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The Implicit Moral Agreement

Whitney Laemmli

In this essay, Whitney Laemmli, a


student in Derek Malone-Frances fall
2003 seminar, Morality, Diversity, and
Human Rights, cogently argues the
case for an absolutist approach to
moral philosophy. If human beings are
to avoid the Hobbesian war of all
against all, then the social contract
including its moral dimensionsmust
bind all to all, transnationally and transculturally. She says that she became
particularly interested in this specific
aspect of James Kellenbergers book
because [Gilbert] Harmans argument
for a relativistic approach to morality
relied on such a relatively small and
specific foundation ...to explain such a
wide variety of moral phenomena. Her
aim for this essay was to account for
the moral absolutism necessary for the
affirmation of universal human rights
without denying the manifest moral
diversity in the world something not
only philosophically, but also practically, important. Indeed, this last observation demonstrates generosity toward
those, like Harman, with whom
Laemmli disagrees. This respect for the
viewpoint of other scholars is a key
dimension in the principles that guide
the Writing 20 curriculum.

oral diversity, the existence of divergent, culturally, or circumstantially determined ethical values, is rapidly becoming less the sole concern of philosophers, and increasingly a matter at the heart of many
social conflicts. Today, the contrasting ethical systems that diverse
individuals and cultures advance are sharply evident. Predictably,
this raises the question of whether morality, at its most primary level, is absolute or
relative in nature. In Moral Relativism, Moral Diversity, and Human Relationships,
philosopher James Kellenberger seeks to address this apparent diversity and discusses its possible origin in both absolute and relative terms.
By way of framing his own perspective, Kellenberger introduces readers to
Gilbert Harmans argument that the foundation for morality lies in the moral agreements made between individuals or groups. For Harman, the fact that morality is
based on explicit agreements requires that we adopt a stance of moral relativism,
since different groups of people may have different agreements, and an action may
be wrong in relation to one agreement but not in relation to another.1 In logical
strength, given its narrow parameters,2 Kellenberger finds Harmans argument
incontrovertible, but he contests its practical import. While Harman sufficiently
defines morality within the context of a specific moral agreement, he fails even to
begin to address broader moral obligations between individuals who have not made
an explicit moral agreement that is, the moral obligations of individuals bound by
nothing other than the largely implicit terms of the social contract. My analysis will
seek to address this difficulty by more broadly defining moral agreement to include
the implicit moral agreements that arise from the social contract. This new definition
of moral agreement requires that we accept an absolute standard of morality
one, however, that still recognizes the legitimacy of differing explicit agreements
under the social contract and the moral diversity concomitant with them.
To clarify why it is essential to consider a specific type of implicit moral agreement when seeking a basis for morality, it is first necessary to examine Gilbert
Harmans rival conception in greater depth. Harman defines morality as aris[ing]
when . . . people reach implicit agreement or come to a tacit understanding about
their relations with one another.3 While, on its surface, this definition seems to
ground all morality in implicit agreements, Harmans explication makes it evident
that it is possible to make practically significant philosophical distinctions even
1 J. Kellenberger, Moral Relativism, Moral Diversity, and Human Relationships (State
College: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 2001), 71, quoting in part Gilbert Harman, Moral
Relativism Defended, in Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, ed. Jack Meiland and Michael
Krausz (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 190.
2 The specific constraints Harman proposes will be more fully explicated below.

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3 Harman, Relativism Defended, 189, quoted in Kellenberger, Moral Relativism, 71.

within this subcategory of implicit agreement. He this conflict and ensure personal security, they reciptells the story of a contented employee of Murder, rocally cede their absolute freedoms and accept sociIncorporated, who has been raised as a child to etal obligations. This agreement to surrender unhonor and respect members of the family but to limited personal freedom is the basis of the social
have nothing but contempt for the rest of society.4 contract. David Gauthier defines the essence of the
Harman goes on to theorize that
social contract as found in the
it is not justifiable to condemn as
mutual advantage of restraining
immoral this mans commission
the pursuit of advantage.6 It is
This new definition of
of murder outside of the family.
important to note, however, that
moral agreement
Harman supposes that since the
the contracting parties never
man will not violate any of his
explicitly agree upon the social
requires that we accept
existing, personal moral agreecontract. It is enforceable in the
an absolute standard of
ments if he commits such a murabsence of explicit consent beder, no moral wrongdoing will
cause it is what a rational person
morality one, however,
have occurred. However, even if
would agree to if placed in the
that still recognizes the
we examine his actions solely in
state of nature. The actual conrelation to the agreements he has
ditions for formation of the solegitimacy of differing
entered into, Harmans theory is
cial contract need not ever to
explicit agreements
valid only if we assume that the
have actually existed its relemurderers implicit obligations
vance as a basis for moral agreeunder the social contract
extend no further than his famiments lies in its function as an a
and the moral diversity
ly. I argue that implicit agreepriori foundation. The needs of
concomitant with them.
ments also include the social
all human beings are such that
contract that binds all members
the development of some type
of society indeed, all of huof contractual agreement is necmanity. Individuals cannot exessary for the propagation of
I argue that implicit
empt themselves from such
human society. Without such imagreements; being human entails
plicit agreements between peragreements also
an inherent moral obligation to
sons, chaos would ensue, as each
include the social
others by virtue of the social
individual single-mindedly purcontract that binds all
contract.
sued his or her own interests
If the social contract binds
without concern for others.
members of society
humans together in mutual
The collective needs of huindeed, all of
moral obligation, then we must
man beings, therefore, provide a
examine the nature of the social
basis for moral absolutism
humanity. Individuals
contract itself if we wish to
grounded in the implicit agreecannot exempt
understand its moral implicaments of the social contract.
tions. Thomas Hobbes defines
Because the aspects of human
themselves from such
the social contract as a mutual
nature that necessitate the foragreements; being
transferring of right.5 Hobbes
mation of the social contract are
founds this concept on the idea
universal, transcending national,
human entails an inherthat the natural state of human
social, and cultural boundaries,
ent moral obligation to
existence is a world in which
the moral conditions of the soothers by virtue of the
individuals exercise absolute
cial contract must be universal
freedom; as a result, they find
as well.7 The deeper basis for
social contract.
implicit agreement lies, therethemselves constantly in conflict
fore, in absolutist thinking about
with one another. To minimize

4 Ibid., quoted in Kellenberger, Moral Relativism, 72.


5 Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, in The Human Rights Reader: Major Political Essays, Speeches, and

Documents from the Bible to the Present, ed. Micheline R. Ishay (New York: Routledge, 1997), 87.
6 David Gauthier, Moral Dealing (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990), 75
7 Rousseau asserts that, although the specific conditions of the social contract may never have been formally pronounced, they are everywhere the same, everywhere tacitly accepted and recognized (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the
Social Contract, in Classics in Political Philosophy, ed. Jene M. Porter, 3d ed. [Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson
Education, 1989], 410).

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human nature and the collective need for order. This


foundation also leads to the conclusion that one
cannot simply choose to remove oneself from civilization at will. The social contract trumps individual choice one cannot escape human nature and
the consequent realities that attend the maintenance
of social order. Harmans suggestion that one can, in
a sense, choose the individuals or groups to which
ones implicit moral agreements extend is in direct
opposition to this thinking, contributing additional
support to the necessity for a broader view of
implicit agreements.

The general principle of implicit moral


agreements does not render impossible the
moral diversity that arises from the profusion of explicit agreements that people
form under the implicit social contract; it
merely places limits on this diversity.
Hence, when I use the term implicit agreement,
it is this absolutist type of implicit moral social contract to which I refer. It is imperative, again, to distinguish this form of agreement from other, explicit
agreements, freely entered into, that are often seen
by relativists such as Harman as implicit, such as the
agreement within a small group to be truthful with
one another in order to facilitate friendship. We
might regard this latter type of agreement as more
nearly explicit than the type of implicit agreements I
propose. By choosing to enter into a specific group
with an awareness of its existing implicit agreements, the individual makes a conscious, explicit
decision to follow its moral framework and, additionally, retains the ability to abandon that framework at will.8 This free decision is entirely unlike
the manner in which the individual enters the social
contract. Entering into any truly implicit agreement,
as I define it, does not involve choice, because such
an agreement must be obligatory and universal
and, thus, one that exists prior to choice. Therefore,
the absence of choice and, with it, the consequent
absolute applicability of implicit agreements, is a
defining element of the moral social contract.
This absolutism separates theories based on
explicit moral agreement from their implicit-based

counterparts, and makes the concept of overarching


implicit agreements valuable in practical moral decision-making. Harmans agreement between persons model opens the way to radical moral
relativism and creates several practical problems
that can only be resolved through a broader view of
agreements. First, while the explicit-agreements
model accounts for the moral diversity that exists
within and among groups, and explains why certain
actions may be morally wrong in some situations
but not in others, it fails to explain the universality
of many moral values. If all moral agreements were
simply matters of preference, it is unlikely that such
a wide consensus would exist regarding the impermissibility of some acts, such as gratuitous killing or
torture. Such moral proscriptions derive from universal, absolute, and implicit agreements that those
actions are detrimental to the whole of society.
While this position might also come under attack
from pragmatists, who argue that such morals are
only universal because they are functional for the
specific people involved in the agreement, it is my
position that the moral social contract underlies this
idea and is inviolable for all of humanity. The conditions that lead to the creation of the social contract
and its implicit moral agreements are the same
across cultures and, thus, universal and binding
upon all cultures.
Furthermore, the general principle of implicit
moral agreements does not render impossible the
moral diversity that arises from the profusion of
explicit agreements that people form under the
implicit social contract; it merely places limits on
this diversity. Within the framework of preexisting
moral contracts, the individual is still free to make
other, varying moral agreements. It is still true that
an action may be moral relative to one agreement
and immoral relative to another so long, I would
argue, as the implicit agreements imbedded in the
social contract are not violated. In a sense, the distinction between explicit and implicit agreements
parallels that between primary and secondary
moral values in conventional relativism.9 For instance, different societies could reach different
explicit agreements pertaining to the distribution of
wealth, while still upholding the requisite implicit
agreement to respect human dignity and needs. As
long as the implicit agreement is honored, different

8 It is important to note that, even if an individual is coerced into joining a group or does not personally accept the

groups moral standards, and may not possess the practical means to renounce the affiliation, it is philosophically possible to do so, as it is not with the moral social contract. Furthermore, although individuals often do enter into complex
social arrangements not fully aware of the implicit agreements these relationships entail, these agreements are by no
means part of the social contract, but particular to the individuals involved. Yet again, these agreements involve an element of choice, while the implicit agreements of the social contract are binding upon all humankind, facilitating social
order among strangers as well as friends, enemies as well as allies.

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9 Kellenberger, Moral Relativism, 97.

explicit agreements remain valid. In this way,


we may account for both the moral diversity
and the moral universality that we observe.
An additional problem with confining morality to explicit agreements is the possibility
that one could make an agreement to be immoral. If the only qualification for making an
agreement morally binding were that both
parties have an agreement in intentions10
to do something, they could consciously agree
to be immoral, and a violation of such an
agreement would, then, itself, be immoral by
Harmans definition. We may exclude this
possibility by considering it within the framework of existing implicit agreements. Within
that framework, such agreements contradict
the overarching obligations of the social contract; violating them does not. In this way,
implicit agreements halt the slide down the
slippery slope to radical relativism, and provide a basis for universal human rights. The
lack of an overarching moral code would
entail a return to the original state of nature,
in which unmitigated self-interest and chaos
would reign. With implicit agreements as a
moral foundation, however, while individual
moral choice is possible in many cases, there
is a limit to acceptable moral decisions; justifi-

cation based on the relative nature of agreements can only be taken so far.
In his philosophical analysis, Harman attempts to use an agreement-based ethical code
to support the case for a relativistic morality.
We have seen, however, that this justification
is only possible when agreements, as such, are
defined in exceptionally narrow terms to exclude true implicit agreement as it exists in the
moral social contract. Indeed, if morality were
based solely upon the type of explicit agreements that Harman proposes, radical relativism would be the logical conclusion, and
such an arbitrary morality would lose its
import. Including consideration of implicit
agreements in a theory of agreement-based
morality, however, resolves this dilemma.
Moral judgments remain possible, and the
morals that form the basis of the social contract remain intact. We may justify the assertion of certain absolutes by pointing to the
moral agreements implicit in the social contract as a matter of human nature. Thus, the
implicit-agreement basis for morality allows
for both moral diversity and moral judgment,
both of which permit moral tolerance, and
ensure that choosing when to be moral cannot always be a choice. 

10 For Harman, an agreement in intentions


signifies that neither party was coerced into the
agreement; it was made of completely free will
(Kellenberger, Moral Relativism, 73, citing Harman,
Relativism Defended, 199).

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