SECOND DIVISION

CARLOS C. DE CASTRO,
Petitioner,

7. Abuse of authority, for instructing Balais to collect commissions from

Aying and Samarita, and for requiring Raul Pacaldo (Pacaldo) to exact 2%5% of the price of the contracts awarded to suppliers; and
8. Slander, for uttering libelous statements against Niguidula.

- versus
LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. and EDGARDO
QUIOGUE,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 165153
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
carpio MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 23, 2008
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner
Carlos C. de Castro (petitioner) to annul, reverse and/or set aside the
Decision2 dated May 25, 2004 and the Resolution3 dated August 30, 2004
of the Former Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 79207 entitled "Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. and
Edgardo B. Quiogue v. National Labor Relations Commission and Carlos
C. de Castro."
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case as gathered from the records are briefly summarized
below.
The petitioner commenced his employment with respondent Liberty
Broadcasting Network, Inc. (respondent company) as Building
Administrator on August 7, 1995. On May 16, 1996, the respondent
company, through its HRM Senior Manager (Personnel Manager) Bernard
Mandap, sent a notice to the petitioner requiring him to explain within
forty-eight (48) hours why he should not be made liable for violation of the
Company Code of Conduct for acts constituting serious misconduct, fraud
and willful breach of the trust reposed in him as a managerial employee.4
In his answer, the petitioner denied the allegations against him contained in
the affidavits of respondents witnesses, Vicente Niguidula (Niguidula) and
Gil Balais (Balais).5 The petitioner labeled all of the respondents
accusations as completely baseless and sham, designed to protect
Niguidula and Balais who were the favorite boys of respondent Edgardo
Quiogue (Quiogue), the Executive Vice President of the respondent
company. At the petitioners request, the respondent company scheduled a
formal hearing at 2:00 p.m. of May 28, 1996. However, the petitioner sent
a notice that he would not participate when he learned through his wife
that criminal cases for estafa and qualified theft had been filed against him
at the Makati Prosecutors Office. He felt that the hearing was a "moromoro" investigation. On May 24, 1996, the respondent company further
charged the petitioner with "Violation of Company Code of Conduct,"
based on the affidavits of Balais, Cristino Samarita (Samarita), and Jose
Aying (Aying).6
On May 31, 1996, the respondent company issued a Notice of Dismissal to
the petitioner based on the following grounds: 7
1. Soliciting and/or receiving money for his own benefit from
suppliers/dealers/traders Aying and Samarita, representing "commissions"
for job contracts involving the repair, reconditioning and replacement of
parts of the airconditioning units at the companys Antipolo Station, as
well as the installation of fire exits at the Technology Centre;
2. Diversion of company funds by soliciting and receiving on different
occasions a total of P14,000.00 in "commissions" from Aying for a job
contract in the companys Antipolo Station;
3. Theft of company property involving the unauthorized removal of one
gallon of Delo oil from the company storage room;
4. Disrespect/discourtesy towards a co-employee, for using offensive
language against Niguidula;
5. Disorderly behavior, for challenging Niguidula to a fight during working
hours within company premises, thereby creating a disturbance that
interrupted the normal flow of activities in the company;
6. Threat and coercion, for threatening to inflict bodily harm on the person
of Niguidula and for coercing Balais, a subordinate, into soliciting money
in his (the petitioners) behalf from suppliers/contractors;

The petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the

respondents with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Arbitration Branch in the National Capital Region. At the arbitration, he
denied committing the offenses charged. He maintained that: he could not
encourage solicitation of commissions from suppliers considering that he
was quite new in the company; the accusations are belated because the
imputed acts happened in 1995; the one gallon of Delo oil he allegedly
carted away was at the room of Balais at the time, which circumstance he
immediately relayed to Mandap; the affidavits of Niguidula and Balais are
not reliable because he had altercations with them; in the first week of May
1996, he reprimanded Balais for incurring unnecessary overtime work,
which Balais resented; on May 9, 1996, Niguidula verbally assaulted and
challenged him to a fight, which he reported to respondent Quiogue and to
the Makati Police. Attached to the petitioners position paper were the
affidavits8 of Aying and Ronalisa O. Rosana, a telephone operator of the
company.
On April 30, 1999, Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati rendered a Decision in the
petitioners favor, holding the respondent company liable for illegal
dismissal.9 Arbiter Pati disbelieved the affidavits of Niguidula, Balais,
Pacaldo, Samarita, and Aying in view of the circumstances prior to their
execution. The Arbiter noted that Niguidula and Balais had altercations
with petitioner prior to the issuance of the notice of violation to the latter;
the affidavit of Samarita showed that it was not petitioner who personally
asked commission from him but Balais; Ayings credibility had been
placed in serious doubt because he recanted his previous affidavit and
issued another stating that the petitioner did not actually ask commission
from him; and Pacaldos affidavit should not also be believed because he
was a subordinate of Niguidula who had an ax to grind against the
petitioner.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters decision and adopted
the findings of Labor Arbiter Tamayo who had reviewed the appeal on the
NLRCs instructions.10 It ruled that Arbiter Pati erred in disregarding the
affidavits of the respondents witnesses.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC granted
in a Resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002.11 The NLRC held
that the charges against petitioner "were never really substantiated other
than by the bare allegations in the affidavits of witnesses" who were the
companys employees and who had altercations with petitioner prior to the
execution of their affidavits.
The NLRC turned down the motion for reconsideration that the respondent
company subsequently filed.12 The respondent company thus elevated the
case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The CA granted the petition in its Decision promulgated on May 25,
2004,13 thereby effectively confirming the validity of the petitioners
dismissal. The appellate court found that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it disregarded the affidavits of all the respondents
witnesses, particularly those of Balais, Samarita, Niguidula, and Pacaldo
who were one in saying that the petitioner demanded commissions from
the companys job contractors. The CA observed that it could not have
been possible that Balais and Niguidula (who had previous altercations
with the petitioner), and Samarita (who did not previously know Quiogue)
all committed perjury to execute respondent Quiogues scheme of
removing the petitioner from the company.
The petitioner moved but failed to secure a reconsideration of the CA
Decision; hence, he came to us through the present petition.
THE PETITION
The petitioner submits that the CA erred when it acted as a trial court and
interfered without sufficient basis with the NLRCs findings. Citing our
ruling in Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. NLRC, et al.,14 he points out
that factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with
those of the Labor Arbiter, are accorded respect and finality and should not
be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence.
The petitioner points out, too, that Rule 65 of the Rules of Court finds full
application only when an administrative tribunal has acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, or
when such finding is not supported by the evidence. He argues that the
respondent company failed to raise any jurisdictional question of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion before the CA. What the
respondent company effectively sought from the CA, citing our ruling in

Flores v. NLRC,15 was a judicial re-evaluation of the adequacy or

inadequacy of the evidence on record an improper exercise of power
outside the scope of the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
The petitioner further argues that the CA erred when it substituted its
judgment for that of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who were the "triers
of facts" who had the opportunity to review the evidence extensively.
The petitioner theorizes that his termination from employment was a
hatchet job maliciously concocted by the respondents, with Quiogue at the
helm. He had offended Quiogue when he questioned the latters award of
the fire exit contract to Samarita; as a result, Quiogue fabricated charges
against him, using his underlings Niguidula and Balais. He particularly
questions the charge that he conspired with his fellow managers (such as
Niguidula, Pacaldo and even Personnel Manager Mandap) in December
1995, and asks why his investigation and the supporting evidence came
only in May 1996.
The petitioner likewise cites Ayings change of statement as evidence that
the respondents charges have been concoctions. He belies that he
slandered and challenged Niguidula to a fight; it was in fact Niguidula who
had defamed him. He stresses that he complained in writing to respondent
Quiogue about the incident immediately after it happened, copy furnished
B. P. Mandap, F. A. Domingo and R. M. Moreno, the Personnel Manager,
Head of Human Relations and President of the company, respectively. He
likewise reported the matter to the police and to the barangay covering the
workplace, and lodged a complaint for grave oral defamation against
Niguidula before the Makati Prosecutors Office. His co-employee,
Ronalisa Rosana, corroborated all these allegations. He points out that
Niguidula never reported the incident to Quiogue or to anyone for that
matter, thus, proving the falsity of his (Niguidulas) complaint.
Finally, the petitioner draws attention to Quiogues failure to act on his
complaint against Niguidula, only to resurrect it under the Notice of
Violation served on him on May 16, 1996.16 This time, however,
Niguidula was already the victim. As to the notice of violation itself, the
petitioner laments that although he was given 48 hours to explain,
Quiogue, in bad faith, immediately filed complaints for estafa and
qualified theft against him. Mandap even went to his residence and warned
his wife not to file charges against the company, or else, Quiogue would
file cases against him in the regular courts.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS
The respondents submit that the CA correctly ruled as the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it flip-flopped in its factual
findings. They further stress that the positive testimonies of Balais,
Pacaldo, and Samarita should be given credence over the negative
testimony of the petitioner. Even granting that the testimony of Niguidula
was tainted with malice and bad faith, the affidavit of Balais should stand
because no evidence supports the petitioners claim that Balais also had
altercations with him before he (Balais) executed his two affidavits.
With respect to the testimony of Samarita, the respondents point out that
Samarita stated in no uncertain terms that he was forced to increase his
quotation for the construction of the company fire exits from P70,091.00 to
P87,000.00 because the petitioner had asked for commissions. The
petitioner failed to rebut this. They brush aside the insinuation that
Samarita and Pacaldo suffer from bias as the petitioner failed to show by
evidence that their personal interests led them to favor the company.
The respondents lastly maintain that petitioners claim that Quiogue
orchestrated the petitioners dismissal after he (the petitioner) questioned
Quiogues award of a contract to Samarita Enterprises for a questionable
price is not supported by evidence. They reiterate the gravity of the
charges the petitioner faces; they constitute serious misconduct and fraud
or willful breach of trust reposed in him by his employer and are just
causes for termination of employment under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, as well as serious breaches of company rules and the trust reposed in
him by the respondent company.
OUR RULING
As a rule, and as recently held in Rudy A. Palecpec, Jr. v. Hon. Corazon C.
Davis, et al.17 (a 2007 case), this Court is not a trier of facts and can
review a Rule 45 petition only on questions of law. We wade, however,
into questions of facts when there are substantial conflicts in the factual
findings of the CA, on the one hand, and the trial court or government
agency concerned, on the other. This is precisely the situation that we have
before us since the NLRC and the CA have diametrically opposed factual
findings leading to differing conclusions. Hence, we are left with no option
but to undertake a review of the facts in this Rule 45 case.

We find the petition meritorious. To our mind, the CA erred in the

appreciation of the evidence surrounding petitioners termination from
employment. The cited grounds are at best doubtful under the proven
surrounding circumstances, and should have been interpreted in the
petitioners favor pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code.
1. The petitioner had not stayed long in the company and had not even
passed his probationary period when the acts charged allegedly took
place.18 This fact carries several significant implications. First, being new,
his natural motivation was to make an early positive impression on his
employer. Thus, it is believable that as building administrator, he
diligently, zealously, and faithfully performed his tasks, working in excess
of eight hours per day to maintain the company buildings and facilities in
excellent shape; he even lent the company his personal tools and
equipment to facilitate urgent repairs and maintenance work on company
properties.19 Second, because of his natural motivation as a new employee
and his lack of awareness of the dynamics of relationships within the
company, he must have been telling the truth when he said that he objected
to the way the contract for the installation of fire escapes was awarded to
Samarita. Third, his being new somehow rendered doubtful the charge that
he had already encouraged solicitation of commission from suppliers,
especially if considered with the timing of the charges against him and the
turnaround of witness Ayings testimony.
2. The relationships within the company at the time the charges were filed
showed that he was a stranger who might not have known the dynamics of
company inter-relationships and might have stepped on the wrong toes in
the course of performing his duties.
Respondent Quiogue was the Executive Vice-President of the company,20
a very powerful official with a lot of say in company operations. Since
Samarita was doing the fabrication of steel balusters for Quiogues home
in New Manila, Quezon City,21 there is a lot of hidden dynamics in their
relationship and it is not surprising that Samarita testified against the
petitioner. Both Samarita and Quioque have motives to resent the
petitioners comments about the irregular award of a contract to Samarita.
Mandap, as Personnel Manager, is a subordinate of Quiogue. The proposal
to secure commissions from company suppliers reportedly took place in a
very public gathering a drinking session in his house. Why Mandap did
not take immediate action when he knew of the alleged plan as early as
December 1995 was never explained although the petitioner raised the
issue squarely.22 The time gap from December 1995 to May 1996 is an
incredibly long time under the evidence available and can be accounted for
only by the fact that there was no intention to terminate the services of the
petitioner in December; the motivation and the scheme to do this came
only sometime in April - May 1996 as the discussions below will show.
Niguidula, as Purchasing Manager, occupies a position that deals with
supplies and suppliers. He, not the petitioner, is one who might be
expected to be in the middle of all the actions regarding supply deals. He
would not welcome a new and over-zealous building administrator since
the building facilities generate the need for supplies and the building
administrator is the end-user who can see how supplies are procured and
used. It is significant that Niguidula and the petitioner had a dispute
regarding the accounting of company items and had a near-fight that
"interrupted the normal flow of activities in the company."23
Pacaldo, a Purchasing Officer and a subordinate of Niguidula, under usual
conditions would side with Niguidula. He and Niguidula, not the
petitioner, occupy the positions critical in the purchase of supplies for the
company and were the people who could exact commissions from
suppliers.
Balais is an air-con maintenance man whom petitioner reprimanded for
unauthorized overtime work on an air-conditioning unit; for failure to
monitor a newly overhauled compressor unit contrary to standard practice;
and for over-pricing his purchases; and thus, Balais had every reason to
testify against the petitioner.24
As already mentioned, Aying the contractor who had earlier testified
against the petitioner recanted his earlier statement that petitioner asked
for commissions from him.25 Aying, in his second statement, exonerated
the petitioner.26 This turnaround by itself is significant, more so if
considered with other circumstances,27 particularly the possibility that the
charges might have been orchestrated owing to the confluence of the
people who were allied against the petitioner, their respective motivations
and the timing of events.
3. The timing of the filing of charges was, as the petitioner pointed out,
unusual. Indeed, if the proposal to solicit commissions had transpired in

December, the charges were quite late when they came in May.
Interestingly, it was in April 1996 that the petitioner questioned the
soundness of respondent Quiogues decision to award the fabrication and
installation of six (6) units of fire escape to Samarita Enterprises without
observing company procedure of requiring at least three quotations from
suppliers and contractors.28 The petitioner reprimanded air-con
maintenance man Balais sometime in the first week of May 1996 for
unnecessary overtime work and the two had a verbal altercation, an
incident that the petitioner reported to Quiogue.29 On May 9, 1996,
petitioner also had an altercation with Niguidula, the companys
Purchasing Manager, who verbally assaulted, slandered, and challenged
him to a fight, another incident which he likewise reported to Quiogue and
to the Makati Police.30 All these strangely coincided with the time the
charges were filed. The respondents never successfully accounted for the
coincidences.
All these considerations, to our mind, render the cited causes for the
petitioners dismissal tenuous as the evidence supporting these grounds
come from highly suspect sources: they come either from people who
harbor resentment against the petitioner; those whose positions have
inherent conflict points with that of the petitioner; or from people with
business dealings with the company. Thus, it was not surprising for the
NLRC to observe:
From the above, the Commission believes that the Motion for
Reconsideration should be granted. Respondents charges against
complainant were never substantiated by any evidence other than the
barefaced allegations in the affidavits of respondents witnesses who are

employees of the company and who had an altercation with complainant

prior to the execution of their affidavits and charges. The other witnesses
are contractors having business deals with respondent company and in fact,
Jose Aying has made a turn around and denied the complainant has been
asking commission from him.
Under the circumstances, we join the NLRC in concluding that the
employer failed to prove a just cause for the termination of the petitioners
employment a burden the company, as employer, carries under the Labor
Code31 and the CA erred when it saw grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRCs ruling. The evidentiary situation, at the very least, brings to the
fore the dictum we stated in Prangan v. NLRC32 and in Nicario v.
NLRC33 that "if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the
employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of
the latter. It is a time-honored rule in controversies between a laborer and
his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the
interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the formers
favor."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition.
Accordingly, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision and Resolution
of the CA promulgated on May 25, 2004 and August 30, 2004,
respectively, and REINSTATE in all respects the Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated September 20, 2002. Costs
against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.