6.

Cause
Art. 850. The statement of a false cause for the
institution of an heir shall be considered as not written,
unless it appears from the will that the testator would
not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of such cause. (767a)

2.

3.

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled by

reason of a false cause, the following requisites
must concur:
(1) The cause for the institution of heirs must be
stated in the will;
(2) The cause must be shown to be false; and
(3) It must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not have made such institution
if he had known the falsity of the cause.
As a general rule, the statement of a false cause
for the institution of an heir does not vitiate the
institution because the testamentary disposition is
considered a gratuitous act in which the generosity
of the testator is the real cause.

However, where it appears from the will that

the testator would not have made the
institution if he had known of the falsity of the
cause he has stated, then the institution is
voided by the falsity of the cause.
The principle underlying the rule on the statement
of a false cause should also apply in the case of an
illegal cause. Hence, the mere statement of a
cause contrary to law will not invalidate an
institution, so long as it does not appear in the will
that such illegal cause is the only motivating factor
for the institution.

Austria v. Reyes (1970) Castro, J.

Petitioners: Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta,
Lauro Austria Mozo
Respondents: CFI Judge Andres Reyes, Perfecto Cruz,
Benita Cruz-Menez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, Luz
Cruz-Salonga
Decedent: Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz
Heirs: Ruben et al. and Perfecto et al.
Concept: Cause
Brief Facts: Basilia died. Under her will, the bulk of
her estate was to pass to Perfecto et al., all of whom
had been declared by Basilia as her legally adopted
children. Her nieces and nephews, Ruben et al.,
intervened in the partition. They argued that Basilia
instituted Perfecto et al. on the belief that they were
legally adopted and therefore compulsory heirs and, as
such, the proof of the falsity of the adoption would
cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the
opening of the estate to intestacy.
Doctrine: Before the institution of heirs may be
annulled under Art. 850, CC, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the cause for the institution of heirs
must be stated in the will; (2) the cause must be shown
to be false; and (3) it must appear from the face of the
will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
FACTS:
1. July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with
the CFI a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her
last will and testament. The probate was opposed

4.

5.

by Ruben Austria et al. (nephews and nieces of

Basilia).
Opposition was dismissed and the probate of the
will allowed after due hearing.
Under the will, the bulk of the estate of Basilia was
to pass on to Perfecto Cruz et al., all of whom had
been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own
legally adopted children.
April 23, 1959 Basilia died. Perfecto was appointed
executor in accordance with Basilia's will.
Ruben et al. filed a petition in intervention for
partition. They alleged that:
i.
They are the nearest of kin of Basilia
ii.
Perfecto et al. had not in fact been adopted by
Basilia in accordance with law, in effect
rendering them mere strangers to Basilia and
without any right to succeed as heirs.
Court allowed Ruben et al.s intervention.
CFI held that the validity or invalidity of the
adoption is neither material nor decisive on the
efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the
adoption in question were spurious, Perfecto et al.
will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs
but as testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's will.
Ruben et al. argue that:
The tenor of the language used in the will gives
rise to the inference that Basilia was deceived into
believing that she was legally bound to bequeath
of her entire estate to Perfecto et al. as the
latter's legitime.
Had Basilia known the adoption to be spurious,
she would not have instituted Perfecto et al. at all
the basis of the institution being solely her
belief that they were compulsory heirs.
Thus, proof of the falsity of the adoption would
cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the
opening of the estate wide to intestacy pursuant
to Art. 850.

ISSUE: Whether the institution of heirs should be

annulled in this case [NO]
RATIO:
NO; the requisites for the annulment of the
institution of heirs under Art. 850 have not been
met.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled
under Art. 850, the following requisites must concur:
(1)The cause for the institution of heirs must be
stated in the will;
(2)The cause must be shown to be false; and
(3)It must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if
he had known the falsity of the cause.
As regards the first requisite:
Ruben et al.: It can be implied from the use of
the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory
heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the
impelling reason or cause for the institution of
Perfecto et al. was Basilia's belief that under the
law she could not do otherwise.
SC: If this were indeed what prompted the
testatrix in instituting Perfecto et al., she did not
make it known in her will. If she was aware that
succession to the legitime takes place by
operation of law, independent of her own wishes,
she would not have found it convenient to name

her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes.

Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes
should very well indicate her complete agreement
with that statutory scheme. But even this is highly
speculative of what was in the mind of Basilia
when she executed her will. Basilia's will does not
state in a specific or unequivocal manner the
cause for such institution of heirs. The Court
cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork
or uncertain implications.
As regards the second requisite: the legality of the
adoption can be assailed only in a separate action
brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject
of a collateral attack.
As regards the third requisite:
Even if Ruben et al.s theory that Basilia instituted
Perfecto et al. solely because she believed that
the law commanded her to do so, on the false
assumption that her adoption of Perfecto et al.
was valid, the institution must still stand.
Art. 850 is a positive injunction to ignore whatever
false cause the testator may have written in his
will for the institution of heirs. Such institution
may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after
an examination of the will, that the testator
clearly would not have made the institution if he
had known the cause for it to be false.
Basilia's will is mute on this point or at best is
vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga
sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana,"
were borrowed from the language of the law on
succession and were used, respectively, to
describe the class of heirs instituted and the
abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no
absolute indication that Basilia would have
willed her estate other than the way she did if
she had known that she was not bound by law
to make allowance for legitimes.
Basilias disposition of the free portion of her
estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored
Perfecto et al. shows a perceptible inclination on
her part to give to the latter more than what she
thought the law enjoined her to give to them.
Compare this with the relatively small devise of
land which the decedent had left for Ruben et
al. (her blood relatives). Excluding Perfecto et al.
from the inheritance would lead to Ruben et al.
succeeding to the bulk of the estate by
intestacy a result which would subvert the
clear wishes of Basilia.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind
should be swept away by these explicit injunctions
in Art. 791, CC: "The words of a will are to receive
an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will
render any of the expressions inoperative; and of
two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy."
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its
side, especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose
of practically his whole estate, as was done in
this case.
Moreover, so compelling is the principle that
intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of
the testator allowed to prevail, that we could

even vary the language of the will for the

purpose of giving it effect.
A probate court has found, by final judgment, that
Basilia possessed testamentary capacity and her
last will executed free from falsification, fraud,
trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it
becomes the Courts duty to give full expression
to her will.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied.
7. Preterition
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or
all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation. (814a)

Preterition the total omission of a compulsory

heir from the inheritance. It consist in the silence of
the testator with regard to a compulsory heir,
omitting him in the statement, either by not
mentioning him at all, or by not giving him
anything in the hereditary property but without
expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned
in the will in the latter case.

Preterition v Disinheritance
Preterition
Disinheritance
Tacit method of depriving Express
method
of
a compulsory heir of his depriving a compulsory
legitime
heir of his legitime
The law presumes that There is some legal cause
there has been merely an
oversight or mistake on
the part of the testator
Omitted heir gets not only If valid, the compu8lsory
his legitime but also his heir is totally excluded
share in the free portion from the inheritance. If
not disposed of by way of invalid, the compulsory
legacies and devises
heir is merely restored to
his legitime

Requisites of Preterition:
(1) That there is a total omission;

There is total omission when the testator

does not disinherit the heir, but leaves him
nothing of the hereditary estate, whether
or not he is mentioned in the will.

If the heir has received anything from the

testator, even by way of donation inter
vivos, there is no preterition, but a case of
incomplete legitime under Art. 906. Such
donation, under Art. 909, is considered as
an advance on the legitime of the
compulsory heir. His only right is to ask for
completion of his legitime under Art. 906, if
the amount already given is not sufficient
to cover such legitime.
(2) That the person omitted is a compulsory heir in
the direct line; and

Par. 1 of Art. 854 does not include those

born between the date of the execution of
the will and the moment of the death of the
testator.

However, since no distinction is made as to

whether such heir be born before or after
the execution of the will, it is to be inferred
that the omission of heirs born between the
execution of the will and of the moment of
the testators death will also constitute
preterition, if such heirs be living at the
latter moment.

Tolentino believes that heirs in the direct

line includes the illegitimate parents and
all kinds of illegitimate children, whether
natural or otherwise.
(3) That the compulsory heir omitted survives the
testator.

If the compulsory heir who has been

preterited dies before the testator, it is the
same as if there had been no preterition.
If the testator institutes an heir to the estate,
including the legitime of a compulsory heir, at the
same time omitting a compulsory heir, then there
is preterition. The effect depends upon the
character of the compulsory heir omitted.

If the omitted heir is in the direct line, the

institution is totally annulled, saving only
legacies and devises which are not inofficious.

If the omitted heir is not in the direct line, only

his legitime is given to him and the institution
is annulled only to that extent.
In the case of preterition, the annulment of the
institution of heirs is in toto and creates intestate
succession; but legacies and devises are valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.
The surviving spouse is not a compulsory heir in
the direct line, hence, Art. 854 does not include
him/her. However, the legitime of the surviving
spouse is protected by Art. 842 which provides that
one who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his
estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime
of said heirs.

The preterition of the surviving spouse does

not entirely annul the institution of heirs but
merely partially annuls the same by reducing
the rights of the instituted heir to the extent
necessary to cover the legitime of the omitted
surviving spouse.

Art. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator

has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to
him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

The heir is limited to the completion of the legitime

when the testator has left to him by any title
some property not sufficient to cover his legitime.

If there is no testamentary disposition in his

favor, the heir cannot ask for completion of his
legitime because there is nothing to complete.
Instead, there should be a case of preterition.
Tolentino is of the view that Manresas and
Valverdes interpretation should be applied: Art.
906, although apparently specially applicable to
testamentary dispositions, does not preclude or

forbid its extension to other acts of liberality by the

testator in favor of the compulsory heir.
Art. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or
diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be
reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may
be inofficious or excessive.

The disposition that may impair the legitime may

not be in a will but in the form of a donation inter
vivos. Art. 771 allows the reduction of inofficious
donations.
Art. 771 provides that only those who at the time
of the donors death have a right to the legitime
and their heirs and successors in interest may ask
for the reduction of inofficious donations.

Those entitled to ask for the reduction of

inofficious donations cannot renounce their
right during the lifetime of the donor.

Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be charged

to their legitime.
Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that
part of the estate of which the testator could have
disposed by his last will.
Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the
disposable portion, they shall be reduced according to
the rules established by this Code. (819a)
Art. 910. Donations which an illegitimate child may
have received during the lifetime of his father or
mother, shall be charged to his legitime.
Should they exceed the portion that can be freely
disposed of, they shall be reduced in the manner
prescribed by this Code. (847a)

The term children in these provisions has been

generally construed to refer to all compulsory
heirs.
Par. 2 of Art. 910 should be understood to mean
that if the donation to an illegitimate child exceeds
his share in the legitime, such excess should be
treated as a donation to a stranger and charged
against the free portion.
Strangers all persons who do not inherit as
compulsory heirs from the donor.

Art. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the

cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted,
is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in
this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as
it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the
devises and legacies and other testamentary
dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not
impair the legitime.
a. Concept
Reyes v. Barretto-Datu (1967) Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Plaintiffs-appellants: Tirso Reyes as guardian of the
minors Azucena Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all surnamed
Reyes y Barretto
Defendant-appellee: Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu
Decedent: Bibiano Barretto

 Milagros' theory, inter alia, was that, inasmuch as

Salud was not a compulsory heir, she (Milagros)
was allotted in Bibiano's will a share less than her
legitime, resulting in an invalid institution of
Salud.

Heirs: Salud and Milagros

Concept: Preterition
Note: Preterition is not the main issue in this case.
Brief Facts: Bibiano was married to Maria. When
Bibiano died, he left his properties to Salud and
Milagros. Usufruct was reserved for Maria. When Maria
died, it was discovered that she had executed two
wills: in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros as
heirs; in the second, she left all her properties to
Milagros. In rejecting the first will, the lower court held
that Salud was not the daughter of Maria by Bibiano.
Salud fell back upon the remnant of the estate of
Bibiano (the fishpond), and she sought the recovery of
one-half thereof. Milagros opposed, arguing, among
others, that Saluds institution as Bibianos heir should
be invalidated since she (Milagros) was allotted in
Bibianos will a share less than her legitime.
Doctrine: The fact that Milagros was allotted in her
father's will a share smaller than her legitime does not
invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there
was here no preterition, or total omission of a forced
heir.
FACTS:
1. Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo.
During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate,
consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga,
and Bulacan.
2. When Bibiano, he left his share of these properties
in a will to Salud Barretto (mother of Azucena and
Tirso, Jr.) and Lucia Milagros Barretto, and a small
portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto
and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The
usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow,
Maria.
3. Maria was appointed administratrix. By virtue
thereof, she prepared a project of partition, and the
estate was distributed and the shares delivered.
Salud took immediate possession of her share and
secured the cancellation of the original certificates
of title and the issuance of new titles in her own
name.
4. Upon Marias death, it was discovered that she had
executed two wills: in the first, she instituted Salud
and Milagros as her heirs; in the second, she
revoked the same and left all her properties in favor
of Milagros alone.
The second will was allowed and the first rejected.
In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes,
as guardian of the children of Salud, the lower
court held that Salud was not the daughter of
Maria by her husband Bibiano. SC affirmed the
same.
5. Having lost this fight for a share in the estate of
Maria, Salud falls back upon the remnant of the
estate of Bibiano, which was given in usufruct to
Maria. Salud filed an action for the recovery of onehalf portion of the fishpond.
Milagros opposed the claim, countering that all
the properties received by Salud from Bibiano
should be returned because Salud was a spurious
heir, not being a daughter of Bibiano and Maria,
thereby directly attacking the validity of the
project of partition and the decision of the lower
court thereon.

ISSUE: Whether the partition from which

acquired the fishpond is void ab initio [NO]

Salud

RATIO:
NO; the partition from which Salud acquired the
fishpond is not void ab initio. As such, Salud
acquired a valid title to it.
Art. 1081, CC1 has been misapplied to the present
case by the court below. Salud had been instituted
heir in Bibiano's last will and testament together
with Milagros; hence, the partition had between
them could not be one such had with a party who
was believed to be an heir without really being one,
and was not null and void under said article. The
legal precept of Art. 1081 does not speak of
children, or descendants, but of heirs (without
distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate
ones). As such, the fact that Salud happened not to
be a daughter of Bibiano does not preclude her from
being one of the heirs expressly named in his
testament, for Bibiano was at liberty to assign the
free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose.
While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on
the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that
reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano.
[ONLY RELEVANT PART] Nor does the fact that
Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share
smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of
Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or
total omission of a forced heir. For this reason, Neri
vs. Akutin, invoked by appellee, is not at all
applicable, that case involving an instance of
preterition or omission of children of the testator's
former marriage.
The view that the partition in question was void as a
compromise on the civil status of Salud in violation
of Art. 1814, OCC is erroneous. A compromise
presupposes the settlement of a controversy
through mutual concessions of the parties; and the
condition of Salud as daughter of Bibiano, while
untrue, was at no time disputed during the
settlement of the estate of the testator. There can
be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And
while a compromise over civil status is prohibited,
the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties
over the share that should correspond to a claimant
to the estate.
At any rate, independently of a project of partition
which is merely a proposal for distribution of the
estate, it is the court alone that makes the
distribution of the estate and determines the
persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each
is entitled. It is that judicial decree of distribution,
once final, that vests title in the distributees. Where
a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of
the estate, and the same has become final, the
validity or invalidity of the project of partition
becomes irrelevant.
1

A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir,

without being so, has been included, shall be null and void.

DISPOSITIVE: CFI decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE

in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to
appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the properties
enumerated.
Aznar v. Duncan (1966) Makalintal, J.
Executor and Appellee: Adolfo Aznar
Oppositor and Appellant: Maria Lucy Christensen
Duncan
Oppositor and Appellee: Maria Helen Christensen
Decedent: Edward Christensen
Heirs: Helen Garcia and Lucy Duncan
Concept: Preterition
Brief Facts: Edward died testate. In his will, he
declared Lucy Duncan as his only descendant. He left a
legacy to Helen Garcia, the amount of which is less
than the latters legitime, without acknowledging the
latter as his daughter. Helen was judicially declared as
Edwards daughter after his death. CFI approved the
project of partition wherein Edwards estate was
divided equally between Helen and Lucy, the said order
being based on the proposition that Helen was
preterited in the will, thereby warranting the
annulment of the institution of Lucy as heir. Lucy
appealed, claiming that there was no preterition in this
case and, as such, Helen is only entitled to the amount
which would complete her legitime.
Doctrine: When a testator leaves to a forced heir a
legacy worth less than the legitime, but without
referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative,
and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the
heir could not ask that the institution of heirs be
annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be
completed.
FACTS:
1. Edward Christensen, a citizen of California with
domicile in the Philippines, died, leaving a will.
Relevant provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (Now Mrs. Bernard Daney),
who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight
years ago, who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living
ascendants, and no descendants except my abovenamed daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx

xxx

xxx

7. I give, devise, and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN

CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has
she been at any time adopted by me the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00)
2. CFI issued an order approving the project of
partition submitted by the executor, wherein the
properties of the estate were divided equally
between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan, whom the
testator had expressly recognized in his will as his
daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia, who had been
judicially declared as such after his death.

The said order was based on the proposition that

since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will,
the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was
annulled. Hence, the properties passed to both of
them as if Edward had died intestate, saving only
the legacies left in favor of certain other persons,
which legacies have been duly approved by the
lower court and distributed to the legatees.
3. Lucy Duncan appealed, contending that this is not a
case of preterition, but is governed by Art. 906, CC,
which says: "Any compulsory heir to whom the
testator has left by any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same be
fully satisfied."
She also suggested that considering the
provisions of the will whereby Edward expressly
denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left
to her a legacy nevertheless although less than
the amount of her legitime, she was in effect
defectively disinherited within the meaning of Art.
9182.
As such, Helen is entitled only to her legitime and
not to a share of the estate equal to that of Lucy
as if the succession were intestate.
ISSUE: Whether the estate, after deducting the
legacies, should pertain to Lucy and to Helen in equal
shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted
heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary
to cover the legitime of Helen [The inheritance of
Lucy should merely be reduced to the extent
necessary to cover Helens legitime]
RATIO:
The inheritance of Lucy should merely be
reduced to the extent necessary to cover Helens
legitime.
The Court notes that in the present case, Helen is
not mentioned as an heir in Edwards will but is
given a legacy of P3,600.00. The question that has
to be answered, as such, is this: In order that the
right of a forced heir may be limited only to the
completion of his legitime (instead of the annulment
of the institution of heirs), is it necessary that what
has been left to him in the will "by any title," as by
legacy, be granted to him in his capacity as heir,
that is, a titulo de heredero? In other words, should
he be recognized or referred to in the will as heir?
In the classical view (pursuant to the Roman law),
the answer is in the affirmative. However,
according to Manresa and Sanchez Roman, that
view was changed by Art. 645 of the "Proyecto de
Codigo de 1851," later on copied in Art. 906 of our
own Code.
Manresa cites three decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain. In each one of those cases, the
testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy
worth less than the legitime, but without referring
to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and
willed the rest of the estate to other persons. It
2

Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a

cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or
which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the
institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited; but the devices and legacies and other
testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will
not impair the legitimate.

was held that Art. 815 applied, and the heir could
not ask that the institution of heirs be annulled
entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.
The foregoing solution is more in consonance with
the expressed wishes of the testator in the
present case as may be gathered from the
provisions of Edwards will. He refused to
acknowledge Helen as his natural daughter, and
limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The
fact that she was subsequently declared judicially
to possess such status is no reason to assume
that had the judicial declaration come during his
lifetime, his subjective attitude towards her would
have undergone any change and that he would
have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy,
who alone was expressly recognized by him.
The decision in Neri, et al. v. Akutin is not
applicable, because it referred to a will where "the
testator left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, and (that) without
expressly disinheriting the children by his first
marriage, he left nothing to them or, at least, some
of them." In the case at bar, the testator did not
entirely omit Helen, but left her a legacy of
P3,600.00.
DISPOSITIVE: Helen Garcia to be given no more than
the portion corresponding to her as legitime.
J.L.T. Agro, Inc. v. Balansag (2005) Tinga, J.
Petitioner: J.L.T. Agro, Inc., represented by its
Manager, Julian Teves
Respondents: Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday
Decedent: Don Julian
Concept: Preterition
Brief Facts: Don Julian, during his lifetime, transferred
ownership of a parcel of land to J.L.T. Agro. His heirs,
Milagros Donio and children, took possession of the
said lot. Unaware that the said lot was already
registered in the name of J.L.T. Agro, Antonio Balansag
and Hilaria Cadayday bought the said lot from Milagros.
Antonio and Hilaria then filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of J.L.T. Agros title. J.L.T. Agro now
appeals from the CA ruling that the Supplemental Deed
(transferring the said lot to J.L.T.) is not valid,
containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don
Julians heirs from the second marriage.
Doctrine: According to Manresa, preterition is the
omission of the heir in the will. It is irrelevant to speak
of preterition in the absence of a will depriving a legal
heir of his legitime. Also, total omission from
inheritance is a requirement for preterition to exist.
FACTS:
1. Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first with
Antonia Baena, and after her death, with Milagros
Donio Teves. Don Julian had two children with
Antonia: Josefa and Emilio. He had four children with
Milagros Donio: Maria Evelyn, Jose Catalino, Milagros
Reyes and Pedro.
2. The present controversy involves a 954-sqm parcel
of land (Lot No. 63), which was originally registered
in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don
Julian and Antonia. When Antonia died, the land was
among the properties involved in an action for
partition where Milagros participated as an

intervenor. The parties to the said case entered into

a Compromise Agreement which embodied the
partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
3. On the basis of the compromise agreement, the CFI
declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don
Julian and his two children of the first marriage. The
property was to remain undivided during the
lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio were also
given other properties at Bais, including the electric
plant, the movie property, the commercial areas,
and the house where Don Julian was living. The
remainder of the properties was retained by Don
Julian, including Lot No. 63.
4. Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa later executed a Deed
of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of
Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Less than a year
later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed a
Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets
with the Assumption of Liabilities, which transferred
ownership over Lot No. 63 to J.L.T. Agro.
5. Don Julian died intestate.
6. J.L.T. Agro had Lot No. 63 registered in its name.
7. Milagros Donio and her children took possession of
Lot No. 63. Unaware that the said lot was already
registered in J.L.T. Agros name, Antonio Balansag
and Hilaria Cadayday bought the same.
8. Antonio and Hilaria filed a complaint before the RTC,
seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of
TCT No. T-375 in the name of J.L.T. Agro.
9. RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that Don Julian
had validly transferred ownership of Lot No. 63
during his lifetime.
10.
CA reversed, holding that the Supplemental
Deed is not valid, containing as it does a prohibited
preterition of Don Julians heirs from the second
marriage.
ISSUE: [RELEVANT] Whether there was preterition in
this case [NO]
RATIO:
NO; there was no preterition.
Art. 854 provides that the preterition or omission of
one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious.
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the
heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or,
while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not
instituting him as heir without disinheriting him
expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the
properties.
It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the
direct line from inheritance.
It consists in the silence of the testator with
regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the
testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or
by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him,
even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter
case.

 There is no preterition where the testator allotted

to a descendant a share less than the legitime,
since there was no total omission of a forced heir.
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will
since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos
of his properties, as evidenced by the court
approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is
premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition
prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a
will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides,
there are other properties which the heirs from the
second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon
his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise
Agreement are indicative of Don Julians desire
along this line. Hence, the total omission from
inheritance of Don Julians heirs from the second
marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is
hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
Note: Despite the foregoing discussion, SC struck
down the alleged deed in this case as it appears on its
face to be a blatant nullity.
DISPOSITIVE: CA AFFIRMED.