RULE 128

People v. Quidato Jr.

General Provisions

GR No. 117401 297 SCRA 1 (1998)

Section 1. Evidence defined. Evidence is the means, sanctioned by

these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth
respecting a matter of fact. (1)

Romero; J:

Section 2. Scope. The rules of evidence shall be the same in all

courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by
law or these rules. (2a)

Bernardo Quidato Jr. was charged with the crime of parricide in the
RTC of Davao for killing his father Bernardo Quidato Sr. together
with Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita. During the trial, the
prosecution presented as its witness Leo Quidato, the brother of the
accused, Gina Quidato; the wife of the accused and Patrolman
Lucerio Mara. The Prosecution also offered in evidence the affidavits
containing the extrajudicial confessions of Eddie and Reynaldo
Malita. Instead of placing the Malita brothers on the witness stand,
the prosecution opted to present Atty. Jonathan Jocom to attest that
the Malita brothers were accompanied by counsels when they
executed their extrajudicial confessions. Prosecution also presented
MTC judge George Omelio who attested to the due and voluntary
execution of the sworn statements by the Malita brothers. According
to the prosecution, Bernardo Quidato Sr. owns a 16 hectare coconut
land. He had [2] sons Bernardo Quidato Jr. and Leo Quidato. He is
also a widower.

Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. Evidence is admissible when

it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules.
(3a)
Section 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. Evidence must have such
a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed,
except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue. (4a)

RULE 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
SEC. 2. Admissibility. An electronic document is admissible in
evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by
the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the
manner prescribed by these Rules.
RULE 11
AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC.
EVIDENCE

VIDEO

AND

EPHEMERAL

SECTION 1. Audio, video and similar evidence. Audio,

photographic and video evidence of events, acts or transactions shall
be admissible provided is shall be shown, presented or displayed to
the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the
person who made the recording or by some other person competent to
testify on the accuracy thereof.
SEC. 2.
Ephemeral electronic communication. Ephemeral
electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge
thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other
competent evidence may be admitted.
A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic
communication shall be covered by the immediately preceding
section.

Facts:

On Sept 16, 1988, Bernadro Jr. accompanied his father to sell 41

sacks of copra in Davao. They hired the Malita brothers. After they
have sold the copras, Bernardo Sr. paid the Malita brothers and they
parted ways. According to the testimony of Gina Quidato, she
allegedly heard that accused appellant and the Malita brothers were
planning to get money from Bernardo Sr. and she went to sleep at
around 10pm so she did not know what transpired next. The accused
Bernardo Jr. raised the issue of marital disqualification rule when his
wife gave the testimony against him.
According to the testimony of the Malita brothers, they went to the
house of Bernardo Sr., Bernardo Jr. knocked on the door and when
the old man opened the door, the son pushed his father and hacked
him with his bolo.
They looked for money in the aparador but found none so they left.
The body of Bernarndo Sr. was found by his grandson when he called
his grandfather for breakfast. Leo Quidato then confronted his brother
and the (3) accused were arrested. During the custodial investigation,
the Malita brothers made an extrajudicial confessionof what
transpired even without the presence of the counsel. Their testimonies
were reduced to writing, and they signed the said testimonies in front
of Atty. Jonathan Jocom the next morning after having been apprised
of their constitutional rights.
Issue: WON, the evidence presented by the prosecution are
admissible and sufficient to convict the accused beyond reasonable
doubt?

If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an

electronic document, then the provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.
Held:
NO. Bernardo Quidato Jr. must be acquitted for inadmissibility of
evidence. His guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by the Malita

brothers. However, the brothers were not presented on the witness

stand to testify on their extrajudicial confessions. The failure to
present the two gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is
hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness
stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be
excluded from the judicial proceedings, being inadmissible hearsay.
The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not
admissible in evidence against his co accused when the latter had not
been given the opportunity to hear him testify and cross examine him.
Solicitor General invoked Sec 30, Rule 130: this rule is inapplicable
because the confession were made after the conspiracy. The manner
by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the same
inadmissible in evidence if they were voluntarily given. The settled
rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid
waiver of the right to counsel that is in writing and in the presence of
counsel is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita
brothers gave their statements in the absence of counsel although they
signed the same in the presence of the counsel the next day.
In People v. De Jesus: admissions obtained during custodial
interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to
writing a signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
constitution. As to the testimony of Gina Quidato the wife, she is
disqualified from testifying against her husband. What cannot be
done directly cannot be done indirectly marital disqualification rule.
Suspicion, no matter how strong, should not sway judgement; it being
an accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness
of the defense to gain a conviction, but must establish beyond
reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the
accused.
REYES V CA
7NOV
G.R. No. 96492 | November 26, 1992 | J. Nocon
Facts:
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya
question the respondent Courts decision, which affirmed with
modification the agrarian courts decision, which ordered them and
the other defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of
the disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela
Cruz.
Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of farm
lots in Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga. Devoted to the production
of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by now deceased
Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.
Eufrocina alleged that her husbands death, she succeeded him
as bona fidetenant of the subject lots; that Olympio, in conspiracy
with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her
workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from
entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing
of the instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the
lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for
judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.

Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy

relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza,
particularly in the cultivation of the latters farm lots and asked for
the dismissal of the case, moral damages and attorneys fees.
Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots
without his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals,
irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses.
Petitioners now bring the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue:
W/N the court erred in holding petitioners liable
Held:
No. The evidence presented before the trial court and CA served as
basis in arriving at their findings of fact. The Supreme Court will not
analyze such evidence all over again because settled is the rule that
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the
exceptions which do not obtain in the instant case.
In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more
than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not necessarily
import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinarily civil
case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its
absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on
record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot
substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in
determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is
entitled to belief.
PEOPLE V TURCO
G.R. No. 137757 | August 14, 2000 | J. Melo
Facts:
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka Totong) was charged
with the rape of his neighbor 13-year-old Escelea Tabada. Escelea
was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice calling her from
outside her house. She recognized appellant Turco immediately as
she had known him for 4 years and he is her second cousin. Unaware
of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the door.
Turco, with the use of towel, covered Esceleas face, placed his right
hand on the latters neck and bid her to walk. When they reached a
grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12 meters away from
the victims house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the
grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her short pants and panty
and succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his
penis inside Esceleas private part despite Esceleas resistance.
Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the
incident to anybody.
For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was
able to muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando
Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victims father, about
the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and
immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination
and eventually file a complaint after the issuance of the medical

certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea were

sweethearts.
The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.
In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof was
presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened
considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the
medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in
court to explain the same.
Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty of rape
W/N the appellants contention that the medical certificate may not
be considered is with merit
Held:

1. No. The Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts finding of
credibility in the testimony and evidence presented by the victim, and
finds the appellant guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Yes. With regards to appellants argument on the proof of medical

certificate, while the certificate could be admitted as an exception to
the hearsay rule since entries in official records constitute exceptions
to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who
must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given
weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court
to show his qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the
distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value
thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Since
admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and
competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On
the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once
admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court.
Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or
no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary
weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its
reception.
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay
rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value
due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it
cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical
certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim
herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is
sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that a medical examination is
not indispensable in the prosecution of rape. The absence of medical
findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence
of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court
that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victims testimony
alone is credible and sufficient to convict.

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S.

SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN, DANILO S. SABANPAN
and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO SAEZ: MA.
LUISA SAEZ TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA.
BELEN SAEZ and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF
CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ GUTIERREZ and
LUIS SAEZ JR., petitioners, vs. ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA,
HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO,[1]
REMEDIOS COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO,1-a
BELINDA M.
COMORPOSA and
ISABELITA H.
COMORPOSA, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its

probative value. Just because a piece of evidence is admitted does not
ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the August 7, 2001 Decision and the
February 27, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals[3](CA) in CAGR SP No. 60645. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby
AFFIRMS the Decision dated 22 June 2000 rendered by Branch 18
of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, REVERSING
and SETTING ASIDE the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of
Sta. Cruz, Davao del Su[r].[4]
The assailed Resolution[5]
Reconsideration.

denied

petitioners

Motion

for

The Facts
The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the case as follows:
A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by
[petitioners] against [respondents] before the Santa Cruz, Davao del
Sur Municipal Trial Court.
The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual
possessor of Lot No. 845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta. Cruz,
Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares. In 1960, he died leaving
all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of
Oboza was terminated from his job. The termination of his
employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a close
family friend of [Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the
late Marcos Saezs son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano
Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian
consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the
land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his

neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of

this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several people, among
them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied
a portion of Marcos Saez property without paying any rental.

Hence, this Petition.[7]

Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in

his possession by the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental
and are occupying the premises through petitioners tolerance.

On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to

vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and
claimed that they [were] the legitimate claimants and the actual and
lawful possessor[s] of the premises. A [C]omplaint was filed with the
barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,] Davao del Sur, but the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate
to File Action was issued by the said barangay and an action for
unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents.

The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the
Courts consideration:

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and [err] in
sustaining the ruling of the Regional Trial Court giving credence to
the Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by the regional executive
director?
II
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in
sustaining the Regional Trial Courts ruling giving weight to the
CENR Officers Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the
alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new
matter raised for the first time on appeal?
III

Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the

[C]omplaint and alleged that they entered and occupied the premises
in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and
owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present time;
that they have acquired just and valid ownership and possession of
the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that the
Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their
possession over the land in question when it ruled that they [were] the
rightful claimants and possessors and [were], therefore, entitled to the
issuance of a title.

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in
holding that the land subject matter of this case has been acquired by
means of adverse possession and prescription?

The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of
Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said
decision. x x x[6]

To facilitate the discussion, the fourth and the third issues shall be
discussed in reverse sequence.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Petition has no merit.

Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the right of
respondents as claimants and possessors. The appellate court held
that -- although not yet final -- the Order issued by the regional
executive director of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) remained in full force and effect, unless declared
null and void. The CA added that the Certification issued by the
DENRs community environment and natural resources (CENR)
officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the
land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person.

First Issue:

According to the CA, respondents had the better right to possess

alienable and disposable land of the public domain, because they
have suffiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious,
exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since
1960. The appellate court deemed as self-serving, and therefore
incredible, the Affidavits executed by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel Oboza
and Paulina Paran.

IV
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion, and err in
declaring that, neither is there error on the part of the Regional Trial
Court, when it did not give importance to the affidavits by Gloria
Leano Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self
serving?[8]

The Courts Ruling

The DENR Order of April 2, 1998

Petitioners claim that the reliance of the CA upon the April 2, 1998
Order issued by the regional director of the DENR was erroneous.
The reason was that the Order, which had upheld the claim of
respondents, was supposedly not yet final and executory. Another
Order dated August 23, 1999,[9] issued later by the DENR regional
director, allegedly held in abeyance the effectivity of the earlier one.

Under the Public Land Act,[10] the management and the disposition
of public land is under the primary control of the director of lands[11]
(now the director of the Lands Management Bureau or LMB),[12]
subject to review by the DENR secretary.[13] As a rule, then, courts
have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling within
the powers of the LMB.

The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate and dispose
of public land does not, however, divest regular courts of jurisdiction
over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants to
protect their respective possessions and occupations.[14] The power
to determine who has actual physical possession or occupation of
public land and who has the better right of possession over it remains
with the courts.[15] But once the DENR has decided, particularly
through the grant of a homestead patent and the issuance of a
certificate of title, its decision on these points will normally prevail.
[16]

appropriate action, as the latter was under the formers direct control
and supervision.
Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on
appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial conference at the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already
been marked as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial
Order.[22] The Certification was not formally offered, however,
because respondents had not been able to file their position paper.

Therefore, while the issue as to who among the parties are entitled to
a piece of public land remains pending with the DENR, the question
of recovery of possession of the disputed property is a matter that
may be addressed to the courts.

Neither the rules of procedure[23] nor jurisprudence[24] would

sanction the admission of evidence that has not been formally offered
during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to
ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary
procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.[25]

Second Issue:

Third Issue:

CENR Officers Certification

Affidavit of Petitioners Witnesses

Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997
is a sham document, because the signature of the CENR officer is a
mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida v.
Sales Jr.[17] and argue that the Certification is a new matter being
raised by respondents for the first time on appeal.

Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of

their witnesses, insisting that the Rule on Summary Procedure
authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the failure of
respondents to file their position paper and counter-affidavits before
the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.

We are not persuaded.

In Garvida, the Court held:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the
transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by
scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of
electric current. x x x[18]
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are
at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as
there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
[19]
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a
facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The
facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in
Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature,
which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but
recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.
[20]
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In
fact, the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as
reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998:
x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a CERTIFICATION dated 22
July 1997, certified among others, that: x x x per records available in
his Office, x x x the controverted lot x x x was not allocated to any
person x x x.[21]
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional
director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he
would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its

probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether
certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative
value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves
an issue.[26] Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,
but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.[27]
While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the
witnesses respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to
reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly
proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of
action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.[28]
Fourth Issue:
Defense of Prescription
Petitioners claim that the court a quo erred in upholding the defense
of prescription proffered by respondents. It is the formers contention
that since the latters possession of the land was merely being
tolerated, there was no basis for the claim of prescription. We
disagree.
For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners, they have first
to prove that the possession of respondents was by mere tolerance.
The only pieces of evidence submitted by the former to support their
claim were a technical description and a vicinity map drawn in
accordance with the survey dated May 22, 1936.[29] Both of these
were discredited by the CENR Certification, which indicated that the
contested lot had not yet been allocated to any person when the
survey was conducted.[30] The testimony of petitioners witnesses
alone cannot prevail over respondents continued and uninterrupted
possession of the subject lot for a considerable length of time.

Furthermore, this is an issue of fact that cannot, as a rule, be raised in

a petition for review under Rule 45.[31]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

DAVID TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CAROLYN ZARAGOZA,
Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The accused was sent by her lawyer a formal demand through

registered mail, for him to pay in cash the aforementioned
bounced/dishonored checks but to no avail. In filing this case she
engaged the services of a lawyer for P50,000.00 acceptance fee and
P1,000.00 per appearance in court; that said accused should pay the
corresponding interest of P50,000.00 which had become due since
November 1994 other than the principal obligation.
Despite ample opportunity given to the accused to present its
evidence, it still failed to do so; hence, the court in its Order dated
March 18, 1997, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
On May 27, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment, to wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused David
Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 in six (6) counts, and hereby sentences said
accused to an imprisonment of six (6) months for each case, and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P600,000.00
representing the total amount of the subject checks, plus interest
thereon in the amount of P50,000.00 and attorneys fees in the
amount of P20,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.2

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by

accused David Tan (petitioner) assailing the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated February 11, 2000, and the Resolution dated
September 4, 2000.
The antecedent facts as accurately narrated by the MTC in its
Decision are as follows:
David Tan, the accused herein, stands charged with the crime of
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (6 counts) in six (6) separate
informations which read as follows:

xxxxxxxxx

Records show that the accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of

Not Guilty, upon being arraigned. Thereafter, these cases were set for
trial on the merits, which cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Carolyn Zaragoza, of legal age, the private complainant, testified
among others that: She met the accused through their common friend,
Paul Dy while they were having some business negotiations (Witness
identified the accused through his pictures which were attached to his
bail bond, as said accused failed to appear in court despite notice,
said pictures were marked as Exhs. "J", "J-1" and J-2"); that during
her first meeting with the accused, they had a loan transaction which
was followed by another loan transaction on June 27, 1994 in the
amount of P1 Million, and for which she gave the accused a
Metrobank Check No. 001430 in the amount of P950,000.00 (Exhs.
"K" & "K-1"), having deduced the 5% interest from said loan.
Thereafter, the accused issued several PCIBANK Checks, among
which are numbered as follows: x x x When all these checks were
deposited at her account with the City Trust Bank, Sucat (Paraaque)
Branch, they all bounced for reason "Account Closed." She thereafter
tried to contact the accused but he (accused) refused to talk to her.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the MTC wherein

he denied receipt of the demand letter3 dated October 30, 1995
marked as Exhibit "R" and alleged that said evidence was not
included in the formal offer of evidence. Said motion for
reconsideration was denied. He then appealed the case to the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 258 (RTC), with the
following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court gravely erred in finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of B.P. 22 on six (6) courts
(sic);
2. The trial court gravely erred in ordering appellant to indemnify the
private complainant the value of the six (6) checks in question, plus
the sum of P50,000.00 interest and P20,000.00 attorneys fees.4
On April 16, 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court a quo is MODIFIED to
read, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused David
Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 in six (6) counts, and hereby sentences said
accused to an imprisonment of six (6) months for each case, and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P600,000.00
representing the total amount of the subject checks, plus interest
thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the Information until fully
paid and to pay the costs.
In view of the foregoing the court a quo is directed to issue a Warrant
of Arrest against the accused which need not be returned until he has
been arrested.
SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision but

per Order dated July 5, 1999, the RTC denied the same.
A Petition for Review was then filed by petitioner with the CA,
alleging as follows:
With due respect to the Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 258,
Paraaque City, it committed reversible error, thus:
1. In affirming the trial courts verdict of conviction despite the
prosecutions failure to prove the guilt of herein petitioner/accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
2. In affirming the trial courts verdict awarding damages to private
respondent.
3. In ordering the trial court to issue warrant of arrest against
petitioner despite the fact that its verdict affirming the trial courts
decision is not yet final and executory.6
The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision, ruling
that petitioners guilt had indeed been proven beyond reasonable
doubt since the existence of the element that he had knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time he
issued the checks is established by the demand letter dated October
30, 1995 notifying him of the dishonor of the checks he issued. The
CA further pointed out that the RTC had already deleted the MTCs
award for interest in the amount of P50,000.00 and attorneys fees,
hence, on said issue, there is no error that needs to be corrected. As to
the order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the CA held that "[i]t
is a constitutional mandate that once accused is convicted in the
Regional Trial Court, bail becomes a matter of discretion upon the
court and no longer a matter of right."7
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration where he argued that no
evidentiary weight should be given to the demand letter dated
October 30, 1995 because, although included in the formal offer of
evidence by the prosecution, it was not presented during trial for
proper identification, hence, it should not have been admitted into
evidence even if the defense failed to object to the formal offer
thereof. Petitioner insisted that the prosecution did not have proof of
notice of dishonor, thus, petitioners guilt had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
The CA denied said motion for reconsideration in its Resolution8
dated September 4, 2000 holding that since said issue was never
raised before the trial court nor before the RTC, the same can no
longer be considered by the reviewing court.
Hence, this petition where it is alleged that:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO
THE LOWER COURTS VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE
THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THE GUILT OF
PETITIONER/ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
MUCH MORE SO CONSIDERING THAT THE PROOF OF
NOTICE OF DISHONOR HAS NOT BEEN SATISFACTORILY
PROVEN OR IS BASED ON EVIDENCE NOT PROPERLY
IDENTIFIED AND OFFERED.

II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

TRIAL COURTS VERDICT AWARDING DAMAGES TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
III. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH ORDERED AN INFERIOR
COURT TO ISSUE A WARRANT OF ARREST AGAINST
PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS VERDICT
AFFIRMING THE INFERIOR COURTS DECISION IS NOT YET
FINAL AND EXECUTORY.9
The petition is imbued with merit.
With regard to the first assignment of error, petitioner reiterates his
argument that no evidentiary weight should be given to the demand
letter dated October 30, 1995 because, although included in the
formal offer of evidence by the prosecution, it was not presented
during trial for proper identification and should not have been
admitted into evidence even if the defense failed to object to the
formal offer thereof.
It is quite true that this Court has ruled that objection to the
admissibility of evidence, if not made at the time such evidence is
offered, shall be deemed waived.10 However, in all cases where said
rule had been applied, the assailed testimonial or object evidence had
been duly presented during the course of the trial.
In the present case, a judicious examination of the entire record
shows that, indeed, the demand letter dated October 30, 1995 was
never presented during the course of the trial.
The transcript of stenographic notes11 for the hearing held on
September 26, 1996 shows that the presentation of the testimony of
the bank representative testifying for the prosecution was dispensed
with since the opposing parties stipulated that the testimony of a bank
representative would prove the following:
x x x the witness will be testifying on the points that at the time the
six checks were presented for payment, the first two checks were
dishonored for being "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" while the
third up to the sixth checks were dishonored for reason of "account
closed" and per records of the bank, the account of the accused was
not sufficient to cover the amount of the checks issued by the accused
as well as the domestic current account of the accused and we have
here the documents, the ledger of the accused which would prove that
the accounts of the accused, both savings and current were not
sufficient to cover the checks issued by the accused to the
complainant?12
The only other prosecution witness is private complainant Carolyn
Zaragosa (Zaragosa), whose testimony is to the effect that after the
checks bounced, she tried to call up petitioner but the latter refused to
talk to her, thus, she was constrained to obtain the services of a
lawyer. Nowhere in the transcript of stenographic notes[13] for the
hearing held on December 17, 1996, did Zaragosa ever mention the
existence of a demand letter dated October 30, 1995. After the direct
testimony of Zaragosa where the exhibits marked were only up to
Exhibits "Q" and "Q-1," all the subsequent hearings did not push
through. Zaragosa was never cross-examined. The defense, despite
numerous resetting of hearing dates set for presentation of its
evidence, failed to appear during those hearings, prompting the MTC

to deem the case submitted for decision without evidence for the
defense.

pay the amount of the check within five (5) banking days from notice
of dishonor.

Since there were no other hearings held, it was impossible for the
prosecution to have presented and marked as exhibit, the demand
letter dated October 30, 1995.

Sec. 2 of B.P. 22 provides:

The very first time said demand letter was ever mentioned or
appeared in the record was in the formal offer of evidence,
supposedly marked as Exhibit "R." How said demand letter came to
be marked as Exhibit "R" and inserted into the record truly mystifies
this Court. Such circumstance, to say the least, is tainted with
irregularity because, as previously mentioned, such document was
never presented or identified in any of the hearings. As held in Pigao
v. Rabanillo,14 for documentary evidence to be considered by the
court, it must have been presented during trial and formally offered.
Although petitioner admits that they failed to submit any opposition
to the formal offer of evidence, he nevertheless raised the issue of the
non-presentation of the demand letter in his motion for
reconsideration filed with the MTC. Evidently, the CA made a
mistake in stating that petitioner only raised for the first time on
appeal, the issue on the admission of the demand letter into evidence.
Thus, in view of the foregoing significant circumstances, it would be
unreasonable to apply to the present case the general rule that
objection to the admissibility of evidence, if not made at the time
such evidence is offered, shall be deemed waived. As the demand
letter was never presented during the course of the trial, petitioner
was never alerted to its possible inclusion in the prosecutions formal
offer of evidence. Verily, therefore, petitioners failure to timely
object to this piece of evidence (the demand letter) is excusable. The
prosecution should not benefit from the anomalous inclusion of the
demand letter in the records. Said evidence should be deemed
inadmissible and should not have been considered by the MTC in
arriving at its judgment.
With the exclusion of the demand letter from the body of evidence
presented by the prosecution, the next question is, would the
remaining evidence still be sufficient to prove petitioners guilt
beyond reasonable doubt? The answer must be in the negative.
The elements of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)
are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on
account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer
that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment.15
In Ongson v. People,16 the Court expounded on the kind of evidence
necessary to prove the second element, to wit:
As to the second element, we have held that knowledge involves a
state of mind which is difficult to establish, thus the statute itself
creates a prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of
the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank at the time of
the issuance and on the check's presentment for payment if he fails to

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making,

drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check,
shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full
by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the
following: (a) the check is presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check; (b) the drawer or maker of the check receives
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee; and (c) the
drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the check the
amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee. In other words, the presumption is brought
into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a
notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he
failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its
payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this
section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee
bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to
when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would
simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period. Furthermore,
the notice of dishonor must be in writing; a verbal notice is not
enough.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the prosecution failed to present evidence during trial that a
written demand had been sent to and received by petitioner, the
second element, that the accused had knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds, had not been established. As stated in Dico v. Court of
Appeals,18 "[a] notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer
of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. x x
x. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution." Hence,
petitioners conviction for the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 must
be set aside.
However, the CA correctly affirmed the RTCs award of the legal rate
of interest on the principal amount of P600,000.00. It should be borne
in mind that Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that
"[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action x x x." Section 1, Rule 133
of the same Rules provides that "[i]n civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence." Here, private complainant successfully proved, by
preponderance of evidence, that despite all her efforts to collect from
petitioner, he failed to pay his indebtedness. Thus, the trial court
correctly ordered petitioner to pay private complainant civil
indemnity.
Petitioners argument that private complainant should not have been
awarded civil indemnity because she failed to exhaust non-judicial
means before resorting to the filing of the criminal case should not be

given any consideration as the evidence shows that private

complainant indeed tried to demand payment from petitioner out of
court but all to no avail.

Estanislao A. Fernandez, Augusto Ilagan, Claro T. Almeda and

Rufino Navarro for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The RTC was correct in awarding interest on the principal amount at

the legal rate which should be 12% per annum from the filing of the
Information until fully paid, as this is in keeping with the Courts
ruling in Trade & Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines v. Roblett Industrial Construction Corporation,19 where
the Court reiterated that:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor
can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on
'Damages' of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of
recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of
actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the
accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of
a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due
should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate
of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
x x x x x x x x x (Underscoring Ours)
Petitioner also keeps harping on the issue of the MTCs error of
awarding attorneys fees, but as correctly pointed out by the CA, the
RTC had already deleted such award for attorneys fees. There is,
therefore, no longer any need to discuss such aspect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22. However,
petitioner is ORDERED to PAY private complainant Carolyn
Zaragosa the amount of P600,000.00 representing the total amount of
the subject checks, plus 12% interest thereon from the filing of the
Information until fully paid and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-9181

November 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN CONSUNJI
and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Solicitor

Meliton G. Soliman, City Attorney Pedro R. Revilla and Assistant
City Attorney Julian E. Lustre for petitioner.

In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City

on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another
whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired
together in the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q1637 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City). Trial of the case
started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had
been presenting its evidence. During the progress of the trial on May
18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses,
Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in
connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession
(allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the
witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban
interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on
the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against
the other accused Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion
of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground:
that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the
confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to
prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such
conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and
circumstances. Thereafter, according to the transcript, the following
remarks were made:
FISCAL LUSTRE:
May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility
of the confession of Consunji as against the accused Consunji
himself?
COURT:
That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the
Court that you cannot prove a confession unless you prove first
conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and
circumstances as required by law. Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9
The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the
order of exclusion, but again the motion was denied. Wherefore, this
petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor
General, for the review and annulment of the lower Court's order
completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions
of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior
proof of conspiracy.
We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's
evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at
the stage of the trial when the ruling was made.
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the
admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and
voluntarily made, as evidence against him.
SEC. 14. Confession. The declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged, may be
given in evidence against him.

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if

Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his coaccused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by
other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43
Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64 Phil.
296), and should have been admitted as such.
The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the
proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123, providing that:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration.
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator
during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during its
existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession
made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to
an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14
Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People vs. Nakpil, 52
Phil., 985).
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove
conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of
them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape
recordings) had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty.
Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions),
much less formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the
prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy
between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are
formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of
Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature
for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground
that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.

It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred

confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by
Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which
the Court issued motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to
Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused
Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the
Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection to
the confessions that it could not be admitted to prove conspiracy
between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such
conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances,
etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so
doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere
privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for
objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed
waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard
the evidence (Marcella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).
We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the
admissibility of the individual extrajudicial confessions of two or

more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between

them through the identity of the confessions in essential details. After
all, the confessions are not before us and have not even been formally
offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower
Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence
at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same
conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution
a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal
to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and
consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish
the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules
of evidence, should be excluded.
Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in
the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816817:
In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most
effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where trial
objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should
be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of
first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to
know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and
where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney
offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the
testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered
will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the
heat of the battle over which the presides, a judge of first instance
may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof
where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a
mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme
Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly
unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for
a new trial, a step which this Court is always very loath to take.
On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance,
even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is
doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the
trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is duty, upon final
consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material
from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the
cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court
then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct
judgment.
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases
where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the
prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges,
from which the People can no longer appeal.
Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan
Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and set aside and the
Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with
law and this opinion. Costs against respondents Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.