resolution dated October 1, 2001 denying
complainants appeal on November 15, 2001.24 However, respondent forwarded a copy of the same to
complainants office only on June 16, 2002.25

Feeling aggrieved by the fate of its appeal, complainant filed a Complaint26 for disbarment before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on April 21, 2004. Complainant alleged that respondents act of
filing three (3) motions for extension of time within which to file the appeal and his wrong choice in the
mode of appeal in the petition that he belatedly filed exemplify gross incompetence and caused serious
prejudice to complainant. Complainant also alleged that the lapse of seven (7) months from the time the
resolution dated October 1, 2001 was received by respondent before he informed complainant of the
same constitutes inexcusable negligence.
On June 16, 2004, respondent filed his Answer.27
In his answer, respondent alleged that the filing of a motion for extension of time to file petition for
review is allowed under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provided that the same is filed and the
docket and other lawful fees and deposit of cost are paid within the reglementary period. Hence,
respondent contends that he exercised due prudence when he filed his first motion for extension of
time. Moreover, he was in the honest belief that the allegation of the date of receipt of the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration would suffice considering that the pertinent rules do not require
that a motion for extension of time must contain a statement of material dates. Respondent claims that
the filing of several motions and within the reglementary period to do so clearly speaks of due diligence
of the legal matter entrusted to him. He argues that the filing of his motions for extension of time was
based on meritorious grounds and the denial of the same was based solely on the ground that his first
motion was wanting of material dates.
As to complainants allegation on his erroneous mode of appeal, respondent claims that it is speculative
at this point since the determination of the same is better left to the Court.
Lastly, respondent admits that he failed to immediately inform complainant of the development of the
case. However, the said omission was not deliberate nor prompted by malice or intent to injure the
complainant but was brought about by "the sudden unexpected technicalities that besieged the appeal
of the case to the Supreme Court"28 which caused him dismay and made it "hard"29 for him to inform
complainant of the same.
After a mandatory conference, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, the investigating commissioner of
the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, submitted her report and recommended to the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.
The Board, in its Resolution30 No. XVII-2006-04 dated January 28, 2006, adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. It reduced the penalty of
disbarment to suspension for six (6) months; hence, the transmittal of the case and its records to this
Court for final resolution pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court, viz:
Review and Decisions by the Board of Governors.- x x x x (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its
total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or
disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with
the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
After a careful review of the records and evidence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the
findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. Respondents conduct relative to the

belated filing of complainants petition for review on certiorari falls short of his obligation to serve his
client with competence and diligence under Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondents act of filing three (3) successive motions for extension of time to file the petition on the
careless assumption that each motion will be granted by the Court, and without taking care of informing
himself of the Courts action thereon, constitutes inexcusable negligence. Moreover, respondent
knowingly referred to Rule 65 in the petition he belatedly filed as an afterthought in his desperate
attempt to salvage the appeal.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to "neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Every case a
lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.31He must constantly keep in mind that his actions or
omissions or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Thus, he is expected to be acquainted with
the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not
just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the
clients cause.32
While pressure of work or some other unavoidable reasons may constrain a lawyer to file a motion for
extension of time to file pleadings, he should not presume that his motion for extension of time will be
granted. Well-settled is the rule that motions for extension of time to file a pleading are not granted as a
matter of course but lie in the sound discretion of the court. It is thus incumbent on any movant for
extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's action on his
motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time
running out on him, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame.33
As noted by Commissioner San Juan, respondent alleged in his answer that he anticipated that he could
not file the petition within the reglementary period due to his prior commitments for the municipal
canvassing of votes of a mayoralty candidate. However, this fact was not called to the attention of the
complainant. In doing so, complainant could have engaged the services of another lawyer who can file
the petition in time.34
A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue representing a client should inform the latter of his
predicament and ask that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to enable the client to engage the
services of another counsel who can study the situation and work out a solution.35
To make matters worse, it took respondent seven (7) months from the time he received a copy of the
Courts resolution denying complainants petition to inform complainant of the same.36 Under Rule
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer "shall keep the client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information."
Finally, the IBP Board of Governors correctly imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months considering that respondent humbly admitted his fault in not immediately informing
complainant of the status of the case.37
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the January 28, 2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 041230 is AFFIRMED.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal record of respondent with the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
its chapters, and to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 51
A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992
CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against
respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi
allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with
respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then pending before the Municipal Court of
Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which respondent
Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm
located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and
supervisor of said farm, receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil
Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were
assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was
the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of the municipal court of
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The defendants in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course, declared in
default.
In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that complainant
Lantoria wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which reads as follows:
Butuan City
23 April 1974
Atty. Ireneo Bunye
928 Rizal Avenue
Santa Cruz, Manila
Dear Atty. Bunye:
xxx xxx xxx
Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements (sic)
on the 3 defaulted cases he said he has no objection in fact he is happy and
recommended that you mail the said decisions in due time thru me to be delivered to
him.
xxx xxx xxx

I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development.
My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas
and all.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) CESAR L LANTORIA
Major Inf PC (ret)
Executive Director 5
On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three (3) cases, in this
wise:
June 1, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,
At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several letters
received, which is about the preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge
Galicia. The delay is that I have been too much occupied with my cases and other
professional commitments here in Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs.
Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been
reminding me but I always find myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an early
date sa (sic) possible. So also with my calendar as to the dates for the next hearing of
the remaining cases over there.
Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted
defendants. I am not sure if they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once.
However, it is my request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind mediation, that if the
preparation of these Decisions do not suit his consideration, then I am ready and willing
to accept his suggestions or correction to charge or modify them for the better. And to
this effect, kindly relay at once what he is going to say or thinks if he signs them readily
and please request for each copy for our hold.
xxx xxx xxx
Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our cases
there. Regards to you and family and prayer for your more vigor and success.
Brotherly yours,
(SGD.) IRINEO L. BUNYI6
Counsel
It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria, dated 04 March
1974, the contents of which read as follows:

928 Rizal Ave.,

Sta. Cruz, Manila
March 4, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,
This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the envelope
addressed to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which he told me to
prepare and he is going to sign them. If you please, deliver the envelope to him as if you
have no knowledge and information and that you have not opened it. Unless, of course,
if the information comes from him. But, you can inquire from him if there is a need to
wait from his words about them, or copies to be furnished me, after he signs them, it
could be made thru you personally, to expedite receiving those copies for our hold.
According to him, this envelope could be delivered to him at his residence at No. 345 M.
Calo St., Butuan City, during week end. or, at Bayugan if you happen to go there, if he is
not in Butuan City.
Thanking You for your kind attention and favor.
Truly yours,
(SGD.) L. BUNYI 7
Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present administrative
case against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted three (3) letters dated 04 March,
23 April and 01 June, 1974. Complainant contends that respondent won the said three (3) cases because
to (respondent) was the one who unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the
preparation by respondent of said decisions warranted disciplinary action against him.
By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the administrative complaint,
admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but explained the contents thereof as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for
itself, that if ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence
of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in question be
drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered such preparation as a big help to
him, because he was at that time holding two (2) salas one as being the regular
Municipal Judge of Bayugan and the other, as the acting Judge of Esperanza, both of
Agusan del Sur, with many pending cases and it was to the benefit of the Complainant
that the early disposition of the cases involved would not suffer inconsiderable delay.
But, the intention to draft or prepare the decisions in question was never spawned by
the Respondent. Instead, it came from the under-standing between the Judge and the
complainant who, from his several letters, had demonstrated so much interest to eject
at once the squatters from the farm he was entrusted to manage. Furthermore, the
Complainant's conclusion that the said decisions were lutong macao is purely non-sense

as it is without any factual or legal basis. He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for
help in the drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were judgments by default, the
defendants lost their standing in court when they were declared in default for failure to
file their answers and to appear at the place and time set for hearing thereof (See first
paragraph, letter of June 1, 1974)
c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as in
fact, the letter mentioned subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify for
the better by Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);
d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in sending
the same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance in attending
to the cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)
In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General submitted his report
to the Court, with the following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April 12,
September 29, and December 18, 1978, but in all said scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi
appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16 January 1979, both respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that
at the same hearing, the Solicitor General reported the following development
Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979 sworn to
before the investigating Solicitor, praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn,
dropped or dismissed on the ground that complainant "could hardly substantiate" his
charges and that he is "no longer interested to prosecute" the same. For his part,
respondent manifested that he has no objection to the withdrawal of the complaint
against him. At the same time, he presented complainant Lantoria as a witness are
elicited testimony to the effect that complainant no longer has in his possession the
original of the letters attached to his basic complaint, and hence, he was not prepared
to prove his charges. 10 (emphasis supplied)
In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi
(dated 4, March and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant, showed that respondent had indeed
prepared the draft of the decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of Esperanza,
Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant; b) that those letters
indicated that respondent had previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of
the decisions; c) that the testimony of complainant to the effect that he had lost the original of said
letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the case at bar are of no moment, as
respondent Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed with the Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared
the draft of the decisions in the said civil cases, and be affirmed the existence of the letters.
Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and
unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the
independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial
determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. 11 The Solicitor General recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court
the corresponding complaint against respondent.

In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in the future
he would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding the provisions of the
canons of professional ethics.
On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the hearing was postponed
until further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was
as yet set in the case since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he requested that the next
hearing be not set until after six (6) months when be expected to return from the United States of
America where he would visit his children and at the same time have a medical check-up.
On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in this case, respondent Bunyi and the
Solicitor General appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his memorandum. Respondent
Bunyi filed his memorandum on 16 November 1981. In said memorandum, 14 respondent submitted that
although he prepared the draft of the decisions in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift
or consideration to influence the Judge in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered
his apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from his preparation of the
draft decisions.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the merits of the
instant case should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in the case, the
respondent himself having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked for
an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present administrative
complaint is based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the acts complained of on
respondent's duty both as a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of disciplinary
action, deserves suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia
regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact
prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's
consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless
amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at
the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for
by the personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to
misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or
argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke
and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal
consideration or favor. A self-respecting independence in the discharge of professional

duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is
the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations between bench and
bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as
shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor
seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court
where he had pending civil case. 17
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in the bar records of
the respondent and the Court Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 52
A.C. No. 7199
July 22, 2009
[Formerly CBD 04-1386]
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and
manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name "CDO," filed
a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as "Batas Mauricio"
(respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and
HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio
program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of
lawyers oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela
City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives
were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a
colony of worms inside the can.
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD).
Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted a
conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages
from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in contravention of
company policy and, in any event, "outrageous."
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos
as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the Corderos
threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the meantime or on
August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be August
10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 122 which complainant found to
contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent
threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos.

Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent
turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos
andP35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place paid
advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3 seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the
BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint.4 Respondent, who affixed his signature to the
KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the
document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract5 asking complainant to
advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per issue or a total
amount ofP360,000, and a Program Profile6 of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also
asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second
TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid
amounting toP45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the television
program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainants offer, respondent relayed to it
that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed with
the publication of the articles/columns.7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio station DZBB,
announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program, which announcement was
transcribed as follows:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang
Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 4337553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, aling liver
spread ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot
kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo
sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang
mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may
uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light. Thus, in
the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article captioned "KADIRI
ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote "IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 which
appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its
September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO."10
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published in
another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles:11 (a) "Uod sa liver spread," Setyembre 6,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);12(b) "Uod, itinanggi ng CDO," Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277);13 (c)

"Pagpapatigil sa CDO," Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278);14 (d) "Uod sa liver spread kumpirmado,"
Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);15 (e) "Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod," Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.280);16 (f) "Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281);17 (g) "Kasong Kidnapping
laban sa CDO guards," Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284);18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards,"
Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);19 (i) "CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP," Setyembre 17, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg.287);20 (j) "May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili," Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.288);21 (k) "Desperado na ang CDO," Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290);22 (l) "Atty. Rufus
Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO," Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);23 (m) "Kasunduan ng CDO at
Pamilya Cordero," Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292);24 (n) "Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO,"
Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293).25
In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an article
"Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread."26
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo ang Batas
aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the "same baseless and
malicious allegations/issues" against it.27
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time of the
filing of the present administrative complaint.28
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, docketed
as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to
Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice,29 alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on his
complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an investigating
prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect
justice to be meted to them?

9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude them in this
Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their cause, but, more
importantly, because of the injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had been the
willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with reports that a
top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing products of
the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere staff and
underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in their respective turfs.
Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates and relatives incognito to
file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant, and they would surely be
given the same rough and insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping
charge here;30
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction31 which respondent filed, as counsel for his
therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their thick skulls, they
would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this action.32 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and several others,
docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04,33 before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and raffled to
Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding, respondent
continued to publish articles against complainant34 and to malign complainant through his television
shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and
Recommendation:35
I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.", the Order
dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C.
Sison which in part reads:

"Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the instant
plaintiffs motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or file an opposition
thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiffs prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain
STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any person acting for and in
behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any
matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or
defects on plaintiff and its products."
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch Sheriff on
13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or
his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein addressed to
him to desists [sic] from "further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the
Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its
products", respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles on the prohibited subject
matter in his column "Atty. Batas", 2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid "Balitang
Bayan Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional
Responsibilitywhich reads: "A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
respondent filed his "Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the
Department of Justice". In said pleading, respondent made the following statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the Office
of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed
the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design to
submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted
language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides: "A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd
[t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers."
III.
The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of the
Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent.
xxxx

In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said "Kasunduan"
was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed
the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the consequent dismissal of the complaint of
his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media offensive intended to
disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the numerous articles of respondent
published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As
already above-stated, respondent continued to come out with these articles against complainant in his
tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining order issued against him expressly prohibiting such
actions. Respondent did not deny that he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication
in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the defects of
complainants products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the
actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainants failure to give in
to respondents "request" that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television programs of
respondent. Complainants explanation is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of
respondent for his barrage of articles against complainant does not detract from the fact
that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the "Kasunduan" which he himself prepared and
signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared
said "Kasunduan" and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was
supposedly already settled in said agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD
case proceeding as it could have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero.
Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The actuations of
respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.36 (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted the
findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and
comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage
of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his Batas Foundation and seek
sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:

A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the
complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the
same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates
lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes." For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a member of the legal
profession to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper, by using intemperate language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does
not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.39 (Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession,
respondent alsoviolated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to "at
all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession."401avvph!1
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v.
Mauricio, Jr.,41 the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondents services as "she was
impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality,"42 only to later
find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was
taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.

On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and
watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected
the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion for reconsideration, took
note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges
against the therein complainant.43
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the premises,
sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and breach of ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 53
RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY.
ADM. CASE No. 7006
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No.
5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of
Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to
the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was
sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for
the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then
Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the
ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail
under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[1]
In an Order dated August 30, 2002,[2] Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the
case because of the harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold
neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount
of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel
P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the
Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which
motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent
appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals
(CA).

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an
article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003issue of the Mindanao
Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder
suspect to bail out, reads:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a
murder suspect to go out on bail.
Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a
motion that sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a
policeman . . . .
Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.
Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But
Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in
cases when the evidence of the prosecution is weak.
But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it,
Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited
from the case for an unclear reason.
xxx
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tans decision before the Court of Appeals and
would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge.
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.
This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there
who are displaying judicial arrogance. he said.[3]

In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent and
the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on
September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the
publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and
misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the
evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for
homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear

reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of
respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that
he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao
Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a press
conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial court why he
printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent.[4] Mr. Francisco clarified
that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason,
the phrase for an unclear reason, was added by the newspapers Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.[5]
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer
whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his
refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court.[6] The Courts Order datedSeptember 30, 2003 reads:
ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth
to give it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor
Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for contempt
and admitting that the article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18,
2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is
contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have
committed indirect contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is
hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond
ofP100,000.00.
SO ORDERD.[7]

Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He
appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for
interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial courts
disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.

In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to
explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt
for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule
11.05 of Canon 11[8] and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.[9]
In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the
interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00 and 8:00
a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003, between
8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan
a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the
people.
The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.
On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed ample
time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly prepare for his
defense.
In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of
particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondents actions and statements are
detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor
informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003
cancelling the hearing to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for, and ordered him to
appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in contempt of
court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003. However, respondent did not
appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.
On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondents Answer dated January 8, 2004.
Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however,
stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who asked
him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall within the
concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony

Consing, at the latters instance. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of
his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was
without malice.
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has
grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional
misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law.
Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is
hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be
served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme
Court for automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the]
disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.[10]

The trial court found respondents denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October 2,
2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:
TONY CONSING:

Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamayng

panahon ang samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa
ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay pagbag-o sa imong hunahuna karon?
(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not
changed your mind yet?)

BAGABUYO

Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang

pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod
tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.
(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges
who are ignorant of the law should be disbarred. Thats it.)
xxx

BAGABUYO :

Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga
hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili

kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay magkalami. Kada adlao

nagatoon
ako. Nagabasa
ako
sa
mga
bagong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro
gayod
nga
inigsang-at
unya
nako
sa
kaso
nga disbarmentniining di mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado
gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini
nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod, pagatangtangon
na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagkaabogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang gibuhat
nga Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .
(Thats true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges
who are ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I study
everyday. I read new jurisprudence and the law to insure
that when I file the disbarment case against this Judge who
does not know his law, I am certain that he loses his
license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the law should not
only be removed as a judge but should also be
disbarred. Just take a look at his Order, Ton, and see what a
liar he is . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO

Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako

nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in
open court, ang kalooy sa dios, ang iyangorder sa Korte
wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga bail
bond. . . .
(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It
states that this Order was given in open court, and in
Gods mercy, he
did
not
state the
amount
of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)

BAGABUYO

Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako

siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to
appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon siya, BJMP arrest
Bagabuyo.
(Because he does not know the law, I said, Your Honor, I
have the right to appeal. Then he came back and said,
BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.)
xxx

BAGABUYO

. . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.

Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross
ignorance of the law. . . .

(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where

you will see his gross ignorance of the law. . . . )
xxx
TONY CONSING :

So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?

(So what is your plan now?)

BAGABUYO

Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na

siya sa pagka abogado. . . .
(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)
xxx

BAGABUYO

Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang

hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon
ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong gisulti mao
lamang ang balaod nga siya in fact at that time I said he is
not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of
murder. . . .
(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should
know that it is not for a judge to determine if a person is a
braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the law. In fact,
at that time, I said he is not conversant of the law, with
regards to the case of murder . . . .)
xxx

BAGABUYO :

Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana,

pero unsa may iyang katuyoan ang iyang katuyoan nga
ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya akong pakauwawan kay
iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi
mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon
por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod,
naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon
ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a
democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to
due process of law you did not accord me due process of
law . . . .
(I sat down. . . . Thats it. But what was his purpose? He made
me come in order to humiliate me because he wanted me
arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but because he is
ignorant of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For Gods sake,

Mr. Tan, whats wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the
law. What is your thinking? That when you are a judge, you
are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic
country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of
law you did not accord me due process of law. . . .)
TONY CONSING:

So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan

kini, with all this problem sa Korte Suprema.
(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given
action with all the problems in the Supreme Court.)

BAGABUYO

Dili

ako
mabalaka
niana
kay usa ka truck ang
akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo
sa balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . .
.Apan unsa man intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini
nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw
na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?
(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence
that judges who are ignorant of the law must be removed
from the Bench. But what law has he been reading? I
heard that he is a mahjong aficionado (mahjongero) and
that is why he is studying mahjong.[11]

The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in the
administration of justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law
under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[12] for any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 27[13] of the
same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held
that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,[14] Rule 138 and Sec. 9,[15] Rule 139 of the Rules of
Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement
of Facts of respondents suspension from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the
order of suspension and other relevant documents.

In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the
August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and independence
of the court and its officers, and respondents criticism of the trial courts Order dated November 12,
2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute
grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was
complied with when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain
silent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial courts order of
suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been
reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.[16] that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit;
malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are
broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or
commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be
wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership
therein.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.[17] Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.[18] Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon
11 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press
conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the
accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying
judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder
suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star
Daily. Respondents statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still
pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress
of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court
and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he
was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct [himself] as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
[his] clients.
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of
observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v.
Gica[19] held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of
the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such
respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly
provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution
must always be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule
11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of violating

the Lawyers Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon
finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.