Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Whitney Laemmli
oral diversity, the existence of divergent, culturally, or circumstantially determined ethical values, is rapidly becoming less the sole concern of philosophers, and increasingly a matter at the heart of many
social conflicts. Today, the contrasting ethical systems that diverse
individuals and cultures advance are sharply evident. Predictably,
this raises the question of whether morality, at its most primary level, is absolute or
relative in nature. In Moral Relativism, Moral Diversity, and Human Relationships,
philosopher James Kellenberger seeks to address this apparent diversity and discusses its possible origin in both absolute and relative terms.
By way of framing his own perspective, Kellenberger introduces readers to
Gilbert Harmans argument that the foundation for morality lies in the moral agreements made between individuals or groups. For Harman, the fact that morality is
based on explicit agreements requires that we adopt a stance of moral relativism,
since different groups of people may have different agreements, and an action may
be wrong in relation to one agreement but not in relation to another.1 In logical
strength, given its narrow parameters,2 Kellenberger finds Harmans argument
incontrovertible, but he contests its practical import. While Harman sufficiently
defines morality within the context of a specific moral agreement, he fails even to
begin to address broader moral obligations between individuals who have not made
an explicit moral agreement that is, the moral obligations of individuals bound by
nothing other than the largely implicit terms of the social contract. My analysis will
seek to address this difficulty by more broadly defining moral agreement to include
the implicit moral agreements that arise from the social contract. This new definition
of moral agreement requires that we accept an absolute standard of morality
one, however, that still recognizes the legitimacy of differing explicit agreements
under the social contract and the moral diversity concomitant with them.
To clarify why it is essential to consider a specific type of implicit moral agreement when seeking a basis for morality, it is first necessary to examine Gilbert
Harmans rival conception in greater depth. Harman defines morality as aris[ing]
when . . . people reach implicit agreement or come to a tacit understanding about
their relations with one another.3 While, on its surface, this definition seems to
ground all morality in implicit agreements, Harmans explication makes it evident
that it is possible to make practically significant philosophical distinctions even
1 J. Kellenberger, Moral Relativism, Moral Diversity, and Human Relationships (State
College: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 2001), 71, quoting in part Gilbert Harman, Moral
Relativism Defended, in Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, ed. Jack Meiland and Michael
Krausz (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 190.
2 The specific constraints Harman proposes will be more fully explicated below.
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within this subcategory of implicit agreement. He this conflict and ensure personal security, they reciptells the story of a contented employee of Murder, rocally cede their absolute freedoms and accept sociIncorporated, who has been raised as a child to etal obligations. This agreement to surrender unhonor and respect members of the family but to limited personal freedom is the basis of the social
have nothing but contempt for the rest of society.4 contract. David Gauthier defines the essence of the
Harman goes on to theorize that
social contract as found in the
it is not justifiable to condemn as
mutual advantage of restraining
immoral this mans commission
the pursuit of advantage.6 It is
This new definition of
of murder outside of the family.
important to note, however, that
moral agreement
Harman supposes that since the
the contracting parties never
man will not violate any of his
explicitly agree upon the social
requires that we accept
existing, personal moral agreecontract. It is enforceable in the
an absolute standard of
ments if he commits such a murabsence of explicit consent beder, no moral wrongdoing will
cause it is what a rational person
morality one, however,
have occurred. However, even if
would agree to if placed in the
that still recognizes the
we examine his actions solely in
state of nature. The actual conrelation to the agreements he has
ditions for formation of the solegitimacy of differing
entered into, Harmans theory is
cial contract need not ever to
explicit agreements
valid only if we assume that the
have actually existed its relemurderers implicit obligations
vance as a basis for moral agreeunder the social contract
extend no further than his famiments lies in its function as an a
and the moral diversity
ly. I argue that implicit agreepriori foundation. The needs of
concomitant with them.
ments also include the social
all human beings are such that
contract that binds all members
the development of some type
of society indeed, all of huof contractual agreement is necmanity. Individuals cannot exessary for the propagation of
I argue that implicit
empt themselves from such
human society. Without such imagreements; being human entails
plicit agreements between peragreements also
an inherent moral obligation to
sons, chaos would ensue, as each
include the social
others by virtue of the social
individual single-mindedly purcontract that binds all
contract.
sued his or her own interests
If the social contract binds
without concern for others.
members of society
humans together in mutual
The collective needs of huindeed, all of
moral obligation, then we must
man beings, therefore, provide a
examine the nature of the social
basis for moral absolutism
humanity. Individuals
contract itself if we wish to
grounded in the implicit agreecannot exempt
understand its moral implicaments of the social contract.
tions. Thomas Hobbes defines
Because the aspects of human
themselves from such
the social contract as a mutual
nature that necessitate the foragreements; being
transferring of right.5 Hobbes
mation of the social contract are
founds this concept on the idea
universal, transcending national,
human entails an inherthat the natural state of human
social, and cultural boundaries,
ent moral obligation to
existence is a world in which
the moral conditions of the soothers by virtue of the
individuals exercise absolute
cial contract must be universal
freedom; as a result, they find
as well.7 The deeper basis for
social contract.
implicit agreement lies, therethemselves constantly in conflict
fore, in absolutist thinking about
with one another. To minimize
Documents from the Bible to the Present, ed. Micheline R. Ishay (New York: Routledge, 1997), 87.
6 David Gauthier, Moral Dealing (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990), 75
7 Rousseau asserts that, although the specific conditions of the social contract may never have been formally pronounced, they are everywhere the same, everywhere tacitly accepted and recognized (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the
Social Contract, in Classics in Political Philosophy, ed. Jene M. Porter, 3d ed. [Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson
Education, 1989], 410).
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8 It is important to note that, even if an individual is coerced into joining a group or does not personally accept the
groups moral standards, and may not possess the practical means to renounce the affiliation, it is philosophically possible to do so, as it is not with the moral social contract. Furthermore, although individuals often do enter into complex
social arrangements not fully aware of the implicit agreements these relationships entail, these agreements are by no
means part of the social contract, but particular to the individuals involved. Yet again, these agreements involve an element of choice, while the implicit agreements of the social contract are binding upon all humankind, facilitating social
order among strangers as well as friends, enemies as well as allies.
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cation based on the relative nature of agreements can only be taken so far.
In his philosophical analysis, Harman attempts to use an agreement-based ethical code
to support the case for a relativistic morality.
We have seen, however, that this justification
is only possible when agreements, as such, are
defined in exceptionally narrow terms to exclude true implicit agreement as it exists in the
moral social contract. Indeed, if morality were
based solely upon the type of explicit agreements that Harman proposes, radical relativism would be the logical conclusion, and
such an arbitrary morality would lose its
import. Including consideration of implicit
agreements in a theory of agreement-based
morality, however, resolves this dilemma.
Moral judgments remain possible, and the
morals that form the basis of the social contract remain intact. We may justify the assertion of certain absolutes by pointing to the
moral agreements implicit in the social contract as a matter of human nature. Thus, the
implicit-agreement basis for morality allows
for both moral diversity and moral judgment,
both of which permit moral tolerance, and
ensure that choosing when to be moral cannot always be a choice.
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