SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
[GR 148560, 19 November 2001]
En Banc, Bellosillo (J) : 2 concur, 2 filed separate concurring opinions, 6 joined the concurring
opinion of
Mendoza, 3 dissented in a separate opinion, 1 took no part
Facts: On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8
separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Criminal Case 26558, for violation of Republic Act (RA) 7080, as
amended by RA 7659; (b) Criminal Cases 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Sections 3,
paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (e), and 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Criminal Case 26563, for violation of Section 7,
paragraph (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); (d) Criminal Case 26564, for Perjury (Article. 183 of The Revised Penal Code);
and, (e) Criminal Case 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (Commonwealth Act 142, as amended
by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001, Joseph Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the
case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the
charges in the Information in Criminal Case 26558; and, for reconsideration /reinvestigation of
the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file
counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. The grounds
raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration / reinvestigation of offenses,
and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and
the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April
2001, the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558
finding that "a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants
for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001, Estrada moved to quash the Information in
Criminal Case 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable
offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the
Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 9 July 2001, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

Issue: Whether the Plunder law, and the information, are clear to inform Estrada of the
accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Held: As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2
is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden,
and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as
the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must
sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its
violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct.
Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act
of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Section 1, paragraph (d), of the Plunder
Law. Herein, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating
with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which Estrada is alleged to have
committed. There was nothing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse Estrada in his
defense. Factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such
unequivocal assertions, Estrada is completely informed of the accusations against him as to
enable him
to prepare for an intelligent defense.
There is no basis for Estrada's claim that the Supreme Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its
face and in its entirety. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity." This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states
that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand,
decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." The doctrines of
strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases. "On its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is
generally disfavored.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

David v Arroyo
GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Facts:
As the nation celebrated EDSAs 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a
state of national emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry
out necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism
and lawless violence.
This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA People
Power I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of
facilities, including the media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed.
Along with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant.
A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial review.
Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his qualification to sue.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Solicitor Generals refute that the case has been moot and academic was not upheld by the
Court. According to the Supreme Court, courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and
academic if: there is grave Constitutional violation, the situations exceptional character and
paramount public interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on the grounds that his personal rights were
involved. The petitioner qualifies under the direct injury test. The personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury qualifies him to
impugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he sustained are the illegal
arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the court entertained his petition as
he has adequately shown that he entitled to judicial protection.
However, the court does not liberally declare statutes as invalid although they may be abused
and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The
validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency
to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into consideration that legislative power is
vested only in congress.
The Court partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the President
to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, commanding the AFP to
enforce laws not related to lawless violence are declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation
does not also authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utilities or business
affected with public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is constitutional as it is
a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement PP1017, but portion where acts of
terrorism has not been defined and punishable by congress is held unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the following acts of the government were held unconstitutional: warrantless arrest
of the petitioner, dispersal and warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that said
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or violating
BP 800; imposition of media standards and any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as
warrantless search of the Tribune Offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and
other materials.

Balacuit v CFI G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988

J. Gancayo

Facts:
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the
Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to of the ticket
price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month
imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being
enforced. Therespondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra
vires and an invalidexercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within
the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523
where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for theaters and not admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare
clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.

Issue:

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to
these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the
general welfare clause as invoked by the City?

Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio:
1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to control,
to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and
amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as to
the mode in which the business shall be exercised.
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other
places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of
delegated police power by the local government.
People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs from selling
tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police
power.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question
under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to
it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public
generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere
with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In
other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for
being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the
right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a
contract with the film owners for just admission prices for generaladmission, balcony and lodge.
Homeowners Association- the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification,
limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the
prescriptions of the fundamental law
The court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public
interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who
have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for
themselves. A reduction in the price ofadmission would mean corresponding savings for the parents;
however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does
not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to
comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation
because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12
years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the
ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as
such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house
patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the
ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners.
Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health,
safety, morals and the general welfare.
Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by movie
house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission.
They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults.
Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be
discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures
if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves.
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor
of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the
purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that
he behaves properly. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case
may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property.
The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner
thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has
the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can
obtain.
In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a
national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean
however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain degree.
Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas
and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and
public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within
the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions
cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of
regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably
interfered with even by the exercise of police power.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not
encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right
of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the
property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause.
Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such
presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on
the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence

PHILIPPINES vs. DELA PIEDRA

G.R. No. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta
together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine
Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore.
Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other
hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down.
They listened to the recruiter who was then talking about the breakdown of the fees involved:
P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the
processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary
deduction. The recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore.
Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit
pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of
P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring
about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos,
whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a
friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was
reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos
entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the
pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even
heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to
provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15)
minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.
Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service
(CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then
organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed.
Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment.
Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails,
as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. First, accused submits
that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness
and, thus, violates the due process clause.
The provision in question reads:

ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.

(b)
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the illegal
recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause. (2) Whether or not
accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpated
HELD:
(1)
For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code
defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due
process clause.
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.
In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court
criticized the definition of recruitment and placement.
The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced.
The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal
recruitment could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in any manner
promised or offered any employment for a fee. In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the
lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such
records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the
proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the
law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on
its face.
If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was
salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.
Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer from
overbreadth since by merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted of
illegal recruitment.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and
harmless acts such as labor or employment referral (referring an applicant, according to
appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad.
Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual
freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or
religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be
constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate
warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally
impermissible applications of the statute.
(2)
Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equal protection clause in her
defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro
handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the
only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, she
concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in
Zamboanga City.
The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit.
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by
itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a
statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated
alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of
intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there
must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination.
In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a clear and
intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials.
Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties,
and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation.
As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The
mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime,
while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a
conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.