People v Fajardo G.R. No.

L-12172 August 29, 1958

J. B. L . Reyes
Facts:
Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance
that prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza.
Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission to the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline
station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the
construction under the rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was
destroyed by a typhoon.
He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing
view.
He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the
ordinances constitutionality.
Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?
Held: No, petition granted.
Ratio:
The ordinance doesnt state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an
arbitrary and unlimited conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and
which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The
ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be
secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police
power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may
eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of
the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or
assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes.
To do this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity
to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for
any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. The municipal council
shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be
constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof,
charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be

less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The
fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school
fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either
established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of
buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in
question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the
express authority of sec. 2243 (c)

Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty

32 Phil. 580 (1915)

In re: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case involves
a dual question one involving the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection
of the tax in question and the other relating to the power of the Collector of Internal
Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is
offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
The focus of this digest is to highlight the cases latter aspect as correlated to the police
power of the State.
Facts
Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business,
particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the
Province of Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant
Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of
Act No. 2339.
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of
Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same
is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in
question in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or
general welfare of the community, or of any persons. Defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and
German Consuls, the defendant decided that the billboard complained of was and still
offensive to the sight and is otherwise a nuisance.
Issue
1.
Was
the
enactment
assailed
by
exercise of the police power of the Government?
Held

the

plaintiffs

was

legitimate

The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or
billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of
the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well- recognized principle
to further application. Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a
healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of
the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such
territory is amenable to the police power. Judgment reversed.

City of Manila vs. Gerardo Garcia et.al

Jun
28

FACTS:
1.Plaintiff is the owner of certain parcels of land. Without the knowledge and consent of
plaintiff, defendants occupied the property and built their houses.2.Having discovered,
plaintiff through its mayor gave each defendant written permits, each labeled as lease
contract to occupy specific areas. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal
rentals.3.After sometime, plaintiff, through its treasurer, demanded payment of their rentals
and vacate the premises for the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary Schools
expansion.4.Despite the demand, defendants refused to vacate the said property. Hence,
this case was filed for recovery of possession.5.The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff
taking judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 appropriating P100k for the construction of
additional building of Epifanio De Los Santos Elementary School.6.Defendants appealed.
ISSUE: WoN the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school
purposes
HELD: YES The trial court ruled out the admissibility of the documentary evidence presented
by plaintiff
Certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board which
recites the amount of P100k had been set aside in Ordinance 4566 for the construction of
additional building of the said school.
But then the decision under review, the trial court revised his views. He then declared that
there was a need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the
very document. Because of the courts contradictory stance, defendants brought this case
on appeal. However, the elimination of the certification as evidence would not profit
defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken because he
was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 . The reason being that the city
charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances
passed by the municipal board of Manila.

And, Ordinance4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of

P100,000.00 was set aside for the construction of additional building of the Epifanio de los
Santos Elementary School.
Further defendants entry to the said property is illegal. Their constructions are as illegal,
without permits. The city mayor doesnt have the authority to issue permits. The permits
issued are null and void.

VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAEDA, JR., ET. AL.

VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAEDA, JR., ET. AL.
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria)
Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being public in
nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private
occupancy.
CRUZ, J.:
Facts: In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip
of land, a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right
to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization
(Resolution no. 28) granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny
this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per
municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking
place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No.
218.
Issue: WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.
Ruling: Petition Dismissed.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market
stalls, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law.
The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot
insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming
a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the
agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away
through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or damage caused to petitioners, in the
case at bar, does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong damnum absque injuria.