Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Whether or not the appointment in PCGs falls upon the officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain of Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which requires the confirmation by
the Commission of Appointments.
Held:
No. Due to the exercise of statutory authority of the President to
reorganize the Office of the President, the PCG is now under the DOTC
and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of
the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that
matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.
The clause officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain refers to military officers alone.
Held:
THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT CANNOT BE RESTRICTED TO THE POINT
THAT THE OFFICER LOSES THE DISCRETION. The Court finds
unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission (except
the position of "junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by
"succession" or by "operation of law" for that would deprive the
President of his power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and
Associate Commissioners "all to be appointed by the President"
under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only occasion
for the President to exercise his appointing power would be when the
position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant.
We may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he
deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of
the PRC and limited himself to the selection and appointment of only
the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in
that agency. Since such an absurdity may not be presumed, the Court
should so construe the law as to avoid it.
"The duty devolves on the court to ascertain the true meaning where
the language of a statute is of doubtful meaning, or where an
adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice, absurdity, or
contradictory provisions, since an ambiguity calling for construction
may arise when the consequence of a literal interpretation of the
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known
as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which
respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the
President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided
that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be
appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority.
Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision
of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no
ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional
prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts.
RULING:
The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold
multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a
full time job to let them function without the distraction of other
governmental duties.
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this
finding, order his replacement by the latter?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service
Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified
and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commissions resolution is set
aside.
Matibag vs. Benipayo
G.R. No. 149036
April 2, 2002
Facts:
The case is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner questions the
constitutionality of the appointment and the right to hold office of the
following: Alfredo L. Benipayo as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as
Issue:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President
Ruling:
No, An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it
takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the
President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not
alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress." (Emphasis supplied)
will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution.
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional
the appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo through
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita et al,. as acting secretaries of
their respective departments. The petition also seeks to prohibit
respondents from performing the duties of department secretaries.
During the pendency of the case, congress adjourned and PGMA issued
an ad interim appointment re-appointing those previously appointed in
acting capacity.
Issue:
Whether President Arroyos appointment is valid even without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments and while the Congress is
in session?
Ruling:
SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
Respondents also rely on EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the
Presidents power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title
I, Book III of EO 292 read:
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power
to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when:
(a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his
duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there
exists a vacancy[.]
(2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to
the position, unless he is already in the government service in which
case he shall receive only such additional compensation as, with his
existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the
position filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of
the funds appropriated for the office or agency concerned.
(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.
(Emphasis supplied)
In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an
acting capacity, a noted textbook writer on constitutional law has
observed:
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in
an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But
ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time
there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.
Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices
but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442
or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division
Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall
all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments (COA).
Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed
Bartolome Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners
respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were however not
submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Peter John Calderon
questioned the appointment saying that without the confirmation by
the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon
insisted that RA 6715 should be followed as he asserted that RA 6715
is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive
contained in Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by
law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other
officers appointed by the President in addition to those mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public
officers required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointment
as listed in the Constitution.
HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are
four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four
(4) groups are:
Tarrosa vs Singson
Appointing Power, Commission on Appointments, Confirmation Power
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COAs
confirmation.
Held:
FACTS:
Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General
Manager of the Philippine TourismAuthority from which he claims to
have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of
tenure. The petitioner bases his claim on the following communication
addressed to him by theMinister of Tourism on April 7, 1986.Persuant
thereto, petitioner assumed office on the same date.Binamira claims
that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA
General Manager andVice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had
been acknowledged as such by various governmentoffices, including
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner had been removed without just cause in
violation of security of tenure
illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that
the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any
other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which
because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not
possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion
as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of
the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could
be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this
case to be a member of the Cabinet.
Sarmiento v Mison
FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
and Carague as the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento
assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by CoA.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power
in appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the
CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority
and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads,
ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with
the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to
appoint;
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention.
By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory
construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others
not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to
positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
FACTS:
This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with
injunction seeking to compel CoA to allow Quintos-Deles to perform
and ischarege her duties as HoR member representing Women's Sector
and to restrain respondents from subjecting her appointment to the
confirmation process. Quintos-Deles ad three others were appointed
Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Art. VII Sec 16
p.2 and Art. XVIII Sec. 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WoN the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral
representatives to the HoR to be confirmed by the CoA.
RULING:
CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS SALONGA
G.R. No. 86439 April 13 1989 [Appointing Power]
FACTS:
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's
confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim
appointment.
RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution,
which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the
ANG-ANGCO v. CASTILLO
The power of control of the President extends to the power to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
[President] for that of the [subordinate officer]. This may be extended
to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and
employees who belong to the executive department if they are
presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for
such can be justified that the power to remove is inherent to the power
to appoint. The same cannot be done to officers or employees who
belong to the classified service. The procedure laid down in the Civil
Service Act of 1959 must be followed for their removal.
Facts:
The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola
concentrates which were notcovered by any Central Bank release
certificate. Its counsels approached Collector of Customs Ang-Angco to
secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the
counsel to secure the releasecertificate from the No-Dollar Import
Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Ang-Angcowhich
stated that his office had no objection to the release of the
concentrates but could not take action onthe request as it was not in
their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco telephoned the Secretary of Finance
whoexpressed his approval of the release on the basis of said
certificate. Collector Ang-Angco finally releasedthe concentrates. When
Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he filed an
administrativecomplaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco. For
three years Ang-Angco had been discharging theduties of his office.
Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority of the President,
rendered his judgment against the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees
in the classified civilservice.
Holding:
The President does not have the power to remove officers or
employees in the classified civil service.
It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of
1959, the case of petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the
procedure laid down in connection with the investigation and
disposition of his case, itmay be said that he has been deprived of due
process as guaranteed by said law.The Power of control of the
President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary
of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer,
HELD:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to
revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or
modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to
substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government
that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what
the Code should be. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he
did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners
were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with
the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the
grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government
Code. As the court sees it, that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision. Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only
on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires
provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or
reasonableness, of the tax measure.
As regards the issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court has carefully
examined every one of the exhibits and agree with the trial court that
the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of
the public hearings were sent to interested parties. The minutes of the
hearings are found in the exhibits and such show that the proposed
ordinances were published.
FACTS: Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used
for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later
declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.
Jose Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of
land. The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of
Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the
Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred that
the earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive
hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the
Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution,
LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential
power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is
argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act
personally upon the matter.
HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his
constitutional powers in person. However, the president may delegate
certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The
president may delegate powers which are not required by the
Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this
allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in
person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The
office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the
President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that under
our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in
behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction
to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may
issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the
President, shall remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated
by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the
decision granting the land to Pao cannot be reversed.
Held: YES
1. Section 60 of Public Land Act states that tracts of land can be
disposed of by grant, donation or transfer made to a province,
municipality, branch, or subdivision of government for purposes
conducive to public interest.
a. Who has authority to donate? Secretary of Agriculture and
National Resources through Director of Lands (Sec 60)
2. Can President donate instead of Secretary and Director? YES
Issue:
Note: There wasn't exactly an issue, as the court dismissed the case
because the petitioners did not have locus standi. If the need arises, I
would say the issue is "Whether or not the Agreement to Arbitrate, as
an alternative to a lawsuit against the State, is valid"; to which, the
answer is yes. Either way, I'll just enumerate below the court's
statements regarding the expropriation topic.
The Executive Secretary, in entering into the "Agreement to Arbitrate,"
was acting for and in behalf of the President when he signed it. Hence,
the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the
Philippines.
Where the government takes property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
The government's immunity cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
Note: In a separate opinion, Justice Feliciano remarks that the above
comments as obiter dicta.
charter (RA 1345) does not provide for an appeal to any governmental
body. The President refused to reconsider. However, the GM did not act
on the order of reinstatement. Arive filed a complaint with the CFI for
reinstatement and damages. Judge Arca ruled that the President
exercised supervision and control over all GOCCs including NAMARCO;
hence, he may review,
revise, alter modify or nullify the decision of the Board and substitute
his judgment for that of the latter.
Issue: Does the President of the Philippines have the
authority to reverse the decision of the Board of Directors of the
NAMARCO? YES
Ratio: The Presidents authority to review and reverse the decision of
the NAMARCO Board falls within the
constitutional power of the President over all executive departments,
bureaus and officers. GOCCs partake of the nature of government
bureaus or offices. EO No. 386 (Reorganization Act of 1950) provides
that government bureaus and offices are administratively supervised
by the Administrator of the Office of Economic Coordination, who has
the rank of a Department head and shall perform his functions under
the control of the President. The fact that
the NAMARCO Charter does not provide for an appeal from the GMs
decision does not mean that no appeal lies to the President.
Facts:
The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the
municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954
Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the
Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape
committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for
cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal
dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the
complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate
investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the petitioner
appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons
and was served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial
governor with the provincial board. On the same day, the provincial
governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner
from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the
charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection.
Issue:
Held:
No. The department head as agent of the President has direct
control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any
act or conduct of any person in the person in the service of any bureau
of office under his department is confined to bureaus under his
jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over the
President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by
law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII of the Constitution). If the
provisions of section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be
construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head
direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments
and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of
a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would
SECTION 18
. Randolf David vs President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a
state of emergency, thus:
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of
PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of
the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The
petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important
provisions, thus:
First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18,
Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion
IBP vs Zamora
(G.R. No. 171396, August 15, 2000)
FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.
the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the
task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution
THE FACTS
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling
Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage,
President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a
state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
session to review the validity of the Presidents action. But two days
later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the
President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
II.
THE ISSUES
Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
[privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot and
academic?
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took
off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it
having become moot and academic.
Facts: In the wee hours of 27 July 203 some 300 junior officers and
enlisted men of AFP, heavily armed stormed the Oakwood Premiere in
Makati demanding for the resignation of the President, Secretary of
Defence and Chief of the PNP. By virtue of Proclamation 427 dated 27
July 2003, state of rebellion was declared and General Order No 4 of
the same date, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police were directed to suppress and quell the rebellion
pursuant to Section 18 Article VII of the Constitution. The soldiers
returned to barracks on the same night and the declaration of state of
rebellion was lifted on 1 August 2003 by virtue of Proclamation No 435.
In the interim, several petitions were filed before the Court challenging
the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4. Sanlakas
contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require
the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces.
Because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no
sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state
of rebellion for an indefinite period. Solicitor General argues that the
petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.
Issue: Whether or not declaring state of rebellion is needed to declare
General order No 4?
Decision: Petitions dismissed. The state of rebellion has ceased to exist
and has rendered the case moot.
HELD: Yes. First, the Court considered that since the martial law has
been lifted during the case is still pending, military tibunals, which
were created for the purpose of martial law, shall be held void already
since the law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on the dissenting
views of some justices in AQUINO V. MILCOMM, stating that Civilians
like the petitioner placed on tiral for civil offenses under general law
are entited o trial by judicial process, not by executive or military
processxxx..Judicial power exist only in courts.1Moreover, the Court
emphasized thatReverence for precedent, simply as precedent,
cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the public interest demand
otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or modified
should be abandoned or modified accordingly. after all, more important
than anything else is that this Court should be right.
Ruffy vs Chief of Staff
HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military
law since members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the
National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an
occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is
considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to
military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers,
which makes them even more eligible for the military court's
jurisdiction.
the petition; (2) give due course to the petition; and (3) consider this
case calendared for deliberation. Hence, this decision. The petition is
meritorious.
Issue: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
Held: yes, petition should be granted.Clearly, under the circumstances
obtaining in the present case, respondent court martial acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to or excess of jurisdiction in
proceeding with the arraignment of the petitioner on 28 December
1990.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his
comment Section 46 should be read in the light of the policy of the
State declared under Section 2 of the act, which says:
Sec. 2 Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to promote peace and order, ensure public safety and further
strengthen local government capability aimed towards the effective
delivery of the basic services to the citizenry through the
establishment of a highly efficient and competent police force that is
national police force that is national in scope and civilian in character.
Towards this end, the State shall bolster a system of coordination and
cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated
law enforcement and public safety agencies created under this Act.
The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for
the performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian
character shall be paramount. No element of the police force shall be
military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The civilian character with which the PNP is expressly invested is
declared by RA 6975 as paramount, and, in line herewith, the law
mandates the transfer of criminal cases against its members to civilian
courts.
While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the
office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had
appeared before the Senate Committee in spite of the fact that a
guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought
prior to such an appearance; that such directive was in keeping with
the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command; and that the
two officers disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar]
65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected
to General Court Martial proceedings x x x Both Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.
On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order
(E.O.) 464. The Office of the Solicitor General notes that the E.O.
enjoined officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
approval.
In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a
blanket prohibition barring executive officials from testifying before
Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the
jurisdiction of the court-martial, considering his retirement last 4
October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No. 408,
which defines persons subject to military law as, among others, all
officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP], and points out
that he is no longer in the active service. However, an officer whose
FACTS:
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then
Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a
state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake
such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named
places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273 transferring
supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG.
She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the
term transfer used in AO 273 was amended to delegate, referring
to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).
HELD:
1The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did
not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law
enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of ARMM into
custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the
ARMM ViceGovernor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on
10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12
Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then
Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner SahaliGenerale,
Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take
over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.
2The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as
understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not
always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable
for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence
upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out
the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In
the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to
call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be
done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of
emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and
Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out
power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all
areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it
follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had
no basis too.
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President
issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act
to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.
Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these
places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to
the two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the
situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out
the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and
dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace
and security in the affected places.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of
state of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have
clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the Presidents actions
(Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011).
Legazpi vs Minister
ISSUE: Whether or not the President (PM) can issue such decrees.
President and A Prime Minister. They are now two different offices
which cannot be held by a single person not a transitory one but a
regular one provided for and governed by the main provisions of the
newly amended Constitution. Subsequent events accept the reality
that we are no longer governed by the transitory provisions of the
Constitution. This form of government is essentially parliamentary
with presidential features.
Aquino v. Enrile
59 SCRA 183
FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having
been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation
1081. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General
Order No.2 of the President "for being participants or for having given
aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in
the country and to take over the Government by force..." General
Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he
assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country
under martial law.
ISSUES:
Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the
Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza
Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general
elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were
thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were.
Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889
was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas
corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in
order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas
corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a
warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it
is to be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally,
Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word actually
staging. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege
in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued
restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in
Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and
4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose
privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No.
889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has
arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas
(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.
TORRES v. GONZALES
PARTIES:
Petitioner: WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG
Respondents: HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF
PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS
FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the
president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws
again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against
in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional
pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982,
Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales
petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president
cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring
that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for violating the conditions
of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet
final and executory as they were still on appeal.
FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with
some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo
III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was
found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice
governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however,
Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence
he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension
imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency
only in criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase after
conviction by final judgment applies solely to criminal cases, and no
other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone
who has been convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because
the word conviction refers only to criminal cases.
ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant
executive clemency in administrative cases.
HELD:
GARCIA v. COA
September 14, 1993 (G.R. No. 75025)
FACTS:
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the
Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of
qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an
executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of
salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March
1984 but the records do not show whether petitioners reinstatement
was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.
HELD:
In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was
founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact
that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from
finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily,
petitioners innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of
executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable
recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner
SABELLO VS DECS
Facts: Sabello, an elementary school principal and the assistant
principal of the Talisay Brgy. High School together with their barrio
captain were charged of the violation of RA 3019(Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). They were both convicted and sentenced 1yr &
disqualification to hold office. Petitioner is alleged that he gravely erred
in depositing 840.00 to the City Treasurer's office in the name of Talisay
Barrio H.S to cover up for the teachers salary. The amount of 840 came
from the aid given by the Pres. in the amount of 2,000 for each barrio.
The Barrio Council believing in good faith that the barrio H.S was a
barrio project therefore it is entitled to its share with the funds given by
the pres. Petitioner then appealed to the C.A of MNL. Court of appeals
then modified the penaly by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency in the payment of 1/2 of the amount being involved.
Petitioner could no longer appeal to the Supreme court so then
judgment became final. Afterwards, the pres granted the petitioner
ABSOLUTE PARDON restoring him full civil and political rights.
Petitioner then applied for the reinstatement of his employment; he
was reinatated but not as a Principal rather a classroom teacher. He
then appealed for the relief of the Supreme Court to grant his requesr
of being reinstated to his former position and for the payment of his
backwages.
HELD: The DECS did not act on the request of the petitioner because
they contended through the Sol.Gen that there is no justiceable
controversy to be resolved.
However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from
September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto 4 this
Court said he is not entitled to automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was
lawfully separated from the government service upon his conviction for
an offense. Thus, although his reinstatement had been duly authorized,
it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is afforded only
to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered
reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and/or his duly
authorized representative is hereby directed to appoint petitioner to
the position of Elementary School Principal I or it equivalent, without
pronouncement as to cost. This decision is immediately executory.
PEOPLE VS SALLE, JR
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The appellants
seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, the Court
accepted the appeal. On 6 January 1994, however, appellant Francisco
Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw his Appeal. They were
HELD: No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final,
pardon has no effect until the person withdraws his appeal and thereby
allows his conviction to be final and Mengote has not filed a motion to
withdraw his appeal. WHEREFORE, counsel for accusedappellantRicky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days
from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the
withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional
pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only
upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance
with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said
appellant, forwhich purpose he may seek the assistance of the
Philippine National Police or the NationalBureau of Investigation.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
February 9, 1989 (G.R. No. 78239)
FACTS:
The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute
pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement
The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still
be the same
ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by
the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment.
HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense
and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases
the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye
of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted
after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores
him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless expressly grounded on
the persons innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada, a former President of the
Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case
No. 26558, entitled People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, et al.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way
of pardon, to former President Estrada. On October 26, 2007, at 3:35
p.m., former President Estrada received and accepted6 the pardon
by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for local elective post of Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification
against former President Estrada before the COMELEC.). Risos- Vidal
anchored her petition on the theory that [Former President Estrada] is
Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for
Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Sentencing Him
to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute
ISSUES:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former
President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office
as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
HELD:
The petition for certiorari lacks merit. Former President Estrada was
granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office,
the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended
to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a
way that will give full effect to the executive clemency granted by the
President, instead of indulging in an overly strict interpretation that
may serve to impair or diminish the import of the pardon which
emanated from the Office of the President and duly signed by the Chief
Executive himself/herself. The said codal provisions must be construed
to harmonize the power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the
penalties for such crimes and the power of the President to grant
executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that the
pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it the remission of
the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said
accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential
prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to
pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or
to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROCLAMATION NO. 80
GRANTING AMNESTY IN FAVOR OF ALL PERSONS WHO, IN THE
FURTHERANCE OF THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS, MAY HAVE COMMITTED
ACTS PENALIZED BY EXISTING LAWS
Any person who desires to avail of the amnesty provided herein may,
at anytime within six (6) months from date of issuance of this
Proclamation, file an application for amnesty with the Bayanihan
Center organized in each province or city. The Bayanihan Center
immediately forward the application to the Amnesty Committee, which
shall then evaluate and pass upon the application in accordance with
the Guidelines that may be issued by the National Reconciliation and
Development Council to implement this Proclamation and shall make
the necessary decision in each particular case.
This Proclamation take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 28th day of February, in the year of
Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
SECTION 21
Commissioner of Customs & Collector of Customs vs Eastern
Sea Trading
October 29, 2011 No comments
3 SCRA 351 Political Law Constitutional Law Treaties vs Executive
Agreements
Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from
Japan onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner
of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods
because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44
and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On
the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and
Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between
the Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states, among
others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines
should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by
EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive
agreement that the EO was implementing was never concurred upon
by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and
the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject
to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate.
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are
commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less
common in our scheme of government than are the more formal
instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the
form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated agreements or protocols.
Facts:
2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will
have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by
the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The
provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state.
Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the
ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute
signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without
the signature of the President.
Facts:
Issue :
Whether the agreement is valid, binding, and effective without the
concurrence by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the
senate
Held:
Evidently, there is, as yet, no overwhelming consensus, let alone
prevalent practice, among the different countries in the world that the
prosecution of internationally recognized crimes of genocide, etc.
should be handled by a particular international criminal court.
SECTION 23
Soliven Vs. Makasiar
Facts: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when
informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of
the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2)
whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot
and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima
facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on
April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2,
1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners'
contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies
available under the law has lost factual support.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when
informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of
the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.
HELD: The Supreme Court did not pass upon the issue of the suability
of the President in this case considering that the COMELEC, the body
tasked to implement the referendum, was impleaded.
The SC however ruled that the referendum is valid and that the same
will merely ask the people if they want Marcos to stay in power or not
and that the referendum will not amend the Constitution as Hidalgo
avers.
DECISION
CASTRO, C.J.:
Considering the allegations, issues presented, and arguments adduced
(a) in the petition for mandamus and/or prohibition, (b) in the Solicitor
Generals Comment on the petition, (c) in the petitioners reply to the
Comment, and (d) at the hearing on December 1, 1977, the Court,
without passing upon the question of the suability of the President,
considering that the Commission on Elections, which is the government
entity called upon to implement Presidential Decree No. 1229, is
impleaded, Resolved NOT to give due course to the petition and to
DISMISS the same, for the reasons hereunder set forth.
(1) The President cannot be compelled by mandamus or otherwise to
convene the Interim National Assembly because, inter alia, this body
was abrogated and supplanted by the interim Batasang Pambansa by
virtue of the 1976 amendments to the Constitution, particularly
Amendment No. 1, which partly provides that There shall be, in lieu of
the interim National Assembly, an Interim Batasang Pambansa.
It is clear from the above that the petition does not pose any question
of sufficient importance or significance to warrant the further attention
of the Court.
The dismissal of the instant petition is immediately executory.