Racial, Ethnic, and Religious

Surveillance Af

Plans

Plan Policy
The United States Federal Judiciary should rule that
domestic surveillance on the basis of race, religion, and
ethnicity are unconstitional.
Plan solves.
Unegbu, Howard University JD candidate, 2013
[Cindy, 57 How. L.J. 433, NOTE AND COMMENT: National Security
Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional
Misstep Lexis, accessed 7-6-15, TAP]
The grant of surveillance power to monitor individuals without
suspicion of criminal or terrorist activity and the ability to collect
personal information from various sources on the basis of race or
ethnicity has resulted in the discrimination of domestic individuals
who belong to a particular racial or ethnic group. This discrimination
is generated through a disparate impact that the new government
surveillance authority has on various ethnic and religious groups,
specifically those that are Arab, South Asian, or practitioners of the Islamic
religion. Through a balancing test of five factors established through Supreme
Court jurisprudence, it is apparent that there is sufficient indirect
evidence of the government's intent to discriminate. Because there is
an established intent to discriminate, the new government surveillance
authority and procedures can only be constitutionally upheld if the
acts are narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. The
compelling state interest is satisfied through the goal of nationally security;
however, the narrowly tailored prong fails because of the monitoring
system's over-inclusiveness. Therefore, the government national
security surveillance authority and procedures, via the NCTC
amendments and DIOG guidelines, are in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

Plan K
The United States Federal Government should end
domestic surveillance on the basis of race, religion, and
ethnicity.
Plan solves.
Unegbu, Howard University JD candidate, 2013
[Cindy, 57 How. L.J. 433, NOTE AND COMMENT: National Security
Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional
Misstep Lexis, accessed 7-6-15, TAP]
The grant of surveillance power to monitor individuals without
suspicion of criminal or terrorist activity and the ability to collect
personal information from various sources on the basis of race or
ethnicity has resulted in the discrimination of domestic individuals
who belong to a particular racial or ethnic group. This discrimination
is generated through a disparate impact that the new government
surveillance authority has on various ethnic and religious groups,
specifically those that are Arab, South Asian, or practitioners of the Islamic
religion. Through a balancing test of five factors established through Supreme
Court jurisprudence, it is apparent that there is sufficient indirect
evidence of the government's intent to discriminate. Because there is
an established intent to discriminate, the new government surveillance
authority and procedures can only be constitutionally upheld if the
acts are narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. The
compelling state interest is satisfied through the goal of nationally security;
however, the narrowly tailored prong fails because of the monitoring
system's over-inclusiveness. Therefore, the government national
security surveillance authority and procedures, via the NCTC
amendments and DIOG guidelines, are in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

Policy 1ac

Terror Adv
Voluntary informants wont come forward now FBI
surveillance of Muslim communities undermines
involvement. Reversing that is critical to stop terrorism.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
Moreover, Professor David A. Harris claims that "the unregulated use
of informants in mosques and other religious and cultural settings
can also do great damage because it poses the risk of cutting of our
best possible source of intelligence : the voluntary, cooperative
relationships that have developed between law enforcement and
Muslim communities." 102Link to the text of the note Having community
members report suspicious information to the FBI may be a more
efective way of obtaining reliable terrorism intelligence from these
communities. 103Link to the text of the note For example, in the few
domestic terrorist prosecutions where a terrorist attack plan
actually existed prior to informant involvement, community
members who had noticed something amiss were the first to alert
the FBI and identify the subjects. 104Link to the text of the note In fact,
since 9/11, community members have assisted law enforcement in
stopping potential terrorism plots in a number of cases. 105Link to the
text of the note A [252] recent example, the case of Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, the "Underwear Bomber," shows that the attempted
bombing could have been prevented had law enforcement heeded
the warnings that Abdulmutallab's father gave the CIA at the U.S.
embassy in Nigeria. 106Link to the text of the note As the president of
the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and former criminal
prosecutor, David Chiu testified regarding the Arab, Middle Eastern,
Muslim, and South Asian communities in San Francisco: "Without
that level of cooperation, that level of trust, everything falls apart
. Surveillance only serves to continue to drive wedges when
cooperation is what is needed most ." 107Link to the text of the note

FBI surveillance fails now it produces a massive chilling

efect and alienates Muslim communities inside the United
States.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014

[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:

The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
the FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide
("DIOG"), which provides guidance on implementing the Attorney General's Guidelines, allowed
supervisory agents to delegate to inferior agents decisions
concerning the surveillance of mosques and other religious
gathering places. 72Link to the text of the note Recently, however, restrictions have been slightly
In the past,

strengthened by requiring agents in charge of the field operations to approve surveillance. 73Link to the

numerous
instances of mosque surveillance have already eroded Muslim
communities' trust of law enforcement. 74Link to the text of the note By placing
informants in places of worship and cultural spaces, the FBI has
chilled free speech and damaged the most reliable way of obtaining
accurate terrorism intelligence from these communities . In a wellpublicized and egregious case, an FBI informant named Craig
Monteilh was assigned to surveil a mosque in Irvine, California . 75Link
text of the note Nevertheless, this change may not really improve matters, as

to the text of the note The FBI instructed Monteilh, a convicted felon working as a paid informant, 76Link to
the text of the note to [248] indiscriminately surveil worshippers at the mosque, without concentrating on
a particular target or activity. 77Link to the text of the note After congregants noticed Monteilh's
inflammatory rhetoric and repeated talks about instigating terrorism, they reported him to the FBI. 78Link
to the text of the note The FBI failed to investigate further, and after the arrest of another suspected
terrorist, Monteilh revealed his identity as an FBI informant. 79Link to the text of the note This incensed
the Islamic community, in part because an FBI Assistant Director had promised a year earlier that the

Islamic groups like

the Council on American-Islamic Relations and the American Muslim
Task Force on Civil Rights and Elections, which had previously
cooperated with the FBI and urged community members to do the
same, reversed course and stopped their outreach eforts to aid law
enforcement. 81Link to the text of the note In the end, Craig Monteilh's story is just one of many
that demonstrate why Muslim communities have soured on helping the FBI
locate suspicious people within their communities . 82Link to the text of the
agency would not surveil mosques. 80Link to the text of the note In response,

note Although Monteilh was neither an immigrant nor was offered immigration incentives in return for

informants can potentially damage both

law enforcement and immigrant communities. Monteilh's story also illustrates why
many communities feel mosque surveillance infringes on their freedom of speech. Once a
community becomes aware that FBI informants may be surveilling its
mosques, the fear that informants will target them chills the free
exchange and expression of ideas and speech. 83Link to the text of the note
Given the constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment, places
of worship should be treated with utmost sensitivity by law
enforcement, 84Link to the text of the note as the self-editing that occurs when
people know they are being watched curtails the free exchange of
ideas. The very knowledge of potential surveillance may caution
people against discussing their political and religious viewpoints for
fear of being targeted by informants like Monteilh. Consequently, mosque
attendance falls 85Link to the text of the note and community cohesion sufers,
thwarting the First Amendment's protection of free expression. Even
those not harboring extreme viewpoints may be [249] dissuaded
intelligence, his story shows how the use of

from political speech for fear of misinterpretation. For example, after

revelations of potential FBI surveillance surfaced at the Islamic Center of Irvine, congregant Omar Turbi
attested, "It gives you a little bit of apprehension about who you trust . Makes you think twice about
what you say; what if people misunderstand you?" 86Link to the text of the note Similarly, the executive
director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations in Anaheim stated, "Some average Muslims
interested only in praying are avoiding mosques for fear of somehow being monitored or profiled .
Everybody is afraid, and it is leading to an infringement of the free practice of our religion." 87Link to the
text of the note Although some states like Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Oregon have enacted laws
prohibiting the surveillance of religious sites without reasonable suspicion, 88Link to the text of the note it
should not be necessary to rely on state laws to protect the integrity and values of the First Amendment. B.

In addition to eroding the

First Amendment's free speech rights of Muslims and Middle
Easterners, the FBI's informant surveillance tactics also
inappropriately target these religious and ethnic groups. Most of the
organizations designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the
State Department are Muslim or Arab groups. 89Link to the text of the note
Many post-9/11 policies, like the extensive detention of Muslims and Middle Easterners,
indicate that the federal government views Muslims and Middle
Eastern immigrants as potential terrorists. 90Link to the text of the note
Popular perception of Muslims has moved in the same direction, with
huge opposition, for example, to the construction of an Islamic
community center - Park 51 - near the site of the World Trade Center in
New York. 91Link to the text of the note Other examples include state laws banning the use of
Mosque Surveillance Encourages Religious and Ethnic Profiling

Shari'ah law in judicial decisions 92Link to the text of the note and Islamophobia 93Link to the text of the
note rising in the United States 94Link to the text of the note and abroad. 95Link to the text of the note
[250] By sending immigrant informants into mosques and religious and ethnic communities with little more

the FBI perpetuates ethnic profiling and

the conflation of Islam and terrorism. In recruiting terrorism
informants from the immigrant population, the FBI puts an ethnic
and religious face on terrorism, and perpetuates the popular
perception of what terrorists look like. Sending these informants
into mosques and immigrant communities greatly increases the
chances that alleged suspects fit the ethnic and religious
stereotypes of terrorists. Put diferently, if an informant is assigned
to surveil a mosque, the chances of the informant bringing back a
non-Muslim or non-Middle Eastern suspect are low. This surveillance
policy becomes a vicious cycle. The FBI recruits immigrant
individuals from suspect communities to become informants,
pressures them into producing terrorism suspects that fit the
popular perception of what terrorists are like, and then prosecutes
these suspected terrorists. All this reinforces the public conflation of
immigrants, Muslims, Middle Easterners, and terrorists. Ethnic and
religious profiling further alienates Muslim and Middle Eastern
communities, and deepens their mistrust for government . 96Link to the
text of the note Additionally, by predisposing many Americans to view
Muslims, immigrants, and Middle Easterners as potential terrorist
threats, ethnic and religious profiling may also bias juries in
terrorism prosecutions. 97Link to the text of the note Although suspects often
claim entrapment as a defense, after 9/11 the entrapment defense
has never been successfully used in terrorism cases. 98Link to the text of the
than a vague directive to find terrorists,

In fact, many, if not most, terrorism cases never reach the jury
because the chances of successfully defending against terrorism
charges after 9/11 are almost nonexistent. 99Link to the text of the note Popular
note

stereotypes concerning Muslims and Middle Easterners play a role in this. Although the use of immigration
law in recruiting informants is only one of many factors contributing to this harmful cycle, the use of
coercive tactics like immigration law to recruit informants creates a [251] higher risk of unfounded

Consequently, this
fuels the public perception that a stereotypical terrorist is a Middle
Easterner or Muslim.
terrorism prosecutions against innocent individuals who do not pose a risk.

FBI surveillance of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities

creates a chilling efect it undermines the legitimacy of
informant cooperation programs, trades of with
resources for countering terrorism, and produces false
intelligence.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
The FBI's use of immigration rewards and threats to recruit
informants undermines civil liberties and cooperation with Muslim,
Middle Eastern, and other immigrant communities. 67Link to the text of the
note In general, the presence of informants in mosques and the
surrounding community creates suspicion and distrust of law
enforcement eforts, chilling free speech. That is, when community
members know that informants are potentially monitoring their
speech, community members are less likely to cooperate with law
enforcement eforts. Furthermore, by sending informants into
Muslim and Middle Eastern communities without specific targets to
surveil, the FBI encourages ethnic and religious profiling and helps
conflate Islam and terrorism in the public eye. Because informants
recruited via immigration law possess less bargaining power and
face potentially more serious consequences than those recruited via
criminal law incentives, there is greater incentive for these
informants to supply false information and accuse innocent
individuals. Ethnic and religious profiling, combined with the
indiscriminate surveillance carried out by informants, can entrap
individuals who do not pose a threat. Entrapment wastes
government resources and undermines public confidence in the
justice system and law enforcement. Although the FBI's problematic surveillance of
Muslim and Middle Eastern communities stems from the use of all types of informants and not merely
those recruited with immigration promises, a modification to the use of immigration law in rewarding or
coercing terrorism informants would provide a step toward producing more useful intelligence and
reducing the risk of harm to innocent individuals.

Perception of government accountability is critical to

efective informants limiting arbitrary surveillance is
critical to the perception of legitimacy of surveillance
programs.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
[245] Third, while false and inaccurate intelligence has generally
been a problem with informants, 58Link to the text of the note recent
terrorism investigations raise the question of whether the alleged
terrorist crimes would have occurred without law enforcement
instigating the terrorist activities. 59Link to the text of the note
Informants in these cases aggressively instigated the defendants'
participation in the plot. 60Link to the text of the note Recruiting
informants who lack ties to terrorist organizations may be at the
root of this problem, because they lack predetermined targets
known to be involved in terrorist groups. 61Link to the text of the note
Without these targets, informants under pressure to avoid
deportation or other immigration consequences, for example, are
more likely to produce false information. 62Link to the text of the note
Further complicating this issue, the government has sufered from
credibility problems in terrorism investigations for not always
fulfilling the promises made to informants. 63Link to the text of the note
One FBI informant, a Yemeni citizen named Mohamed Alanssi, set himself on
fire in front of the White House after alleging that the FBI had broken
numerous promises to him. 64Link to the text of the note Governmental
credibility is critical to maintaining a relationship of trust between
law enforcement and informants, and thereby facilitates the
gathering of credible intelligence . Due to the vast number of
terrorism informants today, the secrecy underlying the
investigations, 65Link to the text of the note and the potential for false
intelligence, the recruitment and use of informants in terrorism
investigations present unique problems to the FBI. Because of
increased confidentiality surrounding national security issues, the
government has the means and incentives to shield the true extent
of its recruitment and use of terrorism informants from courts and
the public. 66Link to the text of the note To increase accountability and
lessen the risk of abuse, more oversight over the FBI's dealings with
terrorism informants is needed. Notably, some limits on the FBI's
use of informants do exist. However, given the secrecy [246]

surrounding national security concerns, whether these limits apply

in terrorism investigations remains unclear.

Rebuilding trust between Muslim communities and law

enforcement is critical curtailing surveillance is key to
law enforcement credibility.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
In order to procure accurate intelligence from any community, a
relationship of trust and respect between law enforcement and the
community must exis t. 116Link to the text of the note However, from the
mass arrest and detention of Muslims shortly after 9/11 117Link to the
text of the note to the ongoing allegations of ethnic and religious
profiling today, 118Link to the text of the note the federal government
has made serious errors in dealing with Muslim and Middle Eastern
communities since 9/11. While the government recognizes that
community policing 119Link to the text of the note is the best way to
obtain reliable intelligence, 120Link to the text of the note the FBI is
caught between two contradictory strategies and must choose
between sending informants into mosques without reasonable
suspicion, and gaining the trust and cooperation of Muslim and
Middle Eastern communities. As one congregant in a surveilled mosque
observed, "The FBI wants to treat the Muslim community as a partner
while investigating us behind our backs . They can't have it both
ways." 121Link to the text of the note While it is unrealistic to think that the
FBI will stop using informants in these communities, a more restrained use
of informants based on reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing would
mitigate perceived damages to community relations. Requiring the
FBI to have preexisting reasonable suspicion would add credibility
to the agency and alleviate some of the fear surrounding terrorism
investigations involving informants.

Nuclear terrorism triggers extinction.

Dvorkin, Major General (retired), 12
(Vladimir, doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the
Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and
International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center
participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent

Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear

Terrorism is a Real Threat,"
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what_can_destroy_strategic_s
tability.html]
Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear
terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with
participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of
U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat
have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing
Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs,
Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General
Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of
leading states in this sphere is developing. At the same time, these eforts
fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of
nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by
detonation of conventional explosives (dirty bombs) is a method
that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of
radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become
much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or
nuclear weapons. The use of dirty bombs will not cause many
immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive
contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socioeconomic destabilization. Severe consequences can be caused by
sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive
materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to
such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with
a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage
facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities
located nearby. The past few years have seen significant efforts made to
enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities,
especially at nuclear power plants. Eforts have also been made to
improve security culture. But these eforts do not preclude the
possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate
nuclear facilities. Some estimates show that sabotage of a research
reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high
doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become
uninhabitable for a long time. Of all the scenarios, it is building an
improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum
risk. There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if
terrorists decide to build a simple gun-type nuclear device.
Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type
devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of
weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite
numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that
such materials can be bought on the black market. Theft of

weapons-grade uranium is also possible. Research reactor fuel is

considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at
sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors
in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A terrorist guntype uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is
comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The
explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound
hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There
will also be long-term sociopsychological and political
consequences. The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented
security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale
public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain,
Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the
countries populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A
nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures
meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly
restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to.
Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more
restrictive measures. If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will
delegate tens of thousands of their secret services best personnel
to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are
among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen
if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that
conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in
developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the nonindigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an
attack in what will cause violent protests in the Muslim world. Series
of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow. The prediction that
Samuel Huntington has made in his book The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order may come true. Huntingtons book
clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the
Western worlds problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is
rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is
especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across
its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason
to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability. BMD does
not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling
massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful
only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or
groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factorsthat
could affect global and regional stabilitymerits a separate study or studies.
But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed
on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a
successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical
transformation of the global order. All of the threats on the revised list
must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work

hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a

strategy to combat them.

High risk of agroterror which collapses the economy and

food security.
Olson, Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy
MA, 2012
[Dean, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Threats to Americas Economy and
Food Supply http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcementbulletin/february-2012/agroterrorism, accessed 3-23-14, TAP]

Americans spend only

11 percent of their income on food compared with the global
average of 20 to 30 percent.1 The nations agricultural abundance
helps drive its economic prosperity. As many as 1 of 6 jobs are linked
to agriculture, a trillion-dollar industry. Agriculture-related products comprise
nearly 10 percent of all U.S. exports, amounting to nearly $68 billion in 2006.2
Terrorists consider Americas agriculture and food production
tempting targets. They have noticed that its food supply is among
the most vulnerable and least protected of all potential targets of attack. When
The United States enjoys a safe, plentiful, and inexpensive food supply.

American and allied forces overran al Qaeda sanctuaries in the caves of eastern Afghanistan in 2002,

among the thousands of documents they discovered were U.S.

agricultural documents and al Qaeda training manuals targeting
agriculture. A subset of bioterrorism, agroterrorism is defined as the deliberate introduction of an
animal or plant disease for the purpose of generating fear, causing economic losses, or undermining social

Killing
livestock and plants or contaminating food can help terrorists cause
economic crises in the agriculture and food industries . Secondary goals
stability.3 It represents a tactic to attack the economic stability of the United States.

include social unrest and loss of confidence in government. Serious Concern Agroterrorism is not new.
The Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with rye ergot during the 6th century B.C. During World War I,
German agents in the United States infected horses and cattle in transit across the Atlantic to France. In
1994, in The Dalles, Oregon, a religious cult intentionally contaminated 10 restaurant salad bars with
salmonella, sickening more than 750 people in an attempt to influence the outcome of a local election.
Since 1912, 12 documented cases have involved the substate use of pathogenic agents to infect livestock
or contaminate food.4 Terrorist leaders realize that America’s strength stems largely from its

The
foremost threat is posed by transnational groups, like al Qaedawidely
believed to present the most probable threat of inflicting economic harm on the
economic vitality. The agroterrorism threat emanates from four categories of perpetrators.

United States. The second group is comprised of economic opportunists tempted to manipulate markets.
They understand that a foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak, for example, would have a dramatic
impact on markets. By introducing the virus, they could exploit the markets for personal economic gain.
The third category includes domestic terrorists who may view the introduction of FMD as a blow against
the federal government. As an outlier of this category, the unbalanced individual or disgruntled employee
may perpetrate an attack for a variety of idiosyncratic or narcissistic motivations. Finally, militant animal
rights or environmental activists pose a threat because they consider immoral the use of animals for food.
Groups, such as the Animal Liberation Front and its sister organization, the Earth Liberation Front, could
view an attack on the animal food industry a positive event.5 Threat Environment Because it lacks the
drama and spectacle of more common terrorist violence, such as bombings and murders, agroterrorism
has remained a secondary consideration, and no documented attacks in the homeland have occurred since

Several recent factors may have made agroterrorism a more

attractive tactic. First, the threat environment has changed dramatically. America has had recent
successes against al Qaedas leadership. These victories have forced the
group to morph in both structure and tactics. The increasingly dangerous
9/11.

environment it now must operate in has prevented it from mounting catastrophic terrorist attacks on the
scale of 9/11. Now, al Qaeda places its emphasis on smaller, independent attacks following a death by a
thousand cuts strategy to exhaust, overwhelm, and distract U.S. Department of Homeland Security
forces. The group seeks to flood Americas already information overloaded intelligence systems with
myriad threats and background noise.6 Agroterrorism also may serve as a way to magnify the social
upheaval caused by smaller, independent attacks, like bombings. Second, Usama Bin Ladin consistently
had argued that attacking the U.S. economy represented the best way to destroy Americas ability to
project military power abroad. Underpinning this view is al Qaedas historical narrative that jihad against
the Soviets following the invasion of Afghanistan led not only to the defeat of the Red Army but, ultimately,
to the demise of the U.S.S.R.7 As divorced from reality as this view seems, economic harm remains one of
the pillars of al Qaedas terror strategy against the United States. In a video broadcast before the 2004
U.S. presidential elections, Usama Bin Ladin bragged that his organization bled Russia for 10 years until
it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat. We are continuing in the same policy to make
America bleed profusely to the point of bankruptcy. He boasted that the 9/11 attacks had cost al Qaeda
$500,000 while inflicting a staggering $500 billion in economic losses to America.8 According to Bin Ladin,
every dollar of al Qaeda defeated a million dollars [of America]...besides the loss of a huge number of

Analysts believe that al Qaedas evolving tactics increasingly

will focus on targets that will yield the most economic damage .9
jobs.

Terrorist leaders realize that Americas strength stems largely from its economic vitality. They pursue an
overarching strategy that all attacks should focus on weakening Americas economic strength, especially
through protracted guerilla warfare. In their view, as the United States loses its standing in the Middle East,
groups, like al Qaeda, can gain ground and remove from power regimes they view as corrupt and

Terrorists know that a successful agroterrorism incident

threatens Americas economic welfare and its standing as a leading
exporter of agricultural products to the world. A significant
disruption in agricultural exports caused by such an attack would
have ripple efects in the United States and global economies. This
illegitimate.10

economic disruption would occur on three levels. The first involves direct losses due to containment
measures, such as stop-movement orders (SMOs) or quarantines of suspected stock. Additional costs
would arise from the culling and destruction of disease-ridden livestock.11 Second, indirect multiplier
effects, such as compensation to farmers for destruction of agricultural commodities and losses suffered
by directly and indirectly related industries, would arise.12 And, third, international costs would result from
protective trade embargoes. Less measurable consequences would include the undermining of confidence
in and support of government, creation of social panic, and threat to public health on the national and

Given its ease of execution and low cost to high benefit

ratio, agroterrorism fits the evolving strategy of al Qaeda that focuses on
global levels.

inexpensive but highly disruptive attacks in lieu of monumental ones. Agroterrorism could exacerbate the
social upheaval caused by random bombings. The ability to employ cheap and unsophisticated means to
undermine Americas economic base, combined with the added payoff to potentially overwhelm its
counterterrorism resources, makes livestock- and food-related attacks increasingly attractive.13 Foot and

Attacks directed against the cattle, swine, or poultry

industries or via the food chain pose the most serious danger for
latent, ongoing efects and general socioeconomic and political
disruption. Experts agree that FMD presents the most ominous threat.14 Eradicated in the United
Mouth Disease

States in 1929, FMD remains endemic in South America, Africa, and Asia.15 An especially contagious virus
20 times more infectious than smallpox, FMD causes painful blisters on the tongues, hooves, and teats of
cloven-hoofed animals, including cattle, hogs, sheep, goats, and deer, rendering them unable to walk, give
milk, eat, or drink. Although people generally cannot contract the disease, they can carry the virus in their
lungs for up to 48 hours and transmit it to animals. The animal-to-animal airborne transmission range is 50
miles.16 An infected animal can shred the virus in large quantities from its upper respiratory tract via
drooling, coughing, and discharging mucus. Extremely stable, FMD can survive in straw or clothing for 1

Because herds exist as highly

crowded populations bred and reared in extremely close proximity to
month and spread up to 100 kilometers via the wind.

one another, a significant risk exists that such pathogenic agents as

FMD will spread well beyond the locus of a specific outbreak before
health officials become aware of a problem. An FMD outbreak could
spread to as many as 25 states in as little as 5 days simply through the
regulated movement of animals from farm to market.17 From a tactical perspective, an FMD attack holds
appeal for several reasons. First, unlike biological warfare directed against humans, no issue of
weaponization exists. In an FMD attack, the animals themselves serve as the primary medium for
pathogenic transmission, and countries as close as those in South America offer a ready source of the
virus. As one analyst described it, the virus can be spread by simply wiping the mucus from an infected
animal on a handkerchief and then transferring the virus to healthy animals by wiping their nosesby
stopping on a highway in rural America and releasing the virus among curious livestock an outbreak could
be initiated.18 Second, FMD is nonzoonotic, presenting no risk of accidental human infection. There
exists no need for elaborate personal protective equipment or an advanced understanding of animal
disease science. In a biowarfare attack targeting people, the deadly pathogen poses a threat to the
perpetrators, as well as their intended victims. Preparing the pathogen so that terrorists can handle it
safely yet disseminate it effectively to intended victims can prove difficult. For instance, the Aum Shinrikyo
sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway in 1994 largely failed to kill the number of people intended due to
the crude method of dissemination. Third, terrorists could introduce and subsequently disperse the virus
throughout the American food production system through multiple carriers, including animals carrying and
introducing it into susceptible herds; animals exposed to contraband materials, such as contaminated food,
hay, feedstuffs, hides, or biologics; people wearing clothing or using equipment, including tractors and
trucks, to transmit the virus to uninfected animals; and contaminated facilities, such as feed yards, sale
barns, and trucks that commonly hold or transport susceptible animals.19 The same factors that yield
inexpensive and plentiful food by promoting maximum production efficiency also make American
agricultural systems inherently vulnerable. The highly concentrated and intensive nature of livestock
production encourages the rapid spread of contagious pathogens.20 Most dairies house at least 1,500
cows, with the largest facilities containing 10,000. Animals often are born on breeding farms and then
transported to another state for slaughtering and processing. Otherwise isolated and widely dispersed
farms often share equipment, vehicles, and veterinary instruments. Feedlots and auctions routinely
intermingle animals from a wide geographic area. On average, a pound of meat travels 1,000 miles before

FMD would require the mass

slaughter and disposal of infected animals. An outbreak could halt the domestic
it reaches the consumers table.21 The introduction of

and international sale of meat and meat products for years. In this regard, in 2001, FMD in the United
Kingdom affected 9,000 farms and required the destruction of more than 4,000,000 animals. Researchers
believe that a similar outbreak in the United States would cost taxpayers up to $60 billion.22 An FMD
attack could result in massive herd culling, the need to destroy processed goods, and extensive
decontamination efforts of production and livestock-containment facilities. Most Americans have not
witnessed the intense media coverage of high-volume culling operations involving the destruction and
disposal of tens of thousands of animals. Large-scale eradication and disposal of livestock likely would be
especially controversial as it affects farmers and ranchers and offends the sensibilities of animal rights
activists and environmental organizations. Food Production and Distribution If terrorists strive for human
deaths, the food production and distribution chain offers a low-tech but effective mechanism for
disseminating toxins and bacteria, such as botulism, E. coli, and salmonella. Developments in the farm-totable continuum greatly have increased the number of entry points for these agents. Many food processing
and packing plants employ large, unscreened seasonal workforces. They commonly operate uneven
standards of internal quality and inadequate biosurveillance control to detect adulteration.23 These
vulnerabilities, combined with the lack of security at many processing and packing plants, contribute to the
ease of perpetrating a food-borne attack. Beyond the economic and political impact, low-tech bioterrorist
assaults against the food chain have the potential to create social panic as people lose confidence in the
safety of the food supply. A large-scale attack potentially could undermine the publics confidence in its
government. Because most processed food travels to distribution centers within a matter of hours, a single
case of chemical or biological adulteration could have significant latent ongoing effects, particularly if the
source of the contamination is not immediately apparent and there are acute ailments or deaths.24
Supermarkets in major American cities stock only a 7-day supply of food; therefore, any significant and

Experts believe that

fruit- and vegetable-packing plants are among the most vulnerable
venues for food-borne attacks. Many represent small-scale
manufacturers that specialize in ready-to-eat meats or aggregated
foodstufs. They do not practice uniform biosecurity methods, and they do not use heat, an effective
continuing disruption in supply quickly will lead to severe shortages.

front-end barrier against pathogens, in food processing. Also, because they deal in already-prepared

produce that does not require cookinga good back-end defense against microbial introductionthey

Farms, ranches,
and feedlots in America are dispersed, open, and generally
unprotected. The majority of state and local law enforcement agencies face financial and strategic
provide a viable portal to introduce pathogens. Law Enforcement Preparedness

challenges when responding to agroterrorism, yet the laws of many states treat agroterrorism as a crime
investigation, giving local law enforcement agencies primary responsibility. An outbreak of FMD would
exhaust law enforcement resources quickly. After recognition of the disease by state agriculture
authorities, subsequent steps in the emergency response involve containment and eradication, often
involving multiple herds and a large quarantine area that may encompass multiple counties. State
agriculture authorities working with the U.S. Department of Agricultures Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service have responsibility and authority for animal disease.25 Specially trained animal health
officials make decisions on disease control, such as livestock quarantine and the timing and method of
livestock depopulationculling, destroying, and disposing of diseased animals from infected herds by
burning or burial. Following strict biosecurity measures can prevent the spread of disease. Local and state
law enforcement would play a pivotal role in this effort by adhering to three primary responsibilities. First,
police officials would enforce quarantine orders given by state agriculture authorities. This involves
isolating and containing infected stock to prevent the spread of disease. A quarantine area would comprise
a 6-mile radius, approximately 113 square miles, surrounding the point of origin; numerous roadblocks
would prevent vehicles, equipment, or persons from entering or leaving without detailed decontamination
measures and authorization.26 Inside the quarantine area, officials would establish an exposed zone in
which all cloven-hoofed animals would be destroyed. For effectiveness, quarantine of infected premises
and SMOs would have to remain in effect for a minimum of 30 days.27 The second responsibility occurs in
conjunction with quarantine. Officers would enforce SMOs issued by the state governor to prevent the
spread of the disease.28 Initial biosecurity efforts could require placement of all animals under an SMO.
Law enforcement may be empowered to restrict human and animal movement in and out of the quarantine
zone. This authority would include all animals in transit within a wide geographic area until the
investigation clarified the extent of the infection and determined which animals can move safely. Although
FMD affects only cloven-hoofed animals, humans, horses, and other animals may carry the virus.
Enforcing an SMO would require care and shelter for animals in transit that must be temporarily unloaded
and housed at local sites providing feed and water.29 During the SMO, law enforcement would interview
drivers to determine points of origin and destinations of animals. Research indicates that officers would
stop and evaluate an average of nearly 50 vehicles per hour in the first day of an SMO. Third, the criminal
investigation of the outbreak further would tax already strained law enforcement resources. The
investigation would focus on identifying the source of the virus and the mechanism used to infect
susceptible animals. The danger of additional infections by the perpetrators would make the criminal

Many law enforcement agencies lack the

sufficient resources and procedures to simultaneously cope with
quarantines, SMOs, and criminal investigations while also staffing widely
investigation time sensitive.

dispersed checkpoints around the clock for the duration of the emergency. When combined with the need
also to deliver routine law enforcement services, most agencies would struggle to meet these demands,
especially during the protracted nature of an FMD outbreak. Conclusion Agriculture may not represent
terrorists first choice of targets because it lacks the shock factor of more traditional attacks; however, it
comprises the largest single sector in the U.S. economy, making agroterrorism a viable primary aspiration.
Such terrorist groups as al Qaeda have made economic and trade disruption key goals. They believe that
by imposing economic hardship on America, its citizens will tire of the struggle and force their elected

Every level of the food chain,

including farms, feedlots, chemical storage facilities, meatpacking
plants, and distribution operations, remains vulnerable to
agroterrorism. Because terrorists rely on a lack of preparedness, law enforcement agencies should
leaders to withdraw from commitments abroad.

develop a plan to prevent agroterrorism and minimize the results of an attack. Officers must investigate
from an agroterrorism perspective thefts of livestock; a criminal organization may steal animals with the
intent of infecting them and placing them back into the population. Thefts of vaccines, medicines, and
livestock-related equipment should be of concern and carefully investigated. It also is vital that law
enforcement officials forward reports of such incidents to their states intelligence-fusion centers, threatintegration centers, or law enforcement intelligence units or networks.

Economic collapse leads to global war.

Lind, New America Foundation Economic Growth Program
Policy Director, 5/11/2010
[Michael, "Will the great recession lead to World War IV?,"
http://www.salon.com/news/economics/index.html?
story=/opinion/feature/2010/05/11/great_recession_world_war_iv]

an era of global economic stagnation will help the

nationalist and populist right, at the expense of the neoliberal and
cosmopolitan/multicultural left. During the Long Depression of the late
19th century, which some historians claim lasted from 1873 to 1896, the nations of the
West adopted protectionist measures to promote their industries .
If history is any guide,

Beginning with Bismarcks Germany, many countries also adopted social reforms like government pensions and health
insurance. These reforms were often favored by the nationalist right, as a way of luring the working class away from the

When World War I broke

out, the working classes and farmers in most countries rallied
enthusiastically around their respective flags. The Great Depression
of the 1930s similarly led to the rise of one or another version of the
authoritarian, nationalist right in Europe. Only in a few societies
with deeply established liberal traditions, like the English-speaking countries and
Scandinavia, did liberals or liberal conservatives hold on. And Franklin
Delano Roosevelts New Deal Democratic Party, a coalition that included racist
Southerners and traditionalist Catholic immigrants, was not particularly liberal by todays
standards. In both eras of depression, great-power rivalry for resources
and markets intensified and ultimately led to a world war. Following World War
temptations of Marxism and left-liberalism. By and large the strategy worked.

II, the U.S. sought to avert a repetition of that pattern, by creating a global market secured by a global great-power concert in the form of the
Security Council. But the project of economic disarmament and security cooperation broke down almost immediately after 1945 and the split
between the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans produced the Cold War. The second attempt at a global market that began after the Cold War
may be breaking down now, as the most important economic powers pursue their conflicting national interests. A functioning global market
system can work only if its members abandon mercantilism -- the policy of trying to enjoy perpetual trade surpluses, by fair means or foul.
However, the nations with the three largest economies after the U.S. -- China, Japan and Germany -- all want to enjoy never-ending
merchandise trade surpluses. All three have used "currency mercantilism" to help their export industries, to the detriment of the global
economic system. China and Japan, by different methods, have deliberately undervalued their currencies, to help their exports and keep
imports out of their markets. Germany accomplished something similar, by persuading its trade partners to give up independent currencies
that they were able to revalue for the crippling straitjacket of the euro. The system worked only as long as Americans borrowed to pay for
imports from Japan and China, while southern Europeans borrowed to pay for imports from Germany. But the consumers are tapped out and
neither Americans nor southern Europeans are in a mood for austerity measures in the middle of a near-depression. Unless the Chinese,
Japanese and Germans turn into credit-happy consumer societies the global economy may be in for prolonged stagnation. Instead of changing
their ways, however, the surplus countries are denouncing their own customers for their profligacy in buying their goods and insisting that the

This will not end happily.

same customers be penalized by austerity programs.

As the oversold promise of freemarket globalization fades, countries large and small may turn increasingly toward state capitalism. At home, this would mean permanent
state support of troubled industries like banking and the automobile industries, which all of the major industrial countries have bailed out. In
trade, this would mean a retreat from global trade areas toward regional blocs and bilateral deals. Examples include agreements between
energy-hungry governments like those of China and Japan and the state-owned oil or natural gas companies of Saudi Arabia and Russia. In a
world of diplomatic rivalries among great powers to win contracts with state-owned corporations, the distinctions between geoeconomics and

Direct war between great powers

seems unlikely, but if the Cold War was World War III, then a cold
World War IV resembling Orwells shifting coalitions of Eurasia,
Eastasia and Oceania in 1984 is all too easy to imagine.
geopolitics would erode, with potentially dangerous consequences.

Ag collapse causes extinction

Lugar, Senate foreign relations committee former
member, 2K
[Richard, former senator from Indiana, Calls for a new green revolution to
combat global warming and reduce world instability
http://www.unep.org/OurPlanet/imgversn/143/lugar.html, accessed 1-17-13,
TAP]

In a world confronted by global terrorism, turmoil in the Middle East, burgeoning nuclear
threats and other crises, it is easy to lose sight of the long-range
challenges. But we do so at our peril. One of the most daunting of
them is meeting the worlds need for food and energy in this
century. At stake is not only preventing starvation and saving the
environment, but also world peace and security. History tells us that states may
go to war over access to resources, and that poverty and famine
have often bred fanaticism and terrorism. Working to feed the world
will minimize factors that contribute to global instability and the proliferation of
[WMDs] weapons of mass destruction. With the world population expected to grow from 6 billion people
today to 9 billion by mid-century, the demand for afordable food will increase
well beyond current international production levels. People in rapidly
developing nations will have the means greatly to improve their standard of living and caloric intake.
Inevitably, that means eating more meat. This will raise demand for feed grain at the same time that the
growing world population will need vastly more basic food to eat. Complicating a solution to this problem is
a dynamic that must be better understood in the West: developing countries often use limited arable land
to expand cities to house their growing populations. As good land disappears, people destroy timber

The longterm environmental consequences could be disastrous for the entire

globe. Productivity revolution To meet the expected demand for food over the next 50 years, we in the
resources and even rainforests as they try to create more arable land to feed themselves.

United States will have to grow roughly three times more food on the land we have. Thats a tall order. My
farm in Marion County, Indiana, for example, yields on average 8.3 to 8.6 tonnes of corn per hectare
typical for a farm in central Indiana. To triple our production by 2050, we will have to produce an annual
average of 25 tonnes per hectare. Can we possibly boost output that much? Well, its been done before.
Advances in the use of fertilizer and water, improved machinery and better tilling techniques combined to
generate a threefold increase in yields since 1935 on our farm back then, my dad produced 2.8 to 3

Much US agriculture has seen similar increases. But of

course there is no guarantee that we can achieve those results
again. Given the urgency of expanding food production to meet
world demand, we must invest much more in scientific research and target that money toward
tonnes per hectare.

projects that promise to have significant national and global impact. For the United States, that will mean a
major shift in the way we conduct and fund agricultural science. Fundamental research will generate the
innovations that will be necessary to feed the world. The United States can take a leading position in a
productivity revolution. And our success at increasing food production may play a decisive humanitarian
role in the survival of billions of people and the health of our planet.

Internet Freedom Adv Insert from Old Af

Surveillance undermines US internet credibility reviving
judicial accountability is key.
Clement, University of Toronto Faculty of Information
professor, 2013
[Andrew, Information Policy Research Program coordinator and Identity,
Privacy, and Security Institute co-founder, and PhD in computer science, 313-13, Democratic State Surveillance, Transparency and Trust
http://www.cyberdialogue.ca/2013/03/democratic-state-surveillancetransparency-and-trust-by-andrew-clement/, accessed 7-10-15, TAP]
Those of us who believe that democratic governments have a central
role to play in multi-stakeholder cyberspace governance have
received in the past few weeks a bracing reminder of both the
hazards of this ideal in practice and the importance of broad-based
civil society mobilization. Democratic states, while not sufficient for
efective internet governance, are necessary parties because no
other institutions have yet emerged that combine as well as they do
the inclusivity, legitimacy and resources to help manage the internet
efectively in the broad public interest. However, when such states
violate the democratic principles that they espouse and are built on,
they seriously undermine their legitimacy as well as the viability of
the internet governance project overall. Two events in February related to
state surveillance in North America illustrate such problematic governmental
behaviour and point to the importance of transparency for restoring
trust in governance processes. On February 26 the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled against a group of human rights organizations and
journalists seeking to challenge the constitutionality of the
warrantless domestic surveillance program that the National
Security Agency (NSA) has been conducting since 2001. Earlier that month
the Canadian government announced that in light of strong public
opposition, it had dropped proposed legislation mandating many of
the same controversial internet surveillance features . Far from being isolated
events, these cases are just two among a larger set of contentious, ongoing governmental attempts to surveil individuals and criminalize
many common internet activities that raise disturbing civil liberties
issues and provoke popular resistance. Shortly after 9/11, the NSA
embarked on what is likely the largest domestic surveillance
operation in history. On presidential order but without warrants, court orders or legislative
sanction, the NSA installed fibre-optic splitters in the main switching centres of the major telecom carriers,
enabling the agency to selectively intercept, store and analyse a large portion of internet communications.
We only know of this surveillance dragnet thanks to brave whistleblowers formerly at AT&T (Mark Klein)
and the NSA (William E. Binney, Thomas A. Drake, and J. Kirk Wiebe), determined journalists (e.g. James
Bamford and Jane Mayer) and the more than 40 court cases filed against the telecommunications carriers
and the government (mainly litigated by the American Civil Liberties Association (ACLU) and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF)). While

the federal government subsequently acknowledged the

has fought to keep every aspect of

existence of the warrantless wiretapping program, it

it away from public scrutiny. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act (FISAA)
gave retroactive immunity from prosecution to AT&T, Verizon/MCI, BellSouth, Sprint and Cingular, all of

the federal government

has consistently invoked a state secrets override that has so far
successfully kept all but one of them from going to trial . When FISAA
passed in 2008, the ACLU immediately challenged its
constitutionality on behalf of a group of journalists and human rights
lawyers in Clapper v. Amnesty. The recent Supreme Court decision
closed this case by finding that the plaintifs lacked the standing to
bring charges because they couldnt demonstrate that the NSA had
targeted them, nor that they had faced certainly impending injury by its surveillance. In other
words, the constitutional issues raised by the warrantless wiretapping
program have not been addressed and further it appears that they
may never be , because no party would be granted standing until
they can positively demonstrate they have been its victims. In a
Kafkaesque twist, the government has in efect rendered its secret
surveillance activities immune from legal challenge and public
accountability a clear undermining of liberal democratic norms to
which had pending court cases against them. In the cases against it,

say the least. In Canada, lawful access legislation designed to give law enforcement, security agencies
(such as the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), and Canadian Security Intelligence
Service (CSIS)) and other branches of government similarly broad surveillance powers has been introduced
into Parliament on four occasions since 2005. Each time it died on the order paper without parliamentary
debate, until February 2012 when the Conservative government introduced it as Bill C-30 and began
actively promoting it. Anticipating this re-introduction a broad coalition of civil liberties and on-line
advocacy organizations, academics and privacy commissioners mounted the oppositional Stop Online
Spying campaign that included videos, public service announcements, posters, letter writing, screenings,
and an on-line petition that eventually garnered over 125,000 signatories. The major concerns highlighted
in the campaign included allowing authorities access to internet subscriber information without a warrant,
no substantial justification for the additional surveillance and policing powers, a requirement that
telecommunications service providers install equipment to enable interception of subscriber
communication and no effective reporting or accountability. Evidently to boost its appeal, the government
changed the name of the bill on the day of the announcement to Protecting Children from Internet
Predators Act, but this backfired when the Public Safety Minister, Vic Toews, declared that one could either
stand with the government or with the child pornographers prowling online. This provoked an immediate
storm of protest with a large social media component. Public opinion polls showed a significant drop in
public support, from a majority (56% Ipsos-Reid) shortly after re-introduction to just 23% (Postmedia News)
a year later. Though with a parliamentary majority the government could have forced this bill through, they
deemed the political price too high and on February 11, 2013 declared that they were dropping the
legislation. While much of the surveillance covered by the lawful access bill continues quietly under the
current privacy legislation and some of the key proposed measures are being re-introduced piecemeal as
parts of other legislation, this declaration constituted a surprising victory for civil liberties advocates. This
outcome echoes similar campaigns in the US a year earlier around the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and
PROTECT IP Act (PIPA), both of which contained new surveillance measures and appeared set to pass the
legislative branch until massive popular opposition forced a dramatic reversal. It remains to be seen
whether the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), now before Congress with similar
surveillance provisions as the Canadian lawful access legislation, will also be turned back by popular

we can see a recurring pattern of lack of

transparency of government action in relation to the surveillance
and related security measures. This lack of transparency is
observed in both the process of developing surveillance capabilities
and in the substance of their (proposed) enactments. Far from
providing a basis for informed public decision making about matters
afecting the relationship between state and citizen that is hallmark
of democratic societies, we repeatedly witness the marginalization
opposition. In each of these cases

of public involvement at every stage. The familiar invocation of security and protection
as taking such precedence over other considerations that it doesnt merit discussion is wearing thin after

the US and
governments appear to ofer as little information as possible
about proposed surveillance measures, provide bogus or at best
flimsy justifications, avoid opportunities to examine or debate
issues, dismiss or close down public discussion when it occurs, and
actively resist critical inquiry. In stark contrast to the lack of public consultation, but well in
more than a decade of exaggerated fears and little evidence of positive results. Both
Canadian

keeping with neo-liberal norms, the leading private sector actors have in each case been heavily involved
behind the scene, and at least with the intellectual property legislation, they have been prime movers

When details of state surveillance

practices do emerge, they show similar patterns of governmental
preemption of citizen rights previously taken for granted. These
include fine-grained surveillance of individual on-line behavior,
weakening or elimination of conventional norms of judicial oversight
such as court orders or search warrants and a lack of mandated
reporting, review requirements or other forms of public
accountability . Few would disagree that states have a legitimate
interest in developing the capacity to intercept communication in the service of national
security, law enforcement and protection of vital infrastructure. But when they pursue
even legitimate surveillance ends with illegitimate means it invites
suspicion and opposition. The recent history of secrecy, over-reach,
false claims and unwarranted targeting of individuals and groups
unsurprisingly brings hostile responses from those concerned for
democratic values. This reaction may make governments even more
wary of disclosure, thus fueling the vicious cycle we are witnessing. However, if they
were to act more in line with the ideals of openness, transparency
and democracy they espouse and insist others respect, they would
gain significantly in the forms of trust that are so vital for efective
governance. For a start, transparent governments would earn more
domestic support for the surveillance they actually do need. In addition,
they would gain credibility in the international fora , such as the recent
conferences Roger Hurwitz mentions in his blog post, whether making claims for national sovereignty or
advancing openness and freedom . The principle of transparency of course needs to
pushing the state to tighten internet surveillance.

apply to other cyberspace actors, in proportion to their power and influence. In particular the large private
sector enterprises, notably the telecommunication carriers and equipment vendors, that have so closely
colluded with state security agencies across democratic as well as authoritarian regimes, would do well to
be more transparent. The Transparency Reports that several major internet enterprises, such as Google

If all
parties to multi-stakeholder forums insisted on greater transparency
and led by example, it would contribute significantly to building the
necessary trust and confidence while mitigating the fortress
approach that is so hampering the internet governance discussion.
Growing transparency, especially in the area of internet surveillance,
is an essential pre-condition for developing global cyberspace
governance as a welcoming oasis where everyone has a part to play, thereby
and Twitter, have begun producing represent a small but promising step in this direction.

enriching us all.

K 1ac

Anti-Blackness Contention
The FBI has surveillance authority to commit prejudicial
monitoring on the basis of race, religion, and ethnicity.
Unegbu, Howard University JD candidate, 2013
[Cindy, 57 How. L.J. 433, NOTE AND COMMENT: National Security
Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional
Misstep Lexis, accessed 7-6-15, TAP]
the FBI has
been given express surveillance procedural authority through the
DIOG . 93Link to the text of the note The new rules were enacted to give agents
more latitude as they search for indications of criminal and terrorist
activity. 94Link to the text of the note The various FBI surveillance procedures
that have been outlined include the ability to observe and collect
any form of protected speech by citizens and those residing within
the country's jurisdiction. 95Link to the text of the note Furthermore, the FBI
has the authority to use religion as a factor when determining
whether an individual or group deserves greater scrutiny and
monitoring. 96Link to the text of the note Race and ethnicity may be considered
as a factor in its national security assessment, as long as it is not
the dominant factor for focusing on a particular person. 97Link to the text of
the note Another power that has been granted is the authority to retain
personal information that has been collected on an individual, even
if an assessment does not suggest that an individual is engaged in
any wrongdoing. 98Link to the text of the note Perhaps the most daunting new
permission that has been granted to the FBI is the ability to monitor
domestic individuals and citizens without there being any
presupposed suspicion of terrorist or criminal activity . 99Link to the text of
the note The manual prohibits "racial profiling" in the national security
assessments; however, it allows an assessor to monitor [449]
"religious practitioners or religious facilities," 100Link to the text of the note
and to identify locations of concentrated ethnic communities. 101Link to
the text of the note The FBI, in essence, has the authority to infiltrate
lawful and peaceful places of worship, communities and businesses,
and take race, religion and ethnicity into account when developing
its threat analysis. 102Link to the text of the note The guidelines permitting the
use of race, religion, or ethnicity to assess national security threats
or criminal activity could result in the unconstitutional and
prejudicial monitoring of individuals . 103Link to the text of the note
In addition to the procedural power given to the NCTC through its amended guidelines,

The massive expansion of the surveillance state depended

on the perfection of imperial techniques abroad combined
with concerns for regulating the market these two forces
combined to result in the racialized surveillance practices
that created the era of the New Jim Crow in the Post Civil
Rights period.
Kundnani, New York University media culture and
communication professor, and Kumar, Rutgers University
media studies and Middle East studies professor, 2015
[Arun and Deepa, Race, surveillance, and empire
http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, accessed 7-11-15,
TAP]
The expansion of the surveillance state in the twentieth century was
one aspect of a wider penetration of the state into the lives of
Americans. Working class struggle had somewhat unexpectedly
driven this expansio n: the state responded by taking on a mediating
role between labor and capital, ofering a measure of protection
from the ravages of a market economy through Keynesian economics
and the creation of a welfare state after the New Dealalbeit one that was
underdeveloped compared to Western Europe. State managers sought to stabilize
capitalism by imposing a degree of rationality on the system
through regulating the economy and providing social services, all of
which required a greater penetration of the state into civil society.48
In the new era of neoliberal capitalism that began in the 1970s,
ruling elites sought to break this social contract , which rested on
the premise that, if the working class played by the rules, it could
see increases in wages and living conditions. From the 1970s
onwards, this arrangement was undone. Alongside, there were also
the beginnings of a contraction of the social wage of welfare
provisions, public housing, education, and healthcare. The end
result was growing inequality and a new regime of the one percent.
The state responded to the permanent joblessness, ghettoization,
and stigmatization that neoliberalism produced among the poor by
turning to policies of mass criminalization and incarceration. Thus,
the neoliberal onslaught went hand in hand with securitization . As
Loc Wacquant writes, since the civil rights era America has launched
into a social and political experiment without precedent or equivalent in the societies
of the postwar West: the gradual replacement of a (semi-) welfare state by
a police and penal state for which the criminalization of marginality
and the punitive containment of dispossessed categories serve as
social policy at the lower end of the class and ethnic order .49 The law

and order rhetoric that was used to mobilize support for this project
of securitization was racially coded, associating Black protest and
rebellion with fears of street crime. The possibilities of such an approach had been
demonstrated in the 1968 election, when both the Republican candidate Richard Nixon and the
independent segregationist George Wallace had made law and order a central theme of their campaigns. It
became apparent that Republicans could cleave Southern whites away from the Democratic Party through
tough-on-crime rhetoric that played on racial fears. The Southern Strategy, as it would be called, tapped
into anxieties among working-class whites that the civil rights reforms of the 1960s would lead to them

With the transformation of the

welfare state into a security state , its embedding in everyday life
was not undone but diverted to diferent purposes. Social services
were reorganized into instruments of surveillance. Public aid became
increasingly conditional on upholding certain behavioral norms that
were to be measured and supervised by the state, implying its
increasing intrusion into the lives of the poorculminating in the
workfare regimes of the Clinton administration.50 In this context,
a new model of crime control came into being. In earlier decades,
criminologists had focused on the process of rehabilitation ; those who
competing with Blacks for jobs, housing, and schools.

committed crimes were to be helped to return to society. While the actual implementation of this policy

by the 1970s, this model went out of fashion. In its place, a

new preventive model of crime control became the norm, which
was based on gathering information about groups to assess the
risk they posed. Rather than wait for the perpetrator to commit a crime, risk
assessment methods called for new forms of preventive
surveillance , in which whole groups of people seen as dangerous
were subject to observation, identification, and classification.51 The
War on Drugs launched by President Reagan in 1982 dramatically
accelerated the process of racial securitization. Michelle Alexander
notes that At the time he declared this new war, less than 2 percent
of the American public viewed drugs as the most important issue
facing the nation. This fact was no deterrent to Reagan, for the drug war from the
outset had little to do with public concern about drugs and much to
do with public concern about race. By waging a war on drug users and dealers, Reagan
was uneven,

made good on his promise to crack down on the racially defined othersthe undeserving.52

Operation Hammer, carried out by the Los Angeles Police

Department in 1988, illustrates how racialized surveillance was
central to the War on Drugs . It involved hundreds of officers in
combat gear sweeping through the South Central area of the city
over a period of several weeks, making 1,453 arrests, mostly for
teenage curfew violations, disorderly conduct, and minor traffic
ofenses. Ninety percent were released without charge but the thousands of young
Black people who were stopped and processed in mobile booking
centers had their names entered onto the gang register database,
which soon contained the details of half of the Black youths of Los
Angeles. Entry to the database rested on such supposed indicators of gang membership as high-five
handshakes and wearing red shoelaces. Officials compared the Black gangs they
were supposedly targeting to the National Liberation Front in

Vietnam and the murderous militias of Beirut, signaling the

blurring of boundaries between civilian policing and military force,
and between domestic racism and overseas imperialism .53 In the
twelve years leading up to 1993, the rate of incarceration of Black
Americans tripled,54 establishing the system of mass incarceration
that Michelle Alexander refers to as the new Jim Crow .55 And yet
those in prison were only a quarter of those subject to supervision
by the criminal justice system, with its attendant mechanisms of
routine surveillance and intermediate sanctions, such as house
arrests, boot camps, intensive supervision, day reporting,
community service, and electronic tagging. Criminal records
databases, which are easily accessible to potential employers, now
hold files on around one-third of the adult male population .56 Alice
Goffman has written of the ways that mass incarceration is not just a matter of
imprisonment itself but also the systems of policing and surveillance
that track young Black men and label them as would-be criminals
before and after their time in prison . From stops on the street to
probation meetings, these systems, she says, have transformed poor
Black neighborhoods into communities of suspects and fugitives. A
climate of fear and suspicion pervades everyday life, and many
residents live with the daily concern that the authorities will seize
them and take them away.57 A predictable outcome of such systems
of classification and criminalization is the routine racist violence
carried out by police forces and the regular occurrences of police
killings of Black people , such as Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, on
August 9, 2014.

Racism is unethical and causes extinction

Memmi, Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Paris, 19 97
[Albert, RACISM, p. 165]

Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression
of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be

society contains within itself the seeds of its own death.

It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with
respect. "Recall," says the Bible, "that you were once a stranger in Egypt,"
which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a
stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an
ethical and a practical appeal -- indeed, it is a contract , however implicit
it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all
theoretical and practical morality .
reversed. All unjust

Public deliberation and informed public involvement over

domestic surveillance is shut down now.
Clement, University of Toronto Faculty of Information
professor, 2013
[Andrew, Information Policy Research Program coordinator and Identity,
Privacy, and Security Institute co-founder, and PhD in computer science, 313-13, Democratic State Surveillance, Transparency and Trust
http://www.cyberdialogue.ca/2013/03/democratic-state-surveillancetransparency-and-trust-by-andrew-clement/, accessed 7-10-15, TAP]
we can see a recurring pattern of lack of transparency
of government action in relation to the surveillance and related
security measures. This lack of transparency is observed in both
the process of developing surveillance capabilities and in the
substance of their (proposed) enactments. Far from providing a
basis for informed public decision making about matters afecting
the relationship between state and citizen that is hallmark of
democratic societies, we repeatedly witness the marginalization of
public involvement at every stage. The familiar invocation of security and protection as
In each of these cases

taking such precedence over other considerations that it doesnt merit discussion is wearing thin after

the US and
Canadian governments appear to ofer as little information as possible
about proposed surveillance measures, provide bogus or at best
flimsy justifications, avoid opportunities to examine or debate
issues, dismiss or close down public discussion when it occurs, and
actively resist critical inquiry . In stark contrast to the lack of public consultation, but well
more than a decade of exaggerated fears and little evidence of positive results. Both

in keeping with neo-liberal norms, the leading private sector actors have in each case been heavily
involved behind the scene, and at least with the intellectual property legislation, they have been prime

When details of state

surveillance practices do emerge, they show similar patterns of
governmental preemption of citizen rights previously taken for
granted. These include fine-grained surveillance of individual on-line
behavior, weakening or elimination of conventional norms of judicial
oversight such as court orders or search warrants and a lack of
mandated reporting, review requirements or other forms of public
accountability . Few would disagree that states have a legitimate
interest in developing the capacity to intercept communication in the service of national
security, law enforcement and protection of vital infrastructure. But when they pursue
even legitimate surveillance ends with illegitimate means it invites
suspicion and opposition. The recent history of secrecy, over-reach,
false claims and unwarranted targeting of individuals and groups
unsurprisingly brings hostile responses from those concerned for
democratic values. This reaction may make governments even more
wary of disclosure, thus fueling the vicious cycle we are witnessing. However, if they
were to act more in line with the ideals of openness, transparency
and democracy they espouse and insist others respect, they would
movers pushing the state to tighten internet surveillance.

gain significantly in the forms of trust that are so vital for efective
governance. For a start, transparent governments would earn more
domestic support for the surveillance they actually do need. In addition,
they would gain credibility in the international fora , such as the recent
conferences Roger Hurwitz mentions in his blog post, whether making claims for national sovereignty or
advancing openness and freedom . The principle of transparency of course needs to
apply to other cyberspace actors, in proportion to their power and influence. In particular the large private
sector enterprises, notably the telecommunication carriers and equipment vendors, that have so closely
colluded with state security agencies across democratic as well as authoritarian regimes, would do well to
be more transparent. The Transparency Reports that several major internet enterprises, such as Google

If all
parties to multi-stakeholder forums insisted on greater transparency
and led by example, it would contribute significantly to building the
necessary trust and confidence while mitigating the fortress
approach that is so hampering the internet governance discussion.
Growing transparency, especially in the area of internet surveillance,
is an essential pre-condition for developing global cyberspace
governance as a welcoming oasis where everyone has a part to play, thereby
and Twitter, have begun producing represent a small but promising step in this direction.

enriching us all.

Informed and active citizens are necessary to challenge

the surveillance state.
Unegbu, Howard University JD candidate, 2013
[Cindy, 57 How. L.J. 433, NOTE AND COMMENT: National Security
Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional
Misstep Lexis, accessed 7-6-15, TAP]
as the government's
surveillance measures began to increasingly violate domestic civil
liberties, American sentiment became wearier of these government
measures. 67Link to the text of the note In fact, a new CBS poll found [445] that nearly six in ten
Initially, Americans welcomed the heightened security measures; however,

Americans said they were very concerned or somewhat concerned about losing privacy because of federal

The debate on national security

surveillance practices has resulted in the public's awareness and
disdain for the government's intrusive practices. Some of this
disdain is sparked by the June 2013 information leak by Edward
Snowden, a former intelligence agent who leaked to the public highly sensitive intelligence. 69Link to
efforts to fight terrorism. 68Link to the text of the note

the text of the note He asserted that the public deserved to be aware of the government's intrusive
intelligence gathering practices. 70Link to the text of the note In an interview with The Guardian, Snowden
stated "'I, sitting at my desk,' could 'wiretap anyone, from you or your accountant, to a federal judge or
even the president, if I had a personal email.'" 71Link to the text of the note This country's well-founded
focus of national security has led to a development of policy and laws that create a very fine line between

Because of responses
to Freedom of Information Act requests, the government's
surveillance practices are now exposed and shed some light on the
inappropriate measures that are being taken in the post-9/11
national security era. 72Link to the text of the note
national security and the unrestrained infringement upon civil liberties.

High School Students learning about Surveillance is key to

solve war and threat-construction that justifies atrocities
Ralston 14 (Robert Ralston is a second-year Master's student in the
Department of Political Science at Virginia Tech. His research interests broadly
include international relations, critical security studies, cyberpolitics, and
surveillance. Robert is writing a thesis that examines state ontological
insecurity with respect to cyberspace, and how state surveillance practices
are justified through narratives of liberty and security, MILTON WOLF
SEMINAR, CYBERSPACE AND SURVEILLANCE: CHALLENGES TO STATE
IDENTITY AND ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/app/uploads/2015/04/Milton-Wolf-2014Compendium.pdf#page=41 DA:7/8/15 CB)

Increasing state surveillance of the internet and a seeming lack of global

accountability and best practices regarding foreign and domestic internet policies demands
the attention of students, scholars, and practitioners of media and
communication , political science, sociology, computer science, and
the like. With these concerns in mind, the 2014 Milton Wolf Seminar highlighted themes of
surveillance, visibility, disclosure, and espionage in the digital age. This essay seeks to touch
upon some of these themes, and to present a case for the study of ontological
security in international relations as a way to explain, in part, U.S. practices of
surveillance following the leaks by former National Security Administration (NSA)
contractor Edward Snowden. Politically, the stakes are high as
cyberpolitics becomes an issue of high politics in the study of
international relations; states and the agents who produce
narratives about the state frame cyber discourse in ways that
attempt to justify practices of surveillance, espionage, and
censorship. States justify intrusion into cyberspace in the name of stability and an idealized selfimage. This, can prove violent and costly, with parallels to justifying
war on the basis of empire in offline venues. In cyber venues, the United States
in particular has had to justify state intrusion into cyber venues.
Void of routinized responses to traditional threats, the state must
reshape or reconfigure its self-image in order to combat the
contradictions inherent in state intrusions into cyberspa ce. Taking in
consideration such concerns and dynamics, this essay first sets out to
explain ontological security in the study of international relations
and the discursive practices of U.S. state agents in justifying state
surveillance practices. It then concludes by drawing parallels between these discursive
practices and various presentations at the 2014 Milton Wolf Seminar. Ontological Security in
International Relations Theory Physical security concerns dominate
realist accounts of security in world politics (Mitzen 2006: 342). Ontological
security in international relations goes beyond the premise that states are solely concerned with physical

The assumption that states only seek physical security, Mitzen

(2006: 364) argues, constrains international relations theory by failing
to explain why states may seek or continue conflict at the expense
security.

of physical security. Inherent in the conception of a states

ontological security is the notion of the state as person, or at the
very least, that states are concerned with their own self-image. 20
Ontological security is about constructing and maintaining the
stability of a states self-image. Power, in this regard, can be understood
in terms 20 See Wendt (2004) for a discussion of the validity and appropriateness of understanding
the state as person in international relations theory. 40 of a centralized bodys internal
capacity to perceive its ability to operate upon its own selfimage, as
well as influence others and determine outcomes (Steele 2010: 15). Thus,
power is not solely based upon a states ability to make other actors do what they would otherwise not do,
to pose material threats to other states, or assert global influence; power is about the states recognition
that it can use and recreate its own self-image. States put forward narratives about themselves through

State actions must be justified, even if

they go against the grain of international norms or expectations
(Steele 2008: 10). What is particularly interesting about the U.S response
to the Snowden disclosures is the manner in which the disclosures
were framed, the contradictions that arose as a result of this framing, and how
the narratives that the state produced regarding NSA practices
harken back to the self-image-making of the U.S. state. Why the United States? When
state agents, such as government officials.

examining speeches made by U.S. state agents, publications regarding U.S. citizenship, and the ways the
United States is presented in popular culture, common trends emerge: The United States is presented as
exceptional, as a land of shared values-- liberty, freedom, and prosperitywhich were created by the
nations founding fathers. David Campbell (1998: 131) suggests that America is an imagined community
par excellence. America, like all other states, is dependent upon practices that make up its ontological
being. However, as Campbell (1998) argues: Defined, therefore, more by absence than presence,

America is peculiarly dependent on representational practices for its

being. Arguably more than any other state, the imprecise process of imagination is what constitutes
American identity (p. 91). Space and time in reference to U.S. identity is crucial to this analysis because
successful fulfillment of ontological state security is predicated upon that states ability to maintain a

the United
States self-identity is quite fleeting, and, thus, hinges on
representational, symbolic, and iconic imagery in order to ascribe to
itself some form of identity (Campbell 1998: 132). The U.S. State Narrative
In a speech made prior to Snowdens disclosures, President Obama
spoke of the necessity to secure cyber infrastructure while
maintaining the internet as a free and open space: Our pursuit of cybersecurity
consistent self-identity and self-image. Void of a people as a foundational element,

will notI repeat, will not includemonitoring private sector networks or Internet traffic. We will preserve
and protect the personal privacy and civil liberties that we cherish as Americans. Indeed, I remain firmly
committed to net neutrality so we can keep the Internet as it should beopen and free. In light of the

a contradiction arises between the actual behavior of

the state through its national security agency and the self-image of the state.
Snowden disclosures,

President Obama sends two distinct and seemingly irreconcilable messages regarding cyberspace: First,
the United States, as a centralized power, recognizes the tensions that it must mediate between security
and 41 liberty; Second, the United States has a vision for cyberspace, one focused on being open and
free. But free for whom? U.S. security policy is decentralized insofar as it attempts to do too much while
still trying to keep a constant self-image (See Campbell 1998 and Gould and Steele 2014). Cyberspace is
not an American thing, but from cyberspace comes a multitude of images that only exacerbate the
imagined nature of American identity. Thus, what cyberspace is and what cyberspace means, from an
American perspective, is inherently American. Addressing the noise surrounding the practices of the
National Security Administration, President Obama first noted the history of intelligence gathering by the
United States: At the dawn of our Republic, a small, secret surveillance committee, born out of the Sons of
Liberty, was established in Boston. And the groups members included Paul Revere. At night, they would
patrol the streets, reporting back any signs that the British were preparing raids against Americas early
patriots. In order to find footing and precedent in the face of ontological insecurity in cyberspace two
rhetorical moves are deployed. First, history is resurfaced and reworked to create a seemingly appropriate

metaphor for the present. This history is doused in a patriotic whitewash, whereby particular events are
chosen but not others that are perhaps more indicative and relevant to the current situation. Further, the
parallels put forward by Obama are not parallels at all; the nature of surveillance, global politics,
globalization, and technology are not the same as they were 200 or so years ago. This history serves to
maintain the states self-image over time. Campbell (1998: 130) notes that the American quasi-war with
France demonstrated how previously established discursive strategies of otherness could be invoked in
novel circumstances to provide powerful modes of understanding. Much in the same way, President
Obamas return to history serves not only to ground justifications for NSA activities in seemingly consistent
practices of state surveillance, but also in actions against threats from an other, in this case, the British
during the Revolutionary War. Threats in cyberspace come from a plethora of sources, including: other
states, non-state actors, rogue Americans, or even cyberspace itself. Obamas second rhetorical move is to
argue for American exceptionalism. He goes on to note, But Americas capabilities are unique, and the
power of new technologies means that there are fewer and fewer technical constraints on what we can do.
That places a special obligation on us to ask tough questions about what we should do. The justification for
(at least toned down) policies of NSA surveillance centers on the notion that someone has to do it, and
we can do it better than anyone else. Americas status as the worlds only superpower, as President
Obama declares, opens itself up for interrogation. At the end of his speech on NSA reforms, President
Obama demonstrates, perhaps unintentionally, that ontological insecurity is a powerful motivator for the

whats really at stake is how

we remain true to who we are in a world that is remaking itself at
dizzying speed. Whether its the ability of 42 individuals to
communicate ideas, to access information that would have once
filled every great library in every country in the world, or to forge
bonds with people on the other side of the globe, technology is
remaking what is possible for individuals and for institutions and for
the international order . This is not to say that the United States consciously and reflexively

United States in cyberspace: When you cut through the noise,

recognizes its ontological insecurity in its relationship to cyberspace. However, the examples that are
raised concerning the dangers of cyberspacefrom cyberspace as a mechanism for terrorist mobilization
to cyber wars of the futuredo not paint an entirely clear picture of what makes cyberspace something
truly different in global politics. This shift is not universal, or at least to the same degree, for every state.

Cyberspace may provide a vehicle for dissent, organization, etc. for

every state, but it burdens states that are fixed in terms of physical
security and depend on an idealized self-image. States are pressured into
explaining the contradictions that arise as a result of their self-image (freedom, openness, transparence,
for example) and state-led intrusions into cyberspace. Foreign Policies of the Internet: Surveillance and
Disclosure Revisited The 2014 Milton Wolf Seminar brought to bear, and framed well, this theoretical
construction of state ontological security in international relations. In particular, many of the presentations
dealt with the critical problematic of the balance that must be struck between state self-interest by way of
national security and internet diplomacy, global governance, and transparency. Panelists discussed this
problematic in various contexts ranging from state censorship of information, international law, and state

The internet, and cyberspace more generally, has very real

physical characteristics that are often forgotten in discourses of a
borderless digital world or the metaphor of the internet as a cloud. Indeed , the
internet is built upon a physical framework, logical building blocks,
and interaction (Choucri 2012); and each of these layers carries very
real political ramifications. State ontological security in cyberspace, as described above,
sovereignty.

assumes the structural realities of power in international relations regarding the internet, and seeks to
elaborate upon how states, beyond concern for their physical security, come to justify surveillance
practices on the internet. In this sense, the Milton Wolf Seminar proved invaluable as practitioners and
scholars sought to elaborate upon the role of the internet, censorship, privacy, and surveillance in diverse
contexts including the national policies and practices of Russia, South Africa, the United States, China, and
Britain. Further, the seminar participants elaborated upon shifting or different physical as well as contentlayer considerations that need to be taken into account, such as changing modes of internet use, types of
surveillance practices, and statecraft in the digital age. The discussion held over the course of the two-day
seminar invoked more questions than answers; analysis of such issues has thus far moved, as one seminar
participant described, glacially alongside the need for internet governance. Thus, the seminar was both

timely and a necessary given the salience of internet security, privacy, and surveillance in international
politics, along with the perhaps shifting role of the state, and traditional concepts of international politics:
state power, sovereignty, and global governance

Domestic surveillance is a necessary starting point

surveillance is a critical facet in the historically contingent
construction of race under the neoliberal order of Empire.
Kundnani, New York University media culture and
communication professor, and Kumar, Rutgers University
media studies and Middle East studies professor, 2015
[Arun and Deepa, Race, surveillance, and empire
http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, accessed 7-11-15,
TAP]
In what follows, we argue that the debate on national security
surveillance that has emerged in the United States since the
summer of 2013 is woefully inadequate, due to its failure to place
questions of race and empire at the center of its analysis. It is racist
ideas that form the basis for the ways national security surveillance
is organized and deployed, racist fears that are whipped up to
legitimize this surveillance to the American public, and the
disproportionately targeted racialized groups that have been most
efective in making sense of it and organizing opposition. This is as
true today as it has been historically: race and state surveillance are
intertwined in the history of US capitalism. Likewise, we argue that the
history of national security surveillance in the United States is
inseparable from the history of US colonialism and empire. The
argument is divided into two parts. The first identifies a number of
moments in the history of national security surveillance in North
America, tracing its imbrication with race, empire, and capital, from
the settler-colonial period through to the neoliberal era. Our focus
here is on how race as a sociopolitical category is produced and
reproduced historically in the United States through systems of
surveillance. We show how throughout the history of the United
States the systematic collection of information has been interwoven
with mechanisms of racial oppression. From Anglo settlercolonialism, the establishment of the plantation system, the post
Civil War reconstruction era, the US conquest of the Philippines, and
the emergence of the national security state in the post-World War II
era, to neoliberalism in the post-Civil Rights era, racialized
surveillance has enabled the consolidation of capital and empire . It
is, however, important to note that the production of the racial
other at these various moments is conjunctural and heterogenous.
That is, the racialization of Native Americans, for instance, during the
settler-colonial period took diferent forms from the racialization of

African Americans. Further, the dominant construction of Blackness

under slavery is diferent from the construction of Blackness in the
neoliberal era; these ideological shifts are the product of specific
historic conditions . In short, empire and capital, at various moments,
determine who will be targeted by state surveillance , in what ways,
and for how long. In the second part, we turn our attention to the current
conjuncture in which the politics of the War on Terror shape national
security surveillance practices. The intensive surveillance of Muslim
Americans has been carried out by a vast security apparatus that
has also been used against dissident movements such as Occupy
Wall Street and environmental rights activists, who represent a
threat to the neoliberal order. This is not new; the process of
targeting dissenters has been a constant feature of American
history. For instance, the Alien and Sedition Acts of the late 1790s
were passed by the Federalist government against the Jefersonian
sympathizers of the French Revolution. The British hanged Nathan
Hale because he spied for Washingtons army in the American
Revolution. State surveillance regimes have always sought to
monitor and penalize a wide range of dissenters, radicals, and
revolutionaries. Race was a factor in some but by no means all of
these cases. Our focus here is on the production of racialized
others as security threats and the ways this helps to stabilize
capitalist social relations . Further, the current system of mass
surveillance of Muslims is analogous to and overlaps with other
systems of racialized security surveillance that feed the mass
deportation of immigrants under the Obama administration and that
disproportionately target African Americans, contributing to their
mass incarceration and what Michelle Alexander refers to as the
New Jim Crow .4 We argue that racialized groupings are produced in
the very act of collecting information about certain groups deemed
as threats by the national security statethe Brown terrorist, the
Black and Brown drug dealer and user, and the immigrant who
threatens to steal jobs. We conclude that security has become one
of the primary means through which racism is ideologically
reproduced in the post-racial, neoliberal era . Drawing on W. E. B.
Duboiss notion of the psychological wage, we argue that
neoliberalism has been legitimized in part through racialized notions
of security that ofer a new psychological wage as compensation
for the decline of the social wage and its reallocation to homeland
security.

The 1AC is a prerequisite to the alternative the 1AC

posits a critique of the national security state that is a
better starting point and explanation for the current
manifestations of the impact of the K than the alternative.
Kundnani, New York University media culture and
communication professor, and Kumar, Rutgers University
media studies and Middle East studies professor, 2015
[Arun and Deepa, Race, surveillance, and empire
http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, accessed 7-11-15,
TAP]
The election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 was said to have
ushered in a new post-racial era, in which racial inequalities were meant to be a thing
of the past. African Americans and Muslim Americans placed their hopes
in Obama, voting for him in large numbers. But in the so-called postracial era, the security narrative of hard-working families (coded
white) under threat from dangerous racial others has been as
powerful as ever. The unprecedented mass deportation of more than
two million people during the Obama presidency is one form taken
by this post-racial racialized securitization. Over the last two decades, the
progressive criminalization of undocumented immigrants has been
achieved through the building of a militarized wall between Mexico
and the United States, hugely expanding the US border patrol, and
programs such as Secure Communities, which enables local police departments to access immigration

It has
resulted in migrants being increasingly likely to be profiled,
arrested, and imprisoned by local police officers, before being
passed to the federal authorities for deportation. Undocumented migrants can
databases. Secure Communities was introduced in 2008 and stepped up under Obama.

no longer have any contact with police officers without risking such outcomes. There is an irony in the way

fears of illegal immigration threatening jobs and the public

purse have become stand-ins for real anxieties about the neoliberal
collapse of the old social contract: the measures that such fears lead
toracialization and criminalization of migrantsthemselves serve
to strengthen the neoliberal status quo by encouraging a precarious
labor market. Capital, after all, does not want to end immigration
but to profit from a vast exploitable labor pool that exists under
precarious conditions, that does not enjoy the civil, political and
labor rights of citizens and that is disposable through deportation .66
What brings together these diferent systems of racial oppression
mass incarceration, mass surveillance, and mass deportationis a
security logic that holds the imperial state as necessary to keeping
American families (coded white) safe from threats abroad and at
home. The ideological work of the last few decades has cultivated not only racial security fears but also
an assumption that the security state is necessary to keep us safe. In this sense, security has
become the new psychological wage to aid the reallocation of the
welfare states social wage toward homeland security and to win
that

support for empire in the age of neoliberalism. Through the notion

of security, social and economic anxieties generated by the
unraveling of the Keynesian social compact have been channeled
toward the Black or Brown street criminal, welfare recipient, or
terrorist . In addition, as Susan Faludi has argued, since 9/11, this homeland in need of
security has been symbolized, above all, by the white domestic
hearth of the prefeminist fifties, once again threatened by mythical
frontier enemies, hidden subversives, and racial aggressors. That
this idea of the homeland coincides culturally with the denigration
of capable women, the magnification of manly men, the heightened
call for domesticity, the search for and sanctification of helpless
girls points to the ways it is gendered as well as racialized .67

Reformism Contention
Radical critiques of the criminal justice system mislocate
the proximate cause of racism reforms are necessary
and good from within institutions.
-

Prison abolition/Rodriguez k alt bad doesnt solve racism

Perm solves
AT: Reform Prisons v Legalize weed

Wilkinson, US Court of Appeals 4th Circuit judge, 2014

[J Harvie, former University of Virginia law professor and former DOJ civil
rights attorney, Vanderbilt Law Review, In Defense of American, Criminal
Justice http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2014/06/InDefense-of-American-Criminal-Justice.pdf, p.1168-1172, accessed 9-29-14,
TAP]
when a very
large section of the citizenryAfrican-Americansfeel oppressed by
or excluded from it? Is this a reason to discredit American criminal
justice? The reaction to the verdict in the George Zimmerman trial in July 2013in parts angry,
One final count in the indictment remains. Can we truly call a system democratic

reflective, and resignedreminded us that many African-Americans feel as though the criminal justice
system does not work for them. Washington Post columnist Eugene Robinson argued, Our society
considers young black men to be dangerous, interchangeable, expendable, guilty until proven

John McWhorter
argued that, for African-Americans, the poisonous relationship
between young black men and law enforcement is the prime
manifestation of racism in modern America.363 And President Obama noted that
innocent.362 Manhattan Institute scholar and New Republic contributor

the African American community is looking at this issue through a set of experiences and history that
doesnt go away, one wrapped up in a history of racial disparities in the application of our criminal
law.364

There is something to these criticisms. Americans have tried to

address them over the years by requiring objective, race-neutral
justifications for government actions within the criminal justice
system. We have, for example, required that the jury venire be composed of a fair cross-section of the
community,365 and in Batson v. Kentucky,366 the Supreme Court outlawed the use of peremptory
challenges of jurors based upon their race. We can insist that objective criteria support stop and frisks. And

we can focus on racial discrepancies in criminal-law enforcement

which may lead, for example, to four times as many marijuana arrests for black Americans as white
Americans, despite similar rates of use.367

But eforts such as these wont solve our problems altogether. This
is because the story is more complicated than simply a criminal
justice system that has failed to win the trust and confidence of
many in the African-American community. The problem of racial
equality and criminal justice is one of painful complexity.368 We
can acknowledge that we have not yet reached our goal of race
neutrality in the dispensation of justice while acknowledging also
that this alone does not account for the racial makeup of our prisons
and halfway houses. ThenNew York Mayor Michael Bloomberg stated, Ninety percent of all
people killed in our cityand 90 percent of all those who commit the murders and other violent crimes
are black and Hispanic.369 That is the great double-edged sword. It understandably leads to more stops

and more arrests in high-crime areas. It understandably leads to more convictions of those of whatever
race who commit the crimes. But it also leads to understandable anger and resentment on the part of
disadvantaged young black males who want to make a decent go of American life, only to find themselves
the object of recurrent false suspicion and repeated frisks.

The solution to the problem of race and criminal justice is not a total
overhaul of the system. That just renders the criminal justice system
the scapegoat for a much larger set of social problems. The criminal
justice system feels the efects of those problems; it does not cause
them. Drug and gun crimes are not any less a blight upon society because of the racial makeup of the
offenders; indeed, as Robinson noted, [N]owhere will you find citizens more supportive of tough law-and-

Our criminal justice system

rightly aims to reduce dangerous behavior, and the beneficiaries of
success in that endeavor may be those less advantaged citizens for
whom basic safety will make for greater opportunity, not to mention
better prospects for a brighter life.
order policies than in poor, high-crime neighborhoods.370

To cast ceaseless blame on Americas criminal justice system is to

ignore the enormity of the problems it has been asked to solve. It
only diverts attention from the larger ways in which America has
failed its underclass. As Michael Gerson recently noted, The problem of African
American boys and young men is a complex mix of lingering racial
prejudice, urban economic dislocation, collapsing family structure,
failing schools and sick, atomized communities.371 To chastise
criminal justice when many levers of upward mobility are so
compromised is an inversion of priorities. A complete fix of what
the critics allege ails criminal justice will do nothing to restore
shattered family structures, improve failing schools, impart
necessary job skills, restore religious and community support
groups, or provide meaningful alternatives in deprived
neighborhoods to the gangs and drug rings that steer young people
toward lifelong addictions and lives of crime. Society doesnt create
opportunity by sacrificing the basic social need for order . To the contrary,
improvements in communities and institutions will only take root in
the kind of safe environment that, at its best, a strong criminal
justice system can provide. And when we provide opportunity, we in
turn reduce the pressure on the criminal justice system and lessen
the monumental task that lack of opportunity for the poorest
Americans has left it to perform.
How a society chooses to balance justice and safety with rights and liberties will invariably be the subject
of vigorous debate. Our criminal justice system is no exception. Many good and intelligent people will

We should not
grow complacent in the face of particular problems, both for the sake of
disagree passionately about the contours of our criminal law. That is all to the good.
individual defendants and for the rule of law itself.

instead of engaging in a constructive debate about the American

approach to criminal justice, legal elites largely have condemned the
entire enterprise. The system, we are told, is broken, and only
sweeping reforms imposed from on high can save it. But the rhetoric
that fuels the wholesale assault upon the system not only will fail to
But

achieve any meaningful change, it obscures the many strengths of

our institutions. By focusing so much on what is wrong, we inevitably forget what is right.
The terms of engagement must change. My call is not for scholars to
whitewash our systems failings but to realize the picture is far
more nuanced and complex than they have presented it. Given the volume
of matters it is asked to address and immensity of the task it is asked to perform, our criminal
justice system functions rather well. It is both unrealistic and
uncharitable to portray the system as an engine of oppression and
injustice. Ironically, many of the features that critics claim operate one-sidedly against defendants
often work to their benefit. The American criminal justice system strikes a valuable front-end note. It
strikes difficult balances between protecting the innocent and convicting the guilty, between procedural
protections and administrative realities. It rightly allows these contestable choices to be made
democratically, but only to a point. Such qualities are hardly the hallmarks of a failed system.
Indeed, those who have been among the most persistent critics of the criminal justice system were among
the first to call for its utilization in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks.372 And since that
time, the refrain has often been that acts of terrorism are crimes that should be dealt with in the

I recognize that this plea

for criminal trials does not constitute an acknowledgment of the
systems perfection, but it does indicate that the system imparts a
legitimacy for the deprivation of liberty that other routes of trying suspected
customary way through enforcement of federal criminal law.373

terrorists may lack. This is no place to explore the complicated question of whether alleged terrorism is
more aptly regarded as a criminal offense or as an act of war. Separation of powers concerns and the need
for action to prevent mass casualties make the question an exceptionally complicated one. I note only the
irony that many who reject the considerable virtues of the American criminal justice system are at least
prepared to look upon it as a preferred solution when the values of liberty and security are in epochal
tension.

To be sure, there is plenty of room for reform, and all parts of the legal profession
should head for the front lines. But let us not forget our systems virtues as we
seek to correct its vices. Otherwise, any legitimate concerns will be
lost in the din of diatribe. We have gone too long without a degree of
balance or moderation in our assessment of the American criminal
justice system. It is time we gave our institutions a fair trial .

Reformism is efective and brings the revolution closer

intellectual idealism is a privileged mode of thought that
fails to eradicate racism.
Delgado, University of Alabama minority scholar and chair
of law, 2009
[Richard, in Arguing about Law, Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want http://books.google.com/books?
id=g75cAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1&lpg=PA1&dq=arguing+about+law&source=bl&
ots=8q7fJpE0h&sig=Y2nyM2lsR2roG3IEFPisRXGs3Q8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=zfooVJrlOo6gy
ASRmYDwCw&ved=0CEsQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=imperialistic&f=false,
p.589-90, accessed 9-29-14, TAP]

2. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform

Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental
change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that
must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social system survives by
using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression . Those who
control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory
of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just. In fact, Crits believe that
teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching
incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure. To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law
professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to find rationality and order in the case law, and
teach in an unabashedly political fashion.

The CLS critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and

wrong. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised
Land is at hand. The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other
oppressed peoples how they should interpret events afecting them.
A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for
heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, or it
may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families
warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable
academic working in a warm office. It smacks of paternalism to
assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty
of heat now, unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence.
some incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes
closer, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce
complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat . The
welfare family may hold a tenants union meeting in their heated living room. CLS scholars critique of
piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities, and neglects the
question of whether total change, when it comes, will be what we
want.
Indeed,

3. CLS idealism
scholars idealism transforms social
reality into a mental construct.46 Facts become intelligible only through the categories of
The CLS program is also idealistic.45 CLS

thought that we bring to experience. Crits argue that the principle impediments to achieving an ideal
society are intellectual. People are imprisoned by a destructive system of mental categories that blocks
any vision of a better world.47 Liberal-capitalist ideology so shackles individuals that they willingly accept

Changing the world requires

primarily that we begin to think about it diferentl y.48 To help break the mental
a truncated existence and believe it to be the best available.

chains and clear the way for the creation of a new and better world, Crits practice trashing a process
by which law and social structures are shown to be contingent, inconsistent and irrationally supportive of
the status quo without good reason.49

CLS scholars idealism has a familiar ring to minority ears. We cannot

help but be reminded of those fundamentalist preachers who have assured us
that our lot will only improve once we see the light and are saved.
Are the chains really mental? They may be so for members of
privileged groups. They are much less so for minorities. Imagine that

all laws were repealed. Would our lot

improve? That proposition is open to serious doubt. The forces that
hold us back are not largely mental, legal, or even political. What holds us back is, simply,
racism the myriad of insults, threats, indifference, and other microaggressions to which we are
the Crits trashing program succeeded and that

continually exposed.50

intellectuals, they assign a large role to reason and

ideology. Yet reason and ideology do not explain all evil. Telling an
individual that he or she harbors racism will not make it go away;
telling a black person that a rebuf was racially motivated will not
ease its sting. Racism will not go away simply because Crits show that legalisms are indeterminate,
that rights are alienating and legitimizing, and that law is a reflection of the interests
of the ruling class. Whatever utility these concepts may have in other settings and in
attempting to explain the angst of CLS members,51 they have limited application in
helping to understand, much less cure, racism.
Because the Crits are

Revolution requires a strategy reforms pave the way to

revolution creating a dichotomy between reform and
revolution fails to cause systemic change.
Wray, International Socialist Group, 4-14-14
[Ben, The case for revolutionary reforms
http://internationalsocialist.org.uk/index.php/2014/04/the-case-forrevolutionary-reforms/, accessed 9-29-14, TAP]

But as Ive discussed in the previous five parts of this series,

getting from where we are to

a revolutionary transformation that overthrows the dominant property relations of the

capitalist economy and replaces them with social relations based on
democratic control of the worlds resources is not as simple as
declaring our desire for it to be so. I saw a petition on change.org the other day
proposing the overthrow of capitalism. If one million people signed that petition
and one million people signed a further petition to introduce full
collective bargaining rights for trade-unions in the UK, which one
would move us closer to the overthrow of capitalism? I wager the
latter.
Whilst having an end goal in sight is important, most people dont
change their thinking about the world based on bold visions of what
could be done at some point in the future : they change their ideas
based on evidence from their material lives which points to the
inadequacy or irrationality of the status quo. In other words, we
need to have ideas that build upon peoples lived experience of
capitalism, and since that it is within the framework of a representative democracy system, we
need ideas based around proposals for reforms. At the same time
those reforms have to help rather than hinder a move to more

revolutionary transformation that challenges the very core of the

capitalist system.
The dialectic of reform and revolution
What we need, therefore, is a strategy of revolutionary reforms . Such a
notion would appear as a contradiction in terms to many who identify as reformists or

revolutionaries and see the two as dichotomous, but there is no

reason why this should be the case. Indeed, history has shown that
revolutionary transformations have always happened as a dialectical
interaction between rapid, revolutionary movements and more
institutional, reform-based challenges. Even the revolutionary part
of that dialectic has always been motivated by the immediate needs
of the participants involved land, bread and peace being the first half of the slogan of
the Russian Revolution.
What does a strategy of revolutionary

reforms entail? Ed Rooksby explains that it is a

political strategy that builds towards revolutionary change by using
reforms to push up against the limits of the logic of capitalism in
practice:
At

first these feasible objectives will be limited to reforms within

capitalismor at least to measures which, from the standpoint of a
more or less reformist working class consciousness, appear to be
legitimate and achievable within the system, but which may actually
run counter to the logic of capitalism and start to push up against its limits. As the
working class engages in struggle, however, the anti-capitalist
implications of its needs and aspirations are gradually revealed. At
the same time, through its experience of struggle for reform, the
working class learns about its capacity for self-management,
initiative and collective decision and can have a foretaste of what
emancipation means. In this way struggle for reform helps prepare
the class psychologically, ideologically and materially for revolution .
The late Daniel Bensaid expressed this argument through the lens of the
history of the socialist movement:
In reality all sides in the controversy agree on the fundamental points inspired by The Coming
Catastrophe (Lenins pamphlet of the summer of 1917) and the Transitional Programme of the Fourth
International (inspired by Trotsky in 1937): the need for transitional demands, the politics of alliances (the
united front), the logic of hegemony and on the dialectic (not antinomy) between reform and revolution.
We are therefore against the idea of separating an (anti-neoliberal) minimum programme and an (anti-

consistent antineoliberalism leads to anti-capitalism and that the two are

interlinked by the dynamic of struggle.
capitalist) maximum programme. We remain convinced that a

revolutionary reforms means a policy agenda that, as Alberto

Toscano has put it, at one and the same time make concrete gains
within capitalism which permits further movement against
capitalism. The Italian marxist Antonio Gramsci described this approach as a war of positon.
So

Racial progress has occurred though legal change and

more is still possible reject monolithic theories of racism
because they doom resistance to be self-fulfilling and lack
empirical validity.
Omi, University of California Berkeley ethnic studies
professor, and Winant, University of California Santa
Barbara sociology professor, 2013
[Michael and Howard, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961973, Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias Social Text,
accessed 9-29-14, TAP]

white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable

and permanent. There is little sense that the white racial frame evoked by systemic racism
theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important
rearrangements and reforms as merely a distraction from more
ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that
continue to define US society (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias
use a concept they call surface flexibility to argue that white elites
frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely
engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial
oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase racial democracy is an oxymoron a word defined in
In Feagin and Elias's account,

the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a
contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that

we disagree. The USA

is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a
racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less
inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for
that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (postpeople of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA,

Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism?

Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of eforts
to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy,
and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities
in different institutional sites employment, health, education persist and in many cases have
increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in
racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example,
was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by
predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened

It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white

racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout
US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and
turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World
War and the civil rights era.
tremendously.

Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the
changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we

overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of

huge racial inequalities (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its
wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about racial reaction in a chapter of that name,
and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps

While we argue that the right wing

was able to rearticulate race and racism issues to roll back some of
the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are
limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political
landscape.
because they are in substantial agreement with us.

the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing

at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial
conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period , in
ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of
the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful
democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the
results of unprecedented political mobilizations , led by the black movement, but
not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces,
as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the
Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler),
as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late
Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his interest convergence hypothesis
efectively explains all these developments . How does Lyndon Johnson's famous
So we agree that

(and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 We have lost the South
for a generation count as convergence?

The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As

Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation
of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen
as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime under
movement pressure was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists
that such reforms which he calls passive revolutions cannot be
merely symbolic if they are to be efective: oppositions must win real
gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not
absolute rule.
there were important if partial victories that shifted the
racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life.
And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the
broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social
interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across
civil society . Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most important
accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA
was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, racebased movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially
defined others and the democratization of structurally racist
societies, but also the recognition and validation by both the state
So yes, we think

and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity. These

demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated
not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black
movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards
equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other new
social movements: second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the
environmentalist and anti-war movements among others.
By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was
an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements
were subject to the same rearticulation (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that
produced the racial ideology of colourblindness and its variants;
indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the

Yet even their incorporation and containment,

even their confrontations with the various backlash phenomena of
the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly
contradictory ideology of colourblindness, reveal the
transformative character of the politicization of the social . While it is not
possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed
eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the
mainstream political arena that set of this transformation, shaping
both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are
evident in US politics today.
political right to counter them.

What are the political implications of contemporary racial trends?

anyone
writing about race and racism needs to frame terms with care and
precision, and we undoubtedly get fuzzy too from time to time. The absence of a careful approach
Feagin and Elias's use of racial categories can be imprecise. This is not their problem alone;

leads to racial lumping and essentialisms of various kinds. This imprecision is heightened in polemic. In
the Feagin and Elias essay the term whites at times refers to all whites, white elites, dominant white
actors and very exceptionally, anti-racist whites, a category in which we presume they would place
themselves. Although the terms black, African American and Latino appear, the term people of colour
is emphasized, often in direct substitution for black reference points.
In the USA today it is important not to frame race in a bipolar manner. The black/white paradigm made
more sense in the past than it does in the twenty-first century. The racial make-up of the nation has now
changed dramatically. Since the passage of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965, the USA has become
more coloured. A majorityminority national demographic shift is well underway. Predicted to arrive by
the mid-twenty-first century, the numerical eclipse of the white population is already in evidence locally
and regionally. In California, for example, non-Hispanic whites constitute only 39.7 per cent of the state's
population. While the decline in the white population cannot be correlated with any decline of white racial
dominance, the dawning and deepening of racial multipolarity calls into question a sometimes implicit and

Shifting
racial demographics and identities also raise general questions of
race and racism in new ways that the systemic racism approach is
not prepared to explain.3
sometimes explicit black/white racial framework that is evident in Feagin and Elias's essay.

Class questions and issues of panethnicizing trends, for example,

call into question what we mean by race, racial identity and race
consciousness. No racially defined group is even remotely uniform ;
groups that we so glibly refer to as Asian American or Latino are particularly heterogeneous. Some

have achieved or exceeded socio-economic parity with whites, while

others are subject to what we might call engineered poverty in
sweatshops, dirty and dangerous labour settings, or prisons.
Tensions within panethnicized racial groups are notably present , and
conflicts between racially defined groups (black/brown conflict, for example) are evident in both urban
and rural settings. A substantial current of social scientific analysis now argues that Asians and Latinos are
the new white ethnics, able to work toward whiteness4 at least in part, and that the black/white
bipolarity retains its distinct and foundational qualities as the mainstay of US racism (Alba and Nee 2005;
Perlmann 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters, Ueda and Marrow 2007).

We question that argument in light of the massive demographic

shifts taking place in the USA. Globalization, climate change and above all neoliberalism
on a global scale, all drive migration. The country's economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of
immigrants, low-wage workers and their families (including a new, globally based and very female, servant
class) without generating the sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms race and
racism, may be more limited than it was when the whitening of Europeans took place in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. In other words this argument's key precedent, the absorption of white immigrants
of a different color (Jacobson 1998), may no longer apply. Indeed, we might think of the assimilationist
model itself as a general theory of immigrant incorporation that was based on a historically specific case
study one that might not hold for, or be replicated by, subsequent big waves of immigration. Feagin and

systemic racism model, while ofering numerous important

insights, does not inform concrete analysis of these issues.
Elias's

It is important going forward to understand how groups are

diferentially racialized and relatively positioned in the US racial
hierarchy: once again racism must be seen as a shifting racial
project. This has important consequences, not only with respect to
emerging patterns of inequality, but also in regard to the degree of
power available to diferent racial actors to define, shape or contest
the existing racial landscape. Attention to such matters is largely absent in Feagin and
Elias's account. In their view racially identified groups are located in strict reference to the dominant white
racial frame, hammered into place, so to speak. As a consequence, they fail to examine how racially
subordinate groups interact and influence each others boundaries, conditions and practices. Because they
offer so little specific analysis of Asian American, Latino or Native American racial issues, the reader finds
her/himself once again in the land (real or imaginary, depending on your racial politics) of bipolar US racial
dynamics, in which whites and blacks play the leading roles, and other racially identified groups as well
as those ambiguously identified, such as Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans (MEASA) play at best
supporting roles, and are sometimes cast as extras or left out of the picture entirely.

We still want to acknowledge that blacks have been catching hell

and have borne the brunt of the racist reaction of the past several
decades. For example, we agree with Feagin and Elias's critique of the
reactionary politics of incarceration in the USA. The new Jim Crow
(Alexander 2012) or even the new slavery that the present system
practises is something that was just in its beginning stages when we
were writing Racial Formation. It is now recognized as a national and indeed global
scandal. How is it to be understood? Of course there are substantial
debates on this topic, notably about the nature of the prisonindustrial complex (Davis 2003, p. 3) and the social and cultural efects of
mass incarceration along racial lines. But beyond Feagin and Elias's
denunciation of the ferocious white racism that is operating here,
deeper political implications are worth considering . As Alexander (2012),
Mauer (2006), Manza and Uggen (2008) and movement groups like Critical Resistance and the Ella Baker
Center argue,

the upsurge over recent decades in incarceration rates for

black (and brown) men expresses the fear-based, law-and-order

appeals that have shaped US racial politics since the rise of
Nixonland (Perlstein 2008) and the Southern strategy. Perhaps even
more central, racial repression aims at restricting the increasing
impact of voters of colour in a demographically shifting electorate .
There is a lot more to say about this, but for the present two key points stand out: first, it is not an area

for all the horrors

and injustices that the new Jim Crow represents, incarceration,
profiling and similar practices remain political issues. These
practices and policies are not ineluctable and unalterable
dimensions of the US racial regime. There have been previous waves
of reform in these areas. They can be transformed again by mass
mobilization, electoral shifts and so on. In other words, resistance is not futile.
where Feagin and Elias and we have any sharp disagreement, and second,

Speaking of electoral shifts and the formal political arena, how should President Barack Obama be
politically situated in this discussion? How do Feagin and Elias explain Obama? Quite amazingly, his name
does not appear in their essay. Is he a mere token, an oreo, a shill for Wall Street? Or does Obama
represent a new development in US politics, a black leader of a mass, multiracial party that for sheer
demographic reasons alone might eventually triumph over the white people's party, the Republicans? If

we are in the
world of politics: neither the near-total white despotism depicted by Feagin
and Elias, nor a racially inclusive democracy.
the President is neither the white man's token nor Neo, the One,5 then once again

President Obama continues to enjoy widespread black support, although it is clear that he has not
protected blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in history. He has not explicitly criticized
the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over
workers rights particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of colour are
concentrated. He has not intervened to halt or slow foreclosures, except in ways that were largely
symbolic. Workers and lower-middle-class people were the hardest hit by the great recession and the
subprime home mortgage crisis, with black families faring worst, and Latinos close behind (Rugh and
Massey 2010); Obama has not defended them. Many writers have explained Obama's centrism and
unwillingness to raise the issue of race as functions of white racism (Sugrue 2010).

While
black folk have taken the hardest blows from the reactionary and
racist regime that has mostly dominated US politics since Reagan (if
not since Nixon), no united black movement has succeeded the
deaths of Malcolm and Martin. Although there is always important political activity
underway, a relatively large and fairly conservative black middle class, a
black bourgeoisie in Frazier's (1957) terms, has generally maintained its
position since the end of the civil rights era. Largely based in the public sector,
The black community and other communities of colour as well remains politically divided.

and including a generally centrist business class as well, this stratum has continued to play the role that
Frazier and before him, Charles S. Johnson. William Lloyd Warner, Alison Davis and other scholars
identified: vacillation between the white elite and the black masses. Roughly similar patterns operate in
Latino communities as well, where the working towards whiteness framework coexists with a substantial
amount of exclusion and super-exploitation.
Alongside class issues in communities of colour, there are significant gender issues. The disappearance of
blue-collar work, combined with the assault by the criminal justice system chiefly profiling by the police
(stop and frisk) and imprisonment, have both unduly targeted and victimized black and brown men,

Women of colour are also targeted, especially by

violence, discrimination and assaults on their reproductive rights
(Harris-Perry 2011); profiling is everywhere (Glover 2009).
especially youth.

Here again we are in the realm of racial politics. Debate proceeds in the black
community on Obama's credibilty, with Cornel West and Tavis Smiley leading the critics. But it seems safe
to say that in North Philly, Inglewood or Atlanta's Lakewood section, the president remains highly popular.
Latino support for Obama remains high as well. Feagin and Elias need to clarify their views on black and
brown political judgement. Is it attuned to political realities or has it been captured by the white racial
frame? Is Obama's election of no importance?

do Feagin and Elias really believe that white power is so

complete, so extensive, so sutured (as Laclau and Mouffe might say) as they suggest
here? Do they mean to suggest, in Borg-fashion, that resistance is futile?
This seems to be the underlying political logic of the systemic
racism approach, perhaps unintentionally so. Is white racism so ubiquitous that no
meaningful political challenge can be mounted against it ? Are black and
In conclusion,

brown folk (yellow and red people, and also others unclassifiable under the always- absurd colour
categories) utterly supine, duped, abject, unable to exert any political pressure? Is such a view of race and
racism even recognizable in the USA of 2012? And is that a responsible political position to be advocating?
Is this what we want to teach our students of colour? Or our white students for that matter?

racial conflict,
both within (and against) the state and in everyday life, is a
fundamentally political process. We think that they would also accept our claim that the
ongoing political realities of race provide extensive evidence that
people of colour in the USA are not so powerless , and that whites
are not so omnipotent, as Feagin and Elias's analysis suggests them to be.
We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that

there are contradictions in racial

oppression. The racial formation approach reveals that white racism is unstable and
constantly challenged , from the national and indeed global level
down to the personal and intra-psychic conflicts that we all
experience, no matter what our racial identity might be. While
racism largely white continues to flourish, it is not monolithic . Yes,
there have been enormous increases in racial inequality in recent
years. But movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and
sometimes scores victories. Challenges to white racism continue
both within the state and in civil society. Although largely and properly led by people
Racial formation theory allows us to see that

of colour, anti-racist movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and Elias themselves.

Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for which they

fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their leaders may
be co-opted or even eliminated, but racial subjectivity and self-awareness,
unresolved and conflictual both within the individual psyche and the
body politic, abides. Resistance is not futile .

Pessimism fails it foregoes legitimate reforms, creates

defeatism, crushes movements, and results in pursuing
simplistic and counter-productive proposals.
Kennedy, Harvard University law profeesor, 2012

[Randall, Race, Crime, and the Law http://books.google.com/books?

id=TE3cE4UnghgC&pg=PA388&lpg=PA388&dq=kennedy,+%22True,
+it+is+sometimes+genuinely+difficult+to+determine+an+appropriate+rem
edial+response
%22&source=bl&ots=4eTFbno1dG&sig=yox9NLgt7uA_pAeDhrB7FOPmCzU&h
l=en&sa=X&ei=kIopVKuSC81sQTD14CgDQ&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=kennedy%2C
%20%22True%2C%20it%20is%20sometimes%20genuinely%20difficult%20to
%20determine%20an%20appropriate%20remedial%20response%22&f=false,
p.388-9, accessed 9-29-14, TAP]

it is sometimes genuinely difficult to determine an appropriate

remedial response. The proper way to address that difficulty,
however, is to acknowledge and grapple with it, not bury it beneath
unbelievable assertions that, in fact, no real problem exists. Whitewashing racial
wrongs (especially while simultaneously proclaiming that courts are doing everything reasonably
possible to combat racially invidious government action) corrupts officials and jades
onlookers, nourishing simplistic, despairing, and defeatist critiques
of the law that are profoundly destructive.
True,

an antidote to these
defeatist critiques by acknowledging that the administration of criminal
law has changed substantially for the better over the past half
century and that there is reason to believe that, properly guided, it
can be improved even more. Today there are more formal and
informal protections against racial bias than ever before , both in terms of
The second impression that I want to leave with readers should serve as
overwrought,

the protections accorded to blacks against criminality and the treatment accorded to black suspects,

That deficiencies, large deficiencies, remain is clear.

But comparing racial policies today to those that prevailed in 1940
or 1960 or even 1980 should expose the fallacy of asserting that
nothing substantial has been changed for the better.
defendants, and convicts.

This point is worth stressing because of the prevalence and prominence of

pessimistic thinking about the race question in American life. Some
commentators maintain, in all seriousness, that there has been no
significant improvement in the overall fortunes of black Americans
during the past half century, that advances that appear to have been made
are merely cosmetic, and that the United States is doomed to remain a pigmentocracy. This
pessimistic strain often turns paranoid and apocalyptic in
commentary about the administration of criminal law.
It is profoundly misleading, however, to focus exclusively on the ugliest
aspects of the American legal order . Doing so conceals real
achievements : the Reconstruction Constitutional Amendments, the
Reconstruction civil rights laws, Strauder v. Alabama, Dempsey v. Moore, Brown v. Mississippi, Powell
v. Alabama, Norris v. Alabama, Batson v. Kentucky, the resuscitation of Reconstruction by the civil rights
movement, the

changing demographics of the bench, bar, and police

departmentsin sum, the stigmatization (albeit incomplete) of invidious racial bias.

Neglecting

these achievements robs them of support . Recent sharp attacks upon basic
guarantees bequeathed by the New Deal ought to put everyone on notice of the perils of permitting social
onedimensional condemnations of the racial situation in America
renders attractive certain subversive proposals that are, given
actual conditions, foolish, counterproductive , and immoral. I think here in
accomplishments to lose their rightful stature in the public's estimation. Moreover,

particular of the call for racially selective jury nullification. Such proposals should be openly challenged on
the grounds that they fundamentally misperceive the racial realities of American life.

The law is problematic but it is a lived reality the only

efective method is redeploying institutional logic against
itself.
Crenshaw, University of California Los Angeles law
professor, 1988
[Kimberle, Harvard law review, RACE, REFORM, AND RETRENCHMENT:
TRANSFORMATION AND LEGITIMATION IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1341398.pdf?
acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true, JSTOR, p.1366-8, accessed 9-29-14, TAP]
The Critics' product is of limited utility to Blacks in its present form .
The implications for Blacks of trashing liberal legal ideology are troubling, even though it may be proper to
assail belief structures that obscure liberating possibilities. Trashing legal ideology seems to tell us
repeatedly what has already been established -- that legal discourse is unstable and relatively

trashing ofers no idea of how to avoid the

negative consequences of engaging in reformist discourse or how to
work around such consequences. Even if we imagine the wrong world when we think in
terms of legal discourse, we must nevertheless exist in a present world where legal
protection has at times been a blessing -- albeit a mixed one . The
fundamental problem is that, although Critics criticize law because it functions
to legitimate existing institutional arrangements, it is precisely this
legitimating function that has made law receptive to certain
demands in this area.
indeterminate. Furthermore,

The Critical emphasis on deconstruction as the vehicle for liberation leads to the conclusion that engaging
in legal discourse should be avoided because it reinforces not only the discourse itself but also the society
and the world that it embodies. Yet Critics offer little beyond this observation. Their focus on

delegitimating rights rhetoric seems to suggest that, once rights

rhetoric has been discarded, there exists a more productive strategy
for change, one which does not reinforce existing patterns of
domination.
Unfortunately, no such strategy has yet been articulated, and it is
difficult to imagine that racial minorities will ever be able to discover
one. As Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward point out in their [*1367] excellent account of the civil
rights movement, popular struggles are a reflection of institutionally determined logic and a challenge to
that logic. 137

People can only demand change in ways that reflect the

logic of the institutions that they are challenging. 138 Demands for
change that do not reflect the institutional logic -- that is, demands
that do not engage and subsequently reinforce the dominant
ideology -- will probably be inefective . 139
The possibility for ideological change is created through the very process of legitimation, which is triggered

Powerless people can sometimes trigger such a crisis by challenging

an institution internally, that is, by using its own logic against it. 140
Such crisis occurs when powerless people force open and politicize a
contradiction between the dominant ideology and their reality. The
political consequences [*1368] of maintaining the contradictions
may sometimes force an adjustment -- an attempt to close the gap
or to make things appear fair. 141 Yet, because the adjustment is
triggered by the political consequences of the contradiction,
circumstances will be adjusted only to the extent necessary to close
the apparent contradiction.
by crisis.

This approach to understanding legitimation and change is applicable to the civil rights movement.
Because Blacks were challenging their exclusion from political society, the only claims that were likely to
achieve recognition were those that reflected American society's institutional logic: legal rights ideology.
Articulating their formal demands through legal rights ideology, civil rights protestors exposed a series of
contradictions -- the most important being the promised privileges of American citizenship and the practice

Rather than using the contradictions to suggest

that American citizenship was itself illegitimate or false, civil rights
protestors proceeded as if American citizenship were real, and
demanded to exercise the rights that citizenship entailed. By
seeking to restructure reality to reflect American mythology, Blacks
relied upon and ultimately benefited from politically inspired eforts
to resolve the contradictions by granting formal rights. Although it is the
of absolute racial subordination.

need to maintain legitimacy that presents powerless groups with the opportunity to wrest concessions
from the dominant order, it is the very accomplishment of legitimacy that forecloses greater possibilities .

In sum, the potential for change is both created and limited by

legitimation .

Institutional macropolitical policy engagement is vital to

solve any alternative results in failure to actualize
change, cooption, and moot activism
Lobel, University of San Diego assistant law professor,
2007
[Orly, Harvard law review, THE PARADOX OF EXTRALEGAL ACTIVISM:
CRITICAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS
http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/lobel.pdf, p.983-7,
accessed 9-29-14, TAP]
Both the practical failures and the fallacy of rigid boundaries
generated by extralegal activism rhetoric permit us to broaden our inquiry

to the underlying assumptions of current proposals regarding

transformative politics that is, attempts to produce meaningful changes in the political and
socioeconomic landscapes. The suggested alternatives produce a new image of social and political action.

This vision rejects a shared theory of social reform, rejects formal

programmatic agendas, and embraces a multiplicity of forms and
practices. Thus, it is described in such terms as a plan of no plan ,211
a project of pro-jects,212 anti-theory theory,213 politics rather than goals,214 presence
rather than power,215 practice over theory,216 and chaos and openness over order and
formality. As a result, the contemporary message rarely includes a
comprehensive vision of common social claims, but rather engages
in the description of fragmented eforts. As Professor Joel Handler argues, the
commonality of struggle and social vision that existed during the
civil rights movement has disappeared.217 There is no unifying
discourse or set of values , but rather an aversion to any
metanarrative and a resignation from theory. Professor Handler warns that this
move away from grand narratives is self-defeating precisely because
only certain parts of the political spectrum have accepted this new
stance: [T]he opposition is not playing that game . . . . [E]veryone
else is operating as if there were Grand Narratives . . . .218 Intertwined with
the resignation from law and policy, the new bromide of neither left nor right has become axiomatic only

The contemporary critical legal consciousness informs the

scholarship of those who are interested in progressive social
activism, but less so that of those who are interested, for example, in a
more competitive securities market. Indeed, an interesting recent development has
for some.219

been the rise of conservative public interest lawyer[ing].220 Although public interest law was originally
associated exclusively with liberal projects, in the past three decades conservative advocacy groups have
rapidly grown both in number and in their vigorous use of traditional legal strategies to promote their
causes.221 This growth in conservative ad-vocacy is particularly salient in juxtaposition to the decline of
traditional progressive advocacy. Most recently, some thinkers have even suggested that there may be
something inherent in the lefts conception of social change focused as it is on participation and
empowerment that produces a unique distrust of legal expertise.222
Once again, this conclusion reveals flaws parallel to the original disenchantment with legal reform.

Although the new extralegal frames present themselves as apt

alternatives to legal reform models and as capable of producing
significant changes to the social map, in practice they generate very
limited improvement in existing social arrangements . Most strikingly, the
cooptation effect here can be explained in terms of the most profound risk of the typology that of

The common pattern of extralegal scholarship is to describe

an inherent instability in dominant structures by pointing , for example, to
grassroots strategies,223 and then to assume that specific instances
of counterhegemonic activities translate into a more complete
transformation. This celebration of multiple micro-resistances seems
to rely on an aggregate approach an idea that the multiplication
of practices will evolve into something substantial. In fact , the myth
of engagement obscures the actual lack of change being produced ,
while the broader pattern of equating extralegal activism with social
reform produces a false belief in the potential of change . There are
few instances of meaningful reordering of social and economic
legitimation.

arrangements and macro-redistribution . Scholars write about decoding what is really

happening, as though the scholarly narrative has the power to unpack more than the actual conventional
experience will admit.224 Unrelated efforts become related and part of a whole through mere reframing.
the elephant in the room the rising level of economic inequality is
left unaddressed and comes to be understood as natural and inevitable.225 This is
precisely the problematic process that critical theorists decry as
losers self-mystification, through which marginalized groups come to see
systemic losses as the product of their own actions and thereby
begin to focus on minor achievements as representing the
boundaries of their willed reality.
At the same time,

micro-instances of activism are often fundamentally

performative, obscuring the distance between the descriptive and
the prescriptive. The manifestations of extralegal activism the law and organizing
The explorations of

model; the proliferation of informal, soft norms and norm-generating actors; and the celebrated, separate

all produce a fantasy that change can be

brought about through small-scale, decentralized transformation.
The emphasis is local, but the locality is described as a microcosm of
the whole and the audience is national and global. In the context of the
nongovernmental sphere of action

humanities, Professor Carol Greenhouse poses a comparable challenge to ethnographic studies from the
1990s, which utilized the genres of narrative and community studies, the latter including works on
American cities and neighborhoods in trouble.226 The aspiration of these genres was that each individual
story could translate into a time of the nation body of knowledge and motivation.227 In contemporary
legal thought, a corresponding gap opens between the local scale and the larger, translocal one. In reality,
although there has been a recent proliferation of associations and grassroots groups, few new local-statenational federations have emerged in the United States since the 1960s and 1970s, and many of the

There is,
therefore, an absence of links between the local and the national, an
absent intermediate public sphere, which has been termed the
missing middle by Professor Theda Skocpol.229 New social movements have for the most part
existing voluntary federations that flourished in the mid-twentieth century are in decline.228

failed in sustaining coalitions or producing significant institutional change through grassroots activism.

this failure is due in part to the ideas of

contingency, pluralism, and localism that are so embedded in
current activism.230 Is the focus on small-scale dynamics simply an
evasion of the need to engage in broader substantive debate ?
Professor Handler concludes that

It is important for next-generation progressive legal scholars, while

maintaining a critical legal consciousness, to recognize that not all
extralegal associational life is transformative . We must diferentiate,
for example, between inward-looking groups, which tend to be selfregarding and depoliticized, and social movements that participate
in political activities, engage the public debate, and aim to challenge
and reform existing realities.231 We must differentiate between professional associations
and more inclusive forms of institutions that act as trustees for larger segments of the community.232 As

extralegal activism tends to operate on a more divided

and hence a smaller scale than earlier social movements, which had
national reform agendas. Consequently, within critical discourse there is a need to
recognize the limited capacity of small-scale action. We should
question the narrative that imagines consciousness-raising as
directly translating into action and action as directly translating into
described above,

change. Certainly not every cultural description is political . Indeed,

it is questionable whether forms of activism that are opposed to
programmatic reconstruction of a social agenda should even be
understood as social movements. In fact, when groups are situated
in opposition to any form of institutionalized power, they may be
simply mirroring what they are fighting against and merely
producing moot activism that settles for what seems possible within
the narrow space that is left in a rising convergence of ideologies.
The original vision is consequently coopted , and contemporary
discontent is legitimated through a process of self-mystification .

Af

Solvency

Solvency General
Plan solves.
Unegbu, Howard University JD candidate, 2013
[Cindy, 57 How. L.J. 433, NOTE AND COMMENT: National Security
Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional
Misstep Lexis, accessed 7-6-15, TAP]
The grant of surveillance power to monitor individuals without
suspicion of criminal or terrorist activity and the ability to collect
personal information from various sources on the basis of race or
ethnicity has resulted in the discrimination of domestic individuals
who belong to a particular racial or ethnic group. This discrimination
is generated through a disparate impact that the new government
surveillance authority has on various ethnic and religious groups,
specifically those that are Arab, South Asian, or practitioners of the Islamic
religion. Through a balancing test of five factors established through Supreme
Court jurisprudence, it is apparent that there is sufficient indirect
evidence of the government's intent to discriminate. Because there is
an established intent to discriminate, the new government surveillance
authority and procedures can only be constitutionally upheld if the
acts are narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. The
compelling state interest is satisfied through the goal of nationally security;
however, the narrowly tailored prong fails because of the monitoring
system's over-inclusiveness. Therefore, the government national
security surveillance authority and procedures, via the NCTC
amendments and DIOG guidelines, are in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

Solvency 14th Amendment

Surveillance targets religious, ethnic, and racial
minorities disproportionately which violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Unegbu, Howard University JD candidate, 2013
[Cindy, 57 How. L.J. 433, NOTE AND COMMENT: National Security
Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional
Misstep Lexis, accessed 7-6-15, TAP]
you live in a society in which the government is allowed to
partake in intrusive surveillance measures without the
institutionalized checks and balances upon which the government
was founded. In this society, the government pursues citizens who
belong to a particular race or ethnicity, practice a certain religion, or
have affiliations with specific interest groups. Individuals who have
these characteristics are subject to surreptitious monitoring, which
includes undercover government officials disguising themselves as
community members in order to attend various community events
and programs. The government may also place these individuals on
watch lists, even where there is no evidence of wrongdoing. These
watch lists classify domestic individuals as potential or suspected
terrorists and facilitate the monitoring of their personal activity
through various law enforcement agencies for an extended period of
time. This "hypothetical" society is not hypothetical at all; in fact, it is the current state
of American surveillance. The government's domestic spying
activities have progressed to intrusive levels, primarily due to an
increased fear of terrorism. 1Link to the text of the note This fear has resulted
in governmental intelligence eforts that are focused on political
activists, racial and religious minorities, and immigrants . 2Link to the text
of the note [435] The government's domestic surveillance eforts are not
only geared toward suspected terrorists and those partaking in
criminal activity, but reach any innocent, non-criminal, non-terrorist
national, all in the name of national security. The government's
power to engage in suspicionless surveillance and track innocent
citizens' sensitive information has been granted through the
creation and revision of the National Counterterrorism Center 3Link to
the text of the note and the FBI's (Federal Bureau of Investigation) Domestic
Investigations and Operations Guide. 4Link to the text of the note The grant of
surveillance power has resulted in many opponents, including those
within the current presidential administration, who challenge the
order for numerous reasons. 5Link to the text of the note These reasons include the
Picture this:

inefficiency of storing citizens' random personal information for extended periods of time, 6Link to the text
of the note the broad unprecedented authority granted to this body of government without proper
approval from Congress, 7Link to the text of the note and the constitutional violations due to the

the widesweeping surveillance authority granted to the government results

deprivation of citizens' rights. 8Link to the text of the note [436] This Comment argues that

in a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection

Clause due to far-reaching domestic monitoring practices.
Surveillance practices, such as posing as members of the community and placing individuals
on watch lists without suspicion of terrorist activity, result in the impermissible
monitoring of individuals on the basis of their race or ethnicity.
These practices, although done in the name of national security, an
established compelling government interest, violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they are
not narrowly tailored to the stated interest. The procedures are not
narrowly tailored to the interest of national security because of the
over-inclusiveness of the measures.

K Advs Solvency

K Adv Public Key

As we continue to accept government surveillance, they
are able to continue
<Zach Beauchamp writer for Thinkprogress.org, contributed at Newsweek and the daily
beast. He has also written for other foreign policy magazines. Has BAs in philosophy and
political science from Brown University and a M.Sc in international relations form the London
School of economics June 7th 2013
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/06/07/2120141/why-the-nsas-secret-online-surveillanceshould-scare-you/ Why the NSAs secret online surveillance should scare you Accessed 7-82015 PAM>

The more we accept

perpetual government and corporate surveillance as the norm, the more
we change our actions and behavior to fit that expectation subtly but
inexorably corrupting the liberal ideal that each person should be free to live life as
they choose without fear of anyone else interfering with it. Put differently, George
That second reaction illustrates precisely why this program is so troubling.

Orwell isnt who you should be reading to understand the dangers inherent to the NSAs dragnet. Youd be
better off turning to famous French social theorist Michel Foucault.

Currently the government is unwilling to pass any more

surveillance reform, leaving it up to us
<Grant Gross covers news in technology policy in the government for IDG news services
June 5 2015 http://www.fastcoexist.com/3019312/heres-an-idea/could-a-new-privacyth

generation-change-our-surveillance-politics Could a New "Privacy Generation" Change Our

Surveillance Politics? Accessed 7-8-2015 PAM>

The Senate this week passed the USA Freedom Act, which aims to end the NSA's
mass collection of domestic phone records, and President Barack Obama signed the bill hours later.

After that action, expect Republican leaders in both the Senate and the
House of Representatives to resist further calls for surveillance reform. That
resistance is at odds with many rank-and-file lawmakers, including many House Republicans, who want to
further limit NSA programs brought to light by former agency contractor Edward Snowden .

Civil
liberties groups and privacy advocates also promise to push for more
changes. It may be difficult to get "broad, sweeping reform" through
Congress, but many lawmakers seem ready to push for more changes, said Adam Eisgrau, managing
director of the office of government relations for the American Library Association.

---

People are willing to get involved. Recent polls prove

<Stan Alcorn multi-media journalist based in New York City. Frequently reports for WNYC
and NPR. October 9th 2013 http://www.fastcoexist.com/3019312/heres-an-idea/could-anew-privacy-generation-change-our-surveillance-politics Could A New "Privacy Generation"
Change Our Surveillance Politics? Accessed 7-8-2015 PAM>

a recent poll conducted at the Center for Public Opinion at the

University of Massachusetts-Lowell, we asked a series of questions about
peoples willingness to trade privacy for security or vice versa. Across a
series of questions, we find that people under 40 are extremely
concerned about privacy issues and willing to sacrifice their safety
In

to keep their lives away from the eyes and ears of government
monitors, but that those over 40 are far more likely to trade their
privacy for security. The fact that younger people are more apt to be
anti-surveillance state may not contradict the conventional wisdom
of the Internet as much as it (apparently) does that of political scientists. But whether or not its
catalyst is 9/11, the generational divide does seem to suggest that the way our politicians balance privacy
and security will shift as the under-40s take control. The arc of history is long, but it bends toward the
youngs.

---

Uniqueness Racial Targeting Now

Domestic surveillance is inherently racist. Mass
surveillance will inevitably target marginalized
communities of color. Khalek 13
Khalek, Rania Rania Khalek is an independent journalist reporting on the underclass and marginalized. In
addition to her work for Truthout, she's written for Extra, The Nation, Al Jazeera America, the Electronic
Intifada and more. October 30 2013.Activists

of Color Lead Charge Against

Surveillance, NSA http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/19695-activists-of-color-at-forefront-of-antinsa-movement. July 8, 2015

Steven Renderos, national organizer for the Center for Media Justice, who
helped put together the panel, told Truthout that examining the legacy of
surveillance in communities of color could help lead to solutions.
"It's critical to understand the history so we can learn how to
dismantle it," Renderos said. "Those of us from marginalized
communities grew up in environments very much shaped by
surveillance, which has been utilized to ramp up the criminal justice
system and increase deportations," Renderos said. "It's having real
consequences in our communities where children are growing up without
parents in the home and families are being torn apart through raids and
deportations, a lot of which is facilitated through the use of
surveillance. "Panelist Fahd Ahmed, legal and policy director for the South
Asian-led social justice organization Desis Rising Up and Moving, argued that
mass surveillance is the predictable outgrowth of programs that
have targeted marginalized communities for decades. "Just by the very
nature of [the United States] being a settler-colonialist and capitalist
nation, race and social control are central to its project," Ahmed said.
"Anytime we see any levels of policing - whether it's day-to-day policing in
the streets, surveillance by the police or internet surveillance - social
control, particularly of those that resist the existing system,
becomes an inherent part of that system. "But, he warned, "These
policies are not going to be limited to one particular community. They're
going to continue to expand further and further" because "the surveillance
has a purpose, which is to exert the power of the state and control the
potential for dissent."Seema Sadanandan, program director for ACLU DC,
acknowledged the collective resentment felt by people of color who are
understandably frustrated that privacy violations are only now eliciting mass
public outrage when communities of color have been under aggressive
surveillance for decades. "The Snowden revelations represent a terrifying
moment for white, middle-class and upper-middle-class people in this
country, who on some level believe that the Bill of Rights and Constitution
were protecting their everyday lives," Sadanandan said. "For people of color
from communities with a history of discrimination and economic oppression
that prevents one from realizing any of those rights on a day-to-day basis, it
wasn't a huge surprise. "But Sadanandan argued that NSA surveillance still
"has particular concerns for communities of color because of their
unique relationship to the criminal justice or social control system, a

billion-dollar industry with regard to, for example, border patrol or data
mining as it's applied to racially profile." Sadanandan warned that NSA
surveillance more than likely would strengthen that system of
control.

The Black community is racially targeted by domestic

surveillance. Targeted surveillance is a form of anti-black
violence.
Cyril 15

Cyril, Malkia A.- Malkia Amala Cyril is founder and executive director of the Center for Media
Justice (CMJ) and co-founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network, a national network of 175
organizations working to ensure media access, rights, and representation for marginalized communities.
April
15
2015
Black
Americas
State
of
Surveillance
http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas-state-surveillance. July 7, 2015

government surveillance is laser-focused on the

revelations by Edward Snowden that millions of Americans were
being spied on by the NSA. Yet my mothers visit from the FBI reminds me that, from the slave pass
Today, media reporting on

system to laws that deputized white civilians as enforcers of Jim Crow,

black people and other people of color have lived for centuries with
surveillance practices aimed at maintaining a racial hierarchy. Its time for

to tell a new story that does not start the clock when privileged
classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to understand
that data has historically been overused to repress dissidence,
journalists

monitor perceived criminality, and perpetually maintain an

impoverished underclass. In an era of big data, the Internet has
increased the speed and secrecy of data collection. Thanks to new
surveillance technologies, law enforcement agencies are now able to
collect massive amounts of indiscriminate data. Yet legal protections
and policies have not caught up to this technological advance.

Concerned advocates see mass surveillance as the problem and

protecting privacy as the goal. Targeted surveillance is an obvious
answerit may be discriminatory, but it helps protect the privacy perceived as an earned privilege of the inherently
innocent. The trouble is, targeted surveillance frequently includes the
indiscriminate collection of the private data of people targeted by
race but not involved in any crime. For targeted communities, there
is little to no expectation of privacy from government or corporate
surveillance. Instead, we are watched, either as criminals or as
consumers. We do not expect policies to protect us. Instead, weve
birthed a complex and coded culturefrom jazz to spoken dialectsin
order to navigate a world in which spying, from AT&T and Walmart to
public benefits programs and beat cops on the block, is as much a
part of our built environment as the streets covered in our blood.

The violence of anti-blackness subjugates black existence.

The only way to solve is acknowledging the violence and
recognizing the Black identity within civil society.
R.L 13
R.L. R.L. is an informal theorist working on the problematic of racialised identities, gender and
communisation theory. June 5, 2013.

WANDERINGS OF THE SLAVE: BLACK LIFE AND

SOCIAL DEATH. http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/wanderings-slave-black-life-and-socialdeath. July 8, 2015.

This gratuitous violence, on the one hand, subjugates black existence to

an irrational accumulation of bodies, and subsequently produces a
condensed delimitation of blackness in space. Whether it was the
owning and trading of slaves or the contemporary phenomena of the
ghetto and mass incarceration, black existence is excluded and
stockpiled as so many objects within a spatial boundary. In this
condition, life is reduced to a statistical quantity, black existence is made
exchangeable with any other. Therefore, on the other hand, black existence
is also a fungible object, infinitely malleable in its content due to the
abstraction of its quality and open for use for anyone who can claim
subjecthood.11 These structural features come to their fullest
expression in the contemporary scenario of police shootings. The
endless stream of young black men shot by police borders on
excess, demonstrating the pure interchangeability of such names as
equivalents, meaning that such seemingly particular empirical cases
are in actuality a general condition. Blackness is as devalued as it is
susceptible to all aspects of material and social containment, control and
debility. Yet, in these instances, even morally indignant liberals are
complicit with anti-blackness by focusing on police shootings as a
contingent rather than structural feature of black existence . Often
such moral indignation emphasises the atrocious nature of such events and
spectacularises the use of excessive force so as to fundamentally produce a
completely inert body. Attention is then focalised on the excess of black
suffering, reducing the victim to a tabula rasa upon which all manners of
empathetic projection obscures the basis of a morbid white enjoyment that
garners pleasure through the depiction of excoriated black flesh.12 In short;
there is no prior positive blackness that could be potentially
appropriated. Black existence is , the violence of anti-blackness
produces black existence simultaneously produced and negated by
racial domination, both as presupposition and consequence.
Affirmation of blackness proves to be impossible without
simultaneously affirming the violence that structures black
subjectivity itself. And these conditions that procure black existence
consistently repeat the sombre refrain of anti-blackness: there is no black
identity, there is no black subject, there is no black life as such. As a
consequence, black existence is fundamentally marked by social
death, materially living as a sentient object but without a stable or
guaranteed social subjectivity. And as such, the status of blackness forms

the basis upon which white life can subjectivise itself, socially and materially
through the negation of the black body. White life recognises itself as a
positive counterpart to the non-subjecthood of blacks. However, Afropessimists claim that this relation between black death and white life is
not merely asymmetrical. The distinction between the two is
qualitatively diferent, and potential for reconciliation between
whites and blacks is impossible. This particular distinction instead
procures an antagonism in relation to the social totality. The
inordinate amount of violence perpetuated against blacks
naturalised and thus ontological means that such a situation is
untranslatable to any representable terms of experience or
identity. Such a structural feature of blackness mired in violence
cannot be related to contingent experiences of social, political or
economic violence, such as the struggles of workers or immigrants. Black
existence forms the bottom line, the condition of possibility, of general social
and material integration. It is not necessarily ones whiteness that
matters inasmuch as one is not black enabling entrance and
participation in civil society. Barred from the immanent capacities of
living, anti-blackness is the necessary ground for the definition and
propagation of life in general.13 In this way, Afro-pessimism also enacts a
political intervention onto the terrain of identity politics and multiracial
coalitions. Perhaps more generally, Afro-pessimism can be seen as a critique
of the Left and all forms of activism that participate in representational
politics. In the US, the past decades have seen the proliferation of identitybased politics predicated on a politics of recognition. It is this position that
was made possible by the legacies of the black struggles of the 1950s to
1970s, epitomised in black liberation and the civil rights movement. However,
contemporary anti-racist formations obfuscate and implicitly disavow such a
legacy, while simultaneously utilising their impact to promote reform and
integration. The basis of such perspectives is a wider acceptance and
visibility of marginalised identities within the stronghold of civil
society. Calls for unity by multiracial coalitions mask complicity with the
structures of anti-blackness. They proffer an analysis that seeks to go beyond
the framework of black and white racial dynamics. Yet in this gesture to go
beyond black and white, the specificity of anti-blackness is obscured. In such
instances, these analyses aim to discover common ground through the
particularity of non-black racial identities or other oppressed categories. But
this common ground is predicated on an underlying humanness, from which
black existence is fundamentally barred. Such a perspective presents an
atomised individual traversed by a variety of oppressions, yet these
oppressions are representable and conditional to a historic instance of
violence (as opposed to the ontological unconditionality of violence
perpetuated against blacks), and could potentially be recognised and
addressed. For it is on the basis of ( human) recognition and selfrepresentation from which minoritarian identities can wage their struggle.
Black existence is barred from such a possibility due to the fact that such

recognition is based upon not being black. As long as one can distance
onself enough from blackness, then one has the possibility of integrating into
civil society generally:

The only way to solve for anti-blackness is to destroy civil

society.
R.L 13
R.L. R.L. is an informal theorist working on the problematic of racialised identities, gender and
communisation theory. June 5, 2013.

WANDERINGS OF THE SLAVE: BLACK LIFE AND

SOCIAL DEATH. http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/wanderings-slave-black-life-and-socialdeath. July 8, 2015

Whereas redress for grievances can be sought and gained through these
minoritarian struggles, ultimately they rely upon the further subjection of
blacks in order to achieve such goals. Violence deployed against nonblack minoritarian positions is contingent and efectively
communicable through shared experiences, and therefore could be
formulated into coherent demands that might be met or not. If these
demands are recognised and met, they necessitate anti-blackness as a sine
qua non for further integration. It is inside this ambiguous nature of empirical
demands that black existence introduces a categorical antagonism reaching
far beyond any empirical enunciation for socio-political recognition. For Afropessimists, there is no possible empirical redress for its structural position in
relation to civil society, for it is the very condition that enables civil society to
cohere in the first place. And this condition is that of an inordinate suffering
that is not commensurate to mere experience. For this reason, black
existence figures as an antagonism that transcends any empirical injustice,
an antagonism that splits the world between black or human. Consequently
this antagonism entails a total disorganisation of what it would mean to exist
in the world at all. Black existence is essentially a structural position that
positions itself as demandless, an antagonsim which is irreconcilable, and
without any possible future of organic synthesis of black existence and
humanity. For the form of freedom that would enable the abolition of black
existence is not empirical but ontological in nature. To overcome antiblackness, there would have to be what Fanon had called a program of
complete disorder, an expropriation and affirmation of the very violence
perpetuated against black existence and a fundamental reorientation of the
social coordinates of the Human relation. It would entail a war against the
concept of humanity and a war that splits civil society to its core, a civil war
that would elaborate itself to the death.

The alternative is to reject the affirmative and reorient ourselves towards the
world through an unflinching paradigmatic analysis
Wilderson 10 [Frank B. III, Ph.D., Associate Professor at UC Irvine, former ANC member,
on some guerilla shit, Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,
pages ix-x, OG]
STRANGE AS it might seem, this book project began in South Africa. During the last years of
apartheid I worked for revolutionary change in both an underground and above-ground
capacity, for the Charterist Movement in general and the ANC in particular . During this
period, I began to see how essential an unflinching paradigmatic analysis is to a movement
dedicated to the complete overthrow of an existing order. The neoliberal compromises that
the radical elements of the Chartist Movement made with the moderate elements were due,
in large part, to our inability or unwillingness to hold the moderates' feet to the fire of a
political agenda predicated on an unflinching paradigmatic analysis. Instead, we allowed our
energies and points of attention to be displaced by and onto pragmatic considerations. Simply put,
we abdicated the power to pose the questionand the power to pose the question is the
greatest power of all. Elsewhere, I have written about this unfortunate turn of events
(Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid), so I'll not rehearse the details here. Suffice it to
say, this book germinated in the many political and academic discussions and debates that I was
fortunate enough to be a part of at a historic moment and in a place where the word revolution
was spoken in earnest, free of qualifiers and irony. For their past and ongoing ideas and
interventions, I extend solidarity and appreciation to comrades Amanda Alexander, Franco
Barchiesi, Teresa Barnes, Patrick Bond, Ashwin Desai, Nigel Gibson, Steven Greenberg, Allan
Horowitz, Bushy Kelebonye (deceased), Tefu Kelebonye, Ulrike Kistner, Kamogelo Lekubu,
Andile Mngxitama, Prishani Naidoo, John Shai, and S'bu Zulu

Policing/Settler societies allow for the black body to be a magnet for

gratuitous violence
Wilderson, Professor UCI, 2003 (Frank B., The Prison Slave as Hegemonys (Silent)
Scandal, Soc Justice 30 no2 2003, Accessed 8-4-12, MR)

It makes no difference that in the U.S. the "casbah" and the "European" zone are laid one
on top of the other. What is being asserted here is an isomorphic schematic relation the schematic interchangeability - between Fanon' s settler society and Martinot and
Sexton's policing paradigm. For Fanon, it is the policeman and soldier (not the
discursive, or hegemonic, agents) of colonialism that make one town white and the
other Black. For Martinot and Sexton, this Manichean delirium manifests itself by
way of the U.S. paradigm of policing that (re)produces, repetitively, the
inside/outside, the civil society/Black world, by virtue of the difference between
those bodies that do not magnetize bullets and those that do. "Police impunity serves
to distinguish between the racial itself and the elsewhere that mandates it...the distinction
between those whose human being is put permanently in question and those for whom it
goes without saying" (Ibid.: 8). In such a paradigm, white people are, ipso facto,
deputized in the face of Black people, whether they know it (consciously) or not.
Whiteness, then, and by extension civil society, cannot be solely "represented" as

some monumentalized coherence of phallic signifiers, but must first be understood as a

social formation of contemporaries who do not magnetize bullets. This is the essence of
their construction through an asignifying absence; their signifying presence is manifested
by the fact that they are, if only by default, deputized against those who do magnetize
bullets. In short, white people are not simply "protected" by the police, they are - in
their very corporeality - the police. This ipso facto deputization of white people in the
face of Black people accounts for Fanon's materiality, and Martinot and Sexton's
Manichean delirium in America. What remains to be addressed, however, is the way in
which the political contestation between civil society's junior partners (i.e., workers,
white women, and immigrants), on the one hand, and white supremacist institutionality,
on the other hand, is produced by, and reproductive of, a supplemental antiBlackness. Put
another way: How is the production and accumulation of junior partner social capital
dependent upon on an anti-Black rhetorical structure and a decomposed Black body?

Technological surveillance creates a new space for racially

profiled stop-and-frisk.
Hackman 15
Hackman, Rose. New York journalist. April 23 2015.

Online surveillance: The new stop-andfrisk. http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/23/online-surveillance-black-teenagers-new-stopand-frisk. July 8, 2015.

In 2013, stop-and-frisk was found unconstitutional by a federal judge for its

use of racial profiling. Since then, logged instances have dropped from an
astonishing 685,000 in 2011 to just 46,000 in 2014. But celebrations may be
premature, with local policing increasingly moving off the streets and
migrating online. In 2012, the NYPD declared a war on gangs across the city
with Operation Crew Cut. The linchpin of the operations activities is the
sweeping online surveillance of individuals as young as 10 years old deemed
to be members of crews and gangs. This move is being criticized by an
increasing number of community members and legal scholars, who see it as
an insidious way of justifying the monitoring of young men and boys of color
in low-income communities. These days, crews are understood geographically
(turf-based). Theyre no longer entrepreneurial that is, heavily within
the organized crime world, like LA gangs were in the 1990s. In other words,
New York City crew membership, which mostly appeals to teenagers, is
simply related to the block you grew up on, your community and family ties,
and perhaps even your interest in partying, dance or graffiti. Advertisement
Mostly, being a member of a gang or a crew is a fleeting moment of
adolescence, and something that people grow out of, explains Jeffrey Lane, a
professor in communication at Rutgers University whose research has looked
at the way in which adolescent street life is lived online. What is
unquestionably worrying and what the NYPD is using to justify
broad monitoring of large swaths of people is when these crews turn
on each other, and rivalries between crews become violent, or even deadly.
And while some of the humiliation and potential violence is avoided by

diverting resources away from the physical practice of stop-and-frisk, online

surveillance raises a vast series of questions tied to the civil liberties of young
men of color.

Counter surveillance good/Bad

Counter surveillance good
EPIS 15
Empire Pacific Investigation Services. Feburary 2015.

Counter Surveillance

Investigation.http://www.epis.us/services/domestic-surveillance-investigations/countersurveillance.html. July 8, 2015.

Counter surveillance refers to measures undertaken to prevent surveillance,

including covert surveillance. Counter surveillance may include electronic
methods such as bug sweeping, the process of detecting surveillance
devices, including covert listening devices and visual surveillance devices.
More often than not, counter surveillance will employ a set of actions that,
when followed, reduce the risk of surveillance. Counter surveillance is the art
of performing surveillance on those who are performing surveillance
themselves and is used to ensure that the target is not being followed or
under surveillance from another source. For instance, on one of the Counter
surveillance cases, our client hired one of our counter surveillance private
investigators to watch see who was following him, he become aware that
someone is following him around and videotaping his activities. The client
then hired Counter Surveillance investigators to identify the people watching
him and to determine who hired them. In another case, Counter surveillance
is used in cases where someone may be stalking another person. Stalkers
attempt to follow and determine the patterns and activities of their targets.
Counter surveillance can be used to determine who is responsible for the
stalking without alerting the stalker or causing the stalker to withdraw. If the
stalker withdrew, it would make it impossible to identify and neutralize their
threat. Counter surveillance is an extremely difficult surveillance operation.
Not only is the investigator attempting to perform surveillance on someone
that may be proficient in surveillance techniques themselves, but they must
do it without being detected during times when that person is performing
surveillance and is, therefore, actively monitoring their surroundings.

Starting Point Good Surveillance Key

Surveillance is a key starting point.
Kundani and Kumar 15 (Spring 2015 Arun Kundnani teaches at New York University.
His latest book is The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror,
Deepa Kumar is an associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at Rutgers University. She
is the author of Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, International Socialist Review Issue 96, Race,
surveillance, and empire http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire DA:7/8/15 CB)

a series of news articles based on whistle-blower

Edward Snowdens collection of documents from the National
Security Agency (NSA) took the world by storm. Over the course of a year, the
Beginning in June 2013,

Snowden material provided a detailed account of the massive extent of NSAs warrantless data collection.

material. Less
apparent was how this data was actually used by the NSA and other
national security agencies. Part of the answer came in July 2014 when Glenn
Greenwald and Murtaza Hussain published an article that identified specific
targets of NSA surveillance and showed how individuals were being
placed under surveillance despite there being no reasonable
suspicion of their involvement in criminal activity .1 All of those
named as targets were prominent Muslim Americans. The following month,
What became clear was that the NSA was involved in the mass collection of online

Jeremy Scahill and Ryan Devereaux published another story for The Intercept, which revealed that under
the Obama administration the number of people on the National Counterterrorism Centers no-fly list had
increased tenfold to 47,000. Leaked classified documents showed that the NCC maintains a database of
terrorism suspects worldwidethe Terrorist Identities Datamart Environmentwhich contained a million

This
database includes 20,800 persons within the United States who are
disproportionately concentrated in Dearborn, Michigan, with its
significant Arab American population.2 By any objective standard, these were major
news stories that ought to have attracted as much attention as the earlier revelations. Yet the stories
barely registered in the corporate media landscape. The tech
community, which had earlier expressed outrage at the NSAs mass digital surveillance,
seemed to be indiferent when details emerged of the targeted
surveillance of Muslims. The explanation for this reaction is not hard to find. While
many object to the US government collecting private data on
ordinary people, Muslims tend to be seen as reasonable targets of
suspicion. A July 2014 poll for the Arab American Institute found that
42 percent of Americans think it is justifiable for law enforcement
agencies to profile Arab Americans or American Muslims.3 In what follows,
we argue that the debate on national security surveillance that has
emerged in the United States since the summer of 2013 is woefully
inadequate, due to its failure to place questions of race and empire
at the center of its analysis . It is racist ideas that form the basis for
the ways national security surveillance is organized and deployed,
racist fears that are whipped up to legitimize this surveillance to the
American public, and the disproportionately targeted racialized
groups that have been most efective in making sense of it and
organizing opposition. This is as true today as it has been historically:
names by 2013, double the number four years earlier, and increasingly includes biometric data.

race and state surveillance are intertwined in the history of US

capitalism. Likewise, we argue that the history of national security
surveillance in the United States is inseparable from the history of
US colonialism and empire. The argument is divided into two parts. The first identifies a
number of moments in the history of national security surveillance in North America, tracing its imbrication
with race, empire, and capital, from the settler-colonial period through to the neoliberal era. O ur

focus
here is on how race as a sociopolitical category is produced and
reproduced historically in the United States through systems of
surveillance. We show how throughout the history of the United States the systematic collection of
information has been interwoven with mechanisms of racial oppression. From Anglo settlercolonialism, the establishment of the plantation system, the post
Civil War reconstruction era, the US conquest of the Philippines, and
the emergence of the national security state in the post-World War II
era, to neoliberalism in the post-Civil Rights era, racialized
surveillance has enabled the consolidation of capital and empire . It is,
however, important to note that the production of the racial other at these
various moments is conjunctural and heterogenous. That is, the racialization
of Native Americans, for instance, during the settler-colonial period took different forms from the

the dominant construction of Blackness

under slavery is diferent from the construction of Blackness in the
neoliberal era; these ideological shifts are the product of specific
historic conditions. In short, empire and capital, at various moments,
determine who will be targeted by state surveillance, in what way s,
racialization of African Americans. Further,

and for how long. In the second part, we turn our attention to the current conjuncture in which the politics

The intensive
surveillance of Muslim Americans has been carried out by a vast
security apparatus that has also been used against dissident
movements such as Occupy Wall Street and environmental rights
activists, who represent a threat to the neoliberal order. This is not new; the process of
targeting dissenters has been a constant feature of American
history. For instance, the Alien and Sedition Acts of the late 1790s
were passed by the Federalist government against the Jeffersonian sympathizers of
of the War on Terror shape national security surveillance practices.

the French Revolution. The British hanged Nathan Hale because he spied for Washingtons army in the

State surveillance regimes have always sought to

monitor and penalize a wide range of dissenters, radicals, and
revolutionaries. Race was a factor in some but by no means all of these cases. Our
focus here is on the production of racialized others as security
threats and the ways this helps to stabilize capitalist social
relations. Further, the current system of mass surveillance of
Muslims is analogous to and overlaps with other systems of
racialized security surveillance that feed the mass deportation of
immigrants under the Obama administration and that
disproportionately target African Americans, contributing to their
mass incarceration and what Michelle Alexander refers to as the New Jim Crow.4 We
argue that racialized groupings are produced in the very act of
collecting information about certain groups deemed as threats by
the national security state the Brown terrorist, the Black and Brown
American Revolution.

drug dealer and user, and the immigrant who threatens to steal jobs.
We conclude that security has become one of the primary means through
which racism is ideologically reproduced in the post-racial, neoliberal
era. Drawing on W. E. B. Duboiss notion of the psychological wage, we argue that neoliberalism has
been legitimized in part through racialized notions of security that offer a new psychological wage as
compensation for the decline of the social wage and its reallocation to homeland security. Se ttler-

colonialism and racial security National security surveillance is as

old as the bourgeois nation state, which from its very inception sets
out to define the people associated with a particular territory, and
by extension the non-peoples, i.e., populations to be excluded from
that territory and seen as threats to the nation. Race, in modern
times, becomes the main way that such threatsboth internal and external
are mediated; modern mechanisms of racial oppression and the
modern state are born together. This is particularly true of settler-colonial projects, such
as the United States, in which the goal was to territorially dispossess Indigenous nations and pacify the
resistance that inevitably sprang up. In this section, we describe how the drive for territorial expansion and
the formation of the early American state depended on an effective ideological erasure of those who
peopled the land.

Elaborate racial profiles, based on empirical

observationthe precursor to more sophisticated surveillance
mechanismswere thus devised to justify the dispossession of
native peoples and the obliteration of those who resisted . The idea
of the American nation as the land of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants
enabled and justified the colonial-settler mission.5 Thus, when the US
state was formed after the Revolutionary War, white supremacy was codified in
the Constitution; the logical outcome of earlier settler-colonial systems of racial discrimination
against African slaves and Indigenous populations.6 But the leaders of the newly formed state were not
satisfied with the thirteen original colonies and set their sights on further expansion. In 1811, John Quincy
Adams gave expression to this goal in the following w ay:

The whole continent of North

America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to be peopled
by one nation, speaking one language, professing one general
system of religious and political principles, and accustomed to one
general tenor of social usages and customs.7 This doctrine, which would later
come to be known as manifest destiny animated the project of establishing the American nation across
the continent. European settlers were the chosen people who would bring development through
scientific knowledge, including state-organized ethnographic knowledge of the very people they were
colonizing.8 John Comaroffs description of this process in southern Africa serves equally to summarize the
colonial states of North America: The

discovery of dark, unknown lands, which

were conceptually emptied of their peoples and cultures so that
their wilderness might be brought properly to orderi.e., fixed and named
and mappedby an officializing white gaze.9 Through, for example, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, the United States sought to develop methods of identification, categorization, and enumeration
that made the Indigenous population visible to the surveillance gaze as racial others. Surveillance that
defined and demarcated according to officially constructed racial typologies enabled the colonial state to
sort tribes according to whether they accepted the priorities of the settler-colonial mission (the good
Indians) or resisted it (the bad Indians).10 In turn, an idea of the US nation itself was produced as a
homeland of white, propertied men to be secured against racial others. No wonder, then, that the founding
texts of the modern state invoke the Indigenous populations of America as bearers of the state of nature,
to which the modern state is counterposedwitness Hobbess references to the the Savage people of

The earliest process of gathering systematic knowledge

about the other by colonizers often began with trade and religious
missionary work. In the early seventeenth century, trade in furs with the Native population of
America.11

Quebec was accompanied by the missionary project. Jesuit Paul Le Jeune worked extensively with the

Montagnais-Naskapi and maintained a detailed record of the people he hoped to convert and civilize.12
By studying and documenting where and how the savages lived, the nature of their relationships, their
child-rearing habits, and the like, Le Juene derived a four-point program to change the behaviors of the
Naskapi in order to bring them into line with French Jesuit morality. In addition to sedentarization, the
establishment of chiefly authority, and the training and punishment of children, Le Juene sought to curtail
the independence of Naskapi women and to impose a European family structure based on male authority
and female subservience.13 The net result of such missionary work was to pave the way for the racial
projects of colonization and/or integration into a colonial settler nation. By the nineteenth century, such
informal techniques of surveillance began to be absorbed into government bureaucracy. In 1824, Secretary
of War John C. Calhoun established the Office of Indian Affairs (later Bureau), which had as one of its

The key security question was

whether to forcibly displace Native Americans beyond the colonial
territory or incorporate them as colonized subjects; the former
policy was implemented in 1830 when Congress passed the Indian Removal Act and President
tasks the mapping and counting of Native Americans.

Jackson began to drive Indians to the west of the Mississippi River. Systematic surveillance became even
more important after 1848, when Indian Affairs responsibility transferred from the Department of War to

the Bureau of Indian Afairs sought to

comprehensively map the Indigenous population as part of a
civilizing project to change the savage into a civilized man , as a
congressional committee put it. By the 1870s, Indians were the quantified
objects of governmental intervention; resistance was subdued as
much through rational techniques of racialized surveillance and a
the Department of the Interior, and

professional bureaucracy as through war.14 The assimilation of Indians became a comprehensive policy
through the Code of Indian Offenses, which included bans on Indigenous cultural practices that had earlier
been catalogued by ethnographic surveillance. Tim Rowse writes that For the U.S. government to
extinguish Indian sovereignty, it had to be confident in its own. There is no doubting the strength of the

as the new
nation conquered and purchased, and filled the new territories with
colonists, it had also to develop its administrative capacity to govern
the added territories and peoples. U.S. sovereign power was not just a legal doctrine and a
sense of manifest destiny in the United States during the nineteenth-century, but

popular conviction; it was an administrative challenge and achievement that included acquiring, by the

The use of
surveillance to produce a census of a colonized population was the
first step to controlling it. Mahmood Mamdani refers to this as define and rule, a process
1870s, the ability to conceive and measure an object called the Indian population.15

in which, before managing a heterogeneous population, a colonial power must first set about defining it; to
do so, the colonial state wielded the census not only as a way of acknowledging difference but also as a
way of shaping, sometimes even creating, difference.16 The ethnic mapping and demographics unit

programs practiced by US law enforcement agencies today in the

name of counterterrorism are the inheritors of these colonial
practices. Both then and now, state agencies use of demographic information to identify
concentrations of ethnically defined populations in order to target surveillance resources and to identify
kinship networks can be utilized for the purposes of political policing. Likewise, todays principles of
counterinsurgency warfarewinning hearts and minds by dividing the insurgent from the nonresistant
echo similar techniques applied in the nineteenth century at the settler frontier. Class, gender, and racial
security While racial security was central to the settler-colonial project in North America, territorial
dispossession was only one aspect of the process of capital accumulation for the new state; the other was
the discipline and management of labor. As Theodore Allen shows in The Invention of the White Race ,

the white race did not exist as a category in Virginias colonial

records until the end of the seventeenth century. Whiteness as an explicit racial
identity had to be cultivated over a period of decades before it could become the basis for an organized
form of oppression.17 A key moment in the production of whiteness was the response of the ruling Anglo

The rebellion was begun by colonial settlers

who wanted a more aggressive approach to securing the territory
against Indigenous peoples. But it also involved African and Anglo
bond laborers joining together in a collective revolt against the
elite to Bacons Rebellion of 1676.

system of indentured servitude. This threatened not only the

profitability but also the very existence of the plantation system . Over
the following three decades, the Virginia Assembly passed a series of acts that racialized workers as Black
and white. Those who could now call themselves white were granted some benefits by law, whereas those
designated Black were turned from bond laborers (who could therefore expect to be free after a period of

To win them to
the side of the plantation bourgeoisie, poor white men were given
privilegesthey had access to land and enjoyed common law protections such as trial by jury and
habeas corpus that were denied to Black enslaved people.18 In practice this meant that
white men, for instance, could rape Black women and not be charged
with a crime (because Blacks were property and so only damages were to be paid to the slave
owner). Further, property rights and the legal notion of settled land not only denied Native
American property claims but even erased the existence of Indigenous people
on the basis that, because white settlers had transformed the pristine North American wilderness
time) into slavesproperty with no rights whatsoever and no hope of freedom.

into productive land, they were the real natives.19 Once the legal and ideological work had been done to
naturalize race as a visible marker of inherent difference and to separate us from them, it could be

patrols set up to capture runaway

slavesarguably the first modern police forces in the United
States20needed only to see race in order to identify suspects.
made use of as a stable category of surveillance; the

Moreover, the plantation system was stabilized by enabling non-elite whites to see security as a racial
privilege and shared responsibility. W. E. B. Du Bois argued in Black Reconstruction that, in the slave
plantations of the South, poor whites were brought into an identification with the planter elite by being
given positions of authority over Blacks as overseers, slave drivers, and members of slave patrols. With the
associated feeling of superiority, their hatred for the wider plantation economy that impoverished them
was displaced onto Black enslaved people: class antagonism was racialized and turned into a pillar of
stability for the system. Meanwhile, in the North, labor leaders had little appetite for abolition, fearing
competition from a newly freed Black workforce.21 After abolition, the same racial anxieties were
mobilized to disenfranchise the Black laborer in the South. Du Bois used the term psychological wage to
describe this sense of superiority granted to non-elite whites in the South: It must be remembered that the
white group of laborers, while they received a low wage, were compensated by a sort of public and
psychological wage. They were given public deference and titles of courtesy because they were white.
They were admitted freely with all classes of white people to public functions, public parks, and the best
schools. The police were drawn from their ranks, and the courts, dependent under their votes, treated
them with such leniency as to encourage lawlessness. On the other hand, in the same way, the Negro
was subject to public insult; was afraid of mobs; was liable to the jibes of children and the unreasoning
fears of white women; and was compelled almost continuously to submit to various badges of inferiority.
The result of this was that the wages of both classes could be kept low, the whites fearing to be supplanted
by Negro labor, the Negroes always being threatened by the substitution of white labor.22 We suggest

neoliberalism has involved a similar kind of

process, in which the social wage of the New Deal welfare state was
progressively withdrawn and racialized notions of security ofered in
its place as a psychological compensation. These racialized notions
of security are also inflected by gender. As Du Bois notes in the above quote, free
below that, since the 1970s,

Black men were positioned as threats to white women in the postCivil War era. Unlike during slavery,
when Black men were not indiscriminately labeled as rapists and lynching was rare, the period between
1865 and 1895 saw the lynching of over ten thousand African Americans. Fredrick Douglass argued that,
when all the other methods of demonizing Black people failed, the myth of the Black rapist was developed
to justify lynchings and white terror.23 Vigilante groups like the Ku Klux Klan justified their brutality by
claiming to keep white women safe from the Black rapist, as visualized, for instance, in D. W. Griffiths Birth
of a Nation. Such constructions of white women in need of protection from predatory Black men were
reminiscent of the captivity scenarios of the seventeenth century, in which Native Americans were
accused of kidnapping white women, a charge that then justified genocide.24 Thus, from the early settlercolonial period onwards, security and protection were defined by elites in gendered and racial terms. In
particular, the white, heterosexual family was positioned as the subject of a security narrative that cast
racialized others as threats to the homeland. The homeland so defined also needed to be secured from
racialized immigrant threats, but which immigrants counted as white in this homeland was somewhat
unstable. When Irish immigrants began to arrive in the United States in large numbers from the 1850s

onwards, they were considered nonwhite because they were perceived to be of Celtic rather than Anglo
Saxon background. More importantly, Irish Catholics faced the same exclusionary practices that Catholics
did in previous centuries. Even though by the mid-eighteenth century, the need for English colonies to be
economically sustainable and militarily secure from indigenous threat, opened up non-English immigration
to North America, Catholics (along with Indian tribes) were denied basic rights on the grounds that they
were religiously and culturally different from the WASP population.25 Over time, however, Irish and Italian

the policing of the United

Statess borders was another context where racial and imperial
security was intertwined with practices of surveillance. Congress first
immigrants were made white. From the late nineteenth century,

sought to police borders as part of a strategy of regulating labor in 1882, when it excluded Chinese

In 1909, US immigration officials began excluding around

half of all Asian Indians from entering. Following concern from the British government
that anti-colonial nationalists from India were using the United States
as a base to spread radical politics, US officials began to interrogate
Indian migrants at West Coast ports, and a British agent arranged for the Justice
immigrants.

Department to monitor all mail moving between India and the Berkeley and San Francisco post offices.26

In 1917, legislation was introduced to create a barred Asiatic

zone, stretching from Afghanistan to the Pacific, from which no one
could be admitted to the United States.27 With the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of
1924, a comprehensive system of national quotas was introduced reflecting a global racial hierarchy.
Through immigration policy, an idea of the US homeland as a Western European, white ethnoracial identity
was institutionalized. To implement such a vision, appropriate systems of record keeping and surveillance
of immigrants were required.28 Through these various means, Mae M. Ngai argues, Asian Americans and
Mexican Americans were produced as alien citizens, formally US citizens but legally racialized and
excluded. The surveillance of these groups made possible the repatriation of 400,000 persons of Mexican
descent during the Great Depression (of whom half had been thought to be US citizens) and the
internment of 120,000 of Japanese ancestry during World War II (two-thirds of whom were citizens).29 In

the nineteenth century, the political surveillance of labor militancy

had routinely been practiced by private agencies such as Pinkerton
and Burns, who were directly contracted by capitalists rather than through the
state. But toward the end of the century, such practices began to be absorbed into government agencies.
Following the so-called Tompkins Square Riot of 1874actually a demonstration in New York against
unemployment that was attacked by the policethe New York Police Department began to assign
detectives to spy on socialist and union meetings. By the mid-1890s, the department was tapping 350
phones.30 By 1900, a number of police departments in the United States had created red squads
specifically to deploy informants to left-wing organizations and meetings. Empire and the national security
state By 1890, coast-to-coast colonization was effectively complete, with the surviving Native American
population consigned to reservations. Thereafter, the priority became the projection of US power further
afield, again justified through a racialized understanding of American exceptionalism. As Paul Kramer

[T]he wars advocates

subsumed US history within longer, racial trajectories of AngloSaxon history which folded together US and British imperial
histories. The Philippine-American War, then, was a natural extension
of Western conquest, and both taken together were the organic
expression of the desires, capacities, and destinies of Anglo-Saxon
peoples. Americans, as Anglo-Saxons, shared Britons racial genius for empire-building, a genius which
writes in the context of the US conquest of the Philippines:

they must exercise for the greater glory of the race and to advance civilization in general. Unlike other
races, they liberated the peoples they conquered; indeed, their expressions of conquest as freedom
proliferated as the terrors they unleashed became more visible.31 The resistance that Filipinos mounted to
American benevolence could then only be seen as an atavistic barbarism to be countered through modern
techniques of surveillance and repression. While local police departments within the United States had
begun to develop techniques of political surveillance, it was under the US colonial regime in the Philippines
that systematic and widespread surveillance of political opponents and the manipulation of personal
information as a form of political control was first institutionalized. A unit within the police called the
Constabulary Information Section was established in Manila in 1901, founded by Henry Allen, a former
military attach to Tsarist Russia.32 The Constabulary Information Section cultivated hundreds of paid
Filipino agents across the country, making it scarcely possible for seditionary measures of importance to

be hatched without our knowledge, as Allen wrote to President Theodore Roosevelt.33 The techniques of
compiling dossiers on dissidents private lives, spreading disinformation in the media, and planting agents
provocateurs among militants were applied to combating radical nationalist groupings in Manila. Control
over information proved as effective a tool of colonial power as physical force. As historian Alfred W. McCoy
notes, during World War I police methods that had been tested and perfected in the colonial Philippines
migrated homeward to provide both precedents and personnel for the establishment of a US internal
security apparatus. After years of pacifying an overseas empire where race was the frame for perception
and action, colonial veterans came home to turn the same lens on America, seeing its ethnic
communities . . . as internal colonies requiring coercive controls.34 On this basis, a domestic national
security apparatus emerged, with notions of race and empire at its core. From 1917, the FBI and police
department red squads in US cities increasingly busied themselves with fears of subversion from
communists, pacifists, anarchists, and the ten million German Americans who were suspected of harboring
disloyalties. During World War I, thirty million letters were physically examined and 350,000 badgecarrying vigilantes snooped on immigrants, unions, and socialists.35 Concerns over privacy set limits to
such surveillance after the war, but with increasing left-wing and right-wing radicalization in the 1930s,
President Roosevelt decided to issue a secret executive order that authorized a shift in the FBIs role from a
narrowly conceived law enforcement agency focused on gathering evidence for criminal prosecutions into
an intelligence agency. Thereafter ,

it was dedicated to spying on subversive

political movements (primarily communists, but also fascists) and
countering their ability to influence public debate . This meant the FBI

systematically identifying subversives based on ideological and associational criteria.36 It also opened
the door to the burgeoning counter-subversion practices that the bureau would launch over the following

the FBI was collecting detailed files on

suspected communists while Black organizations such as the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the
Nation of Islam were also surveillance targets.37 At the end of the Second World
decades. Already during World War II,

War, the United States emerged as one of two superpowers on the world stage. Pushing back against the
isolationists, Cold War liberals made the case for the establishment of a permanent national security state.
According to historian Paul Hogan, the national security mindset that emerged involved a conviction that a

total war, the battle was not

confined to the front lines but extended to the home front as well, as
did the awesome destruction that modern weapons could inflict not
only on military combatants but also on industry, urban centers, and
civilian populations. Modern war was total war in this sense that modern armies depended on
new era of total war had dawned on the United States. In

the output of citizen soldiers in farms and factories behind the battle line. In total war all of the nations
resources and all of its energy and talent had to be mobilized on behalf of the war effort, thereby
obliterating the old distinction between civilian and military, between citizen and soldier, between home
front and the front line. When American leaders talked about total war they did so in these terms and also
in terms that recognized that modern weapons could bring massive destruction from great distances with

American leaders would no longer have

the time to debate the issue of war or peace or to prepare at a slow
pace.38 This was an updating and reworking of the settler-colonial mentality, with the notion of Manifest
barely a moments notice. In the new age,

Destiny being explicitly drawn on in making the case for an exceptional American empire. The notion of the
citizen-soldier was built upon earlier settler-colonial racialized security narratives. However ,

American exceptionalism, as it emerged in this period, was based on the

premise that the United States was not only unique among other nations and therefore
destined to play a leading global role, but also a nation built upon liberal principles. This
meant that the centrality of whiteness to the security narrative was
muted and less prominent. Even though the white middle-class home was
cast as the locus of a privatized notion of self-defense and military
preparedness through government civil defense policies and
programs,39 the image of the US empire was one of liberalism,
inclusivity, and the melting pot. The United States sought quite
consciously to diferentiate itself from past empires as it positioned

itself to be one of two hegemons on the global stage . In this context, the
existence of Jim Crow segregation was an embarrassment for the ruling class. In 1947, the National
Security Act was passed which entrenched security as a key element of the postwar order. Every aspect
of lifethe social, political, intellectual, and economicwas conceived as playing a role in national
defense, and a massive security establishment was built up. The 1947 act created the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). The National Security Agency (NSA) was formed in 1952, conceived as an
organization to carry out the gathering of signals intelligence. During this period, there was also the
integration of corporate America, of universities, of research institutions, and of the media into the
machinery of the national security state. The earlier distinctions between the citizen and soldier and
between the home front and the battle front were blurred to shore up an imperial system at home and
abroad. Surveillance was central to sustaining and reproducing this system. From the 1940s to the early
1970s, FBI wiretapping and bugging operations focused on a wide range of movements, activists, and
public figures. The following list of targets compiled by historian Athan Theoharis gives a flavor of the
surveillance and is worth quoting in full: Radical activists (David Dallin, Charles Malamuth, C. B. Baldwin,
Frank Oppenheimer, Bertolt Brecht, Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann, Helene Weigel, Berthold Viertel, Anna
Seghers, Bodo Uhse, Richard Criley, Frank Wilkinson), prominent liberal and radical attorneys (Bartley
Crum, Martin Popper, Thomas Corcoran, David Wahl, Benjamin Margolis, Carol King, Robert Silberstein,
National Lawyers Guild, Fred Black), Radical labor leaders and unions (Harry Bridges; United Auto Workers;
National Maritime Union; National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards; United Public Workers; United
Electrical Radio and Machine Workers; Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers; International
Longshoremens and Warehousemens Union; CIO Maritime Committee; Congress of Industrial
Organizations Council), Journalists (I. F. Stone, Philip Jaffe, Kate Mitchell, Mark Gayn, Leonard Lyons, William
Beecher, Marvin Kalb, Henry Brandon, Hedrick Smith, Lloyd Norman, Hanson Baldwin, Inga Arvad), Civilrights activists and organizations (Martin Luther King, Jr.; Malcolm X; Southern Christian Leadership
Conference; National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; March on Washington Movement;
Gandhi Society for Human Rights; Elijah Muhammad; Nation of Islam; Stokely Carmichael; H. Rap Brown;
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee; Alabama Peoples Education Association; Committee to Aid
the Monroe Defendants; Southern Conference for Human Welfare; Black Panther Party; Universal Negro
Improvement Association; African Liberation Day Committee), The Students for a Democratic Society, Ku
Klux Klan, National Committee to Abolish HUAC, Socialist Workers Party, Washington Bookstore Association,
Northern California Association of Scientists, Federation of American Scientists, American Association of
Scientific Workers, preWorld War II isolationists (Henry Grunewald, Ethel Brigham, John OBrien, Lillian
Moorehead, Laura Ingalls, America First, Jehovahs Witnesses, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce), and
even prominent personalities (Joe Namath, Harlow Shapley, Edward Condon, Edward Prichard, Muhammad
Ali, Benjamin Spock).40 In a bid to shape public opinion, the FBI also launched a mass media campaign in
1946 that released educational materials to cooperative journalists and legislators. In the late 1950s, the
FBI launched its secret counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO), which used provocateurs and
informants to infiltrate communist groups initially, but later widened to include Puerto Rican nationalists,
the student movement, the civil rights movement, and Black liberation movements. About 1,500 of the
8,500 American Communist Party members were likely FBI informants in the early 1960s. By the end of the
decade, agents who had previously worked in US foreign intelligence were transferring to the burgeoning
field of domestic intelligence to spy on radical movements, whether employed by the bureau, military
intelligence, or the expanding red squads in local police departments.41 A key part of the FBIs
countersubversion strategy was the manipulation of political activists into committing criminal acts so that
they could be arrested and prosecuted. Agents provocateurs working for the FBI initiated disruptions of
meetings and demonstrations, fights between rival groups, attacks on police, and bombings. FBI agents
also secretly distributed derogatory and scurrilous material to police, Congress, elected officials, other
federal agencies, and the mass media.42 In an attempt to neutralize Martin Luther King, Jr., who, the FBI
worried, might abandon his obedience to white liberal doctrines (as indeed he did), he was placed under
intense surveillance, and attempts were made to destroy his marriage and induce his suicide. In various
cities, the FBI and local police used fake letters and informants to stir up violence between rival factions
and gangs to disrupt the Black Panther Party.43 In a number of cases, police departments or federal agents
carried out the direct assassination of Black Panthers.44 Since 1945, the government had been running a
mass spying program known as Project Shamrock, which the NSA took over in 1952. The
telecommunications companies at the time handed over to the NSA all telegrams sent out of and into the
United States. By the early 1970s, NSA analysts were collecting and analyzing approximately 150,000
telegrams a month. In 1967, the FBI and CIA submitted lists of names to the National Security Agency of
key activists in the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements, hoping that the NSA would be able to find
evidence of the communist conspiracy that President Lyndon Johnson thought must be causing the new
militancy of the 1960s. The list included politically active public figures such as actress Jane Fonda and
singer Joan Baez, as well as Martin Luther King, Jr., Eldridge Cleaver, and Abbie Hoffman. NSA officers
began surveillance of these activists communications, using special records procedures to prevent
discovery of what they knew to be an illegal program. This watch list program was expanded under

President Nixon and named Operation Minaret; in all, the international communications of more than a
thousand US citizens and organizations and more than two thousand foreign citizens were intercepted.45
Such was the proliferation of government spying in the 1960s that even such a minor law enforcement
agency as the Ohio Highway Patrol ran an intelligence unit claiming to have student informers on every
campus in the state.46 The vast expansion of state surveillance in the 1960s was a response to the new
militancy of the movements against the imperialist war in Vietnam and for civil rights and Black liberation.
Initially, security officials assumed the Civil Rights movement in the South, the campus protests, and the
Black insurrections in northern cities were the result of a communist conspiracy; informants and electronic
monitoring were deployed to try to identify the hidden agitators thought to be manipulating events behind
the scenes. But it soon became apparent that these movements were manifestations of a new kind of
politics that could not be understood according to the conspiratorial calculus of front groups and fellow
travelers; surveillance therefore had to be widened to monitor ordinary participants, particularly in Black
communities, in what was increasingly seen as a popular insurgency. Even then, the hope was that new
electronic technologies would be the answer. National security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski commented in
1970 that technology would make it possible to assert almost continuous surveillance over every citizen
and maintain up-to-date files, containing even personal information about the . . . behavior of the citizen,
in addition to the more customary data.47 Neoliberalism and racial security The expansion of the
surveillance state in the twentieth century was one aspect of a wider penetration of the state into the lives
of Americans. Working class struggle had somewhat unexpectedly driven this expansion: the state
responded by taking on a mediating role between labor and capital, offering a measure of protection from
the ravages of a market economy through Keynesian economics and the creation of a welfare state after
the New Dealalbeit one that was underdeveloped compared to Western Europe. State managers sought
to stabilize capitalism by imposing a degree of rationality on the system through regulating the economy
and providing social services, all of which required a greater penetration of the state into civil society.48 In
the new era of neoliberal capitalism that began in the 1970s, ruling elites sought to break this social
contract, which rested on the premise that, if the working class played by the rules, it could see
increases in wages and living conditions. From the 1970s onwards, this arrangement was undone.
Alongside, there were also the beginnings of a contraction of the social wage of welfare provisions, public
housing, education, and healthcare. The end result was growing inequality and a new regime of the one
percent. The state responded to the permanent joblessness, ghettoization, and stigmatization that
neoliberalism produced among the poor by turning to policies of mass criminalization and incarceration.
Thus, the neoliberal onslaught went hand in hand with securitization. As Loc Wacquant writes, since the
civil rights era America has launched into a social and political experiment without precedent or equivalent
in the societies of the postwar West: the gradual replacement of a (semi-) welfare state by a police and
penal state for which the criminalization of marginality and the punitive containment of dispossessed
categories serve as social policy at the lower end of the class and ethnic order.49 The law and order
rhetoric that was used to mobilize support for this project of securitization was racially coded, associating
Black protest and rebellion with fears of street crime. The possibilities of such an approach had been
demonstrated in the 1968 election, when both the Republican candidate Richard Nixon and the
independent segregationist George Wallace had made law and order a central theme of their campaigns. It
became apparent that Republicans could cleave Southern whites away from the Democratic Party through
tough-on-crime rhetoric that played on racial fears. The Southern Strategy, as it would be called, tapped
into anxieties among working-class whites that the civil rights reforms of the 1960s would lead to them
competing with Blacks for jobs, housing, and schools. With the transformation of the welfare state into a
security state, its embedding in everyday life was not undone but diverted to different purposes. Social
services were reorganized into instruments of surveillance. Public aid became increasingly conditional on
upholding certain behavioral norms that were to be measured and supervised by the state, implying its
increasing intrusion into the lives of the poorculminating in the workfare regimes of the Clinton
administration.50 In this context, a new model of crime control came into being. In earlier decades,
criminologists had focused on the process of rehabilitation; those who committed crimes were to be helped
to return to society. While the actual implementation of this policy was uneven, by the 1970s, this model
went out of fashion. In its place, a new preventive model of crime control became the norm, which was
based on gathering information about groups to assess the risk they posed. Rather than wait for the
perpetrator to commit a crime, risk assessment methods called for new forms of preventive surveillance,
in which whole groups of people seen as dangerous were subject to observation, identification, and
classification.51 The War on Drugslaunched by President Reagan in 1982dramatically accelerated the
process of racial securitization. Michelle Alexander notes that At the time he declared this new war, less
than 2 percent of the American public viewed drugs as the most important issue facing the nation. This
fact was no deterrent to Reagan, for the drug war from the outset had little to do with public concern about
drugs and much to do with public concern about race. By waging a war on drug users and dealers, Reagan
made good on his promise to crack down on the racially defined othersthe undeserving.52 Operation
Hammer, carried out by the Los Angeles Police Department in 1988, illustrates how racialized surveillance
was central to the War on Drugs. It involved hundreds of officers in combat gear sweeping through the
South Central area of the city over a period of several weeks, making 1,453 arrests, mostly for teenage

curfew violations, disorderly conduct, and minor traffic offenses. Ninety percent were released without
charge but the thousands of young Black people who were stopped and processed in mobile booking
centers had their names entered onto the gang register database, which soon contained the details of
half of the Black youths of Los Angeles. Entry to the database rested on such supposed indicators of gang
membership as high-five handshakes and wearing red shoelaces. Officials compared the Black gangs they
were supposedly targeting to the National Liberation Front in Vietnam and the murderous militias of
Beirut, signaling the blurring of boundaries between civilian policing and military force, and between
domestic racism and overseas imperialism.53 In the twelve years leading up to 1993, the rate of
incarceration of Black Americans tripled,54 establishing the system of mass incarceration that Michelle
Alexander refers to as the new Jim Crow.55 And yet those in prison were only a quarter of those subject to
supervision by the criminal justice system, with its attendant mechanisms of routine surveillance and
intermediate sanctions, such as house arrests, boot camps, intensive supervision, day reporting,
community service, and electronic tagging. Criminal records databases, which are easily accessible to
potential employers, now hold files on around one-third of the adult male population.56 Alice Goffman has
written of the ways that mass incarceration is not just a matter of imprisonment itself but also the systems
of policing and surveillance that track young Black men and label them as would-be criminals before and
after their time in prison. From stops on the street to probation meetings, these systems, she says, have
transformed poor Black neighborhoods into communities of suspects and fugitives. A climate of fear and
suspicion pervades everyday life, and many residents live with the daily concern that the authorities will
seize them and take them away.57 A predictable outcome of such systems of classification and
criminalization is the routine racist violence carried out by police forces and the regular occurrences of
police killings of Black people, such as Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, on August 9, 2014. The mass
surveillance of Muslim Americans Discussions of the surveillance of Muslim Americans usually begin with
9/11 and make little attempt to locate them in the longer history of racial surveillance in the United States.
Yet the continuities are striking, particularly for Black Muslims, who have been seen as extremists and
subject to national security monitoring since the 1940s. Already in the late 1960s, Arab American student
groups involved in supporting the Palestinian national movement had come under surveillance and, in
1972, the Nixon administration issued a set of directives known as Operation Boulder that enabled the CIA
and FBI to coordinate with the pro-Israel lobby in monitoring Arab activists. By the 1980s, but especially
after 9/11, a process was under way in which Muslimness was racialized through surveillanceanother
scene of the states production of racial subjects. Since all racisms are socially and politically constructed
rather than resting on the reality of any biological race, it is perfectly possible for cultural markers
associated with Muslimness (forms of dress, rituals, languages, etc.) to be turned into racial signifiers.58
This signification then serves to indicate a people supposedly prone to violence and terrorism, which,
under the War on Terror, justifies a whole panoply of surveillance and criminalization, from arbitrary
arrests, to indefinite detention, deportation, torture, solitary confinement, the use of secret evidence, and
sentencing for crimes that we would not be jailed for, such as speech, donations to charitable
organizations, and other such acts considered material support for terrorism. Significantly, the racial
underpinnings of the War on Terror sustain not just domestic repression but foreign abusesthe wars vast
death toll in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere could not be sustained without the
dehumanization of its Muslim victims. As before, racism at home goes hand in hand with empire abroad.
Counterinsurgency thinking that informed the strategies used in Iraq and Afghanistan in the face of
popular insurrection are also brought home to be deployed in relation to Muslim American populations.
Winning hearts and minds, the counterinsurgency slogan first introduced by British colonialists in
Malaya, and then adopted by the US military in Vietnam, reappears as the phrase that state planners
invoke to prevent extremism among young Muslims in the United States. Counterinsurgency in this
context means total surveillance of Muslim populations, and building law enforcement agency partnerships
with good Muslims, those who are willing to praise US policy and become sources of information on
dissenters, making life very difficult for bad Muslims or those who refuse (in ways reminiscent of the
good and bad Indians). It is a way of ensuring that the knowledge Muslims tend to have of how US
foreign policy harms the Middle East, Africa, and Asia is not shared with others. The real fear of the
national security state is not the stereotypical Muslim fanatic but the possibility that other groups within
US society might build alliances with Muslims in opposition to empire. The various measures that the US
national security system has adopted in recent years flow from an analysis of Muslim radicalization,
which assumes that certain law-abiding activities associated with religious ideology are indicators of
extremism and potential violence. Following the preventive logic discussed above, the radicalization model
claims to be able to predict which individuals are not terrorists now but might be at some later date.
Behavioral, cultural, and ideological signals are assumed to reveal who is at risk of turning into a terrorist
at some point in the future.59 For example, in the FBIs radicalization model, such things as growing a
beard, starting to wear traditional Islamic clothing, and becoming alienated from ones former life are
listed as indicators, as is increased activity in a pro-Muslim social group or political cause.60 Thus,
signifiers of Muslimness such as facial hair, dress, and so on are turned into markers of suspicion for a
surveillance gaze that is also a racial (and gendered) gaze; it is through such routine bureaucratic
mechanisms that counterterrorism practices involve the social construction of racial others. Official

acceptance of the model of radicalization implies a need for mass surveillance of Muslim populations and
collection of as much data as possible on every aspect of their lives in order to try to spot the supposed
warning signs that the models list. And this is exactly the approach that law enforcement agencies
introduced. At the New York Police Department, for instance, the instrumentalizing of radicalization models
led to the mass, warrantless surveillance of every aspect of Muslim life. Dozens of mosques in New York
and New Jersey and hundreds more hot spots, such as restaurants, cafs, bookshops, community
organizations, and student associations were listed as potential security risks. Undercover officers and
informants eavesdropped at these locations of interest to listen for radical political and religious
opinions. A NYPD Moroccan Initiative compiled a list of every known Moroccan taxi driver. Muslims who
changed their names to sound more traditionally American or who adopted Arabic names were
investigated and catalogued in secret NYPD intelligence files. It is clear that none of this activity was based
on investigating reasonable suspicions of criminal activity. This surveillance produced no criminal leads
between 2006 and 2012, and probably did not before or after.61 As of 2008, the FBI had a roster of 15,000
paid informants62 and, according to Senator Dianne Feinstein of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the
bureau had 10,000 counterterrorism intelligence analysts in 2013.63 The proportion of these informants
and analysts who are assigned to Muslim populations in the United States is unknown but is likely to be
substantial. The kinds of infiltration and provocation tactics that had been practiced against Black radicals
in the 1960s are being repeated today. What has changed are the rationales used to justify them: it is no
longer the threat of Black nationalist subversion, but the threat of Muslim radicalization that is invoked.
With new provisions in the Clinton administrations 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the
FBI can launch investigations of a suspected individual or organization simply for providing material
support to terrorisma vague term that could include ideological activity unrelated to any actual plot to
carry out violence. While COINTELPRO violated federal laws, today similar kinds of investigation and
criminalization of political dissent can be carried out legitimately in the name of countering terrorism. For
Muslim populations on the receiving end of state surveillance programs designed to prevent
radicalization, everyday life increasingly resembles the patterns described in classic accounts of
authoritarianism. There is the same sense of not knowing whom to trust and choosing ones words with
special care when discussing politics, and of the arbitrariness and unpredictability of state power.64 With
the 2011 leaking of some NYPD intelligence files, individual Muslims have had the disturbing experience of
seeing their names mentioned in government files, along with details of their private lives. Numerous
businesses, cafs, restaurants, and mosques in New York are aware that the NYPD considers them hotspots
and deploys informants to monitor them. And the recent outing of a small number of NYPD informants has
meant some Muslims in New York have found that relationships they thought of as genuine friendships
were actually covert attempts to gather intelligence.65 Racial security in the post-racial era The election
of Barack Obama as president in 2008 was said to have ushered in a new post-racial era, in which racial
inequalities were meant to be a thing of the past. African Americans and Muslim Americans placed their
hopes in Obama, voting for him in large numbers. But in the so-called post-racial era, the security narrative
of hard-working families (coded white) under threat from dangerous racial others has been as powerful as
ever. The unprecedented mass deportation of more than two million people during the Obama presidency
is one form taken by this post-racial racialized securitization. Over the last two decades, the progressive
criminalization of undocumented immigrants has been achieved through the building of a militarized wall
between Mexico and the United States, hugely expanding the US border patrol, and programs such as
Secure Communities, which enables local police departments to access immigration databases. Secure
Communities was introduced in 2008 and stepped up under Obama. It has resulted in migrants being
increasingly likely to be profiled, arrested, and imprisoned by local police officers, before being passed to
the federal authorities for deportation. Undocumented migrants can no longer have any contact with police
officers without risking such outcomes. There is an irony in the way that fears of illegal immigration
threatening jobs and the public purse have become stand-ins for real anxieties about the neoliberal
collapse of the old social contract: the measures that such fears lead toracialization and criminalization
of migrantsthemselves serve to strengthen the neoliberal status quo by encouraging a precarious labor
market. Capital, after all, does not want to end immigration but to profit from a vast exploitable labor pool
that exists under precarious conditions, that does not enjoy the civil, political and labor rights of citizens
and that is disposable through deportation.66 What brings together these different systems of racial
oppressionmass incarceration, mass surveillance, and mass deportationis a security logic that holds
the imperial state as necessary to keeping American families (coded white) safe from threats abroad and
at home. The ideological work of the last few decades has cultivated not only racial security fears but also
an assumption that the security state is necessary to keep us safe. In this sense, security has become
the new psychological wage to aid the reallocation of the welfare states social wage toward homeland
security and to win support for empire in the age of neoliberalism. Through the notion of security, social
and economic anxieties generated by the unraveling of the Keynesian social compact have been
channeled toward the Black or Brown street criminal, welfare recipient, or terrorist. In addition, as Susan
Faludi has argued, since 9/11, this homeland in need of security has been symbolized, above all, by the
white domestic hearth of the prefeminist fifties, once again threatened by mythical frontier enemies,
hidden subversives, and racial aggressors. That this idea of the homeland coincides culturally with the

denigration of capable women, the magnification of manly men, the heightened call for domesticity, the
search for and sanctification of helpless girls points to the ways it is gendered as well as racialized.67 The
post-Snowden debate The mechanisms of surveillance outlined in this essay were responses to political
struggles of various kindsfrom anticolonial insurgencies to slave rebellions, labor militancy to antiimperialist agitation. Surveillance practices themselves have also often been the target of organized
opposition. In the 1920s and 1970s, the surveillance state was pressured to contract in the face of public
disapproval. The antiwar activists who broke into an FBI field office in Media, Pennsylvania, in 1971 and
stole classified documents managed to expose COINTELPRO, for instance, leading to its shut down. (But
those responsible for this FBI program were never brought to justice for their activities and similar
techniques continued to be used later against, for example in the 1980s, the American Indian Movement,
and the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador.68) Public concern about state surveillance
in the 1970s led to the Church committee report on government spying and the Handschu guidelines that
regulated the New York Police Departments spying on political activities. Those concerns began to be
swept aside in the 1980s with the War on Drugs and, especially, later with the War on Terror. While
significant sections of the public may have consented to the security state, those who have been among
its greatest victimsthe radical Left, antiwar activists, racial justice and Black liberation campaigners, and
opponents of US foreign policy in Latin America and the Middle Eastunderstand its workings. Today, we
are once again in a period of revelation, concern, and debate on national security surveillance. Yet if real
change is to be brought about, the racial history of surveillance will need to be fully confrontedor
opposition to surveillance will once again be easily defeated by racial security narratives. The significance
of the Snowden leaks is that they have laid out the depth of the NSAs mass surveillance with the kind of
proof that only an insider can have. The result has been a generalized level of alarm as people have
become aware of how intrusive surveillance is in our society, but that alarm remains constrained within a
public debate that is highly abstract, legalistic, and centered on the privacy rights of the white middle

On the one hand, most civil liberties advocates are focused on

the technical details of potential legal reforms and new oversight
mechanisms to safeguard privacy. Such initiatives are likely to bring
little change because they fail to confront the racist and imperialist
core of the surveillance system. On the other hand, most technologists believe the
class.

problem of government surveillance can be fixed simply by using better encryption tools. While encryption
tools are useful in increasing the resources that a government agency would need to monitor an individual,
they do nothing to unravel the larger surveillance apparatus. Meanwhile, executives of US tech
corporations express concerns about loss of sales to foreign customers concerned about the privacy of
data. In Washington and Silicon Valley, what should be a debate about basic political freedoms is simply a
question of corporate profits.69 Another and perhaps deeper problem is the use of images of state
surveillance that do not adequately fit the current situationsuch as George Orwells discussion of
totalitarian surveillance. Edward Snowden himself remarked that Orwell warned us of the dangers of the
type of government surveillance we face today.70 Reference to Orwells 1984 has been widespread in the
current debate; indeed, sales of the book were said to have soared following Snowdens revelations.71 The
argument that digital surveillance is a new form of Big Brother is, on one level, supported by the evidence.
For those in certain targeted groupsMuslims, left-wing campaigners, radical journalistsstate
surveillance certainly looks Orwellian. But this level of scrutiny is not faced by the general public. The
picture of surveillance today is therefore quite different from the classic images of surveillance that we find
in Orwells 1984, which assumes an undifferentiated mass population subject to government control. What
we have instead today in the United States is total surveillance, not on everyone, but on very specific
groups of people, defined by their race, religion, or political ideology: people that NSA officials refer to as
the bad guys. In March 2014, Rick Ledgett, deputy director of the NSA, told an audience: Contrary to
some of the stuff thats been printed, we dont sit there and grind out metadata profiles of average people.
If youre not connected to one of those valid intelligence targets, you are not of interest to us.72 In the
national security world, connected to can be the basis for targeting a whole racial or political community
so, even assuming the accuracy of this comment, it points to the ways that national security surveillance
can draw entire communities into its web, while reassuring average people (code for the normative white
middle class) that they are not to be troubled. In the eyes of the national security state, this average
person must also express no political views critical of the status quo. Better oversight of the sprawling
national security apparatus and greater use of encryption in digital communication should be welcomed.
But by themselves these are likely to do little more than reassure technologists, while racialized
populations and political dissenters continue to experience massive surveillance. This is why the most
effective challenges to the national security state have come not from legal reformers or technologists but
from grassroots campaigning by the racialized groups most affected. In New York, the campaign against
the NYPDs surveillance of Muslims has drawn its strength from building alliances with other groups
affected by racial profiling: Latinos and Blacks who suffer from hugely disproportionate rates of stop and
frisk. In Californias Bay Area, a campaign against a Department of Homeland Security-funded Domain

Awareness Center was successful because various constituencies were able to unite on the issue, including
homeless people, the poor, Muslims, and Blacks. Similarly, a demographics unit planned by the Los
Angeles Police Department, which would have profiled communities on the basis of race and religion, was
shut down after a campaign that united various groups defined by race and class. The lesson here is that,
while the national security state aims to create fear and to divide people, activists can organize and build
alliances across race lines to overcome that fear. To the extent that the national security state has targeted
Occupy, the antiwar movement, environmental rights activists, radical journalists and campaigners, and

But
understanding the centrality of race and empire to national security
surveillance means finding a basis for unity across diferent groups
who experience similar kinds of policing: Muslim, Latino/a, Asian,
Black, and white dissidents and radicals. It is on such a basis that we
can see the beginnings of an efective multiracial opposition to the
surveillance state and empire.
whistleblowers, these groups have gravitated towards opposition to the national security state.

Surveillance Good Starting Point

Surveillance Good Comes First

Surveillance Good Starting Point

Domestic surveillance is a necessary starting point
surveillance is a critical facet in the historically contingent
construction of race under the neoliberal order of Empire.
Kundnani, New York University media culture and
communication professor, and Kumar, Rutgers University
media studies and Middle East studies professor, 2015
[Arun and Deepa, Race, surveillance, and empire
http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, accessed 7-11-15,
TAP]
In what follows, we argue that the debate on national security
surveillance that has emerged in the United States since the
summer of 2013 is woefully inadequate, due to its failure to place
questions of race and empire at the center of its analysis. It is racist
ideas that form the basis for the ways national security surveillance
is organized and deployed, racist fears that are whipped up to
legitimize this surveillance to the American public, and the
disproportionately targeted racialized groups that have been most
efective in making sense of it and organizing opposition. This is as
true today as it has been historically: race and state surveillance are
intertwined in the history of US capitalism. Likewise, we argue that the
history of national security surveillance in the United States is
inseparable from the history of US colonialism and empire. The
argument is divided into two parts. The first identifies a number of
moments in the history of national security surveillance in North
America, tracing its imbrication with race, empire, and capital, from
the settler-colonial period through to the neoliberal era. Our focus
here is on how race as a sociopolitical category is produced and
reproduced historically in the United States through systems of
surveillance. We show how throughout the history of the United
States the systematic collection of information has been interwoven
with mechanisms of racial oppression. From Anglo settlercolonialism, the establishment of the plantation system, the post
Civil War reconstruction era, the US conquest of the Philippines, and
the emergence of the national security state in the post-World War II
era, to neoliberalism in the post-Civil Rights era, racialized
surveillance has enabled the consolidation of capital and empire . It
is, however, important to note that the production of the racial
other at these various moments is conjunctural and heterogenous.
That is, the racialization of Native Americans, for instance, during the
settler-colonial period took diferent forms from the racialization of
African Americans. Further, the dominant construction of Blackness

under slavery is diferent from the construction of Blackness in the

neoliberal era; these ideological shifts are the product of specific
historic conditions . In short, empire and capital, at various moments,
determine who will be targeted by state surveillance , in what ways,
and for how long. In the second part, we turn our attention to the current
conjuncture in which the politics of the War on Terror shape national
security surveillance practices. The intensive surveillance of Muslim
Americans has been carried out by a vast security apparatus that
has also been used against dissident movements such as Occupy
Wall Street and environmental rights activists, who represent a
threat to the neoliberal order. This is not new; the process of
targeting dissenters has been a constant feature of American
history. For instance, the Alien and Sedition Acts of the late 1790s
were passed by the Federalist government against the Jefersonian
sympathizers of the French Revolution. The British hanged Nathan
Hale because he spied for Washingtons army in the American
Revolution. State surveillance regimes have always sought to
monitor and penalize a wide range of dissenters, radicals, and
revolutionaries. Race was a factor in some but by no means all of
these cases. Our focus here is on the production of racialized
others as security threats and the ways this helps to stabilize
capitalist social relations . Further, the current system of mass
surveillance of Muslims is analogous to and overlaps with other
systems of racialized security surveillance that feed the mass
deportation of immigrants under the Obama administration and that
disproportionately target African Americans, contributing to their
mass incarceration and what Michelle Alexander refers to as the
New Jim Crow .4 We argue that racialized groupings are produced in
the very act of collecting information about certain groups deemed
as threats by the national security statethe Brown terrorist, the
Black and Brown drug dealer and user, and the immigrant who
threatens to steal jobs. We conclude that security has become one
of the primary means through which racism is ideologically
reproduced in the post-racial, neoliberal era . Drawing on W. E. B.
Duboiss notion of the psychological wage, we argue that
neoliberalism has been legitimized in part through racialized notions
of security that ofer a new psychological wage as compensation
for the decline of the social wage and its reallocation to homeland
security.

Anti-Blackness Adv

Uniqueness Racial Targeting Now

Black peace movements are being labeled as terrorists in

the SQ
PARTON 15 (HEATHER DIGBY PARTON, a political writer for
Salon.com, A racial Big Brother debacle: Why is the
government spying on Black Lives Matter protests?, Salon.com,
THURSDAY, MAR 19, 2015 02:22 PM EDT,
http://www.salon.com/2015/03/19/a_racial_big_brother_debacle_w
hy_is_the_government_spying_on_black_lives_matter_protests/,
Accessed July 2015, CMT)
After all, in these days of hyper awareness over the terrorist threat, it doesnt
take much imagination to see how that sort of thing could get out of hand, so
its important that they follow the rules. Now there was a time when the
cause of anti-communism required that we be extra-vigilant because
the Russians were coming and dissent was closely monitored by
police and the FBI in order that the government keep tabs on all those
potential commie infiltrators such as Martin Luther King and John Lennon.
And even quite recently, it was found that the authorities had peace
activists under surveillance in the wake of 9/11. The Washington Post
reported in 2006: A database managed by a secretive Pentagon intelligence
agency called Counterintelligence Field Activity, or CIFA, was found last
month to contain reports on at least four dozen antiwar meetings or
protests, many of them on college campuses. Ten peace activists who
handed out peanut butter and jelly sandwiches outside Halliburtons
headquarters in Houston in June 2004 were reported as a national
security threat. So were people who assembled at a Quaker meeting house
in Lake Worth, Fla., or protested military recruiters at sites such as New York
University, the State University of New York and campuses of the University
of California at Berkeley and at Santa Cruz. The protesters were written up
under a Pentagon program called Talon, which is supposed to collect raw data
on threats to defense facilities in the United States. CIFA, an agency created
just under four years ago that now includes nine directorates and more than
1,000 employees, is charged with working to prevent terrorist attacks.
The logic that peace activists must be in league with terrorists has
never been adequately explained, but it follows along the same line
of thought which leads conservatives to assume that decadent leftwing hippies are natural allies of Muslim fundamentalists.

FYI- Many diferent types of anti-black surveillance

KHALEK 13 (RANIA KHALEK, an independent journalist reporting
on the underclass and marginalized who has written for Extra,
The Nation, Al Jazeera America Activists of Color Lead Charge
Against Surveillance, NSA, Truth-out.org, Published 30 October
2013, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/19695-activists-ofcolor-at-forefront-of-anti-nsa-movement, Accessed July 7th 2015,
CMT)
"We been exposed to this type of surveillance since we got here ,"
declared Kymone Freeman, director of the National Black LUV Fest as
he emceed the historic rally against NSA surveillance in Washington,
DC. He continued, "Drones is [are] a form of surveillance. Racial
profiling is a form of surveillance. Stop-and-frisk is a form of
surveillance. We all black today!"

Mass surveillance in communities of color increase the

amount of minorities in the criminal justice system
KHALEK 13 (RANIA KHALEK, an independent journalist reporting
on the underclass and marginalized who has written for Extra,
The Nation, Al Jazeera America Activists of Color Lead Charge
Against Surveillance, NSA, Truth-out.org, Published 30 October
2013, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/19695-activists-ofcolor-at-forefront-of-anti-nsa-movement, Accessed July 7th 2015,
CMT)
Steven Renderos, national organizer for the Center for Media Justice, who
helped put together the panel, told Truthout that examining the legacy of
surveillance in communities of color could help lead to solutions. "It's
critical to understand the history so we can learn how to dismantle it,"
Renderos said. "Those of us from marginalized communities grew up in
environments very much shaped by surveillance, which has been
utilized to ramp up the criminal justice system and increase
deportations," Renderos said. "It's having real consequences in our
communities where children are growing up without parents in the
home and families are being torn apart through raids and
deportations, a lot of which is facilitated through the use of
surveillance." Panelist Fahd Ahmed, legal and policy director for the South
Asian-led social justice organization Desis Rising Up and Moving, argued that
mass surveillance is the predictable outgrowth of programs that have
targeted marginalized communities for decades . "Just by the very
nature of [the United States] being a settler-colonialist and capitalist nation,
race and social control are central to its project," Ahmed said. "Anytime we
see any levels of policing - whether it's day-to-day policing in the

streets, surveillance by the police or internet surveillance - social

control, particularly of those that resist the existing system,
becomes an inherent part of that system." But, he warned, "These
policies are not going to be limited to one particular community. They're
going to continue to expand further and further" because "the surveillance
has a purpose, which is to exert the power of the state and control
the potential for dissent." Seema Sadanandan, program director for ACLU
DC, acknowledged the collective resentment felt by people of color who are
understandably frustrated that privacy violations are only now eliciting mass
public outrage when communities of color have been under aggressive
surveillance for decades. "The Snowden revelations represent a terrifying
moment for white, middle-class and upper-middle-class people in this
country, who on some level believe that the Bill of Rights and Constitution
were protecting their everyday lives,"

The black community has and will always been surveilled,

empirics prove
Kayyali 14 (Nadia Kayyali, Nadia earned a B.A. from UC
Berkeley with a major in Cultural Anthropology and minored in
Public Policy, The History of Surveillance and the Black
Community, eff.com, published February 13, 2014,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/history-surveillance-andblack-community, Accessed July 7th 2015, CMT)
Government surveillance programs, most infamously the FBIs
COINTELPRO, targeted Black Americans fighting against
segregation and structural racism in the 1950s and 60s. COINTELPRO,
short for Counter Intelligence Program, was started in 1956 by the FBI
and continued until 1971. The program was a systemic attempt to
infiltrate, spy on, and disrupt activists in the name of national
security. While it initially focused on the Communist Party, in the 1960s its
focus expanded to include a wide swathe of activists, with a strong
focus on the Black Panther Party and civil rights leaders such as Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. FBI papers show that in 1962 the FBI started and
rapidly continued to gravitate toward Dr. King. This was ostensibly because
the FBI believed black organizing was being influenced by communism. In
1963 FBI Assistant Director William Sullivan recommended
increased coverage of communist influence on the Negro . However,
the FBIs goal in targeting Dr. King was clear: to find avenues of
approach aimed at neutralizing King as an efective Negro leader,
because the FBI was concerned that he might become a messiah.

Anti-Blackness Adv Surveillance Bad

Threat-constructing Surveillance rhetoric justifies racism
as: necessary for the common good. This normalizes
racism and makes it invisible even to its victims.
Declaring Solidarity with the victims is necessary to solve
this discrimination.
Prison Culture 13 (June 12 2013, Site dedicated to exposing racism of
the military-industrial complex, On (Some) Black People and the Surveillance
State, http://www.usprisonculture.com/blog/2013/06/12/on-some-blackpeople-and-the-surveillance-state/ DA: 7/6/15 CB)
Some black folks in my life have no patience for some white peoples new
found interest/discovery of Cointelpro and particularly of their (now
incessant) invocation of the FBIs surveillance of Martin Luther King Jr. The
interest seems to them instrumental and transactional. Its as if folks who
have had little concern about black peoples daily experiences of state
violence are now demanding our support in safeguarding their rights. There
has been no prior relationship or trust-building so some black folks are
feeling used and exploited. It brings to mind the lyric: Will you still love
me, tomorrow? This sentiment is understandable. As the revelations about
NSA surveillance roil the political world, media outlets & others are suddenly
very interested in Americans views on matters of privacy, civil liberties, and
individual rights. A poll was released a few days ago. It apparently found
that blacks were more likely than whites and hispanics to consider
the patriot act a necessary tool [that helps the government find
terrorists] (58% to 42% and 40% respectively). On my Twitter timeline,
several people mused about why this would be the case. After all, black
people are the disproportionate targets of government surveillance
at all levels (city, county, state, and federal). Weve always been under
the gaze of the state and we know that our rights are routinely
violable. Moreover, we are used to these abuses being ignored by
the majority of our fellow citizens. Shouldnt black people then be the
most opposed to violations of civil liberties and to laws that encroach on
those liberties? Civil liberties and individual rights have diferent
meanings for diferent groups of people. They also have diferent
priorities depending on social contexts. A review of black history suggests
that considerations of civil liberties are always embedded within
concepts of equality and social justice. In other words by design or
necessity, black people have focused on our collective rights over our
individual liberties. This makes sense in a society where we dont just assume
individual black guilt and suspicion. We are all guilty and we are all
suspicious (even if we may want to deny this reality). In that context,
individual liberties and rights take a back seat to a collective
struggle for emancipation and freedom. Additionally, as a people, we
have always known that it is impossible for us to exercise our
individual rights within a context of more generalized social,

economic, and political oppression. Individual rights are necessarily rooted

within a larger social context. Civil liberty concerns take a back seat to
putting food on the table and to survival more generally. To guarantee our
individual rights as black people, we know that we must address
broader social concerns. We dont have the luxury to ignore this fact. For
others not to understand this reality is to foreclose on any opportunities to
recruit more black people to the cause of dismantling the surveillance state.
Returning to the poll: what might account for a majority of (polled) black
peoples seeming support of using the Patriot act to find terrorists? Are
they indirectly expressing their support for President Obamas foreign
policy through their response? Its possible. Are some black people
answering yes & perhaps hoping that concentrating on terrorists
might shift the focus away from the governments targeting of AfricanAmericans? Maybe. It isnt crazy to think that if the government
develops a new public enemy #1, it might lower its black people as
threat matrix just a little bit. This is of course wishful thinking but its a
plausible explanation. My personal hypothesis is that black people living in
the U.S. are Americans and that we have, like millions of other Americans,
bought into some of the law & order rhetoric espoused by the
government. In this context, it should be unsurprising that some black
people would express support for the Patriot act. Many other Americans do
too. picimage2 Black people are disproportionately incarcerated in the
U.S. Prisoners have no presumption of privacy'; that idea is an
abstraction. Blacks are disproportionately subjected to bodily
searches and seizures through practices like stop and frisk. Stop and frisk
is a neon no tresspassing sign for young black people in particular.
Unfortunately too many of us have become acclimated to the daily
assaults on our persons and the trampling of our individual rights.
Can you blame us? If you are a black woman, then you may have the direct
experience of the state policing your body in various ways. Many of us resist
policies intended to do this but some of us dont (for a number of good and
bad reasons). The examples that I have cited suggest that for most of us
(black people) government surveillance and being perceived as
threats are a daily fact of life; not an academic/analytical exercise.
Many black people living in public housing, for example, can attest to
the fact that they arent seen as having any privacy rights when law
enforcement routinely kicks down their doors supposedly looking for
narcotics. The vast majority of the country accepts these law and
order practices as the price of freedom and safety. The outcry
against mass incarceration and stop & frisk is still overwhelmingly confined to
people of color and other marginalized communities like LGBTQ individuals.
Yet even in those communities, many have become inured to the routine
violations of rights and liberties. In order to have an elusive sense of
safety, we are told by politicians and law enforcement that these practices
are necessary and that they are in fact color-blind. We mostly swallow their
propaganda. It doesnt matter that incarceration and intense policing &
surveillance are actually decimating black communities. Black people

know that the state and its gatekeepers exert their control over all aspects of
our lives. So when we mention that the NSA surveillance regime isnt new to
us, the appropriate response is not to mock, ridicule, belittle and berate. No.
The response that conveys solidarity and a desire to partner is to
say: Yes thats true and while I may have been personally
concerned about these issues, I am sorry that more of my peers
havent been outraged for years. How can we work together to
dismantle the surveillance state that harms us all? Check your
privilege, please.

Anti-Blackness ADv Colorblindness Bad

Colorblindness is the experiences of diferent racial
groups become overlooked.
Hobson 15
Mellody Hobson is an American businesswoman who is the president of Ariel Investments and the current
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Dreamworks Animation. Feburary 3 2015.

Colorblindness

vs. ColorBRAVE. Progressive Pupil.

https://progressivepupil.wordpress.com/2015/02/03/colorblindess-vs-colorbrave/. July 9, 2015
In her Ted Talk, Mellody Hobson, a Financial Executive, discusses her stance on colorblindness. She opens

race in our country is an uncomfortable

subject. However, by using her personal experiences as a successful Black women in a field dominated
by White men, she provides compelling arguments as to why we should no longer be
colorblind, but start the conversation of race in the workplace. Colorblindness is a term
used to describe ones ability or choice to disregard and/or overlook
race. Variations of phrases similar to I dont see color are distinct examples. As Hobson points out,
avoiding the topic of race is not the answer, for it mutes the
discussion of diversity and inclusiveness ultimately. This neglects a
significance piece of ones identity. I personally remember a time when the people
the Ted Talk by acknowledging that

around me chose to be colorblind. It was my freshman year of high school, and I was the only Black person
on our cheerleading team. One of our away games took place in a very conservative town in North
Georgia. There were approximately fifteen people of color in the entire gym, including the members of our
basketball team and their families. At some point, the game got heated; racial slurs and threats were
exchanged to the Black basketball players and myself. Yes I was upset in that moment, but I remember
feeling more disappointed that the other cheerleaders chose it act like it didnt happen. My race was never
discussed during practices or at games. The only reference to my color would arise while trying to explain
to my coaches that my hair does not curl while in box braids. My teammates and coaches chose to
overlook the difference in my hair, just like they did during the Georgia situation. I wanted them to

Blackness made me a victim to racial threats . So no, they did not

spit out the racial slurs, but choosing to not acknowledge my race and the
experiences that come with it, is form of racism. While some choose
to be colorblind, others seem to be on the opposite end of the
extreme by being color conscious. Color Consciousness is when one
thinks they are aware of someones reality due to the assumptions
they have about their race. While I do think its important to be aware of race,
assuming to know anyones reality without being that person can be
ofensive. During her Ted Talk Hobson stated that she was recently mistaken for kitchen help. Though
acknowledge that my

I dont have details about the situation, I believe her skin color played a role is ones decision to mistake

We have to
start creating spaces where we can have these difficult
conversations. As Hobson stated if we dont begin this conversation about
race and discrimination it threatens to rob another generation of all
the opportunities wanted for them regardless of the color of their
skin.
her as kitchen help. Concluding her Ted Talk Hobson challenged us to be Colorbrave.

Colorblindness isnt actually color blind; its a hidden form

of racism. Color consciousness is better.
Wilkins 96
David Wilkins is the Lester Kissel Professor of Law, and Faculty Director of the Program on the Legal
Profession and the Center on Lawyers and the Professional Services Industry at Harvard Law School. He is
a Senior Research Fellow of the American Bar Foundation, the Harvard Law School's Vice Dean for Global
Initiatives on the Legal Profession, and a Faculty Associate of the Harvard University Edmond J. Safra
Foundation Center for Ethics. Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race
https://thenatureofrace.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/color-conscious-the-political-morality-of-race-copy.pdf.
July 9, 2015.

Not only are we as a nation destined to fail to solve the problem of

the color-line in this century, but we are in danger of losing our
ability even to talk about the subject intelligently. Far too often, speakers
on both sides of contemporary debates about race acknowledge only half of
Americas complex racial legacy. Those who oppose taking race into
account, for example, when awarding benefits or designing educational curricula, point to the
fact that our political institutions rest on principles of individual freedom and
equality that expressly deny the moral or political significance of ascriptive
characteristics such as race. Echoing Justice Harlans famous dissent in Plessy v. Fergusson,
these advocates passionately assert that our Constitution is color blind, and morality is
as well.2 Supporters of affirmative action or multiculturalism, on the other hand, cite the fact that
Americans frequently acting in the name of individual freedom and equalityexterminated the
indigenous Native American population, kidnapped and enslaved millions of Africans, held JapaneseAmericans (but not German-Americans) in internment camps during World War II, and, from 1790 to 1952,
restricted legal naturalization to white persons. For these advocates, color blindness in our political and
moral discourse has been little more than a smoke screen for the pervasive color consciousness (and,
more specifically, white supremacy) that has been a dominant feature of the American saga since the
Pilgrims first landed on Plymouth Rock. Given this dual legacy, it is not surprising, as Anthony Appiah
observes in his thoughtful epilogue to this volume, that so much of what is said today about race is
dishonest, confused, illinformed, unhelpful. If we are to fare any better on Du Boiss challenge in the next
century, we must create a discourse about race that acknowledges both parts of Americas racial heritage.
This volume is an attempt to create such a discourse. It does so by bringing together two leading scholars
and, to quote Appiah again, passionate democrats, to ask the kind of probing and critical questions
about the meaning and significance of race that are rarely addressed in our sound bite culture. Each
author brings a wealth of experience and expertise to the task. Anthony Appiah has written extensively
about a wide range of topics relating to African and African-American intellectual history and literary
studies, ethics, and the philosophy of mind and language. Amy Gutmann is one of the countrys leading
scholars in the fields of democratic theory, ethics, and public education. In the essays that follow, both
these accomplished authors strive to give an account of race in contemporary American society that pays
due regard both to the promise of Americas ideals and to its persistent failure to live up to these noble
aspirations. Appiahs essay, entitled Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, explores the

that the concept of race 2

developed
in this country neither adequately explains existing American social
distinctions nor properly acts as a surrogate for culture or identity. Although
Americas history of racial oppression creates a role for racial identities, Appiah concludes, if we are
ever to realize the promise of individual freedom and equality embedded in
the other part of our racial heritage, we shall have, in the end, to move
beyond current racial identities. In Responding to Racial Injustice, Amy Gutmann brings the
role of race in the formation of individual identity. His central claim is

Plessy v. Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), p. 559. 4 INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEXT OF RACE

two parts of Americas racial dilemma together to provide a color blind argument in favor of color

in order to treat individuals fairly, the

ultimate goal of a just society, it will sometimes be necessary to enact color
conscious policies that recognize the extent to which race continues to
consciousness in public policy. Gutmann argues that

influence the life chances of citizens.

At the same time, Gutmann insists, these policies must

also be consistent with the truth about color blindness that all persons, regardless of their skin color, are

Only those color conscious public policies that are both

instrumentally valuable to overcoming racial injustice and consistent with the
fundamental equality of all human beings, Gutmann concludes, are justifiable in a democracy that hopes one day to live up to its professed ideals.
civic equals.

Color Consciousness is superior to color blindness.

Chaky 14
Chris Chaky, Muhlenberg College, Politics Department, Undergraduate. Studies History, International
Relations, and Cultural Studies. Thoughts of Color Conscious. July 7 2014. Contemporary
Racism. http://contemporaryracism.org/2744/thoughts-on-color-consciousness/. July 9, 2015

colorblind racial
ideology is a harmful way of viewing the world. By ignoring both the
material disadvantages faced by people of color and the implicit
racial biases that influence decision-making, subscribing to
colorblind racial ideology leads people to ignore the realities of
racism in modern America and thus oppose policies that would
address racial inequalities. In a recent class, we discussed how some white
people who subscribe to such an ideology will go to any length to avoid
mentioning a person of colors race. This avoidance occurs despite the fact that, in all
likelihood, this person is thinking about the person of colors race. Research has shown that people
who practice this kind of avoidance are perceived by many people of
color as more racially biased. The solution to colorblindness, then, is
color-consciousness, which involves the active acknowledgment of race. One should
not actively ignore the race of a person of color; one should feel free
to discuss it. It is this recognition that can lead to an overcoming of
system and implicit racial bias. All of this sounds good, but there is one issue I want to
raise. It occurred to me that subscribing to a color-conscious ideology might be
problematic if one only recognizes the races of people of color and ignores
the race of white people. This reinforces white normativity, the idea that
white is the default or normal identity in America. Any other race is different and even
The recent literature in social psychology and other disciplines is clear:

less American. How would this play out in the real world? Interpersonally, it could mean not just refusing to
avoid using the race of people of color as a descriptor (granted, it should never be the only descriptor) but
also actively using the race of white people as a descriptor. It could mean that one could discuss the effect
race has not only on black politicians but also on white politicians. Do you think this is a good idea? Would
such a strategy be able to gradually chip away at the dominance of white normativity? My reasoning is

calling attention to the fact that white Americans are in fact

white will reduce the tendency to automatically associate white with
American. It could also call attention to white privilege and not just
the subordination of people of color.
that

Racial color blindness is a form of modern day racism.

Neville 11

Helen Neville Professor, Department of Psychology B.A., University of British Columbia M.A., Simon Fraser
University Ph.D., Cornell University. August 17 2011. Color-Blind Racial Ideology
http://studysites.sagepub.com/healeyregc6e/study/chapter/encycarticles/ch11/NEVILL~1.PDF. July 9, 2015
Over the past 2 decades scholars and popular authors have written about racial color-blindness as a way to
characterize racial beliefs in the postcivil rights era. At its core ,

racial color-blindness
refers to the belief that racism is a thing of the past and that race no
longer plays a role in understanding peoples lived experience.
Conceptually, racial color-blindness has its roots in the law field and
traditionally has been applied mainly to the Constitution. More recently,
scholars have redefined the term to better capture the new social relations within the current racial
climate.

As early as 1997, the field of psychology questioned the underlying

assumption that ignoring race and color was a desirous and appropriate
approach to interracial interactions. In a pamphlet on color-blind racial
attitudes, the American Psychological Association (APA) concluded that
research conducted for more than two decades strongly supports the view
that we cannot be, nor should we become, color-blind (p. 3). The APA further provided
a critique of the color-blind perspective, arguing that a color-blind approach ignores
research showing that, even among well-intentioned people, skin
color . . . figures prominently in everyday attitudes and behavior (p.
2). The APA thus argued that to get beyond racism it is essential to take into
account diferences between the lived experiences of people. There are a
number of complementary but competing definitions of racial color-blindness. Couching racial colorblindness as an expression of modern-day racism, sociologist Eduardo BonillaSilva identified four frames or types: abstract liberalism (i.e., emphasizing political liberalism and the
availability of equal opportunities to everyone, regardless of race, and the belief that political/economic
interventions only serve to create a schism between racial groups); naturalism (i.e., interpreting racial
clustering as a natural and preferred occurrence); cultural (i.e., using essentialist arguments to explain
racial disparities, thus rooting racial differences in cultural practices); and minimization of racism in todays
society. Ruth Frankenberg, also a sociologist, viewed racial color-blindness as a perspective consisting of
two types: color-evasion (i.e., placing an emphasis on racial sameness to the detriment of seeing or
acknowledging differences in experiences and political realities) and power-evasion (i.e., the belief that
resources are fairly distributed to everyone and success is attributed to individual effort). In the Guidelines
on Multicultural Education, Training, Research, Practice, and Organizational Change for Psychologists,
authored by the APA, the interpersonal aspects of racial color-blindness are emphasized. Based on this
perspective potential racial differences are minimized in favor of universal or human experiences. There is

color-blind perspective
dismisses potential diferences based on racial group membership
and downplays how these diferences may shape human
experiences. This limited awareness of the manifestation of race and
racism in society is the foundation for most conceptualizations of
racial color-blindness. Regardless of the definition, racial colorblindness is also thought to help justify existing racial practices or
policies that ultimately create and support existing racial
inequalities. Consistent with these articulations, researchers argue that racial color-blindness
a great deal of commonality across cultures; however, the

reflects a broader ideological stance. Racial ideology is complex, but essentially it can be conceptualized
as a global term referring to the dominant views about race within a hierarchical society .

Ideology in
this regard consists of a shared worldview about race that helps to
justify and legitimize the current racial status quo; it accounts for
individual beliefs and dominant societal racial beliefs or ideas that
are commonly understood and transmitted through a variety of civil
society and structural mechanisms. From this perspective racial

color-blind ideology is a set of commonly held beliefs that minimize

and distort the existence of institutional racism. This perspective is most
consistent with the minimization type of color-blind racism identified by Bonilla-Silva and the powerevasion type proffered by Frankenberg. Recently, scholars have challenged the assumption of the
emergence of a new racism. Based on the review of the interdisciplinary literature in the United States and
in other English-speaking countries, Colin Wayne Leach concluded that old-fashioned racism or the
endorsement of racial inferiority/superiority ideology and actions have not been supplanted by more covert
forms of racial expressions. Although he did not name racial color-blindness in his critique, Leach raised
questions about whether or not a shift has occurred in the manifestation of racism since the passage of
civil rights laws.

In sum, racial color-blindness is premised on the

persistence of racism as manifested in contemporary racial
disparities across a range of indexes, including housing, health, and
employment. The complex set of beliefs used to restrict awareness
of the persistence of racism is part of a larger ideological stance
that serves to legitimize and further perpetuate racial inequalities.
There is some debate about whether racial colorblindness is a new
phenomenon or whether it reflects a dimension of racism that, until
relatively recently, has received attention in the social science
literature.

Color blindness causes racial backgrounds, ethnic stories,

heritage, and culture to be destroyed.
Williams 11
Monnica T Williams received her Master's and Doctoral Degrees in clinical
psychology from the University of Virginia, where she conducted research in
the areas of psychopathology, tests and measurement, and ethnic
differences,Dec 27, 2011 Psychology Today, Colorblind Ideology Is a Form of
Racism, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/culturallyspeaking/201112/colorblind-ideology-is-form-racism, Date Accessed; July 9th,
2015
Racial issues are often uncomfortable to discuss and rife with stress
and controversy. Many ideas have been advanced to address this
sore spot in the American psyche. Currently, the most pervasive
approach is known as colorblindness. Colorblindness is the racial
ideology that posits the best way to end discrimination is by treating
individuals as equally as possible, without regard to race, culture, or
ethnicity. At its face value, colorblindness seems like a good thing
really taking MLK seriously on his call to judge people on the content
of their character rather than the color of their skin. It focuses on
commonalities between people, such as their shared humanity .
However, colorblindness alone is not sufficient to heal racial wounds
on a national or personal level. It is only a half-measure that in the
end operates as a form of racism . Racism? Strong words, yes, but
let's look the issue straight in its partially unseeing eye. In a
colorblind society, White people, who are unlikely to experience

disadvantages due to race, can efectively ignore racism in American

life, justify the current social order, and feel more comfortable with
their relatively privileged standing in society (Fryberg, 2010). Most minorities,
however, who regularly encounter difficulties due to race, experience colorblind ideologies quite differently.

Colorblindness creates a society that denies their negative racial

experiences, rejects their cultural heritage, and invalidates their
unique perspectives . Let's break it down into simple terms: Color-Blind = "People of color we
don't see you (at least not that bad colored' part)." As a person of color, I like who I
am, and I don't want any aspect of that to be unseen or invisible . The
need for colorblindness implies there is something shameful about the way God made me and the culture I
was born into that we shouldn't talk about. Thus, colorblindness has helped make race into a taboo topic
that polite people cannot openly discuss. And if you can't talk about it, you can't understand it, much less

Many Americans view colorblindness

as helpful to people of color by asserting that race does not matter
(Tarca, 2005). But in America, most underrepresented minorities will
explain that race does matter, as it afects opportunities,
perceptions, income, and so much more. When race-related
problems arise, color blindness tends to individualize conflicts and
shortcomings, rather than examining the larger picture with cultural
diferences, stereotypes, and values placed into context . Instead of

fix the racial problems that plague our society.

resulting from an enlightened (albeit well-meaning) position, color blindness comes from a lack of
awareness of racial privilege conferred by Whiteness (Tarca, 2005). White people can guiltlessly subscribe
to colorblindness because they are usually unaware of how race affects people of color and American
society as a whole. How might colorblindness cause harm? Here's an example close to home for those of

in psychotherapy a client's
racial and ethnic remarks were viewed as a defensive shift away
from important issues, and the therapist tended to interpret this as
resistance (Comas-Diaz & Jacobsen, 1991). However, such an approach hinders the exploration of
you who are psychologically-minded. In the not-so-distant past,

conflicts related to race, ethnicity, and culture. The therapist doesn't see the whole picture, and the client

A colorblind approach efectively does the same thing.

Blind means not being able to see things. I don't want to be blind. I
want to see things clearly, even if they make me uncomfortable . As a

is left frustrated.

therapist I need to be able to hear and "see" everything my client is communicating on many different
levels. I can't afford to be blind to anything. Would you want to see a surgeon who operated blindfolded?
Of course not. Likewise, a therapist should not be blinded either, especially to something as critical as a
person's culture or racial identity. By encouraging the exploration of racial and cultural concepts, the
therapist can provide a more authentic opportunity to understand and resolve the client's problems
(Comas-Diaz & Jacobsen, 1991). Nonetheless, I have encountered many fellow therapists who ascribe to a
colorblind philosophy. They ignore race or pretend its personal, social, and historical effects don't exist.
This approach ignores the incredibly salient experience of being stigmatized by society and represents an
empathetic failure on the part of the therapist. Colorblindness does not foster equality or respect; it merely
relieves the therapist of his or her obligation to address important racial differences and difficulties.

Research has shown that hearing colorblind messages predict

negative outcomes among Whites, such as greater racial bias and
negative afect; likewise colorblind messages cause stress in ethnic
minorities, resulting in decreased cognitive performance (Holoien et al.,
2011). Given how much is at stake, we can no longer afford to be blind. It's time for change and growth.

The alternative to colorblindness is multiculturalism, an

ideology that acknowledges, highlights, and celebrates ethnoracial
It's time to see.

diferences. It recognizes that each tradition has something valuable

to ofer. It is not afraid to see how others have sufered as a result of
racial conflict or diferences. So, how do we become multicultural? The following
suggestions would make a good start (McCabe, 2011): Recognizing and valuing
diferences, Teaching and learning about diferences, and Fostering
personal friendships and organizational alliances, Moving from
colorblindness to multiculturalism is a process of change, and
change is never easy, but we can't aford to stay the same .

Color blindness promotes a ''post-racial'' society that

excludes the history of people of color.
Iweala 08
Uzodinma Iweala is the author of "Beasts of No Nation," a novel about child
soldiers in Africa, January 23,2008, Los Angeles Times, ''Race still matters''
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/23/opinion/oe-iweala23 Date Accessed;
July 9th 2015
I am shocked by the commentary on the prominence of race as a theme in the Democratic Party primaries.
Shocked not because race is a theme but because so many in the media seem to think that race would not
be or should not be mentioned. It is as if we think that not speaking about race is the equivalent of making

The only thing more amusing than the use of a new

term, "post-racial," to describe the positive response to Barack
Obama's campaign is the lamentation at the loss of "post-raciality ."
This entire narrative is a media-concocted fiction. America is decidedly not "postracial ." One need only observe the prosecution of the Duke University lacrosse team or the Jena Six,
the debate about race-based affirmative action and the atrocity that
was and is Hurricane Katrina to know that racial issues are still with
us. The desire that the subject of race be set aside in the current
"post-racial" political conversation shows that society is unwilling to
openly face its worst fear: Not only could a black man ably lead this
nation, but the mere fact of a black president would force both the
majority and minority populations to reset our parameters for
normality. Some (perhaps many) white Americans don't think it's normal for a black person to be
successful; their stereotypes can't accommodate the fact of a black person
having gone to Harvard and achieved some prominence. As an African
progress on race issues.

American writer, I am reminded of this each time I finish a reading, when without fail a white person
overzealously praises my speaking ability. The most recent version of this was a 15-year-old high school
student who was amazed that I had actually attended college. Also telling is Obama's initial lack of support
in the black community, which may have been a result of an African American unwillingness to see him as

The majority of
Americans are comfortable accepting successful blacks in
stereotypically prescribed fields such as entertainment or sports,
where blacks are expected to be physically and emotionally strong
and yet largely politically mute. When a black person becomes
successful in another field, he or she becomes a "surprise" to the
majority and is subsequently stripped of color. How many times have you heard a
representative of traditional (very different from stereotypical) black America.

white person say that he or she thinks of Obama not as a black man but as a man, or of Oprah not as a
black woman but as just, well, Oprah? I have lost count. This well-meaning, praise-expectant affirmation of
colorblindness may seem like progress, but it's really indicative of having avoided the central issue:
Someone who looks different (read black) could be just as qualified, just as deserving as a "normal" person
(read white). The in-your-face, un-stereotypical blackness of Obama therefore forces all of us to question
our ideas of race and racial progress in a way that makes us work. This type of work is difficult and scary,
and it's understandable why some would rather delay the discussion or label it unnecessary and

Obama's
presence forces us to ask whether it is reasonable to call a biracial
man black; whether definitions of race designed to benefit slaveowners are still necessary and valid in 2008. His openness about
past drug use could put front and center the debate about the
patently racist sentencing guidelines our "post-racial" society
employs to punish narcotics-related ofenses. In general, Barack Hussein
Obama brings us face to face with the discomfort our society feels
with this idea of diference. Indeed, fascination with Obama's name recalls studies that
unproductive. But having this discussion will allow us to grow stronger as a country.

show how hard it is for those with unique African American names to find employment. And it is interesting
that no one has mentioned an obvious reason for the Obama campaign's initial reluctance to attack Hillary
Rodham Clinton -- that it might conjure up the age-old assumption that aggressive young black men are a
menace to older white women. (If that statement offends you, I'm sure plenty of young black men like
myself can tell you about older white women crossing the street to avoid us in our "post-racial" society.)

Even if we were to confront head-on these and other questions

surrounding race, we are unlikely to grow into the "post-racial"
modifier some of us so crave. That's because the idea of "postraciality" is a total fallacy. Should Obama become president, he will not suddenly cease to
be black, nor will white Americans be any less white. However, Obama's continual presence in our
newspapers, on television and in our national consciousness would force us to reconsider just what these
colors mean. A President Obama (or any other black president) would bring us face to face with the

colorblindness and equality are not the same, and that

real progress on racial issues means respect for, and not avoidance
of, diference. Our racial past and future is something that we
Americans must address. Thanks to Obama, there is no better time than
now.
threatening idea that

Color-blindness is the new arise form of racism to oppress

people of color.
Neville 11
Helen. A Neville is a Professor in the Departments of Educational Psychology
and African American Studies at the UIUC. August 17, 2011, ''SAGE
PUBLICATIONS'' http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412963978.n343 Date
accessed; July 9, 2015
Recently, scholars have challenged the assumption of the emergence
of a new racism. Based on the review of the interdisciplinary
literature in the United States and in other English-speaking countries, Colin
Wayne Leach concluded that old-fashioned racism or the

endorsement of racial inferiority/superiority ideology and actions

have not been supplanted by more covert forms of racial
expressions. Although he did not name racial color-blindness in his
critique, Leach raised questions about whether or not a shift has
occurred in the manifestation of racism since the passage of civil
rights laws. In sum, racial color-blindness is premised on the
persistence of racism as manifested in contemporary racial
disparities across a range of indexes, including housing, health, and
employment. The complex set of beliefs used to restrict awareness
of the persistence of racism is part of a larger ideological stance
that serves to legitimize and further perpetuate racial inequalities.
There is some debate about whether racial colorblindness is a new
phenomenon or whether it reflects a dimension of racism that, until
relatively recently, has received attention in the social science
literature.

Islamophobia Adv

Uniqueness Islamophobic Targeting Now

Islamophobic targeting by the FBI is rampant now.
Unegbu, Howard University JD candidate, 2013
[Cindy, 57 How. L.J. 433, NOTE AND COMMENT: National Security
Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional
Misstep Lexis, accessed 7-6-15, TAP]
In accordance with its surveillance and national security
investigation power, the FBI has conducted various undercover
monitoring procedures that call into question their constitutional
permissibility. 115Link to the text of the note In 2009, the FBI
participated in a career day event conducted in San [451] Jose, CA
sponsored by an Assyrian community organization. 116Link to the text
of the note The FBI's observations were placed in a mapping report.
117Link to the text of the note In the report, the FBI recited information
about the organization's activities, the identities of several leaders
within the organization, and the content of conversations at the
event. 118Link to the text of the note This content included opinions,
backgrounds, travel histories, educations, occupations, and
charitable activities. 119Link to the text of the note Similarly, a memo
submitted by the Sacramento Division of the FBI details a
conversation in which an undercover agent discusses the Saudi
Student Association with an innocent California State University
student. 120Link to the text of the note The conversation included the
organization's size, purpose, and activities. 121Link to the text of the
note The memo, which included the student's social security number,
telephone number, and address, was submitted to the FBI in
Washington, DC. 122Link to the text of the note Additionally, in San
Francisco, the FBI submitted a 2007 and 2008 report that detailed
FBI spy eforts at Ramadan Iftar dinners. 123Link to the text of the note
In the reports, the FBI documented the names of attendees, the
contents of various conversations and presentations, a photo of
dinner participants, and other information. 124Link to the text of the
note Both of the reports indicate that the information was
disseminated outside of the FBI. 125Link to the text of the note There
are several other instances, similar to these, in which the FBI
utilized individuals' race or ethnicity as a basis for monitoring.
126Link to the text of the note The American Civil Liberties Union and
[452] other organizations have protested the wide-sweeping
authority that has been granted to the national government to
monitor domestic individuals, especially those that are not
suspected of terrorism or criminal activity. 127Link to the text of the
note Furthermore, the government has received criticism in the past
for misusing its surveillance authority. 128Link to the text of the note In
March of 2007, the Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller III,
acknowledged that the bureau had improperly used the Patriot Act

to obtain surveillance information. 129Link to the text of the note An

investigation into the government's surveillance practices found that
national security letters, which allow the bureau to obtain records
from telephone companies, internet service providers, banks, credit
companies, and other businesses without a judge's approval, were
improperly, and sometimes illegally, used. 130Link to the text of the
note Additionally, incorrect recordkeeping was exposed, in which the
actual number of national security letters utilized were frequently
understated when reported to Congress. 131Link to the text of the note
Several legislatures have expressed concern about the misuse of
government surveillance. 132Link to the text of the note It is apparent
that this concern is not misguided since the Justice Department's
Office of the Inspector General noted, in a 2007 audit report, that
many FBI failures had occurred as a result of its surveillance
procedures. 133Link to the text of the note These failures include a lack
of internal controls 134Link to the text of the note and the absence of
required information in national security letter approval memoranda.
135Link to the text of the note Critics of the government's surveillance
procedures assert that the broad monitoring authority given to the
government not only is unconstitutional because of a lack of checks
and balances that would [453] allow for proper controls of the monitoring of
citizens, 136Link to the text of the note but also because it has the efect
of inappropriately singling out individuals for no other reason than
their race or ethnicity. 137Link to the text of the note Therefore, the
surveillance power given to the government and the anti-terrorist domestic
monitoring procedures must be analyzed to determine their constitutional
permissibility.

NYPDs undercover operation have been targeting

Muslims and other minorities
APUZZO AND GOLDMAN 11

(matt and adam, , With CIA help, NYPD moves covertly in

Muslim areas,8/23,Associated Press, With CIA help, NYPD moves covertly in Muslim areas, LS)

In New Brunswick, N.J., a building superintendent opened the door to

apartment No. 1076 one balmy Tuesday and discovered an alarming scene:
terrorist literature strewn about the table and computer and surveillance
equipment set up in the next room. The panicked superintendent dialed 911,
sending police and the FBI rushing to the building near Rutgers University on
the afternoon of June 2, 2009. What they found in that first-floor apartment,
however, was not a terrorist hideout but a command center set up by a
secret team of New York Police Department intelligence officers. From that
apartment, about an hour outside the department's jurisdiction, the NYPD
had been staging undercover operations and conducting surveillance
throughout New Jersey. Neither the FBI nor the local police had any idea.
Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the NYPD has become one of the
country's most aggressive domestic intelligence agencies. A months-long
investigation by The Associated Press has revealed that the NYPD operates

far outside its borders and targets ethnic communities in ways that would run
afoul of civil liberties rules if practiced by the federal government. And it does
so with unprecedented help from the CIA in a partnership that has blurred the
bright line between foreign and domestic spying. Neither the city council,
which finances the department, nor the federal government, which
contributes hundreds of millions of dollars each year, is told exactly what's
going on. The department has dispatched teams of undercover officers,
known as "rakers," into minority neighborhoods as part of a human mapping
program, according to officials directly involved in the program. They've
monitored daily life in bookstores, bars, cafes and nightclubs. Police have also
used informants, known as "mosque crawlers," to monitor sermons, even
when there's no evidence of wrongdoing. NYPD officials have scrutinized
imams and gathered intelligence on cab drivers and food cart vendors, jobs
often done by Muslims. Many of these operations were built with help from
the CIA, which is prohibited from spying on Americans but was instrumental
in transforming the NYPD's intelligence unit. A veteran CIA officer, while still
on the agency's payroll, was the architect of the NYPD's intelligence
programs. The CIA trained a police detective at the Farm, the agency's spy
school in Virginia, then returned him to New York, where he put his new
espionage skills to work inside the United States. And just last month, the CIA
sent a senior officer to work as a clandestine operative inside police
headquarters. While the expansion of the NYPD's intelligence unit has been
well known, many details about its clandestine operations, including the
depth of its CIA ties, have not previously been reported. The NYPD denied
that it trolls ethnic neighborhoods and said it only follows leads. In a city that
has repeatedly been targeted by terrorists, police make no apologies for
pushing the envelope. NYPD intelligence operations have disrupted terrorist
plots and put several would-be killers in prison. "The New York Police
Department is doing everything it can to make sure there's not another 9/11
here and that more innocent New Yorkers are not killed by terrorists," NYPD
spokesman Paul Browne said. "And we have nothing to apologize for in that
regard." But officials said they've also been careful to keep information about
some programs out of court, where a judge might take a different view. The
NYPD considers even basic details, such as the intelligence division's
organization chart, to be too sensitive to reveal in court. One of the enduring
questions of the past decade is whether being safe requires giving up some
liberty and privacy. The focus of that debate has primarily been federal
programs like wiretapping and indefinite detention. The question has received
less attention in New York, where residents do not know for sure what, if
anything, they have given up. The story of how the NYPD Intelligence Division
developed such aggressive programs was pieced together by the AP in
interviews with more than 40 current and former New York Police Department
and federal officials. Many were directly involved in planning and carrying out
these secret operations for the department. Though most said the tactics
were appropriate and made the city safer, many insisted on anonymity,
because they were not authorized to speak with reporters about security
matters. The story begins with one man. David Cohen arrived at the New York
Police Department in January 2002, just weeks after the last fires had been
extinguished at the debris field that had been the twin towers. A retired 35year veteran of the CIA, Cohen became the police department's first civilian

intelligence chief. Cohen had an exceptional career at the CIA, rising to lead
both the agency's analytical and operational divisions. He also was an
extraordinarily divisive figure, a man whose sharp tongue and supreme
confidence in his own abilities gave him a reputation as arrogant. Cohen's
tenure as head of CIA operations, the nation's top spy, was so contentious
that in 1997, The New York Times editorial page took the unusual step of
calling for his ouster. He had no police experience. He had never defended a
city from an attack. But New York wasn't looking for a cop. "Post-9/11, we
needed someone in there who knew how to really gather intelligence," said
John Cutter, a retired NYPD official who served as one of Cohen's top
uniformed officers. At the time, the intelligence division was best known for
driving dignitaries around the city. Cohen envisioned a unit that would
analyze intelligence, run undercover operations and cultivate a network of
informants. In short, he wanted New York to have its own version of the CIA.
Cohen shared Commissioner Ray Kelly's belief that 9/11 had proved that the
police department could not simply rely on the federal government to prevent
terrorism in New York. "If anything goes on in New York," one former officer
recalls Cohen telling his staff in the early days, "it's your fault." Among
Cohen's earliest moves at the NYPD was making a request of his old
colleagues at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. He needed someone to help
build this new operation, someone with experience and clout and, most
important, someone who had access to the latest intelligence so the NYPD
wouldn't have to rely on the FBI to dole out information. CIA Director George
Tenet responded by tapping Larry Sanchez, a respected veteran who had
served as a CIA official inside the United Nations. Often, when the CIA places
someone on temporary assignment, the other agency picks up the tab. In this
case, three former intelligence officials said, Tenet kept Sanchez on the CIA
payroll. When he arrived in New York in March 2002, Sanchez had offices at
both the NYPD and the CIA's station in New York, one former official said.
Sanchez interviewed police officers for newly defined intelligence jobs. He
guided and mentored officers, schooling them in the art of gathering
information. He also directed their efforts, another said. There had never
been an arrangement like it, and some senior CIA officials soon began
questioning whether Tenet was allowing Sanchez to operate on both sides of
the wall that's supposed to keep the CIA out of the domestic intelligence
business. "It should not be a surprise to anyone that, after 9/11, the Central
Intelligence Agency stepped up its cooperation with law enforcement on
counterterrorism issues or that some of that increased cooperation was in
New York, the site of ground zero," CIA spokeswoman Jennifer Youngblood
said. Just as at the CIA, Cohen and Sanchez knew that informants would have
to become the backbone of their operation. But with threats coming in from
around the globe, they couldn't wait months for the perfect plan. They came
up with a makeshift solution. They dispatched more officers to Pakistani
neighborhoods and, according to one former police official directly involved in
the effort, instructed them to look for reasons to stop cars: speeding, broken
tail lights, running stop signs, whatever. The traffic stop gave police an
opportunity to search for outstanding warrants or look for suspicious
behavior. An arrest could be the leverage the police needed to persuade
someone to become an informant. For Cohen, the transition from spying to
policing didn't come naturally, former colleagues said. When faced with a

decision, especially early in his tenure, he'd fall back on his CIA background.
Cutter said he and other uniformed officers had to tell Cohen, no, we can't
just slip into someone's apartment without a warrant. No, we can't just
conduct a search. The rules for policing are different. While Cohen was being
shaped by the police department, his CIA background was remaking the
department. But one significant barrier stood in the way of Cohen's vision.
Since 1985, the NYPD had operated under a federal court order limiting the
tactics it could use to gather intelligence. During the 1960s and 1970s, the
department had used informants and undercover officers to infiltrate anti-war
protest groups and other activists without any reason to suspect criminal
behavior. To settle a lawsuit, the department agreed to follow guidelines that
required "specific information" of criminal activity before police could monitor
political activity. In September 2002, Cohen told a federal judge that those
guidelines made it "virtually impossible" to detect terrorist plots. The FBI was
changing its rules to respond to 9/11, and Cohen argued that the NYPD must
do so, too. "In the case of terrorism, to wait for an indication of crime before
investigating is to wait far too long," Cohen wrote. U.S. District Judge Charles
S. Haight Jr. agreed, saying the old guidelines "addressed different perils in a
different time." He scrapped the old rules and replaced them with more
lenient ones. It was a turning point for the NYPD.With his newfound authority,
Cohen created a secret squad that would soon infiltrate Muslim
neighborhoods, according to several current and former officials directly
involved in the program.The NYPD carved up the city into more than a dozen
zones and assigned undercover officers to monitor them, looking for potential
trouble. At the CIA, one of the biggest obstacles has always been that U.S.
intelligence officials are overwhelmingly white, their mannerisms clearly
American. The NYPD didn't have that problem, thanks to its diverse pool of
officers. Using census data, the department matched undercover officers to
ethnic communities and instructed them to blend in, the officials said.
Pakistani-American officers infiltrated Pakistani neighborhoods, Palestinians
focused on Palestinian neighborhoods. They hung out in hookah bars and
cafes, quietly observing the community around them. The unit, which has
been undisclosed until now, became known inside the department as the
Demographic Unit, former police officials said. "It's not a question of profiling.
It's a question of going where the problem could arise," said Mordecai
Dzikansky, a retired NYPD intelligence officer who said he was aware of the
Demographic Unit. "And thank God we have the capability. We have the
language capability and the ethnic officers. That's our hidden weapon." The
officers did not work out of headquarters, officials said. Instead, they passed
their intelligence to police handlers who knew their identities. Cohen said he
wanted the squad to "rake the coals, looking for hot spots," former officials
recalled. The undercover officers soon became known inside the department
as rakers. A hot spot might be a beauty supply store selling chemicals used
for making bombs. Or it might be a hawala, a broker that transfers money
around the world with little documentation. Undercover officers might visit an
Internet cafe and look at the browsing history on a computer, a former police
official involved in the program said. If it revealed visits to radical websites,
the cafe might be deemed a hot spot. Ethnic bookstores, too, were on the list.
If a raker noticed a customer looking at radical literature, he might chat up
the store owner and see what he could learn. The bookstore, or even the

customer, might get further scrutiny. If a restaurant patron applauds a news

report about the death of U.S. troops, the patron or the restaurant could be
labeled a hot spot. The goal was to "map the city's human terrain," one law
enforcement official said. The program was modeled in part on how Israeli
authorities operate in the West Bank, a former police official said. Mapping
crimes has been a successful police strategy nationwide. But mapping
robberies and shootings is one thing. Mapping ethnic neighborhoods is
different, something that at least brushes against what the federal
government considers racial profiling. Browne, the NYPD spokesman, said the
Demographic Unit does not exist. He said the department has a Zone
Assessment Unit that looks for locations that could attract terrorists. But he
said undercover officers only followed leads, disputing the account of several
current and former police and federal officials. They do not just hang out in
neighborhoods, he said. "We will go into a location, whether it's a mosque or
a bookstore, if the lead warrants it, and at least establish whether there's
something that requires more attention," Browne said. That conflicts with
testimony from an undercover officer in the 2006 trial of Shahawar Matin
Siraj, who was convicted of planning an attack on New York's subway system.
The officer said he was instructed to live in Brooklyn and act as a "walking
camera" for police. "I was told to act like a civilian _ hang out in the
neighborhood, gather information," the Bangladeshi officer testified, under a
false name, in what offered the first narrow glimpse at the NYPD's infiltration
of ethnic neighborhoods. Officials said such operations just made sense.
Islamic terrorists had attacked the city on 9/11, so police needed people
inside the city's Muslim neighborhoods. Officials say it does not conflict with a
2004 city law prohibiting the NYPD from using religion or ethnicity "as the
determinative factor for initiating law enforcement action." "It's not profiling,"
Cutter said. "It's like, after a shooting, do you go 20 blocks away and
interview guys or do you go to the neighborhood where it happened?" In
2007, the Los Angeles Police Department was criticized for even considering
a similar program. The police announced plans to map Islamic neighborhoods
to look for pockets of radicalization among the region's roughly 500,000
Muslims. Criticism was swift, and chief William Bratton scrapped the plan. "A
lot of these people came from countries where the police were the terrorists,"
Bratton said at a news conference, according to the Los Angeles Daily News.
"We don't do that here. We do not want to spread fear." In New York, current
and former officials said, the lesson of that controversy was that such
programs should be kept secret. Some in the department, including lawyers,
have privately expressed concerns about the raking program and how police
use the information, current and former officials said. Part of the concern was
that it might appear that police were building dossiers on innocent people,
officials said. Another concern was that, if a case went to court, the
department could be forced to reveal details about the program, putting the
entire operation in jeopardy. That's why, former officials said, police regularly
shredded documents discussing rakers. When Cohen made his case in court
that he needed broader authority to investigate terrorism, he had promised to
abide by the FBI's investigative guidelines. But the FBI is prohibited from
using undercover agents unless there's specific evidence of criminal activity,
meaning a federal raking program like the one officials described to the AP
would violate FBI guidelines. The NYPD declined to make Cohen available for

comment. In an earlier interview with the AP on a variety of topics, Police

Commissioner Kelly said the intelligence unit does not infringe on civil rights.
"We're doing what we believe we have to do to protect the city," he said. "We
have many, many lawyers in our employ. We see ourselves as very conscious
and aware of civil liberties. And we know there's always going to be some
tension between the police department and so-called civil liberties groups
because of the nature of what we do." The department clashed with civil
rights groups most publicly after Cohen's undercover officers infiltrated antiwar groups before the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York. A
lawsuit over that program continues today. During the convention, when
protesters were arrested, police asked a list of questions which, according to
court documents, included: "What are your political affiliations?" "Do you do
any kind of political work?" and "Do you hate George W. Bush?" "At the end of
the day, it's pure and simple a rogue domestic surveillance operation," said
Christopher Dunn, a New York Civil Liberties Union lawyer involved in the
convention lawsuit. Undercover agents like the rakers were valuable, but
what Cohen and Sanchez wanted most were informants. The NYPD dedicated
an entire squad, the Terrorist Interdiction Unit, to developing and handling
informants. Current and former officials said Sanchez was instrumental in
teaching them how to develop sources. For years, detectives used informants
known as mosque crawlers to monitor weekly sermons and report what was
said, several current and former officials directly involved in the informant
program said. If FBI agents were to do that, they would be in violation of the
Privacy Act, which prohibits the federal government from collecting
intelligence on purely First Amendment activities. The FBI has generated its
own share of controversy for putting informants inside mosques, but unlike
the program described to the AP, the FBI requires evidence of a crime before
an informant can be used inside a mosque. Valerie Caproni, the FBI's general
counsel, would not discuss the NYPD's programs but said FBI informants can't
troll mosques looking for leads. Such operations are reviewed for civil
liberties concerns, she said. "If you're sending an informant into a mosque
when there is no evidence of wrongdoing, that's a very high-risk thing to do,"
Caproni said. "You're running right up against core constitutional rights. You're
talking about freedom of religion." That's why senior FBI officials in New York
ordered their own agents not to accept any reports from the NYPD's mosque
crawlers, two retired agents said. It's unclear whether the police department
still uses mosque crawlers. Officials said that, as Muslims figured out what
was going on, the mosque crawlers became cafe crawlers, fanning out into
the city's ethnic hangouts. "Someone has a great imagination," Browne, the
NYPD spokesman, said. "There is no such thing as mosque crawlers."
Following the foiled subway plot, however, the key informant in the case,
Osama Eldawoody, said he attended hundreds of prayer services and
collected information even on people who showed no signs of radicalization.
NYPD detectives have recruited shopkeepers and nosy neighbors to become
"seeded" informants who keep police up to date on the latest happenings in
ethnic neighborhoods, one official directly involved in the informant program
said. The department also has a roster of "directed" informants it can tap for
assignments. For instance, if a raker identifies a bookstore as a hot spot,
police might assign an informant to gather information, long before there's
concrete evidence of anything criminal. To identify possible informants, the

department created what became known as the "debriefing program." When

someone is arrested who might be useful to the intelligence unit _ whether
because he said something suspicious or because he is simply a young
Middle Eastern man _ he is singled out for extra questioning. Intelligence
officials don't care about the underlying charges; they want to know more
about his community and, ideally, they want to put him to work. Police are in
prisons, too, promising better living conditions and help or money on the
outside for Muslim prisoners who will work with them. Early in the intelligence
division's transformation, police asked the taxi commission to run a report on
all the city's Pakistani cab drivers, looking for those who got licenses
fraudulently and might be susceptible to pressure to cooperate, according to
former officials who were involved in or briefed on the effort. That strategy
has been rejected in other cities. Boston police once asked neighboring
Cambridge for a list of Somali cab drivers, Cambridge Police Chief Robert
Haas said. Haas refused, saying that without a specific reason, the search
was inappropriate. "It really has a chilling effect in terms of the relationship
between the local police department and those cultural groups, if they think
that's going to take place," Haas said. The informant division was so
important to the NYPD that Cohen persuaded his former colleagues to train a
detective, Steve Pinkall, at the CIA's training center at the Farm. Pinkall, who
had an intelligence background as a Marine, was given an unusual temporary
assignment at CIA headquarters, officials said. He took the field tradecraft
course alongside future CIA spies then returned to New York to run
investigations. "We found that helpful, for NYPD personnel to be exposed to
the tradecraft," Browne said. The idea troubled senior FBI officials, who saw it
as the NYPD and CIA blurring the lines between police work and spying, in
which undercover officers regularly break the laws of foreign governments.
The arrangement even made its way to FBI Director Robert Mueller, two
former senior FBI officials said, but the training was already under way and
Mueller did not press the issue. NYPD's intelligence operations do not stop at
the city line, as the undercover operation in New Jersey made clear. The
department has gotten some of its officers deputized as federal marshals,
allowing them to work out of state. But often, there's no specific jurisdiction
at all. Cohen's undercover squad, the Special Services Unit, operates in
places such as New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, officials said.
They can't make arrests and, if something goes wrong _ a shooting or a car
accident, for instance _ the officers could be personally liable. But the NYPD
has decided it's worth the risk, a former police official said. With Police
Commissioner Kelly's backing, Cohen's policy is that any potential threat to
New York City is the NYPD's business, regardless of where it occurs, officials
said. That aggressiveness has sometimes put the NYPD at odds with local
police departments and, more frequently, with the FBI. The FBI didn't like the
rules Cohen played by and said his operations encroached on their
responsibilities. Once, undercover officers were stopped by police in
Massachusetts while conducting surveillance on a house, one former New
York official recalled. In another instance, the NYPD sparked concern among
federal officials by expanding its intelligence-gathering efforts related to the
United Nations, where the FBI is in charge, current and former federal officials
said. The AP has agreed not to disclose details of either the FBI or NYPD
operations because they involve foreign counterintelligence. Both Mueller

and Kelly have said their agencies have strong working relationships and said
reports of rivalry and disagreements are overblown. And the NYPD's out-ofstate operations have had success. A young Egyptian NYPD officer living
undercover in New Jersey, for example, was key to building a case against
Mohamed Mahmood Alessa and Carlos Eduardo Almonte. The pair was
arrested last year at John F. Kennedy Airport en route to Somalia to join the
terrorist group al-Shabab. Both pleaded guilty to conspiracy. Cohen has also
sent officers abroad, stationing them in 11 foreign cities. If a bomber blows
himself up in Jerusalem, the NYPD rushes to the scene, said Dzikansky, who
served in Israel and is the co-author of the forthcoming book "Terrorist
Suicide Bombings: Attack Interdiction, Mitigation, and Response." "I was there
to ask the New York question," Dzikansky said. "Why this location? Was there
something unique that the bomber had done? Was there any pre-notification.
Was there a security lapse?" All of this intelligence _ from the rakers, the
undercovers, the overseas liaisons and the informants _ is passed to a team
of analysts hired from some of the nation's most prestigious universities.
Analysts have spotted emerging trends and summarized topics such as
Hezbollah's activities in New York and the threat of South Asian terrorist
groups. They also have tackled more contentious topics, including drafting an
analytical report on every mosque within 100 miles of New York, one former
police official said. The report drew on information from mosque crawlers,
undercover officers and public information. It mapped hundreds of mosques
and discussed the likelihood of them being infiltrated by al-Qaida, Hezbollah
and other terrorist groups. For Cohen, there was only one way to measure
success: "They haven't attacked us," he said in a 2005 deposition. He said
anything that was bad for terrorists was good for NYPD. Though the CIA is
prohibited from collecting intelligence domestically, the wall between
domestic and foreign operations became more porous. Intelligence gathered
by the NYPD, with CIA officer Sanchez overseeing collection, was often
passed to the CIA in informal conversations and through unofficial channels, a
former official involved in that process said. By design, the NYPD was looking
more and more like a domestic CIA. "It's like starting the CIA over in the post9/11 world," Cohen said in "Protecting the City," a laudatory 2009 book about
the NYPD. "What would you do if you could begin it all over again? Hah. This
is what you would do." Sanchez's assignment in New York ended in 2004, but
he received permission to take a leave of absence from the agency and
become Cohen's deputy, former officials said. Though Sanchez's assignments
were blessed by CIA management, some in the agency's New York station
saw the presence of such a senior officer in the city as a turf encroachment.
Finally, the New York station chief, Tom Higgins, called headquarters, one
former senior intelligence official said. Higgins complained, the official said,
that Sanchez was wearing both hats, sometimes acting as a CIA officer,
sometimes as an NYPD official. The CIA finally forced him to choose: Stay with
the agency or stay with the NYPD. Sanchez declined to comment to the AP
about the arrangement, but he picked the NYPD. He retired last year and is
now a consultant in the Middle East. Last month, the CIA deepened its NYPD
ties even further. It sent one of its most experienced operatives, a former
station chief in two Middle Eastern countries, to work out of police
headquarters as Cohen's special assistant while on the CIA payroll. Current
and former U.S. officials acknowledge it's unusual but said it's the kind of

collaboration Americans expect after 9/11. Officials said revealing the CIA
officer's name would jeopardize national security. The arrangement was
described as a sabbatical. He is a member of the agency's senior
management, but officials said he was sent to the municipal police
department to get management experience. At the NYPD, he works
undercover in the senior ranks of the intelligence division. Officials are
adamant that he is not involved in actual intelligence-gathering. The NYPD
has faced little scrutiny over the past decade as it has taken on broad new
intelligence missions, targeted ethnic neighborhoods and partnered with the
CIA in extraordinary ways. The department's primary watchdog, the New York
City Council, has not held hearings on the intelligence division's operations
and former NYPD officials said council members typically do not ask for
details. "Ray Kelly briefs me privately on certain subjects that should not be
discussed in public," said City Councilman Peter Vallone. "We've discussed in
person how they investigate certain groups they suspect have terrorist
sympathizers or have terrorist suspects." The city comptroller's office has
audited several NYPD components since 9/11 but not the intelligence unit,
which had a $62 million budget last year. The federal government, too, has
done little to scrutinize the nation's largest police force, despite the massive
federal aid. Homeland Security officials review NYPD grants but not its
underlying programs. A report in January by the Homeland Security inspector
general, for instance, found that the NYPD violated state and federal
contracting rules between 2006 and 2008 by buying more than $4 million in
equipment through a no-bid process. NYPD said public bidding would have
revealed sensitive information to terrorists, but police never got approval
from state or federal officials to adopt their own rules, the inspector general
said. On Capitol Hill, where FBI tactics have frequently been criticized for their
effect on civil liberties, the NYPD faces no such opposition. In 2007, Sanchez
testified before the Senate Homeland Security Committee and was asked how
the NYPD spots signs of radicalization. He said the key was viewing innocuous
activity, including behavior that might be protected by the First Amendment,
as a potential precursor to terrorism. That triggered no questions from the
committee, which Sanchez said had been "briefed in the past on how we do
business." The Justice Department has the authority to investigate civil rights
violations. It issued detailed rules in 2003 against racial profiling, including
prohibiting agencies from considering race when making traffic stops or
assigning patrols. But those rules apply only to the federal government and
contain a murky exemption for terrorism investigations. The Justice
Department has not investigated a police department for civil rights
violations during a national security investigation. "One of the hallmarks of
the intelligence division over the last 10 years is that, not only has it gotten
extremely aggressive and sophisticated, but it's operating completely on its
own," said Dunn, the civil liberties lawyer. "There are no checks. There is no
oversight." The NYPD has been mentioned as a model for policing in the post9/11 era. But it's a model that seems custom-made for New York. No other
city has the Big Apple's combination of a low crime rate, a $4.5 billion police
budget and a diverse 34,000-person police force. Certainly no other police
department has such deep CIA ties. Perhaps most important, nobody else had
9/11 the way New York did. No other city lost nearly 3,000 people in a single
morning. A decade later, police say New Yorkers still expect the department

to do whatever it can to prevent another attack. The NYPD has embraced that
expectation. As Sanchez testified on Capitol Hill: "We've been given the
public tolerance and the luxury to be very aggressive on this topic."

Since 9/11 Muslims have been unlawfully targeted. NYPD

proves
CCR 14
The center for constitutional rights is a website that reports on social
injustices such as the unjust surveillance of people based on their race,
ethnicity or religion. March 6th 2014 https://ccrjustice.org/home/getinvolved/tools-resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/nypd-s-surveillance-andtargeting-muslims-new July 7th 2015
Since 9/11, (actual or perceived) Muslims, Arabs and South Asians
have been viewed by law enforcement as a potential threat on no
basis other than religion, casting guilt on all members of that faith.
The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has developed a sweeping
and secretive human surveillance program that targets Muslims and
members of the Arab and South Asian communities in New York City,
New Jersey, and elsewhere solely on the basis of their religious
affiliation. This massive mapping and surveillance program has been used
to monitor the lives of Muslims, their businesses, houses of worship,
organizations and schools despite any basis for belief of criminal
activity.

The methods the NYPD uses in their surveillance program

are extremely invasive and places targeted make little
sense
CCR 14
The center for constitutional rights is a website that reports on social
injustices such as the unjust surveillance of people based on their race,
ethnicity or religion. March 6th 2014 https://ccrjustice.org/home/getinvolved/tools-resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/nypd-s-surveillance-andtargeting-muslims-new July 7th 2015

As part of the surveillance program, NYPD officers have snapped pictures,

taken video, and mounted cameras aimed at mosques for the purpose
of round-the-clock surveillance in order to help identify worshippers.
The NYPD has also employed Mosque crawlers are undercover
officers who monitor sermons and conversations in mosques and

report back to the NYPD. As a result, thousands of prayer services in

mosques have been monitored and documented. The NYPD also uses
undercover officers called rakers to monitor daily life in
neighborhoods and locations they believe to be heavily Muslim
including bookstores, bars, businesses, cafes, delis, restaurants and
nightclubs. Officers have taken note of flyers ofering Quran classes
and which delis that ofer halal meat. One woman was surveilled
because she operates a grade-school for Muslim girls.

The only efect of the surveillance the NYPD has

conducted is harming the Muslim American Community,
no criminal leads have been produced
CCR 14
The center for constitutional rights is a website that reports on social
injustices such as the unjust surveillance of people based on their race,
ethnicity or religion. March 6th 2014 https://ccrjustice.org/home/getinvolved/tools-resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/nypd-s-surveillance-andtargeting-muslims-new July 7th 2015
The NYPDs surveillance program has had a chilling effect on Muslim
American communities, particularly in New Jersey and New York City. By
suggesting that Muslims pose a special threat to public safety and
treating them with suspicion as such, the program has led to the
alteration and reduction of religious practices, decreased mosque
attendance, and loss of business not to mention a widespread
sense of fear, distrust, and alienation. Furthermore, in ten years, this
surveillance program has not produced any leads to criminal
activity. Instead, by targeting Muslims based on their beliefs and
affiliations rather than their actions, the NYPD has equated Islam
with predisposition to criminality.

This surveillance is not only discriminatory but

unconstitutional
CCR 14
The center for constitutional rights is a website that reports on social
injustices such as the unjust surveillance of people based on their race,
ethnicity or religion. March 6th 2014 https://ccrjustice.org/home/getinvolved/tools-resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/nypd-s-surveillance-andtargeting-muslims-new July 7th 2015

The targeting of Muslim communities in New Jersey by the NYPD must

be contextualized as another facet of the Departments use of
discriminatory policing practices that is, when law enforcement targets
communities for enforcement activities not on the basis of what they have
done, but who they are . This is not only unjust, it is also
unconstitutional.

The FBI pushed vulnerable Muslims to commit acts of

terror for sting operations
CAIR 14 (The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is a grassroots civil
rights and advocacy group and CAIR America's largest Muslim civil liberties
organization, with regional offices nationwide, Pub. 7/22/14, HRW Report: FBI
encourage, paid Muslims to plot attacks, http://www.cair.com/press-center/americanmuslim-news/12571-hrw-report-fbi-encouraged-paid-muslims-to-plot-attacks.html,
Access 7/7/15)

The FBI encouraged and sometimes even paid Muslims to commit terrorist
acts during numerous sting operations after the 9/11 attacks, a human rights
group said in a report published Monday. "Far from protecting Americans,
including American Muslims, from the threat of terrorism, the policies
documented in this report have diverted law enforcement from pursuing real
threats," said the report by Human Rights Watch. Aided by Columbia
University Law School's Human Rights Institute, Human Rights Watch
examined 27 cases from investigation through trial, interviewing 215 people,
including those charged or convicted in terrorism cases, their relatives,
defense lawyers, prosecutors and judges. "In some cases the FBI may have
created terrorists out of law-abiding individuals by suggesting the idea of
taking terrorist action or encouraging the target to act, " the report said. In
the cases reviewed, half the convictions resulted from a sting operation, and
in 30 percent of those cases the undercover agent played an active role in
the plot. "Americans have been told that their government is keeping them
safe by preventing and prosecuting terrorism inside the US," said Andrea
Prasow, the rights group's deputy Washington director. "But take a closer look
and you realise that many of these people would never have committed a
crime if not for law enforcement encouraging, pressuring and sometimes
paying them to commit terrorist acts." The report cites the case of four
Muslim converts from Newburgh, New York who were accused of planning to
blow up synagogues and attack a US military base. A judge in that case "said
the government 'came up with the crime, provided the means, and removed
all relevant obstacles,' and had, in the process, made a terrorist out of a man
'whose buffoonery is positively Shakespearean in scope,'" the report said. The
rights group charged that the FBI often targets vulnerable people, with
mental problems or low intelligence. It pointed to the case of Rezwan
Ferdaus, who was sentenced to 17 years in prison at age 27 for wanting to
attack the Pentagon and Congress with mini-drones loaded with explosives.
An FBI agent told Ferdaus' father that his son "obviously" had mental health

problems, the report said. But that didn't stop an undercover agent from
conceiving the plot in its entirety, it said. "The US government should stop
treating American Muslims as terrorists-in-waiting ," the report concluded.

Insert Tag
Phelps 13

(Paulina, Author at the Seattle Globalist, Georgetown media group, Africa.redux media,
and Saratoga wire, Arab and Muslim communities react to NSA surveillance leak, June/25, Seattle
Globalist, http://seattleglobalist.com/2013/06/25/arab-and-muslim-nsa-surveillance-leak/14225,LS)
So the governments been spying on us? Arab and Muslim activists in Seattle say they arent surprised.

news broke earlier this month of the NSAs vast, intrusive surveillance
programs, U.S. citizens had the uncomfortable experience of suddenly feeling like suspects. Even for
When

the majority of Americans who say they approve of the program, it was hard not to rack your brain for
things you had said in a phone call or email that might have caught the governments attention. But that

was nothing new for Arabs, Muslims, South Asians and other groups who
have been subject to surveillance and prejudice since 9/11. President
Obama responded to the leak with assurances that nobody is listening to your
telephone calls. Instead, he said, the surveillance only takes place when they
may identify potential leads with respect to people that might engage in terrorism.
Devon Abdallah, secretary of the Arab American Community Coalition (AACC), based here in
Seattle, says that the kind of reasonable suspicion used to justify NSA surveillance often
amounts to little more than racial profiling. The reality is, in our society there is so
much institutional racism and subconscious stereotyping that people
naturally are going to just pay more attention to someone with an Arab name, Abdallah
feeling

said. Ive seen the people theyve deported that theyve seen as terrorists and I can guarantee you that
they arent. Damon Shadid, a Lebanese-American attorney who also works with the AACC believes that if
people knew the extent of the personal information that has been collected, they wouldnt be as
supportive of the program. The thing that disturbs me mostis this poll that is being cited all over the
Internet that is saying 60% of Americans are okay with [the surveillance system] the poll does not ask
the right questions. Shadid said. If they asked the question are you okay with your text messages being
read, or are you okay with the subject line of your email being read by the government the public would
have a completely different response. As a Lebanese-American who deals with international clients, all
the sudden my metadata may be looked at closer. [That]

could create suspicion on me

where none should exist, Shadid said. And that goes for every Arab and
Muslim in the community. Suspicionless surveillance does not become okay simply
because its only victimizing 95 percent of the world instead of 100 percent, whistleblower Edward
Snowden said in an online Q & A hosted by the Guardian last week, referring to assurances that only
communications outside the US are being monitored. Our founders did not write, we hold these Truths to
be self-evident, that all US Persons are created equal. Arsalan Bukhari, executive director of the Council
on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) Washington Chapter, agrees that the system is unconstitutional. But
hes more optimistic about the ultimate outcome of the leak. I hope the good that comes out of this are
clear guidelines that regulate when and how the government can survey a person. he said. For too long
weve had unconstitutional surveillance. We want to make sure the constitution is the law of the land and
is followed which means you have to get a warrant. Egyptian-American Muslim activist Tarek Dawoud
compared the governments actions to that of other countries. This

is what is happening in
Egypt its not a good sign you can see this country going down that path
and its a concern because one of the greatest gifts people have here is to be free and the ability to
challenge authority. Ultimately all of these voices on the issue, including the person behind the leak, echo
feelings of betrayal by the government. And they seem to agree that the existing system is

Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians

have been experiencing government surveillance as a national
security measure ever since 9/11. So for the entire country to suddenly realize they
unconstitutional and vulnerable to racial profiling.

may be subject to the same thing is almost a relief.

Insert Tag
Kayyali 06

(Randa, course instructor at George Mason University, Director of Finance and

Administration at the Safe Energy communication Council, Excutive Director for the Association of ArabAmerican University Graduates, Director of Public Relations/Office Manager at the American Educational
Trust, Writer at the American Anti-Discrimination Committee, and Presidential Intern at the American
University in Cairo, anti-discrimination advocate , The People Perceived as a Threat to Security: Arab
Americans Since September 11, 7/1, Migration Policy Institute,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/people-perceived-threat-security-arab-americans-september-11,LS)

Since the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, Arab Americans have regularly
been featured in the press as a group "of interest" to many federal agencies,
particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Yet government security agencies have recruited
them for their language skills the FBI has hired 195 Arabic linguists since 9/11 although other agencies,
such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), have not released the number of new hires. Despite
demand,

the number of recruits is low due to bureaucratic problems and the

difficulties Arab Americans face in getting top-level security
clearances. Similar to other U.S. immigrant groups in the past, they are viewed as
suspect simply because of their origin. Although the term "Arab American" is often
used, it remains misunderstood. Who exactly is an Arab American? Are all Arab Americans Muslim? Has the
immigration rate of Arab Americans decreased as a result of 9/11? What has been the net fall-out effect of
9/11 on this group? This article will provide definitions, look at flow data from recent years, and examine
the trend of immigration and security policies affecting Arab Americans.

Arab Americans are the immigrants (and their descendents) from the
Arabic-speaking countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Under this classification,
Arabic-speaking countries include the members of the Arab League and range from
Morocco in the west to Iraq in the east (see sidebar). Individuals from Iran and
Definitions

Turkey, where the predominant languages are Farsi and Turkish, respectively, are not considered to be of
Arab origin even though these countries are part of the Middle East. According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
Arab Americans are those who responded to the 2000 census question about ancestry by listing a
predominantly Arabic-speaking country or part of the world as their place of origin. The main Arabspeaking countries cited in the 2000 census included Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and

Although some people from Arabic-speaking countries identify themselves as

Arab, many do not but are regularly defined as such in the United States by the
Syria.

government and the average American, adding further weight to the term. Because some choose a
national identity, such as Lebanese or Egyptian, over the term Arab, the diversity of the community must
be recognized at the outset of any discussion about Arab Americans. In truth, there are hot debates about
whether there is one or many communities of Arab Americans because of the distance, both physical and
emotional, between various groups. In regards to religious affiliation among Arab Americans, surprisingly
few studies have been done. However, the Arab American Institute, based on a 2002 Zogby International

63 percent of Arab Americans are Christian, 24 percent

are Muslim, and 13 percent belong to another religion or have no
religious affiliation. The Muslim Arab-American population includes Sunni, Shi'a, and Druze.
poll, estimates that

Among the Christians, 35 percent are Catholics (Maronites, Melkites, and Eastern Rite Catholics), 18
percent are Eastern Orthodox (Antiochian, Syrian, Greek, and Coptic Christians), and 10 percent are
Protestant. The high proportion of Christians among Arab Americans is partially due to the descendants of
Arab immigrants who arrived in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; they mostly came from Mount
Lebanon, an area inhabited by Maronite Christians and Druze that is now in Lebanon. Also, minority groups
Maronites and Orthodox Christians from Lebanon, Coptic Christians from Egypt, Shia' Muslims and
Chaldeans from Iraq, and Orthodox Christians from Palestine are immigrating to the United States today
in larger numbers than the majority Sunni Muslim population of the Middle East.

"Arab" is not a racial

category for the Census Bureau. Rather, Arab Americans are considered
white, defined by the Census Bureau as "a person having origins in any of the original peoples of
How Arab Americans Are Counted Unlike Asian, white, or black,

Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa." This distinction dates back to court decisions from 1913 to 1917
on the "whiteness" of Syrian and Palestinian immigrants. Arab Americans who received only the short form
of the 2000 census, which is sent to all U.S. households, could check the "white" box for race;

if they

self-identified as "other" and then identified themselves on the long form as a person from
the Middle East or North Africa, the Census Bureau reassigned them to the "white"
category. This classification system is in line with other federal guidelines on race and ethnic standards, as
set out by Directive 15 by the Office of Management and Budget, and therefore is present in many
administrative forms. Since the 2000 census, the Census Bureau has published two reports on Arab
Americans, both of which are based on the long form that asks about ancestry and is sent to only one-sixth
of all U.S. households. The first report, issued in 2003, reported that about 1.2 million people in the United
States reported Arab ancestry alone or in combination with another ancestry. The second report, issued in
2005, focused on the 850,000 people who reported at least one Arab ancestry and no non-Arab ancestries
(see Table 1 and Figure 1). Therefore, a person of British-Egyptian heritage would have been included in
the first report and excluded from the second. In both reports, the Census Bureau differs from the
Arab League membership definition in that it excludes those from Mauritania, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan,
and the Comoros countries that are members of the Arab League and include large Arabic-speaking

Census Bureau counted only

one of every three Arab Americans in 2000, and therefore these organizations estimate
populations. Arab-American organizations estimate that the

the number at approximately 3.5 million, or 1.2 percent of the total U.S. population. This 3.5 million
estimate of Arab Americans in 2000 also includes those of mixed Arab and non-Arab heritage, unlike the
2005 Census report. Another way to examine the Arab-American population is to look at the foreign-born
population from Arab countries. Although the media portray the Arab-American population as wholly
foreign born, the 2005 census report found that only about 50 percent of Arabs in the United States were
foreign born; of these, about half were naturalized U.S. citizens and the other half were not citizens.
Therefore, half of the Arab Americans in 2005 report were either born in the United States or born abroad
to U.S.-citizen parents. Of the foreign born, 46 percent arrived between 1990 and 2000, compared to 42
percent of the total foreign-born population.

Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Flows Since 9/11 Many assume that the immigration of Arabs to the United

after 9/11. However, the numbers of those admitted as

immigrants or those who became legal permanent residents from Arabic-speaking
countries has remained level at around four percent of the total number of foreign
States decreased

nationals admitted as immigrants to the United States, even though there was a drop in 2003. In 2005,
over 4,000 nationals from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia, and Sudan, in addition to an unknown

What has dropped drastically

post-9/11 is the number of nonimmigrants who are issued visas and admitted
number of Palestinians, became permanent residents (see Table 2).

to the United States as tourists, students, or temporary workers. The largest numerical drop between 2000
and 2004 (70 percent) has been in the number of tourist and business visas issued to individuals from Gulf
countries, which include Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Although

the
number of student visas issued to individuals from Arabic-speaking
countries dropped substantially. The greatest numerical drop, from 19,696 student visas
there was a decrease in the number of all incoming foreign students between 2001 and 2004,

in 2000 to 6,826 in 2004 (65.3 percent), came from the Gulf countries. The number of Egyptians who

One of the
first reasons cited for the decrease in the number of foreign students was increased
security measures, particularly the Patriot Act and its provision that required the
implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System ( SEVIS). SEVIS is an online
database that monitors international student compliance with immigration
laws by requiring all schools to be certified and to regularly update information on each foreign student,
entered on student visas dropped 52.7 percent between 2000 and 2004 (see Table 3).

including their visa type, status as a student (full-time enrollment is required), biographical information,
class registration, and current address. Recent reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and

the Institute of International Education (IIE) found that the decline in the number of international students
is not due to SEVIS but, according to IIE, to "real and perceived difficulties in obtaining students visas
(especially in scientific and technical fields), rising U.S. tuition costs, vigorous recruitment activities by
other English-speaking nations, and perceptions abroad that it is more difficult for international students to
come to the United States." Increasing global competition for the best students has added to the drop in
the numbers of international students. While these reasons may be the most significant deterrents for all
international students, such observations do not adequately answer why the number of Arab students has

The numbers of visitors for business and

pleasure has similarly decreased. Businessmen and tourists from the Gulf went from
been disproportionately reduced.

84,778 in 2000 to 25,005 in 2004, a 70.5 percent decrease. The number of Egyptian visitors dropped 51.5
percent, from 48,904 in 2000 to 23,742 in 2004. The decrease in the number of both visitors and students
from Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon was also significant but lower than that of Egypt and the Gulf states.
The causes for these declines have not been investigated although

some researchers cite

visa delays and fears of discrimination.

Security-Related Policy and Arab Americans Another consequence of 9/11 has been the increased
monitoring of Arab and Muslim Americans for security reasons. Although most FBI interviews of Arab

the increased attention has

caused tension, nervousness, and concern to many individuals, as well
as community leaders and organizations. A two-year study conducted by the Vera
and/or Muslim Americans have been conducted voluntarily,

Institute of Justice and funded by the National Institute of Justice, a research agency of the U.S.

9/11 had a substantial impact on Arab Americans

and their perceptions of federal agencies, particularly the FBI. The report states,
"Although community members also reported increases in hate victimization, they
expressed greater concern about being victimized by federal policies and practices
than by individual acts of harassment or violence ." A major issue of concern remains the
2001 Patriot Act and its provisions that allow increased surveillance without
approved court orders. The number of people who have been charged or convicted for
Department of Justice, confirmed that

terrorism under the act is unclear. In June 2005, President Bush stated that over 400 charges were made as

the federal prosecutors

chose to charge the plaintiffs with nonterror charges , such as immigration violations.
a result of terrorism investigations, but in almost all of these cases,

Under the Patriot Act, anyone asked for information about an individual or group of people by the FBI has a
gag order placed on them, regardless of whether the identity of the individual becomes public knowledge.

Bush confirmed that he authorized warrantless

searches in which the National Security Agency (NSA) monitored phone calls
and emails from possibly thousands of citizens and others in the United States who contacted
In December 2005, President

persons abroad. Despite the former NSA directors reassurances that the program was targeted and

Arab Americans are concerned about

the legality of warrantless searches, and the program has increased
feelings of being targeted and put under surveillance due to their
ethnic background and contact with friends and family in the Middle East. In 2006, several
focused on persons associated with Al Qaeda,

organizations filed lawsuits challenging the legality of warrantless domestic spying as well as the release of
thousands of customer phone records by BellSouth, AT&T, and Verizon, citing violation of privacy. In
addition, in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security implemented the National Security Entry/Exit

(NSEERS), which required males over the age of 16 from

certain countries who had entered the United States since October 2002
to report to immigration offices to be photographed and fingerprinted on an
annual basis. Shortly after NSEERS was implemented, immigration authorities fingerprinted,
photographed, and questioned 80,000 men. It is not known how many individuals were Arab, but 19
out of the 25 countries on the NSEERS list were Arabic-speaking .
Although the main features of this program were suspended in December 2003, nationals of
Registration System

some countries Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria are still bound by the
NSEERS requirements. As a result of NSEERS and other initiatives, the number of
deportations from the Arab countries on the NSEERS list and an additional five
predominantly Muslim countries also on the list increased 31.4 percent in the
two-year period following 9/11. The percentile rise in deportation orders for
nationals of other countries was 3.4 percent in comparison . Human rights,
civil liberties, and Arab-American organizations believe these facts point to a trend of
profiling and patterns of selective enforcement of immigration laws .
Together, these security and immigration measures have given the impression
that the U.S. government believes Arabs and Muslims to be a
suspicious and dangerous group to whom constitutional rights and
liberties do not apply.
One of the long-term consequences of 9/11 was a questioning of
identity and the outward expression of ethnicity and religion. In the last
Looking Ahead

five years, many Arab Americans have asked themselves, How do I present myself when the mention of

some have decided

to hide their heritage or privilege another ethnic background also the reaction of some
my ethnicity and/or religion is enough to make others uncomfortable? While

German Americans after World War I and Japanese Americans after World War II others have channeled
this dilemma into artistic expression. As a result, Arab-American arts have blossomed. Fiction and poetry
particularly by Arab-American women art exhibits, and comedy acts have found their way into the public

heightened security fears

and recent terrorist attacks in Europe have kept the Arab American
community under the microscope of the FBI and NSA . The perception
of surveillance that dominates many local and national-level discussions between Arab Americans
and these agencies is not likely to decrease unless pending lawsuits result in the courts
domain, giving Arab Americans a more human face. However,

finding the warrantless searches or the release of phone records to be unconstitutional and a violation of
due process or privacy. While the flow of immigrants has remained slow but steady, the number of
students and visitors has slowed down substantially. Although these decreases are unlikely to isolate Arab
Americans from their friends and family in the Middle East and North Africa, it may indicate a decrease in
the interactions between people who are Arab and live in the Middle East and Americans who live in the
United States. In the current political climate, it seems there is

exchanges yet the opportunities

a growing need for cultural

are declining.

for those very cultural exchanges

The Arab American Identity

Phelps 13 (Paulina, Author at the Seattle Globalist, Georgetown media group, Africa.redux media,
and Saratoga wire, Arab and Muslim communities react to NSA surveillance leak, June/25, Seattle
Globalist, http://seattleglobalist.com/2013/06/25/arab-and-muslim-nsa-surveillance-leak/14225,LS)

Since the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, Arab Americans have regularly
been featured in the press as a group "of interest" to many federal agencies,
particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Yet government security agencies have recruited
them for their language skills the FBI has hired 195 Arabic linguists since 9/11 although other agencies,
such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), have not released the number of new hires. Despite

the number of recruits is low due to bureaucratic problems and the

difficulties Arab Americans face in getting top-level security
clearances. Similar to other U.S. immigrant groups in the past, they are viewed as
suspect simply because of their origin. Although the term "Arab American" is often
used, it remains misunderstood. Who exactly is an Arab American? Are all Arab
demand,

Americans Muslim? Has the immigration rate of Arab Americans decreased as a result of 9/11?
What has been the net fall-out effect of 9/11 on this group? This article will provide definitions, look at flow
data from recent years, and examine the trend of immigration and security policies affecting Arab

Arab Americans are the immigrants (and their descendents) from

the Arabic-speaking countries of the Middle East and North Africa.
Under this classification, Arabic-speaking countries include the members of the Arab
League and range from Morocco in the west to Iraq in the east (see
Americans. Definitions

sidebar). Individuals from Iran and Turkey, where the predominant languages are Farsi and Turkish,
respectively, are not considered to be of Arab origin even though these countries are part of the Middle
East. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Arab Americans are those who responded to the 2000 census
question about ancestry by listing a predominantly Arabic-speaking country or part of the world as their
place of origin. The main Arab-speaking countries cited in the 2000 census included Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,

Although some people from Arabic-speaking countries

identify themselves as Arab, many do not but are regularly defined as
such in the United States by the government and the average American,
adding further weight to the term. Because some choose a national identity, such as
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Syria.

Lebanese or Egyptian, over the term Arab, the diversity of the community must be recognized at the
outset of any discussion about Arab Americans. In truth, there are hot debates about whether there is one
or many communities of Arab Americans because of the distance, both physical and emotional, between
various groups. In regards to religious affiliation among Arab Americans, surprisingly few studies have
been done. However, the Arab American Institute, based on a 2002 Zogby International poll, estimates

63 percent of Arab Americans are Christian, 24 percent are Muslim, and 13

percent belong to another religion or have no religious affiliation . The
that

Muslim Arab-American population includes Sunni, Shi'a, and Druze. Among the Christians, 35 percent are
Catholics (Maronites, Melkites, and Eastern Rite Catholics), 18 percent are Eastern Orthodox (Antiochian,
Syrian, Greek, and Coptic Christians), and 10 percent are Protestant. The high proportion of Christians
among Arab Americans is partially due to the descendants of Arab immigrants who arrived in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries; they mostly came from Mount Lebanon, an area inhabited by Maronite Christians
and Druze that is now in Lebanon. Also, minority groups Maronites and Orthodox Christians from
Lebanon, Coptic Christians from Egypt, Shia' Muslims and Chaldeans from Iraq, and Orthodox Christians
from Palestine are immigrating to the United States today in larger numbers than the majority Sunni
Muslim population of the Middle East. How Arab Americans Are Counted Unlike Asian, white, or black,

"Arab" is not a racial category for the Census Bureau. Rather, Arab
Americans are considered white, defined by the Census Bureau as "a person having
origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa." This distinction
dates back to court decisions from 1913 to 1917 on the "whiteness"
of Syrian and Palestinian immigrants. Arab Americans who received only the short
form of the 2000 census, which is sent to all U.S. households, could check the "white" box for race; if
they self-identified as "other" and then identified themselves on the long form as a person
from the Middle East or North Africa, the Census Bureau reassigned them to the
"white" category. This classification system is in line with other federal guidelines on race
and ethnic standards, as set out by Directive 15 by the Office of Management and Budget, and therefore

is present in many administrative forms.

Since the 2000 census, the Census Bureau

has published two reports on Arab Americans, both of which are based on the long form that asks about
ancestry and is sent to only one-sixth of all U.S. households. The first report, issued in 2003, reported that
about 1.2 million people in the United States reported Arab ancestry alone or in combination with another
ancestry. The second report, issued in 2005, focused on the 850,000 people who reported at least one Arab
ancestry and no non-Arab ancestries (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Therefore, a person of British-Egyptian

In both reports,
the Census Bureau differs from the Arab League membership definition in that it excludes
those from Mauritania, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and the Comoros
heritage would have been included in the first report and excluded from the second.

countries that are members of the Arab League and include large Arabic-speaking populations. Arab-

the Census Bureau counted only one of

every three Arab Americans in 2000, and therefore these organizations estimate the
American organizations estimate that

number at approximately 3.5 million, or 1.2 percent of the total U.S. population. This 3.5 million estimate

of Arab Americans in 2000 also includes those of mixed Arab and non-Arab heritage, unlike the 2005
Census report. Another way to examine the Arab-American population is to look at the foreign-born
population from Arab countries. Although the media portray the Arab-American population as wholly

the 2005 census report found that only about 50 percent of

Arabs in the United States were foreign born; of these, about half were
foreign born,

naturalized U.S. citizens and the other half were not citizens. Therefore, half of the Arab Americans in 2005
report were either born in the United States or born abroad to U.S.-citizen parents. Of the foreign born, 46
percent arrived between 1990 and 2000, compared to 42 percent of the total foreign-born population.
Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Flows Since 9/11 Many assume that the immigration of Arabs to the United
States decreased after 9/11. However, the numbers of those admitted as immigrants or those who became
legal permanent residents from Arabic-speaking countries has remained level at around four percent of the
total number of foreign nationals admitted as immigrants to the United States, even though there was a
drop in 2003. In 2005, over 4,000 nationals from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia, and Sudan, in
addition to an unknown number of Palestinians, became permanent residents (see Table 2). What has
dropped drastically post-9/11 is the number of nonimmigrants who are issued visas and admitted to the
United States as tourists, students, or temporary workers. The largest numerical drop between 2000 and
2004 (70 percent) has been in the number of tourist and business visas issued to individuals from Gulf
countries, which include Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Although
there was a decrease in the number of all incoming foreign students between 2001 and 2004, the number
of student visas issued to individuals from Arabic-speaking countries dropped substantially. The greatest
numerical drop, from 19,696 student visas in 2000 to 6,826 in 2004 (65.3 percent), came from the Gulf
countries. The number of Egyptians who entered on student visas dropped 52.7 percent between 2000 and
2004 (see Table 3). One of the first reasons cited for the decrease in the number of foreign students was
increased security measures, particularly the Patriot Act and its provision that required the implementation
of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). SEVIS is an online database that monitors
international student compliance with immigration laws by requiring all schools to be certified and to
regularly update information on each foreign student, including their visa type, status as a student (fulltime enrollment is required), biographical information, class registration, and current address. Recent
reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Institute of International Education (IIE)
found that the decline in the number of international students is not due to SEVIS but, according to IIE, to
"real and perceived difficulties in obtaining students visas (especially in scientific and technical fields),
rising U.S. tuition costs, vigorous recruitment activities by other English-speaking nations, and perceptions
abroad that it is more difficult for international students to come to the United States." Increasing global
competition for the best students has added to the drop in the numbers of international students. While
these reasons may be the most significant deterrents for all international students, such observations do
not adequately answer why the number of Arab students has been disproportionately reduced. The
numbers of visitors for business and pleasure has similarly decreased. Businessmen and tourists from the
Gulf went from 84,778 in 2000 to 25,005 in 2004, a 70.5 percent decrease. The number of Egyptian
visitors dropped 51.5 percent, from 48,904 in 2000 to 23,742 in 2004. The decrease in the number of both
visitors and students from Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon was also significant but lower than that of Egypt
and the Gulf states. The causes for these declines have not been investigated although some researchers
cite visa delays and fears of discrimination. Security-Related Policy and Arab Americans Another
consequence of 9/11 has been the increased monitoring of Arab and Muslim Americans for security
reasons. Although most FBI interviews of Arab and/or Muslim Americans have been conducted voluntarily,
the increased attention has caused tension, nervousness, and concern to many individuals, as well as
community leaders and organizations. A two-year study conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice and
funded by the National Institute of Justice, a research agency of the U.S. Department of Justice, confirmed
that 9/11 had a substantial impact on Arab Americans and their perceptions of federal agencies,
particularly the FBI. The report states, "Although community members also reported increases in hate
victimization, they expressed greater concern about being victimized by federal policies and practices than
by individual acts of harassment or violence." A major issue of concern remains the 2001 Patriot Act and its
provisions that allow increased surveillance without approved court orders. The number of people who
have been charged or convicted for terrorism under the act is unclear. In June 2005, President Bush stated
that over 400 charges were made as a result of terrorism investigations, but in almost all of these cases,
the federal prosecutors chose to charge the plaintiffs with nonterror charges, such as immigration
violations. Under the Patriot Act, anyone asked for information about an individual or group of people by
the FBI has a gag order placed on them, regardless of whether the identity of the individual becomes
public knowledge. In December 2005, President Bush confirmed that he authorized warrantless searches in
which the National Security Agency (NSA) monitored phone calls and emails from possibly thousands of
citizens and others in the United States who contacted persons abroad. Despite the former NSA directors
reassurances that the program was targeted and focused on persons associated with Al Qaeda, Arab
Americans are concerned about the legality of warrantless searches, and the program has increased
feelings of being targeted and put under surveillance due to their ethnic background and contact with
friends and family in the Middle East. In 2006, several organizations filed lawsuits challenging the legality

of warrantless domestic spying as well as the release of thousands of customer phone records by
BellSouth, AT&T, and Verizon, citing violation of privacy. In addition, in 2003, the Department of Homeland
Security implemented the National Security Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which required males
over the age of 16 from certain countries who had entered the United States since October 2002 to report
to immigration offices to be photographed and fingerprinted on an annual basis. Shortly after NSEERS was
implemented, immigration authorities fingerprinted, photographed, and questioned 80,000 men. It is not
known how many individuals were Arab, but 19 out of the 25 countries on the NSEERS list were Arabicspeaking. Although the main features of this program were suspended in December 2003, nationals of
some countries Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria are still bound by the NSEERS requirements. As a
result of NSEERS and other initiatives, the number of deportations from the Arab countries on the NSEERS
list and an additional five predominantly Muslim countries also on the list increased 31.4 percent in the
two-year period following 9/11. The percentile rise in deportation orders for nationals of other countries
was 3.4 percent in comparison. Human rights, civil liberties, and Arab-American organizations believe
these facts point to a trend of profiling and patterns of selective enforcement of immigration laws.
Together, these security and immigration measures have given the impression that the U.S. government
believes Arabs and Muslims to be a suspicious and dangerous group to whom constitutional rights and
liberties do not apply.

Targeted surveillance hurts the Arab American Identity

Phelps 13 (Paulina, Author at the Seattle Globalist, Georgetown media group, Africa.redux media,
and Saratoga wire, Arab and Muslim communities react to NSA surveillance leak, June/25, Seattle
Globalist, http://seattleglobalist.com/2013/06/25/arab-and-muslim-nsa-surveillance-leak/14225,LS)

Since the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, Arab Americans have regularly
been featured in the press as a group "of interest" to many federal agencies,
particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Yet government security agencies have recruited
them for their language skills the FBI has hired 195 Arabic linguists since 9/11 although other agencies,
such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), have not released the number of new hires. Despite

the number of recruits is low due to bureaucratic problems and the

difficulties Arab Americans face in getting top-level security
clearances. Similar to other U.S. immigrant groups in the past, they are viewed as
suspect simply because of their origin. Although the term "Arab American" is often
demand,

used, it remains misunderstood. Who exactly is an Arab American? Are all Arab Americans Muslim? Has the
immigration rate of Arab Americans decreased as a result of 9/11? What has been the net fall-out effect of
9/11 on this group? This article will provide definitions, look at flow data from recent years, and examine
the trend of immigration and security policies affecting Arab Americans. Definitions Arab Americans are
the immigrants (and their descendents) from the Arabic-speaking countries of the Middle East and North
Africa. Under this classification, Arabic-speaking countries include the members of the Arab League and
range from Morocco in the west to Iraq in the east (see sidebar). Individuals from Iran and Turkey, where
the predominant languages are Farsi and Turkish, respectively, are not considered to be of Arab origin even
though these countries are part of the Middle East. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Arab Americans
are those who responded to the 2000 census question about ancestry by listing a predominantly Arabicspeaking country or part of the world as their place of origin. The main Arab-speaking countries cited in the
2000 census included Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Syria. Although some people
from Arabic-speaking countries identify themselves as Arab, many do not but are regularly defined as such
in the United States by the government and the average American, adding further weight to the term.
Because some choose a national identity, such as Lebanese or Egyptian, over the term Arab, the diversity
of the community must be recognized at the outset of any discussion about Arab Americans. In truth, there
are hot debates about whether there is one or many communities of Arab Americans because of the
distance, both physical and emotional, between various groups. In regards to religious affiliation among
Arab Americans, surprisingly few studies have been done. However, the Arab American Institute, based on
a 2002 Zogby International poll, estimates that 63 percent of Arab Americans are Christian, 24 percent are
Muslim, and 13 percent belong to another religion or have no religious affiliation. The Muslim ArabAmerican population includes Sunni, Shi'a, and Druze. Among the Christians, 35 percent are Catholics
(Maronites, Melkites, and Eastern Rite Catholics), 18 percent are Eastern Orthodox (Antiochian, Syrian,
Greek, and Coptic Christians), and 10 percent are Protestant. The high proportion of Christians among Arab
Americans is partially due to the descendants of Arab immigrants who arrived in the late 19th and early
20th centuries; they mostly came from Mount Lebanon, an area inhabited by Maronite Christians and
Druze that is now in Lebanon. Also, minority groups Maronites and Orthodox Christians from Lebanon,

Coptic Christians from Egypt, Shia' Muslims and Chaldeans from Iraq, and Orthodox Christians from
Palestine are immigrating to the United States today in larger numbers than the majority Sunni Muslim
population of the Middle East. How Arab Americans Are Counted Unlike Asian, white, or black, "Arab" is not
a racial category for the Census Bureau. Rather, Arab Americans are considered white, defined by the
Census Bureau as "a person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or
North Africa." This distinction dates back to court decisions from 1913 to 1917 on the "whiteness" of Syrian
and Palestinian immigrants. Arab Americans who received only the short form of the 2000 census, which is
sent to all U.S. households, could check the "white" box for race; if they self-identified as "other" and then
identified themselves on the long form as a person from the Middle East or North Africa, the Census Bureau
reassigned them to the "white" category. This classification system is in line with other federal guidelines
on race and ethnic standards, as set out by Directive 15 by the Office of Management and Budget, and
therefore is present in many administrative forms. Since the 2000 census, the Census Bureau has
published two reports on Arab Americans, both of which are based on the long form that asks about
ancestry and is sent to only one-sixth of all U.S. households. The first report, issued in 2003, reported that
about 1.2 million people in the United States reported Arab ancestry alone or in combination with another
ancestry. The second report, issued in 2005, focused on the 850,000 people who reported at least one Arab
ancestry and no non-Arab ancestries (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Therefore, a person of British-Egyptian
heritage would have been included in the first report and excluded from the second. In both reports, the
Census Bureau differs from the Arab League membership definition in that it excludes those from
Mauritania, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and the Comoros countries that are members of the Arab League
and include large Arabic-speaking populations. Arab-American organizations estimate that the Census
Bureau counted only one of every three Arab Americans in 2000, and therefore these organizations
estimate the number at approximately 3.5 million, or 1.2 percent of the total U.S. population. This 3.5
million estimate of Arab Americans in 2000 also includes those of mixed Arab and non-Arab heritage,
unlike the 2005 Census report. Another way to examine the Arab-American population is to look at the
foreign-born population from Arab countries. Although the media portray the Arab-American population as
wholly foreign born, the 2005 census report found that only about 50 percent of Arabs in the United States
were foreign born; of these, about half were naturalized U.S. citizens and the other half were not citizens.
Therefore, half of the Arab Americans in 2005 report were either born in the United States or born abroad
to U.S.-citizen parents. Of the foreign born, 46 percent arrived between 1990 and 2000, compared to 42
percent of the total foreign-born population. Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Flows Since 9/11 Many assume
that the immigration of Arabs to the United States decreased after 9/11. However, the numbers of those
admitted as immigrants or those who became legal permanent residents from Arabic-speaking countries
has remained level at around four percent of the total number of foreign nationals admitted as immigrants
to the United States, even though there was a drop in 2003. In 2005, over 4,000 nationals from Egypt, Iraq,
Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia, and Sudan, in addition to an unknown number of Palestinians, became

What has dropped drastically post-9/11 is the number of

nonimmigrants who are issued visas and admitted to the United States as
tourists, students, or temporary workers. The largest numerical drop between 2000
permanent residents (see Table 2).

and 2004 (70 percent) has been in the number of tourist and business visas issued to individuals from Gulf
countries, which include Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Although

the
number of student visas issued to individuals from Arabic-speaking
countries dropped substantially. The greatest numerical drop, from 19,696 student visas
there was a decrease in the number of all incoming foreign students between 2001 and 2004,

in 2000 to 6,826 in 2004 (65.3 percent), came from the Gulf countries. The number of Egyptians who

the first
reasons cited for the decrease in the number of foreign students was increased
security measures, particularly the Patriot Act and its provision that required the
implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System ( SEVIS). SEVIS is an online
database that monitors international student compliance with
immigration laws by requiring all schools to be certified and to regularly update information on
entered on student visas dropped 52.7 percent between 2000 and 2004 (see Table 3). One of

each foreign student, including their visa type, status as a student (full-time enrollment is required),
biographical information, class registration, and current address. Recent reports by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Institute of International Education (IIE) found that the decline in the
number of international students is not due to SEVIS but, according to IIE, to "real and perceived difficulties
in obtaining students visas (especially in scientific and technical fields), rising U.S. tuition costs, vigorous
recruitment activities by other English-speaking nations, and perceptions abroad that it is more difficult for
international students to come to the United States." Increasing global competition for the best students
has added to the drop in the numbers of international students. While these reasons may be the most
significant deterrents for all international students, such observations do not adequately answer why the

The numbers of visitors for

business and pleasure has similarly decreased. Businessmen and tourists from
the Gulf went from 84,778 in 2000 to 25,005 in 2004, a 70.5 percent decrease. The number of
Egyptian visitors dropped 51.5 percent, from 48,904 in 2000 to 23,742 in 2004. The
number of Arab students has been disproportionately reduced.

decrease in the number of both visitors and students from Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon was also
significant but lower than that of Egypt and the Gulf states. The causes for these declines have not been

some researchers cite visa delays and fears of

discrimination. Security-Related Policy and Arab Americans Another consequence of 9/11 has been
the increased monitoring of Arab and Muslim Americans for security
reasons. Although most FBI interviews of Arab and/or Muslim Americans have been conducted
voluntarily, the increased attention has caused tension, nervousness, and concern
to many individuals, as well as community leaders and
organizations. A two-year study conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice and funded by the
National Institute of Justice, a research agency of the U.S. Department of Justice, confirmed that 9/11
had a substantial impact on Arab Americans and their perceptions of
federal agencies, particularly the FBI. The report states, "Although community
members also reported increases in hate victimization, they expressed greater
investigated although

concern about being victimized by federal policies and practices than by individual acts of harassment or

issue of concern remains the 2001 Patriot Act and its provisions that allow
increased surveillance without approved court orders. The number of people
violence." A major

who have been charged or convicted for terrorism under the act is unclear. In June 2005, President Bush
stated that over 400 charges were made as a result of terrorism investigations, but in almost all of these
cases, the federal prosecutors chose to charge the plaintiffs with nonterror charges, such as immigration
violations. Under the Patriot Act, anyone asked for information about an individual or group of people by
the FBI has a gag order placed on them, regardless of whether the identity of the individual becomes

Bush confirmed that he authorized

warrantless searches in which the National Security Agency (NSA) monitored
phone calls and emails from possibly thousands of citizens and others in the United States who
public knowledge. In December 2005, President

contacted persons abroad. Despite the former NSA directors reassurances that the program was targeted
and focused on persons associated with Al Qaeda,

Arab Americans are concerned

about the legality of warrantless searches, and the program has
increased feelings of being targeted and put under surveillance due
to their ethnic background and contact with friends and family in the Middle East. In 2006,
several organizations filed lawsuits challenging the legality of warrantless domestic spying as well as the
release of thousands of customer phone records by BellSouth, AT&T, and Verizon, citing violation of
privacy. In addition, in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security implemented the National Security
Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which

required males over the age of 16

from certain countries who had entered the United States since
October 2002 to report to immigration offices to be photographed and
fingerprinted on an annual basis. Shortly after NSEERS was implemented, immigration
authorities fingerprinted, photographed, and questioned 80,000 men. It is not known how many individuals

but 19 out of the 25 countries on the NSEERS list were

Arabic-speaking. Although the main features of this program were suspended in December 2003,
nationals of some countries Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria are still bound
by the NSEERS requirements. As a result of NSEERS and other initiatives, the
number of deportations from the Arab countries on the NSEERS list and an
additional five predominantly Muslim countries also on the list increased 31.4
percent in the two-year period following 9/11. The percentile rise in deportation
orders for nationals of other countries was 3.4 percent in
comparison. Human rights, civil liberties, and Arab-American organizations believe these facts
point to a trend of profiling and patterns of selective enforcement of
were Arab,

immigration laws. Together, these security and immigration measures have given
the impression that the U.S. government believes Arabs and Muslims
to be a suspicious and dangerous group to whom constitutional
rights and liberties do not apply. Looking Ahead One of the long-term
consequences of 9/11 was a questioning of identity and the outward
expression of ethnicity and religion. In the last five years, many Arab Americans
have asked themselves, How do I present myself when the mention
of my ethnicity and/or religion is enough to make others
uncomfortable? While some have decided to hide their heritage or
privilege another ethnic background also the reaction of some German Americans after World War I
and Japanese Americans after World War II others have channeled this dilemma into artistic expression.
As a result, Arab-American arts have blossomed. Fiction and poetry particularly by Arab-American
women art exhibits, and comedy acts have found their way into the public domain, giving Arab

heightened security fears and recent

terrorist attacks in Europe have kept the Arab American community
under the microscope of the FBI and NSA. The perception of
Americans a more human face. However,

surveillance that dominates many local and national-level discussions between Arab Americans
and these agencies is not likely to decrease unless pending lawsuits result in the courts
finding the warrantless searches or the release of phone records to be unconstitutional and a violation of
due process or privacy.

Islamophobia Adv Surveillance Bad

Fear of terrorism results in targeting of Muslims.
Unegbu, Howard University JD candidate, 2013
[Cindy, 57 How. L.J. 433, NOTE AND COMMENT: National Security
Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional
Misstep Lexis, accessed 7-6-15, TAP]
After the 9/11 attacks, domestic fear of future
terrorist attacks grew, spurring the national government's focus of
more intrusive levels of surveillance. 56Link to the text of the note
The government's focus on national security surveillance was
indicative of the ballooning of the post-9/11 national security
budget, the expansion of technological abilities, and the almost
complete unaccountability and secrecy of national security covert
operations. 57Link to the text of the note Former Vice President Dick Cheney, a well-known advocate of the
INVASIVE SURVEILLLANCE MEASURES

government's surveillance programs, has argued that the surveillance programs are necessary if terrorist attacks are to
be stopped. 58Link to the text of the note Other major political figures, like Robert Mueller, the current director of the FBI,
assert that the loss of privacy for everyday Americans is justified because the eavesdropping has thwarted terrorist plots.
59Link to the text of the note In an address to Congress in 2013, Mueller stated that the "challenge in a position such as I
have held in the last 11 years is to [444] balance on the one hand the security of the nation and on the other hand the

Following 9/11, the

government instituted specific profiling of U.S. nationals who were
residents or citizens of a foreign country of interest and were
traveling through the airways. 61Link to the text of the note After the
Abdulmutallab attack, the Obama administration reinstated this
airport profiling of approximately fourteen countries, most of which
were majority Muslim countries. 62Link to the text of the note This program may
be similarly compared to the National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System Program implemented by President George W.
Bush in 2002. 63Link to the text of the note Critics of the 2002 program noted that
it failed to capture any terrorists, yet it placed approximately 14,000
of the individuals into deportation proceedings. 64Link to the text of the note This
program required male nationals from twenty-five countries, twentyfour of which were predominantly Muslim, who were working,
visiting, or living in the United States to report to immigration
authorities for fingerprinting and interviews. 65Link to the text of the note Critics
of both programs contend that the singling out of individuals from
these countries has the efect of singling them out because of their
religion or nationality. 66Link to the text of the note
civil liberties that we enjoy in this country." 60Link to the text of the note

Government informants are inserted into Islamic

communities to create terrorist plots where none exist
Al-Arain, 14 (Abdullah Al-Arian, Assistant professor history at
Georgetown, School of Foreign Servicein Quatar, The Informants:
Manufacturing Terror,

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/informantsmanufacturing-terror-20147218131267614.html, Al Jazeera Media

Network, 21 Jul 2014)
On the surface, the scene unfolds without any hint of intrigue. A young
Muslim convert named Darren Griffin meets fellow congregants at a
local mosque in northwest Ohio. In addition to sharing the same faith
as his new friends, they enjoy similar interests: watching sports, playing
video games, working out at the local gym, and discussing international
affairs. Except the scene ends tragically with a string of arrests, a
national media frenzy, and self-congratulation among federal officials
claiming to have foiled yet another terrorist plot. The only problem is
that Griffin was an FBI plant and the terror plot he supposedly helped
thwart was entirely manufactured by the United States government.
Purely on the strength of Griffin's aggressive recruitment tactics, three young
American Muslims received prison sentences ranging from eight to 20 years.
Similar scenarios have played out in many cities across the US during the
past decade. "Informants", the new documentary film from Al Jazeera's
Investigative Unit, explores a phenomenon that has been far more pervasive
than the media, government officials, or community leaders have
acknowledged. In addition to sharing the heart-wrenching stories of the
victims of these entrapment tactics, the film is unique because it shines a
light on the informants themselves, highlighting the crucial role that they
played in actively enlisting young men who never demonstrated any
inclinations toward engaging in violence. The informants In order to
understand how the use of paid informants became such a crucial cog in the
FBI's counterterrorism policy, one need only trace the major shift in the US
national security paradigm after 9/11. Prior to the September 11 attacks,
the FBI employed 10,500 agents, about 2,500 of whom were dedicated to
national security investigations. After 9/11, however, the overall number of
agents expanded to 13,600, half of whom became devoted to national
security. The annual budget of the FBI has risen dramatically from $3.1bn in
2001 to $8.4bn in the current fiscal year. Together, expanded budgets, the
availability of advanced technological capabilities, and a permissive political
climate combined to create an environment where federal law
enforcement agencies enjoyed vastly expanded powers but were
also expected to demonstrate immediate results. In the course of
investigating American Muslims for possible terrorist threats, the
government cast a wide net. It placed tens of thousands of Muslims
under constant surveillance, infiltrated community spaces, including
mosques, dug through private records, interrogated many Muslims
because of their political views and probed for any links to violent
activities. These investigations largely turned up nothing, and that was a
problem. In order to continue to justify the robust expenditure of resources
and the expansive investigative powers, officials needed results in the
form of thwarted terrorist plots that demonstrated to American citizens
that unless the FBI acted, the next attack was right around the corner. That

climate of fear helped rationalise many of the country's worst civil

liberties violations committed under the Bush Administration and
consolidated as standard practice during Obama's presidency. To sustain the
perception of the threat, one had to be created where it did not exist. Enter
the informants. As Al Jazeera's investigative film lays out, many of the most
high-profile terrorism cases of the last decade were not a product of
insidious Muslim sleeper cells uncovered by skillful investigators. Rather,
in the absence of actual plots, the FBI actively targeted
communities, identifying particularly vulnerable individuals, and sending
them informants with the expressed purpose of ensnaring them in a
conspiracy. The informants are not government agents. Rather, they are
almost always criminal offenders attempting to avoid prison time through
their cooperation with the government. From drug dealing to fraud, their
criminal history ostensibly provides them the tools they need to maintain
their deception, though a crash course on basic Islamic beliefs and rituals is a
must. With codenames like "The Trainer", "The Closer", and "The
Bodybuilder", they play to their particular strengths while identifying the
weaknesses of those they are sent to entrap. In the case of the latter, Craig
Monteilh hung out in mosques where he hoped to meet Muslim youth and
invite them to work out at a local gym. There, he could ostensibly engage
them in conversation about volatile political subjects and broach the topic of
terrorism over an intense workout regimen. When his aggressive posture
provoked suspicion on the part of community members in southern California,
local leaders reported Monteilh to the FBI, apparently not realising that it was
the FBI which had sent him into their community in the first place. The
community's experience with the "Bodybuilder" is particularly egregious,
given the seeming vindictive nature of the FBI's conduct in that case. The
local imam, Sheikh Yassir Fazaga, dared to question publicly the veracity of
claims made by a local FBI official at a town hall meeting. "The FBI does not
take that lightly," Monteilh recalled to Al Jazeera. "So they had me get close
to Mr Fazaga, to get into his inner circle." When Monteilh failed to ensnare
Fazaga or any other local Muslims into a terrorist plot the FBI attempted to
pursue immigration charges against Ahmadullah Sais Niazi, an Afghan
immigrant who was one of those who reported Monteilh to the FBI for his
suspicious behaviour. But the Department of Justice eventually dropped those
charges and so Operation Flex, it seems, ended in failure. This case, however,
was the exception. The overwhelming majority of so-called "pre-emptive
prosecutions" end in convictions on terrorism charges of individuals who the
government is unable to prove would have ever entered into a violent plot on
their own accord. More often than not, the FBI targets young Muslims with
strong political opinions, usually concerning the role of the US in the plight of
Muslims in places like Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Kashmir. As a former FBI
special agent told Al Jazeera about the Ohio case, "The whole purpose was to
verify whether it was more than just talk." By treating the political opinions of
American Muslims as cause for suspicion, government investigators operate
on the assumption that free speech rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment of the US Constitution do not extend to a particular segment of

the American people. Over the years, the FBI's actions have had a
dramatic chilling efect on the ability of Muslims to express their
political views. Motivated by such pressures from the government, many
community leaders around the country have since attempted to suppress
political expression in mosques and community centres. But absent such
healthy community spaces through which to channel passions for
humanitarian concerns around the globe, it actually becomes more likely that
young Muslims could channel their frustrations through alternative modes of
oppositional politics. This type of quietist, disaffected atmosphere sanitised of
all political expression is precisely the environment in which agent
provocateurs thrive. Exploiting poverty In some cases, there is not even any
"talk" to motivate the FBI into infiltrating communities. The Liberty City case
with which Al Jazeera's investigative film begins concerns a group of
impoverished black men in Florida with no history of political activism or
inflammatory speech. Nevertheless, the FBI sent in "The Closer" a fast-talking
informant named Elie Assaad who operated as the ringleader for an alleged
plot to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago. Swaying the impressionable and
impoverished young men with promises of everything from shoes to wear to
large sums of cash, Assaad enlists Rothschild Augustine and six others in his
conspiracy. The use of informants to target communities is one of the
most alarming trends to have developed since 9/11, as it threatens
to undo the fabric of a free society. In relaying this story to Al Jazeera's
investigators, Assaad and Augustine reveal a number of disturbing practices
in the concocted plot. The FBI specifically selected its own south Florida
offices as a surveillance target, attempting to position itself as the victim of
the conspiracy rather than the originator of it, despite the fact that there is
no indication that the men even knew where or what it was. The ceremonial
oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda that Assaad administered to the seven men
displayed what can only be described as a symbol of the cartoonish imagery
with which many in the US government associate Islam and Muslims. Perhaps
most worrisome in the case of the Liberty City 7, and an eerily similar case in
New York, is the ways in which the FBI has exploited the endemic poverty and
social problems from drug use to lack of education that are prevalent within
some black communities across the US in order to construct the perception of
a terrorist threat. In the latter case, the Newburgh Four were promised a
payment of $250,000 by a government informant who they hoped to
manipulate in turn. The Newburgh Sting is an HBO documentary, also
premiering soon, which chronicles the government's excesses in carrying out
this plot and the devastation it has caused to an impoverished community. A
startling report utilising the Department of Justice's internal statistics recently
stated that in the decade after 9/11, 94.2 percent of federal terrorism
convictions were obtained, at least in part, on the basis of preemptive
prosecutions. Given how pervasive this practice has been, it is noteworthy
that American Muslim civil rights groups have not developed a coordinated
response to what has plainly become a widespread use of informants
nationwide. In some instances, they have even attempted to downplay the
problem of preemptive prosecutions, as in one report by a prominent

American Muslim organisation that states that "while the numbers clearly
show informants are frequently used by federal law enforcement, a majority
of these cases do not involve them at all." The use of informants to target
communities is one of the most alarming trends to have developed since
9/11, as it threatens to undo the fabric of a free society. That these recent
investigative films have laid bare this troubling phenomenon and
displayed its consequences for all to see, is a critical first step in
confronting its damaging efect not only on the vulnerable American
Muslim community but on American society as a whole.

Current domestic surveillance policies promote

Islamophobia and discrimination against MuslimAmericans.
Greenwald & Hussain 14 (Glenn & Murtaza. Glenn Greenwald
is a constitutional lawyer, journalist, and author of four
bestselling books on law and politics, including No Place To Hide
which discusses the American surveillance state.. Murtaza
Hussain is a journalist and political commentator with focuses on
human rights and foreign policy. Meet the Muslim-American
leaders the FBI and NSA have been spying on. Occupy. 7-102014. Accessed 7-7-2015. http://www.occupy.com/article/meetmuslim-american-leaders-fbi-and-nsa-have-been-spying)
The National Security Agency and FBI have covertly monitored the
emails of prominent Muslim-Americansincluding a political
candidate and several civil rights activists, academics, and lawyers
under secretive procedures intended to target terrorists and foreign
spies. According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward
Snowden, the list of Americans monitored by their own government includes:
Faisal Gill, a longtime Republican Party operative and one-time
candidate for public office who held a top-secret security clearance
and served in the Department of Homeland Security under President
George W. Bush; Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has
represented clients in terrorism-related cases; Hooshang
Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of international relations
at Rutgers University; Agha Saeed, a former political science
professor at California State University who champions Muslim civil
liberties and Palestinian rights; Nihad Awad, the executive director
of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest
Muslim civil rights organization in the country. The individuals appear
on an NSA spreadsheet in the Snowden archives called FISA recapshort
for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Under that law, the Justice
Department must convince a judge with the top-secret Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court that there is probable cause to believe that American

targets are not only agents of an international terrorist organization or other

foreign power, but also are or may be engaged in or abetting espionage,
sabotage, or terrorism. The authorizations must be renewed by the court,
usually every 90 days for U.S. citizens. The spreadsheet shows 7,485 email
addresses listed as monitored between 2002 and 2008. Many of the email
addresses on the list appear to belong to foreigners whom the government
believes are linked to Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Among the Americans
on the list are individuals long accused of terrorist activity, including Anwar
al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, who were killed in a 2011 drone strike in Yemen.
But a three-month investigation by The Interceptincluding interviews with
more than a dozen current and former federal law enforcement officials
involved in the FISA processreveals that in practice, the system for
authorizing NSA surveillance afords the government wide latitude in
spying on U.S. citizens. The five Americans whose email accounts
were monitored by the NSA and FBI have all led highly public,
outwardly exemplary lives. All five vehemently deny any
involvement in terrorism or espionage, and none advocates violent
jihad or is known to have been implicated in any crime, despite
years of intense scrutiny by the government and the press. Some
have even climbed the ranks of the U.S. national security and
foreign policy establishments. I just dont know why, says Gill, whose
AOL and Yahoo! email accounts were monitored while he was a Republican
candidate for the Virginia House of Delegates. Ive done everything in my
life to be patriotic. I served in the Navy, served in the government, was active
in my communityIve done everything that a good citizen, in my opinion,
should do. Given that the governments justifications for subjecting Gill and
the other U.S. citizens to surveillance remain classified, it is impossible to
know why their emails were monitored, or the extent of the surveillance. It is
also unclear under what legal authority it was conducted, whether the men
were formally targeted under FISA warrants, and what, if anything, authorities
found that permitted them to continue spying on the men for prolonged
periods of time. But the five individuals share one thing in common:
Like many if not most of the people listed in the NSA spreadsheet,
they are of Muslim heritage. I believe that they tapped me because my
name is Asim Abdur Rahman Ghafoor, my parents are from India, I travelled
to Saudi Arabia as a young man, and I do the pilgrimage, says Ghafoor,
when told that no non-Muslim attorneys who defended terror suspects
had been identified on the list. Yes, absolutely I believe that had
something to do with it. The FBIwhich is listed as the responsible
agency for surveillance on the five menhas a controversial record
when it comes to the ethnic profiling of Muslim-Americans.
According to FBI training materials uncovered by Wired in 2011, the
bureau taught agents to treat mainstream Muslims as supporters
of terrorism, to view charitable donations by Muslims as a funding
mechanism for combat, and to view Islam itself as a Death Star
that must be destroyed if terrorism is to be contained. John
Guandolo, a former FBI counterterrorism official who takes credit for

developing a training program for agents on the Muslim

Brotherhood and their subversive movement in the United States,
told The Intercept that he participated in investigations of some of the
individuals whose email accounts were monitored. Echoing the red under
every bed hysteria of the McCarthy era, Guandolo believes that
hundreds of covert members of the Muslim Brotherhood are active
in the United States, that some of them have succeeded in
infiltrating the Pentagon, and that CIA director John Brennan is a
secret Muslim. Other former and current federal officials say such beliefs
are not representative of the FBI or Justice Department. But blatant prejudice
against Muslim-Americans is also documented in the Snowden archive. In
one 2005 document, intelligence community personnel are
instructed how to properly format internal memos to justify FISA
surveillance. In the place where the targets real name would go, the
memo ofers a fake name as a placeholder: Mohammed Raghead.
The vast majority of individuals on the FISA recap spreadsheet are not
named. Instead, only their email addresses are listed, making it impossible in
most cases to ascertain their identities. Under the heading Nationality, the
list designates 202 email addresses as belonging to U.S. persons, 1,782 as
belonging to non-U.S. persons, and 5,501 as unknown or simply blank.
The Intercept identified the five Americans placed under surveillance from
their email addresses. It is unclear whether the government obtained any
legal permission to monitor the Americans on the list. The FBI and the Justice
Department declined to comment for this story. During the course of multiple
conversations with The Intercept, the NSA and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence urged against publication of any surveillance targets.
Except in exceptional circumstances, they argued, surveillance directly
targeting Americans is conducted only with court-approved warrants. Last
week, anonymous officials told another news outlet that the government did
not have a FISA warrant against at least one of the individuals named here
during the timeframe covered by the spreadsheet. The FISA process was
enacted in 1978 in response to disclosures that J. Edgar Hoover and a long
line of presidents from both parties had used U.S. intelligence agencies to spy
on dissidents and political enemies. Intended to allow authorities to covertly
investigate suspected spies or terrorists on U.S. soil, the surveillance is often
used simply to gather intelligence, not to build a criminal case. The law was
revised in 2008in part to place limits on the controversial program of
warrantless wiretaps initiated by George W. Bush after 9/11, and in part to
legalize the programs warrantless eavesdropping on Americans when they
speak with foreign surveillance targets. Under current law, the NSA may
directly target a U.S. person (an American citizen or legal
permanent resident) for electronic surveillance only with a warrant
approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Because the
FISC operates in complete secrecyonly the Justice Department and
the FBI are permitted to attend its proceedings on domestic
surveillanceit is impossible to assess how the court applies the
standard of probable cause in cases of suspected terrorism or

espionage. But its rulings are notoriously one-sided: In its 35-year

history, the court has approved 35,434 government requests for
surveillance, while rejecting only 12. Law enforcement officials familiar
with the FISA process told The Intercept that the FISCs high approval rate is
the result of a thorough vetting process that weeds out weak applications
before they reach the court. The system, they added, seeks to balance what
they consider to be the essential role of surveillance in protecting national
security with the civil liberties of potential targets. The NSA issued a
statement that reads in part: No U.S. person can be the subject of FISA
surveillance based solely on First Amendment activities, such as staging
public rallies, organizing campaigns, writing critical essays, or expressing
personal beliefs. But legal experts have long expressed concern that the
secretive nature of the FISA process makes it impossible to know what level
of evidence is actually used to authorize surveillance, precisely what it means
to be an agent of a foreign power, or whether there is any effective oversight
to protect civil liberties. We have very little idea what this probable cause
standard means in individual FISA cases, says Patrick Toomey, a staff
attorney for the National Security Project of the American Civil Liberties
Union. No FISA application or order has ever been publicly disclosed, even to
a criminal defendant or his lawyer in cases where the government later
brings charges based on that FISA surveillance. A former Justice Department
official involved in FISA policy in the Obama Administration says the process
contains too many internal checks and balances to serve as a rubber stamp
on surveillance of Americans. But the former official, who was granted
anonymity to speak candidly about FISA matters, acknowledges that there
are significant problems with the process. Having no one present in court to
contest the secret allegations can be an invitation to overreach. There are
serious weaknesses, the former official says. The lack of
transparency and adversarial processthats a problem. Indeed,
the governments ability to monitor such high-profile MuslimAmericanswith or without warrantssuggests that the most
alarming and invasive aspects of the NSAs surveillance occur not
because the agency breaks the law, but because it is able to exploit
the laws permissive contours. The scandal is what Congress has
made legal, says Jameel Jafer, an ACLU deputy legal director. The
claim that the intelligence agencies are complying with the laws is
just a distraction from more urgent questions relating to the breadth
of the laws themselves. Government agencies have invoked a host of
legal theories over the years to justify spying on Americans without obtaining
individual FISA warrants. Prior to mid-2008, for example, the NSA could target
Americans when they were located on foreign soil simply by obtaining an
authorization from the attorney general. The NSA also relies on the so-called
FISA backdoor to read the emails of Americans communicating with foreign
targets without obtaining a warrant, and engages in the bulk collection of
metadata from Internet service providers without individual warrants. In
other cases, it can obtain a warrant against an entire organizationand then
monitor the emails of individuals allegedly associated with the group. While

the NSA documents do not prove that the government has been
systematically monitoring the communications of political dissidents, Jaffer
notes that some of the most abusive surveillance practices carried out by the
FBI during the 1960s were arguably legal at a time when many Americans
believed that the groups targeted by Hoovers FBIincluding antigovernment activists on the left and rightposed a threat to the country.
Some of the governments surveillance practices today are
reminiscent of those earlier abusive practices, Jafer says. Todays
American-Muslim activists occupy the same position that civil-rights
and anti-war activists occupied during the 1960s. Current and former
law enforcement officials reject that analogy, and say that the FISA process is
too rigorous to permit any abuse. Still, several acknowledge that political
speech is sometimes viewed as a sufficient reason to launch an investigation
that can culminate in full-blown surveillance. If you are a political activist
calling for violent jihadyes, that could trigger an investigation, says Marion
Spike Bowman, the top FBI lawyer whose office handled all law
enforcement requests for FISA surveillance under the Clinton and Bush
administrations. Bowman stresses that such investigations are launched only
when the bureau believes that speech has crossed the line into incitement.
When Edward Snowden turned over a trove of NSA documents last year, he
explained that he included the spreadsheet of monitored emails because he
wanted to give people subjected to electronic surveillance the opportunity to
challenge the spying as unconstitutional. For years, the government has
succeeded in having such challenges dismissed on the ground that the
various plaintiffs lack standing to sue because they could not prove that they
were personally targeted. Thanks to Snowdens disclosures, those seeking to
obtain such a ruling now have specific cases of surveillance against American
citizens to examine. So do those charged with reforming the FISA process.
Richard Clarke, a former counterterrorism official in the Clinton and Bush
administrations, served on the recent White House intelligence review panel
convened to address concerns raised by the Snowden revelations. If he had
seen the NSA spreadsheet, Clarke says, he would have asked more questions
about the process, and reviewed individual FISA warrants. Knowing that, I
would specifically ask the Justice Department: How many American citizens
are there active FISAs on now? he says. And without naming names, tell me
what categories they fall intohow many are counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, espionage cases? Wed want to go through [some
applications], and frankly, we didnt. Its not something that five part-time
guys can dorummage through thousands of FISA warrants. The FISA
recap spreadsheet offers a revealing if incomplete glimpse into the murky
world of government surveillance. Each email address is accompanied by a
date that appears to denote the beginning of surveillance, and another that
indicates when it was set to expire. A column called Collection Status
indicates whether the surveillance was terminated, sustained, or
pending as of a particular date. In some cases, the spreadsheet also names
the federal agency that requested the surveillance, and a terrorist group,
target, or foreign power affiliated with the email address. In addition, each

address has a corresponding Case Notation code beginning with the prefix
XX.SQFa designation that, according to other documents in the Snowden
archive, is assigned to all FISA accounts as a unique identifier. The five
Americans whose email accounts were placed on the list come from
diferent backgrounds, and hold diferent religious and political
views. None was designated on the list as connected to a foreign
power. Some have come under sharp public scrutiny for their
activities on behalf of Muslim-Americans, and several have been
investigated by the government. But despite being subjected to
what appears to be long periods of government surveillance, none
has been charged with a crime, let alone convincingly linked to
terrorism or espionage on behalf of a foreign power. Taken together,
their personal stories raise disturbing questions about who the
government chooses to monitor, and why.

AT: Islamaphobia K
Domestic surveillance of Muslim populations is rooted in
racialized fear of the other that underpins BOTH a
massive authoritarian police state as well as the broader
War on Terror.
Anti-blackness is not the root cause of this aff either. BUT the aff understands
the history of surveillance against the black body and the way that it is now
being operationalized against Muslim populations.

Kundnani, New York University media culture and

communication professor, and Kumar, Rutgers University
media studies and Middle East studies professor, 2015
[Arun and Deepa, Race, surveillance, and empire
http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, accessed 7-11-15,
TAP]
Discussions of the surveillance of Muslim Americans usually begin
with 9/11 and make little attempt to locate them in the longer
history of racial surveillance in the United States. Yet the
continuities are striking, particularly for Black Muslims, who have
been seen as extremists and subject to national security monitoring
since the 1940s. Already in the late 1960s, Arab American student
groups involved in supporting the Palestinian national movement
had come under surveillance and, in 1972, the Nixon administration
issued a set of directives known as Operation Boulder that enabled
the CIA and FBI to coordinate with the pro-Israel lobby in monitoring
Arab activists. By the 1980s, but especially after 9/11, a process was
under way in which Muslimness was racialized through
surveillanceanother scene of the states production of racial
subjects. Since all racisms are socially and politically constructed
rather than resting on the reality of any biological race, it is
perfectly possible for cultural markers associated with Muslimness
(forms of dress, rituals, languages, etc.) to be turned into racial
signifiers.58 This signification then serves to indicate a people
supposedly prone to violence and terrorism, which, under the War
on Terror, justifies a whole panoply of surveillance and
criminalization, from arbitrary arrests, to indefinite detention,
deportation, torture, solitary confinement, the use of secret
evidence, and sentencing for crimes that we would not be jailed
for, such as speech, donations to charitable organizations, and other
such acts considered material support for terrorism. Significantly,
the racial underpinnings of the War on Terror sustain not just
domestic repression but foreign abuses the wars vast death toll in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere could not be sustained

without the dehumanization of its Muslim victims . As before, racism at

home goes hand in hand with empire abroad . Counterinsurgency
thinking that informed the strategies used in Iraq and Afghanistan in
the face of popular insurrection are also brought home to be
deployed in relation to Muslim American populations. Winning
hearts and minds, the counterinsurgency slogan first introduced
by British colonialists in Malaya, and then adopted by the US military
in Vietnam, reappears as the phrase that state planners invoke to
prevent extremism among young Muslims in the United States.
Counterinsurgency in this context means total surveillance of Muslim
populations, and building law enforcement agency partnerships with
good Muslims , those who are willing to praise US policy and
become sources of information on dissenters, making life very
difficult for bad Muslims or those who refuse (in ways reminiscent of the
good and bad Indians). It is a way of ensuring that the knowledge Muslims
tend to have of how US foreign policy harms the Middle East, Africa,
and Asia is not shared with others. The real fear of the national
security state is not the stereotypical Muslim fanatic but the
possibility that other groups within US society might build alliances
with Muslims in opposition to empire . The various measures that the
US national security system has adopted in recent years flow from
an analysis of Muslim radicalization, which assumes that certain
law-abiding activities associated with religious ideology are
indicators of extremism and potential violence. Following the preventive logic
discussed above, the radicalization model claims to be able to predict
which individuals are not terrorists now but might be at some later
date. Behavioral, cultural, and ideological signals are assumed to
reveal who is at risk of turning into a terrorist at some point in the
future.59 For example, in the FBIs radicalization model, such things as growing a beard,
starting to wear traditional Islamic clothing, and becoming alienated
from ones former life are listed as indicators, as is increased
activity in a pro-Muslim social group or political cause.60 Thus,
signifiers of Muslimness such as facial hair, dress, and so on are
turned into markers of suspicion for a surveillance gaze that is also a
racial (and gendered) gaze; it is through such routine bureaucratic
mechanisms that counterterrorism practices involve the social
construction of racial others. Official acceptance of the model of
radicalization implies a need for mass surveillance of Muslim
populations and collection of as much data as possible on every
aspect of their lives in order to try to spot the supposed warning
signs that the models list . And this is exactly the approach that law
enforcement agencies introduced. At the New York Police
Department, for instance, the instrumentalizing of radicalization
models led to the mass, warrantless surveillance of every aspect of
Muslim life. Dozens of mosques in New York and New Jersey and

hundreds more hot spots, such as restaurants, cafs, bookshops, community

organizations, and student associations were listed as potential security risks. Undercover officers and
informants eavesdropped at these locations of interest to listen for radical political and religious
opinions. A NYPD Moroccan Initiative compiled a list of every known Moroccan taxi driver. Muslims who
changed their names to sound more traditionally American or who adopted Arabic names were

It is clear that none of this

activity was based on investigating reasonable suspicions of criminal
activity. This surveillance produced no criminal leads between 2006
and 2012, and probably did not before or after.61 As of 2008, the FBI had a roster
of 15,000 paid informants62 and, according to Senator Dianne
Feinstein of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the bureau had
10,000 counterterrorism intelligence analysts in 2013 .63 The proportion of
investigated and catalogued in secret NYPD intelligence files.

these informants and analysts who are assigned to Muslim populations in the United States is unknown but

The kinds of infiltration and provocation tactics that

had been practiced against Black radicals in the 1960s are being
repeated today . What has changed are the rationales used to justify
them: it is no longer the threat of Black nationalist subversion, but
the threat of Muslim radicalization that is invoked . With new provisions in the
Clinton administrations 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the FBI can launch
investigations of a suspected individual or organization simply for
providing material support to terrorisma vague term that could
include ideological activity unrelated to any actual plot to carry out
violence. While COINTELPRO violated federal laws, today similar
kinds of investigation and criminalization of political dissent can be
carried out legitimately in the name of countering terrorism . For
Muslim populations on the receiving end of state surveillance
programs designed to prevent radicalization, everyday life
increasingly resembles the patterns described in classic accounts of
authoritarianism . There is the same sense of not knowing whom to
trust and choosing ones words with special care when discussing
politics, and of the arbitrariness and unpredictability of state
power.64 With the 2011 leaking of some NYPD intelligence files, individual Muslims have had the
is likely to be substantial.

disturbing experience of seeing their names mentioned in government files, along with details of their
private lives. Numerous businesses, cafs, restaurants, and mosques in New York are aware that the NYPD
considers them hotspots and deploys informants to monitor them. And the recent outing of a small number
of NYPD informants has meant some Muslims in New York have found that relationships they thought of as
genuine friendships were actually covert attempts to gather intelligence.65

Internet Freedom Adv

Internet Freedom Good Court Key

Judicial Indepedence Adv

JI Adv Yes Modeling Generic

American Judicial Independence is modeled abroad-It
promotes accountable governments, and human rights.
Smith, 08 (is a federal judge on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit.) PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW AND RESPECTING
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE LEGITIMATE ROLE OF THE
AMERICAN JUDICIARY ABROAD accessed online 7/12/15
http://lr.avemarialaw.edu/Content/articles/AMLR.v7i1.smith.pdf
The rule of law1 is fundamental to the freedom enjoyed in the United
States today. John Locke explained its essential nature well before the Revolutionary War: Freedom
of men under government, is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society . . . a
liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the
inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man. Yet, the rule of law so central to American
democracy today has deep historical roots, which long precede even Lockes lifetime. In ancient Greece,
Aristotle considered a variety of constitutions before concluding that it is more proper that the law should
govern than any of the citizens.3 During our nations infancy, Thomas Paine wrote in Common Sense that
the world may know that, so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America the law is king. For as in
absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be
no other.4 John Adams later memorialized this principle when drafting the Massachusetts State
Constitution of 1780, declaring to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of men.5 While it was
clear the rule of law would play a central role in the federal government following the Revolution, the
Founding Fathers deliberated carefully for eleven years before incorporating it into the Constitution in a
way that would thwart tyranny and best achieve a free, yet ordered, society.6 The success and stability of
our nation today flows, in large part, from our faithful adherence to the rule of law. In addition to its central
and vital role in any strong democracy,7 the rule of law has been described as an unqualified human

There is a wide
consensus among the international community that democratic
values, including the rule of law, should be universal furthered in
all nationsbecause these values preserve and protect human
dignity, facilitate accountability in government, and allow access to
the political process.10 Reflecting its own growing commitment to fostering democracy abroad,
the United States has formally incorporated rule-of-law promotion in
its foreign assistance eforts in conjunction with traditional
monetary aid .11 The rule of law is increasingly considered one of the
most valuable American exports to developing and transitioning
nations .12 Effective administration of the rule of law requires an independent, transparent, and
accountable judiciary.13 Because of the experience and expertise our federal
judges gain in their domestic role, they are well positioned to
promote the rule of law abroad. 14 And indeed, federal judges have
played a significant role in the efort to advance the rule of law and
the democratic values essential to it in other parts of the world. Each
year, dozens of federal judges assist in presenting seminars abroad
that educate and train judges in other countries on a host of topics
including how to oversee a case, how to write an opinion, and the
importance of impartiality. I have had the privilege of participating in at least a dozen such
good.8 It stands alone in terms of its extensive international endorsement.9

programs. Beyond the exhilarating human experiences these programs have provided me, I have gained
some background in their structure, objectives, and efficacy. My experience has also given me reason to
pause and consider some of the tensions created by the participation of the federal judiciary in efforts to
promote the rule of law abroad. One of the more sensitive concerns relates to the federal judiciarys
involvement in matters that touch upon foreign policy, a province conferred by the Constitution to the
politically accountable branches of government.15 Judicial participation in these efforts may also raise
questions concerning government funding and compliance with judicial ethical obligations. That said ,

clearly defined roles for participating judges coupled with

cognizance of these tensions will allow these important eforts to

continue in a manner that maintains the delicate separation-ofpowers balance and comports with the Canons of the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges.16

JI Adv Surveillance Key

Surveillance laws are especially modeled globally.
Ozan O. Varol, 15 Stealth Authoritarianism
http://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/ILR_100-4_Varol.pdf
The attacks of September 11, 2001, ushered in a new era of
surveillance to combat organized crime and terrorism.234 In the
United States, for example, the enactment of the USA Patriot Act
provided additional surveillance authorities to federal government
agencies.235 Many other countries followed suit pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1373, which requires states to change
their domestic laws to criminalize terrorism and enact certain
surveillance measures.236 Because these surveillance laws are often
enacted with the imprimatur of international organizations, they
also enjoy a certain level of legitimacy both domestically and
internationally. Despite the protections they offer, surveillance laws and institutions
can also be employed for two primary anti-democratic purposes. First,
surveillance can chill the exercise of civil liberties. As Lilian Mitrou puts it, Under pervasive surveillance, individuals are inclined to
make choices that conform to mainstream expectations.237 That inclination to support the status quo may impede political and
intellectual diversity238 and help protect and entrench the incumbents stronghold on government power. In addition, the fear of being
watched by the government may cause people to think and speak differently and foment self-censorship.239 Second, governments can
use surveillance mechanisms for blackmail. Surveillance can permit the incumbents to gather information about dissidents to
blackmail them into silence or discredit them by revealing sensitive, and perhaps embarrassing, secrets to the public.240 In many
postcommunist states in Eastern Europe, for example, secret surveillance files are routinely turned into a weapon in political
struggles, seriously undermining democratic processes and freedoms.241 The information gathered through surveillance can also
serve as evidence to prosecute political opponents for non-political crimes.

JI Adv LatAm Uniqueness JI Low

The Latin American Judiciary is manipulated by the
President (retag for the country if you want)
Helmke 14 (Gretchen Helmke, University of Rochester
Department of Political Science chair and specializes in
comparative politics, The Puzzle of Purges: A New Theory of
Judicial Manipulation with Evidence from Latin America,
http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?
ID=1650040660951040650811011260050121051230840020280
6003506509601706912407710910500011802501802102200800
9118083121092115003064120108054086029012101026107028
1170900821080170750521251041041120050170810141091110
67126090106110122110088109094125089115116081&EXT=pdf
&TYPE=2, Published August 5 2014, Accessed July 13 2015, CMT)
Former Venezuelan President Carlos Andrs Prez provides a perfect case in
point. One day after the Supreme Courts approval of the Attorney Generals
accusation of Prez for mismanaging state funds, the Senate unanimously
voted to strip the president of immunity and suspend him from office
(Lalander 2010: 138). Or, consider the role that the Paraguayan Supreme
Court played in helping congress to oust President Cubas in 1999. Shortly
after coming to office, the president issued a decree freeing his political
mentor, General Lino Oviedo, from prison, where Oviedo was serving a term
for his attempt to lead a coup against the previous government. In response,
the Supreme Court struck down the decree and ordered that Oviedo be sent
back to prison. The presidents blatant refusal to then comply with the
Supreme Court order led Congress to launch its first attempt to
impeach Cubas. Although ultimately it took the assassination of vice
president Luis Maria Argana, and Cubas alleged involvement in it, to succeed
in removing the president from office, the Court clearly played a vital role
in exacerbating the conflict between the executive and legislative
branch to the point where the presidents own survival was at stake.
Putting these observations together leads to the opposite pattern of
institutional behavior from that captured by conventional wisdom. Whereas
insulation theories hold that political 6 uncertainty promotes judicial
independence, here I claim just the opposite. In environments where
politicians are frequently at risk of being removed from office early,
and courts, in part, shape these prospects, the likelihood that the
cooperative equilibrium leading to judicial independence obtains will
be substantially reduced. Rather, rapid irregular alternations of
power force politicians to adopt a warlike mentality. Instead of
creating institutions, they destroy them. In turn, two possible types of
judicial crises stem from this common mechanism: preemptive strikes and
preventive strikes. Preemptive judicial attacks are waged by

presidents who are under imminent threat; preventive judicial strikes

occur whenever the threat is palpable, but more distal. The differences
between former President Lucio Gutirrezs attack on the Ecuadorian courts
and Bolivian President Evo Morales assault on his judiciary help illuminate
this distinction. Perhaps nowhere in Latin America has the presidents
manipulation of the judiciary in order to cling to power been clearer
than it was under Gutirrez. During his shortlived minority government
(2003-2005), the president blatantly used the court as a bargaining
chip with his allies. After threats to impeach the president began to mount,
Gutirrez made a fatal last ditch quid pro quo deal with the opposition to pack
the court in exchange for the opposition dropping impeachment charges
against the president. Given the immediacy of the threat to his presidency,
Gutirrezs tactical move against the court most closely resembles a
preemptive strike.

Latin America is transitioning towards JI, despite political

corruption and military intervention
Popkin, 01 (Margaret Popkin, Executive director due process law
foundation, Nov 2001 Efforts to Enhance Judicial Independence
in Latin America: A Comparative Perspective,
http://cejamericas.org/index.php/biblioteca/bibliotecavirtual/doc_view/3787-efforts-to-enhance-judicial-independencein-latin-america.html, accessed digitally 7/13/15, SAM)
The struggle for judicial independence in Latin America remains an
ongoing process, but important developments have taken place in
recent years. With the exception of Costa Rica, all the countries included in this
study have recently undergone a process of democratic transition
after the end of authoritarian rule or, in the case of El Salvador and Guatemala, following
an internal armed conflict.3 Not all of Latin America has moved in the same direction nor have all the steps

new challenges to judicial independence

have arisen in the form of massive crime waves, drug trafficking and
the eforts to end it, and, in the case of Colombia, frequent threats against
judges by the diferent parties to the armed conflict . Executive
eforts to increase control over the judiciary have been undertaken
in recent years in Argentina, Panama, and Peru, and concerns have
been raised about potential executive intervention elsewhere .
Despite the clouds on the horizon, there is substantial consensus that in many countries
throughout the region, judiciaries now have a greater degree of external
independence most notably from the executive and the military -- than ever before.
taken yielded positive results. Moreover,

JI Adv Rwanda
Judicial Independence in Rwanda is good reform in 2003
prove
Rugege 07 (Sam Rugege, Chief Justice in Rwanda who was
educated at Makerere University and Yale Law school and Oxford
University in England, Judicial Independence in Rwanda,
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Conferences/JUDIND_RUGE
GE_MASTER.pdf, Published in 2007, Accessed July 13 2015, CMT)
Before the 2003-2004 judicial reform in Rwanda, there was
substantial corruption among judges, court clerks, and other judicial
officers. As a result of these reforms, a number of measures were
taken and institutional mechanisms were put in place to combat
corruption in the judiciary. First, there was a vetting exercise. The
employment of all judges and other court personnel was terminated,
and a recruitment exercise took place based on certain criteria. First,
all potential judges have to be legally qualifiedthey must have a
minimum of a Bachelor of Laws degree. Part of the problem causing
corruption was that judges were not legally qualified, and the temptation to
make judicial decisions based on considerations other than law was much
higher. Second, they have to be persons of integrity. Those who had a
record of corruption or misconduct were excluded. Finally, in addition
to the rigorous selection process, there is now a Code of Ethics30 for
judges that, among other things, requires impartiality, integrity, and
diligence. Article 7 states that [i]n particular a judge shall refrain from acts
of corruption and other related offences and fight against it in an exemplary
manner. Judges and court personnel with a record of corruption are
dismissed. The Superior Council of the Judiciary has a committee on
discipline which investigates allegations of corruption and other forms of
misconduct against judges and other court personnel. Before a final decision
is taken by the Council, the accused official is given an opportunity to be
heard.31

AT: JI US Inevitable
Separation of powers guarantees judicial Independence in
the United States
Ragsdale 15 (Bruce Ragsdale, served as director of the Federal
Judicial History Office at the Federal Judicial Center and as
associate historian of the U.S. House of Representatives, Judicial
Independence and the Federal Courts, fjc.gov,
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/JudicialIndependence.pdf/
$file/JudicialIndependence.pdf, Published in 2006, Accessed on
July 13 2015, CMT)
A central principle of the United States system of government holds that
judges should be able to reach decisions free from political pressure.
The framers of the Constitution shared a commitment to judicial
independence, and they organized the new government to ensure that
federal judges would have a proper measure of independence from the
executive and legislative branches. The Constitution guaranteed that
judges would serve during good behavior and would be protected
from any reduction in their salaries, thus preventing removal by a
President who opposed their judicial philosophy and congressional
retaliation against unpopular decisions. These twin foundations of
judicial independence were well established in the British judicial system of
the eighteenth century and had been enacted by many of the new state
constitutions following independence from Great Britain. But the
constitutional outline for the judiciary also ensured that the court system
would always be subject to the political process and thus to popular
expectations. The Constitutions provision for such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish, granted the legislative
branch the most powerful voice in deciding the structure and jurisdiction of
the nations court system. The appointment of judges by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, further ensured that important aspects
of the judiciary would be part of the political process. The inherent tension
between provisions for judicial independence and the Judicial Independence
and the Federal Judiciary ~ Federal Judicial Center 2 elected branches
authority to define the court system has led to recurring debates on judicial
tenure and the federal courts jurisdiction. Throughout United States
history, unpopular court decisions and the general authority of the
federal judiciary have prompted calls to limit judges terms of office,
to define more narrowly the jurisdiction of the federal courts, or to
limit judicial reviewthe courts authority to determine the
constitutionality of laws. Underlying the debates on judicial independence
have been basic questions about the proper balance of Congresss authority
to define the court system and the need to protect a judges ability to reach
decisions independent of political pressure. The debates have also addressed
the extent to which the judiciary should be independent of popular opinion in

a system of government where all power is based on the consent of the

governed. Other debates have raised the need for safeguards for judicial
independence in addition to those provided by the Constitution.

JI Adv China Uniqueness JI Low

Chinas JI is low

Weifang, 12 (He Weifang, professor of law at Peking Universitys

School of Law, in 2011 foreign policy named him to its list of Top
100 Global Thinkers, The Ongoing Quest for Judicial
Independence in Contemporary China, Pg. 98-99
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/2012/inthenameo
fjustice/inthenameofjustice_chapter.pdf, accessed 7/13/15, SAM)
This study has examined to what extent the Chinese judiciary is
politically independent, and identified and considered factors that may help explain the
degree of judicial independence identified. An exploratory qualitative case study
with expert interviews and supplementary secondary data was
employed to answer the research question. I created a theoretical framework
based on previous studies on judicial independence in authoritarian regimes which separated between four
legal issue areas in which the judiciary may be independent: criminal, civil, administrative, and commercial
cases. The analysis was devoted to examining the degree of judicial independence in each legal issue area
with a focus on interference from both national/central and local political actors through direct case
interference, ex parte communication, and policy interference. In each legal issue area I have identified
and analyzed explanatory factors. The explanations have been discussed in relation to the existing

The main finding of this thesis is first

and foremost that the Chinese judiciarys independence is low . Both
central and local political organs and actors interfere with judges
decision-making in various ways, not only through direct case
interference and ex parte communication, but also through more
indirect policy interference. However, it seems to be mostly local,
and not central, political organs and actors that are behind the
interference. In political criminal cases, I find that there is substantial political interference,
theories embodied in my theoretical framework.

especially direct case interference, both by local and central political actors. This low degree of judicial
independence is explained by the regime-related theory and is therefore an expected finding. Political
authorities interfere in order to sideline political opponents. In ordinary criminal cases, there also appears
to be a quite low degree of judicial independence. This is unexpected and in contrast to previous theory
stating that political actors lack incentives to interfere in non-political matters, such as ordinary criminal

My findings suggest that it is actually the local police who

pressures and interferes with judges in ordinary criminal cases.
Their ability to interfere, and the disability of judges to handle
criminal cases independently, comes from the fact that police chiefs
are often also leaders of local Party organs that are in charge of
overseeing the courts. The general view on crime is highly politicized in China, and central
cases.

political authorities are concerned with social and political stability. In turn, the police have been politically
empowered by the central authorities. All this has affected the independence of the judiciary in ordinary

since the police 94 can impose their will on the courts

given their political power. Furthermore, I have argued that the
politicized view on crime in general and the close association
between Party organs and the police can be traced back to the
communist totalitarian regime.
criminal cases,

JI Adv JI Good Democracy

JI checks corrupt government, maintains civil rights, and
maintains constitutional law
Hosseini, 15 (Seyyed Ebrahim Hosseini1, Mehran Ahmadi2, Sadoun Esmaeili3,
and Ako Arya4 1. PhD in International Law, Lecturer in Islamic Azad University
Mahabad Branch, Mahabad, Iran 2. M.A. in Private Law, science and research
University, Tabriz branch, Tabriz, Iran 3. M.A. in Criminal Law, Islamic Azad University,
Damghan, Iran 4. M.A. in International Law, Lecturer in Islamic Azad University
Mahabad Branch, Mahabad, Iran, March 2015, Impact of Judicial Independence
Principle on Consolidation of Rule of Law, pg398-399,
http://absronline.org/journals/index.php/masr/article/viewFile/451/470, accessed
digitally 7/13/15, SAM)

Judicial independence principle is

vital in the consolidation of the rule of law in international law. This
can be examined in some ways. First , the judges free of any political or
apolitical pressure would employ legal principles and obligation in
dealing with disputes, away from any undue external factors
leveraging. This attitude strengthens the public respect to the courts and
persuades citizens and governance to often refer to the courts to settle
their disputes credibly and fairly1. The possibility of fairly settlement of disputes is a
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND RULE OF LAW

vital element in economic and political stability. Economic and political actors shall have faith in an
independent and neutral arbitrator to deal with their disputes.

regulations are respected.

This way, rules and

The judges would illuminate the ambiguities in the process of

investigation with the examination and clarification of the existing rules and regulations. The judges
who use the existing rules, judicial process and unbiased application of the rule to support their decisions
regarding any dispute grant a predictable feature to their decisions . Predictability
enables the economic and political actors to set their behavior accordingly and this way, they would

Secondly, the
existence of independent courts is necessary to support the
individual freedom and right. Individual right might be respected by the constitutions or
other rules of the governments, it is however necessary for an independent and
unbiased authority to deal with the individual complaints and verdict the
noticeably help their communitys political stability and economic welloff2.

realization of their rights. The effective way of doing this issue by the judges is bound to ensure that there
is no threat including dismissal, downgrading or even lowering monthly wages or benefits facing them3.
Thirdly, the existence of independent courts is the inevitable means to obligate the government to follow

In a law-abiding society, the

government can be held responsible by the court. Therefore, judicial
independence a division of the powers, plays a significant role in
the maintenance of individual rights and freedom. The presence of independent
the rules and regulations in force within their own territory.

powers would obviously provide the setting for disputes. Some disputes can be settled using political
arrangements and strategies. However, it doesnt seem logical to settle all disputes through political

Considering what has been mentioned so far, we

cant help drawing this conclusion that the principle of judicial
independence is of top significance in establishment and
consolidation of the rule of law principle . It is the judicial independence which
methods (Torbert, 2014).

ultimately puts the rule of law at first and its absence means the lack of priority for the rule of law in due
society. It is clear that the absence of rule of law in a society would put the law under question. As Aristotle
states: where there is no rule of law, there is no constitution4.

JI Adv China Uniqueness JI Low

China no longer wants Judicial Independence
Gang 15 (Qian Gang is known for his tenure as managing editor of
Southern Weekend, one of Chinas most progressive newspapers, Qian Gang
is one of Chinas foremost journalists. Qian was also a co-creator and
executive editor of News Probe, CCTVs pioneering weekly investigative
news program with nearly 20 million viewers. Qian collected historical
documents for Chinese Boy Students, a book and five-hour documentary
series on 120 young Chinese students sent to universities in the United
States by the Qing government in the late 19th century, 1/14/15, China Media
Project, Who gave judicial independence a death sentence?,
http://cmp.hku.hk/2015/01/14/37754/, 7/13/15, HDA)
In recent weeks, China has slipped into a place of turmoil with respect
to its discourse on the concept of judicial independence, or sifa duli
(). The recent hostility in official circles toward what has long
seemed a point of consensus within the Chinese Communist Party
sends a worrying signal for rule of law in the country. On January 7,
more than 100 websites in China re-posted an article from the
Partys official Peoples Daily called Our Rule of Law Cannot Travel
the Same Road as the Wests Judicial Independence' (
). The article, written by politburo member Zhang
Chunxian (), the top leader of Chinas Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous
Region, kicked up a storm of confusion on Chinas internet. Over the past
three decades of reform, the slogan judicial independence has
been consistently upheld as something positive. Why, now, were the
tables turning? In the Maoist Era, the Term Goes Black In Chinas prereform period, political discourse was a simple matter of black or red.
Anything that wasnt red, meaning accepted as a part of Mao Zedongs
official discourse, was by definition black unwelcome and dangerous.
After 1949, the Chinese Communist Party announced that it would repeal all
laws, acts and judicial systems of the reactionary and repressive Kuomintang
government. From that point on, the notion of judicial independence was
mercilessly criticized, branded a black word (). One of the chief
goals during the first few years of Communist rule in China was to redefine
the relationship between the countrys new rulers and the administration of
justice. When the Provisional Organization Procedures for Peoples
Courts () were promulgated in September 1951,
Communist authorities emphasized that courts at every level must
accept the leadership and oversight of corresponding government
leaders (Peoples Daily, September 5, 1951). The case was made
more directly in the October 30 edition of the Peoples Daily that
same year, which stated that judicial work must actively serve
politics () From 1952 to 1953, judicial
organs in China engaged in what was described as a struggle to

oppose the old legal concepts (). Among the concepts on

the chopping block: the belief that it was a violation of the principle
of judicial independence for Party chiefs at the city and county
levels to serve concurrently as presidents of the local court (
); the belief that it intruded on the rights and responsibilities of
judges to allow court presidents priority in the issuing of sentences;
the belief that allowing military judge advocates to actively repress
counter-revolutionaries obstructed the independent exercise of
judicial organs (Peoples Daily, August 22, 1952); the belief that criminal
law is subject to universality (), that it must stress the
protection of the rights of the individual and that all are equal before the
law (Peoples Daily, October 17, 1952). Despite this struggle, Chinas new
constitution, introduced in 1954, maintained some notion of court
independence, saying in Article 78 that the peoples courts shall exercise
trials independently, subject only to the law (
). Furthermore, the constitution made clear in Article 83 that the peoples
prosecutors at various levels shall exercise their powers independently,
without interference from local state organs. All notions of independence
were tossed out the window during the 1957 Anti-Rightist Movement. The
idea of judicial independence was roundly condemned in the October 9, 1957,
edition of the Peoples Daily. The official front-page commentary was called,
Serious Struggles Are Still Ahead on the Front Lines of the Legal System

JI Adv JI Good Econ/Stability

Judiciary Independence key to economic growth and
stability
McCormack 11 (Wayne McCormack professor in the college of law at the
University of Utah, 2011, Foreign Aid and Judicial Independence,
http://aiddata.org/sites/default/files/wright_et_al_2015_aid_judicial_independe
nce.pdf, 7/10/15, HDA)
The post-Colonial Era has brought a new awareness and immediacy
to the role of the judiciary . The rule of law is critical to the safety
and welfare of any society. In the past decade, almost every nation
in the world has faced crises of one sort or another. Several nations
are attempting to recover from a crisis of mass violence or trying to
escape a pattern of violence. Less volatile developing nations may
be experiencing economic and social crises while making the
transition into the global economy. Meanwhile, developed nations
have hit roadblocks involving both economics and security. In all of
these instances, the judiciary is a critical player, and judicial
independence becomes a major concern . The articles in this Symposium
address various aspects of the role of the judiciary in times of crisis. Most of
them speak from the perspective of a specific countrythe United Kingdom,
United States, India, Iraq, and Israel. The sixth article draws on the authors
experience with the former Soviet republics and the Middle East to make the
point that many governments are in transition, just as the United States was
in transition for much of its history. It might not be immediately clear why the
current experiences of developed countries such as the United Kingdom and
the United States are considered times of crisis compared to the struggles of
post-Baathist Iraq, or how the comparatively well-established but still
maturing judiciaries of Israel and India relate to the others. The details of
those correlations will emerge later, but for now, it will suffice to say that the
judiciaries of all of these countries have faced challenges to their autonomy
and authority, while the countries themselves have faced challenges to
national security and economic stability. These articles discuss countries that
are in crisis for at least three different reasons. Two countries are faced with
violent threats to their population from nonstate actors: the United States
and Israel. Two are in transition to new judicial models: the United Kingdom
and India. Some are founding new governments: Iraq and the former Soviet
countries. In the past decade, the West has mounted Herculean
development eforts in a variety of settings: emerging economies
(primarily in southern Asia, Africa, and South America), the former
Soviet bloc, and countries embroiled in violence. In all of these
settings, judges face the daunting task of achieving impartiality,
maintaining their independence, and simultaneously providing some

measure of accountability for their own actions . As emerging nations

have struggled both politically and economically, a dominant theme has been
the need for developed nations to lend expertise to developing nations.1
Among the assumptions inherent in that theme are the following. The
developing nations in particular need complementary economic and
legal systems; neither can exist without the other. The health of the
people necessitates a functioning and at least minimally fair
economic systemwithout which there is no point in attempting to
build other systems. The operation of an economic system requires a
credible legal system, one that is also functioning and at least
minimally fairwithout assurance that disputes will be resolved by
the rule of law, little investment can occur and therefore very little
productive work can be performed. Simultaneously, infrastructure needs
civil engineering, food provision needs agricultural expertise, and so on.
Because neither an economic nor a legal system can thrive in the
chaos of wartime, there is a dilemma posed by violence and the rule
of law. A justice system can hardly operate efectively in the midst of
chaos, but chaos is difficult to forestall without a functioning justice
system. That reality may bedevil U.S. eforts in places such as
Afghanistan, but it also confronts many judges on a daily basis in
societies facing lesser levels of violence. The stereotype of the judge
sitting solemnly above the fray and detached from reality has opened the
judiciary to some ridicule, and even some harsh attacks. While there is some
merit in the stereotype, judges themselves are aware of the need to maintain
connection to the real world.

JI Adv JI Good Democracy/Econ

Judicial independence key to democracy and economic
growth
Wright et al. 15 (Joe Wright an associate professor in the Department of
Political Science at Pennsylvania State University and previously held
the Jeffrey L. and Sharon D. Hyde Early Career Professorship. He completed
my Ph.D. at UCLA in 2007. Prior to arriving in State College, he was a postdoctoral research associate at Princeton University and a visiting faculty
fellow at the University of Notre Dame. Dr. Dietrich is an Assistant Professor
of Political Science at the University of Missouri, Columbia. Prior to joining
Mizzou, she was a Postdoctoral Research Associate at the Niehaus Center for
Globalization and Governance at Princeton University. She received her Ph.D.
in Political Science at Penn State University in 2011. Molly Ariotti is a fourth
year graduate student in Political Science at Penn State, with a major field in
comparative politics (minors in methods and geography). I completed my
undergraduate work at Binghamton University, which consisted of a double
major in Political Science and Geography. 4/6/15, Penn State University,
Foreign Aide and Judicial Independence,
http://aiddata.org/sites/default/files/wright_et_al_2015_aid_judicial_independe
nce.pdf, 7/10/15, HDA)
In the past two decades, donor governments increasingly embrace
judicial independence as an important component of advancing
democracy. We develop and test an argument that links foreign aid
to judicial independence through the mechanism of incumbent-led
democracy promotion. Because judicial independence improves the
investment environment necessary for sustained economic growth,
both donors and recipient governments generally have an interest
in using aid resources to improve judicial independence . Thus
foreign aid should increase judicial independence. During election
periods, however, when judicial independence can influence the distribution
of power in the recipient country, incumbents are more likely to find aid
investments in an independent judiciary politically costly. Therefore, during
election periods in recipient countries, donor and recipient interests
are less likely to align and the relationship between aid and judicial
independence should weaken. We employ an instrumental variable model
to test this argument with a global sample of aid-eligible countries. The
literature on the effects of foreign aid has received considerable attention
among academics and policy-makers. While some evidence exists that links
aggregate foreign aid flows to democratic progress (Goldsmith, 2001;
Dunning, 2004; Wright, 2009; Heckelman, 2010; Bermeo, 2011), other work
suggests that aid is similar to a resource curse, where windfall income in
the form of foreign aid hinders development by supporting the survival of

nonrepresentative institutions (Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle, 2006;

Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2008; Morrison, 2009; Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith, 2009).1 Foreign aid is heterogeneous, however,2 which
has prompted scholars to disagregate aid into distinct sectors and delivery
mechanisms to investigate external influence on democratic change. This
work demonstrates that donors are selective when allocating foreign aid
across different sectors and types (Dietrich, 2013, Forthcoming) and that they
carefully choose among different strategies to shape democratic change
(Dietrich and Wright, 2015). Even within the individual category of democracy
and governance aid, which has served as focal point for students of external
promotion (Carothers, 2007; Bush, 2015), donors link aid with different
outcomes and deliver the assistance using different mechanisms. For
instance, donors can promote democracy via bottom-up pressure, by
financing civil society groups and opposition (Finkel et al., 2008). They can
also pursue incumbent-led democracy promotion tactics whereby donor
governments collaborate with the incumbent government in efforts to
strengthen the capacity of state institutions.3 Dietrich and Wright (2015)
show that incumbent-led democracy promotion is the most common strategy
among donors across time.4 This particular strategy dovetails with donor
efforts to promote development as it focuses on the build-up of indigenous
state capacity. Funding of civil society and opposition, on the other hand, is
more infrequent. It can work against development objectives in the shortterm if the bottom-up pressure causes political instability.5 In this paper, we
develop and test an argument that links foreign aid to judicial independence
through the mechanism of incumbent-led democracy promotion. Over time,
donor governments have increasingly embraced judicial
independence as an important pillar for advancing democracy. Some
have even argued that the establishment of the rule of law,
including judicial independence, is necessary before democratic
deepening can occur (Carothers, 2007). Donor governments typically
promote judicial independence in two ways: they can require
recipient governments to engage in judicial reform through
conditions attached to economic aid. Alternatively, they can directly
invest in judicial reform by designing specific aid projects that guide
the recipient public sector in their implementation. In both cases,
donors rely on cooperation by local authorities in recipient
countries . Among students of economic development, judicial
independence is thought of as a sine qua non for the enforcement of
property rights and contracts (Haggard and Tiede, 2011) as well as
for lowering transaction costs associated with captial investment
(Williamson, 1985). Over time evidence has accumulated
documenting a systematic positive link between judicial
independence and economic growth (Feld and Voigt, 2003; Henisz,
2000). From this growth perspective, it is easy to see how incumbents in
recipient countries can benefit from institutionalizing judical review. And

although donors and incumbent governments may disagree over the motives
that drive the promotion of judicial independence whether they originate in
theories of democratic change or economic growth we posit that donor and
incubment goals largely align in favor of judicial independence. We expect
this alignment between donors and incumbents to hold across democracies
and autocracies6 but we expect it to weaken during election times, when
independent courts can directly influence election outcomes.7 The
conditional nature of our argument suggests that foreign aid should increase
judicial independence unless judicial review becomes politically costly. As
costs of judicial independence increase, which we argue occurs when
incumbents stand for re-election, we expect incumbents to withdraw
their support from externally funded judicial reform activities, or
increase control over the judiciary branch to maintain their position
of power. This incentive should sharpen when elections are more closely
contested. This study contributes to our understanding of democracy
promotion in two ways. First, it presents a new framework that accounts for
heterogeneity among donor governments democracy promotion stratgies
and electoral dynamics in aid-receving countries. Second, it establishes that
judicial independence is not only an important area through which donors can
influence the democratic process abroad. It also posits that the electoral
cycle shapes incumbent governments incentives to use aid resources to
implement judicial review. The results directly reinforce a line of work that
focuses on the testing of the various causal mechanisms through which
donors promote democracy abroad.

JI Adv JI Good Econ

Judicial independence creates economic growth
Feld and Voigt 04 (Lars Feld is a Public Economics, Public Finance, Law
and Economic. Stefan Voigt is a Development Economics, Institutional
Economics, Law and Economics. 2004, ResearchGate, Judicial Independence
and Economic Growth: Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary,
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/237619174_Judicial_Independence_a
nd_Economic_Growth_Some_Proposals_Regarding_the_Judiciary1, 7/10/15,
HDA)
The judiciary has frequently been called the least dangerous branch (e.g.,
Hamilton 1787/1961, Federalist Paper #78). This evaluation might be one
reason why the judiciary is rarely moved to center stage during discussions
concerning issues of constitution al design. To give just one example: in his
treatise on Comparative Constitutional Engineering, Sartori (1994) deals
extensively with electoral systems (majoritarian vs. proportional) as well as
with the modus of electing the executive (presidential vs. parliamentary
systems) but the term judiciary does not even appear in the index. It has,
however, been hypothesized that judicial independence (JI) is one
central aspect in the proper functioning of the judiciary as part of
the concept of separation of powers as it has been developed by
Montesquieu and further concretized by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay,
the authors of the Federalist Papers. Feld and Voigt (2003) have recently
presented two indicators that aim at making judicial independence
measurable. Their first indicator deals with de jure independence, i.e.
the independence of the superior courts as it can be deduced from
legal documents. Their second indicator deals with de facto
independence, i.e. the degree of independence that the superior
courts factually enjoy. Estimating the impact of judicial independence on
economic growth, Feld and Voigt (2003) find that while de jure judicial
independence does not have an impact on economic growth, de facto judicial
independence positively influences real GDP per capita growth in a sample of
56 countries. The impact of de facto judicial independence on economic
growth is robust to outliers, to the inclusion of several additional economic,
legal and political control variables and to the construction of the index. The
authors thus conclude that judicial independence matters for economic
growth. If judicial independence matters for growth, economists
ought to reconsider its role when discussing issues of constitutional
design. Accordingly, the main question of this paper is to ask what
components of de jure and de facto judicial independence are particularly
conducive to economic growth and ho w they interact with the constitutional
and legal environment in the different countries.3 This investigation is based
on a cross section of 73 countries extending the Feld and Voigt (2003) data
set. In a first step, we replicate the result of the former papernamely that
the independence of superior courts matters for economic growthfor the
extend ed data set. In a second step, we inquire into the effects of the

organizational structure of the judiciary. In a third step it is asked whether

institutional arrangements that are not part of the judiciary themselves have
an impact on economic growth and whether there is an interaction of other
constitutional and legal provisions with JI. We find that de facto JI has a robust
and highly significant positive impact on economic growth. Looking at the
components of de jure JI, the specification of the procedures, of the
accessibility and of the term length of highest court judges in the constitution
show a modestly significant positive impact on economic growth, while a
wide accessibility of the highest court as well as the highest courts power for
constitutional review are negatively affecting economic growth. The other
components of de jure JI do not appear to have an impact. With respect to de
facto JI, no deviations from normal average term length, low numbers of
changes of the number of judges since 1960 and a competitive income of
judges are the main factors influencing growth. With regard to the impact
of the organizational structure of the courts on economic growth,
we find no significant diferences between courts organized as
constitutional c ourts and courts 3 The World Bank ha s been
involved in a number of programs dealing with similar, yet not
identical goals: whereas our interest focuses on the independence
of the judiciary from the other two government branches, the World
Bank ha s often put emphasis on the efficiency of the court system .
Dakolias (1999) has explained that efficiency-enhancing me asures within the
judiciary can be kicked off without having to wait for the consent of th e other
government branches. A more recent description of the organized differently.
Concerning the additional constitutional and legal environment, our results
indicate that the positive impact of de facto JI on economic growth is stronger
in presidential than in parliamentary systems as well as in systems with a
high extent of checks and balances. De facto JI appears to be effective
independent of the age of a constitution. On the contrary, if a state is able to
implement de facto JI, countries with older constitutions have a growth
disadvantage. To non-economists, the approach take n in this paper might
appear very odd: according to many, the primary function of the judiciary
would be to enhance justice, fairness, or equity. Yet, these goals do not
necessarily conflict with economic growth. If the degree to which these other
goals are realized can be kept constant and different institutional
arrangements promise different levels of growth (or per capita income), it
makes sense to argue in favor of the implementation of those institutional
arrangements that are most conducive to economic growth. In this paper, we
are concerned with the economic consequences of institutional choices
regarding the judiciary broadly conceived. It is thus a positive paper. As long
as the underlying goaleconomic growthis shared, it can easily be turned
into constitutional advice . The choice of institutional arrangements itself will,
however, not be endogenized. We are thus not concerned with possible
reasons of constitution-makers to choose different institutional arrangements
with regard to the judiciary (for this question, see Landes and Posner 1975,
Ramseyer 1994, and Ginsburg 2002). The remainder of the paper is organize

d as follows: in section 2, there will be a short review of the existing

literature, section 3 presents a number of hypotheses concerning the effects
of JI, judicial structure and the structure of state organization on economic
growth, the section 4 contains the description of our data set as well as own
World Banks activities can be found in a recent edition of the World
Development Report (2002, especially chapter 7). estimations. In section 5,
some preliminary conclusions regarding constitutional design are drawn, and
section 6 concludes.

JI Adv JI Good Lesotho

Judicial Independence key to Lesotho stability
Ellett 13 (Rachel Ellett is Associate Professor of Political Science. Rachel
received her PhD in Political Science from Northeastern University in 2008.
Her research is located at the intersection of politics and law. Rachel writes
on judicial politics, rule of law and development, and lawyers as political
actors in southern and eastern Africa and the commonwealth Caribbean. She
has conducted fieldwork in Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho,
Barbados and Trinidad. She recently published "Going off bench: Protecting
Judicial Autonomy in Competitive Clientelist Regimes" with Alexei Trochev in
the Journal of Law and Courts (2014) and "Courts and the emergence of
statehood in post-colonial Africa" in Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly (2013).
She has also published in Comparative Politics, PS and Law and Courts. In
2013 her book "Pathways to Judicial Power in Transitional States: Perspective
from Africa Courts" was released by Routledge. Rachel consults with the U.S.
based organization Freedom House and has written extensive reports on
judicial independence in Lesotho and Malawi, 5/29/13, Freedom House
Southern Africa, Politics of Judicial Independence in Lesotho,
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Politics%20%20of%20Judicial
%20Independence%20in%20Lesotho.pdf, 7/10/15, HDA)
Lesotho is a small landlocked country entirely surrounded by South
Africa. Since gaining independence from British rule in 1960 Lesotho
has faced manifold challenges towards achieving political stability
and sustained economic growth. The population of Lesotho remains
overwhelmingly rural-agrarian and despite some economic growth, gains in
GNI per capita have been small and life expectancy has dropped. In 2011
Lesotho placed below average for countries classified by the United
Nations as low human development.1 Since transitioning from
authoritarian rule in the early 1990s Lesotho has struggled to
establish a stable multiparty democracy, particularly during election
periods. These challenges are compounded by the failure to fully
address fundamental governance issues such as the relationship
between traditional institutions and the state.2 As is the case in all
democratic states, the establishment of mechanisms of
accountability is critical to political and economic development in
Lesotho. To be truly efective these institutions must span the formal
and informal sector and, they must transect horizontal and vertical
dimensions of accountability.3 Policymakers and academics have
increasingly turned their attention to the foundational importance
of strong, transparent and fully functional rule of law institutions to
economic and political development. First and foremost the courts
role in resolving conflict is essential to maintenance of the rule of
law. A stable and predictable investment climate is rooted in the
ability of courts to apply the law in a predictable and consistent

manner. Second, in transitioning democracies the courts can play an

important role in acting as a restraint on overzealous executives,
hegemonic political parties and human rights abusers . Given the
importance of rule of law to both political and economic
development, it is within this context that Freedom House Southern
Africa has commissioned a report on judicial independence in
Lesotho. The Lesotho judiciarys history as paramount defender of
the rule of law is uneven . Despite being infused with a fairly robust set of
institutional protections and a history of strong personnel, the judiciary
continues to face a number of challenges . These challenges relate
to three major substantive areas: 1) long-term resources
constraints, 2) public perceptions of corruption and weak
independence and, 3) a hostile and unstable political environment.
The goals of this report are twofold: Part I assesses the current state of
judicial independence in Lesotho; Part II reviews the scope and type of
interference experiences by the Lesotho judiciary. Finally, while the
introduction to this report provides analysis and description of the historical
backdrop to contemporary Lesotho the greater part of the analysis focuses on
the last ten years (2002-2012). Each section of the report is structured
around a taxonomy of judicial independence/interference. Judicial
independence is compartmentalized into five broad descriptive categories;
each of which contains a number of sub-elements. These sub-elements are
captured through a combination of checklist items and descriptive analysis.
Category i Scope of Judicial Power and Category ii Differentiation and
Separation of Powers focus on the formal legal and political distribution of
power as it relates to the judiciary. Category iii Internal Institutional
Safeguards examines the internal factors both formal and informal that
shape and protect judicial independence. Category iv Transparency speaks to
the need for access to information in order to monitor judicial independence.
Finally, Category v External Institutional support articulates the significance
of judicial allies in buttressing strong judicial institutions. Seeking to move
beyond a rigid constitutional definition of judicial independence to a more
holistic approach, this framework is interdisciplinary and captures both the
informal and formal relationships between courts, government, groups and
individuals. The taxonomy of interference is captured across five major
categories: Manipulation of Personnel, Institutional Assaults, Personal Attacks
on Judges, Budget Manipulation and, Attempted Cooption of Judges. This
section of the report is a straightforward description of the interference
experienced by judges in Lesotho over the last ten years. The overall
performance of the Lesotho judiciary exhibits no substantially serious issues
related to professionalism and/or independence. After applying the
framework (see Figure 2) to Lesotho three broad weaknesses were observed:
1. Separation of Powers Chronic underfunding and inadequate autonomy from
the Ministry of Justice continues to be a serious drag on the performance of
the judiciary. Further, it undermines institutional legitimacy in the eyes of the

public and weakens the morale of judicial officers. 2. Internal Institutional

Safeguards Perceptions of judicial independence in Lesotho are very weak.
Perceived weaknesses are primarily due to structural problems related to the
appointments procedures and internal administrative structure. 5 6 3.
External Institutional Support There has been an increase in the politicization
of the judiciary and attacks on judicial independence since the 2007 election.
This is due in part to the amplified political volatility and subsequent split
within the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) party which has
necessitated keeping the judiciary under tight control. 4. These weaknesses
are further detailed and diagrammed in Figure 1 below:

JI Adv Yes Model Iraq

Iraq ready to model Judicial Independence
Gluck 08 (Jason Gluck is a senior program officer for Rule of Law and director
of USIP's Constitution-Making Program. Gluck's focus is on the design and
implementation of constitution-making processes in post-conflict and
transitional states. He has advised government officials and civil society
actors on issues of constitutional reform in Burma, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen and elsewhere. Substantively,
Gluck's areas of expertise include constitutional design, federalism and
minority rights.
3/17/08, United States Institute of Peace, Judicial
Independence in Iraq, http://www.usip.org/programs/projects/judicialindependence-in-iraq, 7/10/15, HDA)
ROL played a key role in helping to create the Iraqi Committee for Judicial
Independence (ICJI), a network of representatives from the government,
judiciary, and civil society that provides crucial input on issues facing the
countrys judiciary. ROL continues to work with ICJI to educate members of
the judiciary and the general public on the issue of judicial independence.
ROL played an important role in helping create the Iraqi Committee
on Judicial Independence, a consortium of representatives from the
Ministries of Human Rights and Justice, the judiciary, the legal
community, civil society organizations, academia and the media from
across Iraq. The ICJI has provided a forum for the development of
consensus recommendations regarding the country's judicial system,
and continues to consult with the Constitutional Review Committee
and the Council of Representatives more generally to gain
assurances for the independence of the judiciary. Following the judicial
federalism conference in March 2009, ROL hosted a two-day conference on
judicial independence a particularly timely and much needed conference
given that only in 2009 was the Kurdish judiciary separated from the KRG
Ministry of Justice. The conference expanded on previous work by USIP
to assist judicial authorities and civil society organizations in
securing safeguards for the independence of the judiciary. One
outcome is the consideration of opening a Kurdistan branch of ICJI.
Other results from the conference and next steps will feed into a
weeklong training of judges in coordination with the CEELI Institute
this summer. ROL has encouraged building the capacity of the judiciary,
which has been enacted through a number of Iraqi-owned developments. ICJI
began hosting educational seminars for members of the Council of
Representatives and has provided recommendations to parliament on
constitutional amendments and draft laws impacting the independence of the
judiciary. A staff member from ICJI spearheaded the first law journal in Iraq
(see the first issue below), and ICJI recently successfully completed its third
annual ICJI conference (report forthcoming).

JI Adv Yes Model Brazil, Dubai

Brazil, Dubai, and Ghana all looking to model there courts
Georgia Law N.D. (The University of Georgia School of Law is
regarded as one of the nation's top law schools. Our school ofers the Juris
Doctor degree (J.D.) , the Master of Laws degree (LL.M.), and the Master in
the Study of Law degree (M.S.L.) and features a welcoming community in a
charming locale. The challenging curriculum and experienced professors
dedicated to teaching the theoretical foundations of law and providing
hands-on experience make Georgia Law an excellent place for your legal
studies, University Law, International Judicial Training Program (IJTP) at the
University of Georgia, http://www.law.uga.edu/international-judicial-trainingprogram-ijtp-university-georgia, 7/10/15, HDA)

A strong and independent judiciary is the foundation of a

democratic country's stability . The International Judicial Training
Program (IJTP) seeks to foster increased judicial independence,
efficiency, and accountability, thereby increasing public and investor
confidence in national judiciaries . The emphasis on judicial
independence, court administration, case management, ethics,
continuing education, and implementation is designed to foster
long-term, systemic change in participant countries. IJTP is a
collaboration between the University of Georgia School of Law's Dean Rusk
Center and the university's Institute of Continuing Judicial Education. Since its
inception in 1998, the program has trained more than 1000 judges and court
personnel at the University of Georgia School Of Law. Its participants have
hailed from countries such as Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Egypt, Ghana and
the Czech Republic. IJTP facilitates reform by offering capacity-building
judicial administration programs tailored to the individual needs of each
participating country. Designed to introduce foreign judges and court
personnel to the U.S. judicial system, IJTP hosts seminars (up to two weeks)
at the UGA School of Law and at sites throughout the state and includes
sessions with the Georgia Supreme Court, Georgia Court of Appeals, and
other specialized courts. Examples of topics covered in prior training
programs include court administration, judicial budgeting, caseload
management, alternative dispute resolution, court technology, and judicial
ethics and professionalism . IJTP Partnerships Brazil Since 1998, when
the Supreme Court of the State of Pernambuco, Brazil, requested
that its judges and court personnel be trained by the University of
Georgia on issues concerning continuing education, more than fifty
judges, administrators, and members of the Pernambuco judiciary
have trained through IJTP . The idea was to train a cadre of judges
and court personnel who would constitute the backbone of
Pernambuco's Institute of Continuing Judicial Education. One of the
many outcomes of the strong partnership between IJTP and the Pernambuco
judiciary was the development of a Code of Judicial Conduct by the

Pernambuco Supreme Court. Dubai In November 2009, IJTP traveled to

Dubai and conducted 3 days of training for 30 members of the
United Arab Emirates and the Bahrain judiciary in case flow
management and judicial leadership . This marked the first time that IJTP
partnered with a foreign organization The Dubai Judicial Institute (DJI).
Prominent speakers included Judge Doris Downs of Fulton County Superior
Court, Judge David Emerson, current member of the Georgia Supreme Court
Technology Advisory Committee and Judicial Counsel of Georgia; and Mark
Beer, Registrar of the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts. Ghana IJTP
expanded into Ghana as part of concrete plans to further extend the
program's reach in other countries and regions. Rusk Center staff
collaborated with Ghana Judicial Service officials to identify concrete
strategies for reform within the guidelines of the Ten-Year Strategic Plan for
the Judicial Servicea reform structure developed by the United Nations
Development Programme's National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP).
Under the sponsorship of this UNDP and the World Bank, members of the
Judicial Service of Ghana, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Justice, as well
as the informational technology consultant to the Judicial Service, attended a
program on court automation at UGA. The training led to the
implementation of a Fast Track Court in Ghana, which reduced the
average time for adjudication of cases, originally five-to-seven
years, to six months. This model court has drawn the attention of
international donors who are willing to fund a number of additional
Fast Track Courts in Ghana.

JI Adv Pakistan Uniqueness JI Low

Judicial corruption runs rampant in Pakistan
Iqbal N.D. (Nasira Iqbal, is a retired judge of Lahore High Court. She is
married to Justice (R) Dr. Javid Iqbal (Sr.), Hilal-e-Imtiaz, Former Chief Justice
of Lahore High Court and retired judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, N.d.,
American Bar Association, Judicial Independence Abroad: The Struggle
Continues,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/hum
an_rights_vol36_2009/winter2009/judicial_independence_abroad.html,
7/10/15, HDA)
Judicial independence in Pakistan is perhaps best understood
through the prism of military intervention and multiple revisions of
the Pakistani Constitution . When Pakistan was created in 1947, its
founders envisioned a state where the constitution would be supreme. It
would provide for a division of powers among the executive, the legislature,
and the judiciary, each able to function independently in its own sphere. In
1949, Pakistans Constituent Assembly passed the Objectives Resolution,
which stated that the territories included in Pakistan would form a federation;
that those internal units would be autonomous and would guarantee
fundamental rights, equality before law, status, opportunity, social, economic,
and political justice, freedom of thought, expression, belief, worship, and
association; and that the independence of the judiciary would be fully
secured. However, Pakistan has been under martial law for more than half of
its sixty-one years, and its constitution has been rewritten several times
during that period, notably in 1956, 1962, and 1973. These constitutions, in
turn, were abrogated or suspended by military adventurers when they
imposed martial law. Nonetheless, the Objectives Resolution formed the
preamble of the three successive constitutions and in 1985 became a
substantive part of the constitution. T he constitutional provisions
regarding the powers and composition of superior courtsthose
delineating the qualifications, appointment, and terms and
conditions of service of judgesin theory guarantee judicial
independence. Fighting for citizens rights. While Pakistan has
witnessed its share of dubious court decisions, it likewise has seen
an honest and determined efort to seek judicial decisional
independence. Among the former, the Supreme Court on three
occasions relied on the doctrine of state necessity to declare that
martial law had been validly imposed in State v. Dosso (1958), Begum
Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff (1977), and Zafar Ali Shah v. General
Pervez Musharraf (2000). Yet in 1972, after General Yahya Khan resigned and
handed over power to the popularly elected government of Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, the Supreme Court, headed by Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman, held
in Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab (1972), that the assumption of power
and the martial law proclaimed by Khan in 1969 was unconstitutional and

invalid. These contradictory judgments demonstrate that whenever

the constitution is abrogated or suspended, the independence of the
judiciary goes into eclipse, yet when there is a civilian, democratic
government, the courts assert their independence as guardians of
the constitution. For the most part, courts have worked
independently and for the good of the citizenry, providing relief
against excesses of the executive. They have held that when a statutory
functionary acts in an oppressive and unjust manner, courts have the power
to grant relief to the aggrieved party. Murree Brewery Ltd. v. Government of
Pakistan (1972). Similarly, courts have held that all legal steps taken by
citizens are meant to advance the cause of justice, not to entrap litigants in a
blind corner so as to frustrate the purpose of law. Thus a mere slip up on
procedure cannot operate as an impediment to the dispensation of justice.
Mir Mazar v. Azim (1993). In Shehla Zia v. WAPDA (1994), the Supreme Court
expanded the fundamental rights to life and dignity by including protection of
the environment and quality of life. In Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto v. President
of Pakistan (1998), it held that tapping of telephones and eavesdropping by
government authorities was immoral, illegal, and unconstitutional. In Sh.
Liaquat Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan (1999), the Supreme Court declared
that the establishment of military courts for the trial of civilians was beyond
the powers enumerated in the Pakistan Constitution. Attempting to elevate
the status of women, in Ghulam Ali v. Mst Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (1990) the
Supreme Court declared that no waiver by a female can deprive her of her
right to inheritance of immovable property and the law of limitation would not
operate as a bar to her claim. Supporting womens right to education, the
court declared that if numerous girl students qualified for admission to
medical colleges on the basis of merit, the provision of special seats for
female students could not restrict their number. Shirin Munirv.Government
of Punjab (1990). In 2001, the Lahore High Court declared the Pakistan
Citizenship Act of 1951 was discriminatory and invalid to the extent that it
provides that the foreign spouse of a Pakistani male is eligible for acquiring
Pakistan nationality but the foreign male spouse of a Pakistani female citizen
is not entitled to this benefit. That court also held that free consent of a
woman is a prerequisite for a valid marriage ( Mst. Humaira Mehmood v.
State (1999)) and that murder in the name of honor is not merely the
physical elimination of a man or a woman, it is at the sociopolitical level a
blow to the concept of a free, dynamic, and egalitarian society ( Muhammad
Siddique v. State (2002)). Thus, whenever the country was governed under a
constitution, the judiciary acted independently to safeguard the rights of the
citizens and to uphold the rule of law. But when judges were called upon to
adjudicate on the imposition of martial law while the constitution was held in
abeyance, they thought it wiser to exercise judicial prudence. They were
aware that if they delivered a judgment that was not acceptable, the military
dictators could remove them with impunity and replace them with eager
opportunists, precipitating a descent into chaos. Pressure by the public or
media for upholding the independence of the judiciary was lacking. Against
this backdrop, the courts tried to ensure governance according to law rather

than to the whims of military commanders. This mode of reasoning

represents one strain of Pakistani judical thought, adopted by Chief Justice
Muhammad Munir, which may be termed judicial pragmatism. It has been
opposed by another, judicial purism, espoused by Rahman and other
eminent judges who have followed his example. Recent encroachments on
independence. The defining moment in the Supreme Courts move toward
judicial independence came on March 9, 2007, when Chief Justice Iftikhar
Muhammad Chaudhry was suspended by General Pervez Musharraf on
alleged charges of misuse of power when he did not oblige Musharraf and
refused to resign. He had worked hard to clear the backlog of cases while
simultaneously taking suo moto notice and deciding thousands of human
rights cases of poor and vulnerable victims of injustice across the country. He
gave judgments against the excesses of public functionaries regardless of the
consequences. In the Pakistan Steel Mills case, he declared that the Cabinet
Committee on Privatization, headed by the prime minister, grossly violated
the law in selling the mills. While pursuing the case of so-called missing
persons, he held the government responsible and observed that it was the
duty of the state to protect peoples lives and to ensure their safety. He also
canceled, as harmful to the environment, the New Murree Project and other
urban development schemes undertaken by the government to benefit
various members of the power elite. Thousands of lawyers, citizens, and the
media rallied to his support. Lawyers took to the streets in peaceful
processions and boycotted the courts. Ultimately, Chaudhry was reinstated
by the judgment of a fifteen-member bench of the Supreme Court on July 20
of that year. On November 3, however, Musharraf preempted an impending
court decision against his reelection and invoked emergency powers,
suspending the constitution. Under his directions, the chief justice and seven
other judges were arrested. Musharraf replaced Chaudhry with Justice Abdul
Hameed Dogar. Dogar promptly obliged by declaring Musharraf validly
elected as president and by declaring valid Musharrafs National
Reconciliation Ordinance, which provided immunity from prosecution to
numerous corrupt public functionaries. Martial law was lifted and a
considerably disfigured version of the constitution was restored on December
15. General elections were held in February 2008. On March 24, the newly
elected government released Chaudhry, his colleagues, and his family from
incarceration. Musharraf resigned under pressure on August 18. Asif Ali
Zardari, who promised to restore Chaudhry to office, was elected president on
September 6, but the restoration of the judiciary to its pre-November 3, 2007,
position has still not come to pass. Those who have benefited from the
judgments of a pliant judiciary, particularly by the validation of the dubious
National Reconciliation Ordinance, are not eager to accept an independent
judiciary. However, the lawyers movement and the proactive media have
forced average citizens to realize that good governance, economic and social
justice, peace, stability, freedom from terror, and credibility in the comity of
nations cannot be achieved without an independent judiciary. The future
destiny of Pakistan will be determined by the elected representatives of the
people. Rule of law must be upheld by an independent, impartial judiciary.

The alternative is a descent into chaos. Hon. Nasira Iqbal is a retired justice
who served on the Lahore High Court in Lahore, Pakistan. A View from Kenya
by Hon. Mary A. Angawa The lack of confidence in the Kenyan judiciary has a
long history. This was recently borne out by the elections of December 2007.
When the results were announced, the losers felt cheated and were angry.
When they were told, If you are not satisfied with the election results, go to
court and challenge them, they responded, We have no confidence in the
judiciary; we refuse to go to court. As a judicial officer of twenty-seven years
at that time, fourteen on the High Court of Kenya, this remark cut me to the
core. Instead of organized and rational legal intervention, violence broke out
and the country burned. It was a crushing blow to be unable to arbitrate,
comment, or intervene in the events because a matter cannot be judicially
reviewed unless it is brought before a court by any party. I attempted to join
independent groups established to foster peace among the communities, but
this severely limited my ability to ascertain whether there might be potential
litigants among them. Some constitutional background. The Kenyan judiciary
is based on the British system, with the major difference being that no jury
system exists. The judiciary is comprised of three tiers, including (1) the
subordinate courts, presided over by magistrates; (2) the superior courts,
presided over by puisne judges of the High Court; and (3) the Court of
Appeal, presided over by the judges of appeal. The judges have security of
tenure, whereas the magistrates do not. Like most Commonwealth countries,
Kenya adapted a constitution that was used by most of the former British
colonies when they gained their independence. Nearly all of these
constitutions contained the Declaration of Human Rights. In the current
Kenyan Constitution, the executive powers are vested in the president as
head of the executive branch, and the legislative power is vested in
Parliament, but no similar enactment was made concerning the judicial
authority being vested in the judiciary. This created an imbalance between
the judiciary and the legislature and executive, with the outcome that the
judiciary was constructed on the weakest foundation. Attempts at reform.
This shortcoming, and others, of the current constitution were patently
evident to many Kenyans. The chapter in the constitution on the judiciary was
clearly one where the public wanted reform. The Constitution of Kenya
Review Commission was established in 2002, and it was intended to be
driven by the people rather than by the government. The Review Commission
mandated an advisory panel of eminent Commonwealth judicial experts to
reconsider the chapter on the Kenyan judiciary and to give its input on the
proposed new constitution. Surprisingly, the Court of Appeal resisted this
panels investigations and fielded two separate court cases to stop the review
process. Similarly, a committee established for the judiciary by the chief
justice ended its meetings with the commission. In protest, members of the
Law Society wore yellow ribbons on their robes and took to the streets. The
few judges who openly supported the review process found themselves
transferred to stations far distant from the capitol, which is what happened to
me. In the end, the dispute boiled down to one issue: Should there be a
separate court, known as a Supreme Court, that would address constitutional

issues and that would not be presided over by the current judges of the Court
of Appeal? Some interested parties suggested that all the judges should
resign simultaneously and reapply for their jobs afresh. This time their actual
qualifications would be taken into account, such as the extent of their work
experience and whether they had obtained additional academic law degrees.
In May 2002, the panel of experts released a report finding a crisis of
confidence in the judiciary. The panel suggested this was caused by the
politicization of appointments of judicial officers, and it pointed to the need
for a guarantee of security of tenure and for judicial remuneration to be
delineated in the constitution, so that judicial officers would be protected
from job uncertainty and salary cuts. They also concluded that reforms were
urgently required to restore public confidence in the judiciary and that
enhanced transparency, independence, and accountability were necessary.
Further, they opined that widespread corruption had crippled and
compromised the judiciary, regardless of the constitutional issues. Yet 2002
was an election year, and Parliament was dissolved earlier than scheduled,
forcing the work of the commission to come to a halt. After the 2002
elections, a new government assumed power, ending twenty-four years of
rule by the previous government. When the review process began again, a
new draft that had been reworked by the government under the auspices of
the attorney general was substituted for the original draft, the effect of which
was to compromise it considerably. The stakeholders on the reforms of the
judiciary nonetheless were of the opinion that the legal reforms contained in
the new proposed draft should emphasize making the judiciary independent,
accountable, and effective. The drafters opposed making reforms piecemeal.
They declared that financial and budgeting autonomy for the judiciary was
essential. They felt that the process for judicial appointment should be clearly
outlined, as should the provisions for discipline and removal of judges from
office. They similarly felt that access to justice issues and the backlog of
cases needed to be made part of the reform agenda. If such reforms were
enacted, they said, this would restore public confidence in the judiciary. The
newly proposed constitution, which advocated land reform and many other
provisions not related directly to the judiciary, was voted down in a national
referendum in late 2005, and as such the 2007 general elections were held
under the old rules. Further, the judicial reforms that had been instituted
piecemeal in the interim, while substantial, nonetheless did not inspire
confidence in the independence of the judiciary to resolve the disputes that
arose after those elections. To understand this, we need to look at what
comprises independence of the judiciary. To quote Wikipedia, Judicial
independence is the doctrine that decisions of the judiciary should be
impartial and not subject to influence from the other branches of government
or from private or political interests. In most cases, judicial independence is
secured by giving judges long tenure, and making them not easily removable.
Some definitions of judicial independence distinguish only decisional
independence and institutional independence. I am nevertheless persuaded
that judicial independence may be divided into four categories that I
have discussed in greater depth elsewhere. These are (1) judicial

independence, which relates to the decision-making process; (2)

juridical independence, which relates to the finality of the decision;
(3) administrative independence, which relates to the autonomy of
management of afairs; and (4) budgetary independence, which
relates to being autonomous financially. Judicial self-regulation and
progress. As far back as 1998, in recognition of problems within the
judiciary, the chief justice set up a Committee on the Administration
of Justice (commonly known as the Kwach Committee), which admitted
for the first time that corruption existed within the judiciary.
Unfortunately, the chief justice passed away shortly thereafter and the next
chief justice did not fully implement the findings of this report before
resigning when the new government came to power. In September 2003, the
next chief justice established another commission, commonly known as the
Ringera Commission, which prepared a report that called for the full
implementation of the Kwach Committee report. It similarly noted that
judicial corruption was rampant. In a separate report, the
commission named twenty-five judges and eighty-three magistrates
as being corrupt, and both reports were disclosed to the press . The
effect was damaging. Most of the judicial officers opted to resign and take
their dues. A few faced the tribunal and were reinstated. Unfortunately, the
disciplinary procedures were irregular because no fair hearing was given nor
strict rule of law followed. Hence, the security of tenure was compromised.
The judiciary then set up a standing committee in 2005 known as the Ethics
and Governance Subcommittee. Its first incarnation, known as the Onyango
Otieno Committee, continued to investigate corruption. It was still so much a
problem that in May 2006 Transparency International, a global organization
fighting corruption, named the judiciary as the No. 6 bribe taker in Kenya,
which was nevertheless an improvement from the No. 3 slot in the year 2004.
Today, the judiciary does not appear in that list. The Onyango Otieno
Committee took a different approach and kept secret the names of those
found corrupt. To date, no disclosure or actions taken against those who have
been found wanting has been made public, and no official report has been
published by the government. This committee was followed by the Kariuki
Kihara Committee in 2007, and it, too, has not published open accusations
against judges or magistrates. The days when the security of tenure was
curtailed by Parliament in order to fire judges appear to have passed. The
executive rarely interferes in judicial decision making. The infrastructure of
courts is being upgraded. Judges have been provided with computers that
work well, especially in Nairobi. One of the most positive aspects surrounding
the judiciary is that law reporting, which did not exist for twenty years, is now
flourishing. An annual colloquium is now held regularly to interact and
exchange views. The recent taxation on judges allowance was reconsidered.
A training institute for judicial officers was established and will long be
remembered as an extremely positive milestone in Kenyas judicial reform
history. Conclusion. The failure of confidence in the Kenyan judiciary can be
explained by the lack of independence of the judiciary, which in turn has

been compromised by corruption. To achieve this independence, the judiciary

must be made autonomous and achieve budgetary and financial
independence from the executive. This would require a change in the
constitution to give authority to the judiciary to be independent. Kenya needs
to work toward complete transparency in the selection of judges. Judges
themselves must be diligent in upholding the rule of law in an environment
that is conducive to doing so. In the end, we are left with a larger question: Is
judicial independence and a regular adherence to the rule of law possible
where only sixty-one judges of the Court of Appeal and the High Court,
working together with 250 magistrates, serve a population of thirty-four
million?

It is only a matter of time before the Supreme Court will face calls
for new measures of accountability to act as a counterweight to the
new judicial independence. The trigger may be a high profile and
politically-sensitive human rights case. In order to defend the new
judicial independence, the Supreme Court must cultivate a public
commitment to its lawmaking role by demonstrating governance
improvements resulting from the new institutional arrangements. In
Canada, the principal justification for the Supreme Court's role in
fundamental rights cases is the dialogue theory'. First popularised
in a 1997 law review article by Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell,
dialogue theory posits that while judges exercise discretion, they
are engaged in an interactive dialogue with the other branches of
government about rights issues.72 The theory places limits on the
judicial role by emphasising that Parliament has the final word in the dialogue
as a result of the structure of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 73
Dialogue theory has been expressly endorsed by the Supreme Court of
Canada.74 Yet observers have pointed out that the Canadian dialogue is
sometimes more like a judicial monologue given political reluctance to
challenge judicial decisions that hold rhetorical advantages, particularly in
human rights cases.75 In the result, legislative responses' include the
repeal of ofending statutory provisions or the taking of other action
in direct compliance with judicial directives, such as the Reference
re Manitoba Language Rights case, where the legislature hastily
translated its entire repertoire of statutory legislation into the
French language before the Supreme Court of Canada's declaration
of invalidity took efect (which would have resulted in a legal
vacuum with consequent legal chaos given that all statutory
instruments exclusively in English were held to be unconstitutional
and thus invalid ).76 Dialogue theory might provide some answers to the
legitimacy concerns of judicial lawmaking but it is a descriptive theory in that
it does not immediately justify why courts should be part of a dialogue in the
first place, particularly if there is no such thing as a correct' policy answer:
what makes judicial values superior to the values of the executive or

legislature? Some evidence relating to the improved quality of the democratic

process as a result of judicial contributions may be required.77 Even as a
descriptive theory, dialogue ofers an idealised view that overstates
the Government's participation in the discussion over rights, which
is potentially misleading and could increase the comfort of courts to
engage in politically-charged lawmaking: dialogue theory cuts
against the grain of deference to the elected branches of
government by actively seeking out the pronouncements of courts
as an important part of the on-going dialogue. Despite these
limitations, it seems that some form of dialogue theory looms on the horizon
in the United Kingdom given the dialogic structure of the Human Rights
Act.78 It remains to be seen, however, whether the Government will be
comfortable sharing governance with the courts and ultimately
dencentralising its political power. A further justification ofered for the
new judicial independence is the increased capacity of the courts to
hold the executive to account. The Supreme Court has seized upon
the accountability function to justify its institutional autonomy. In his
February 2011 speech, Lord Phillips stated that because the individual
citizen is subject to controls imposed by the executive in respect of almost
every aspect of life, courts must review executive actions for legality, and
thus it is from executive pressure or influence that judges require
particularly to be protected.79 However, English judges have had little
difficulty in holding the executive to account through judicial review
for decades, so it is not entirely clear how the new judicial
independence enhances this role. 80 If the idea is that the scope and
intensity of judicial supervision will be expanded through judiciallyconstructed rules as a result of the new judicial independence, it
raises many of the same legitimacy concerns over judicial
lawmaking as previously discussed. The impact of the new judicial
independence on other judicial functions must also be considered.
While this article focused on the lawmaking of appellate courts, the functions
of the courts cannot be so neatly divided, especially in the public mind.
Changes to one judicial function may alter the functioning of others.
Emboldened and institutionally autonomous courts, wading deeper into
controversial issues pitting individuals against the political majority, may
undermine public confidence in the core judicial function of dispute
resolution. By revealing the political nature of rights-based adjudication, the
decisions of courts in controversial cases may threaten the perceived
impartiality of the trial judge in resolving ordinary conflict. Paradoxically, in
such a situation, the new judicial independence would counteract the
very thing it was designed to do: protect the status of the judge as a
third party to the dispute. As a result of this possibility, a critical
eye must be cast upon the direction in which the new judicial
independence leads the courts to ensure continued public
confidence in the administration of justice.

JI Adv Turkey Uniqueness JI Low

Turkeys independence Judicial independence id declining
Misztal and Michek 14 (Blaise Misztal is the director of the national security
program at the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC), having previously served as
the projects associate director and senior policy analyst. At BPC, Misztal has
researched a variety national security issues, including: Iran and its nuclear
program; cyber security; stabilizing fragile states; and public diplomacy in the
21st century. He has testified before Congress and published op-eds in The
Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The Weekly Standard, The New
Republic, and Roll Call. In addition, Misztal wrote and directed the 2009
Cyber ShockWave simulation that aired on CNN. Jessica Michek joined the
Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) as an administrative assistant for the Foreign
Policy Project in February 2014, having started with BPC as an intern in May
2013. Prior to joining BPC, Michek served as a virtual intern for the U.S.
Embassy in Bahrain, working to monitor trials related to the unrest in Bahrain
since the Arab Spring. As an undergraduate, Michek focused her studies on
the Middle East and North Africa, studying abroad in Amman, Jordan and
writing her honors thesis on the impact of U.S. aid on Jordans foreign policy.
Michek graduated with honors from Oberlin College in May 2013 with a B.A. in
politics, having also received Oberlins John D. Lewis Memorial Prize for
excellence in international politics, 12/12/14, Bipartisan Policy Center, HSYK
Elections and the Future of Judicial Independence in Turkey,
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/hsyk-elections-and-the-future-of-judicialindependence-in-turkey/, 7/13/15, HDA)
Turkeys judiciary is losing its independence. At issue is a seeming
commitment of a majority of new HSYK members to issue rulings
and decrees in support of the ruling party. Indeed, pro-government
candidates ran on a platform promising to work in harmony with the
executive, proclaiming their subservience to Erdoan and the AKP. A CHP
deputy explained, [i]t shows that the rule of separation of power is being
destroyed. Constitutionally there has to be a separation of power and
the judicial system has to be impartial and apolitical. As an
opposition deputy stated, [t]his HSYK is the AKPs. Ahmet Gndel, a
retired Supreme Court of Appeals prosecutor has voiced fear that
the government may attempt to use the HSYK to punish judges and
prosecutors who attempt to investigate government corruption or
those who will not toe the government line . As he explained, [t]he
[members of the judiciary] will fear that they might, after a complaint against
them, be reassigned to another post [in another town], be investigated or be
expelled from the profession. Indeed, the new HSYK has already acted
in the governments favor, requiring an investigation into military
commanders who ordered the stopping and searching of trucks
belonging to Turkeys National Intelligence Organization (MIT) en
route to Syria in January 2014. The trucks were alleged to be carrying

explosives and weapons to be supplied to the Syrian opposition. While the

previous HSYK did not give permission to launch an investigation into the
generals involved in the incident, the governments more agreeable HSYK
readily acquiesced.

JI Adv JI Good Nigerian Stability

Nigeria Judicial Independence create stability
Ige 08 (John Olagake Ige was a Justice for the Nigerian Supreme court,
11/9/08, THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY AS A PANACEA FOR STABILITY OF
DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA: PAPER PRESENTED BY YUSUF O. ALI ESQ; SAN AT
THE LUNCHEON IN HONOUR OF HON. JUSTICE OLAGOKE IGE,
http://www.yusufali.net/articles/the_independence_of_judiciary_as_a_panacea
_for_stability_of_democracy_in_nigeria.pdf, 7/13/15, HDA)
The issue of stability of democracy in Nigeria is a perennial one.
There has been no permanent solution to recurring unstable
democratic system we experience in Nigeria. However, there is no
doubt; a strong and independent judiciary promotes the rule of 'aw. It
checks acts of dictatorship and the rule of terror by the ruling class.
It is so helpful in the promotion of justice and fair play. When the
public feels confident in its adjudicator's roles, the judiciary is often
described as the last hope of the common man. The judiciary as often
described as the last hope of common man has a very big task ahead, this
task could be illustrated by the statement made by a former judge of Lagos
State High Court, Justice Akinola R. in his paper, Salute to cournge", The story
of Justice Yahaya Jinadu: published by Nigerian Law Publications Ltd. In 1989
at pages 139 - 140. The Honourable Judge stated thus: "I believe the
judiciary has an important role to play in this country as it is the last
hope of the common man. The judiciary has to be firm, fair and
courageous and must not employ any form of double standards. It is
not right in my view to regard or treat the court of Justice as an
extension of the Federal Ministry of Justice. I cannot cordon any
attempt to destroy the judicial system in this country using me as a
scape goat." In recent times, it is a matter of common knowledge
that there has been a fair amount of loss of faith in the judicial
process and adjudication in resolving conflicts and members of the
public in certain instances preferred the use of self help, to the use
of the judicial processes. The processes had been characterized with
serious allegations of corruption, abuse of office, claim of ethnic lopsidedness
in the appointment of judicial officers and so on. It is against the background
of the above observation that this paper seeks to examine how an
independent judiciary can be a viable and everlasting solution to the stability
of democracy in Nigeria. Before going into the main theme of this paper, it is
pertinent at this juncture to define certain terms used in the topic that is:
independence, judiciary, panacea, stability and democracy i. Independence: it
is freedom from control from dependence on or control by another person,
organization or state, ii. Judiciary: this is a branch of government
saddled with dispensation and administration of justice, iii. Panacea: it
is a case of solution to an identified problem, iv. Stability: this is a quality of
condition of being stable. v. Democracy: it is a free and equal representation
of people in a system of government. The free and equal right of every

person to participate in government often practiced by electing

representatives of the people by the majority of people. It is also
important to note at this juncture that this paper will be divided into
some headings and I shall take the heading one after the other.

JI Adv Eastern Europe Uniqueness

Transition Now
Eastern Europe Striving for judicial independence
OSCE 2010 (The OSCE has a comprehensive approach to security that
encompasses politico-military, economic and environmental, and human
aspects. It therefore addresses a wide range of security-related concerns,
including arms control, confidence- and security-building measures, human
rights, national minorities, democratization, policing strategies, counterterrorism and economic and environmental activities. All 57 participating
States enjoy equal status, and decisions are taken by consensus on a
politically, but not legally binding basis, 7/10/10, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN
EASTERN EUROPE, SOUTH CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA Challenges,
Reforms and Way Forward, http://www.osce.org/odihr/71178?download=true,
7/13/15, HDA)

Balancing the independence of the judiciary with the need for

democratic legitimacy in a society governed by the rule of law is a
challenge for every participating State. The legacy of the Socialist
legal tradition has shaped justice systems in a great number of OSCE
participating States. After departure from the doctrine of unity of
state power, these States in the past two decades have
implemented numerous reforms, both legislative and institutional,
which were intended to foster separation of powers and judicial
independence. The time is now ripe for a fresh look at these efforts, to
assess their success in establishing truly independent judiciaries, as well as
identify remaining challenges in strengthening them. Therefore, ODIHR and
the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law
(MPI) have undertaken an assessment of 4 the state of judicial independence
across the OSCE region which provides the basis for developing an ODIHR
strategy for this sector. The primary purpose of the project is to
identify impediments and recognize good practices for the makeup
of independent judiciaries in the participating States of the OSCE,
and assist the States, with a predominant focus on Eastern Europe,
South Caucasus and Central Asia, in adhering to their commitments.
For the assessment phase of the project, ODIHR designed a questionnaire on
judicial independence and commissioned country reports from independent
experts. The questionnaire benefitted from feedback by MPI and the Council
of Europe Venice Commission and covers the most relevant aspects of judicial
independence, as outlined in several international instruments. Special
attention has been given, inter alia, to the administration of the judiciary
including budget management, the role of judicial councils, selection and
appointment of judges, tenure and promotion, remuneration, case
assignment systems, disciplinary procedures, immunity, ethics and resources.
As second step in the assessment phase of the judicial independence project,

the expert meeting in Kyiv was intended to result in concrete

recommendations to the participating States on how to further strengthen
judicial independence in the region. The comparative analysis of
independent expert reports in the first step had led to the
identification of subtopics for the expert meeting, namely (1) Judicial
Administration judicial councils, judicial self-governing bodies and
the role of court chairs; (2) Judicial Selection criteria and
procedures; and (3) Accountability versus Independence in
Adjudication. These subtopics were also subject to discussion at
separate working sessions at the recent Human Dimension Seminar
on Strengthening Judicial Independence and Public Access to Justice
on 17-19 May 2010 in Warsaw. The meeting was attended by 27
prominent scholars and senior practitioners from 19 participating States, in
addition to experts from ODIHR, MPI and the Council of Europe including its
Venice Commission. The OSCE field presences in Moldova, Ukraine and Skopje
were also represented. The meeting aimed to serve as a platform for in-depth
discussion of challenges in selected areas related to judicial independence,
critical examination of the impact of past reforms, as well as identification of
good practice examples from participating States.

Terror Adv

Terror Adv Entrapment Link

Use of aggressive intelligence collection practices against
Muslim communities fails and risks increased terrorism
entrapment increases false information and alienates
communities.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
Because the FBI's post-9/11 establishment of a preventative stance
towards terrorism 5Link to the text of the note has increased the need for
intelligence, 6Link to the text of the note the agency has [237] turned to the
increased use of immigration law and residence status to recruit
more confidential informants. 7Link to the text of the note Although the FBI does not
comment on its informant recruitment methods, 8Link to the text of the note numerous stories similar to

allegations of the
FBI's aggressive use of past [238] violations of immigration laws to
pressure individuals whom the agency believes may have terrorism
knowledge have repeatedly surfaced. 10Link to the text of the note The
Informants, a yearlong investigation into the FBI's use of informants,
led by Trevor Aaronson and the University of California at Berkeley's
Reporting Program in conjunction with Mother Jones, details the
FBI's expanded use of informants in terrorism investigations. 11Link to
the text of the note Of the approximately five hundred federal terrorism
prosecutions conducted since 9/11, about half used an informant ,
12Link to the text of the note and forty-nine of them were the result of work
done by agent provocateurs. 13Link to the text of the note Aaronson's
investigation also shed light on the FBI's use of immigration law and
the threat of deportation to incentivize informants to cooperate . 14Link
to the text of the note Aaronson explains, A typical scenario will play out like this:
An FBI agent trying to get someone to cooperate will look for
evidence that the person has immigration troubles. If they do, he
can ask [Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)] to begin or expedite
deportation proceedings. If the immigrant then chooses to
cooperate, the FBI will tell the court that he is a valuable asset,
averting deportation. 15Link to the text of the note [239] Using the threat of immigration
Farahi's have been reported since 9/11. 9Link to the text of the note In fact,

consequences like deportation to produce terrorism intelligence presents novel problems for the

When individuals are pressured into

becoming informants by the threat of deportation, which may
remove them from their family and all sources of support, the
decision essentially becomes a Hobson's choice . 16Link to the text of the note
Informants recruited in this manner who also lack legitimate ties to
foreign terrorist organizations 17Link to the text of the note have an enormous
intelligence gathering process and the informants.

incentive to fabricate information to fulfill their end of the

agreement and avoid deportation. 18Link to the text of the note Attorney Stephen
Downs of Project SALAM explained, Community life is shattered as the
government often forces Muslim immigrants to spy on their own
communities or give false testimony with the threat that the
Muslim's immigration status will be "revised" if the Muslims do not
cooperate. Such practices generate fear and alienation in the
Muslim community and diminish our security rather than enhance it .
19Link to the text of the note As Downs notes, the intelligence these informants
provide can be unreliable, 20Link to the text of the note because these
individuals may feel they must ofer up something to the
government to avoid being removed from their families, jobs, and
lives. The threat of false intelligence is grave. In addition to the
possibility of entrapment 21Link to the text of the note by agent provocateurs,
false intelligence may encourage ethnic and religious profiling of
Muslim and Middle Eastern communities, 22Link to the text of the note chill
free speech , 23Link to the text of the note and waste finite intelligence
resources. Recruitment through [240] immigration law also affords less protection to informants than
recruitment done by offering monetary rewards or reductions in sentencing. 24Link to the text of the note

unlike criminal ofenses, there is no statute of limitations

governing civil penalties like deportation, removal, or exclusion
orders, which means that the FBI can use immigration violations to
leverage cooperation from out-of-status individuals who have been
in the country for years. Moreover, unlike an informant who is
promised a sentence reduction or lessened charges and who can enforce his or her
bargain with the government through plea bargaining, an informant promised
immigration benefits has no way of enforcing these promises . 25Link to
For example,

the text of the note Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel 26Link to the text of the
note does not apply to immigration violations. 27Link to the text of the note Finally, according to some
reported cases, the government has failed to reward informants with the promised immigration benefits
after receiving their cooperation. 28Link to the text of the note With fewer bargaining options, less
protection, and potentially more to lose 29Link to the text of the note than informants recruited through
monetary incentives or promises of sentence reductions, there is greater incentive for informants "flipped"
30Link to the text of the note via [241] immigration violations to provide unreliable information.

there is
a darker veil of secrecy shrouding measures for recruiting terrorism
informants than for other types of informants. 31Link to the text of the note
Immigration status ofers a valuable way for the FBI to elicit
cooperation and collect intelligence from individuals who otherwise
would not be forthcoming. However, this method for collecting
intelligence can prove counterproductive when indiscriminately
applied to situations where the informants lack useful connections
to terrorist groups. Decreased intelligence benefits, lack of
protection for informants, and increased ethnic and religious
profiling suggest that changes to how the FBI recruits terrorism
informants with immigration threats and rewards are needed .
Furthermore, due to the latitude afforded to the executive branch in national security matters,

Terror Adv Informants Key

Informants are key to preventing terrorism.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
While there are no detailed studies on the differences between terrorism
informants and traditional informants because the FBI keeps most of this
information confidential, 47Link to the text of the note broad observations
can still be made. First, the FBI's preventative stance on terrorism has
significantly increased reliance on informants' intelligence. 48Link to
the text of the note After 9/11, the FBI drastically expanded the use of
[244] informants 49Link to the text of the note from around 1,500 in
1975 50Link to the text of the note to an estimated 15,000 today. 51Link
to the text of the note Informants have become the number one tool
for preventing terrorist acts. 52Link to the text of the note

Terror Adv Informants Key

Voluntary informants are key.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
[254] By virtue of their connections and daily interactions, those active in a
particular community are in the best position to notice when others
in the community act strangely. Unlike informants who may be new
to the community and who other members may view with suspicion,
well-established community members may already know what is
going on in their community and can more accurately spot genuine
threats.

Terror Adv Uniqueness FBI Fails Now

Current FBI surveillance targets muslim communities,
causing resentment of the FBI.
Shamas 13
Diala Shamas, Diala Shamas is a staff attorney at the Creating Law
Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) project, based out of
Main Street Legal Services at CUNY School of Law. 10-31-2013, "Wheres the
Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?," Nation,
http://www.thenation.com/article/wheres-outrage-when-fbi-targets-muslims/
our clients are targeted by FBI agents inquiring into the most
intimate and protected areas of their lives
stopped in
front of their neighbors or children
And the interrogations are far
from voluntary FBI agents regularly warn our clients who invoke
their right to have an attorney present that they can do this the
easy way or the hard way. One client was so frightened by the
agents threats that he agreed to accompany them to FBI
headquarters and let them strap him to what they claimed was a
polygraph machine for four hours as they peppered him with
questions
While the precise number of
these interviews is not available
we often ask for a show of hands in the room of people who
have themselves been
interrogated by law enforcement
The interrogations have a devastating chilling efect on
communities
After a visit by the FBI
un-joining groups and
deleting the news articles he had posted in the hope that would
spare him from a repeat
The interrogations are also deeply
stigmatizing
hethe majority are young Muslim men
is perceived by his peers as someone under investigation, and
from whom people want to keep their distance Our clients regularly
explain that they agreed to get into the FBI agents cars because
they did not want to let them into their homes and expose their
families
Ive had conversations with college students
weighing the pros and cons of taking up a leadership position in
their Muslim student group Instead of weighing their class workload
against their extracurricular commitments the balancing involved
exposure to further FBI questioning if they were to become more
active Muslims and whether their past experience being
questioned by the FBI would be bad for the organization
On a daily basis,

. They are approached at night at their homes,

, solicited outside their subway stops or interrogated at their workplaces in front of their colleagues and

customers. GET THE LATEST NEWS AND ANALYSIS DELIVERED TO YOUR INBOX EVERY MORNING. SIGN UP
.

, accused him of lying and then turned around and asked him to work for them as an informant.

, our experience suggests they are omnipresent. When CLEAR members facilitate Know-Your-Rights workshops at

mosques in New York City,

, or know others who have been,

. In many

mosques, every hand will go up.

. Being pressed about their religious and political affiliations or their community activities inevitably makes our clients hesitate before being active in their mosque or

community.

, one 20-year-old client scrubbed his Facebook account,

. It did not work.

: when an individual is approached for questioning,

, but also did not want their neighbors to see them.

, as other students may hesitate to join.

I cant tag cards to save my life. US counterterrorism

expansion into the Muslim-American community functions
under the assumption that those individuals and groups
are terrorists which creates a radicalization of the
community and an us v. them mindset
Williams 2012 (Suspicious Minds: The American Consciousness,
Domestic Security And The Radicalization Of Muslim-Americans, Ronald E.
Williams II, has over ten years of experience with the US Department of Justice (DoJ). His
current work at DoJ involves developing and administering technical assistance in order to
effectively partner with the department to combat terrorism, human trafficking, organized
crime, corruption and financial crimes. Williams other work includes investigating allegations
of racial discrimination, Guest Commentaries- Security Today, November 07, 2012

http://www.hstoday.us/columns/guest-commentaries/blog/suspicious-mindsthe-american-consciousness-domestic-security-and-the-radicalization-ofmuslim-americans/3ede05589b6d0296ab8dc8edb5c12ca9.html)
Immediately following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the
priorities, energies and resources of the FBI concentrated on the
proactive objective of preventing future terrorist incidents. In
pursuit of this new strategy, the FBI understood that the success of
this highly complex mission depended on cooperation from the
Muslim-American community specifically the need to understand
its culture, history, religion and language. These early cooperation
efforts were successful in part because many Muslims had sought to define
themselves as Americans. And like most Americans, they, too, play an
important role in ensuring domestic security, if by no other means than
providing pertinent information to include identifying questionable behavior
and activities. Taken at face value, these early partnerships developed into
successful examples of intelligence-led policing. But if one is to seriously
bisect this relationship, one would reasonably conclude that as
potential terrorist suspects and targets become numerous and
branches, and as deception operations become more sophisticated,
domestic security and counterterrorism eforts will expand, reaching
deep into the Muslim-American community, oftentimes crossing
sensitivity lines, as was evidenced by the New York City Police
Departments surveillance of the regions Muslim community. As a result of
this cultural infiltration, the Muslim-American community has
become, by and large, suspicious of government counterterrorism
programs. The Muslim-American community has justified its suspicions on
what it perceives to be American predispositions of both Islam in general, and
Muslims in particular. As the American mainstream consciousness overtly
claim that not all Muslims are violent, anti-American or prone to engage in
terrorism while subconsciously believing the opposite and privately
expressing such, the latter mindset will inevitably influence domestic
counterintelligence/counterterrorism prerogatives. In the most subtle
forms, these prerogatives will include identifying specific racial and
ethnic groups/individuals as the sources, financiers and

sympathizers of Islamic-oriented terrorism a de facto policy that will

never be officially sanctioned for it contradicts our own understanding of
race neutrality. Hence, the radicalization of our own racial, ethnic
and religious population will undoubtedly be the most complex
challenge for our domestic security. Note that theories abound
attempting to explain radicalization. Most popular among academics
is the notion that a disafected group perceives that the current
government structure is the cause of some kind of injustice against
them, and continues to nurture an environment of inequality (i.e.
political, social, economical). With no legitimate means through which to
seek redress, the group thus turns to more radical ways to demand justice
and equality, oftentimes turning to violent behavior or other forms of criminal
and subversive activity. While this formula may explain radicalization at the
theoretical level and in homogenous environments, it does not adequately
address the core elements of radicalization currently underway in the United
States. If one is to fully understand American radicalization, one must
critically recall the realities of American history. To be sure, any candid
discussion of counter-radicalization eforts involving homegrown
Islamic radicalism must first be predicated on the proposition that
racialization is an indivisible element of the American consciousness .
Racialization is to be defined as the process by which a racial or ethnic group
is understood through the prism of racial generalizations. It is distinct from
racism, which constitutes specific attitudes directed at a racial or ethnic
group based on hatred of one race on the premise of inferiority. From
racialization, the concept of Us versus Them matures, and the
cultural subordination of a subordinate group by the dominate group
is an accepted practice throughout the mainstream.

Muslim-American radicalization is shaped by the struggle

to define American and the communitys refusal to
assimilate which causes a split between the traditional
definition of the American and the Muslim-American
communities, i.e. the Us v. them mindset which
breeds resentment and radicalization
Williams 2012 (Suspicious Minds: The American Consciousness,
Domestic Security And The Radicalization Of Muslim-Americans, Ronald E.
Williams II, has over ten years of experience with the US Department of Justice (DoJ). His
current work at DoJ involves developing and administering technical assistance in order to
effectively partner with the department to combat terrorism, human trafficking, organized
crime, corruption and financial crimes. Williams other work includes investigating allegations
of racial discrimination, Guest Commentaries- Security Today, November 07, 2012

http://www.hstoday.us/columns/guest-commentaries/blog/suspicious-mindsthe-american-consciousness-domestic-security-and-the-radicalization-ofmuslim-americans/3ede05589b6d0296ab8dc8edb5c12ca9.html)
Racial and ethnic categorization is a default mindset of the American
psyche. It is deeply and skillfully woven into our national fabric, as is the

ardent defense of the principles of the First Amendment. To deny this strain
of our cultural DNA is to remain disadvantaged when pursuing any
real eforts to understand the undercurrents of Muslim-American
radicalization. Important to note is that the American public
consciousness has become hyper-sensitive to the discussion of race
and aloof to experiences from history. With each generation,
American perceptions on race and the racial order are refined,
resulting from the inherent push-pull relationship between the racial
majority (Us) and the racial minority (Them). As these perceptions
further root themselves into the American mainstream consciousness, the
management thereof is, in truth, dominated by the racial majority. Since
perceptions management is controlled by the racial majority, it stands to
reason that the terms afecting the political and cultural narrative are
too controlled by this majority. But in the face of bold demographic
shifts, greater racial and ethnic diversity (especially without any
desire to fully assimilate), and the real possibility of the racial
majority becoming the numerical minority, control of the narrative
becomes a strategic objective. Here, the starting point of the
narrative revolves around two ideas: 1) How is American defined;
and 2) What groups constitute Americans? Understand that these
are two distinctly separate and important concepts that form the
undercurrents of Muslim-American radicalization. During the early
years of the republic, the mainstream view was that America was to be a
place where distinct groups could retain their individual identity while
simultaneously assimilating and submitting to the idea that is America:
Acknowledging that the protection of the Constitution and the principles
enshrined therein is the only obligation of an American citizen. However, the
unique irony is that the American mainstream has always maintained a
working level of cultural ignorance of its ethnic minority groups, and
whereby the racial majority categorized and separated us from
them. Recognize that throughout most of American history, an
American was categorized as only those people of English origin,
or those who were Protestant, or white or hailed from northern
Europe. But at this juncture in our history, we must recognize that
the American mainstream is being pushed and pulled by a variety of
factors such as immigrant populations (in this country legally or
otherwise) who refuse to culturally assimilate and agitate ethnonationalist sentiment. This psycho-cultural conflict has forced the
American public consciousness into default mode. As mainstream
America continues to become suspicious of Muslim-Americans and
vice versa, the Us versus Them construct, based on existing racial
paradigms, will be categorized in two ways: 1) White/AfricanAmericans (Us) versus Muslim-Americans (Them); and 2) White
Americans (Us) versus African-Americans (Us) versus MuslimAmericans (Us). What is absolute of the Us versus Them
construct is that it results in alienation that breeds resentment
which, in turn, manifests into political radicalization.

Terror Adv Informants Key

FBI Surveillance of Muslim communities distrupts trust
making counter terror eforts impossible
Currier 15 ( Cora Currier is a journalist with a focus on national security, foreign
affairs, and human rights. As a reporting fellow at ProPublica, she covered national
security and finance, 1/21/15, SPIES AMONG US: HOW COMMUNITY OUTREACH
PROGRAMS TO MUSLIMS BLUR LINES BETWEEN OUTREACH AND INTELLIGENCE, The
Intercept, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/21/spies-among-us-communityoutreach-programs-muslims-blur-lines-outreach-intelligence/, 7/8/15, HDA)

Last May, after getting a ride to school with his dad, 18-year-old Abdullahi
Yusuf absconded to the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport to board a flight
to Turkey. There, FBI agents stopped Yusuf and later charged him
with conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist
organizationhe was allegedly associated with another Minnesota
man believed to have gone to fight for the Islamic State in Syria. To
keep other youth from following Yusufs path, U.S. Attorney Andrew
Luger recently said that the federal government would be launching
a new initiative to work with Islamic community groups and promote
after-school programs and job trainingto address the root causes
of extremist groups appeal. This is not about gathering
intelligence, its not about expanding surveillance or any of the
things that some people want to claim it is, Luger said. Lugers
comments spoke to the concerns of civil liberties advocates, who believe that
blurring the line between engagement and intelligence gathering could end
up with the monitoring of innocent individuals. If past programs in this area
are any guide, those concerns are well founded. Documents obtained by
attorneys at the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law, and shared with the Intercept, show that previous
community outreach eforts in Minnesotalaunched in 2009 in
response to the threat of young Americans joining the al-Qaedalinked militia al-Shabab, in Somaliawere, in fact, conceived to
gather intelligence. A grant proposal from the St. Paul Police Department to
the Justice Department, which the Brennan Center obtained through a
Freedom of Information Act request to the FBI, lays out a plan in which
Somali-speaking advocates would hold outreach meetings with community
groups and direct people toward the Police Athletic League and programs at
the YWCA. The proposal says that the team will also identify radicalized
individuals, gang members, and violent offenders who refuse to cooperate
with our efforts. Its startling how explicit it was You dont want to join the
Police Athletic League? You sound like you might join al-Shabab! said
Michael Price, an attorney with the Brennan Center. *** The Islamic State
may be the new face of religious extremism, but for a number of
years, law enforcement in St. Paul and Minneapolis have had to
contend with the appeal of al-Shabab to members of the countrys
largest Somali populationmore than 20 young men have reportedly
left Minnesota to fight with the group since 2007. Dennis Jensen, St.

Pauls former assistant police chief, had spent years studying

relations between police and the citys Somali community, which is
largely composed of recent immigrants from a war zone who have
little reason to trust the authorities. But the al-Shabab threat
galvanized the Department to see their work as a frontline for
counterterrorism. Jensen told the Center for Homeland Defense and
Security in 2009 that extremist recruitment added a greater sense of
urgency about what we are doing, he said. Were up front about what our
intentions are. Its not a secret were interested in radicalized individuals.
(Jensen did not respond to emailed questions from the Intercept.) Jensen
helped design a new program for St. Paula two-year initiative called the
African Immigrant Muslim Coordinated Outreach Program, which was funded
in 2009 with a $670,000 grant from the Justice Department. The outreach
push would help police identify gang members or extremists, using criteria
that will stand up to public and legal scrutiny, according to the proposal
submitted to the Justice Department. The effort of identifying the targets will
increase law enforcements ability to maintain up-to-date intelligence on
these offenders, alert team members to persons who are deserving of
additional investigative efforts and will serve as an enhanced intelligence
system, the proposal reads. The Center for Homeland Defense and Security,
in the 2009 interview with Jensen, characterized it as developing databases
to track at-risk youth who may warrant follow-up contact and investigation by
law enforcement. Asad Zaman, executive director of the Muslim American
Society of Minnesota, said that his organization got funding through the
program to hire a police liaison. They held meetings once or twice a month
for two years, usually involving 20 or so community members and a few local
cops. The officers talked about drug enforcement and gangs and recruitment
and domestic violence. Everyone loved it when they brought their bombsniffing robot once, he recalled. He said he was not told about an
intelligence component, though he had been asked to keep track of
attendees at outreach meetings. Several times [the police department]
asked me whether that was possible to turn over the list of people at the
programs, and I said, It aint gonna happen, Zaman said. Steve Linders, a
St. Paul Police spokesman, said that the intelligence aspect never came to
fruition. The program evolved away from that. He said that they would
sometimes pass information that community members brought to their
attention to the FBI, but that was the extent of the bureaus involvement.
Linders said that people were not required to sign in to outreach meetings
and there was no list of people who refused to participate, as originally
proposed. It was a conscious decision, not to follow the plan laid out in the
grant application, Linders said. We frankly got more out of the program
when we viewed it more as a way to get [community groups] resources and
get their trust and partnership, he said. For the Brennan Centers Price, the
shifting description just underlines how such programs can mislead the
public. Im glad to hear they appear to have had a change of heart, he said,
but it would be in everybodys interest to clarify at the outset that they are
collecting information for intelligence purposes, or that they are not. The

program still raises questions for me, Price added. What led them to at
first propose intelligence gathering, and then do an about face? *** Around
the same time that St. Paul developed its program, the FBI was leading a
parallel push to leverage community outreach for intelligence. In
2009, it launched Specialized Community Outreach Teams, which
would strategically expand outreach to the Somali community to
address counterterrorism-related issues in Minneapolis and
several other cities around the country. Then-FBI director Robert
Mueller described the teams as part of an efort to develop trust,
address concerns, and dispel myths about the FBI. In an internal
memo obtained by the Brennan Center, however, the teams were
called a paradigm shift, allowing FBI outreach to support
operational programs. The co-mingling of intelligence and outreach
missions would appear to run afoul of the FBIs own guidelines for
community engagement, the 2013 version of which state that
officers must maintain appropriate separation of operational and
outreach eforts. The FBI would not say if the Specialized
Community Outreach Teams (which have ended) would be allowed
under the new guidance, though in a statement, the FBI said the
guidance does not restrict coordination with operational divisions
to obtain a better understanding of the various violations (i.e.
terrorism, drugs, human trafficking, white collar crime, etc.) which may be
impacting communities. If the guidance would allow this program
to continue, then it just confirms that its full of loopholes, said Price,
of the Brennan Center . This isnt the first FBI outreach program to
raise these concerns. The American Civil Liberties Union has
documented cases in recent years in San Francisco and San Jose
where federal agents visited mosques and attended Ramadan
dinners in the name of outreach, all the while keeping records on
the participants . Some of the programs were well-meaning attempts
at educating Islamic leaders about the threat of hate crimes, but
nonetheless ended up collecting private information , according to
Mike German, a former FBI agent who worked on this issue for the ACLU (he is
now also with the Brennan Center). In other cases, FBI agents were going
out with outreach officers or mimicking community outreach to
exploit it for intelligence purposes , he said. Lori Saroya, until recently
executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations Minnesota,
said that people werent always aware of their rights when faced with
outreach visits. We had cases of people inviting FBI agents in for tea or to
have dinner, not knowing they didnt have to let them in, she said. Its this
precedent that gives pause to critics of a new White House initiative to
counter violent extremism. Though it is ostensibly aimed at extremists of
all stripes, the outreach push has largely framed the involvement of Islamic

community groups as key to helping authorities disrupt homegrown

terrorists, and to apprehend would-be violent extremists, in Attorney General
Eric Holders words. Lugers plan for the Minneapolis area is part of this
initiative, run jointly between the Justice Department, National
Counterterrorism Center, and the Department of Homeland Security. Los
Angeles and Boston are the other pilot cities. Details about the undertaking
are still vague, though the attacks in Paris this month refocused attention on
the issue, and the White House abruptly scheduled a summit on the topic for
February (it was postponed last fall, without explanation.) German is doubtful
about the prospects. Countering violent extremism is a relatively young
science, and he points to studies that have failed to identify predictable
indicators of what makes someone decide to commit ideologically motivated
violence. Pumping resources into underserved communities is great, says
German, but some of these programs may end up just alienating the
communities they are intended to work with. It suggests that the entire
community is a threat, or a potential threat, and something to be
managed, he said.

Target Surveillance of Muslim groups strains trust with

authorities makes counter terror impossible
Patel and Price 12 (Faiza Patel is Co-Director of the Liberty and National
Security Programme at the Brennan Centre for Justice. She is also a member of the
United Nations Human Rights Council's Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries.
Michael Price is Counsel of the Liberty and National Security Programme at the
Brennan Centre for Justice. He was the National Security Coordinator for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 4/12/12, Aljazeera, Surveillance of
American Muslims: A tale of three cities,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/201241061612704789.html,
7/8/15, HDA)

The flood of reports about the New York City Police Department's
surveillance of American Muslims - in mosques, restaurants, bookstores
and even elementary schools in New York, New Jersey, New Orleans and
beyond - has triggered a range of responses around the country.
Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Ray Kelly have defended
the programme, suggesting that such wholesale surveillance of Muslims is
necessary to keep the City safe. The NYPD certainly has a formidable task
and has protected New Yorkers through times of high alert. But the
reactions of public officials in cities such as Los Angeles and
Chicago, which have also faced serious terrorist threats, suggest
that efective counterterrorism does not require such a stark choice
between our liberty and our safety . Honest efforts to build partnerships
with American Muslim communities present an alternative approach to
terrorism that has proven to be both successful and respectful of our
Constitutional values. New York City is understandably sensitive to terrorism

concerns. As both Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly have repeatedly

acknowledged, keeping New York safe requires the police to build trust with
American Muslim communities who may be best positioned to provide
information necessary to avert a terrorist plot. Indeed, studies show that
up to 40 per cent of the tips that have been used to stop terrorists
have come from American Muslims. But the NYPD's decision to
monitor Muslim communities solely on the basis of their religion is
not conducive to building relationships of trust . The fraying of the
fragile relationship between the police and Muslim New Yorkers has
been vividly on display since reports of these programmes first
emerged, with several Muslim leaders boycotting the Mayor's
annual interfaith breakfast, declining meetings with the Police
Commissioner and staging repeated protests outside City Hall .
These connections are vital not only to counterterrorism eforts, but
also to ensure that Muslim communities feel comfortable enough
communicating with local police to help solve everyday crimes.
Decades of research show that perceptions of police legitimacy
influence the willingness of communities to co-operate with officers.
The FBI, which has faced its own challenges with respect to its treatment of
Muslim communities, has publicly criticised the NYPD's approach because it
has strained relations with American Muslims who have generally "embraced"
law enforcement's counterterrorism mission. NYPD's approach Public officials
in other cities have rushed to distance themselves from the NYPD's approach.
In Chicago, Mayor Rahm Emanuel said the city would never permit its officers
to spy on Muslim communities as the NYPD has done, promising: "We don't
do that in Chicago and we're not going to do that". As reports emerged that
the NYPD had spied on Muslim neighbourhoods in Newark, New Jersey, the
Chicago Police Department, now run by the former head of the Newark Police
Department, quickly issued an order prohibiting "bias based policing". In Los
Angeles, the Deputy Chief of the Police Department, Michael Downing,
stressed that his department considered the Muslim community a key partner
in fighting terrorism. In his view: "There is no reason for us to survey Muslim
students or where people buy their meat; that is not suspicious to us. That is
how someone lives their life." Indeed, in 2007, the LAPD considered and
rejected a New York-style plan to "map" Muslim communities because of
concerted opposition from both Muslim and civil rights groups. But the
difference between these police departments is not just one of attitude
towards American Muslim communities. Los Angeles and Chicago conduct
their counterterrorism work primarily in partnership with the FBI. The NYPD,
however, houses a stand-alone counterterrorism and intelligence operation
that costs taxpayers more than $100 million a year and employs 1,000
officers. But unlike the FBI, which is overseen by an Inspector General
reporting to Congress, the NYPD's intelligence operation is conducted
without any meaningful oversight. If the NYPD insists on modelling
itself as a mini-FBI, then it should be subject to the same level of

oversight - an independent Inspector General. New Yorkers are grateful

to the NYPD for its work in protecting the city. However, our nation's historical
commitment to civil liberties and religious tolerance must not be brushed
aside by talismanic claims of national security. An Inspector General could
bring greater transparency to the murky world of intelligence gathering,
serving as an honest broker to determine whether NYPD programmes comply
with the law. By developing and sharing credible information that would allow
both our elected leaders and New Yorkers to better evaluate police
programmes, the Inspector General could help break the current cycle of
accusations and denials. And such transparency would help restore the badly
battered trust between the NYPD and minority communities and lead to a
stronger, more effective police force. Let us not forget that all Americans Muslims, Jews, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus and atheists alike - are
committed to the security of our country and our country will be safest when
we all work together towards this goal.

A report that the U.S. government conducted electronic surveillance

on five prominent Muslim Americans is troubling. It deserves a fuller
response from the government than a boilerplate assurance that it
doesn't choose targets of surveillance based on their political or
religious views. The notion that the FBI would target innocent
individuals because of their views isn't fantastic in light of the
agency's past activities. Relying on a spreadsheet supplied by former
National Security Agency contract worker Edward Snowden, the online news
site Intercept reported that, between 2006 and 2008, the government
tracked the email accounts of Faisal Gill, who had served in the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, and four other men, including Nihad
Awad, executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, this
country's largest Muslim civil rights organization. The article suggested
that the men might have been targeted for surveillance because of
their religion or peaceful advocacy, although no evidence of that was
given. It noted that all of the men deny involvement in terrorism.
None has been charged with a crime arising from the surveillance. The
article also quotes a former FBI counter-terrorism official as spinning
outlandish theories about Muslim Brotherhood infiltration of the
United States, and it refers to a directive for intelligence personnel
that used "Mohammed Raghead" as the name of a hypothetical
surveillance target. It isn't clear whether any or all of the men were
subjected to surveillance under the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. That 1978 law requires the government to demonstrate to a
special court that there is probable cause that an American citizen or

permanent resident is an agent of a foreign power or terrorist organization.

(It's possible that there can be probable cause to subject someone to
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes without there being probable
cause to charge him with a crime.) The notion that the FBI would target
innocent individuals because of their views isn't fantastic in light of the
agency's past activities, and profiling of Muslims was an unfortunate aspect
of the official reaction to 9/11. That doesn't mean that the past is prologue in
this case and that these five men were the victims of religious bias, but the
suspicion is understandable. The American Civil Liberties Union and several
other organizations have called on President Obama to make a "full public
accounting" of the government's surveillance practices. It's unrealistic to
expect the administration to publicize classified information in specific cases,
but the FBI's inspector general should inquire into the circumstances of these
investigations and any broader role that religious stereotyping might be
playing in the selection of targets for surveillance.

FBI targeted Surveillance of Muslims alienates Muslim

communities who are key for counter-terrorism eforts
CAIR 12 (The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is a grassroots civil
rights and advocacy group and CAIR America's largest Muslim civil liberties
organization, with regional offices nationwide, 10/1/12, FBI COUNTER TERRORISM
MEASURES CREATING MISTRUST IN AMERICAN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES, CAIR Chicago,
http://www.cairchicago.org/blog/2012/10/fbi-counter-terrorism-measures-creatingmistrust-in-american-muslim-communities, 7/8/15, HDA)

Since the September 11th, 2001 attacks, the FBI has placed an
emphasis on preventing further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. To do
so, they have focused their energy on preemptive measures, seeking
to discover terrorists before their dreams of destruction can be
realized. However, this efort has not been without controversy, as
many of the terrorists claim foul play and entrapment. These
accusations refer to the FBIs strategy of placing informants within specific
communities, in particular the American Muslim community, and having them
seek out radical elements for further assessment. Recently, the FBI
appears to have conducted blanket surveillance of broad sections of
the American Muslim community, leading to a number of foiled
terrorist plots. However, a closer look into some of these foiled
terrorist attempts reveals that the planning, materials, funding, and
even transportation for these attacks have almost all been provided
to these disgruntled young men by the FBI themselves . This raises a
very serious question: Would these young men still pose a terrorist
threat to the U.S. had the FBI not engaged them, and even provided
them with all the resources necessary to commit these acts of
violence? Though the legal definition of entrapment makes it hard to clearly
define these cases as such, the methods used by the FBI in recent years

create an impression of racial profiling on a scale reminiscent of the

oppression of Japanese Americans during the Second World War. Apparently,
the FBI feels that American Muslims are guilty by association until
proven innocent through extensive, and extremely intrusive,
surveillance campaigns. In an article published by The Guardian (UK), Paul
Harris interviewed former FBI informant Craig Monteilh, who gave an
inside account of the FBIs domestic counter terrorism eforts.
Monteilh, having been an integral part of the hunt for Muslim terrorists,
characterized the methods used by the FBI as a joke, a real joke.
There is no real hunt. Its fixed. Monteilh began working for the FBI as a
confidential informant in 2006, participating in an operation referred to as
Flex, where he posed as a Syrian by the name of Farouk Aziz. By this alias,
Monteilh was ordered to spend time in Orange County, California,
mosques and Islamic centers until the Muslim community there became
comfortable enough to accept him as a fellow member. From there he was
tasked with recording any and all conversations he had with
members of the community, subtly suggesting radical ideas to those
he talked to in hopes of luring out more extreme members. According
to Monteilh, the aim of his investigation was to record members saying
specific words or phrases that could justify further investigations. The skill is
that Im going to get you to say something. I am cornering you to say jihad.
But thats not all Monteilh was tasked with doing. He even reports of being
told to use private information about members of the Islamic
community, such as individuals being homosexual or having an affair, as
blackmail in order to recruit more informants. In one case he was even
told to have sex with women of the community in order to get closer to them.
And despite his best efforts to corner members into saying the right
words, or using their religious stigmas towards sexuality against them,
Monteilh was unsuccessful in producing any material initiating a
serious terrorist investigation. In fact, one of the communities that he
was attempting to infiltrate got a restraining order against him and even
reported him to the FBI, unaware that he was actually working for them.
Surely, however, this is an isolated incident of misconductthis couldnt
happen in a nation that respects the constitutionally protected civil liberties
of ALL its citizens. I wish I could say that was the truth. According to an
article written for The New York Times, of the 22 most frightening
foiled terrorist plots since the September 11th, 2001 attacks, 14
have been the products of operations very similar to that described
by Monteilh. In 2009, four men were arrested in Newburgh, New Jersey, for planning to
bomb Jewish synagogues and shoot down military aircraft with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.
Referred to as the Newburgh Four, and portrayed as hardcore Islamic extremists, these men
were all convicted and sentenced to lengthy jail terms. But after reviewing the case, it is hard
not to notice that the profiles of these four men didnt fit those of hardened terrorist
masterminds. Rather, their lives were characterized by drug and financial problems, criminal
histories (for petty crimes), and in one case schizophrenia. Furthermore, the fifth man involved
in this plot, the one who provided the plans, weapons, transportation, and an offer of
$250,000, a free car and vacation to the others, was none other than a well-paid FBI informant.
This case has raised serious doubt as to whether these four men would have posed any sort of
threat had they not been approached by an FBI agent who offered to pay large sums of money

for their cooperation. Considering that one of the four, David Williams, was having trouble
raising the money to pay for a much needed liver transplant for his sick brother, these men
look more like paid thugs than terrorist masterminds. Susanne Brody, an attorney representing
one of the four, claimed that We have as close to a legal entrapment case as I have ever
seen. Unfortunately, the list of cases nearly identical to these goes on, from the Liberty City
Six, whose plans never surpassed the discussion stage, to the Fort Dix Five, where one FBI
informants past included attempted murder and another admitted in court that two of the
men convicted were never aware of any terrorist plot (both were sentenced to life in prison).
According to Mike German, a former FBI agent now working for the ACLU, Most of these
terrorist suspects had no access to weapons unless the government provided them. I would
say that showed they were not the biggest threat to the U.S. According to German, the FBI
has been expanding its tools for carrying out such investigations, something he considers a
terrible prospect. But are the tools used in these cases legitimate, even by the FBIs own
standards? According to the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG FBI, 2008),
these tactics are questionable at best. Section four of the DIOG, entitled [O]n Privacy and Civil
Liberties, and Least Intrusive Methods, it states that each investigation must have a clearly
defined and approved purpose and that this purpose is prohibited from being based solely on
race, ethnicity, national origin or religion. Whats more telling is, in section 4.2 B, on the
exercise of religion, the DIOG states that, solely because prior subjects of an investigation of
a particular group were members of a certain religion and they claimed a religious motivation
for their acts of crime or terrorism, other members mere affiliation with that religion, by itself,
is not a basis to assess or investigate absent a known and direct connection to the threat
under assessment or investigation. However, the blanket surveillance of Muslim communities
in California described by Monteilh, and the recently uncovered case of NYPD eavesdropping
on the entire New York Muslim community, seem to clearly violate these regulations. It has
recently become ever clearer that many of these investigations have been initiated solely
because these communities happen to be Muslim, with no prior evidence of suspicious
behavior whatsoever. Assistant Chief Thomas Galati, head of NYPDs secret Demographics Unit
charged with this task, admitted that after nearly six years of monitoring the Muslim
community in New York they were unable to come up with a single investigation. But it doesnt
stop there. The DIOG (Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide) places a heavy emphasis
on the protection of First Amendment rights, stating that no investigations can be initiated
based solely in response to ones expression of these rights, or solely to monitor their
expression of them. Of course, however, freedom of speech in the United States does not
protect all language. The DIOG refers to a U.S. Supreme Court ruling, Brandenburg v. Ohio
(1969), where the court ruled that the government may not prohibit the advocacy of force or
violence except when such activity is intended to provoke imminent (emphasis added by DIOG)
lawless activity, and is likely to do so. However, according to the testimony given by Monteilh,
using the word jihad (which has two meanings, the main meaning having nothing to do with
holy war) was enough to initiate an investigation. But simply using the word jihad does not
provoke imminent lawless behavior; therefore, being protected under the First Amendment
rights that the FBI is prohibited from using as their sole justification for initiating an
investigation. The blanket recording of conversations with members of the Muslim community,
all of whom had said absolutely nothing to provoke imminent lawless behavior, is a clear
violation of both DIOG regulations and the Brandenburg (1969) ruling. Lastly, the DIOG also
mandates the use of the least intrusive methods possible for conducting intelligence gathering
operations and lists the use of wiretaps, electronic surveillance, and informants as very
intrusive. The fact that the FBI has chosen to use such methods, especially on populations
and individuals that have presented no prior evidence of wrongdoing, suggests that this
regulation means little to the Bureau. Though the FBI has played a significant role in keeping
America safe from further terrorist attacks, it also seems clear that some of their efforts have
been severely misguided, even jeopardizing their ability to do the best job possible. The fact
that Monteilh was reported to the FBI by the very community he was trying to infiltrate,
suggests that these investigations are an unwarranted waste of valuable resources; and one of
the most valuable resources in the counter terrorism efforts of the FBI, according to the DIOG,
is the trust and confidence of the American public. Ironically, the very next statement in the
DIOG is, and because that trust and confidence can be significantly shaken by our failure to

respect the limits of our power, special care must be taken by all employees to comply with
these limitations. However, many experts agree that the FBIs recent conduct regarding such
cases has created an atmosphere of distrust within the American Muslim community .

According to civil rights groups, American Muslims feel as if they are

being unjustly targeted by the authorities for investigations simply
because of their faith, triggering a natural fear of the authorities
among people that should be a vital defense against real terror
attacks. Instead of alienating the Muslim population, whose
cooperation is essential to counter terrorism eforts, the FBI should
push itself to comply with their own procedures and legal precedent
established by the nations highest court, and focus their energy on
investigating proven threats to society. This would help to rebuild
the trust of the American Muslim community, as well as put pressure
on the individuals that actually intend to do harm .

Government Islamophobia and Surveillance harm crucial

counterterrorism relations
Al-Marayati 11 (Salam Al-Marayati is executive director of the Muslim
Public Affairs Council, an American institution which informs and shapes
public opinion and policy by serving as a trusted resource to decision makers
in government, media and policy institutions, 10/19/12, Las Angeles Times,
The wrong way to fight terrorism,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/19/opinion/la-oe-almarayati-fbi20111019, 7/8/15, HDA)
We in the Muslim American community have been battling the corrupt and
bankrupt ideas of cults such as Al Qaeda. Now it seems we also have to battle
pseudo-experts in the FBI and the Department of Justice. A disturbing
string of training material used by the FBI and a U.S. attorney's
office came to light beginning in late July that reveals a deep antiMuslim sentiment within the U.S. government. If this matter is not
immediately addressed, it will undermine the relationship between
law enforcement and the Muslim American community another
example of the ineptitude and/or apathy undermining bridges built
with care over decades. It is not enough to just call it a "very valid
concern," as FBI Director Robert Mueller told a congressional committee this
month. The training material in question provided to FBI agents at
the academy in Quantico, Va. as first reported by Wired
magazine's Danger Room blog contained bigoted and
inflammatory views on Muslims, including claims that "devout"
Muslims are more prone toward violence, that Islam aims to
"transform a country's culture into 7th century Arabian ways," that

Islamic charitable giving is a "funding mechanism for combat" and that the
prophet Muhammad was a "violent cult leader." Wired also found a 2010
presentation by an analyst working for the U.S. attorney's office in
Pennsylvania that warns of a " 'Civilizational Jihad' stretching back from the
dawn of Islam and waged today in the U.S. by 'civilians, juries, lawyers,
media, academia and charities' who threaten 'our values.' The goal of that
war: 'Replacement of American Judeo-Christian and Western liberal social,
political and religious foundations by Islam.'" Such baseless and
inflammatory claims shall best be left to those few who share Al
Qaeda's agenda of keeping America in a perpetual state of war with
Islam. In other words, the rhetoric of Al Qaeda and these law
enforcement trainers are opposite sides of the same coin of hate. If
our law enforcement and intelligence agencies continue to use
incorrect and divisive training literature, the crucial partnership
between the Muslim American community and law enforcement will
slowly disintegrate . According to the Muslim Public Afairs Council's
Post-9/11 Terrorism Incident Database, these partnerships have
proved efective in keeping our nation safe. Nearly 40% of Al Qaedarelated plots threatening the American homeland since 9/11 have
been foiled thanks to tips from Muslims . One example of this is the socalled Virginia 5 case in 2009, in which information from the Muslim
community in Virginia led to the arrest in Pakistan of five Muslims from
Virginia who were trying to join an Al Qaeda group. Last year, in another case,
members of a Maryland community warned law enforcement about Antonio
Martinez, who had recently converted to Islam. He was subsequently arrested
after he allegedly tried to blow up a military recruitment center. More
important, Muslim leaders, not FBI agents, can more efectively battle
Al Qaeda's destructive ideas. I have worked for more than 20 years with
law enforcement and Muslim American communities, and one of the
biggest consequences of these training sessions and use of this
material is the setback of a vital relationship that required years to
build. I know justifiable criticism can be levied against some Muslim leaders
in America for not aggressively promoting civic engagement, for not being
self-critical enough and for not distancing themselves from rabble-rousers.
But how can we persuade Muslim American communities to stay at
the table when the food on the table is filled with poison? These
training manuals are making it more difficult for Muslim Americans
to foster any trust with law enforcement agencies . Biased and faulty
training leads to biased and faulty policing. The real challenge now is
getting the partnership back on track, and for the FBI and the
Justice Department to take the following steps: issue a clear and
unequivocal apology to the Muslim American community; establish a
thorough and transparent vetting process in selecting its trainers

and materials; invite experts who have no animosity toward any

religion to conduct training about any religious community to law
enforcement. Finally, the White House needs to form an interagency task
force that can conduct an independent review of FBI and Justice Department
training material. The following words are etched into the walls of the FBI
headquarters building in Washington: "The most effective weapon against
crime is cooperation of all law enforcement agencies with the support and
understanding of the American people." Atty. Gen. Eric H. Holder Jr. and FBI
Director Mueller, take some leadership on this matter, or the partnership
we've built to counter violent extremism will forever be handicapped. The
question you have to answer is simple: Are we on the same team or not?

FBI sting operations have destroyed relations with

Muslims communities- only stopping this targeting with
build trust to help counter-terrorism efort
HRW 14 (The Human Rights Watch is a nonprofit, nongovernmental human
rights organization made up of roughly 400 staff members around the globe.
Its staff consists of human rights professionals including country experts,
lawyers, journalists, and academics of diverse backgrounds and nationalities.
Established in 1978, Human Rights Watch is known for its accurate factfinding, impartial reporting, effective use of media, and targeted advocacy,
often in partnership with local human rights groups, 7/21/14, HRW, US:
Terrorism Prosecutions Often An Illusion,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/21/us-terrorism-prosecutions-oftenillusion, 7/8/15, HDA)
The US Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) have targeted American Muslims in abusive counterterrorism
sting operations based on religious and ethnic identity , Human
Rights Watch and Columbia Law Schools Human Rights Institute
said in a report released today. Many of the more than 500
terrorism-related cases prosecuted in US federal courts since
September 11, 2001, have alienated the very communities that can
help prevent terrorist crimes. The 214-page report , Illusion of Justice:
Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions, examines 27 federal
terrorism cases from initiation of the investigations to sentencing
and post-conviction conditions of confinement. It documents the
significant human cost of certain counterterrorism practices, such as
overly aggressive sting operations and unnecessarily restrictive
conditions of confinement . Americans have been told that their
government is keeping them safe by preventing and prosecuting terrorism
inside the US, said Andrea Prasow, deputy Washington director at Human
Rights Watch and one of the authors of the report. But take a closer look and
you realize that many of these people would never have committed a crime if

not for law enforcement encouraging, pressuring, and sometimes paying

them to commit terrorist acts. Many prosecutions have properly targeted
individuals engaged in planning or financing terror attacks, the groups found.
But many others have targeted people who do not appear to have been
involved in terrorist plotting or financing at the time the government began to
investigate them. And many of the cases involve due process
violations and abusive conditions of confinement that have resulted
in excessively long prison sentences . The report is based on more than
215 interviews with people charged with or convicted of terrorism-related
crimes, members of their families and their communities, criminal defense
attorneys, judges, current and former federal prosecutors, government
officials, academics, and other experts. In some cases the FBI may have
created terrorists out of law-abiding individuals by suggesting the
idea of taking terrorist action or encouraging the target to act.
Multiple studies have found that nearly 50 percent of the federal
counterterrorism convictions since September 11, 2001, resulted
from informant-based cases . Almost 30 percent were sting
operations in which the informant played an active role in the
underlying plot . In the case of the Newburgh Four, for example, who
were accused of planning to blow up synagogues and attack a US military
base, a judge said the government came up with the crime, provided the
means, and removed all relevant obstacles, and had, in the process, made a
terrorist out of a man whose buffoonery is positively Shakespearean in
scope. The FBI often targeted particularly vulnerable people, including those
with intellectual and mental disabilities and the indigent. The government,
often acting through informants, then actively developed the plot, persuading
and sometimes pressuring the targets to participate, and provided the
resources to carry it out. The US government should stop treating American
Muslims as terrorists-in-waiting, Prasow said. The bar on entrapment in US
law is so high that its almost impossible for a terrorism suspect to prove. Add
that to law enforcement preying on the particularly vulnerable, such as those
with mental or intellectual disabilities, and the very poor, and you have a
recipe for rampant human rights abuses. Rezwan Ferdaus, for example, pled
guilty to attempting to blow up a federal building and was sentenced to 17
years in prison. Although an FBI agent even told Ferdaus father that his son
obviously had mental health problems, the FBI targeted him for a sting
operation, sending an informant into Ferdaus mosque. Together, the FBI
informant and Ferdaus devised a plan to attack the Pentagon and US Capitol,
with the FBI providing fake weaponry and funding Ferdaus travel. Yet Ferdaus
was mentally and physically deteriorating as the fake plot unfolded, suffering
depression and seizures so bad his father quit his job to care for him. The US
has also made overly broad use of material support charges, punishing
behavior that did not demonstrate an intent to support terrorism. The courts
have accepted prosecutorial tactics that may violate fair trial rights, such as
introducing evidence obtained by coercion, classified evidence that cannot be
fairly contested, and inflammatory evidence about terrorism in which

defendants played no part and asserting government secrecy claims to limit

challenges to surveillance warrants. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali is a US citizen who
alleged that he was whipped and threatened with amputation while detained
without charge in Saudi Arabia after a roundup following the 2003 bombings
of Western compounds in the Saudi capital of Riyadh until he provided a
confession to Saudi interrogators that he says was false. Later, when Ali went
to trial in Virginia, the judge rejected Alis claims of torture and admitted his
confession into evidence. He was convicted of conspiracy, providing material
support to terrorists, and conspiracy to assassinate the president. He
received a life sentence, which he is serving in solitary confinement at the
federal supermax prison in Florence, Colorado. The US has in terrorism cases
used harsh and at times abusive conditions of confinement, which often
appear excessive in relation to the security risk posed. This includes
prolonged solitary confinement and severe restrictions on communicating in
pretrial detention, possibly impeding defendants ability to assist in their own
defense and contributing to their decisions to plead guilty. Judges have
imposed excessively lengthy sentences, and some prisoners suffer draconian
conditions post-conviction, including prolonged solitary confinement and
severe restrictions on contact with families or others, sometimes without
explanation or recourse. Nine months after his arrest on charges of material
support for terrorism and while he was refusing a plea deal, Uzair Paracha
was moved to a harsh regime of solitary confinement. Special Administrative
Measures (SAMs) national security restrictions on his contact with others
permitted Paracha to speak only to prison guards. You could spend days to
weeks without uttering anything significant beyond Please cut my lights,
Can I get a legal call/toilet paper/a razor, etc., or just thanking them for
shutting our light, he wrote to the reports researchers. After he was
convicted, the SAMs were modified to permit him to communicate with other
inmates. I faced the harshest part of the SAMs while I was innocent in the
eyes of American law, he wrote. These abuses have had an adverse impact
on American Muslim communities. The governments tactics to seek out
terrorism suspects, at times before the target has demonstrated
any intention to use violence, has undercut parallel eforts to build
relationships with American Muslim community leaders and groups
that may be critical sources of information to prevent terrorist
attacks. In some communities, these practices have deterred
interaction with law enforcement. Some Muslim community
members said that fears of government surveillance and informant
infiltration have meant they must watch what they say, to whom,
and how often they attend services. Far from protecting
Americans, including American Muslims, from the threat of
terrorism, the policies documented in this report have diverted law
enforcement from pursuing real threats, Prasow said. It is possible
to protect peoples rights and also prosecute terrorists, which
increases the chances of catching genuine criminals.

Terror Adv Radicalization Link

NSA and FBI surveillance specifically targeted ArabAmerican communities. Further discriminatory
surveillance risks key co-op, possible radicalization.
Risen 14
(Internally quoting Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow on foreign policy at the Brookings
Institution. Tom Risen is a reporter for U.S. News & World Report. Racial Profiling Reported in
NSA, FBI Surveillance - U.S. News & World Report - July 9, 2014 http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/09/racial-profiling-reported-in-nsa-fbisurveillance)

Congregants pray at a mosque in Paterson, New Jersey. The NSA and FBI
reportedly spied on prominent Muslim Americans following the 9/11 attacks,
according to a leaked government document. The National Security Agency
and the FBI have reportedly been overzealous trying to prevent
terrorist attacks to the point that anti-Islamic racism in those
agencies led to the surveillance of prominent Muslim-Americans,
revealing a culture of racial profiling and broad latitude for spying
on U.S. citizens. An NSA document leaked by former agency contractor
Edward Snowden to reporter Glenn Greenwald shows 202 Americans targeted
among the approximately 7,485 email addresses monitored between 2002
and 2008, Greenwalds news service The Intercept reports. [READ: Glenn
Greenwald Suggests There's a Second NSA Leaker] To monitor Americans,
government agencies must first make the case to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court that there is probable cause that the targets are terrorist
agents, foreign spies or are or may be abetting sabotage, espionage or
terrorism. Despite this filter The Intercept identified five Muslim-Americans
with high public profile including civil rights leaders, academics, lawyers and
a political candidate. NSA Spied On U.S. Muslims Like Hoover Did On MLK
Daily Caller Racial profiling of Muslims by security officers has been a
controversy since the terrorist attacks of 2001 spiked fears about alQaida trainees preparing more attacks . The New York Police Department
has disbanded its unit that mapped New Yorks Muslim communities that
designated surveillance of mosques as terrorism enterprise investigations
after pressure from the Justice Department about aggressive monitoring by
police. A 2005 FBI memo about surveillance procedures featured in
The Intercept story uses a fake name Mohammed Raghead for the
agency staf exercise . This latest report about email surveillance of
successful Muslim-Americans is akin to McCarthyism that fed paranoia
about communist spies during the Cold War, says Reza Aslan, a professor at
the University of California, Riverside. The notion that these five upstanding
American citizens, all of them prominent public individuals, represent a threat
to the U.S. for no other reason than their religion is an embarrassment to the

FBI and an affront to the constitution, Aslan says. There is a risk of

radicalization among citizens Americans, evidenced by some who have gone
to fight jihads in Syria and Somalia, but mass shootings carried out by U.S.
citizens of various racial backgrounds occurs much more often, says Vanda
Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow on foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.
Since 1982, there have been at least 70 mass shootings across the U.S. We
have seen very little domestic terrorism in the U.S. , Felbab-Brown
says. This lack of terrorism is due in part to the willingness of the
Islamic community to cooperate with law enforcement to identify
possible radical threats, out of gratitude that the U.S. is a stable, secure
country compared with the Middle East, she says. [ALSO: Privacy Watchdog
Says NSA Spying Legal, Effective] That could go sour if law
enforcement becomes too aggressive, too extreme, she says.

Terror Adv Yes Nuclear Terror

Threat exists, and terrorists have the capability and
motivation
Brill et al 15(Kenneth C. Brill is a former U.S. ambassador to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the founding director of the
U.S. governments National Counterproliferation Center. John H. Bernhard is a
former Danish ambassador to the IAEA and the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe and a former legal adviser in the Danish Foreign
Ministry. They are members of the Nuclear Security Governance Experts
Group, A Convention on Nuclear Security: A Needed Step Against Nuclear
Terrorism, 6/1/15, https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_06/Features/AConvention-on-Nuclear-Security-A-Needed-Step-Against-Nuclear-Terrorism
7/8/15)
Some wonder whether the threat of nuclear terrorism exists outside of
novels and Hollywood action films. The administrations of President George
W. Bush and Obama have made clear the threat is real. Other global
leaders, including those from the other 52 countries that have
participated in the nuclear security summits, have done the same.
Successive U.S. directors of national intelligence have outlined the
reality of the threat in testimony to Congress and in their national
intelligence strategies. Yukiya Amano, the director-general of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and his immediate
predecessor, Mohamed ElBaradei, have described nuclear terrorism as
a threat that needs urgent attention. A nuclear terrorist attack,
particularly one involving fissionable materials, would produce
devastating international political, economic, humanitarian, and
environmental consequences. Expert studies have concluded that even a
small nuclear explosion in a major city would immediately kill tens of
thousands of people and cause even more deaths subsequently. The
explosion would destroy infrastructure over a wide area, and radiation
would make a larger area unusable for many years. The costs of attending
to the human casualties, relocating large numbers of people, and undertaking
new construction and the cleanup of land and buildings, combined with the
costs arising from bankruptcies, trade dislocations, and the disruption
of energy and other supplies, would most likely be in the trillions of
dollars.[2] Terrorists also could make a device from radiological substances,
which are used globally for medical, research, and industrial purposes. A
radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb, would produce fewer
casualties, but could result in significant consequences and costs for health,
infrastructure, and the environment. Such a device also could make many
blocks in an urban area too contaminated for humans to work or live in
without time-consuming remediation. This would be very expensive and very
disruptive to peoples lives, the environment, and the economy. Terrorist
use of any type of nuclear device would cross an important
psychological threshold for the public, governments and terrorist groups

themselves, taking questions of national and international security into

uncharted waters. At least five terrorist groups, including al Qaeda
and the Islamic State, have demonstrated an interest in acquiring
and using nuclear material or a nuclear weapon. Terrorists do not need
to steal a nuclear weapon. An improvised nuclear device, which would
have the explosive power comparable to the weapons used in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, can be made from highly enriched uranium or plutonium
being used for civilian purposes. The Islamic State indicated its interest in
nuclear terrorism with a boast about constructing a dirty bomb after stealing
88 pounds of unenriched uranium compounds from a university laboratory
when it overran Mosul, Iraq, in 2014.[3] The continued loss, theft, and
illegal movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials
demonstrate that material is available for terrorists to acquire and
use as a weapon. Since 1993, the IAEA has logged some 2,500 cases
related to the theft, loss of control, unauthorized possession, or illicit
trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material.[4] The insecurity of
nuclear and other radioactive material continues, with some 150 cases of
theft, loss of control, or illicit trafficking reported annually. At least 18 cases of
confirmed thefts or loss of weapons-usable nuclear material have occurred,
the latest in 2011. The growing global demand for nuclear energy for
power production and industrial, medical, and research uses means there
will be an increasing amount of nuclear material in a growing
number of countries that needs to be secured in the future. The impact
of a terrorist nuclear explosion would be felt far beyond the city and country
where it occurred. The entire global community would be affected,
particularly those least able to afford it. In a 2005 speech, UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan said an act of nuclear terrorism would stagger the
world economy and thrust tens of millions of people into dire
poverty and create a second death toll throughout the developing
world.[5] Other likely impacts would be an enhanced focus on security to
prevent future nuclear attacks. This would affect international trade and
investment, development assistance, and quite possibly domestic and
international systems of governance. For all these reasons, nuclear terrorism
must be prevented, as no response could undo the pervasive damage
an incident would inflict on individuals, societies, and global
approaches to governance and security.

Convergence of three factors: loose nukes, new nukes,

and new nuclear states, makes nuclear terrorism likely
Schwartz 15 (Benjamin Schwartz, served in a variety of national security
positions within the United States government, including in the Department
of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Energy, Jan 22, 2015,
Right of Boom: The Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism
https://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=kx90BQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT16&dq=
%22nuclear+terrorism

%22+&ots=0eodK81fLB&sig=Udz6i4kLUHb3hE66PGweV9zgBSg#v=onepage
&q=%22plausible%20deniability%22&f=false 7/8/2015 ZEC)
Over seventy years has passed since the dawn of the nuclear age without a
nuclear shot fired in anger. In that time, the world's nuclear powers have built
enough atomic bombs to destroy the planet many times over. It is no
exaggeration to describe this arms race as humankind approaching the edge
of a nuclear abyss, staring down at Armageddon and slowly stepping back.
Today the historical record makes clear that a minor miscalculation during the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis would have sparked a war with casualties in the
hundreds of millions.' Not only was atomic warfare avoided during those
fourteen days in October 1962 and during the subsequent decades of the
Cold War, but today an apocalyptic scenario involving the exchange of
multikiloton warheads is extremely unlikely. This accomplishment is a
testament to the wisdom of world leaders and the effectiveness of the
modern state, though surely some credit is due to divine providence, fate, or
extraordinary good luck. Yet just as this nuclear threat was receding another
gradually emerged. Today, the risk of a single atomic bomb detonating
in a city like Dubai, New York, Singapore, or Washington, DC, is
higher than at any point in history. Why? Because the difusion of
nuclear weapons designs, materials, and know-how mean that it is
or soon will be plausible for malign actors to conduct a clandestine
nuclear attack with limited or no attribution. In 2004, Graham Allison
warned that the chance of this type of attack taking place would be
somewhere between "inevitable" and "highly likely" unless three
conditions, which he referred to as the "Three No's," were met: (1)
"no loose nukes." meaning vulnerable nuclear weapons and/or fissile
material; (2) "no new nascent nukes," which means no new national
capabilities to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium; and (3) "no
new nuclear weapons states." Unfortunately, ten years have passed
and in that time each of the three conditions has been violated.

The impacts of nuclear terrorism go beyond the initial loss

of the detonation- i.e. infrastructure damage and its
impact on the economy, radiation, etc.
Trimble 15 (David Trimble, serves as a Director in the U.S. Government
Accountability Offices Natural Resources & Environment group in Washington
DC. Mr. Trimble provides leadership and oversight on Nuclear Security, Safety,
and Nonproliferation issues. Mr. Trimble has also led GAOs work on EPA
management and environmental issues such as climate change, hydraulic
fracturing, toxic chemicals, and water and air regulations , 2015, GAO: Two
Decades Evaluating the Impact and Effectiveness of U.S. Nuclear and
Radiological Material Security Programs from Nuclear Threats and Security
Challenges pg. 4 7/8/2015 ZEC)
One of the most serious threats facing the United States and other
countries is the possibility that other nations or terrorist organizations could
steal a nuclear warhead or nuclear weapon-usable materials from poorly

secured stockpiles around the world. or that nations could divert nuclear
material intended for peaceful purposes to the development of nuclear
weapons.' Of great concern is that terrorists could fashion a crude
nuclear bomb made from either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or
plutonium into an improvised nuclear device. Such a device would
create an explosion producing extreme heat. powerful shockwaves and
intense radiation that would be immediately lethal to individuals within miles
of the explosion. as well as radioactive fallout over thousands of square
miles. Nonproliferation experts estimate that a successful improvised
nuclear device could devastate the heart of a medium- sized U.S.
city and could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries.
as well as pose long-term cancer risks to those exposed to the
radioactive fallout. Radiological material also poses a significant security
threat to the United States and the international community. Radiological
material-such as cobalt-60. cesium- I37, and iridium-l92-is
encapsulated or sealed in metal to prevent its dispersal and is
commonly called a sealed radiological source. Sealed radiological
sources are used worldwide for many legitimate purposes. such as medical.
industrial. and agricultural applications. The total number of these sources in
use worldwide is unknown because many countries do not systematically
account for them. If certain types of these sources were obtained by
terrorists. they could be used to produce a simple and crude but
potentially dangerous weapon-known as a radiological dispersion
device, or dirty bomb. Although experts believe that a dirty bomb
would result in a limited number of deaths. it could have severe
economic consequences. Depending on the type. amount. and form.
the dispersed radiological material could cause radiation sickness
for people nearby and produce serious economic and psychological
disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup
of the contaminated area.

Nuclear terrorism is both likely and dangerousramification of an attack have both devastating and
global ramifications
Pitts-Kiefer 14 (Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, Senior Project Ofcer, Nuclear
Threat Initiative (NTI) completed a masters degree in public administration at
the Harvard Kennedy School where she focused on foreign policy and national
security. At the Kennedy School, Pitts-Kiefer studied under Graham Allison
and Matthew Bunn and was Graham Allisons course assistant, 2014,
NUCLEAR NIGHTMARES
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Nuclear_Nightmares.pdf?_=1417020879 7/8/15
ZEC)
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built up vast
amounts of nuclear weapons and materials. The Cuban Missile Crisis
heightened fears that the nuclear arms race could result in destruction on a
massive scale, whether as a result of an intentional or accidental launch and

detonation of a nuclear bomb. As the Cold War came to a close, a new

threat emerged: nuclear terrorism. With the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, nuclear weapons and materials were left scattered
across hundreds of sites in former Soviet states prompting urgent
concern that smugglers or terrorists would steal enough material for
a bomb. Russia and the United States worked together, through the
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, to dismantle
and destroy thousands of weapons and to ensure that the nuclear
materials from those weapons were disposed of safely. Despite all
that has been achieved, the security of weapons-usable nuclear
materials remains an urgent concern, while at the same time
terrorist groups have grown more sophisticated and more adept at
carrying out mass-casualty attacks. So, todays leaders and citizens face
a chilling prospect: the detonation of a crude nuclear weapon built by
terrorists with materials stolen or purchased on the black market. Though the
al Qaeda that attacked the United States on 9/11 has been much diminished,
al Qaeda affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula and Northern Africa, ISIL, and
terrorist organizations like al-Shabaab in Somalia remind us that the
terrorist threat is dynamic, constantly evolving, and, most of all,
enduring. At the same time, the materials needed to build a bomb
are spread around the world. Globally, there are approximately
2,000 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material (plutonium
and highly enriched uranium or HEU) located at hundreds of sites
some of them poorly securedscattered across twenty-five
countries. Building one bomb requires only enough HEU to fill a fivepound bag of sugar or a quantity of plutonium the size of a
grapefruit. Terrorists also have access to the technology and knowhow needed to build a crude nuclear device, and a number of
terrorist groups have in the past stated a desire to acquire and use a
nuclear bomb. The consequences of detonating such a bomb in a
major city would be staggering: hundreds of thousands of
casualties; long-lasting environmental damage; economic losses in
the hundreds of billions; and considerable political and social
ramifications. No matter where a bomb is detonated, the
consequences would reverberate around the globe. To build a bomb
the biggest challenge terrorists face is obtaining enough HEU or separated
plutonium. Every step after acquiring the materialbuilding the bomb,
transporting it, and detonating itis easier for terrorists to take and harder
for the international community to stop. So it is imperative that terrorists
dont get a hold of the materials. Today, there are myriad ways that a wellorganized and sufficiently-funded terrorist group could seize the materials
they need to build an improvised nuclear device that would destroy the heart
of a city. They could send a team of armed assailants to overwhelm guards at
an understaffed nuclear facility or to attack a convoy transporting weaponsusable nuclear materials from one facility to another. A terrorist or criminal
network could corrupt insiders or use a cyberattack to defeat security
controls. That is why ensuring that all weapons-usable nuclear material is

properly secured to the highest standards is the key to preventing nuclear

terrorism.

Risk of nuclear terror is high and likely

Ogilvie-White 2014
Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White, former senior analyst at the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute; Stanton nuclear security fellow at the International Institute
for Strategic Studies, senior lecturer in international relations at the
University of Canterbury, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Australias Leadership
Role, https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/preventing-nuclear-terrorismaustralias-leadership-role/SR63_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.pdf
The main worry about the theft and trafficking of nuclear and radiological
materials is that they will end up in the hands of terrorist groups, who will use
them in INDs or RDDs. Even in the case of an RDD, which is a more likely
scenario but would be much less lethal than an IND, radioactive
contamination in a densely populated area could have serious economic and
social consequences. Although a successful RDD attack has never been
perpetrated, theres evidence that terrorists have invested in such
devices: Chechen separatists were involved in two incidents
involving radioactive materials in November 1995 and December 1998,
and more recently intelligence agencies in mainland Europe, Thailand, the
UK and the US have managed to foil RDD plots before they reached
fruition. In 2012, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Incident and
Trafficking Database reported 160 incidents involving the illegal trade
and movement of nuclear or other radioactive material across
national borders. Of those, 17 involved possession and related criminal
activities, 24 involved theft or loss and 119 involved other unauthorised
activities. Two incidents involved highly enriched uranium (HEU) in
unauthorised activities. There were also three incidents involving dangerous
Category 13 radioactive sources, two of which were thefts. Information
reported to the database demonstrates that: the availability of
unsecured nuclear and other radioactive material persists although
effective border control measures help to detect illicit trafficking, efective
controls arent uniformly implemented at all international border
points individuals and groups are prepared to engage in trafficking
this material. The possibility of RDD or, worse, IND detonation is real and,
while the risks need to be kept in perspective, they need to be taken
seriously . One of the most worrying recent cases of illicit trafficking
involving HEU occurred in June 2011 in Moldova, where officials arrested six
people with a quantity of weapon-grade material. The group claimed to have
access to plutonium and up to 9 kilograms of HEU, which they were willing to

sell for $31 million. A serious buyer, reportedly of North African origin,
appears to have been involved and remains at large. Research reactors
are considered vulnerable to thefts of nuclear and radiological
materials because theyre often located on university campuses or in
larger scientific research centres, which are relatively open to the
public or have many users and visitors. Moreover, other than the
amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which
has yet to enter into force, theres no internationally binding requirement for
securing these facilities. Since 2003, however, the US and the IAEA have
been working with various countries to reduce the risks associated with
research reactors. Many countries with HEU-fuelled research reactors,
including some in Australias near neighbourhood, have taken part in
securing HEU and converting the reactors to use low-enriched uranium (LEU).
In particular, HEU has been removed and secured from Indonesia, the
Philippines, Thailand and, most recently, Vietnam. Of course, LEU-fuelled
research reactors remain a target for terrorists who wish to spread ionising
radiation or damage a symbolic facility representing technological progress,
and most research reactors have substantial quantities of sealed sources that
are potentially vulnerable to theft.

its High risk - acquisition know-how and , motivation

Robichaud 14 (Carl, specialist in nuclear policy at Carnegie Corporation of
New York, The Hill, "Preventing nuclear terrorism requires bold action,"
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:sIkI4u49jooJ:thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homelandsecurity/201395-preventing-nuclear-terrorism-requires-boldaction+&cd=11&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)
Nuclear terrorism is one of the most serious threats of the 21st
century. Fortunately, the threat is a preventable one: consolidate and lock
down weapons-usable materials and you dramatically reduce the risks. At the
Nuclear Security Summit this week, President Obama and more than 50 world
leaders will gather in The Hague with an opportunity to take a major step
forward in doing just that. But taking the next step in this process will require
strong leadership and skillful diplomacy. Though they rarely make the
headlines, cases of smuggling, theft or loss of nuclear and
radiological materials are alarmingly frequent. Over the past few years
weve seen incidents from Moldova to India, South Africa to Japan. Just a few
months ago in Mexico, carjackers unwittingly heisted radiological
materials that, in the wrong hands, could have done significant
harm. In fact, more than one hundred thefts and other incidents are reported
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each year. In many of these
instances we still do not know where the material came from, who stole it, or
where it was headed. Nuclear technology is widespread, used not only
in power production but in medicine, mining, and other industries. As

a result, dozens of countries possesses radiological materials that

could be used in a dirty bomb. Beyond that, over 25 countries have
highly-enriched uranium or plutoniumenough to build more than
20,000 new weapons like the one that destroyed Hiroshima and almost
80,000 like the one that destroyed Nagasaki. In the wrong hands, it
wouldnt take much plutonium or highly enriched uranium to fashion
a nuclear device. You could fit a bombs-worth of this material into a lunch
box. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups around the globe have
expressed intent to acquire weapons-usable materials. If they
succeed there is little doubt they would use such a device . Thus the
spread of these materials is a grave threatnot only to the United States but
to any country that relies upon the global economy, which would be
severely disrupted if an attack ever succeeded. Robert Gates, former
U.S. Secretary of Defense, noted that, Every senior leader, when youre
asked what keeps you awake at night, its the thought of a terrorist
ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.

2 its High risk - acquisition know-how and , motivation

Robichaud 14 (Carl, specialist in nuclear policy at Carnegie Corporation of
New York, The Hill, "Preventing nuclear terrorism requires bold action,"
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:sIkI4u49jooJ:thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homelandsecurity/201395-preventing-nuclear-terrorism-requires-boldaction+&cd=11&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)
Nuclear terrorism is one of the most serious threats of the 21st
century. Fortunately, the threat is a preventable one: consolidate and lock
down weapons-usable materials and you dramatically reduce the risks. At the
Nuclear Security Summit this week, President Obama and more than 50 world
leaders will gather in The Hague with an opportunity to take a major step
forward in doing just that. But taking the next step in this process will require
strong leadership and skillful diplomacy. Though they rarely make the
headlines, cases of smuggling, theft or loss of nuclear and
radiological materials are alarmingly frequent. Over the past few years
weve seen incidents from Moldova to India, South Africa to Japan. Just a few
months ago in Mexico, carjackers unwittingly heisted radiological
materials that, in the wrong hands, could have done significant
harm. In fact, more than one hundred thefts and other incidents are reported
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each year. In many of these
instances we still do not know where the material came from, who stole it, or
where it was headed. Nuclear technology is widespread, used not only
in power production but in medicine, mining, and other industries. As
a result, dozens of countries possesses radiological materials that
could be used in a dirty bomb. Beyond that, over 25 countries have
highly-enriched uranium or plutoniumenough to build more than

20,000 new weapons like the one that destroyed Hiroshima and almost
80,000 like the one that destroyed Nagasaki. In the wrong hands, it
wouldnt take much plutonium or highly enriched uranium to fashion
a nuclear device. You could fit a bombs-worth of this material into a lunch
box. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups around the globe have
expressed intent to acquire weapons-usable materials. If they
succeed there is little doubt they would use such a device . Thus the
spread of these materials is a grave threatnot only to the United States but
to any country that relies upon the global economy, which would be
severely disrupted if an attack ever succeeded. Robert Gates, former
U.S. Secretary of Defense, noted that, Every senior leader, when youre
asked what keeps you awake at night, its the thought of a terrorist
ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.

Terror Adv Nuclear Terror Causes Extinction

Causes US-Russia miscalcextinction
Barrett et al, RAND Stanton nuclear security fellow, 2013
[Anthony, PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon
University, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute
AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University,
Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and
Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk InstituteAND Kelly Hostetler,
BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global
Catastrophic Risk Institute, 6-24-13, Science & Global Security: The Technical
Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume
21, Issue 2, Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War
Between the United States and Russia, Tanfonline]

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear

arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have
globally catastrophic efects such as severely reducing food
production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern
civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2
Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by
various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate
first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or
unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or
procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a
way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without
direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation
decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In
an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is
under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a
counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the
above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise
accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was
aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development
of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce
probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For
purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have
maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a
first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counterattack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first
attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-andcontrol capabilities led to both sides development of capabilities to
detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before sufering
damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the
end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United

States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly
reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear
war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a
substantial risk . 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively
threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch
nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators
of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of
events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack,
including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity,
and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second,
terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the
United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by
the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised
nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis
between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear
terrorism scenarios are possible . 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain
or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United
States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear
weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has
long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is
significantly higher during U.S.Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the
Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.
Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear
tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise
tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both
nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16

Absent retaliation, it is sufficient to trigger extinction.

Robock, Rutgers University environmental sciences
professor, 2011
[Alan, Nature International weekly journal of science 473, 5-19-11, Nuclear
winter is a real and present danger
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v473/n7347/full/473275a.html]

Yet the environmental threat of nuclear war has not gone away. The
world faces the prospect of a smaller, but still catastrophic, nuclear
conflict. There are now nine nuclear-weapons states. Use of a
fraction of the global nuclear arsenal by anyone, from the
superpowers to India versus Pakistan, still presents the largest
potential environmental danger to the planet by humans. That
threat is being ignored. One reason for this denial is that the prospect of a
nuclear war is so horrific on so many levels that most people simply look

away. Two further reasons are myths that persist among the general public:
that the nuclear winter theory has been disproved, and that nuclear
winter is no longer a threat. These myths need to be debunked. The
term 'nuclear winter', coined by Carl Sagan and his colleagues in a 1983
paper1 in Science, describes the dramatic effects on the climate caused by
smoke from fires ignited by nuclear attacks on cities and industrial areas. In
the 1980s my colleagues and I calculated, using the best climate models
available at the time, that if one-third of the existing arsenal was used, there
would be so much smoke that surface temperatures would plummet below
freezing around the world for months, killing virtually all plants and producing
worldwide famine. More people could die in China from starvation than in the
nations actively bombing each other. As many countries around the world
realized that a superpower nuclear war would be a disaster for them, they
pressured the superpowers to end their arms race. Sagan did a good job of
summarizing the policy impacts2 in 1984: although weapons were continuing
to be built, it would be suicide to use them. The idea of climatic catastrophe
was fought against by those who wanted to keep the nuclear-weapon
industry alive, or who supported the growth of nuclear arsenals politically3.
Scientifically, there was no real debate about the concept, only
about the details. In 1986, atmospheric researchers Starley Thompson and
Stephen Schneider wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs appraising the theory4
and highlighting what they saw as the patchiness of the effect. They coined
the term 'nuclear autumn', noting that it wouldn't be 'winter' everywhere in
the aftermath of a nuclear attack. They didn't mean for people to think that it
would be all raking leaves and football games, but many members of the
public, and some pro-nuclear advocates, preferred to take it that way. The
fight over the details of the modelling caused a rift between Sagan and
Schneider that never healed. When I bring up the topic of nuclear winter,
people invariably tell me that they think the theory has been disproved. But
research continues to support the original concept. By 2007, models
had began to approximate a realistic atmosphere up to 80
kilometres above Earth's surface, including the stratosphere and
mesosphere. This enabled me, and my coauthors, to calculate for the
first time that smoke particles would be heated by the Sun and lifted
into the upper stratosphere, where they would stay for many years5,
6. So the cooling would last for much longer than we originally
thought. Dark days Many of those who do accept the nuclear-winter
concept think that the scenario applies only to a mass conflict, on a scale no
longer conceivable in the modern world. This is also false. A 'small' nuclear
war between India and Pakistan, with each using 50 Hiroshima-size bombs
(far less than 1% of the current arsenal), if dropped on megacity targets in
each country would produce climate change unprecedented in
recorded human history5. Five million tonnes of black carbon smoke
would be emitted into the upper troposphere from the burning
cities, and then be lofted into the stratosphere by the heat of the
Sun. Temperatures would be lower than during the 'Little Ice Age'
(14001850), during which famine killed millions. For several years, growing

seasons would be shortened by weeks in the mid-latitudes (see 'A decade of

cooling). Brian Toon at the University of Colorado in Boulder, Richard Turco
at the University of California, Los Angeles, Georgiy Stenchikov at Rutgers
University in New Brunswick, New Jersey, and I, all of whom were
pioneers in nuclear-winter research in the 1980s, have tried, along with
our students, to publicize our results. We have published refereed journal
articles, popular pieces in Physics Today and Scientific American, a policy
forum in Science, and now this article. But Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy,
perhaps the two most prominent foreign-policy magazines in English, would
not even review articles we submitted. We have had no luck getting attention
from the US government. Toon and I visited the US Congress and gave
briefings to congressional staff on the subject two years ago, but nothing
happened as a result. The US President's science adviser John Holdren has
not responded to our requests in 2009 and more recently for
consideration of new scientific results in US nuclear policy.

Yes Extinction AT: No Retaliation

Retaliation causes global nuclear war
Hellman, Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering,
Stanford University, 8
[Martin, Spring, Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence,
http://nuclearrisk.org/3likely.php]

Nuclear proliferation and the specter of nuclear terrorism are creating

additional possibilities for triggering a nuclear war. If an American
(or Russian) city were devastated by an act of nuclear terrorism, the
public outcry for immediate, decisive action would be even stronger
than Kennedy had to deal with when the Cuban missiles first became
known to the American public. While the action would likely not be directed
against Russia, it might be threatening to Russia (e.g., on its borders) or
one of its allies and precipitate a crisis that resulted in a full-scale
nuclear war. Terrorists with an apocalyptic mindset might even
attempt to catalyze a full-scale nuclear war by disguising their act to
look like an attack by the U.S. or Russia.

That escalates to global nuclear war

Speice, JD Candidate, February 2006
[Patrick, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427, Lexis]

The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear

knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass
destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack
with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate
human and economic losses. n49 Moreover, there would be immense
political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and
retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of
casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. N50
In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge
and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear
ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear
weapons. n51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks
against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, n52 as well
as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United
States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

Yes Extinction AT: Not Feasible

Nuclear terrorism is feasible, there are no barriers and
theres motivation for an attack now
Bunn et al. 14
[March 2014, Matthew Bunn is a Professor of Practice at the Harvard Kennedy School. His
research interests include nuclear theft and terrorism; nuclear proliferation and measures to
control it; the future of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle; and innovation in energy
technologies, he served as an adviser to the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy, as a study director at the National Academy of Sciences, and as editor of Arms Control
Today, author or co-author of more than 20 books or major technical reports, and over a
hundred articles in publications, Martin B. Malin, the Executive Director of the Project on
Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvards
Kennedy School of Government, focuses on arms control and nonproliferation in the Middle
East, US nonproliferation and counter-proliferation strategies, and the security consequences
of the growth and spread of nuclear energy. Malin taught international relations, American
foreign policy, and Middle East politics at Columbia University, Barnard College, and Rutgers
University, served as Director of the Program on Science and Global Security at the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences. Nickolas Roth is a research associate at the Project on
Managing the Atom. Mr. has a Masters of Public Policy from the University of Maryland. While at
Maryland, he served as a research assistant for the Center for International and Security
Studies Nuclear Materials Accounting Project. He has expertise in national security issues
related to US nuclear weapons policy. William H. Tobey is a Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs. He was most recently Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration. There, he managed
the US governments largest program to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism by
detecting, securing, and disposing of dangerous nuclear material. Mr. Tobey also served on the
National Security Council Staff in three administrations, in defense policy, arms control, and
counter-proliferation positions. He has participated in international negotiations ranging from
the START talks with the Soviet Union to the Six Party Talks with North Korea. He is chair of the
board of directors of the World Institute for Nuclear Security, Advancing Nuclear

Security: Evaluating Progress and Setting New Goals,

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/advancingnuclearsecurity.pdf]

Unfortunately, nuclear and radiological terrorism remain real and

dangerous threats.1 The conclusion
the assembled leaders reached at the Washington Nuclear Security
Summit and reaffirmed
in Seoul remains correct: Nuclear terrorism continues to be one of
the most challenging
threats to international security. Defeating this threat requires strong
national measures and
international cooperation given its potential global political, economic, social,
and psychological
consequences.2
There are three types of nuclear or radiological terrorist attack:

 Nuclear weapons. Terrorists might be able to get and detonate an

assembled nuclear
weapon made by a state, or make a crude nuclear bomb from stolen
separated plutonium
or HEU. This would be the most difficult type of nuclear terrorism for
terrorists to accomplish
but the devastation could be absolutely horrifying, with political and
economic
aftershocks reverberating around the world.
Dirty bombs. A far simpler approach would be for terrorists to obtain
radiological materials
available in hospitals, industrial sites, and moreand disperse them to
contaminate
an area with radioactivity, using explosives or any number of other means. In
most scenarios
of such attacks, few people would die from the radiationbut the attack
could spread fear,
force the evacuation of many blocks of a major city, and inflict billions of
dollars in costs of
cleanup and economic disruption. While a dirty bomb attack would be much
easier for terrorists
to carry out than an attack using a nuclear explosive, the consequences
would be far
lessan expensive and disruptive mess, but not the heart of a major city
going up in smoke.
Nuclear sabotage. Terrorists could potentially cause a Fukushima-like
meltdown at a
nuclear reactor or sabotage a spent fuel pool or high-level waste store.
An unsuccessful sabotage
would have little effect, but a successful one could spread radioactive
material over a
huge area. Both the scale of the consequences and the difficulty of carrying
out a successful
attack would be intermediate between nuclear weapons and dirty bombs.
Overall, while actual terrorist use of a nuclear weapon may be the least likely
of these dangers,

its consequences would be so overwhelming that we believe it poses the

most significant risk. A
similar judgment drove the decision to focus the four-year effort on securing
nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them. Most of this report
will focus on the threat of terrorist
use of nuclear explosives, but the overall global governance framework for
nuclear security is
relevant to all of these dangers.
The danger of nuclear terrorism is driven by three key factorsterrorist
intent to escalate to the
nuclear level of violence; potential terrorist capability to do so; and the
vulnerability of nuclear
weapons and the materials needed to enable terrorists to carry out such an
attackthe motive,
means, and opportunity of a monstrous crime.
Terrorist intent. While most terrorist groups are still focused on small-scale
violence for local
political purposes, we now live in an age that includes some groups
intent on inflicting largescale
destruction to achieve their objectives. Over the past quarter century,
both al Qaeda and the
Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo seriously sought nuclear weapons and the
nuclear materials
and expertise needed to make them. Al Qaeda had a focused program
reporting directly to Ayman
al-Zawahiri (now head of the group), which progressed as far as carrying out
crude but sensible
conventional explosive tests for the nuclear program in the desert of
Afghanistan. There is some
evidence that North Caucusus terrorists also sought nuclear weapons
including incidents in
which terrorist teams were caught carrying out reconnaissance on
Russian nuclear weapon storage
sites, whose locations are secret.3
Despite the death of Osama bin Laden and the severe disruption of
the core of al Qaeda, there are

no grounds for complacency. There is every reason to believe Zawahiri

remains eager to inflict
destruction on a nuclear scale. Indeed, despite the large number of al
Qaeda leaders who have
been killed or captured, nearly all of the key players in al Qaedas
nuclear program remain alive
and at largeincluding Abdel Aziz al-Masri, an Egyptian explosives expert
who was al Qaedas
nuclear CEO. In 2003, when al Qaeda operatives were negotiating to buy
three of what they
thought were nuclear weapons, senior al Qaeda officials told them to go
ahead and make the
purchase if a Pakistani expert with equipment confirmed the items were
genuine. The US government
has never managed to determine who the Pakistani nuclear weapons expert
was in whom al
Qaeda had such confidenceand what he may have been doing in the
intervening decade.
More fundamentally, with at least two, and probably three, groups having
gone down this path in
the past 25 years, there is no reason to expect they will be the last. The
danger of nuclear terrorism
will remain as long as nuclear weapons, the materials needed to make them,
and terrorist
groups bent on large-scale destruction co-exist.
Potential terrorist capabilities. No one knows what capabilities a secret cell of
al Qaeda may
have managed to retain or build. Unfortunately, it does not take a
Manhattan Project to make a
nuclear bombindeed, over 90 percent of the Manhattan Project effort was
focused on making
the nuclear materials, not on designing and building the weapons.
Numerous studies by the United
States and other governments have concluded that it is plausible that a
sophisticated terrorist group

could make a crude nuclear bomb if it got enough separated plutonium or

HEU.4 A gun-type
bomb, such as the weapon that obliterated Hiroshima, fundamentally
involves slamming two
pieces of HEU together at high speed. An implosion-type bomb, which is
needed to get a sub-stantial explosive yield from plutonium, requires
crushing nuclear material to a higher densitya
more complex task, but still plausible for terrorists, especially if they got
knowledgeable help.
Many analysts argue that, since states spend billions of dollars and assign
hundreds or thousands
of people to building nuclear weapons, it is totally implausible that terrorists
could carry out
this task. Unfortunately, this argument is wrong, for two reasons. First, as the
Manhattan Project
statistic suggests, the difficult part of making a nuclear bomb is making the
nuclear material.
That is what states spend billions seeking to accomplish. Terrorists are highly
unlikely to ever
be able to make their own bomb materialbut if they could get stolen
material, that step would
be bypassed. Second, it is far easier to make a crude, unsafe, unreliable
bomb of uncertain yield,
which might be delivered in the back of a truck, than to make the kind of
nuclear weapon a
state would want in its arsenala safe, reliable weapon of known yield
that can be delivered by
missile or combat aircraft. It is highly unlikely terrorists will ever be able to
build that kind of
nuclear weapon.
Remaining vulnerabilities. While many countries have done a great deal
to strengthen nuclear
security, serious vulnerabilities remain. Around the world, there are
stocks of nuclear weapons or
materials whose security systems are not sufficient to protect against the
full range of plausible

outsider and insider threats they may face. As incidents like the intrusion at
Y-12 in the United
States in 2012 make clear, many nuclear facilities and transporters still
grapple with serious
problems of security culture. It is fair to say that every country where
nuclear weapons, weaponsusable
nuclear materials, major nuclear facilities, or dangerous radiological sources
exist has
more to do to ensure that these items are sustainably secured and
accounted for.
At least three lines of evidence confirm that important nuclear security
weaknesses continue to
exist. First, seizures of stolen HEU and separated plutonium continue
to occur, including, mostly
recently HEU seizures in 2003, 2006, 2010, and 2011.5 These seizures may
result from material
stolen long ago, but, at a minimum, they make clear that stocks of HEU
and plutonium remain
outside of regulatory control. Second, in cases where countries do
realistic tests to probe whether
security systems can protect against teams of clever adversaries determined
to find a weak point,
the adversaries sometimes succeedeven when their capabilities are
within the set of threats the
security system is designed to protect against. This happens with
some regularity in the United
States (though less often than before the 9/11 attacks); if more countries
carried out comparable
performance tests, one would likely see similar results. Third, in real nonnuclear thefts and terrorist
attacks around the world, adversaries sometimes demonstrate capabilities
and tactics well
beyond what many nuclear security systems would likely be able to handle
(see the discussion of
the recent Vstberga incident in Sweden).

being caught.6 And terrorists are unlikely to have enough money to make a
substantial difference
in either the odds of regime survival or the wealth of a regimes elites, even
in North Korea, one
of the poorest countries on earth. On the other hand, serious risks would
arise in North Korea, or
other nuclear-armed states, in the event of state collapseand as
North Koreas stockpile grows, one could imagine a general
managing some of that stockpile concluding he could sell a piece of it
and provide a golden parachute for himself and his family without getting
caught.
No one knows the real likelihood of nuclear terrorism. But the consequences
of a terrorist nuclear blast would be so catastrophic that even a small
chance is enough to justify urgent action
to reduce the risk. The heart of a major city could be reduced to a smoldering
radioactive ruin,
leaving tens to hundreds of thousands of people dead. The perpetrators or
others might claim
to have more weapons already hidden in other major cities and threaten to
set them off if their
demands were not metpotentially provoking uncontrolled evacuation of
many urban centers.
Devastating economic consequences would reverberate worldwide. Kofi
Annan, while serving
as Secretary-General of the United Nations, warned that the global economic
effects of a nuclear
terrorist attack in a major city would push tens of millions of people into dire
poverty, creating
a second death toll throughout the developing world.7

Attacks are feasible

Bunn, et al, 13
[October 2nd 2013, Bunn, Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri
Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S.
Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013,
Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy
School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at

Harvard Universitys Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Vice
Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at
the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of
Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to
NATO from 2002 to 2008. Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on
Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the
Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the
Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General
Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. Simon Saradzhyan.
Fellow at Harvard Universitys Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to
2008. William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard Universitys Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to
Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from
2006 to 2009. Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces).
Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the
Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic
Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from
1994 to 1996. Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed
Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the
Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of
the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy
chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998, "Steps to
Prevent Nuclear Terrorism," http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/JTA
%20eng%20web2.pdf]

In 2011, Harvards Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and
the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies
published The U.S. Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism.
The assessment analyzed the means, motives, and access of would-be
nuclear terrorists, and concluded that the threat of nuclear terrorism
is urgent and real. The Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits
in 2010 and 2012 established and demonstrated a consensus among
political leaders from around the world that nuclear terrorism poses a
serious threat to the peace, security, and prosperity of our planet.
For any country, a terrorist attack with a nuclear device would be an
immediate and catastrophic disaster, and the negative effects would
reverberate around the world far beyond the location and moment of the
detonation. Preventing a nuclear terrorist attack requires international
cooperation to secure nuclear materials, especially among those states
producing nuclear materials and weapons. As the worlds two greatest
nuclear powers, the United States and Russia have the greatest experience
and capabilities in securing nuclear materials and plants and, therefore,

share a special responsibility to lead international efforts to prevent terrorists

from seizing such materials and plants. The depth of convergence between
U.S. and Russian vital national interests on the issue of nuclear security is
best illustrated by the fact that bilateral cooperation on this issue has
continued uninterrupted for more than two decades, even when relations
between the two countries occasionally became frosty, as in the aftermath of
the August 2008 war in Georgia. Russia and the United States have strong
incentives to forge a close and trusting partnership to prevent nuclear
terrorism and have made enormous progress in securing fissile material both
at home and in partnership with other countries. However, to meet the
evolving threat posed by those individuals intent upon using nuclear
weapons for terrorist purposes, the United States and Russia need to deepen
and broaden their cooperation. The 2011 U.S. - Russia Joint Threat
Assessment offered both specific conclusions about the nature of the threat
and general observations about how it might be addressed. This report
builds on that foundation and analyzes the existing framework for action,
cites gaps and deficiencies, and makes specific recommendations for
improvement. The U.S. Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear
Terrorism (The 2011 report executive summary):
Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat. Urgent actions are required to
reduce the risk. The risk is driven by the rise of terrorists who seek to
inflict unlimited damage, many of whom have sought justification for their
plans in radical interpretations of Islam; by the spread of information about
the decades-old technology of nuclear weapons; by the increased
availability of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and by globalization,
which makes it easier to move people, technologies, and materials across the
world.
Making a crude nuclear bomb would not be easy, but is potentially
within the capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group, as
numerous government studies have confirmed. Detonating a stolen
nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for terrorists to accomplish, if the
weapon was equipped with modern technical safeguards (such as the
electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links, or PALs). Terrorists
could, however, cut open a stolen nuclear weapon and make use of its
nuclear material for a bomb of their own.
The nuclear material for a bomb is small and difficult to detect,
making it a major challenge to stop nuclear smuggling or to recover nuclear
material after it has been stolen. Hence, a primary focus in reducing the risk
must be to keep nuclear material and nuclear weapons from being stolen by
continually improving their security, as agreed at the Nuclear Security
Summit in Washington in April 2010.
Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades. The
group has repeatedly attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material or
nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise.
Al-Qaeda reportedly conducted tests of conventional explosives for its

nuclear program in the desert in Afghanistan. The groups nuclear ambitions

continued after its dispersal following the fall of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. Recent writings from top al-Qaeda leadership are focused
on justifying the mass slaughter of civilians, including the use of weapons of
mass destruction, and are in all likelihood intended to provide a formal
religious justification for nuclear use.
While there are significant gaps in coverage of the groups activities, alQaeda appears to have been frustrated thus far in acquiring a nuclear
capability; it is unclear whether the the group has acquired weapons-usable
nuclear material or the expertise needed to make such material into a bomb.
Furthermore, pressure from a broad range of counter-terrorist actions
probably has reduced the groups ability to manage large, complex projects,
but has not eliminated the danger. However, there is no sign the group
has abandoned its nuclear ambitions. On the contrary, leadership
statements as recently as 2008 indicate that the intention to acquire and
use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.

There are no checks on acquisition lack of border

controls and ease of theft
Ogilvie-White, independent researcher specializing in
nuclear issues, and Santoro, senior fellow at the Pacific
Forum CSIS, 14
[Dr Tanya, independent researcher specializing in nuclear issues, based in
Canberra, Australia. Previously, she was senior analyst at the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute; Stanton nuclear security fellow at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, UK; nuclear non-proliferation researcher at the
Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, trustee of the New Zealand
Centre for Global Studies, a member of the Council on Security Cooperation in
the Asia-Pacific, Asia-Pacific representative of the Fissile Material Working
Group, and associate editor of Asian Security. Dr David Santoro is a senior
fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. He directs the Forums nuclear policy
programs and works on nonproliferation and nuclear security, disarmament,
and deterrence, on which he has published widely. Prior to joining the Forum,
he worked on nuclear policy issues in France, Australia, Canada, and the
United Kingdom, including at the Institute for International Strategic Studies
as a Stanton nuclear security fellow, Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Australias Leadership Role,
https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/preventing-nuclear-terrorism-australiasleadership-role/SR63_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.pdf]

The main worry about the theft and trafficking of nuclear and radiological
materials is that they will end up in the hands of terrorist groups, who will
use them in INDs or RDDs. Even in the case of an RDD, which is a more likely
scenario but would be much less lethal than an IND, radioactive
contamination in a densely populated area could have serious economic and
social consequences. Although a successful RDD attack has never been
perpetrated, theres evidence that terrorists have invested in such
devices: Chechen separatists were involved in two incidents
involving radioactive materials in November 1995 and December 1998,
and more recently intelligence agencies in mainland Europe, Thailand, the UK
and the US have managed to foil RDD plots before they reached fruition.
In 2012, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Incident and
Trafficking Database reported 160 incidents involving the illegal trade
and movement of nuclear or other radioactive material across national
borders. Of those, 17 involved possession and related criminal activities, 24
involved theft or loss and 119 involved other unauthorised activities. Two
incidents involved highly enriched uranium (HEU) in unauthorised
activities. There were also three incidents involving dangerous Category 13
radioactive sources, two of which were thefts. Information reported to the
database demonstrates that: the availability of unsecured nuclear
and other radioactive material persists although effective border
control measures help to detect illicit trafficking, efective controls arent
uniformly implemented at all international border points
individuals and groups are prepared to engage in trafficking this
material.
The possibility of RDD or, worse, IND detonation is real and, while the
risks need to be kept in perspective, they need to be taken seriously.
One of the most worrying recent cases of illicit trafficking involving HEU
occurred in June 2011 in Moldova, where officials arrested six people with a
quantity of weapon-grade material. The group claimed to have access to
plutonium and up to 9 kilograms of HEU, which they were willing to sell for
$31 million. A serious buyer, reportedly of North African origin, appears to
have been involved and remains at large.
Research reactors are considered vulnerable to thefts of nuclear and
radiological materials because theyre often located on university
campuses or in larger scientific research centres, which are relatively
open to the public or have many users and visitors. Moreover, other than the
amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which
has yet to enter into force, theres no internationally binding requirement for
securing these facilities. Since 2003, however, the US and the IAEA have
been working with various countries to reduce the risks associated with
research reactors. Many countries with HEU-fuelled research reactors,
including some in Australias near neighbourhood, have taken part in
securing HEU and converting the reactors to use low-enriched uranium (LEU).
In particular, HEU has been removed and secured from Indonesia, the

Philippines, Thailand and, most recently, Vietnam. Of course, LEU-fuelled

research reactors remain a target for terrorists who wish to spread ionising
radiation or damage a symbolic facility representing technological progress,
and most research reactors have substantial quantities of sealed sources
that are potentially vulnerable to theft.

It only takes .001 of a stockpile to kill

Harrell, Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom at
Harvard Universitys Belfer Center for Science and
International Afairs, 3-24-14
[Eben, Were Not Prepared for a Nuclear Heist, TIME,
http://time.com/33802/were-not-prepared-for-a-nuclear-heist/, 3-24-14]

How did an 82-year-old nun come so close to getting her hands on

highly enriched uranium? In September 2009, a group of masked men
armed with automatic weapons and explosives arrived on the roof of a cash
depot in Vastberg, Sweden in a helicopter. The men blasted their way through
a skylight and hoisted millions of dollars up to the hovering aircraft the
operation took less than 20 minutes. When police rushed to respond they
discovered a bag with the word bomb at their heliport a diversion
planted by the thieves and caltrops (road spikes) near the depot to slow
down their response on the ground. While many of the thieves were caught
after an investigation, most of the money was never recovered. The Vastberg
heist was not a nuclear event, but a new report from my colleagues at
Harvard University makes the case that the incident should have deeply
troubling implications for the leaders from over 50 countries convening in the
Netherlands on March 24-25 for a summit on nuclear security. The stark truth
is that many locations around the world that store highly enriched uranium
(HEU) and plutonium the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons would
not be able to repel an attack from adversaries using tactics and weapons as
sophisticated as those used by the Vastberg thieves. An amount of
plutonium that would fit in a soda can would be enough for terrorists
to construct a crude nuclear bomb capable of reducing the heart of a
major city to rubble (it wouldnt require much HEU, either). Today,
there are approximately 1440 tons of HEU and 500 tons of separated
plutonium in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries around the
world; the theft of only .001 percent of this stockpile could lead to
hundreds of thousands of deaths.

Easy to access materials.

Dahl, Reuters, 3-25-14

[Fredrik, U.S. and Russia agree on nuclear terrorism threat - up to a point

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/25/us-nuclear-security-summitidUSBREA2O12820140325]

Since 1991, the number of countries with nuclear weapons-usable

material has roughly halved from some 50. However, more than 120
research and isotope production reactors around the world still use
HEU for fuel or targets, many of them with "very modest" security
measures, a Harvard Kennedy School report said this month. "With
at least two and possibly three groups having pursued nuclear
weapons in the past quarter century, they are not likely to be the
last," the report said. Referring to a push to use low-enriched uranium
(LEU) as fuel in research and other reactor types instead of HEU, the summit
statement said: "We encourage states to continue to minimize the use of HEU
through the conversion of reactor fuel from HEU to LEU, where technically
and economically feasible. "Similarly, we will continue to encourage and
support efforts to use non-HEU technologies for the production of radioisotopes, including financial incentives," it said. An apple-sized amount of
plutonium in a nuclear device and detonated in a highly populated area could
instantly kill or wound hundreds of thousands of people, according to the
Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (NSGEG) lobby group. But a socalled "dirty bomb" is seen as a more likely threat than an atomic bomb:
conventional explosives are used to disperse radiation from a radioactive
source, which can be found in hospitals or other places that may not be very
well secured. In December, Mexican police found a truck they
suspected was stolen by common thieves and which carried a
radioactive medical material that could have provided such an
ingredient. In another incident that put nuclear security in the
spotlight and embarrassed U.S. officials, an elderly nun and two
peace activists have admitted breaking into a Tennessee defense
facility in 2012 where uranium for atomic bombs is stored.

Yes Extinction AT: No Risk

Nuclear terrorism is probable new report
Burns, AP, 1-8-14
[Robert, The Dangerous Weak Link in Nuclear Security,
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/01/08/the_dangerous_weak_lin
k_in_nuclear_security_107023.html]

The number of countries possessing the makings of a nuclear bomb has

dropped by almost one-quarter over the past two years, but there remain
"dangerous weak links" in nuclear materials security that could be
exploited by terrorist groups with potentially catastrophic results,
according to a study released Wednesday. The study by the Nuclear Threat
Initiative said Mexico, Sweden, Ukraine, Vietnam, Austria, the Czech Republic
and Hungary have removed all or most of the weapons-usable nuclear
materials on their territories since 2012. That has reduced the number of
countries with one kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials,
such as highly enriched uranium, to 25 from 32 two years ago, the study said.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative is a private, non-partisan group that advocates
reducing the risk of the spread of nuclear weapons. "That's a big deal," said
Page Stoutland, vice president of the group's nuclear materials security
program. "Getting rid of the materials is one less country where somebody
could potentially steal weapons-usable material." Among the 25 countries
with weapons-usable nuclear materials, the study ranked Australia as having
the best nuclear security arrangements, followed by Canada, Switzerland,
Germany and Norway. The U.S. was ranked No. 11. The weakest nuclear
security is in Israel, Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea, according to the
study, which assessed factors such as accounting methods, physical security
and transportation security. The drop in the number of countries
possessing such materials could be seen as modestly encouraging
for President Barack Obama's declared ambition to lock down all of the
world's highly enriched uranium and plutonium -- the building blocks of
a nuclear weapon. There are an estimated 1,400 tons of highly
enriched uranium and almost 500 tons of plutonium stored in
hundreds of sites around the world. The report said a significant
portion of these materials is poorly secured and vulnerable to theft
or sale on the black market. Relatively small amounts of highly
enriched uranium or plutonium are required to build a nuclear bomb,
which is a declared ambition of terrorist groups such as al-Qaida.
"The result of a nuclear blast at the hands of terrorists or a rogue
state would be catastrophic -- with dire consequences that would
stretch across the globe for economies, commerce, militaries, public
health, the environment, civil liberties and the stability of
governments," the report said. The Obama goal, first proclaimed in 2009,
will be the focus of a summit meeting of world leaders in the Netherlands in

March. And although concern about the security of nuclear materials is

generally directed at Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, the study released
Wednesday said the United States has its own vulnerabilities. It cited two
recent incidents in the U.S. that point up imperfections in U.S.
control of nuclear weapons materials, including a July 2012 break-in
by anti-war protesters at the Y-12 complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn., that
stores the nation's supply of weapons-grade uranium, makes nuclear
warhead parts and provides nuclear fuel for the Navy. The study by
the Nuclear Threat Initiative also cited the firing in October of the No.
2 commander of U.S. Strategic Command, which is in charge of
nuclear war planning and would operate nuclear weapons if a
president ordered their use. Vice Adm. Tim Giardina was fired amid
allegations of involvement with counterfeit gambling chips -- an
allegation that raises questions about the potential corruption of
nuclear secrets. Giardina has been under investigation by the Naval
Criminal Investigative Service; results have not been released. The Giardina
matter, combined with the break-in at Oak Ridge, suggests that "it is
dangerous and inappropriate" to take the security of U.S. nuclear
materials for granted, the Nuclear Threat Initiative study said.

Yes a threat.
Chibarirwe, Trumpet, 7-7-13
[Anthony, IAEA Chief Warns of Threat of Nuclear Terrorism
http://www.thetrumpet.com/article/10787.19.0.0/world/terrorism/iaea-chiefwarns-of-threat-of-nuclear-terrorism]

At a conference on enhancing global nuclear security efforts, the director

general of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency ( iaea ),
Yukiya Amano, warned of the possibility of terrorist attacks involving
radioactive material. The conference, held at the organizations headquarters
in Vienna last Monday, was attended by over 1,300 delegates from 120
countries and 20 international and regional organizations. Amanos chief
concern was the potential use of a crude nuclear device a dirty
bomb, as its often called. Such a bomb may not necessarily be a weapon of
mass destruction but rather of mass disruption. Experts believe dirty
bombs are much more likely to be detonated than actual nuclear bombs
because of the relative ease in obtaining radioactive materials. How serious is
the threat of crude radioactive bombs? To answer that question, Amano
referred to a foiled smuggling and trafficking incident in Moldova two years
ago. The smugglers had tried to avoid detection by using special
radiation shields, showing a worrying level of knowledge . The case

ended well, but unfortunately, said Amano, we cannot be sure if such

cases are just the tip of the iceberg . Every year, the iaea receives
hundreds of reports of thefts and unauthorized activities involving radioactive
materials. While there hasnt yet been a terrorist attack involving
nuclear bombs or dirty bombs, Amano cautioned: [T]his must not lull us
into a false sense of security . If a dirty bomb is detonated in a major
city, or sabotage occurs at a nuclear facility, the consequences could be
devastating. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real , and the global
nuclear security system needs to be strengthened in order to counter that
threat. George Moore, a senior iaea analyst from 2007 to 2012, noted
that many experts believe its only a matter of time before a dirty
bomb or another type of radioactive dispersal device is used, with some
expressing surprise that it hasnt happened already. The destruction and
disruption that could be caused by dirty bombs can be seen in the fairly
simple pressure cooker bombs that paralyzed Boston in April. As our article
Death by a Thousand Cuts noted, the Boston bombing cost three lives as
well as hundreds of millions of dollars. Makeshift radioactive bombs could be
similarly costly. Cleaning up nuclear contamination could take months, and
for some buildings, decontamination could be a greater challenge than to
destroy and rebuild. As unpleasant as this reality is, the fact of the matter
is that the world remains vulnerable to nuclear terrorism , and the
United States, Britain and Israel face the greatest risk. These nations have
enemies determined to destroy them, or at least cripple them
structurally or economically. Some of these foes are undeterred by
religion, morals or death. For some, what they perceive happening after
death actually motivates them.
[Tom note- Citing IAEA director general and SENIOR IAEA analyst]

Yes Extinction AT: Safeguards

Even the 2010 Summit regulations fail- increased security
and culture shift is key
Harrell, Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom at
Harvard Universitys Belfer Center for Science and
International Afairs, 3-24-14
[Eben, Were Not Prepared for a Nuclear Heist, TIME,
http://time.com/33802/were-not-prepared-for-a-nuclear-heist/, 3-24-14]

How did an 82-year-old nun come so close to getting her hands on

highly enriched uranium? In September 2009, a group of masked men
armed with automatic weapons and explosives arrived on the roof of a cash
depot in Vastberg, Sweden in a helicopter. The men blasted their way through
a skylight and hoisted millions of dollars up to the hovering aircraft the
operation took less than 20 minutes. When police rushed to respond they
discovered a bag with the word bomb at their heliport a diversion
planted by the thieves and caltrops (road spikes) near the depot to slow
down their response on the ground. While many of the thieves were caught
after an investigation, most of the money was never recovered. The Vastberg
heist was not a nuclear event, but a new report from my colleagues at
Harvard University makes the case that the incident should have deeply
troubling implications for the leaders from over 50 countries convening in the
Netherlands on March 24-25 for a summit on nuclear security. The stark truth
is that many locations around the world that store highly enriched uranium
(HEU) and plutonium the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons would
not be able to repel an attack from adversaries using tactics and weapons as
sophisticated as those used by the Vastberg thieves. An amount of
plutonium that would fit in a soda can would be enough for terrorists
to construct a crude nuclear bomb capable of reducing the heart of a
major city to rubble (it wouldnt require much HEU, either). Today,
there are approximately 1440 tons of HEU and 500 tons of separated
plutonium in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries around the
world; the theft of only .001 percent of this stockpile could lead to
hundreds of thousands of deaths. Categorizing nuclear terrorism as the
gravest global security threat, President Obama convened the first biennial
Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 as part of a four-year goal to secure all
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide. By elevating the issue of nuclear
security to the level of presidents and prime ministers, the summit process
resulted in indisputable successes. Four years later, the report by Harvard
points out, many countries have strengthened their rules and
procedures for securing nuclear materials, and 13 countries
eliminated all the HEU or separate plutonium on their soil entirely,

including, thank god, Ukraine (you really dont want HEU hanging around in a
country on the verge of war). For these and other reasons, the summits have
made the world a safer place. Nonetheless, every country that still has
nuclear weapons, plutonium or HEU has more to do to ensure these
items are efectively and lastingly secured including the United
States. Some facilities still require physical enhancements, such as
more armed guards, physical barriers, and so on. Others have only
minimal protections against insiders stealing nuclear material or
sabotaging facilities. In most cases, the biggest obstacle remains
security culture. All the bells, whistles and hair-trigger seismic
detectors in the world wont make a diference if security personnel
are not vigilant. The Harvard report quotes Eugene Habiger, former
security czar at the U.S. Department of Energy: good security is
20% hardware and 80% culture. In the U.S. in 2012, an 82-year old
nun and two other peace protestors broke into Y-12, a facility in
Tennessee that contains the worlds largest repository of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) in metal form and until the incident was
colloquially known as the Fort Knox of HEU for its state-of-the-art
security equipment. The nun bypassed multiple intrusion-detection
systems because faulty cameras had not been replaced and guards
at the central alarm station had grown weary of manually validating
sensors that produced frequent false alarms. When the protestors
started hammering on the side of a building that contains enough HEU for
hundreds of weapons, the guards inside assumed the noise was coming from
construction workers that they had not been told were coming. She and her
fellow protestors were eventually challenged by a single guard.

Terror Adv Yes Bioterror

Terrorists could have bioweapons
James Kirkup, 13 (Deputy Political Editor, 3-26-2013, "Biological
attacks 'getting easier for terrorists'," Telegraph.co.uk,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-theuk/9955007/Biological-attacks-getting-easier-for-terrorists.html,
accessed 7/8/15, SM)
the Director of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism,
said that extremists have ever greater access to the information and
technology required to create and spread germ agents or other
biological weapons. He spoke as an official assessment suggested that countering the threat to
Charles Farr,

the UK from international terrorism is becoming harder and more expensive. The Home Office has
published an annual report on its Contest counter-terrorism strategy, which warned that Islamic terrorist
threats are now spread more widely across the world, requiring very significant resources to combat. The
report showed that security officials and intelligence agencies believe that a priority for Britain is
improving its ability to detect biological attacks, treat victims and decontaminate attack sites.

Biological will get easier from a terrorist point of view , Mr Farr said.
Related Articles Republican terrorists claim car bomb was meant for G8 summit 25 Mar 2013 MI5 chief to
step down, Theresa May says 25 Mar 2013 Car bomb found near Lough Erne G8 venue 23 Mar 2013 Major
terror attack on scale of 7/7 foiled every year in UK, police reveal 21 Mar 2013 Syria opposition demands
protection from Patriot shield 26 Mar 2013 Factors facilitating such attacks include the availability of
formulae and other information on the internet; increasing teaching of biological sciences at universities,
and greater availability of technology, he said. Mr Farr, a former MI6 officer, declined to give further
details of the threat, but the Home Office report hints at a range of new precautions. Last year, the Home
Office began enforcing a new list of controlled biological agents to ensure that dangerous pathogens and
toxins that are required in important medical and scientific research are used and held securely. Lessons
learned from the security operations for the London Olympic Games have informed the wider programme
of planning for high impact biological attacks, the report said. The Home Office report also said that
British authorities continue to plan for a Mumbai-style attack by terrorist gunmen. In particular, the
emergency services have been working on plans to treat and extract casualties from an attack scene even
while violence continues. Details are secret, but it is believed that special teams of armed police officers
and volunteer paramedics have been trained to operate under fire. Mr Farr also revealed that even as
officials prepare for such attacks,

the counter-terrorism budget is coming under

pressure to make cuts. Security and intelligence agencies are having to find savings to fund
the battle against al-Qaeda, he said. In some cases, that means reducing manpower. The warnings about
the money available for counter-terrorism come as ministers discuss a Spending Review that is likely to
impose more cuts on the Home Office budget after the next general election. Danny Alexander, the Chief
Secretary to the Treasury, told the Daily Telegraph last week that the Home Office could not be spared cuts
in the 2015/16 round. The Home Office report on British counter-terrorism warned that the UK faces a more
complicated and widespread threat, which is more costly to address. The

terrorist threats we
face are now more diverse than before, dispersed across a wider
geographical areas, and often in countries without efective
governance, it said. This poses significant challenges to our national security and to the security
and intelligence agencies and departments working on counter-terrorism: operating in these areas is
difficult and dangerous, requires very significant resources and is complicated and at times made
impossible by the breakdown of governance and law and order. Mr Farr said that the changing nature of
the threat puts new financial pressure on the Home Office and other agencies. It takes more to do the
same amount of counter-terrorism work, he said. We have to find savings. He added: Across the whole
of the CT budget, which is in the region of 1 billion, you would expect to find some efficiency savings.
Technology means that in some areas, you can do the same with fewer people. The Home Office report
also warned that British Muslims fighting in Syrias civil war could return home to carry out terrorist
attacks.

2ac Answers

AT: T Geography
Domestic surveillance means surveillance of US citizens.
Unegbu, Howard University JD candidate, 2013
[Cindy, 57 How. L.J. 433, NOTE AND COMMENT: National Security
Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional
Misstep Lexis, accessed 7-6-15, TAP]
Recently, the government has been granted a broad authority to
monitor domestic individuals for purposes of national security
without requiring any suspicion of criminal or terrorist activity.
73Link to the text of the note Many counterterrorism authorities have
addressed monitoring procedures; 74Link to the text of the note however,
two specific laws are gaining much criticism--the NCTC and [446]
the FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG). These
authorities are discussed and analyzed below.

AT: Terror Talk

No link, root cause, or epistemological problem with the
af the af does not replicate bias against Muslims or
Middle Eastern communities BUT DOES solve based on
statistics.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
Notably, the argument that Muslims and Middle Easterners are in the
best position to provide accurate intelligence on terrorist activities
within their respective communities risks fueling the government's
conflation of those communities with terrorism. 122Link to the text of
the note However, in analyzing how best to procure counterterrorism
intelligence, it would be amiss not to recognize the FBI's and other
law enforcement agencies' heavy focus on Muslim and Middle
Eastern communities. This is largely due to most recognized foreign
terrorist organizations being based out of the Middle East or having
Islamic ties. 123Link to the text of the note Law enforcement eforts,
immigration law, surveillance policies, and pre-9/11 incidents like
the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center have categorized the
typical terrorist as male, Middle Eastern, and devoutly Muslim.
124Link to the text of the note The reality is that even though recently
immigrated Muslims and Middle Easterners have become
synonymous with terrorism, terrorists come from various ethnicities,
religions, and communities. 125Link to the text of the note While
acknowledging and attempting not to replicate that stereotype, this
Comment seeks to recommend ways to improve the relationship
between law enforcement and potential terrorism informants who
typically belong to the same religion or ethnicity as those they
surveil. The government's focus on Muslim and Middle Eastern
communities as potential breeding grounds for terrorist groups also
directs the focus of this Comment. However, this Comment resists
the broad characterization of these communities as prone to
extremism and violence. In fact, a recent statistical analysis of
terrorism activity after 9/11 discredits the stereotype that Muslims
and Middle Easterners account for most of the terrorism within the
United States. 126Link to the text of the note In total, the report found
that U.S.-originated non-Muslims accounted for 107 post-9/11 plots
while U.S.-originated Muslims accounted for 49. 127Link to the text of
the note Conversely, the report found that cooperation with Muslim
communities helped prevent 40 percent of all Al-Qaeda plots after
9/11. 128Link to the text of the note As the report notes, "[a] singular

focus on Muslim terrorists is both bad for national security and civil
society . Numerous studies and experts have stated that there is
no reliable [255] "terrorist profile.'" 129Link to the text of the note
When compared to the actual threat posed by members of Muslim
and Middle Eastern communities, then, the FBI's explicit target of
Muslim and Middle Eastern communities is excessive.

AT: Speaking for Others

Representations are key to transform consciousness
Spivak 95 (Gayatari Chakravorty Spivak, a University Professor
at Columbia University where she is a founding member of the
school's Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, Can
the Subaltern Speak? http://www.mcgill.ca/files/crclawdiscourse/Can_the_subaltern_speak.pdf, Published in December
of 95 dawg, Accessed July 9th 2015, CMT)
If this is, indeed, Deleuzes argument, his articulation of it is problematic. Two
senses of representation are being run together: representation as
speaking for, as in politics, and representation as re-presentation,
as in art or philosophy. Since theory is also only action, the theoretician
does not represent (speak for) the oppressed group. Indeed, the subject is not
seen as a representative consciousness (one re-presenting reality
adequately). These two senses of representation within state
formation and the law, on the one hand, and in subject-predication,
on the other are related but irreducibly discontinuous. To cover
over the discontinuity with an analogy that is presented as a proof reflects
again a paradoxical subject-privileging. ^12 Because the person who
speaks and acts is always a multiplicity, no theorizing
intellectual [or] party or union can represent those who act and
struggle (FD, p. 206)? These immense problems are buried in the
differences between the same words: consciousness and conscience (both
conscience in French), representation and re-presentation. The critique
of ideological subject-be efaced, as can the active theoretical
practice of the transformation of consciousness. The banality of leftist
intellectuals lists of self-knowing, politically canny subalterns stands
revealed; representing them, the intellectuals represent themselves as
transparent. If such a critique and such a project are not to be given up, the
shifting distinction between representation within the state and political
economy, on the one hand, and within the theory of the Subject, on the
other, must not be obliterated. Let us consider the play of vertreten
(represent in the first sense) and darstellen (represent in the second sense)
in a famous passage in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Lous Bonaparte, where
Marx touches on class as a descriptive and transformative concept in a
manner somewhat more complex than Althussers distinction between class
instinct and class position would allow.

AT: Legalism/Legal Reform Good

The USA Freedom Act is a key component to providing
civil liberties to all citizens
Black 15 (Edward J. Black, Mr. Black received his Bachelor of
Arts degree from Muhlenberg College and his Juris Doctor degree
from the American University Washington College of Law where
he won honors in the area of international law, Congress to Vote
on Surveillance Reforms After Misuse, HuffingtonPost.com,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edward-j-black/congress-to-voteon-surve_b_7342718.html, Published May 21 2015, Accessed July
8th 2015, CMT)
The damage wrought by the government's overreach to the
fundamental trust between tech companies and their users will be
difficult to reverse, but it must start with reform of the mass
surveillance programs and improved transparency and oversight .
Fortunately, the Senate now has an opportunity to speak definitively on the
future of the NSA's mass collection of metadata. A broad coalition of civil
liberties groups, technology companies, and trade associations, including my
own, have publicly agreed the USA FREEDOM Act is the right first step
on the path towards reforming the U.S. government's surveillance
practices. The USA FREEDOM Act ends the government's bulk collection of
call records and includes substantial oversight and transparency mechanisms
designed to ensure that domestic surveillance agencies and programs are
held accountable. At its core, the bill requires government access to call data
for intelligence purposes to be targeted and limited, rather than allencompassing. USA FREEDOM also provides for a civil liberties
advocate to appear before the secret FISA courts that authorize
surveillance programs. Lastly, the bill allows companies that receive data
requests from the NSA to combat misperceptions by reporting the kind and
quantity of those requests with more detail, while respecting national security
concerns over excessive disclosure. When dealing with secret law and
intelligence authorities, there are inherent risks for overreach, as recognized
in the recent appellate court decision regarding the bulk call records
collection program. Pressure for, perhaps well-intentioned, but expansive
interpretations of limited authorities are inevitable when law is made in the
shadows. As such, there can never be enough light shed on such processes.
While the USA FREEDOM Act does much to improve public oversight over the
government's surveillance authorities, we would welcome further legislative
efforts to strengthen the bill's transparency provisions and collection
limitations. Notably, because the USA FREEDOM Act's primary goal is to
provide reform and address privacy and civil liberties concerns, it explicitly
does not include a mandate that companies retain user data for surveillance
purposes. Such a requirement, if included by amendment or otherwise, would
necessarily undermine the bill's reforms and pose further privacy and security

risks to the public given the considerable secrecy surrounding surveillance

practices. The United States must set an example in reforming its
mass surveillance programs. The longer they remain intact, the greater
the opportunity for other governments to cite them as justification for even
more invasive programs with fewer checks and balances. Every day we
wait leads to further erosions of civil liberties worldwide , and
deepens the gulf between the tech industry and its users -- with
serious economic consequences. The Senate should pass the USA
FREEDOM Act and take a critical first step toward preserving the
public's civil liberties and restoring trust in both the tech sector and
the U.S. government. That trust is necessary for both innovation and the
sustained health of the Internet and all it offers citizens and businesses
around the world.

Legal reform is a successful part of American political

culture
McCann 94 (Michael W. McCann, a professor of political science
at the University of Washington, Rights at Work: Pay Equity
Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization, Books.Google.com,
https://books.google.com/books?
id=WtoAayu603kC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false,
Published June 25 1994, Accessed July 8th 2015, CMT)
The first and perhaps most general factor that deserves recognition
is the rich legacy of rights-based legal reform within modern
American political culture. As Scheingold has argued, most
Americans are responsive to legal symbols There is a strong
current of belief in rights We believe that politics is and should be
conducted in accordance with patterns of rights and obligations
(1974:13; Haskell 1987; Minow 1990). This general legal consciousness was
significantly deepened and expanded by the succession of social movements
that, since the 1930s, demanded state support for new citizen rights. These
movements included above all the battles for worker rights and the
civil rights movement, followed by movements advancing the rights of
women, the poor, the disabled, homosexuals, the elderly, and
consumers, among others. Such struggles not only have benefited their
specific constituencies in various degrees, but also in turn created new
political openings for subsequent activism around pay equity and
other rights (see Tarrow 1983). This is true in several ways.

Reforms like the civil rights movement normalize social

diferences
McCann 94 (Michael W. McCann, a professor of political science
at the University of Washington, Rights at Work: Pay Equity
Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization, Books.Google.com,
https://books.google.com/books?
id=WtoAayu603kC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false,
Published June 25 1994, Accessed July 8th 2015, CMT)
Most obviously, such earlier movements provided the guiding
normative logics for evolving rights claims by many longmarginalized citizens. This revolution of rising entitlements, as Daniel
Bell once called it, has been driven in particular by claims about raceand gender-based discrimination (see Olson 1984:57). Activists whom
I interviewed spoke of the enormous debt owed to the civil rights
movement as a progressive consciousness raising experience in
American history that prepared the way for later struggles. In fact,
many activists pointed out that one of the first pay equity rights battles was
the Memphis strike by black male sanitation workers in 1968, during which
Martin Luther King was assassinated. The more important factor at the mass
level, however, is that legal discourses about discrimination, segregation,
equal rights, and the like had permeated the general public as well as
workplace-specific environments for decades. As a result, officially
sanctioned claims to equal rights have become part of everyday
understandings and expectations among citizens to an increasingly
significant degree.^10 National public opinion polls revealing
widespread support for the pay equity idea, once it is explained as a
remedy for sex discrimination, provide some confirmation for this
claim. ^11

Legal reforms can change social relations for minorities

Jolls 15 (Christine Jolls, the Director of the Law and Economics
Program at the National Bureau of Economic Research with a
Ph.D in Economics from MIT, Antidiscrimination Laws Effects on
Implicit Bias law.yale.ed,
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Faculty/Antidiscrimination
_Laws_Effects.pdf, Last Revised March 31 2015, Accessed July 8th
2015, CMT)
For purposes of the present paper, by contrast, the nature of the
relationship between implicit bias and the kinds of decisions policed
by antidiscrimination law is not important. This is so because the

papers essential goal is to describe how existing antidiscrimination law

although it has been broadly criticized for not aiming at implicitly biased
behavior in any significant way nonetheless tends to have the efect of
reducing implicit bias in important contexts. For this descriptive claim
about the effects of current antidiscrimination law on implicit bias to be of
interest, it is only necessary that implicit bias be correlated with some
actual behavior that we might care about, whether or not this is
behavior that antidiscrimination law can directly regulate. What was
said just above establishes clearly that the first correlation exists. (Thus, for
instance, the evidence suggests that implicit bias is linked to an
individuals general friendliness toward African-Americans or
members of other targeted groups. While neither current
antidiscrimination law nor any plausible reform of this law could
directly regulate such general friendliness, it is nonetheless relevant
to learn that existing antidiscrimination law reduces implicit bias
and, thus, the pattern of general unfriendliness associated with such
bias.) In contrast to the case of existing proposals for reforming
antidiscrimination law, an important virtue of the project of this paper is that
it is not necessary that implicit bias be correlated with the specific 16
behaviors such as employment decisions, admissions to educational
institutions, and membership or participation in voluntary organizations that
antidiscrimination law policies.

Society is self-checking; implicit racism is eliminating

itself through diversity (retag if needed)
Jolls 15 (Christine Jolls, the Director of the Law and Economics
Program at the National Bureau of Economic Research with a
Ph.D in Economics from MIT, Antidiscrimination Laws Effects on
Implicit Bias law.yale.ed,
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Faculty/Antidiscrimination
_Laws_Effects.pdf, Last Revised March 31 2015, Accessed July 8th
2015, CMT)
Laws regulating discrimination in the workplace are a basic
component of American antidiscrimination law and have been the site
of many of the existing critiques of the failure of existing doctrines to target
implicitly biased behavior.58 But, notwithstanding these critiques, even the
simplest feature of such laws prohibiting certain hiring, firing and
promotion practices will often have the efect of reducing the
degree of implicit workplace bias through the simple mechanism of
increasing workplace diversity.59 1. Social Science Evidence on the
Effects of Diverse Populations A striking set of results in the social science
literature on implicit bias demonstrates that diversity in the surrounding

population will often shape and affect the degree of implicit bias individuals
exhibit. The studies suggest that the others present in an individuals
environment can significantly reduce the degree of implicit bias as
measured by the Implicit Association Test (IAT) described above. At a
broader level, both these studies and the evidence discussed later in this Part
demonstrate the way in which the environment in which individuals find
themselves structures and affects the degree of implicit bias such individuals
exhibit on the IAT and similar measures. One notable study of the efects
of population make-up on implicit bias showed that individuals who
were administered an inperson IAT by an African-American
experimenter exhibited substantially less implicit racial bias than
individuals who were 58 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 59
Diversity is used throughout this paper to refer to an increase in the
representation of a traditionally underrepresented group. Theoretically such
an increase could make a particular population less diverse if this specific
population was not initially characterized by the general pattern of
underrepresentation; but the usage here, which accords with popular usage,
seems workable for purposes of this paper. 20 administered an in-person IAT
by a white experimenter.60 In other words, subjects speed in
categorizing black-unpleasant and whitepleasant (stereotypeconsistent) pairs was closer to their speed in categorizing blackpleasant and white-unpleasant (stereotypeinconsistent) pairs when an
African-American experimenter was standing in front of the room
than when a white experimenter was standing in front of the room.

AT: Topicality
The af is topical it meets its, domestic surveillance,
curtail, and substantial.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
the FBI lacks
substantial restraints on how it recruits and uses informants.
Currently, there are four restrictions on how the FBI recruits
informants: (1) internal FBI limitations, (2) constitutional limitations,
(3) the entrapment defense and the outrageous government conduct
doctrine, and (4) enforcement of nondeportation agreements in plea
bargains. Because these limitations have neither curtailed the FBI's
mismanagement of informants nor ensured a high degree of
accuracy in information obtained, these restrictions have failed to
protect both the public from terrorism and informants from abuse .
III. Limitations on the FBI's Use of Informants Cromitie demonstrates that

156Link to the text of the note A. Attorney General Guidelines The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI
Confidential Human Sources 157Link to the text of the note ("Guidelines"), issued in 2006 by the
Department of Justice, 158Link to the text of the note are agency guidelines, not regulations, and as such
have no binding legal effect. 159Link to the text of the note [259] Much of the problem of FBI informant
misuse stems from this fact. The Guidelines outline the rules the FBI should follow in undercover
investigations involving informants, which include documenting new informants and recording agreements
made. 160Link to the text of the note The Guidelines are also subject to review and modification by the
Attorney General in accordance with federal laws, and are afforded great deference by the courts. 161Link
to the text of the note The major problems with the Guidelines, however, are that they lack consequences,
are not subject to judicial review, and are not followed by agents. 162Link to the text of the note While the
Guidelines may have internal consequences 163Link to the text of the note for FBI agents who violate
them, they have no meaningful effect beyond internal regulation and cannot be enforced by the public via
judicial review. 164Link to the text of the note Judicial review for violations only occurs when criminal
prosecutions reveal the FBI's activities in the investigation. 165Link to the text of the note However, the
informants in these cases typically remain confidential, and any inquiry into their actions does not extend
beyond the handling agent's conduct and the recruitment methods used. 166Link to the text of the note
Evidence shows that in many cases, FBI agents fail to follow the Guidelines when recruiting and handling
informants. A 2005 study conducted by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General found
that the FBI did not provide enough support to agents to properly follow the pre-2006 Attorney General
Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants. 167Link to the text of the note In fact,
noncompliance with the guidelines was a problem in 87 percent of the cases the Inspector General
reviewed. In particular, agents failed to properly review the suitability of potential informants, properly
document informants' illegal activities, and notify informants of their limitations. 168Link to the text of the
note Given the high levels of noncompliance and agents' nearly unlimited discretion in extending
immigration rewards, agent abuse is likely also high. [260] Immigration rewards appear only once in the
Guidelines, yet this single reference exemplifies the impunity with which law enforcement procures
informants. The Guidelines state that "no promises or commitments can be made, except by the United
States Department of Homeland Security, regarding the alien status of any person or the right of any
person to enter or remain in the United States." 169Link to the text of the note The Guidelines also note
that informants should receive this information if and when they have any issues regarding immigration
status. 170Link to the text of the note While acknowledging that FBI agents may only offer immigration
benefits to informants pursuant to DHS's agreement, the Guidelines do not answer the questions raised by
this arrangement. Unlike monetary rewards, for which the Guidelines establish a number of rules regarding
proper payment procedures and conditions, 171Link to the text of the note it is not clear under what
circumstances immigration rewards must be documented and whether they are subject to conditions
similar to those of monetary rewards. Their brief appearance in the Guidelines shows the FBI's recognition

of immigration benefits as a method to elicit informant cooperation, but details on their use are
nonexistent. This absence of information indicates that agents may possess vast discretion when using
immigration rewards to recruit informants. It also indicates that executing these rewards is ultimately in
the hands of DHS. B. Constitutional Limitations In theory, both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment restrict the FBI's use of informants in terrorism investigations. However,
neither Amendment has actually limited the Agency's recruitment tactics when dealing with subjects
facing immigration-related pressures to serve as informants. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures 172Link to the text of the note does not offer any substantive
restrictions on the FBI's use of informants in terrorist investigations. In criminal investigations where the
Fourth Amendment does apply, it places few restrictions on the use of information gathered by informants.
173Link to the text of the note To obtain a warrant based on intelligence gathered by an informant, the
information must be reliable in establishing the requisite probable cause. 174Link to the text of the note In
matters of national security however, the search standard is less stringent than the probable cause
standard [261] used in criminal investigations. 175Link to the text of the note In fact, the United States
Supreme Court has never held that the Fourth Amendment applies to national security investigations.
176Link to the text of the note In particular, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)
177Link to the text of the note shields federal agents from standard criminal warrant requirements when
carrying out electronic surveillance and searches. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a secret
court 178Link to the text of the note created by FISA to issue warrants in national security investigations,
179Link to the text of the note only requires probable cause that "the target of the electronic surveillance
is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." 180Link to the text of the note Hence, because agents
do not have to produce evidence of criminal activity before initiating electronic or physical surveillance,
they are able to use informants more freely. 181Link to the text of the note Under FISA, the Attorney
General can also authorize surveillance for up to a year without court order. 182Link to the text of the note
Furthermore, in 1982, President Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,333 identified the FBI as the primary
gatherer of domestic intelligence and held that the Attorney General holds the power to carry out

Executive
Order No. 12,333 essentially paved the way for the FBI's use of
informants to conduct domestic surveillance of foreign agents,
including members of foreign terrorist organizations, without [262]
adhering to the restrictions inherent in the use of informants in
domestic criminal investigations. In domestic criminal
investigations, agents are required by law to corroborate
informants' intelligence and credibility before a warrant is issued .
184Link to the text of the note However, under Executive Order No. 12,333, this
corroboration is not required in terrorism investigations . 185Link to the text
warrantless searches and surveil agents of foreign powers. 183Link to the text of the note

of the note For informants facing deportation and immense pressure to cooperate, these lax warrant
requirements remove an important check on the validity of their intelligence. The requirements also give
the FBI more opportunities to abuse its power. Although no court has explicitly found Executive Order No.
12,333 constitutional, no court has found it unconstitutional and thus it remains good law. Indeed, the
Northern District of Illinois found that FBI reliance on the Order in conducting physical searches for foreign
intelligence gathering was reasonable. 186Link to the text of the note

AT: S-6 Reform CP No Solvency Entrapment

CP doesnt solve the entrapment internal link it still
results in the false production of intelligence because it
provides an incentive for intelligence.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
The examples discussed supra in Part II illustrate how the overbroad and
indiscriminate use of informants, particularly those recruited with
immigration threats or rewards, harms the acquisition of useful
information, fails to identify and protect against legitimate threats,
chills speech, and encourages ethnic and religious profiling.
Immigration law ofers less protection to informants than promises
of leniency in criminal matters, thus increasing the potential for
informants to produce faulty intelligence. Part III, supra, demonstrates
that limitations on FBI dealings with informants are practically nonexistent.

AT: S-6 Visa Reform CP No Solvency

Circumvention
No solvency circumvention.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
Reports indicate that no S-6 visas were issued to terrorism informants
between 1994 and 2006. 252Link to the text of the note There is also no
indication of how many S-6 visas, if any, were processed during this time.
The lack of incentives for the FBI to apply for S-6 visas on behalf of
informants may be responsible for this. That is, while the prospect of
legal permanent residency may be tempting bait for the FBI to
dangle in front of potential informants, the bureaucratic process
involved in obtaining an S-6 visa is discouraging. 253Link to the text of
the note Hence, while the FBI may tout S-6 visas to potential
informants, the use of coercive and unapproved [271] threats of
deportation is more likely to result in cooperation - with less time,
efort, and oversight. Since informants waive their recourses in S-6
visa agreements, the FBI sufers no legal backlash when it fails to
fulfill promises made to them. 254Link to the text of the note
Essentially, the potential benefits of using the S-6 visa are
outweighed by the lengthy process involved, especially if the FBI can
circumvent the process or break its promises. In the end, the FBI has
no real reason to seek an S-6 visa for an informant.

AT: S-6 Visa Reform CP No Solvency

The CP is insufficient to solve too narrow to solve the
af.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
Changing the S-6 visa program and focusing on the FBI's use of
immigration incentives to recruit informants may seem too narrow to
appreciably influence national security and community relations.
However, the point of this Comment is a narrow one: to showcase one
problematic aspect in the way the FBI handles human intelligence. The
recommendations here would not fully solve the problems of privacy
violations, ethnic and religious profiling, and informant misuse. The
use of immigration law and status to leverage informants is not the
only way that the FBI recruits informants, and the S-6 visa program
would likely remain relatively small even if expanded. However, as
previously explained, the proposed changes to the S-6 visa would generate a
more transparent system and more fruitful intelligence, and would help
ensure the FBI operates within the scope of its power. Individuals pressured
to provide intelligence information would have a legitimate chance to receive
an S-6 visa, and the FBI would have a greater incentive to stop its overtly
coercive recruitment tactics such as deportation threats.

AT: Race K No Root Cause

The 1AC is a prerequisite to the alternative the 1AC
posits a critique of the national security state that is a
better starting point and explanation for the current
manifestations of the impact of the K than the alternative.
Kundnani, New York University media culture and
communication professor, and Kumar, Rutgers University
media studies and Middle East studies professor, 2015
[Arun and Deepa, Race, surveillance, and empire
http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, accessed 7-11-15,
TAP]
The election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 was said to have
ushered in a new post-racial era, in which racial inequalities were meant to be a thing
of the past. African Americans and Muslim Americans placed their hopes
in Obama, voting for him in large numbers. But in the so-called postracial era, the security narrative of hard-working families (coded
white) under threat from dangerous racial others has been as
powerful as ever. The unprecedented mass deportation of more than
two million people during the Obama presidency is one form taken
by this post-racial racialized securitization. Over the last two decades, the
progressive criminalization of undocumented immigrants has been
achieved through the building of a militarized wall between Mexico
and the United States, hugely expanding the US border patrol, and
programs such as Secure Communities, which enables local police departments to access immigration

It has
resulted in migrants being increasingly likely to be profiled,
arrested, and imprisoned by local police officers, before being
passed to the federal authorities for deportation. Undocumented migrants can
databases. Secure Communities was introduced in 2008 and stepped up under Obama.

no longer have any contact with police officers without risking such outcomes. There is an irony in the way

fears of illegal immigration threatening jobs and the public

purse have become stand-ins for real anxieties about the neoliberal
collapse of the old social contract: the measures that such fears lead
toracialization and criminalization of migrantsthemselves serve
to strengthen the neoliberal status quo by encouraging a precarious
labor market. Capital, after all, does not want to end immigration
but to profit from a vast exploitable labor pool that exists under
precarious conditions, that does not enjoy the civil, political and
labor rights of citizens and that is disposable through deportation .66
What brings together these diferent systems of racial oppression
mass incarceration, mass surveillance, and mass deportationis a
security logic that holds the imperial state as necessary to keeping
American families (coded white) safe from threats abroad and at
home. The ideological work of the last few decades has cultivated not only racial security fears but also
an assumption that the security state is necessary to keep us safe. In this sense, security has
that

become the new psychological wage to aid the reallocation of the

welfare states social wage toward homeland security and to win
support for empire in the age of neoliberalism. Through the notion
of security, social and economic anxieties generated by the
unraveling of the Keynesian social compact have been channeled
toward the Black or Brown street criminal, welfare recipient, or
terrorist . In addition, as Susan Faludi has argued, since 9/11, this homeland in need of
security has been symbolized, above all, by the white domestic
hearth of the prefeminist fifties, once again threatened by mythical
frontier enemies, hidden subversives, and racial aggressors. That
this idea of the homeland coincides culturally with the denigration
of capable women, the magnification of manly men, the heightened
call for domesticity, the search for and sanctification of helpless
girls points to the ways it is gendered as well as racialized .67

AT: Race K Binaries DA/Coalitions Good

The alternative doesnt solve the case the alternative
reifies the black white binary which is inadequate in
addressing the modern surveillance regime.
Kundnani, New York University media culture and
communication professor, and Kumar, Rutgers University
media studies and Middle East studies professor, 2015
[Arun and Deepa, Race, surveillance, and empire
http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, accessed 7-11-15,
TAP]
Better oversight of the sprawling national security apparatus and
greater use of encryption in digital communication should be
welcomed. But by themselves these are likely to do little more than
reassure technologists, while racialized populations and political
dissenters continue to experience massive surveillance. This is why
the most efective challenges to the national security state have
come not from legal reformers or technologists but from grassroots
campaigning by the racialized groups most afected. In New York,
the campaign against the NYPDs surveillance of Muslims has drawn
its strength from building alliances with other groups afected by
racial profiling: Latinos and Blacks who sufer from hugely
disproportionate rates of stop and frisk. In Californias Bay Area, a
campaign against a Department of Homeland Security-funded Domain
Awareness Center was successful because various constituencies were able
to unite on the issue, including homeless people, the poor, Muslims, and
Blacks. Similarly, a demographics unit planned by the Los Angeles Police
Department, which would have profiled communities on the basis of race and
religion, was shut down after a campaign that united various groups defined
by race and class. The lesson here is that, while the national security
state aims to create fear and to divide people, activists can organize
and build alliances across race lines to overcome that fear. To the
extent that the national security state has targeted Occupy, the
antiwar movement, environmental rights activists, radical journalists
and campaigners, and whistleblowers, these groups have gravitated
towards opposition to the national security state. But understanding
the centrality of race and empire to national security surveillance
means finding a basis for unity across diferent groups who
experience similar kinds of policing: Muslim, Latino/a, Asian, Black,
and white dissidents and radicals. It is on such a basis that we can
see the beginnings of an efective multiracial opposition to the
surveillance state and empire.

AT: Race K Perm & AT:

Legalism/Colorblindness
The af may be colorblind BUT the permutation solves
the alternative is not to reject legal reform but to
understand that legal reform alone isnt enough.
This answers colorblindness AND legalism.

Kundnani, New York University media culture and

communication professor, and Kumar, Rutgers University
media studies and Middle East studies professor, 2015
[Arun and Deepa, Race, surveillance, and empire
http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, accessed 7-11-15,
TAP]
Better oversight of the sprawling national security apparatus and
greater use of encryption in digital communication should be
welcomed. But by themselves these are likely to do little more than
reassure technologists, while racialized populations and political
dissenters continue to experience massive surveillance. This is why
the most efective challenges to the national security state have
come not from legal reformers or technologists but from grassroots
campaigning by the racialized groups most afected. In New York,
the campaign against the NYPDs surveillance of Muslims has drawn
its strength from building alliances with other groups afected by
racial profiling: Latinos and Blacks who sufer from hugely
disproportionate rates of stop and frisk. In Californias Bay Area, a
campaign against a Department of Homeland Security-funded Domain
Awareness Center was successful because various constituencies were able
to unite on the issue, including homeless people, the poor, Muslims, and
Blacks. Similarly, a demographics unit planned by the Los Angeles Police
Department, which would have profiled communities on the basis of race and
religion, was shut down after a campaign that united various groups defined
by race and class. The lesson here is that, while the national security
state aims to create fear and to divide people, activists can organize
and build alliances across race lines to overcome that fear. To the
extent that the national security state has targeted Occupy, the
antiwar movement, environmental rights activists, radical journalists
and campaigners, and whistleblowers, these groups have gravitated
towards opposition to the national security state. But understanding
the centrality of race and empire to national security surveillance
means finding a basis for unity across diferent groups who
experience similar kinds of policing: Muslim, Latino/a, Asian, Black,
and white dissidents and radicals. It is on such a basis that we can
see the beginnings of an efective multiracial opposition to the
surveillance state and empire.

AT: K - General Social Death

Social death can only be understood in the context of
surveillance the condition for the possibility of nonhuman was the rise of the surveillance state the 1ac is a
necessary starting point for understanding the K, not the
alt.
Kundnani, New York University media culture and
communication professor, and Kumar, Rutgers University
media studies and Middle East studies professor, 2015
[Arun and Deepa, Race, surveillance, and empire
http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, accessed 7-11-15,
TAP]
National security surveillance is as old as the bourgeois nation state,
which from its very inception sets out to define the people
associated with a particular territory, and by extension the nonpeoples, i.e., populations to be excluded from that territory and
seen as threats to the nation. Race, in modern times, becomes the
main way that such threatsboth internal and externalare
mediated; modern mechanisms of racial oppression and the modern
state are born together. This is particularly true of settler-colonial
projects, such as the United States, in which the goal was to
territorially dispossess Indigenous nations and pacify the resistance
that inevitably sprang up. In this section, we describe how the drive for
territorial expansion and the formation of the early American state depended
on an effective ideological erasure of those who peopled the land. Elaborate
racial profiles, based on empirical observationthe precursor to more
sophisticated surveillance mechanismswere thus devised to justify the
dispossession of native peoples and the obliteration of those who resisted.

AT: K General No Root Cause

The critique does not solve the root cause of the modern
surveillance state the history of surveillance is far more
complex than the reductionist view of the alternative
that means it fails to solve the case national security is
the most accurate historical explanation of the modern
surveillance state.
This card EXPLICITLY says whiteness was not the reason for the creation of
the modern surveillance state. This card also says the KKK was targeted by
surveillance the K likely cannot explain that.

Kundnani, New York University media culture and

communication professor, and Kumar, Rutgers University
media studies and Middle East studies professor, 2015
[Arun and Deepa, Race, surveillance, and empire
http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, accessed 7-11-15,
TAP]
By 1890, coast-to-coast colonization was efectively complete , with the
surviving Native American population consigned to reservations. Thereafter, the priority became the
projection of US power further afield, again justified through a
racialized understanding of American exceptionalism. As Paul
Kramer writes in the context of the US conquest of the Philippines:
[T]he wars advocates subsumed US history within longer, racial
trajectories of Anglo-Saxon history which folded together US and
British imperial histories. The Philippine-American War, then, was a
natural extension of Western conquest, and both taken together were the organic expression of the
desires, capacities, and destinies of Anglo-Saxon peoples. Americans, as Anglo-Saxons, shared Britons racial genius for empire-building, a
genius which they must exercise for the greater glory of the race and to advance civilization in general. Unlike other races, they
liberated the peoples they conquered; indeed, their expressions of conquest as freedom proliferated as the terrors they unleashed became

The resistance that Filipinos mounted to American

benevolence could then only be seen as an atavistic barbarism to be
countered through modern techniques of surveillance and
repression. While local police departments within the United States had begun to develop techniques of political surveillance, it
was under the US colonial regime in the Philippines that systematic
and widespread surveillance of political opponents and the
manipulation of personal information as a form of political control
was first institutionalized. A unit within the police called the
Constabulary Information Section was established in Manila in 1901 ,
founded by Henry Allen, a former military attach to Tsarist Russia.32 The Constabulary Information
Section cultivated hundreds of paid Filipino agents across the
country, making it scarcely possible for seditionary measures of
importance to be hatched without our knowledge, as Allen wrote to
President Theodore Roosevelt.33 The techniques of compiling
dossiers on dissidents private lives, spreading disinformation in the
media, and planting agents provocateurs among militants were
more visible.31

applied to combating radical nationalist groupings in Manila. Control

over information proved as efective a tool of colonial power as
physical force. As historian Alfred W. McCoy notes, during World War I police
methods that had been tested and perfected in the colonial
Philippines migrated homeward to provide both precedents and
personnel for the establishment of a US internal security apparatus.
After years of pacifying an overseas empire where race was the
frame for perception and action, colonial veterans came home to
turn the same lens on America, seeing its ethnic communities . . . as
internal colonies requiring coercive controls.34 On this basis, a
domestic national security apparatus emerged, with notions of race
and empire at its core. From 1917, the FBI and police department
red squads in US cities increasingly busied themselves with fears of
subversion from communists, pacifists, anarchists, and the ten million German
Americans who were suspected of harboring disloyalties. During World War I, thirty million
letters were physically examined and 350,000 badge-carrying
vigilantes snooped on immigrants, unions, and socialists .35 Concerns over privacy
set limits to such surveillance after the war, but with increasing left-wing and right-wing radicalization in the 1930s,
President Roosevelt decided to issue a secret executive order that
authorized a shift in the FBIs role from a narrowly conceived law
enforcement agency focused on gathering evidence for criminal
prosecutions into an intelligence agency. Thereafter, it was
dedicated to spying on subversive political movements (primarily communists,
but also fascists) and countering their ability to influence public debate. This
meant the FBI systematically identifying subversives based on
ideological and associational criteria.36 It also opened the door to
the burgeoning counter-subversion practices that the bureau would
launch over the following decades. Already during World War II, the
FBI was collecting detailed files on suspected communists while
Black organizations such as the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People and the Nation of Islam were also
surveillance targets.37 At the end of the Second World War, the United
States emerged as one of two superpowers on the world stage. Pushing back
against the isolationists, Cold War liberals made the case for the
establishment of a permanent national security state. According to
historian Paul Hogan, the national security mindset that emerged
involved a conviction that a new era of total war had dawned on the
United States. In total war, the battle was not confined to the front lines but extended to the home front as well, as did the
awesome destruction that modern weapons could inflict not only on military combatants but also on industry, urban centers, and civilian
populations. Modern war was total war in this sense that modern armies depended on the output of citizen soldiers in farms and factories
behind the battle line. In total war all of the nations resources and all of its energy and talent had to be mobilized on behalf of the war effort,
thereby obliterating the old distinction between civilian and military, between citizen and soldier, between home front and the front line. When
American leaders talked about total war they did so in these terms and also in terms that recognized that modern weapons could bring
massive destruction from great distances with barely a moments notice. In the new age, American leaders would no longer have the time to

This was an updating and reworking

of the settler-colonial mentality, with the notion of Manifest Destiny
being explicitly drawn on in making the case for an exceptional
American empire. The notion of the citizen-soldier was built upon
earlier settler-colonial racialized security narratives. However,
American exceptionalism, as it emerged in this period, was based on
debate the issue of war or peace or to prepare at a slow pace.38

the premise that the United States was not only unique among other
nations and therefore destined to play a leading global role, but also
a nation built upon liberal principles. This meant that the centrality
of whiteness to the security narrative was muted and less
prominent . Even though the white middle-class home was cast as
the locus of a privatized notion of self-defense and military
preparedness through government civil defense policies and
programs,39 the image of the US empire was one of liberalism,
inclusivity, and the melting pot. The United States sought quite
consciously to diferentiate itself from past empires as it positioned
itself to be one of two hegemons on the global stage. In this context,
the existence of Jim Crow segregation was an embarrassment for the
ruling class. In 1947, the National Security Act was passed which
entrenched security as a key element of the postwar order. Every
aspect of lifethe social, political, intellectual, and economicwas
conceived as playing a role in national defense, and a massive
security establishment was built up. The 1947 act created the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The National Security Agency (NSA) was

there was
also the integration of corporate America, of universities, of
research institutions, and of the media into the machinery of the
national security state. The earlier distinctions between the citizen
and soldier and between the home front and the battle front were
blurred to shore up an imperial system at home and abroad.
Surveillance was central to sustaining and reproducing this system.
From the 1940s to the early 1970s, FBI wiretapping and bugging
operations focused on a wide range of movements, activists, and
public figures. The following list of targets compiled by historian Athan Theoharis gives a flavor of the surveillance and is worth
quoting in full: Radical activists (David Dallin, Charles Malamuth, C. B. Baldwin, Frank Oppenheimer, Bertolt Brecht, Thomas
Mann, Heinrich Mann, Helene Weigel, Berthold Viertel, Anna Seghers, Bodo Uhse, Richard Criley, Frank Wilkinson), prominent
liberal and radical attorneys (Bartley Crum, Martin Popper, Thomas Corcoran, David Wahl, Benjamin Margolis,
Carol King, Robert Silberstein, National Lawyers Guild, Fred Black), Radical labor leaders and unions (Harry
formed in 1952, conceived as an organization to carry out the gathering of signals intelligence. During this period,

Bridges; United Auto Workers; National Maritime Union; National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards; United Public Workers; United Electrical
Radio and Machine Workers; Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers; International Longshoremens and Warehousemens Union; CIO

Journalists (I. F. Stone, Philip Jaffe, Kate Mitchell, Mark Gayn,

Civilrights activists and organizations (Martin Luther King, Jr.; Malcolm X; Southern Christian Leadership
Maritime Committee; Congress of Industrial Organizations Council),

Leonard Lyons, William Beecher, Marvin Kalb, Henry Brandon, Hedrick Smith, Lloyd Norman, Hanson Baldwin, Inga Arvad),

Conference; National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; March on Washington Movement; Gandhi Society for Human Rights;
Elijah Muhammad; Nation of Islam; Stokely Carmichael; H. Rap Brown; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee; Alabama Peoples
Education Association; Committee to Aid the Monroe Defendants; Southern Conference for Human Welfare; Black Panther Party; Universal
Negro Improvement Association; African Liberation Day Committee),

The Students for a Democratic

Society, Ku Klux Klan, National Committee to Abolish HUAC, Socialist Workers Party, Washington Bookstore Association,
Northern California Association of Scientists, Federation of American Scientists, American Association of Scientific Workers, preWorld War II
isolationists (Henry Grunewald, Ethel Brigham, John OBrien, Lillian Moorehead, Laura Ingalls, America First, Jehovahs Witnesses, Los Angeles
Chamber of Commerce), and even prominent personalities (Joe Namath, Harlow Shapley, Edward Condon, Edward Prichard, Muhammad Ali,
Benjamin Spock).40 In a bid to shape public opinion, the FBI also launched a mass media campaign in 1946 that released educational

In the late 1950s, the FBI launched its

secret counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO), which used
provocateurs and informants to infiltrate communist groups initially,
but later widened to include Puerto Rican nationalists, the student
movement, the civil rights movement, and Black liberation
materials to cooperative journalists and legislators.

movements. About 1,500 of the 8,500 American Communist Party members were likely FBI informants in the early 1960s. By
the end of the decade, agents who had previously worked in US
foreign intelligence were transferring to the burgeoning field of
domestic intelligence to spy on radical movements, whether employed by the bureau,
military intelligence, or the expanding red squads in local police departments.41 A key part of the FBIs
countersubversion strategy was the manipulation of political
activists into committing criminal acts so that they could be arrested
and prosecuted. Agents provocateurs working for the FBI initiated disruptions of meetings and demonstrations, fights between
rival groups, attacks on police, and bombings. FBI agents also secretly distributed derogatory and scurrilous material to police, Congress,

In an attempt to neutralize Martin

Luther King, Jr., who, the FBI worried, might abandon his obedience
to white liberal doctrines (as indeed he did), he was placed under
intense surveillance, and attempts were made to destroy his
marriage and induce his suicide. In various cities, the FBI and local police used fake letters and informants to
stir up violence between rival factions and gangs to disrupt the Black Panther Party.43 In a number of cases,
police departments or federal agents carried out the direct
assassination of Black Panthers.44
elected officials, other federal agencies, and the mass media.42

Terror DA Answers

AT: Terror DA Link Not True

View the link to the Terror DA through a skeptical lens
any success stories were rigged by the FBI.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
Many argue that tactics like recruiting informants through immigration law
and surveilling mosques are necessary to prevent terrorist attacks, and that
national security must be the nation's top priority, whatever the cost. These
arguments fail to recognize that when informants lack a specific target
and direction, the gathered intelligence does not necessarily
enhance the nation's security. Instead, the FBI - with little concern
for the actual gravity of the original threat posed by the suspect creates an elaborate terrorism plot for the surveillance targets to
participate in. 100Link to the text of the note After 9/11, many
individuals who showed no signs of violence or extremism prior to
involvement with informants and government-created plots have
been prosecuted under terrorism charges. 101Link to the text of the
note Until the informants provided the means, these individuals did not have
the finances or the proper connections to conceive and carry out these
terrorism plans. Although orchestrating these plots makes the FBI's
preventative stance appear successful in the public eye, it diverts
law enforcement resources from focusing on real targets.

AT: Terror DA
Racial, ethnic, and religious profiling fails entrapment
produces fabricated information.
Stabile, University of California Berkeley School of Law JD,
2014
[Emily, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 235, COMMENT: Recruiting Terrorism Informants:
The Problems with Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa Lexis, accessed
7-12-15, TAP]
Since the FBI's post-9/11 establishment of a preventative stance
toward terrorism has increased the need for intelligence, the agency
has turned to the increased use of immigration law to recruit
additional confidential informants. Using the threat of immigration
consequences - particularly deportation - to produce terrorism
intelligence presents novel problems for both the intelligence
gathering process and the informants. Informants recruited in this
manner who also lack established ties to foreign terrorist
organizations have an enormous incentive to fabricate information
to fulfill their end of the agreement and avoid deportation.
Recruiting informants via immigration law also afords less
protection than recruiting them by ofering monetary rewards or
reductions in sentencing. Furthermore, the FBI's recruitment tactics
encourage ethnic and religious profiling, alienating Muslim and
Middle Eastern communities. Although Congress created the S-6 visa
classification specifically to induce cooperation from informants in terrorism
investigations, the visa is rarely used due to its stringent eligibility
requirements for informants. In order for law enforcement to successfully use
the S-6 visa program and to encourage the trust of and cooperation from
informants, legislative overhaul is needed. An S-6 visa program that
emphasizes pre-existing ties to terrorist organizations, increases the
availability of S-6 visas, and lowers the barriers to the visas' use will produce
counterterrorism intelligence that is more reliable and actionable and provide
greater protection for civil liberties and to informants themselves.

Mass Surveillance Fail

Mass surveillance is fundamentally inefective at
preventing terrorism three reasons
Schneier 15 (Bruce. Bruce Schneier is a renowned security and
cryptology technologist, a fellow at the Berkman Center for
Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at
the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute, a board
member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board
Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the
Chief Technology Officer at Resilient Systems, Inc. He has testified
before Congress and is the author of Data and Goliath. 3-242015. Why Mass Surveillance Cant, Wont And Never Has
Stopped A Terrorist. The Daily Digg. http://digg.com/2015/whymass-surveillance-cant-wont-and-never-has-stopped-a-terrorist.
Accessed 7-9-2015. KC)
Data mining is offered as the technique that will enable us to connect those dots. But while corporations
are successfully mining our personal data in order to target advertising, detect financial fraud, and perform

three critical issues make data mining an inappropriate tool

for finding terrorists. The first, and most important, issue is error rates. For
advertising, data mining can be successful even with a large error rate, but finding terrorists
requires a much higher degree of accuracy than data-mining
systems can possibly provide. Data mining works best when youre searching for a wellother tasks,

defined profile, when there are a reasonable number of events per year, and when the cost of false alarms
is low. Detecting credit card fraud is one of data minings security success stories: all credit card
companies mine their transaction databases for spending patterns that indicate a stolen card. There are
over a billion active credit cards in circulation in the United States, and nearly 8% of those are fraudulently
used each year. Many credit card thefts share a pattern purchases in locations not normally frequented
by the cardholder, and purchases of travel, luxury goods, and easily fenced items and in many cases
data-mining systems can minimize the losses by preventing fraudulent transactions. The only cost of a
false alarm is a phone call to the cardholder asking her to verify a couple of her purchases. Similarly, the
IRS uses data mining to identify tax evaders, the police use it to predict crime hot spots, and banks use it
to predict loan defaults. These applications have had mixed success, based on the data and the

Terrorist plots
are diferent, mostly because whereas fraud is common, terrorist
attacks are very rare. This means that even highly accurate
terrorism prediction systems will be so flooded with false alarms
that they will be useless. The reason lies in the mathematics of
detection. All detection systems have errors, and system designers can tune them to minimize either
application, but theyre all within the scope of what data mining can accomplish.

false positives or false negatives. In a terrorist-detection system, a false positive occurs when the system
mistakenly identifies something harmless as a threat. A false negative occurs when the system misses an
actual attack. Depending on how you tune your detection system, you can increase the number of false
positives to assure you are less likely to miss an attack, or you can reduce the number of false positives at

Because terrorist attacks are so rare, false

positives completely overwhelm the system, no matter how well you
tune. And I mean completely: millions of people will be falsely
accused for every real terrorist plot the system finds, if it ever finds
the expense of missing attacks.

any.

We might be able to deal with all of the innocents being flagged by the system if the cost of false
positives were minor. Think about the full-body scanners at airports. Those alert all the time when scanning
people. But a TSA officer can easily check for a false alarm with a simple pat-down. This doesnt work for a

Each alert requires a lengthy

investigation to determine whether its real or not. That takes time
and money, and prevents intelligence officers from doing other
productive work. Or, more pithily, when youre watching everything, youre not seeing anything.
more general data-based terrorism-detection system.

The US intelligence community also likens finding a terrorist plot to looking for a needle in a haystack. And,
as former NSA director General Keith Alexander said, you need the haystack to find the needle. That
statement perfectly illustrates the problem with mass surveillance and bulk collection. When youre looking

there is no
scientific rationale for believing that adding irrelevant data about
innocent people makes it easier to find a terrorist attack, and lots of
evidence that it does not. You might be adding slightly more signal, but youre also adding
for the needle, the last thing you want to do is pile lots more hay on it. More specifically,

much more noise. And despite the NSAs collect it all mentality, its own documents bear this out. The
military intelligence community even talks about the problem of drinking from a fire hose: having so
much irrelevant data that its impossible to find the important bits. We saw this problem with the NSAs
eavesdropping program: the false positives overwhelmed the system. In the years after 9/11, the NSA
passed to the FBI thousands of tips per month; every one of them turned out to be a false alarm. The cost
was enormous, and ended up frustrating the FBI agents who were obligated to investigate all the tips. We
also saw this with the Suspicious Activity Reports or SAR database: tens of thousands of reports, and
no actual results. And all the telephone metadata the NSA collected led to just one success: the conviction
of a taxi driver who sent $8,500 to a Somali group that posed no direct threat to the US and that was

The second
problem with using data-mining techniques to try to uncover terrorist plots is that
each attack is unique. Who would have guessed that two pressure-cooker bombs would be
probably trumped up so the NSA would have better talking points in front of Congress.

delivered to the Boston Marathon finish line in backpacks by a Boston college kid and his older brother?

Each rare individual who carries out a terrorist attack will have a
disproportionate impact on the criteria used to decide whos a likely
terrorist, leading to inefective detection strategies. The third
problem is that the people the NSA is trying to find are wily, and
theyre trying to avoid detection. In the world of personalized marketing, the typical
surveillance subject isnt trying to hide his activities. That is not true in a police or national security
context.

An adversarial relationship makes the problem much harder,

and means that most commercial big data analysis tools just dont
work. A commercial tool can simply ignore people trying to hide and assume benign behavior on the
part of everyone else. Government data-mining techniques cant do that, because those are the very
people theyre looking for. Adversaries vary in the sophistication of their ability to avoid surveillance. Most
criminals and terrorists and political dissidents, sad to say are pretty unsavvy and make lots of

no justification for data mining; targeted surveillance

could potentially identify them just as well. The question is whether
mass surveillance performs sufficiently better than targeted
surveillance to justify its extremely high costs. Several analyses of
all the NSAs eforts indicate that it does not. The three problems
listed above cannot be fixed. Data mining is simply the wrong tool
for this job, which means that all the mass surveillance required to
feed it cannot be justified. When he was NSA director, General Keith Alexander argued that
mistakes. But thats

ubiquitous surveillance would have enabled the NSA to prevent 9/11. That seems unlikely. He wasnt able
to prevent the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, even though one of the bombers was on the terrorist
watch list and both had sloppy social media trails and this was after a dozen post-9/11 years of honing
techniques. The NSA collected data on the Tsarnaevs before the bombing, but hadnt realized that it was
more important than the data they collected on millions of other people.

Mass surveillance plays a negligible role in initiating

successful terrorist investigations
Bergen et al 14 (Peter, David Sterman, Emily Schneider, and
Baily Cahall. Peter Bergen is the director of the National Security
Program at the New America Foundation, where David Sterman
and Emily Schneider are research assistants and Bailey Cahall is
a research associate. 1-2014. Do NSAs Bulk Surveillance
Programs Stop Terrorists? New America Foundation National
Security Program.
https://www.newamerica.org/downloads/IS_NSA_surveillance.pdf.
Accessed 7-9-2015. KC)
Traditional investigative methods initiated 60 percent of the cases
we identified. In 5 percent of the cases, a violent incident occurred prior to prevention, and in 28
percent of the cases involving 62 individuals court records and public reporting do not identify which
methods initiated the investigation. The unclear cases may have been initiated by an undercover
informant, a family member tip, other traditional law enforcement methods, CIA- or FBI generated
intelligence, NSA surveillance of some kind, or any number of other methods. Additionally, some of these
cases may be too recent to have developed a public record large enough to identify which investigative
tools were used. In 23 of these 62 unclear cases (37 percent), an informant was involved, though we were
unable to determine whether the informant initiated the investigation. The widespread use of informants
suggests that if there was an NSA role in these cases, it was limited and insufficient to generate evidence

NSA surveillance of
any kind, whether bulk or targeted of U.S. persons or foreigners,
played an initiating role in only 7.5 percent of cases. To break that
down further: The controversial bulk collection of telephone
metadata appears to have played an identifiable role in, at most, 1.8
percent of the terrorism cases we examined. In a further 4.4 percent
of the cases, NSA surveillance under Section 702 of targets
reasonably believed to be outside of the country that were
communicating with U.S. citizens or residents likely played a role,
while NSA surveillance under an unknown authority likely played a
role in 1.3 percent of the cases we examined.
of criminal wrongdoing without the use of traditional investigative tools.

Metadata collection doesnt stop terrorism

Bergen et al 14 (Peter, David Sterman, Emily Schneider, and
Baily Cahall. Peter Bergen is the director of the National Security
Program at the New America Foundation, where David Sterman
and Emily Schneider are research assistants and Bailey Cahall is
a research associate. 1-2014. Do NSAs Bulk Surveillance
Programs Stop Terrorists? New America Foundation National
Security Program.

https://www.newamerica.org/downloads/IS_NSA_surveillance.pdf.
Accessed 7-9-2015. KC)
However, our review of the governments claims about the role that
NSA bulk surveillance of phone and email communications records
has had in keeping the United States safe from terrorism shows that
these claims are overblown and even misleading.* An in-depth analysis
of 225 individuals recruited by al-Qaeda or a like-minded group or inspired by
al-Qaedas ideology, and charged in the United States with an act of terrorism
since 9/11, demonstrates that traditional investigative methods, such as
the use of informants, tips from local communities, and targeted intelligence
operations, provided the initial impetus for investigations in the
majority of cases, while the contribution of NSAs bulk surveillance
programs to these cases was minimal. Indeed, the controversial bulk
collection of American telephone metadata, which includes the
telephone numbers that originate and receive calls, as well as the time and
date of those calls but not their content, under Section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, appears to have played an identifiable role in, at most,
1.8 percent of these cases. NSA programs involving the surveillance of
non-U.S. persons outside of the United States under Section 702 of the FISA
Amendments Act played a role in 4.4 percent of the terrorism cases we
examined, and NSA surveillance under an unidentified authority played a role
in 1.3 percent of the cases we examined. Regular FISA warrants not issued in
connection with Section 215 or Section 702, which are the traditional means
for investigating foreign persons, were used in at least 48 (21 percent) of the
cases we looked at, although its unclear whether these warrants played an
initiating role or were used at a later point in the investigation. (Click on the
link to go to a database of all 225 individuals, complete with additional details
about them and the governments investigations of these cases:
http://natsec.newamerica.net/nsa/analysis). Surveillance of American
phone metadata has had no discernible impact on preventing acts of
terrorism and only the most marginal of impacts on preventing
terrorist related activity, such as fundraising for a terrorist group.
Furthermore, our examination of the role of the database of U.S. citizens
telephone metadata in the single plot the government uses to justify the
importance of the program that of Basaaly Moalin, a San Diego cabdriver
who in 2007 and 2008 provided $8,500 to al-Shabaab, al-Qaedas affiliate in
Somalia calls into question the necessity of the Section 215 bulk
collection program.5 According to the government, the database of
American phone metadata allows intelligence authorities to quickly
circumvent the traditional burden of proof associated with criminal warrants,
thus allowing them to connect the dots faster and prevent future 9/11-scale
attacks. Yet in the Moalin case, after using the NSAs phone database to link a
number in Somalia to Moalin, the FBI waited two months to begin an
investigation and wiretap his phone. Although its unclear why there was a

delay between the NSA tip and the FBI wiretapping, court documents show
there was a two-month period in which the FBI was not monitoring Moalins
calls, despite official statements that the bureau had Moalins phone number
and had identified him.6,7 This undercuts the governments theory that
the database of Americans telephone metadata is necessary to
expedite the investigative process, since it clearly didnt expedite
the process in the single case the government uses to extol its
virtues. Additionally, a careful review of three of the key terrorism cases the
government has cited to defend NSA bulk surveillance programs reveals that
government officials have exaggerated the role of the NSA in the cases
against David Coleman Headley and Najibullah Zazi, and the significance of
the threat posed by a notional plot to bomb the New York Stock Exchange.

No War Contention

No War
No war democracy, trade, and IGOs check conflict
escalation
Shermer 14 (Michael. Michael Shermer is a journalist and writer,
editor for The Skeptic, and contributor to Scientific American. 1014-2014. Perpetual Peace. Scientific American.
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/perpetual-peace/ . Accessed 7-82015. KC)
In their 2001 book Triangulating Peace, political scientists Bruce Russett
and John Oneal employed a multiple logistic regression model on
data from the Correlates of War Project that recorded 2,300
militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 2001. They
assigned each country a democracy score between 1 and 10, based
on the Polity Project, which measures how competitive its political
process is, as well as the fairness of its elections, checks and
balances of power, transparency, and so on. The researchers found
that when two countries scored high on the Polity scale, disputes
between them decreased by 50 percent, but when one country was
either a low-scoring democracy or an autocracy, it doubled the
chance of a quarrel between them. Kant also suggested that
international trade (economic interdependency) and membership in
international communities (transparency and accountability) reduce
the likelihood of conflict. So in their model Russett and Oneal
included data on the amount of trade between nations and found
that countries that depended more on trade in a given year were
less likely to have a militarized dispute in the subsequent year. They
also counted the number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
that every pair of nations jointly belonged to and ran a regression
analysis with democracy and trade scores. Overall, democracy, trade
and membership in IGOs (the triangle of their title) all favor
peace, and if a pair of countries are in the top 10th of the scale on
all three variables, they are 81 percent less likely than an average
pair of countries to have a militarized dispute in a given year. How
has the democratic peace theory held up since 2001? With all the conflict
around the world, it seems like peace is on the rocks. But anecdotes are not
data. In a 2014 special issue of the Journal of Peace Research, Uppsala
University political scientist Hvard Hegre reassessed all the evidence on
Democracy and Armed Conflict. He stated that the empirical finding that
pairs of democratic states have a lower risk of interstate conflict than other
pairs holds up, as does the conclusion that consolidated democracies have
less conflict than semi-democracies. Hegre is skeptical that economic
interdependence alone can keep countries from going to warthe Golden
Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention popularized by Thomas Friedman's

observation that no two countries with McDonald's fightunless their

economies are in democratic nations. He wonders, reasonably, if there might
be some other underlying factor that explains both democracy and peace but
does not suggest what that might be. I propose human nature itself and our
propensity to prefer the elements of democracy. Peace is a pleasant byproduct.

World Wars doesnt disprove no war none of the

conditions that make modern peace possible existed
Weede 4 (Erich. Erich Weede is a professor of sociology at the
University of Bonn in Germany, as well as an author and
journalist. Fall 2004. The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by
Globalization. The Independent Review (The Independent
Review, v. IX, n. 2, Fall 2004, ISSN 1086-1653, Copyright 2004,
pp. 165186). http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_09_2_1_weede.pdf .
Accessed 7-8-2015. KC)
Before discussing illustrations of the capitalist peace, I should
consider a standard historical objection against it. Certainly,
economic interdependence, including trade, between the Western
powers and the central European powers before World War I was
quite strong. Nevertheless, World War I occurred. What does this
evidence imply about the capitalist peace in general and about
peace by trade in particular? First, it reminds us that all
macropolitical propositionsand certainly those discussed here
are probabilistic instead of deterministic statements. We should
always expect exceptions. Second, peace by trade is not the
only component of capitalist-peace theory applicable here. Another
is peace among democracies. The democratic character of
Germany and its allies before World War I is debatable. By
contemporary standards, even the democratic character of the
United Kingdom before World War I is not beyond suspicion because
of franchise limitations. So World War I is not a clear exception to
the democratic component of the capitalist peace. Third, no one
should believe that trade and democracy, or the capitalist peace,
suffice to explain the presence or absence of military disputes and
war. At most, we can claim that capitalist-peace theory
summarizes some known pacifying efects, but it does not
summarize conflictpromoting variables and their efects (Russett
2003). As quantitative researchers documenting the pacifying
efects of democracy and trade have found again and again (for

example, Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001),
power balances matter, too. Before World War I, the balance of
power between the opposing coalitions was fairly even. There were
no pacifying preponderance efects. Although one cannot claim
World War I to be a case demonstrating the value of capitalist-peace
theory, neither does it undermine the theory seriously. It may be

argued that the different long-term effects of the settlements of

World Wars I and II derive from failure or success in applying a
capitalist-peace strategy to the losers of the war. After World War
I, France, which determined the peace settlement more than any
other nation, failed to promote a capitalist peace. Immiseration and
desperation in Germany contributed to Hitlers ascent to power and
indirectly to World War II, in which France had to be saved by its
allies. After World War II, the United States pursued a capitalistpeace strategy toward the vanquished and succeeded in making
allies out of Germany and Japan.

International trade prevents war

Weede 4 (Erich. Erich Weede is a professor of sociology at the
University of Bonn in Germany, as well as an author and
journalist. Fall 2004. The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by
Globalization. The Independent Review (The Independent
Review, v. IX, n. 2, Fall 2004, ISSN 1086-1653, Copyright 2004,
pp. 165186). http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_09_2_1_weede.pdf .
Accessed 7-8-2015. KC)
Fourth, bilateral trade reduces the risk of war between dyads of
nations (Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001). As to why
trade contributes to the prevention of war, two ideas come to mind. First, war
is likely to disrupt trade. The higher the level of trade in a pair
(dyad) of nations is, the greater the costs of trade disruption are
likely to be. Second, commerce might contribute to the
establishment or maintenance of moral capital (Ratnapala 2003),
which has a civilizing and pacifying efect on citizens and statesmen.
In the context of this article, however, answering the question of
why trade afects conflict-proneness or providing the answer with
some microfoundation is less important than establishing the efect
itself in empirical research. Although some writers have questioned or
even rejected the peace by trade proposition, their criticisms are not
convincing. Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) raised the serious technical issue of
time dependence in the time-series cross-section data, but Russett and Oneal
(2001; see also Oneal 2003 and Oneal and Russett 2003b) responded to the

objections raised against their earlier work and demonstrated that those
objections do not affect their substantive conclusions. For a while, Hegres
(2000) study seemed to necessitate a qualification of the peace by trade
proposition. He found that the pacifying effect of trade is stronger among
developed countries than among less-developed countries. More recently,
however, Mousseau, Hegre, and Oneal corrected this earlier finding and
reported: Whereas economically important trade has important
pacifying benefits for all dyads, the conflict-reducing effect of democracy
is conditional on states economic development (2003, 300). Gelpi and
Grieco (2003) suggested another qualification. In their view, trade no longer
pacifies relations between autocratic states. According to Mansfield and
Pevehouse (2003), another modification of the peace by trade proposition
might be required. The institutional setting, such as preferential trade
agreements, matters. It is even conceivable that other forms of
economic interdependence, such as crossborder investments,
exercise some pacifying impact. Foreign direct investment (FDI) certainly
promotes prosperity, growth, and democracy (de Soysa and Oneal 1999; de
Soysa 2003), but the conceivable pacifying impact of FDI still lacks sufficient
empirical investigation. The most radical criticism comes from Barbieri
(2002), according to whom bilateral trade increases the risk of conflict. As
outlined by Oneal and Russett (2003a, 2003b; Oneal 2003; Russett 2003), her
conclusion results from disregarding the military power of nationsthat is,
their different capabilities to wage war across considerable distances. Should
we really proceed on the presumption that war between Argentina and Iraq is
as conceivable as between the United States and Iraq or between Iran and
Iraq? Of course, trade has no pacifying effect on international relations
wherever the risk of conflict is extremely close to zero to begin with. Even
this inadequate. Russett and Oneal (2001) refer instead to a Kantian peace,
which is composed of three components: the democratic peace, peace by
trade, and peace by collaboration in international governmental organizations
(IGOs). In their research, the IGO element of the Kantian tripod is the weakest
and least robust one. I do not know who invented the term capitalist peace. I
have heard it spoken more frequently than I have seen it in print, but in any
event it is a felicitous term. handling of the power and distance issue by itself
does not suffice to support her conclusions. If the military-conflict variable is
restricted to those conflicts that resulted in at least one fatality, then trade is
pacifying, whether power and distance are adequately controlled or not.
Moreover, Barbieri (2003) herself found some pacifying effect of economic
freedom and openness to trade on the war involvement of nations. In spite of
the attempted criticism of Russett and Oneals findings, the peace by
trade proposition stands and enjoys powerful empirical support.
Another issue also must be considered. Barbieris (2002) measures are based
on dyadic trade shares relative to national trade, whereas Russett and
Oneals measures are based on dyadic trade shares relative to the size of
national economies. Gartzke and Li (2003) have demonstrated
arithmetically as well as empiricallythat trade shares relative to national
trade may rise when nations are disconnected from world trade. Nations may

concentrate most of their trade on a few partners and remain rather closed
economies. If Barbieris and Oneal and Russetts measures of bilateral trade
and their effects are simultaneously considered, then Barbieris trade shares
exert a conflictenhancing effect and Oneal and Russetts trade dependence
exerts a conflict-reducing effect. This finding of Gartzke and Lis study not
only replicates the substantive findings of both main contenders in the
debate about trade and conflict, but it remains robust whether one relies on
the Oneal and Russett data or on the Barbieri data, whether one includes all
dyads or only dyads for which there is some risk of military conflict to begin
with. If one is interested in finding out whether more trade is better or worse
for the avoidance of military conflict, then it seems more meaningful to focus
on a measure that is related to openness at the national level of analysis, as
Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999, 2003a, 2003b; Russett and Oneal 2001) have
done, than on a measure that may be high for fairly closed economies, as
Barbieri (2002) has done. Actually, the pacifying effect of trade might be
even stronger than the pacifying effect of democracy (Oneal and Russett
1999, 29, and 2003a, 160; Gartzke 2000, 209), especially among contiguous
pairs of nations, where conflict-proneness is greater than elsewhere.
Moreover, trade seems to play a pivotal role in the prevention of war because
it exerts direct and indirect pacifying effects. In addition to the direct
efect, there is the indirect efect of free trade as the consequent
growth, prosperity, and democracy reduce the risk of militarized
disputes and war. Because the exploitation of gains from trade is the
essence or purpose of capitalism and free markets, I label the sum of the
direct and indirect international security benefits the capitalist peace, of
which the democratic peace is merely a component.1 Even if the direct
peace by trade efect were discredited by future research,
economic freedom and globalization would still retain their crucial
role in overcoming mass poverty and in establishing the
prerequisites of the democratic peace. For that reason, I (Weede 1996,
chap. 8) advocated a capitalist-peace strategy even before Oneal and Russett
(1997, 1999) convinced me of the existence of a directly pacifying effect of
trade. An Asian statesman understood the capitalist peace intuitively even
before it was scientifically documented and established. According to Lee
Kuan Yew, The most enduring lesson of history is that ambitious growing
countries can expand either by grabbing territory, people or resources, or by
trading with other countries. The alternative to free trade is not just
poverty, it is war (qtd. in Survey: Asia 1993, 24).

Great power war is impossible if US responsibly manages

foreign relations
Ward 14 (Alex. Alex Ward is a specialist on US defense policy
and strategy at the Atlantic Councils Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security. 8-22-2014. Only US Can Prevent Great
Power War. The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/onlyus-can-prevent-great-power-war/. Accessed 7-8-2015. KC)

Although the world currently satisfies Gilpins three preconditions,

there need not be pessimism. For one, current relations between
the United States and China are nowhere near the point where a
potential great war between them is possible, and there is no other
rivalry nearing that of Washington and Beijing. Second, some of the
trends that can cause harm, like rapid technological progress, can
also be used to help stabilize the global order. To be sure,
technology could be used to curb the desolation brought on by
expectedly low water, food, and energy levels. Finally, and most

importantly, Gilpins guidance is certainly not comprehensive.

There are more variables for which to account (i.e. the effect of
nuclear weapons) that dictate whether or not a great power war
may take place. That said, Gilpins framework serves as a good
rubric by which to measure the current global climate. By all
measures, this is certainly a dangerous time. But Gilpins
preconditions shouldnt be misconstrued as predictive or
fatalistic. Indeed, the United States, as the hegemon, has the
capability (and responsibility) to preserve the international order
and lead the world out of this mess. By keeping good relations with
partners and allies, deterring adversaries, reversing the perception
of its decline, and leveraging technological capabilities for global
good, there is a decent chance that the U.S. can make the greatpower-war-incubation period fade away. Should the United States

not seize this moment, and ensure that China is a responsible

partner in the current global system alongside it, then the chance
of a great power war cannot be dismissed, however remote.

Surveillance Education Key

Explicit Education about surveillance key its prevents
oppressive government policies and other strategies fail
Doctorow 13 (June 14th 2013, Cory Doctorow is an activist, and coeditor of the blog Boing Boing - blog focused on politics, The Guardian, The
NSA's Prism: why we should care
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2013/jun/14/nsa-prism
DA:7/8/15 CB)
**Edited for Gendered Language
The revelations about Prism and other forms of NSA dragnet surveillance has got some people wondering

When William Hague tells us that the innocent have nothing to

fear from involuntary disclosure, it raises questions about exactly what harms
might come about from being spied upon. Here are some reasons you should care
about privacy, disclosure and surveillance. We're bad at privacy because the
consequences of privacy disclosures are separated by a lot of time
what all the fuss is.

and space from the disclosures themselves. It's like trying to get good at cricket by swinging the bat,
closing your eyes before you see where the ball is headed, and then being told, months later, somewhere

almost all our privacy

disclosures do no harm, and some of them cause grotesque harm , but
when this happens, it happens so far away from the disclosure that we can't
learn from it. You should care about privacy because privacy isn't secrecy. I know what
else, where the ball went. So of course we're bad at privacy:

you do in the toilet, but that doesn't mean you don't want to close the door when you go in the stall. You

if the data says you've done something

wrong, then the person reading the data will interpret everything
else you do through that light. Naked Citizens, a short, free documentary, documents
should care about privacy because

several horrifying cases of police being told by computers that someone might be up to something
suspicious, and thereafter interpreting everything they learn about that suspect as evidence of
wrongdoing. For example, when a computer programmer named David Mery entered a tube station
wearing a jacket in warm weather, an algorithm monitoring the CCTV brought him to the attention of a
human operator as someone suspicious. When Mery let a train go by without boarding, the operator
decided it was alarming behaviour. The police arrested him, searched him, asked him to explain every
scrap of paper in his flat. A doodle consisting of random scribbles was characterised as a map of the tube
station. Though he was never convicted of a crime, Mery is still on file as a potential terrorist eight years

Once a computer ascribes

suspiciousness to someone, everything else in that person's life
becomes sinister and inexplicable. You should care about dragnet
surveillance because it gives cops bigger haystacks with proportionately fewer
later, and can't get a visa to travel abroad.

needles. The 9/11 Commission said that America's spooks had everything they needed to predict the
attacks but it was lost amid all the noise of overcollected data. Since then, the

overcollection

has gone into overdrive the haystacks are enormous, but they still have the same number
of needles in them. I want my skies safe, just like you so I want my spooks doing their job well, not simply

You should care about

you know people who can be compromised through
disclosure: people who are gay and in the closet; people with terminal
illnesses; people who are related to someone infamous for some
awful crime. Those people are your friends, your neighbours, maybe your kids:
they deserve a life that's as free from hassle as you are with your lucky, skeletonfree closet. You should care about surveillance because once the system for
sucking up all the data in the hopes it it will be useful some day.
surveillance because

surveillance is built into the networks and the phones, bad

guys [People] (or dirty cops)

can use it to attack you. In Greece, someone used the police back door on the national phone company's

hackers used
Google's lawful interception back door to hack Gmail and figure out who dissidents
talked to. Our communications systems are more secure if they're
designed to keep everyone out and adding a single back door to them blows their
switches to listen in on the prime minister during the 2005 Olympic bid. Chinese

security models up. You can't be a little bit pregnant, and the computers in your pocket and on your desk
and in your walls can't be a little bit insecure. Once they're designed for surveillance, anyone who can
bribe or impersonate a cop can access them. As for Hague: i f

the innocent have nothing to

fear from disclosure, then why did his own government demand an
unprecedented system of secret courts in which evidence of UK
intelligence complicity in illegal kidnapping and torture can be
heard? Privacy, it appears, is totally essential for the powerful and completely worthless for the rest of
us.

Surveillance education key its critical to prevent global

totalitarianism three strategies
Schneier 13 (Bruce Schenier Bruce Schneier is an American
cryptographer, computer security and privacy specialist, and writer. He is the
author of several books on general security topics, computer security and
cryptography, The Guardian, The US Government Has Betrayed the Internet.
We Need to Take It Back.,
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/20568679/1893962603/name/2013+09+07Schneier-The+US+Government+Has+Betrayed+the+Internet.
+We+Need+to+Take+It+Back.pdf DA:7/8/15 CB)
Government and industry have betrayed the internet, and us. By subverting the internet at
every level to make it a vast, multi-layered and robust surveillance platform, the NSA has
undermined a fundamental social contract. The companies that build
and manage our internet infrastructure, the companies that create and sell us our hardware and
software, or the companies that host our data: we can no longer trust them to be
ethical internet stewards. This is not the internet the world needs, or the internet its creators
envisioned. We need to take it back. And by we, I mean the engineering community. Yes, this
is primarily a political problem, a policy matter that requires political intervention. But this is also an
engineering problem, and there are several things engineers can - and should - do. 9/7/13 The US

One, we should expose.

you
are not bound by a federal confidentially requirements or a gag order. If you
Government Has Betrayed the Internet. We Need to Take It Back. 2/3

If you do not have a security clearance, and if you have not received a National Security Letter,

have been contacted by the NSA to subvert a product or protocol, you need to come forward with your

If you work with

classified data and are truly brave, expose what you know. We need
whistleblowers. We need to know how exactly how the NSA and other
agencies are subverting routers, switches, the internet backbone, encryption
technologies and cloud systems. I already have five stories from people like you, and I've just
started collecting. I want 50. There's safety in numbers, and this form of civil disobedience is
the moral thing to do. Two, we can design. We need to figure out how
to re-engineer the internet to prevent this kind of wholesale spying .
We need new techniques to prevent communications intermediaries from leaking private information. We
can make surveillance expensive again. In particular, we need open protocols, open
story. Your employer obligations don't cover illegal or unethical activity.

implementations, open systems - these will be harder for the NSA to subvert. The Internet Engineering
Task Force, the group that defines the standards that make the internet run, has a meeting planned for

This is an
emergency, and demands an emergency response. Three, we can
influence governance. I have resisted saying this up to now, and I am saddened to say it, but
the US has proved to be an unethical steward of the internet . The UK is
no better. The NSA's actions are legitimizing the internet abuses by
China, Russia, Iran and others. We need to figure out new means of internet governance,
ones that makes it harder for powerful tech countries to monitor everything. For example, we need
to demand transparency, oversight, and accountability from our
governments and corporations. Unfortunately, this is going play directly
into the hands of totalitarian governments that want to control their country's
internet for even more extreme forms of surveillance . We need to figure out how to
prevent that, too. We need to avoid the mistakes of the International Telecommunications Union,
early November in Vancouver. This group needs to dedicate its next meeting to this task.

which has become a forum to legitimize bad government behavior, and create truly international
governance that can't be dominated or abused by any one country. Generations from now, when people
look back on these early decades of the internet, I hope they will not be disappointed in us. We can ensure

We have a
moral duty to do this, and we have no time to lose. Dismantling the surveillance state won't be
that they don't only if each of us makes this a priority, and engages in the debate.

easy. Has any country that engaged in mass surveillance of its own citizens voluntarily given up that

Whatever
happens, we're going to be breaking new ground. Again, the politics of this is a
capability? Has any mass surveillance country avoided becoming totalitarian?

bigger task than the engineering, but the engineering is critical. We need to demand that real
technologists be involved in any key government decision making on these issues. We've had enough of
lawyers and politicians not fully understanding technology; we need technologists at the table when we
build tech policy. To the engineers, I say this: we built the internet, and some of us have helped to subvert
it. Now, those of us who love liberty have to fix it.

Surveillance education key Its critical to prevent

oppression and successfully solve all security risks
Regulation absent education fails
Mameli 08 (Peter A. Mameli, Ph.D. John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
Critical Issues in Justice and Politics, Volume 1, Number 1, pages 31-41,
TRACKING THE BEAST: TECHNO-ETHICS BOARDS AND GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS
https://www.suu.edu/hss/polscj/journal/V1N1.pdf#page=41 DA: 7/8/15 CB)
nation-states are experiencing a surge in surveillance
programs as a result of terrorist attacks in the United States, Spain and the United
Kingdom over the last six years. With the growth of surveillance operations
comes a need to ensure that not only the security of the state is
protected, but also the civil liberties of the populace. This paper examines methods of
Democratic

accountability, transparency and oversight that can be applied to monitor and control such efforts through
heightened cooperation between government surveillance entities and established oversight practitioners.
In particular, the primary recommendation made here is for law enforcement organizations across levels of
response to consider developing and implementing Techno-Ethics Boards in order to ensure that the
ongoing practice of surveillance in a free society can be scrutinized and held to an acceptable standard for
a democratic country. Introduction In Thomas Hobbes 1651 treatise, Leviathan, he examined the
condition of man, government and the human spirit. Hobbes work and thought lives on today among
realist, neo-realist and conservative political thinkers. His ideas are continuously referred to in international
relations theories and discourse as a jumping off point for scholars and practitioners alike. Hobbes saw the

legitimate power of government as vested in the sovereign, once the commonwealth had agreed to such
power transference. The sovereign could then apply their will and power to mitigate a natural world of
anarchic behavior among human beings that pitted each against all. This natural world left people in a
quandary, facing a myriad of problems within a state of constant war that would impact on survival. Noting
among the chief threats: TRACKING THE BEAST: TECHNO-ETHICS BOARDS & GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAMS 32 and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes, 1968, p.186). As the post September 11, 2001 world of
New York City and Washington D.C., the post March 11, 2004 world of Madrid, Spain, and the post July 7,

nation-states and their people are

once again facing fear of violent death in a seemingly anarchic world without rules
and searching for answers to this plight. The current response has been to strengthen
an emerging surveillance society in many respects, encouraging wider electronic
2005 world of London, England show us, democratic

surveillance techniques, increasing data mining and manipulation, and enhancing profiling and recognition
initiatives (see American Civil Liberties Union, 2004, for an example of the experience in the United

This is Leviathans legacy the beast with a million eyes and

ears, threatening a true Hayekian nightmare (Hayek, 1976). But does it need to be so? Enhanced
surveillance is considered as warranted by many under the current circumstances, but such
practices come with a responsibility (Lyon, 2003). The responsibility to weigh
and balance the individual rights of the populace against the
security needs of the state. Accomplishing such a goal is complex and multi-faceted. One
States).

element of the puzzle to put into place involves establishing accountability and oversight mechanisms that
can help create transparency of government run surveillance operations to the public. To date, both

electronic
surveillance one finds a multitude of techniques that are now at the
disposal of those in power to monitor and examine both individual and population wide
discussion of this matter and its implementation have been found wanting. Looking at

practices (Marx, 2002: pp. 12-13). From closed circuit television (CCTV) to video and computer monitoring,
to polygraphs, to data aggregation and manipulation, wiretapping and enhanced eavesdropping methods,
a web of surveillance is being woven around people within society (see Muller and Boos, 2004: p. 162, for
one such example in Zurich, Switzerland). The impacts are varied, as are the success rates. Regarding
advances with technology such as CCTV alone, we find a variety of strengths and weaknesses resulting
from application. Clearly, after the London train and bus bombing in 2005, it was obvious that CCTV was
invaluable in tracking down terrorists after the attack. The roving monitoring system provided police with
quick and effective PETER A. MAMELI 33 tracking evidence that allowed for a swift and capable operational
response. This incident should make plain that CCTV has something to offer society, yet all the news about

Does CCTV have any preventative capabilities for

stopping terrorist attacks before they take place? Or are we simply inundating
our surroundings with cameras for the sake of after the fact
evidence gathering? If so, at what price to our everyday freedoms are we
allowing our fears to push us? Further still, Goold notes that the efect of CCTV
on police behavior can be both positive and negative, and that there needs to be
a means of ensuring that the police do not interfere with the
processes of complex surveillance regimes to protect themselves from charges of
CCTV may not be good.

misconduct (Goold, 2003: pp. 200-201). Muller and Boos also point out that there are a variety of
dimensions to consider when reviewing CCTV systems simply for their effectiveness, and that the
dimensions and sophistication of CCTV systems can impact on its overall value (2004: pp. 165-171). Given
the above questions,

many consider it necessary to begin developing means

of accountability and oversight that can ensure correct usage of this
technology in a way that the public can feel both safe and secure with. And this is only a brief
discussion of one type of surveillance system. There are many, with equally weighty
concerns to ponder. Ultimately, the question first becomes one of ends. Although there are no doubt
those who would disagree, it is assumed here that the purpose of said surveillance is at least intended to
be benign, and aimed at protection of both the individual and state despite the negative externalities that
may arise. But what

are the goals we are seeking to achieve when

contemplating managing the growing surveillance world ? Is it to

control what we are creating so that we strike a balance between

security and liberty? Or, are we seeking to give these tools and their users flexibility outside of
our oversight capabilities in order to calm our nerves and assuage our fears? Despite the compelling needs
associated with protection and security,

the only answer that a democratic society

can provide is the former. With this position clarified we can then move on to the questions
of means. Oversight of Surveillance Programs Central to the discussion of accountability of government
surveillance programs is the question of what methods of oversight are at our disposal to ensure
surveillance technologies, techniques and results are reasonably controlled and monitored? And more
importantly, how can these methods of oversight be implemented productively? For instance: TRACKING

How can
auditing of surveillance activities best serve to create public
transparency without sacrificing operational secrecy? How can program
THE BEAST: TECHNO-ETHICS BOARDS & GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 34

evaluations be developed to provide information to elected officials, administrators and citizens as to the
success or failure of surveillance efforts without compromising their effectiveness? Do contracts with
independent vendors need to require that their work on building new surveillance systems undergo
scrutiny by independent ethics boards familiar with the complexities of the technology? Should RFPs
stipulate that such new efforts take place within frameworks of ethics requirements determined
beforehand by numerous entities with expertise in the field in question? Should deployment and
implementation of surveillance tools undergo ongoing scrutiny by entities comprised of internal and
external monitors to ensure compliance with acceptable standards and norms of application in a
democratic society? Answering these questions, and more, holds the future of this field in the balance.
Some of these methods can be used up front (RFPs, contracting requirements and formative program
evaluations) and others can appear throughout the life of surveillance operations (performance and
financial audits, interim and summative program evaluations, and performance measurement reporting).

The problems arise with the willingness and ability to structure

these activities into the logic of ongoing surveillance operations across levels
of government. Are such oversight activities mandated and expected to happen in regular patterns with
regular reporting to elected officials and the public, or simply desired and left to occur at the will of the
agencies and oversight bodies involved? It appears that the latter is the case more often than not and

hard law and regulation have

served as a less than ideal means of managing surveillance activities
this needs to change. The question is how? To date,

across levels of government where oversight responsibilities are concerned. While such legal tools hold a
necessary place among the approaches to monitoring and controlling such operations after long and
detailed public discussion is engaged in (such as developing actual law, and codified rules of practice for
established techniques such as wiretapping), it has at times proven PETER A. MAMELI 35 ineffective in

efective oversight is needed to rectify

emerging problems. For one recent example we need look no further than problems the Federal
certain areas of practice and has required that

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has encountered with their surveillance practices. While the USA PATRIOT Act
has authorized the use of National Security Letters, essentially administrative subpoenas, by the FBI in
investigations of international terrorism and foreign spying (Doyle, 2006), a Department of Justice, Office of
Inspector General (OIG) report identified that there was insufficient monitoring of the implementation of
this tool by its field offices in the earlier part of this decade. These findings raised questions of impropriety
and illegality in the resulting FBI surveillance activities (Associated Press, 2007). It is important that this
step was taken by the OIG before waiting for problems to find their way into the court system for
settlement through judicial review of administrative operations. And it is just this type of occurrence that

the weaknesses and openings for abuse that can develop

between the development of hard law and regulation and its
resulting implementation. In other situations, developers of hard law and regulation can find
points out

themselves struggling to offer the insight required to do the job of managing surveillance activities
effectively where newer forms of technology are involved. For example, unique expertise that exists
among private sector professionals developing technology and innovations within certain fields, such as

without
commensurate knowledge at their disposal government regulators
and elected officials may find themselves challenged to create
control mechanisms that are on point. Understanding these shortcomings, a more

facial recognition imaging, enables them to operate at such high levels that

flexible means of ongoing oversight needs to be sought out that can provide stability as implementation of

to managing our growing

surveillance society is to heighten flexible governmental regulation
hard law and regulation requirements are pursued. One approach

and oversight activities through the exploration of what has been termed soft law and/or soft
regulation. Discussions of soft law and soft regulation can be considered as a part of an emerging
discussion on the overall value of regulation and governance that has recently come to the foreground
(Braithwaite, Coglianese, and Levi-Faur, 2007). Soft law and soft regulation are inexact terms that cover a
multitude of quasi-legislative, often non-binding instruments used to enhance government efforts to
regulate service delivery areas. These instruments hopefully enable policy changes to emerge and harden
TRACKING THE BEAST: TECHNO-ETHICS BOARDS & GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 36 through
voluntary application and adherence in both confrontational and politicized atmospheres where a wide
array of players from the public, private and non-governmental sectors are involved (see Brandsen,
Boogers and Tops, 2006: p. 550-551; and Mameli, 2000, p. 203-204).

Such tools have been

referred to broadly as unofficial guidelines that deliver information to those

being regulated (Brandsen, Boogers and Tops, 2006: p. 546). Some of the instruments that communicate
these ideas include codes of governance, quality standards, letters of advice, handbooks, manuals,
reports, declarations, recommendations, guidelines and resolutions, to name a few (see Brandsen, Boogers
and Tops, 2006: p. 546; and Mameli, 2000, p. 203) .

The result is hopefully a collaborative

efort at ensuring quality service delivery by all parties involved in
the process. Sometimes they can even result in the drafting of binding legal agreements after a
slow process where policy diffusion is accepted and validated by the players affected. In the case of

mutually acceptable
guidelines for the ongoing management and oversight of these
activities would likely enhance their reliability in the eyes of the
public. Among the guidelines provided could be agreement to the need for time driven audits and
government surveillance programs construction and delivery of

program evaluations, ongoing development of relevant performance measurement indicators, public

reporting expectations, and the use of Techno-Ethics Boards to resolve issues of ethical concern while
developing advice for carrying out surveillance activities from the beginning of operations through to their
conclusion. However, while such an approach promises to relieve problems and pressures that have
surfaced with surveillance programs there are quandaries to overcome as well. Quasi-legislative
instrumentation of the nature discussed here is voluntarily adhered to and presents an uncertain edict to

The authors believe that others

should follow these suggestions and upgrade their operations
accordingly. Yet there is no mandated action to be taken. These are not new laws or regulatory rules
those on the receiving end. The intent is obvious.

that must be followed, they are something else indeed. Important enough to be taken note of, but ignored
at ones own professional and personal peril (Brandsen, Boogers and Tops, 2006: p. 550-551). Complicating
matters further, soft law and soft regulation often suggests that new implementation norms be followed
and attested to through self-reporting by the entities that are charged with providing a particular service.
Yet given that a gap exists between hard law and regulation and implementation in this sensitive policy
area, I PETER A. MAMELI 37 believe such an approach to remedying some of the complications involved
may very will find success if crafted carefully. This conundrum frames a central discussion point that needs
to be entertained here. How does soft law and soft regulation consistently result in something more than
soft, or even abdicated, governance? Even if governance was found lacking before, does this yield a better
answer? How can you be sure you have not let the fox guard the henhouse when you are counting on the
fox to give you a daily testament to his/her actions? Given this problem, it is important to begin by noting
that there are two sides to the coin of soft law and soft regulation. The first side of the coin views the use
of such unofficial guidelines as necessary tools to distribute new information to agents perceived as
needing to update and improve their services while still creating room for innovative practices to flourish.

view assumes good faith on the part of those being regulated to

honestly pursue addressing the suggested course of action, or to
ofer a better path to follow. The other side of the coin is one where
the suggested changes are not implemented due to a lack of
comprehension or ability on the part of the receiver, a lack of leverage on the
This

part of the sender, or worst of all, a desire to engage in fraud, waste or abuse by keeping loopholes open
and outside eyes closed by one or both (see Brandsen, Boogers and Tops, 2006: p. 547-548 for a nice
break out of possible paths regulated parties can take in reaction to unofficial guidelines). Both sides of the
coin are relevant aspects of the discussion about the implications these instruments pose for practitioners
of soft law and soft regulation in complex environments. In unpacking these concerns it is important to

first examine weaknesses that complicate the process, and then

note how particular forms of collaborative (rather than adversarial) interaction
between oversight entities and those being inspected can improve possibilities for progress
through enlightened, triangulated oversigh t. Next, addressing elements of
performance measurement and management that can be used in constructing transparent and
accountable partnerships between oversight agents and those being inspected must be further examined.
Together, these

eforts represent an attempt to stretch the current

discourse on regulating new and complex surveillance technologies
into less well traveled areas of thought. Considering a role for oversight personnel in
government surveillance operations that runs counter to the logic of reaction and punishment that often
permeate such discussions, and then offering a tool to build trust between these parties and enhance
capacity to achieve success, this framework can hopefully create room for free TRACKING THE BEAST:
TECHNO-ETHICS BOARDS & GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 38 thinking and discussion about
soft law and regulation in regard to the surveillance society of the future. Techno-Ethics Boards And
Government Surveillance The use of soft law and soft regulation opens doors to programmatic innovation

it can serve to mitigate

administrative confusion and folly when implementation of
perceived surveillance norms, set out in hard law and regulation, founders due to
imprecise understandings of how to accomplish desired ends. However, it is also true that political
stressors and unclear messages from central authorities regarding
unofficial guidelines can drag down the potential gains of the process by causing
and improvement when constructed well. In practice

those being regulated to stifle innovation and simply toe the line in order to avoid being cited during
inspections and oversight even though these are not clear infractions that they will be called on
(Brandsen, Boogers and Tops, 2006: p. 550-551). In such a scenario, the process that should lead to an
active interchange of ideas between the center and the periphery that results in continuous improvement

poorly developed
unofficial guidelines that do not provide efective problem resolution
can also allow for abuse in application by practitioners . We should be
only leads to a game of follow the leader, or worse, resistance. Further still,

striving to shut off the mains that allow illegal activity to flow forward by crafting useful soft law and
regulation that also improves results. In the world of surveillance operations such a goal is of great value in
and of itself given the threats to liberty, privacy and civil rights that hang in the balance. The question that
emerges becomes: How can the relationship between those sending the soft forms of guidance and those
receiving it be made to work better? Can we ensure transparency, attain accountability, improve
effectiveness, prevent misconduct and enable innovation all at once? And, can individuals charged with
overseeing surveillance programs help this development along in a front to back process? The answer
seems to boil down to partnership and how to achieve it. If creative interchange between all parties is what
is desired, then trust must be created to allow the interchange to flourish. But the trust needs to run
through the entire process. Trust must exist in the formulation of the quasi-legislative instruments and
advice up front, and then in the oversight process that is created afterward. However, it is hard to create
that level of trust when there is resistance to oversight in PETER A. MAMELI 39 sensitive areas of national
security (involving surveillance operations, or any other activity). Certainly the recent problems between
the United States Central Intelligence Agency and its own Office of Inspector General, where the former
challenged the investigative methods of the latter in politically sensitive reviews, attest to this dilemma
(Mazzetti and Shane, 2007). Indeed, at the time of this writing the agency has successfully managed to

Yet
oversight and accountability of national security activities must
exist, and so the conundrum surrounding trust is laid bare. One undeniable finding from the CIAs
create two new positions to oversee the actions of its own internal watchdog (Miller, 2008)!

situation so far is that a lack of trust in oversight operations distracts an organization from accomplishing
its mission, at the very least. Therefore, it seems clear that trust needs to be established early on rather
than as an afterthought or result of a crisis if government is to function effectively. Trust can be developed
in a number of ways at the beginning of the process when advice is crafted and distributed to surveillance
practitioners in soft or hard forms. The first model that could be accessed to accomplish this is where the
public sector defers to nongovernmental parties from the start in the development of said guidelines (see
Brandsen, Boogers and Tops, 2006: p. 552; and, Bernstein and Cashore, 2007 for other examples). This is
similar to a model of rulemaking that Weimer refers to as private rulemaking (Weimer, 2006: p. 569). It is
important to note that the private rulemaking model is different than negotiated rulemaking, where
external parties engage in the process but dont control it, or agency rulemaking, where experts and

advisory boards are only invited in to offer their insight and support (Weimer, 2006: p. 569). Yet while
these approaches can create buy-in early that will help to ease relationships in the future, and should also
be pursued when developing soft law, it does not fully address the negative reactions to oversight
discussed above that follow down the road. Another level of trust needs to be developed in order to get
over this hurdle. And, it is incumbent on the personnel charged with such oversight to help facilitate that
trust. But how can this be achieved when thinking in the world of inspection is colored by expectations of
adversarial relationships, rather than collaborative ones? One way is to explore the creation of a means
that will ensure constructive engagement between the parties who could be involved with such a process
from front to back. To achieve this purpose I am suggesting developing Techno-Ethics Boards. Akin to
Institutional TRACKING THE BEAST: TECHNO-ETHICS BOARDS & GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS
40 Review Boards (IRBs) in universities, and Bioethics Boards in health settings, Techno-Ethics Boards in
law enforcement settings would be charged with advising surveillance practitioners on how to go about
implementing hard law and regulation on these matters. They would also be responsible for addressing
ongoing questions of acceptable practice that would evolve as technology (and crime) changes. However,
different from IRBs, they would not have the ability to prevent the implementation of surveillance
programs. Due to the need for security, and the sensitive nature of information that may need to remain
protected even from the Board itself, final calls on implementation would still remain with law enforcement
personnel directly involved with the activity. Hence, the Boards oversight of said surveillance operations

this additional layer of scrutiny would no doubt aid

in clarifying problems and halting preventable errors through the application
would still have limits. Yet

of soft governance built on soft instrumentation. IRBs have been used within universities for decades in
order to protect human and animal subjects from research abuses (Neuman, 2003: p.129). While the
protections of subjects and procedures for construction of a Techno-Ethics Board to provide guidance to
government surveillance programs might indeed differ from an IRB, it is no doubt a worthwhile enterprise
to begin exploring. Could such a body stop abuses from happening where law enforcement is trying to
protect national security, but going beyond acceptable norms of practice? If so, it is at least worth the

Why risk making the error of

creating a new type of Stanley Milgram scenario, where both surveillance
effort to take a hard look at the possibilities for such Boards.

practitioners and their subjects become victims of overzealous observation efforts, if it can be short-

a Techno-Ethics
Board would require a spray of appropriate expertise and talent, with a
circuited (Singleton, Jr. and Straits, 2005: p. 519)? As with federally mandated IRBs

membership of at least five parties (Singleton, Jr. and Straits, 2005: p. 530). My recommendations would
include, at a minimum: one lawyer, one ethicist, one technology expert, one oversight expert, and one
field practitioner. As with IRB appointments, sensitive demographic information would also need to be
taken into account in the development of a Techno-Ethics Board in order to ensure a balance of
backgrounds are represented (OSullivan, Rassell and Berner, 2007: p. 261). All may come from
government circles, or none. However, there are complications that come with including non-governmental
entities in security driven operations that makes for a quandary in this regard. It is more likely, given the
PETER A. MAMELI 41 information and context that surveillance reviews would take place under, that
personnel would need to be drawn from across differing law enforcement agencies (and perhaps levels of
government) more so than from outside parties. Regardless of who is chosen to serve however, the goal, of
course, would not be to create a confrontational atmosphere but rather a mutually supportive one where
professionals concerned with surveillance and its implications could gather to address real world
implementation concerns.

Surveillance education is key to high school students

theyre a top target of surveillance three diferent
programs.
Burns 10 (David R Burns is Fulbright Senior Research Fellow, India United
States Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
Associate Professor (with tenure) of Digital Media Art and Animation Southern
Illinois University, Conferncia Internacional de Artes de Novas Mdias
Borders, surveillance, and control in the digital age
http://bshi.dburns.com/pdf/drburns_softborders.pdf DA: 7/8/15 CB)
The US Department of Homeland Security administers the Student and
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) in connection with the US-VISIT

program. SEVIS was designed to track and monitor international

students before they arrive in and during their stay in the US. SEVIS
includes data on close to a million foreign students, exchange visitors,
and their dependents that is collected before they enter, when they
enter, and during their stay in the US. This information includes
biographical information of the student or exchange visitor and their
dependents (name, place and date of birth, spouse and children's data);
academic information (status, date of study commencement, degree
program, field of study, institutional disciplinary action); employment
information (employer name and address, employment beginning and
end dates); school information (campus address, type of education or
degrees ofered, session dates), and exchange visitor program information
(Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2005). This information combined
with the personal information collected for obtaining a visa through
the US-VISIT program builds a well-defined profile of students and
visitors in the US. However, this type of program is not restricted to
international students. The US Department of Education has
expressed its desire to monitor and track US students. In 2005, the
Department of Education released a feasibility report for a national
Student Unit Record System to track US students using individually
identifiable information such as name, Social Security Number, date
of birth, address, race/ethnicity, gender, and field of study that are
attached to an individual students record (Cunningham, A., Milam, J.,
& Stratham C., 2005). The system would also include academic performance,
receipt of financial aid from federal, state, and institutional sources
and track students as they move to diferent institutions
(Cunningham, A., Milam, J., & Stratham, C., 2005). The US Department of
Education is continuing to develop plans for this student
surveillance system that would be accessible to not only to the US
Department of Education, but also to the US Attorney Generals
office and the US Justice Department for national Borders,
surveillance, and control in the digital age David R. Burns 6 security
purposes (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2005). In 2003, the US
Department of Defense also began compiling a large-scale student
database of personal information for recruiting purposes. The US
Department of Defense has proposed that it plans to continue
gathering personal information on American students including
minors as young as 16 years old. According to the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, the database will be managed by a private direct
marketing firm and will include such information as grade point
average, ethnicity, and social security number of each student
(Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2005). The US government
entering into a large scale marketing agreement and capitalizing on
students personal information is a new development in the way the
government agencies are accessing and controlling their citizens,
including minors, personal information for non-security related projects.
Bogard (2006) comments that control over access to data on you, but

not by you, is the goal of police (corporate, state) control of surveillance

networks. Governments use of personal student information for
marketing purposes is a new development in the way governments
are leveraging the formerly private information they collect on
citizens of all ages. These three programs, SEVIS, Student Unit Record
System, and the DOD database; combined with the US-VISIT program
illustrate the creation of a powerful Orwellian surveillance system to
track international and US students across and within US borders.
The US Department of Homeland Security has already granted the
FBI access to SEVIS and US-VISIT (Field, 2004). This new area of
collaboration between academic institutions and government
agencies to track and monitor students is a critical area to watch for
potential abuses of personal privacy. A critical issue to consider is who or
what governmental and non-governmental institutions have access to all of
the personal information being collected and for what purposes? The US
Department of Homeland Security reports that the US-VISIT program
provides biometric identification and analysis services to federal,
state and local agencies (US Department of Homeland Security, 2008). In
the past, the US Department of Homeland Security required that
airlines and cruise companies report personal passengers
information to them. If this information is combined with individuals
credit card information, a more complete profile of each individual
becomes clear. Companies like Acxiom collect individuals contact
information, estimated incomes, home values, occupations, religions,
shopping habits and keep records for TransUnion, one of the worlds
largest credit reporting agencies. All of this data has been shared with
the US government since 9/11 (O Harrow, 2005). When this data is
combined with information from SEVIS and the Department of
Defense databases, government and nongovernment institutions
have the potential to create a more complete system that can be
used to profile, index, track and monitor individuals. 5. CONCLUSION The
tiers of surveillance technology used to monitor, track, and control
individuals movements within, across and outside borders described in
this paper indicate a shift from public and private institutions
physical control and physical monitoring of individuals to their
electronic control and electronic monitoring of individuals. This type
of electronic, panopticonal surveillance and control ranges from
government satellites, which monitor individuals communications, to
portable electronic devices, which provide information about individuals
physical locations, to virtual border controls, which allow institutional
border control programs to automatically read individuals biometric
data. Private and public institutions use of these new surveillance
technologies has allowed older models of localized, physical controls
over individuals within, across and outside of physical borders to be
replaced with an electronic, decentralized apparatus of control that
transcends physical borders. Public and private institutions use of
this electronic, decentralized apparatus of control to track

individuals vehicles, portable electronic devices and biometric data

presents potential concerns about individuals personal privacy. Public and
private institutions are moving toward a ubiquitous, seamless model
of surveillance and control that extends beyond tracking and
monitoring individuals physical movements across international
borders to tracking and monitoring individuals physical and virtual
movements across localized micro-borders such as streets, stores,
and homes. This new model relies not only on deterritorialization and
biometrics but also on individuals electronic identities. In the past,
individuals were able to opt out of being monitored and controlled
by living without mobile phones, the latest technological gizmos for their
vehicles, and traveling across distant physical borders. Now individuals can
no longer avoid the gaze of surveillance and prevent the collection
of their personal information as they move across localized physical
and virtual borders.

****Surveillance education in debate is critical to teach

advocacy skills that solve totalitarianism, and the failure
of surveillance policies it is the only way for a public
opinion to be formed - Sweden proves.
Kullenberg 09 (Kullenberg, Christopher, PhD, University Gothenburg,
His dissertation concerns the statistical social sciences, their epistemic
problems and their role in modern societies, and contains a case-study of the
SOM-institute, a Gothenburg research center that has been very successful in
providing large surveys, "The social impact of IT: Surveillance and resistance
in present-day conflicts." How can activists and engineers work together pg.
37-40. http://fiff.de/publikationen/fiff-kommunikation/fk-2009/fiff-ko-12009/fiko_1_2009_kullenberg.pdf DA: 7/8/15 CB)
Since the 9/11 attacks the world has been challenged with intrusive
legislation upon civil liberties and increased use of surveillance
technologies. As this development is proceeding rapidly, both from a
legal point of view and the technological side, it takes more than
parliamentary politics to pursue a democratic and open discussion
about these matters. This is where the civil society, or rather the civil societies,
need to collaborate. Thus, I will propose that engineers, softwareprogrammers and people in the private sector of Information
Technology could co-operate with activists, human-rights
organizations and citizen-journalists in a very productive manner. I
will also give tangible examples on how such activities have been
pursued in Sweden during a controversy on the role of signals intelligence.
Surveillance and war. Issues that keep arising in the backwaters of
the wars on terrorists, drugs, and trafficking are often complex and require
technical and legal expertise, not only to be understood, but more importantly, to be
taken seriously in the public debate by the media. In order to avoid laws
are passed without a proper debate or that technologies are
implemented as merely technical solutions, I will propose that

criticism could have a positive task in building a collaborative

informational infrastructure, an effective media strategy, and other innovations. Let me
give an example from Sweden. During 2008, a law was passed which allowed
the government to pursue extensive signals intelligence on the Internet. It
was termed the FRA-law in the press, since the authority responsible for signals intelligence is
called Forsvarets Radioanstalt [1], which is the equivalent to the NSA in the United
States, or the BND in Germany. The FRA was previously only allowed to search and intercept radio traffic,

this new law would allow the authority to intercept all internet
traffic, by monitoring so-called co-operation points at the Internet Service Providers. By copying all
the information passing through the cables, the FRA will be able to extract trafficdata from, the multitude of data, both domestic and international.
but

Consequently, a mode of operation which was developed in the context of the post-war arms race will be
transferred to the Internet as this law is effectuated during 2009. However, the Internet is largely used by
private and corporate communication, rather than military information, a fact that raises questions

I will argue that if it

were not for the active formation of a public, this law would have
been passed without resistance or criticism . In order to understand how this

concerning privacy, integrity and the rights to private communication.

works, the notion of a public is borrowed from the philosopher John Dewey, who explicitly stresses the

participation in activities and sharing in

results are additive concerns. They demand communication as a
prerequisit e. // Communication of the results of social inquiry is the
same thing as the formation of public opinion . [2] Crucial to the
formation of a participatory public issue, and to allow it to build
political pressure, is there free flow of information in the sense that it operates
without restrictions, something which is very diferent compared to traditional
theories of mass-communication. This is where the Internet has a very interesting
importance of communication: But

potential since its architecture, at least ideally, promotes participation, sharing and communication, which
is precisely what Dewey is asking for. However, it seems that

this free flow cannot be

guaranteed by the internet alone, since the same abilities can be used for intrusive
surveillance. Panspectric Surveillance. How are we then to conceive of contemporary technologies of
surveillance? One way is to ask how technologies are used throughout society, by analyzing their
performances and abilities in socio-technical assemblages. Digital technologies, besides sharing certain
properties in hardware such as microprocessors, electricity-based operations and abilities to process
instructions and algorithms, usually share many networked, or social effects. The internet as an
assemblage of computers, routers, switches and all kinds of IP-based technologies, such as mobile devices
and satellites, shapes emergent forms of effectuation. For example file-sharing, voice-transmission, e-mails
etc. are all dependent on interconnectivity. Also, they operate on the potentiality of decentralization and
read-write capacities, and on the ability to transfer the analogue world to a digital realm, which we see in
the digitalization of images, sounds, and even in the keystrokes of keyboard. There is however a critical
paradox built into our mundane technologies. We may use digital cameras on our mundane technologies.
We may use digital cameras on our holiday trips and post the images on a blog, but we may also use the

The present any technologies are

this at the same time what may liberate sounds, texts, images and videos from their
material imprisonment and geographical spatiality , while they
simultaneously make possible for what is called panspectric
surveillance [3] The concept of panspectrocism comes from philosopher Manuel
DeLanda, who situates the origin of these technologies in war . It is
worthwhile to quote from his work War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (1991) in length: There are
many diferences between the Panopticon and the Panspectron //
Instead of positiong some human bodies around a central sensor, a
same capacities for an IP-based surveillance camera.

multiplicity of sensors is deployed around all bodies: its antenna

farms, spy satellites and cable-traffic intercepts feed into its
computers all the information that can be gathered. Thus is then processed
through a series of filters or key-word watch lists. The Panspectron does not merely
select certain bodies and certain (visual) data about them. Rather, it compiles
information about all at the same time, using computers to select
the segments of data relevant to its surveillance tasks [4]. DeLanada thus
argues that the technologies we face in contemporary debates on Internet
surveillance, originate in post-war setting which culminated during the
cold war. Signals intelligence which culminated during the cold war. Signals intelligence was born in a
combination of radio interception, transferring analogue signals to digital information, and computers
which calculated patterns, attached meta-data, and filtered out only the relevant pieces of information in a

The birth of the panspectric technological framew ork, at

least an abstract sense, this came from warfare. However, it was developed and
refined during times when consumer technologies were not yet
digital, and usually not even made for two-way communication (TV. Press, radio). What we see today is
a complete change of orders. Signals intelligence performed by governments ,
such as the NSA, the FRA or the BND have entered a territory populated by
ordinary citizens, rather than tanks, spy satellites and nuclear weapons.
Contemporary panspectric surveillance depends on the
interconnectedness of sensors and computational methods such as data mining, sociograms
multiplicity of signals.

and databases. Sensors include RFID-chips, digital CCTV-cameras, credit cards, mobile phones, internet
surveillance etc., and they all have the ability to record an ever increasing part of our everyday lives. This
is where we get close to the etymology of the words pan-, which means everything, and spectrum which is

The radical digitalisation of our societal

functions and everyday lives, reconfigures and prolongs the range of
surveillance. However, to make sense of this enormous abundance of data, methods of
reducing complexity and finding relevant traces are needed . This is where
the entire range of detectable traces.

the other pole of panspectrocism emerges; the need for supercomputers and advanced software and
statistics. The FRA has bought one of the fastest supercomputers in the world, and it is plugged directly
into the central fibre-cables of the Swedish Internet Service Providers. They will consequently receive a
copy of all traffic-data, and then process it in several steps in order to find patterns. The problem is,
however, that traffic-data (which contains information about with whom, at what time, how frequently etc.
we communicate) can say a great deal about you and your life. If we make social network analyses of the
meta-data you give off during a normal day, the surveyor can probably find out who most of your friends
are, and where you are most likely to be located. With more and more data, the surveyor is able to tell
your religion, sexuality, political affiliation and consumer behaviour. Citizen Journalism, Pirate Parties and

We can make a tripartite division of activities that may

challenge the increasing use of legal and technological means of
mass surveillance; citizen journalism, pirate parties and activism. They may sometimes
Activists

resonate in the same direction, towards a clear goal, but their basic properties and relations are essentially

Issues, such as the FRA-law, can only stir up reactions and become
issues proper if, following Dewey, there is communication between
actors allowing them to react to what is imposed on them . It has been said
heterogeneous.

that the case of the FRA-law was the first time in Swedish history that traditional newspapers lagged the
blogosphere, and for the centre-conservative government the force of citizen journalism came as quite a
surprise. The blogosphere displayed a few interesting abilities by cooperating and sharing knowledge.

One important aspect of raising issues, needed to be accounted for in this case, is
speed. Paul Virilio argues in his book Speed and Politics, that: If speed thus appears
as the essential fall out of styles of conflicts and cataclysms, the
current arms race is in fact only the arming of the race toward the
end of the world as a distance, in other words as a field of action. [5]

Speed turns distance into action, and citizen journalism has a higher
velocity than the traditional media, being dependent on printing presses, paid and
professional journalists, or hierarchical organisations. During the passing of the FRA-law, the only
ones being able to read legal documents, do proper research, and
have a constructive discussion, were bloggers. In this case (and I do not want to
generalise this observation to be valid for the media in general) we may say that the allocation of
resources was much more efficient than that of large media corporations. The critical task for the
blogosphere in making a successful attempt at stopping this law is knowledge production. Surveillance
technologies and intrusive legislations are complex matters which are often secretive in character. Signals
intelligence is maybe an extreme case, since details about methods and search criteria is necessarily kept
away from the public. The first step in the case of the FRA was ontopolitical, in the sense that there was
(and still is) a struggle to define whether signals intelligence is mass-surveillance, which would be a

Bloggers
analysed legal documents and government white papers, as a kind
of swarm intelligence, and could argue convincingly that they
entailed many legal exceptions for the FRA in registering political
opinions, sexual orientation or religious background. The counter-argument
from advocates of the law did not convince the bloggers, and the traditional media started
covering the issue extensively. During the summer of 2008, there were articles in the
disaster for integrity, or simply a means to target very few enemies of society (terrorists).

newspaper almost every day for months, and many bloggers wrote extensively in both arenas

[Theres also a warrant in the card that says speed of conveying

information solves, so speed good]
High School Students learning about Surveillance is key to
solve war and threat-construction that justifies atrocities
Ralston 14
http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/app/uploads/2015/04/Mil
ton-Wolf-2014-Compendium.pdf#page=41
Increasing state surveillance of the internet and a seeming lack of
global accountability and best practices regarding foreign and domestic
internet policies demands the attention of students, scholars, and
practitioners of media and communication , political science,
sociology, computer science, and the like. With these concerns in mind,
the 2014 Milton Wolf Seminar highlighted themes of surveillance, visibility,
disclosure, and espionage in the digital age. This essay seeks to touch
upon some of these themes, and to present a case for the study of
ontological security in international relations as a way to explain, in
part, U.S. practices of surveillance following the leaks by former
National Security Administration (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden.
Politically, the stakes are high as cyberpolitics becomes an issue of
high politics in the study of international relations; states and the
agents who produce narratives about the state frame cyber
discourse in ways that attempt to justify practices of surveillance,
espionage, and censorship. States justify intrusion into cyberspace in the
name of stability and an idealized self-image. This, can prove violent and
costly, with parallels to justifying war on the basis of empire in

offline venues. In cyber venues, the United States in particular has had
to justify state intrusion into cyber venues. Void of routinized
responses to traditional threats, the state must reshape or
reconfigure its self-image in order to combat the contradictions
inherent in state intrusions into cyberspace. Taking in consideration
such concerns and dynamics, this essay first sets out to explain
ontological security in the study of international relations and the
discursive practices of U.S. state agents in justifying state
surveillance practices. It then concludes by drawing parallels between
these discursive practices and various presentations at the 2014 Milton Wolf
Seminar. Ontological Security in International Relations Theory
Physical security concerns dominate realist accounts of security in
world politics (Mitzen 2006: 342). Ontological security in international
relations goes beyond the premise that states are solely concerned with
physical security. The assumption that states only seek physical
security, Mitzen (2006: 364) argues, constrains international relations
theory by failing to explain why states may seek or continue conflict
at the expense of physical security. Inherent in the conception of a
states ontological security is the notion of the state as person, or at
the very least, that states are concerned with their own self-image.
20 Ontological security is about constructing and maintaining the
stability of a states self-image. Power, in this regard, can be
understood in terms 20 See Wendt (2004) for a discussion of the validity
and appropriateness of understanding the state as person in international
relations theory. 40 of a centralized bodys internal capacity to
perceive its ability to operate upon its own selfimage, as well as
influence others and determine outcomes (Steele 2010: 15). Thus,
power is not solely based upon a states ability to make other actors do what
they would otherwise not do, to pose material threats to other states, or
assert global influence; power is about the states recognition that it can use
and recreate its own self-image. States put forward narratives about
themselves through state agents, such as government officials. State actions
must be justified, even if they go against the grain of international norms or
expectations (Steele 2008: 10). What is particularly interesting about the U.S
response to the Snowden disclosures is the manner in which the disclosures
were framed, the contradictions that arose as a result of this framing, and
how the narratives that the state produced regarding NSA practices harken
back to the self-image-making of the U.S. state. Why the United States?
When examining speeches made by U.S. state agents, publications regarding
U.S. citizenship, and the ways the United States is presented in popular
culture, common trends emerge: The United States is presented as
exceptional, as a land of shared values-- liberty, freedom, and prosperity
which were created by the nations founding fathers. David Campbell (1998:
131) suggests that America is an imagined community par excellence.
America, like all other states, is dependent upon practices that make up its
ontological being. However, as Campbell (1998) argues: Defined, therefore,
more by absence than presence, America is peculiarly dependent on

representational practices for its being. Arguably more than any other state,
the imprecise process of imagination is what constitutes American identity (p.
91). Space and time in reference to U.S. identity is crucial to this analysis
because successful fulfillment of ontological state security is predicated upon
that states ability to maintain a consistent self-identity and self-image. Void
of a people as a foundational element, the United States self-identity is quite
fleeting, and, thus, hinges on representational, symbolic, and iconic imagery
in order to ascribe to itself some form of identity (Campbell 1998: 132). The
U.S. State Narrative In a speech made prior to Snowdens disclosures,
President Obama spoke of the necessity to secure cyber infrastructure while
maintaining the internet as a free and open space: Our pursuit of
cybersecurity will notI repeat, will not includemonitoring private sector
networks or Internet traffic. We will preserve and protect the personal privacy
and civil liberties that we cherish as Americans. Indeed, I remain firmly
committed to net neutrality so we can keep the Internet as it should be
open and free. In light of the Snowden disclosures, a contradiction arises
between the actual behavior of the state through its national security agency
and the self-image of the state. President Obama sends two distinct and
seemingly irreconcilable messages regarding cyberspace: First, the United
States, as a centralized power, recognizes the tensions that it must mediate
between security and 41 liberty; Second, the United States has a vision for
cyberspace, one focused on being open and free. But free for whom? U.S.
security policy is decentralized insofar as it attempts to do too much while
still trying to keep a constant self-image (See Campbell 1998 and Gould and
Steele 2014). Cyberspace is not an American thing, but from cyberspace
comes a multitude of images that only exacerbate the imagined nature of
American identity. Thus, what cyberspace is and what cyberspace means,
from an American perspective, is inherently American. Addressing the noise
surrounding the practices of the National Security Administration, President
Obama first noted the history of intelligence gathering by the United States:
At the dawn of our Republic, a small, secret surveillance committee, born out
of the Sons of Liberty, was established in Boston. And the groups members
included Paul Revere. At night, they would patrol the streets, reporting back
any signs that the British were preparing raids against Americas early
patriots. In order to find footing and precedent in the face of ontological
insecurity in cyberspace two rhetorical moves are deployed. First, history is
resurfaced and reworked to create a seemingly appropriate metaphor for the
present. This history is doused in a patriotic whitewash, whereby particular
events are chosen but not others that are perhaps more indicative and
relevant to the current situation. Further, the parallels put forward by Obama
are not parallels at all; the nature of surveillance, global politics,
globalization, and technology are not the same as they were 200 or so years
ago. This history serves to maintain the states self-image over time.
Campbell (1998: 130) notes that the American quasi-war with France
demonstrated how previously established discursive strategies of otherness
could be invoked in novel circumstances to provide powerful modes of
understanding. Much in the same way, President Obamas return to history

serves not only to ground justifications for NSA activities in seemingly

consistent practices of state surveillance, but also in actions against threats
from an other, in this case, the British during the Revolutionary War. Threats
in cyberspace come from a plethora of sources, including: other states, nonstate actors, rogue Americans, or even cyberspace itself. Obamas second
rhetorical move is to argue for American exceptionalism. He goes on to note,
But Americas capabilities are unique, and the power of new technologies
means that there are fewer and fewer technical constraints on what we can
do. That places a special obligation on us to ask tough questions about what
we should do. The justification for (at least toned down) policies of NSA
surveillance centers on the notion that someone has to do it, and we can
do it better than anyone else. Americas status as the worlds only
superpower, as President Obama declares, opens itself up for interrogation.
At the end of his speech on NSA reforms, President Obama demonstrates,
perhaps unintentionally, that ontological insecurity is a powerful motivator for
the United States in cyberspace: When you cut through the noise, whats
really at stake is how we remain true to who we are in a world that is
remaking itself at dizzying speed. Whether its the ability of 42 individuals to
communicate ideas, to access information that would have once filled every
great library in every country in the world, or to forge bonds with people on
the other side of the globe, technology is remaking what is possible for
individuals and for institutions and for the international order. This is not to
say that the United States consciously and reflexively recognizes its
ontological insecurity in its relationship to cyberspace. However, the
examples that are raised concerning the dangers of cyberspacefrom
cyberspace as a mechanism for terrorist mobilization to cyber wars of the
futuredo not paint an entirely clear picture of what makes cyberspace
something truly different in global politics. This shift is not universal, or at
least to the same degree, for every state. Cyberspace may provide a vehicle
for dissent, organization, etc. for every state, but it burdens states that are
fixed in terms of physical security and depend on an idealized self-image.
States are pressured into explaining the contradictions that arise as a result
of their self-image (freedom, openness, transparence, for example) and stateled intrusions into cyberspace. Foreign Policies of the Internet: Surveillance
and Disclosure Revisited The 2014 Milton Wolf Seminar brought to bear, and
framed well, this theoretical construction of state ontological security in
international relations. In particular, many of the presentations dealt with the
critical problematic of the balance that must be struck between state selfinterest by way of national security and internet diplomacy, global
governance, and transparency. Panelists discussed this problematic in various
contexts ranging from state censorship of information, international law, and
state sovereignty. The internet, and cyberspace more generally, has very real
physical characteristics that are often forgotten in discourses of a borderless
digital world or the metaphor of the internet as a cloud. Indeed, the
internet is built upon a physical framework, logical building blocks, and
interaction (Choucri 2012); and each of these layers carries very real
political ramifications. State ontological security in cyberspace, as described

above, assumes the structural realities of power in international relations

regarding the internet, and seeks to elaborate upon how states, beyond
concern for their physical security, come to justify surveillance practices on
the internet. In this sense, the Milton Wolf Seminar proved invaluable as
practitioners and scholars sought to elaborate upon the role of the internet,
censorship, privacy, and surveillance in diverse contexts including the
national policies and practices of Russia, South Africa, the United States,
China, and Britain. Further, the seminar participants elaborated upon shifting
or different physical as well as content-layer considerations that need to be
taken into account, such as changing modes of internet use, types of
surveillance practices, and statecraft in the digital age. The discussion held
over the course of the two-day seminar invoked more questions than
answers; analysis of such issues has thus far moved, as one seminar
participant described, glacially alongside the need for internet governance.
Thus, the seminar was both timely and a necessary given the salience of
internet security, privacy, and surveillance in international politics, along with
the perhaps shifting role of the state, and traditional concepts of international
politics: state power, sovereignty, and global governance.

Uniqueness Terror High

Al-Quada is actively expanding into India through Huji.
Terror attacks through the county are actively being
attempted.
Daily Star 7/3
'Huji Plans, 7-3-2015, "'Huji plans Qaeda merger'," Daily Star,
http://www.thedailystar.net/backpage/huji-plans-qaeda-merger-106585
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Bangladesh (Huji-B)

leaders were preparing to build their

organisational capability to join al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).
They wanted to go on a bombing spree after Eid to let everyone know that they exist. R apid A ction
B attalion made the claim after arresting 12 alleged Huji leaders and
activists. Arrestee Maulana Mainul Islam Mahim's job was to
coordinate with AQIS and organise the Huji leaders and activists to
join al-Qaeda. Arrestee Mufti Zafar Amin Salman was acting as an adviser for the whole operation, Rab officials
said. Rab also said the arrestees were trying to label themselves as Dawate Tabliq and 313 Badrer Sainik. Their plan
was to join AQIS after the two organisations had spread across Bangladesh. They [arrested militants]

plan to carry out bomb attacks across the country

had a

after Eid to send a message to

the inactive members of militant outfits about their existence, said Mufti Mahmud Khan, Rab's Legal and Media wing

He said their plan was to

get as much media coverage as possible through the bomb attacks
and recruit more operatives. Rab officials said the militants had so
far recruited 50 operatives and of them, 20 were supposed to have training at a madrasa in Bogra.
The Rab's claim about the arrestees' attempt to set up a link with
AQIS could not be verified. Journalists had not been allowed to ask the arrestees questions when they
were paraded before the media yesterday. After becoming stronger by recruiting more
operatives, they had a plan to work under AQIS, Rab claimed. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman alZawahiri in last September had announced an Indian subcontinent
branch of al-Qaeda for Bangladesh, India , Pakistan and Myanmar. Earlier, in a video
director, at a press briefing at its headquarters in the capital yesterday.

posted on Jihadist Forum on May 2, AQIS claimed the responsibility for the murder of writer-blogger Avijit Roy. In the video,
AQIS leader Asim Umar said his organisation carried out the attack on Avijit and other blasphemers" in Bangladesh and
Pakistan. Rab officials, however, said they so far did not find any link between the arrestees and the murders and the AQIS
claim. They said they would interrogate them further in remand about the murders and the claim. Mufti Mahmud Khan told
reporters that Maulana Mayeen Uddin alias Abul Jandal, a death-row in mate and a top Huji leader, had been

The arrestees had been planning a Trishalstyle ambush on a prison van to snatch away Mayeen from custody , he
communicating with the arrestees from jail.

said. In February last year, militants attacked a prison van in Trishal of Mymensingh and liberated three condemned JMB
leaders from police custody. A policeman was killed in the attack. Two of the escapees are still at large while the other one
was killed in a shootout. Huji had wanted to free Mayeen by attacking and cutting the grills of Kashimpur Jail, Rab claimed,

On information that Huji men

were gathering in the capital from across the country , several teams
of Rab-4 detained them at Sadarghat, Airport Railway Station and Mirpur during the last two
adding that realising it was very risky, they planned for an ambush.

days. The other arrestees were: Mohammad Saidul Islam alias Sayeed Tamim, Mosharraf Hossain, Abdur Rahman Bapary,
Al Amin Ibrahim, Mozahidul Islam Nakib, Ashraful Islam alias Abul Hashem, Robiul Islam, Habib Ullah, Shohidul Islam, and

Rab during its drive in a Mirpur house also seized bombmaking materials and manuals, and books on jihad.
Altaf Hossain.

Terror attacks have been sharply on the rise.

Lee 6/10
Matthew Lee, 6-10-2015, Matthew Less is State Department correspondent at
Associated Press"US: 35 percent spike in global terror attacks in 2014,"
NorthJersey, http://www.northjersey.com/news/us-35-percent-spike-in-globalterror-attacks-in-2014-1.1359476
Extremists in Iraq, Afghanistan and Nigeria unleashed a savage rise in violence between 2013 and 2014,

according to new statistics released by the State Department .

Attacks largely at the hands of the Islamic State and Boko Haram
raised the number of terror acts by more than a third, nearly
doubled the number of deaths and almost tripled the number of
kidnappings . The figures contained in the department's annual
global terrorism report say that nearly 33,000 people were killed in
almost 13,500 terrorist attacks around the world in 2014. That's up from
just over 18,000 deaths in nearly 10,000 attacks in 2013, it said. Twenty-four Americans were killed by
extremists in 2014, the report said. Abductions soared from 3,137 in 2013 to 9,428 in 2014, the report

The report attributes the rise in attacks to increased terror

activity in Iraq, Afghanistan and Nigeria and the sharp spike in
deaths to a growth in exceptionally lethal attacks in those countries
and elsewhere. There were 20 attacks that killed more than 100 people each in 2014, compared to
just two in 2013, according to the figures that were compiled for the State
Department by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. Among the 20
said.

mass casualty attacks in 2014 were the December attack by the Pakistani Taliban on a school in Peshawar,
Pakistan that killed at least 150 people and the June attack by Islamic State militants on a prison in Mosul,
Iraq, in which 670 Shiite prisoners died. At the end of 2014, the prison attack was the deadliest terrorist
operation in the world since Sept. 11, 2001, according to the report. The State Department's
counterterrorism coordinator said the numbers don't reflect improvements by the U.S. and its partners in
stamping out terrorism financing, improving information sharing, impeding foreign fighters and forming a

Terror
attacks took place in 95 countries in 2014, but were concentrated in
the Mideast, South Asia and West Africa. Iraq, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, India and Nigeria accounted for more than 60 percent
of the attacks and, if Syria is included, roughly 80 percent of the fatalities,
the report found. The rise in kidnappings is mainly attributable to
sharp increases in mass abductions by terrorist groups in Syria,
notably the Islamic State and the al-Qaida-linked al-Nusra Front . In
coalition to fight the Islamic State. "We have made progress," Ambassador Tina Kaidanow said.

Nigeria, Boko Haram was responsible for most, if not all, of the nearly 1,300 abductions in Nigeria in 2014,
including several hundred girls from a school in Chibok. By contrast, fewer than 100 terror-related
kidnappings were reported in Nigeria in 2013, according to the report.

Al-Quada has active control of regions of Yemen.

France 24, 7/8
An Alliance, 8-7-2015, "A report from an al Qaeda-controlled city in Yemen,"
Observers, http://observers.france24.com/content/20150708-yemen-mukallaal-qaeda-control

As Yemen slides into chaos, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

(AQAP) has taken advantage of the deteriorating security and
political situation to gain further ground in the country . The jihadist
group recently took control of a large chunk of the southeastern
province of Hadhramaut. Our Observer explains how AQAP's jihadists have been tightening
their grip over the region and its inhabitants on a daily basis. Air strikes carried out by an
alliance of Gulf states have largely slowed the advance of Shiite
Houthi rebels in southern Yemen. But that hasn't been their only consequence. In just
four months AQAP has managed to wrest control of several cities in
Hadhramaut , including the region's capital, the port city of Mukalla. Militants
have even taken over the local branch of Yemen's central bank, police
stations and military headquarters. "They've started patrolling while carrying megaphones" Our
Observer, Mohamed, is a journalist based in Mukalla. At the start, the arrival of al Qaeda improved
security in the city because thefts and looting had been on the rise since the beginning of the air strikes.
The group's members were very reassuring towards the residents. They said that they had no intention of
applying Sharia law straight away, but favoured dialogue with the local population. "AQAP members

But little by little, the group began imposing

its laws. Firstly, they burned down markets where khat is sold [Editor's note: a popular soft drug in
Yemen]. They also banned sale of the drug, though they didn't lay into users. They also started
patrolling the streets of the city. Often, the fighters would stop women if they found that
burned markets where khat is sold"

their veils didnt conform to AQAP rules, or if they found their perfume to be too strong. At first, it was not
so bad. The AQAP militants were happy enough just giving out 'advice'.

US eforts to stop groups like ISIS have been unsuccessful

Sisk 7/6
Richard Sisk, 7-6-2015, Richard Sisk has more than 40 years experience in
journalism as a reporter and editor for the wire services and the N.Y. Daily
News. He has embedded with U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
reported from Beirut, Tel Aviv, Bosnia, Kosovo, Panama, Haiti, Guatemala,
Northern Ireland, Vietnam, Eritrea and other conflict zones"$500M US
Program Has Only Trained 60 Syrians to Fight ISIS," Military,
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/07/07/500m-us-program-has-onlytrained-60-syrians-to-fight-isis.html
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said Tuesday that only 60 so-called
"moderate" Syrian rebels were currently being trained by the U.S. in
the $500 million program that had been slated to put 3,000 fighters
into the field against ISIS by the end of this year. Carter told the Senate Armed
Services Committee that he regretted disclosing that the number was so low but "I wanted to tell the truth.
The number 60, as you all recognize, is not an impressive number. The number is much smaller than we
hoped for at this point." The $500 million Syrian training program authorized by Congress was intended to

3,000 projected to be ready by

the end of this year. Cater said that Army Maj. Gen. Michael Nagata of
train and equip up to 5,400 fighters annually, with about

U.S. Central Command, who is leading the Syrian training program, had about 7,000 potential recruits
identified but "It's

obviously going to take time, obviously" to vet and prepare

them. SASC Chairman Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., who earlier gave a scathing critique
of the Obama administration's entire approach to the campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), said that "given the poor numbers of recruited and trained Syrian fighters thus far, I am doubtful we

can achieve our goal of training a few thousand this year." " I

got to tell you that after four

years, Mr. Secretary, that is not a very impressive number, " said McCain.

He suggested that the recruiting effort was failing because the U.S. has yet to tell the Syrian rebels
whether the U.S. would protect them from attack by the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
McCain asked: "Is that fair to these young men to say we are sending you in to fight ISIS only, and by the
way, we will decide on the policy whether to defend you if you are barrel bombed?" Carter and Joint Chiefs

U.S. training
program for Iraqis was also falling far short of its goals . About 8,800
have been trained for the Iraqi Security Force (ISF), and another 2,000 for
Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey, who also testified at the hearing, said that the

counter-terrorism activities, against projections that 24,000 would be fielded by the end of this year, Carter
said. The hearing marked what was likely to be the last Congressional testimony by Dempsey, who will
retire in October. On Thursday, the committee will hold a confirmation hearing for Dempsey's designated
successor, Marine Commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford. The hearing also offered McCain and Dempsey what
was probably their last opportunity to renew their long-standing feud over tactics, strategy, readiness and
budgets going back years. Their disputes reached the point two years ago where McCain put a temporary
hold on Dempsey's re-nomination as JCS Chairman.

UQ- The US is losing the war on terror, Us intervention has

created more terrorist activity
Jebreal 14
Rula Jebreal, 11-26-2014, Rula Jebreal is a Palestinian-Italian foreign policy
analyst, journalist, novelist and screenwriter. She was a commentator for
MSNBC."Rula Jebreal: Why America is losing the war on terror and the
Islam debate is so flawed," No Publication,
http://www.salon.com/2014/11/26/rula_jebreal_why_america_is_losing_the_wa
r_on_terror_and_the_islam_debate_is_so_flawed/
America is losing the longest war in its history . An enemy that had
comprised a couple of hundred desperate men hiding in caves in
eastern Afghanistan when the war on terror got underway
following the 9/11 attacks is incarnated today as 20 ,000 fighting men
in the Islamic State movement. And far from hiding in caves, ISIS has brazenly raised its black flag over vast
swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq countries that, in 2001, had been two of the most secular societies in the Middle East. Thus
the fruits of the trillions of dollars and thousands of American lives
and hundreds of thousands of unnamed innocent civilians in the
Middle East and Asia devoured by the war on terror, which the
Obama administration now says could rage for another 30 years.
Given its costs, consequences and failures, the war on terror has provoked
remarkably little sensible public debate in the U.S. The country that congratulated itself
for having killed Osama bin Laden has not asked itself why that fact seems to have mattered so little to the trajectory of the conflict. And
politicians and pundits have been largely indifferent to the devastating consequences of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

Only when jihadists began disseminating macabre , but well-produced

videos of the brutal decapitation of American captives did U.S.
attention turn, once again, to Iraq and Syria. Desultory military strikes followed, but little explanation
to the American people about what has gone wrong except, perhaps, among TV
info-tainers such as Bill Maher, who insist that the problem lies within Islam itself. It may be comforting to see
the ISIS phenomenon as determined by theology rather than the
result of mass regional and American incompetence. Its
conventional wisdom among the Arab worlds secular democrats to

view ISIS as a byproduct of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. We wrecked a country, destroying its institutions
and security forces, creating a vacuum that drew in jihadists from across the
globe. Al-Qaida had not operated in Iraq before the invasion ; it moved
in after the invasion, setting up shop in the Sunni communities
antagonized by the U.S.-led occupation. Similarly, ISIS has exploited the alienation of the Sunni population from the
sectarian Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to gain control of much of northern and western Iraq.

Independent Judiciary Good India

Independent judiciary is important in India
Firstpost 6/18
National, 6-18-2015, "Right to appoint judges is part of judicial independence:
Lawyers body tells SC," Firstpost, http://www.firstpost.com/india/right-appointjudges-part-judicial-independence-lawyers-body-tells-sc-2302012.html
The right of judiciary to insist on appointing judges is a "vital" part
of its independence and basic structure of the Constitution which
has been taken away by the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), a lawyers body
on Thursday told the Supreme Court. Senior advocate and jurist Fali S Nariman,
appearing for the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (SCAORA),
told a five-judge bench headed by Justice JS Khehar that the right to
have its say in the appointments is the "core" of the independence
of the judiciary . "Right to insist is the core of the right. It is the right
of appointment. It is not the only part of independence of judiciary
but it is a vital part of it," he told the bench, also comprising justices J Chelameswar, MB
Lokur, Kurian Joseph and Adarsh Kumar Goel which is hearing the petitions challenging the validity of the
NJAC Act.

Independent Judiciary Good Turkey

Independent judiciary is important in Turkey.
Cihan 6/30
Cihan Haber Ajans, 06-30-2015, "Judge: Turkey should restore judicial
independence ," Cihan Haber Ajans: Doru ve hzl haberin adresi,
http://en.cihan.com.tr/en/judge-turkey-should-restore-judicial-independence1810721.htm
Writing on his Twitter account on Sunday,

Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors

(HSYK) member Mahmut en said the government should listen to
the 10 international organizations that have urged Turkey to restore
judicial independence. It is not enough to say that we are right, fair,
impartial and independent. If we cannot convince international organizations and the public
of this, then there is a serious problem, en said . The HSYK member
listed the international organizations that have criticized Turkey
over government intrusion in the judiciary, which include the European Parliament
(EP) in its Turkey progress report, Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Consultative Council of
European Judges (CCJE), the European Association of Judges (EAJ), the Venice Commission, the United
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Group of States against
Corruption (GRECO).

If these 10 organizations say similar things in their

reports, then either we are acting in a way that contradicts the
universal norms in [judicial] appointment and discipline issues, or
we have failed to clearly express the reasons behind our actions,
en said. The judge also said that ignoring such reports might lead
to rulings against Turkey from the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR ). There should be no special conditions for Turkey when it
comes to the universal rules of law, which aim to promote
fundamental rights and must be applied in every situation, en
stated .

Independent Judiciary Good Human Rights

Independent judiciary key to human rights
UN 6/13
UN News Service Section, 6-13-2015, "UN News,"
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51146#.VZ7XUM6polI
the Secretary-General cautioned that the road to
development must be sustained by a deep commitment to human
rights. There is no peace without development. No development without peace.
And neither is possible without a respect for human rights, he
stated. Adding that violations of human rights are often warning
signs of much worse to come, Mr. Ban reminded those gathered of
his Human Rights Up Front initiative which worked to address human
rights violations before they escalate. To that point, he voiced concern about the perceived
Despite all these efforts, however,

deterioration of some aspects of human rights a shrinking democratic space across Central Asia. Curbing freedoms, he
said, might create an illusion of stability in the short-run but ultimately would foster a breeding ground for extremist
ideologies. The failure to respect human rights, build accountable institutions, promote
political participation, and ensure opportunity for all creates gaps, continued the Secretary-General. Young people

democracy in Central Asia can work. Around the

world, the way to confront threats is not more repression , it is more openness.
More human rights. The road to a stable future is by strengthening the rule of law. By fighting corruption.
By ensuring an independent judiciary . By guaranteeing free media. By
should be sent a message:

building just societies. By empowering citizens, he added.