CHAPTER II

A. Introduction
Platos Philosophical opera, the dialogues are taken to
be one of the greatest in the history of philosophy, that
none

can

equal

it,

with

some

notable

exceptions

as

Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, and several

others.

But

what

makes

him

matchless

is

his

style

and

spirit. Almost everything of his works are in conversational

form in which neither this author himself appeared, nor
speak as himself, but with the use of characters, that
appeared

in

interlocutor,

history,
at

especially

least

in

the

Socrates
early

as

the

dialogues,

primary
for

the

reason that Plato wants to make tribute to his master; at

the same time he was greatly influenced by the latter.
The Dialogues are said to have undergone developments
and revisions (as can be observed in the dialogues, Plato
might have changed some, or completely abandoned others).
They were usually divided into three groups according to
chronology as late, middle and early. The early or more
popularly Socratic dialogues speak rather of the historical
Socrates views than Platos. The former did not have any
published work. He is concerned with ethics: on how to live
life morally. While the latter Socrates (character) does not
appear as the chief interlocutor, nevertheless hes still
involved, but this time he does not only focus on morals,
but with other subject matters as well, e.g. mathematics,
arts, poetry, politics, etc.
In addition to, Plato becomes more astonishing because
at the same time, he accredited his master, but also the
pluralism of his era; synthesizing into a unitary scheme the
elements laid down by his predecessors and contemporaries.

Thus
although
crafts

this

way,

Plato

encyclopedic,

and

arts,

such

becomes

seemingly

obscure,

incorporating

different

sciences,

as

medicine,

painting,

astronomy,

poetry, politics, religion; epistemological and metaphysical

theories that overlap in praxis or in value.
These things make it difficult for readers to approach
him. Conversely, in order to be understood as he should be,
he

himself

might

have

provided

ways

by

which

he

can

communicate to his reader his philosophy. What is the gist

of Plato?
The keystone to Plato is the Theory of Ideas.
Idealism is a philosophical outlook postulating the
actuality of spiritual entities as causes of reality (Forms
or Ideas in Platos phraseology). It is also one of the
mainstream philosophical traditions. Idealists claimed Plato
to be their great forerunner, that subsequently some would
call themselves Platonists.
There are a number of passages that denote the Forms.
More likely the theory was not deliberated explicitly in any
dialogue. Several passages are then patched together to form
a systematic whole of the Theory.
B. The

Definitory

Requirement,

Language

and

Logical

Sciences
Typically it is traced back from Socrates Definitory
requirements. [] and the primary weight of his discussions
falls of the question what is ?1 Thus, when Socrates is
found chatting with other characters, he and his companions
would be inclined over the matter that they argue about.
Usually, a reciprocal term is implied when asking about
1R. M. Dancy, Platonic Definitions and Forms, A Companion to
Plato( Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 72

something,

then

giving

the

definition

of

the

term.

The

interrogation would consistently follow the steps: first,

the subject matter is introduced; then it is defined by
giving the necessary condition; third, another condition is
given

if

the

prior

one

does

not

suffice,

then

the

interrogation will again proceed from the beginning. New set

of definitions will be given, tested, ad infinitum. There
are no final definitions because it is either Socrates
companion would leave him, or they are unable to.
A similar case may be found in the Euthyphro, Socrates
comes across Euthyphro who is going to court to indict his
father or charge him of impiety. However, he seems to be out
of his mind as if he knew very well the nature of impiety,
thus

Socrates

wanted

to

make

clear

what

is

it

and

opposite.
And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am
desirous of becoming your disciple. For I observe
that no one appears to notice younot even this
Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at
once, and he has indicted me for impiety. And
therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of
piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so
well, and of murder, and of other offences against
the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every
action always the same? and impiety, againis it
not always the opposite of piety, and also the
same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion
which includes whatever is impious?
[] And what is piety, and what is impiety?2
[] Piety, then, is that which is dear to the
gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to
them.3
Then we must begin again and ask, What is
piety? That is an enquiry which I shall never be
2 Plato, Euthyphro, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 2, trans.
Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 79
3 Ibid. 80
3

its

weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I

entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your
mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if
any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must
detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you
had not certainly known the nature of piety and
impiety, I am confident that you would never, on
behalf of a serf, have charged your aged father
with murder. You would not have run Edition:
current; Page: [93] such a risk of doing wrong in
the sight of the gods, and you would have had too
much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure,
therefore, that you know the nature of piety and
impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do
not hide your knowledge.
Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry,
and must go now.
Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in
despair? I was hoping that you would instruct me
in the nature of piety and impiety; and then I
might have cleared myself of Meletus and his
indictment. I would have told Jowett1892: 16him
that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had
given up rash innovations and speculations, in
which I indulged only through ignorance, and that
now I am about to lead a better life.4
Similar passages take place. However in the later
dialogues as the Forms gradually unfold, to define something
would mean: to give the Forms of the participants. For
example pious things are pious because of Piety. Here
Piety would denote the Form. The Form Piety would then
acquire a status distinct from piety. The former is the
universal, the latter designates the particular occasions.
It would be quite peculiar if there was really a thing
called Piety that causes Euthyphros father to be pious.
The primary reason for being pious is that because one
participates in the Eternal Form of Piety, as in beautiful
things are beautiful because they participate in Beauty.
This is called participation. (methexis)
4 Ibid. 94
4

While, there is a need to define terms as such, Plato

uses the definitory requirement to disapprove all kinds of
sophism, criticizing the poets and rhetoricians. According
to him, those latter mentioned cannot give valid accounts
() of what they believe to be true. They are involved
in paralogisms or linguistic inconsistencies, and logical
fallacies.

The

sophists

likewise,

merchants

selling

knowledge as a commodity for a living are incompetent of

going further than the legerdemain of language professing
knowledge that are already embodied in language. Thus, they
are merely engrossed or preoccupied in a vain ostentation of
words. They appear to be knowledgeable.
That is why Plato, also a language theorist embarked on
a

journey,

definitions.

adopting
Indeed

he

the

Socratic

proposed

to

requirement
categorize

for

beings,

whereas Aristotle made it more systematic in the Categories.

Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is
able to see clearly one form pervading a scattered
multitude, and many different forms contained
under one higher form; and again, one form knit
together into a single whole and pervading many
such wholes, and many forms, existing only in
separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of
classes which determines where they can have
communion with one another and where not.5
The naive version of the theory favors a position that
seems to postulate a Form for every existing being. So that
every dog, rock must have Forms for themselves.
And would you make an idea of man apart from us
and from all other human creatures, or of fire and
water?

5 Plato, Sophist, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 4, trans.

Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 386
5

I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I

ought to include them or not.
And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates,
about things of which the mention may provoke a
smile?I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or
anything else which is vile and paltry; would you
suppose that each of these has an idea distinct
from the actual objects with which we come into
contact, or not? 6
Consequently, every being of the same kind would then be
clustered into one (supposing that they have a common nature
or

essence

species,

()).

together

characteristics

So

with

that
their

comprehended

there

is

logical

under

succession

descriptions
higher

of
and

species

or

genus. These things, like dogs, cats, mouse, animals or

abstract concepts like piety, beauty, justice are just few
of the things that are said to occupy the realm of Forms.
They are names that serve as stepping stones to that which
is above.
The essences are results of the dialectic that happens
both externally and internally through the rational faculty.
The

former

is

being

employed

by

Socrates

and

his

interlocutors, and the latter is what takes place inside

their thought. Thus, spoken language must necessarily be
parallel to the mechanisms of the mind. (Or brain)
[] thought and speech are the same, with this
exception, that what is called thought is the
unuttered conversation of the soul with herself.
[] but the stream of thought which flows through
the lips and is audible is called speech.7
For this reason,
6 Plato, Parmenides, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 4,
Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 49

7 Plato, Sophist, 400

6

trans. Benjamin

[] Platos main philosophical method, dialectic,

the systematic use of question and answer to
eliminate falsehoods and arrive eventually at
truths.
Platos
worldview
thus
places
an
altogether pivotal importance on the gift of
spoken language: as the basis of dialectic, it is
a privileged means to philosophy.8
Thus, Plato establishes the languages and logical
sciences on a more stable foundation.
C. Mathematics and its relation to the Forms; The Theory
of Recollection
Aside from the Logical Sciences, Plato as well stresses
the

significance

of

mathematics.

As

he

puts

it

in

the

Divided Line, mathematics obtains an in-between position

with the higher Forms and the physical world. There is also
an

indispensable

relationship

between

mathematics

and

language and logic.

In Ancient Philosophy, mathematics is traced back to
the

Pythagoreans

for

they

supposed

that

everything

is

number.
According to Aristotle,
[] they devoted themselves to mathematics; they
were the first to advance this study, and having
been brought up in it they thought its principles
were the principles of all things.[] almost all
other things are numerically expressible.9
They viewed it that way because all things can be
counted, and that everything can be collectively measured by
unity.

Says,

historian):

Wilbur

Knorr

mathematical

(who

is

studies

a
have

Greek

mathematics

already

obtained

8 David Sedley, Plato on Language, A Companion to

Plato( Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 214
9 Aristotle, Metaphysics, The complete works of Aristotle, ed. By
Jonathan Barnes( New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984)
1559
7

autonomy while philosophy draws support and clarification

from mathematical work.( Knorr 1982:112)10
Consequently Plato advocates that it should be included
in the curriculum of the Academy (also of the training of
guardians, but not just of guardians, in his Ideal society).
Why? Because it provides a step up to the higher Forms.
However, he does not advocate a downward mathematics. He is
not after the object of mathematics, but with the method
employed in it.
Arithmetic and Geometry, for example analyzes abstract
things or concepts called numbers or geometrical figures.
Their

value

are

only

represented,

approximated

through

symbols; that when a number 4 written on the blackboard is

erased, still 4 does not cease to exist.

Likewise, Forms

are abstracts that cannot be grasped by the senses, but by

the eye of the soul: the intellect. They are independent
of

sensation.

They

do

not

exist

factually.

[]

That

arithmetic has always a very great and elevating effect,

compelling the soul to reason about abstract number

[]

11

numbers which can only be realized in thought.12

Like in dialectic, the analysis happens internally or
inside the mind (this is properly taken by psychology as its
subject matter) but needed are objects for illustrations and
equations that can demonstrate a proof. Like a child who
just started learning how to count by using sticks, or his
fingers, he cannot do so without. But, as he is natured, the
10 Cf. Michael J. White, Plato and Mathematics, A Companion to
Plato( Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006)229
11 Plato, Republic, Book VII, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 3,
trans. Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 227
12

Ibid. 228
8

brain aptitude goes higher and higher, and the mind can
already analyze without such things as aid. So that, a good
mathematics student is said to be well-trained through mind
exercises. Thus, a philosopher-king can be guided to what is
truth,

what

is

truly

real

by

studying

mathematics,

contemplating the abstracts.

The Physical sciences, astronomy and physics- study of
the

movement

of

celestial

and

physical

bodies(laws

of

nature), arithmetic- all that includes numbers cannot be

truly scientific in Platos mind, because they do not go
away

with

perceptible

infinities(things

that

cannot

be

easily counted), things that are passing. Their end, object

has always been physical bodies.
You, I replied, have in your mind a truly
sublime conception of our knowledge of the things
above. And I dare say that if a person were to
throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling,
you would still think that his mind was the
percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very
likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my
opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and
of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and
whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on
the ground, seeking to learn some particular of
sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing
of that sort is matter of science; his soul is
looking downwards, not upwards, whether his way to
knowledge is by water or by land, whether he
floats, or only lies on his back.
[]
The starry heaven which we behold is wrought
upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the
fairest and most perfect of visible things, must
necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true
motions
of
absolute
swiftness
and
absolute
slowness, which are relative to each other, and
carry with them that which is contained in them,
in the true number and in every true figure. Now,

these are to be apprehended by reason and

intelligence, but not by sight.13
A passage in the Meno introduces a paradoxical position
indicating the object of knowing:
I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a
tiresome dispute you are introducing. You argue
that a man cannot enquire either about that which
he knows, or about that which he does not know;
for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if
not, he cannot; for he does not know the very
subject about which he is to enquire.14
The capability to define something, as Plato must have
thought, must also entail a background knowledge of the
entity sought after. If not, there is no use for searching
what does not exist at all.
The passage is employed as a transition then to introduce a
theory

of

recollection,

which

at

least

follows

mathematical method of analysis. A preceding statement is

hypothesized so that it can be validated. E.g. whether
virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice15 The Theory
of recollection teaches that the answers someone gives must
essentially be derived from an innate knowledge that might
have

been

encountered

by

the

soul

in

its

state

of

preexistence. This is demonstrated by Socrates by calling in

Menos slave boy to be grilled with questions.
The slave boy is uneducated in the matter, so Meno and
Socrates presumed that he will be incapable of giving right
answers. However, it turned out that he gave the correct
ones,

even

though

he

stumbled

upon

it

the

first

time.

Although at the end of the cross-examination, the slave boy

13 Ibid. 232
14 Plato, Meno, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 2, trans. Benjamin
Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892)39-40
15 Ibid. 27
10

recognized his ignorance that he simply does not know the

answers to the proceeding questions. Socrates tries to show
that an advance of knowledge can only be gained when one
recognizes his own ignorance. When he asks for definitions,
he is rather not after nominal ones, but the Real.
The interrogation that happened is just like the common
situation in a mathematics class: What is the arithmetic
mean of the grades of a student on six examinations: 89, 95,
83, 77, 94, and 82?Suppose, a student answers 86.67, he
will then proceed to prove his answer by illustrating the
equation. Thus, X =

X / N = 89+95+83+77+94+82/ 6 = 520/6=

86.67.In this dialogue Socrates was just trying to prove

whether the thesis virtue is teachable is correct.
The theory will appear several times, probably three times,
the others in the Phaedrus and Phaedo. Finally, in the
latter, it serves to introduce the Forms, respectively they
are the answers that are sought for. The soul in a previous
state of being beheld them that is why they can be summoned
when needed. Plato makes clear that they are not the objects
of the senses. Although they teamed up with matter, they can
only

help

in

stimulating

the

mind.

Contemplation

leads

someone to knowledge of the Forms, those that seemingly

cannot be known because they are formless, indefinite Forms.
D. On distinguishing what is Real from what seems.
The third point to be discussed is quite controversial,
since it is about sensation. Sensation is often identified
with a psycho-physical activity in which changes in the body
are communicated to the soul.16 There are five senses and
16 Deborah K. W. Modrak, Plato: A Theory of Perception or a Nod
to Sensation A Companion to Plato( Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
2006) 143
11

each has its proper object: olfactory, auditory, gustatory,

touch and sight which is of greatest importance among them.
Why? Because it is through seeing, looking at the immense
wonder

of

the

philosophize

cosmos

and

so

()

to

that

man

began

In

respect

to

know.17

sensation,

sense-perception,

experience,

and

words

the

other

suggesting

same

sensemeaning

to

this,

phenomena
became

debatable issue most particularly in the Modern period or

pre-Kantian.

Its

status

as

knowledge

is

not

readily

accepted by Plato.
It all started with Descartes who held an extreme view about
sensation. Of course he is best known for his methodic
doubt. On the other side Plato does not seek to doubt the
senses only in view of their delusive character, but because
it hinders someone in the contemplation of truth. However
there is an inconsistency with this position, for in some
passages, they suggest that the senses help somehow.
He made a distinction between opinion and knowledge and
advocates that knowledge must be knowledge of being and not
of becoming. Opinion is characterized as between not-being
and being. Becoming is a state of uncertainty. Following the
line of argument, what is being offered by the senses fail
the requirements to be knowledge, because sense datum are
momentary,

subject

to

alteration,

thus

imperfect

or

uncertain, and relative to the perceiver.

Heraclitus thought [] All things are in motion and
nothing at rest; [..] And compares them to the stream of a
river, and says that you cannot go into the same water

17 Aristotle, Metaphysics, The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed.

by Jonathan Barnes, trans. by. W.D. Ross( New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1984) 1554
12

twice.18 For him, what changes is. But for Plato it is not
and

it

is

at

the

same

time.

Implied

from

Heraclitus,

sensible phenomena is nothing but a succession or flow of

sense experiences, experiences that occur at a given moment
but cease to be as soon as another succeeds. Thus, if this
is the case then no sense datum would be correct. It would
be correct only in relation to the circumstance, although it
is actual. So it can then be implied: Protagoras thesis
that

man

is

the

measure

of

all

things

for

what

he

perceives is necessarily true for him, but may not for

others. But, on the other hand the sense data may be true
objectively.
The fault is not on the senses but on the perceptual
judgment. It is a phenomenal activity, in which there is
subject-object involvement and are often switching places.
In other words, whereas physical objects act upon the body,
the body remains passive but can also be the contrary.
Therefore, the object-as-perceived is a consequence of an
interaction

between

the

perceiver

and

the

external

object.19 That is why anything experienced in the natural

or physical order may appear differently to two individuals
(perceivers).

But,

often

bodily

condition,

or

biased

perceiver may also alter what he has seen. A good example is

given in the Theaetetus:
Let us take you and me, or anything :There
is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick...The
wine which I drink when I am in health, appears
sweet and pleasant to me?...the patient and agent
meet together and produce sweetness and a
perception of sweetness, which are in simultaneous
18 Plato, Cratylus, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 1, trans.
Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 345
19 Modrak 143
13

motion, and the perception which comes from the

patient makes the tongue percipient, and the
quality of sweetness which arises out of and is
moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be
and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue...
But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon
another and a different person?
The combination of the draught of wine, and
the Socrates who is sick, produces quite another
result; which is the sensation of bitterness in
the tongue, and the motion and creation of
bitterness in and about the wine, which becomes
not bitterness but something bitter; as I myself
become not perception but percipient?...
There is no other object of which I shall
ever have the same perception, for another object
would give another perception, and would make the
percipient other and different; nor can that
object which affects me, meeting another subject,
produce the same, or become similar, for that too
will produce another result from another subject,
and become different.20
There are two reasons why sense data fail. First,
because there is an error in judgment, consequently the
realm

of

sensible

phenomena

itself

is

imperfect.

This

suggests of the Forms being paradigms or models. This is

also a mode of participation, which is called imitation
(mimesis) Likewise, physical things participate, or partake
in the nature from their models, but not perfection. So that
a thing constantly undergo a process of becoming, although
it

is

the

change.
demiurge

same

This

substance

can

chose

be

those

seen

(nominal),
in

models

the

that

but

its

Timaeus,
constitute

qualities

wherein

perfection,

immutability, etc.
First then, in my judgment, we must make a
distinction and ask, What is that which always is
and has no becoming; and what is that which is
always becoming and never is? That which is
20 Plato, Theaetetus, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 4, trans.
Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 214-215
14

the

apprehended by intelligence and reason is always

in the same state; but that which is conceived by
opinion with the help of sensation and without
reason, is always in a process of becoming and
perishing and never really is. Now everything that
becomes or is created must of necessity be created
by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be
created. The work of the creator, whenever he
looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form
and nature of his work after an unchangeable
pattern, must necessarily be made fair and
perfect; but when he looks to the created only,
and uses a created pattern, it is not fair or
perfect. 21
The paradigms are the Forms, criteria or standards for
judgment because the Forms are, and they are not time-spacerelational, granting that there is no test of the truth or
falsity

of

the

sense-data

of

sensations
previous

themselves.

experience

are

Memories,
summoned

stored
to

be

compared. Then they are generalized. This is a process of

correction, and abstraction. What are abstracted are not the
sensible qualities, but those truths that are not simple
sensible.
E. Summary
To summarize, there is a line made by Plato symptomatic
of that there is an epistemological or metaphysical rankings
of reality. Starting from the least constituting of truth:
conjectures, or illusions, likenesses; physical things or
opinions about them; then goes on the lower Forms such as
the Paradigms, Criteria for judgment- equality, smallness,
greatness;

fourth

the

Higher

Forms

or

moral.

Finally,

everything partakes of the Universal or Ultimate: Goodness.

21
Plato, Timaeus, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 3,
Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 448

15

trans.

Now take a line which has been cut into two

unequal1 parts, and divide each of them again in
the same proportion, and suppose the two main
divisions to answer, one to the visible and the
other to the intelligible, and then compare the
subdivisions in respect of their clearness and
want of clearness, and you will find that the
first section in the sphere of the visible
consists of images. And by images I mean, in the
first place, shadows, and in the second place,
reflections in water and in solid, smooth and
polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?
Yes, I understand.
Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is
only the resemblance, to include the animals which
we see, and everthing that grows or is made.
Very good.
Would you not
division have
the copy is
opinion is to

admit that both the sections of this

different degrees of truth, and that
to the original as the sphere of
the sphere of knowledge?

Most undoubtedly.
Next proceed to consider the manner in which the
sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.
In what manner?
Thus:There are two subdivisions, in the lower of
which the soul uses the figures given by the
former division as images; the enquiry can only be
hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a
principle descends to the other end; in the higher
of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and
goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses,
making no use of images2 as in the former case,
but proceeding only in and through the ideas
themselves.

16

I do not quite understand your meaning, he said.

Then I will try again; you will understand me
better when I have made some preliminary remarks.
You
are
aware
that
students
of
geometry,
arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the
odd and the even and the figures and three kinds
of angles and the like in their several branches
of science; these are their hypotheses, which they
and every body are supposed to know, and therefore
they do not deign to give any account of them
either to themselves or others; but they begin
with them, and go on until they arrive at last,
and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?
Yes, he said, I know.
And do you not know also that although they make
use of the visible forms and reason about them,
they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals
which they resemble; not of the figures which they
draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute
diameter, and so onthe forms which they draw or
make, and which have shadows and reflections in
water of their own, are converted by them into
images, but they are really seeking to behold the
things themselves, which can only be seen with the
eye of the mind?
That is true.
And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible,
although in the search after it the soul is
compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a
first principle, because she is unable to rise
above the region of hypothesis, but employing the
objects
of
which
the
shadows
below
are
resemblances in their turn as images, they having
in relation to the shadows and reflections of them
a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher
value. 22
22
Plato, Republic, Book VI, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 3,
trans. Benjamin Jowett(London: Oxford University Press, 1892) 211-212

17

He makes a clear distinction between what is genuinely real

and what is seemingly real and uses an analogy: the Forms
are

the

works

of

the

Divine

Artificer,

while,

physical

things are made by humans, patterned after the divine Forms,

then there are likenesses of things made by a painter or
imitator

in

general.

It

would

appear

then

from

these

evidences that the world, the sensible is unreal because it

is a mere copy of the Original which is real. (The two-world
theory) This would imply that all is only an illusion. While
the Forms can be known through recollection, and it is made
possible because they reveal themselves as paradigms, in
which everything sensible are patterned.
He

thought

that

knowing

them,

or

being

able

to

contemplate upon experience, people can make use for it for

a good living. For if not they are merely like prisoners
living in an underground den. Living a life that is only an
illusion, they name things, but they have not seen the
things themselves, cannot grasp reality.
.

18