PEOPLE v.

EFREN BESMONTE
We find no reason to doubt the accuracy of the identification of the malefactor based on auditory and
olfactory perception by the victim on December 15, 1994. Under the circumstances, Melanie was able
to perceive who her rapist was and to make known that perception. Nor is there any reason to doubt
her sincerity to tell the truth, for there is no showing at all by the defense that she charged Besmonte
with rape due to an evil or corrupt motive.
In sum, the defense of denial and alibi interposed by appellants cannot prevail over their positive
identification by the victim. It is a time-honored principle that the positive and categorical assertions of
a witness generally prevail over bare denials.[60] In the case against Apuyan, greater probative value
and evidentiary weight must be accorded to Melanies unwavering and categorical identification of
appellant Apuyan as one of her tormentors over this appellants feeble, self-serving, and
uncorroborated denial. Affirmative testimony from a credible witness is stronger and more trustworthy
than a bare negative testimony.
Equally unmeritorious is appellant Besmontes alibi that he could not have raped Melanie because he
was in Sorsogon, Sorsogon from May 1994 to January 1995. For alibi to prosper, appellant must not
only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must also convincingly
demonstrate the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.
In Besmontes case, it was not physically impossible for Besmonte to have been at the crime scene at
the time the rape was committed, in view of the trial courts observation that:
It is of judicial notice that the poblacion of Magallanes can be reached thru a jeep, which is the means
of transportation from the town of Sorsogon for about one (1) hour only. Accused did not even present
the person he resides with while in Sorsogon.
That Besmontes wife corroborated his alibi is no moment. No other witness unrelated to appellant
Besmonte was presented to corroborate his claim. Alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by
the accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons. This is because alibi is easy to contrive
and difficult to disprove.
Rape is committed when a man has carnal knowledge of a victim with the use of force and
intimidation. In both cases, Melanie credibly testified on the details of her harrowing experiences and
positively identified the appellants as the persons who raped her. The evidence for the prosecution
has established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of carnal knowledge and force or intimidation.
Hence, we must sustain the conviction of both appellants and deny their respective appeals.
Jimenez v. NLRC
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE NLRC, GENERALLY RESPECTED;
EXCEPT WHEN AT ODDS WITH THE LABOR ARBITER. - The review of labor cases elevated to us
on certiorari is confined to questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. As a rule, this Court
does not review supposed errors in the decision of the NLRC which raise factual issues, because
factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are accorded not only respect but even
finality, aside from the consideration that the Court is essentially not a trier of facts. However, in the
case at bar, a review of the records thereof with an assessment of the facts is necessary since the
factual findings of the NLRC and the labor arbiter are at odds with each other.
BURDEN OF PROOF; THE DEBTOR WHO PLEADS AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATION OF PAYMENT
OF OBLIGATION MUST PROVE THE SAME; WHEN THE BURDEN SHIFTS TO THE CREDITOR. -

As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff
must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove
payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing
with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment. When the existence of a debt
is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the burden of proving that it has been
extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such a defense to the claim of the
creditor. Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with
the evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof- shifts to the creditor, who is then under a
duty of producing some evidence to show non-payment. In the instant case, the right of respondent to
be paid a commission is not disputed by petitioners. Although private respondents admit receipt of
partial payment, petitioners still have to present proof of full payment. Where the defendant sued for a
debt admits that the debt was originally owed, and pleads payment in whole or in part, it is incumbent
upon him to prove such payment. That a plaintiff admits that some payments have been made does
not change the burden of proof. The defendant still has the burden of establishing payments beyond
those admitted by plaintiff. The positive testimony of a creditor may be sufficient of itself to show nonpayment, even when met by indefinite testimony of the debtor. Similarly, the testimony of the debtor
may also be sufficient to show payment, but, where his testimony is contradicted by the other party or
by a disinterested witness, the issue may be determined against the debtor since he has the burden
of proof. The testimony of the debtor creating merely an inference of payment will not be regarded as
conclusive on that issue. Hence, for failure to present evidence to prove payment, petitioners
defaulted in their defense and in effect admitted the allegations of private respondents.
RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY; DOCUMENTS NOT PROPERLY ACCOMPLISHED HAS NO
PROBATIVE VALUE. - The testimony of petitioners which merely denied the claim of private
respondents, unsupported by documentary evidence, is not sufficient to establish payment. Although
petitioners submitted a notebook showing the alleged vales of private respondents for the year 1990,
the same is inadmissible and cannot be given probative value considering that it is not properly
accomplished, is undated and unsigned, and is thus uncertain as to its origin and authenticity.
PenaFlor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corp
In our view, it is more consistent with human experience that Peaflor indeed learned of the
appointment of Buenaobra only on March 13, 2000 and reacted to this development through his
resignation letter after realizing that he would only face hostility and frustration in his working
environment. Three very basic labor law principles support this conclusion and militate against the
companys case.
The first is the settled rule that in employee termination disputes, the employer bears the burden of
proving that the employees dismissal was for just and valid cause. That Peaflor did indeed file a letter
of resignation does not help the companys case as, other than the fact of resignation, the company
must still prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. There can be no valid resignation where the
act was made under compulsion or under circumstances approximating compulsion, such as when an
employees act of handing in his resignation was a reaction to circumstances leaving him no
alternative but to resign. In sum, the evidence does not support the existence of voluntariness in
Peaflors resignation.
Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Chante

CASE: Far East Bank & Trust Company vs. Diaz Realty, Inc.
I. FACTS
In August 1973, Diaz and company contracted a loan from Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC)
amounting to P 720,000, with interest of 12% per annum which was later increased to 14%, 16%,
18% and 20% respectively. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land
owned by Diaz Realty both located in Davao City. In 1981, Allied Company rented an office space in
the building constructed in the land mortgaged; it was further agreed that the monthly rental payments
of Allied Company shall be directly paid to the mortgagee [PaBC] for the lessors account. Allied bank
paid the monthly rentals to PaBC in conformance with the contract. On July 5, 1985, Central Bank
closed PaBC, placed it under receivership, and appointed Renan Santos as its liquidator. In
December 1986, Far East Bank Trust Company purchased the credit of Diaz & Company in favor of
PaBc. However, it was only in March 23, 1988 that Diaz was informed about the said purchase of
credit.
According to FEBTC, on March 23, 1988, Antonio Diaz (President of Diaz & Company and VicePresident of Diaz Realty) went to PaBCs office which by then housed FEBTC and was told that the
latter had acquired PaBC. Diaz was told by cashier Ramon Lim that as of the said date, his
outstanding balance with his loan is P 1,447,142.03. Diaz asked the defendant to make an
accounting of Allied Banks monthly rental payments. In December 14, 1988, Diaz furnished a check
to FEBTC in the amount of P 1,450, 000 to avoid further payments of interests and other penalties.
However, FEBTC did not accept it as payment, instead, Diaz was asked to deposit the same to
defendants Davao City Branch Office, pending the approval of Central Bank liquidator Renan Santos.
In the meantime, Diaz asked the defendant to reduce the interest from 20% to 12% per annum; no
reply was received from FEBTC. The defendant asked Diaz to change the P 1,450,000 payment to a
money market placement which he obeyed and that which expired in April 14, 1989. When there was
still no response from the defendant on whether or not it will accept his tender of payment, he filed his
case at the Davao Regional Trial Court.
In its responsive pleading, the defendant set up the following affirmative defenses: that in December
1986, FEBTC purchased from PaBC the account of Diaz for a total consideration of P 1,828, 875 and
that despite the purchase PaBC Davao branch continued to collect interests and penalty charges on
the loan from January 6, 1988 to July 8, 1988. It was not FEBTC but PaBC that collected the interest
rates mentioned in the complaint and it is not true that FEBTC imposed exorbitant interest rates. That
as a matter of fact, FEBTC tried to negotiate with the plaintiffs and that FEBTC has no knowledge of
the rates imposed previously by PaBC. Therefore, FEBTC could not be held responsible for
transactions which took place before the purchase and that defendant acted at the right time to settle
the account.
II. ISSUES
A. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the validity of the tender of payment was not properly
raised in the RTC and could not thus be raised in the appeal.
B. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to apply settled jurisprudential principles militating against
the private respondents contention that a valid tender of payment had been made by it.
C. Whether or not the CA correctly found that the transaction between petitioner and PaBC was an
innefective novation and that the consent of private respondents was necessary therefor.

D. Whether or not the CA erred in refusing to apply the rate of interest freely stipulated upon by the
parties to the respondents obligation.
E. Whether or not the CA committed an irreconcilable error in ordering the parties to re-negotiate the
terms of the contract while finding at the same time that the mortgage contract containing the lease
was valid.
F. Whether or not the petition, as argued by private respondent raises questions of fact not reviewable
by certiorari.
III. RESOLUTION
A. A check does not constitute legal tender, and that a creditor may validly refuse it. It must be
emphasized, however, that this dictum does not prevent a creditor from accepting a check as
payment. Meaning, the creditor has the option and the discretion of refusing or accepting it.
Therefore, since the petitioner bank did not refuse respondents check, and since the check was
cleared, it served as a valid tender of payment.
B. The transfer of credit from PaBC to FEBTC is not an ineffective novation but instead a mere
assignment of credit. Even so, FEBTC had the right to collect the full value of the credit from Diaz,
ubject to the terms as originally agreed upon in the Promissory Note.
C. Petitioner bank as assignee of respondents credit is entitled to the full interest rate of 20% in the
computation of debt of Diaz as stipulated in the August 26, 1983 agreement. However, since there
was a valid tender f payment made on November 14, 1988, the accrual of interest shall stop at that
date. Thus, Diaz should pay FEBTC the principal amount of P 1,067,000 plus accrued interet thereon
at 20% until November 14, 1988 less interest payments given to PaBc from December 1986-July 8,
1988. After that, interest should be computed at 12% per annum until full payment.
D. The petition is hereby denied. The decision of the CA is affirmed with the following modifications:
respondent Diaz Realty is ordered to pay FEBTC its principal obligation amounting to P 1,067,000
with interest thereon computed ar 20% per annum until November 14, 1988 less any interest
payments made to PaBC. Thereafter, interest shall be computed at 12% per annum until fully paid.
Bernardo v. Court of Appeals