A.C. No.

3232 September 27, 1994

ROSITA C. NADAYAG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY JOSE A. GRAGEDA, respondent.

MELO, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 15, 1988, Rosita C. Nadayag charged respondent Atty. A. Grageda, a practicing
attorney and notary public in Iligan City, with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in connection with a "Pacto de Retro"
transaction wherein complainant was the vendee. Complainant's affidavit, which accompanied her letter-complaint,
alleged that respondent:
. . . prepared and notarized a PACTO DE RETRO sale with me as the Vendee-a-Retro last January
21, 1987 in this City using Original Certificate of Land Title stolen from the Office of the Register of
Deeds herein in Iligan as a result of which I was swindled in One hundred eight thousand pesos
(P108,000.00) because the said land sold to me by Pacto de Retro was already sold ahead of time
to another party, using the owner's duplicate copy of the title. That during our pacto de retro sale, as
I was suspicious already of the appearance of the Original Certificate of Title, having many
annotations and old patches thereof, when I brought the matter to the attention of Atty. Jose A.
Grageda, notarizing the same, he simply answered me that the title was all right and that he told me
further not to worry as he is an attorney and besides he knew very well the Vendor-a- Retro whose
business transactions especially notarial matter has been and in fact always handled by him
(Attorney Jose A. Grageda).
That said stolen Original Certificate of Land Title was confiscated by Iligan City Register of Deeds,
Attorney Reynaldo Baguio on the occasion when I applied for registration of my Pacto de Retro.
Findings showed that many other cased of stolen original certificates of land titles have taken place
in the said office but the said Attorney as the Register of Deeds did not prosecute the thieves
thereof.
I filed Estafa case against the Vendor-a-Retro together with her accomplices to include said Attorney
Jose A. Grageda, coursing it through the local Barangay Captain last May 1987 yet, then forwarded
to the City Fiscal through the Police Station Commander in June 1987 but that and until the time of
this Report was not tried in Court yet but that the Information did not include said Atty. Jose A.
Grageda, hence this report.
(p. 2, Vol. I, Record.)
Respondent filed his counter-affidavit dated March 29, 1989, pertinently alleging:
6. That they showed me a copy of the title which I examined and found out the title was clear and
there was no annotation or entry so I told them that as far as the title was concern there was no
encumbrances or annotation and can be the subject of the Pacto de Retro;
7. That they insisted that I notarized the document so I proceeded to translate the document in
Cebu, Visayan dialect to make sure that the parties understood the deed and they replied that they
understood this and I asked then further if they have any more to add or delete; they answered that
there was no more and they will sign the same;

8. That I told them to sign the document above their typewritten name which they did and witnessed
by the other person with them who were present, so after their signature in good faith based upon
their documents I notarized the same.
(p. 10, Vol. II, Record.)
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En Banc of April 12, 1988, the case
was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled hearings for reception of evidence but complainant manifested
that she cannot proceed to Manila and attend to her case due to financial constraints. Upon the other hand,
respondent could no longer be located, having moved without leaving any forwarding address.
Nonetheless, said Commission, on the basis of the complaint and the supporting affidavit, as well as the counteraffidavit of respondent, found that "there is reason for disciplining the respondent" premised upon the following
observations:
Respondent first admits that he was consulted by the vendor-a-retro and the complainant (vendee-aretro) on the matter of the title when he was asked to notarize the Deed of Sale a Retro. He admits
that he rendered an opinion based on the title that was presented to him. It turns out that the title
presented to him is the Original Certificate of Title which only the Register of Deeds has custody of
and he should have sensed foul-play or irregularity. As a lawyer and officer of the court, he should
have been alerted and should have reported the irregularity of an Original Certificate of Title, which
should be in the exclusive safekeeping of the Register of Deeds, in the possession of unauthorized
persons. Even if it were the photostat copy of said Original Certificate of Title that was presented to
him, the same did not bear any certification by the Register of Deeds which could have alerted him
of the irregularity. The testimony that the Original was shown to him has not been controverted. The
Vendee was in fact in possession of the Original because it was testified that when the Register of
Deeds found that respondent was in possession, the original certificate was confiscated by the
Register of Deeds.
The Commission takes special note of a notary public acting more than a notary public and goes
beyond mere certification of the presence of the signatories, their having signed, and having
contracted. By transcending these bounds, such notary public has entered the realm of giving "legal
advice" thus "acting also as counsel aside from notary public" to the parties to the contract.
Treated as counsels for the vendee, he had the legal duty to advice him properly of the irregularities
and the dangers of holding the Original Certificate which should have been in the custody of the
Register of Deeds. Respondent had acted recklessly at the least, in his advise of the vendee. He
rendered an opinion that was irresponsible that his client relied upon which recklessness is
censurable.
(pp. 3-4, Commissioner's Report; ff. p. 22, Vol. Record.)
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence
necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his
profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member
of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty,
and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1 [1992]).

Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., supra).
In the case at bar, respondent should have been conscientious in seeing to it that justice permeated every aspect of
a transaction for which his services had been engaged, in conformity with the avowed duties of a worthy member of
the Bar. He should have fully explained the legal intricacies and consequences of the subject transaction as would
aid the parties in making an informed decision. Such responsibility was plainly incumbent upon him, and failing
therein, he must now face the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. After all, notarization is
not an empty routine. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.
ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Jose A. Grageda from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months commencing from receipt
of this Resolution, with the warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be spread on the records of said respondent, with copies thereof furnished to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10695, March 18, 2015
CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY SUELLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Crescenciano M. Pitogo (Pitogo) purchased a motorcycle from Emcor, Inc. However, Emcor, Inc. allegedly failed to cause the
registration of the motorcycle under his name. Pitogo, thus, filed a Civil Complaint before the Regional Trial Court against
EMCOR, Inc.1
The motorcycle was eventually registered in Pitogos name based on three (3) documents notarized by respondent Atty.
Joselito Troy Suello (Suello).2 The documents indicate that they are registered in Suellos notarial register as follows:

1. Deed of Assignment between

Maria P. Ponce / Rogelio
Ponce and EMCOR, Inc.

Doc. No. 436;

Book No. 83;
Page No. 88;

Series of 20093
2. Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage between Maria P.
Ponce and Mariza G. Ono-on

Doc. No. 437,

Page No. 88;
Book No. 83,
Series of 20094

3. Deed of Sale with Assumption

of Mortgage between Mariza
G. Ono-on and Crescenciano M.
Pitogo

Doc. No. 235;

Page No. 85;
Book No. 83;
Series of 20095

Pitogo obtained a copy of the three (3) documents from the Land Transportation Office, Danao City, Cebu. On August 3,
2009, he went to Suellos office to have them certified. Pitogo claims that when he called Suello the next day to tell him
about the importance of these documents to his civil case, Suello disowned the documents.6 Suello instead ordered his
secretary to give Pitogo a copy of his notarial register.7
In the letter dated August 7, 2009, Pitogo reiterated to Suello that the documents were important in his civil case pending
before the Regional Trial Court. He requested Suello to certify the authenticity and veracity of the three (3) documents he
obtained from the Land Transportation Office.8 He wanted to determine if the documents were duly notarized by Suello or
were merely fabricated.9 Pitogo did not receive a reply from Suello.10
On September 10, 2009, Pitogo filed his Affidavit-Complaint against Suello before the Cebu Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. Pitogo alleges that there were discrepancies between the three (3) documents notarized by Suello and
Suellos entries in his notarial register.11
Specifically, Pitogo claims that Suellos notarial register showed that the above entries pertain to the following documents:
a. Doc. No. 436: Deed of Absolute Sale of Mr. Roel D. Rago; 12
b. Doc. No. 437: Deed of Absolute Sale of Mrs. Conchita Pitogo Tautho; 13
c. Doc. No. 235: Contract to Sell of BF Property Development Corporation. 14
In his Answer to the Affidavit-Complaint, Suello denies having notarized the three (3) documents obtained from the Land
Transportation Office.15 He denies the allegation that he disowned the documents. 16 He admits that he certified the
documents as true copies.17
In his Position Paper, Suello explains that it was his secretary who certified Pitogos documents on August 3, 2009. 18 Pitogo
called Suello the next day to ask for a certification.19 When he advised Pitogo that he can get it at his office after verifying
the documents, Pitogo informed him that his secretary already certified them as true copies. 20 Suello told Pitogo that his
secretary was not given such authority.21
Suello also claims that Pitogo threatened to file an administrative case against him if he did not issue a certification stating
whether the documents were really notarized by him or were fabricated. 22 According to Suello, Pitogo needed the
certification that the three (3) documents used to register the motorcycle under his name were fabricated so he could claim
P1.7 million in damages for EMCOR, Inc.s alleged non-registration of his motorcycle. 23 Pitogos claim against EMCOR, Inc.
was apparently mooted by the registration of the motorcycle under his name.
On January 10, 2012, Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines recommended Suellos suspension from the active practice of law for six (6) months, as well as the revocation of
his commission as a notary public. He also recommended Suellos disqualification as notary public for two (2) years. 24
On April 15, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the Resolution adopting and approving the
findings of Commissioner Almeydas recommendation but further recommended to increase the penalty of disqualification as
notary public to four (4) years, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
A, and finding the recommendation fully supported by evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering respondent violated the Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Joselito Troy Suellos
Notarial Commission is hereby REVOKED immediately if presently commissioned and DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for four (4) years.25 (Emphasis in the original)
Suello filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 15, 2013 Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors Resolution
based on the ground that the penalty imposed on him was excessive:
1. That the sanction imposed is excessive. The respondent realizes that the mere existence of those documents with his
notarization makes him inevitably answerable for them. Regardless how unaware he may be of how these came about, he is
still the only one to answer for them. Not the complainant and not any party who may have access to his office implements

to do this. It made him aware of the need review his procedure to avoid these mistakes. Respondent however finds the
sanction against him is much too excessive and respectfully invokes the following, to wit:
A.

This is the first infraction lodged against him in his 15 years of practice.

B.

The respondent is not in bad faith and has no dishonest or selfish motive.

C.

There is no actual or potential injury caused to any private party; 26

Suello also apologized for his oversight:

2. That substantial justice has not been done. The respondent completely understands that this matter only pertains to him
and his liability and not about anybody or anything else. His indignation distracted him to the mistaken belief that the
complainants dubious motives would not merit his complaint attention because he did not come with clean hands. After
being properly reminded, the respondent realizes his mistake and respectfully apologizes for his oversight to this Honorable
Commission. The respondent finds it however grossly unjust that he is imposed with such sanction for resisting to
accommodate and be a part of the unscrupulous undertaking sought to be accomplished motivating the complaint which is
much bigger wrong.27
On May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the Resolution partially granting Suellos
Motion for Reconsideration, thus:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been
threshed out and taken into consideration under Resolution No. XX-2013-416 dated April 15, 2013. However the Board
DEEMED it judicious to reduce the penalty imposed on Atty. Joselito Troy Suello from DISQUALIFICATION from
reappointment as Notary Public from four (4) years to two (2) years. The IMMEDIATE REVOCATION of his Notarial
Commission, if existing, under said Resolution stands.28 (Emphasis in the original)
After reviewing the case records and considering the parties submissions, this court adopts the findings of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors in its May 3, 2014 Resolution but modifies the penalties imposed upon respondent Atty.
Joselito Troy Suello.
Respondent is administratively liable for his negligence in keeping and maintaining his notarial register. Recording every
notarial act in the notarial register is required under Rule VI the Notarial Rules, 29 thus:
Sec. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. (a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the
time of the notarization the following:
(1) The entry number and page number;
(2) The date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3) The type of notarial act;
(4) The title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5) The name and address of each principal;
(6) The competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the signatory is not personally known to the notary;
(7) The name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the persons identity;
(8) The fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) The address where the notarization was performed if not in the notarys regular place of work or business; and
(10) Any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance.
....
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on
which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
Failure to properly record entries in the notarial register is also a ground for revocation of notarial commission:
SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions. . . . .
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon,
any notary public who:
....
(2) fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts[.] 30

Notarial acts give private documents a badge of authenticity that the public relies on when they encounter written documents
and engage in written transactions. Hence, all notaries public are duty-bound to protect the integrity of notarial acts by
ensuring that they perform their duties with utmost care. This court explained in Bote v. Judge Eduardo:31
A notarial register is prima facie evidence of the facts there stated. It has the presumption of regularity and to contradict the
veracity of the entry, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. . . .
....
. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with such substantial public interest that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. For this reason, notaries
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. 32
Hence, when respondent negligently failed to enter the details of the three (3) documents on his notarial register, he cast
doubt on the authenticity of complainants documents. He also cast doubt on the credibility of the notarial register and the
notarial process. He violated not only the Notarial Rules but also the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires
lawyers to promote respect for law and legal processes. 33
Respondent also appears to have committed a falsehood in the pleadings he submitted. In his Answer to complainants
Affidavit-Complaint, respondent claimed that he certified complainants documents as true copies. 34 Later, in his Position
Paper, he passed the blame to his secretary.35 This violates the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits lawyers
from engaging in dishonest and unlawful conduct. 36
Respondents secretary cannot be blamed for the erroneous entries in the notarial register. The notarial commission is a
license held personally by the notary public. It cannot be further delegated. It is the notary public alone who is personally
responsible for the correctness of the entries in his or her notarial register.37 Respondents apparent remorse may assuage
the injury done privately, but it does not change the nature of the violation.
Besides, respondents remorse was displayed after a penalty was recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors. It was not motivated by a realization of a wrong committed on an individual but only by a desire to
temper the penalty. It came too late.
In Agadan, et al. v. Atty. Kilaan,38 the same violations of Notarial Rules and Code of Professional Responsibility were meted
with the penalty of one-year suspension of notarial commission and three-month suspension from the practice of law. 39 We
find the same penalties proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Joselito Troy Suello GUILTY of violating Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) months and is STERNLY WARNED that any similar violation will be dealt with more severely. His notarial
commission is immediately revoked if presently commissioned. He is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary
public for one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9514

April 10, 2013

BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Bernard N. Jandoquile against respondent Atty. Quirino
P. Revilla, Jr.
The Facts of the case are not disputed.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit2 signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa and
Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile
complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to perform the notarial act3 per Section 3( c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
xxxx
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the
principal4 within the fourth civil degree.
Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show
their valid identification cards.
In his comment5 to the disbarment complaint, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but admitted Jandoquiles material
allegations. The issue, according to Atty. Revilla, Jr., is whether the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of
relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present valid
identification cards is a ground for disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr. submits that his act is not a ground for disbarment.
He also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he should be considered more as counsel than as a
notary public when he notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to present valid identification
cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas and Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while
Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family.
Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to resolve the case instead of referring it to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. We agree with him, however, that his violation is not a sufficient ground for disbarment.
Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is beyond dispute. Atty. Revilla, Jr. readily admitted
that he notarized the complaint-affidavit signed by his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Section 3(c),
Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from
performing the notarial act, since two of the affiants or principals are his relatives within the fourth civil degree of
affinity. Given the clear provision of the disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence

and refuse notarizing the document. We cannot agree with his proposition that we consider him to have acted more
as counsel of the affiants, not as notary public, when he notarized the complaint-affidavit. The notarial certificate 6 at
the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his signature as a notary public, with a notarial commission valid until
December 31, 2012.
He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three affiants.
On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held liable. If the notary public knows the
affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the
definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in
which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument
or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or
affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. In this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of
Atty. Revilla, Jr.s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his wifes sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in
houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants personally. Thus, he was justified in no
longer requiring them to show valid identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing to indicate
such fact in the "jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No statement was included therein that he knows the three affiants
personally.7 Let it be impressed that Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the complaint-affidavit of his
relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. While he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not
exempt him from liability for violating the disqualification rule.
As we said, Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice is not a sufficient ground to disbar him. To our mind, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for disbarment under Section
27,8 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. We recall the case of Maria v. Cortez 9 where we reprimanded Cortez and
disqualified him from being commissioned as notary public for six months. We were convinced that said punishment,
which is less severe than disbarment, would already suffice as sanction for Cortezs violation. In Cortez, we noted
the prohibition in Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice that a person shall not perform a
notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notarys presence
personally at the time of the notarization and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified
by the notary public through a competent evidence of identity. Cortez had notarized a special power of attorney
without having the alleged signatories appear before him. In imposing the less severe punishment, we were mindful
that removal from the Bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe such as reprimand,
temporary suspension or fine would accomplish the end desired.
1wphi1

Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation committed by Atty. Revilla, Jr., we are in
agreement that a punishment less severe than disbarment would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public, or from performing any notarial act if he is presently commissioned as a notary
public, for a period of three (3) months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED to INFORM the Court, through an
affidavit, once the period of his disqualification has lapsed.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10185

March 12, 2014

LICERIO DIZON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
On May 14, 2004, complainant Licerio Dizon (complainant) filed a petition against Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.
(Atty. Cabucana), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), praying for the disbarment of the latter for
falsification of public document.
In his petition, complainant alleged that he was one of the would-be-buyers of a parcel of land owned by the heirs of
the late Florentino Callangan, namely, Susana, Jun and Angeleta, all surnamed Callangan who were parties in Civil
Case No. 1-689 filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch I, Santiago City (MTCC); that on November 6,
2003, a compromise agreement was executed by the parties in the said case and notarized before Atty. Cabucana
on the same date it was signed at the MTCC; that at the hearing conducted on December 11, 2003 regarding the
due execution and the veracity of the compromise agreement, the signatories therein testified that they signed the
instrument in the court room of MTCC but not in the presence of Atty. Cabucana as Notary Public; that because of
the irregularity in the due execution of the Compromise Agreement, there was undue delay in the resolution/decision
of Civil Case No. 1-689 which caused damage and injury to complainant; that Atty. Cabucana violated the Notarial
Law in notarizing the document in the absence of most of the signatories/affiants; and that he should be sanctioned
in accordance with Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Code and Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant
further alleged that Atty. Cabucana uttered grave threats against him on July 20, 2004 after the hearing of the said
case in MTCC.
In his Answer, Atty. Cabucana averred that the complaint was intended to harass him because he was the private
prosecutor in a criminal case filed against complainant before the MTCC; that complainant had no cause of action
as his right was not violated because he was just a "would be" buyer and not a party to the compromise agreement;
and that complainant would not suffer any damage by the pendency of the case or by any defects obtaining in the
notarization of the compromise agreement.
In its Report and Recommendation, dated January 22, 2007, the Investigating Commissioner found that Atty.
Cabucana violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he notarized the
compromise agreement without the presence of all the parties, and recommended that he be suspended as Notary
Public for a period of two (2) years and from the practice of law for six (6) months.
1

In its Resolution, dated May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Cabucana be suspended for only six
(6) months for violation of his obligation as Notary Public.
2

On motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution, modified its earlier resolution and
suspended Atty. Cabucana from the practice of law for one (1) month and disqualified him from re-appointment as
notary public for one (1) year.
3

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the penalty.
Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law states:
The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him
and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The

certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall
so state.
The requirement of affiant's personal appearance was further emphasized in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on
Notarial Practice of 2004 which provides that:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same
person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's
free and voluntary act and deed.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon l of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three
(3) months, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as
a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
1wphi1

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the respondent; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all cou1is throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6010 August 28, 2006
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High
School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:
1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by
him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; a pending administrative case
filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged
unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor
case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of
salary by respondent.
2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:

In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and
3) Malpractice:
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet,
before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one
Mary Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage
was subsequently annulled for being bigamous.
On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and notarized certain
legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of respondents notarial commission on 31
December 1987. A Certification1 dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City of
Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following
documents:
1. Affidavit of Ownership2 dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
2. Affidavit3 dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando
Dela Cruz;
3. Affidavit4 dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando
Dela Cruz;
4. Affidavit5 dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando
Dela Cruz;
5. Absolute Date of Sale6 dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales in favor of Senecio C. Marzan,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties7 dated 5 March 1994, executed by Evelyn C. Canullas and Pastora C.
Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
7. Sworn Statement8 dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando
Dela Cruz;
8. Deed of Sale9 dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor of Jacinto Batara, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz;
9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties10 dated 1 June 1994, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C.
Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
10. Absolute Deed of Sale11 dated 23 March 1995, executed by Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N. Benter,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale12 dated 20 December 1996, executed by Mandapat in favor of Mario R. Mabalot,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties13 dated 17 April 1996, executed by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L.
Quiming, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

13. Conditional Deed of Sale14 dated 27 February 1997, executed by Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A.
Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
14. Memorandum of Agreement15 dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and
AZTEC Construction represented by Mr. George Cham, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal deduction of salary and
others which are still pending before the St. Louis University (SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
and the Prosecutors Office. He did not discuss anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a second
marriage and malpractice in notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
After the filing of comment, We referred16 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.
The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of their allegations in their
complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage, and the
subsequent nullification of the former. He also admitted having notarized certain documents during the period when
his notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good faith,
lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the complained acts.
After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommended that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be administratively penalized
for the following acts:
a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled
first, he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and
b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission, he be
suspended from the practice of law for another one (1) year or for a total of two (2) years. 17
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the recommendation of Commissioner
Pacheco, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that Respondent contracted a second marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to
have the first marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year and for notarizing legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission Atty.
Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for another one (1) year, for a total of two (2) years
Suspension from the practice of law.18
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as to the penalty contained
therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law
only during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the
court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an
attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct rendering him unfit
to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose
of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has
proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to
protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney. Elaborating
on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,19 that the Bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as
well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act
which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity
of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or
of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity.
Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its
members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity
or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and
a mere citizen at another.20 Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may
reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the
subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.21
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character.
Possession of such moral character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must be
continuous. Otherwise, "membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral
conduct."22
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted marriage on 31 May 1982
before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted ways owing to their irreconcilable differences
without seeking judicial recourse. The union bore no offspring. After their separation in-fact, respondent never knew
the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter,
respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of SLU-LHS. There is also
no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Baguio City, Branch 68. Respondent even admitted this fact. When the second marriage was entered into,
respondents prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action having been initiated before the court
to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or annulment of respondents prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second marriage in 1989, having
been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a
second marriage may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the
appropriate court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9,
or about five years after respondent contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondents second
marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment came
after the respondents second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a disbarment case is sui
generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its
officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against
him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the judgment of
annulment of respondents second marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as
the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar is
met, then liability attaches.23
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment.

The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis--vis, grossly immoral
conduct. Immoral conduct is "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" and what is "grossly immoral,"
that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree."24
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his disbarment? Indeed,
he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he
made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a
second marriage while the first marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.25
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondents act as grossly immoral.
This finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board of
Governors, thus:
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the high moral standard of
the legal profession, to wit:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not
been romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he described to be very
intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.26
In the case of Terre v. Terre,27 respondent was disbarred because his moral character was deeply flawed as shown
by the following circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and
void ab initio and that she was legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had
contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some
assistance from respondents parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant
pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his
own child safely to a hospital.
In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,28 respondent was also disbarred for his grossly immoral acts such as: first,
he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him;
third, he mispresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he availed
himself of complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters
daughter. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant
that "everything is legal."
Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself acknowledged and declared
his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble enough to offer no defense save for his love and declaration of
his commitment to his wife and child.
Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly harsh. The power
to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be

decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. 29 In line with this philosophy, we find that a
penalty of two years suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the
IBP is too light and not commensurate to the act committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years 1988-1997 after his
commission as notary public had expired, respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain documents despite
his knowledge that he no longer had authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he received no payment in
notarizing said documents.
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and,
for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. 30
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality.
The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission to do so as
"reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public
documents."31
The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine
Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary
action or one, performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws,
more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he
is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes.
These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By
acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same
Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,32 a lawyer was suspended for one year when he notarized five documents
after his commission as Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit,
a deed of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in said case, we find that a suspension of two
(2) years is justified under the circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14)
documents33 without the requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly
committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; the pending
administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by
SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on
alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before the proper
forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in disregard of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and
another two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission or a total of four (4) years of
suspension.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP,
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.