Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FACTS:
This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband while
living with a paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had
been bought by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of
1950 but the final deed, as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law
spouse, has ensued during the latter Codes regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take
note of the new Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1988.
The prpoerty was acquired by Alayo then transferred title to the name of the second wife.
Alayo Bosing died and left the property to his paramour turned second wife (first marriage still
subsisting). First wife petitioned.
HELD:
The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate
wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407),
all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This presumption has not
been convincingly rebutted.
It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of
Josefa at Alayos request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property
unquestionably was acquired by Alayo it was just transferred to Josefa.
Uy vs CA
GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose.
Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole
administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the
same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband
necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot
4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in favor
of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC
and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary
proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the petition made by her mother was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As
such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on
summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing
special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural
due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits.
He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading
on Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife contemplating a
Petitioner then filed a complaint for Sum of Money with damages against
respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42. Respondents admitted their
loan but in the tune of Php340,000.00 and prayed for dismissal on the
grounds of improper venue, res judicata, and forum shopping. RTC
Branch 42 denied the motion to dismiss. CA set aside decision of RTC
Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. CA
ruled in general that the creditor may institute two alternative remedies:
either a personal action for the collection of debt or a real action to
foreclose the mortgage, but not both.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can no longer file complaint for collection
of sum of money onthe ground of multiplicity of suits
Ruling: The Court ruled that generally, it is true that the mortgagecreditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of
sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage
security. An election of the first bars recourse to the second,
otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would
be tossed from one venue to another depending on the location of the
mortgaged
properties
and
the
residence
of
the
parties.
In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into
consideration. Accordingly since the Deed was executed by respondent
Edna without the consent and authority of her husband, it is void
pursuant
to
Article
96
of
the
Family
Code.
still
has
remedy
under
the
law.
Code
which
provides:
him.
The
principle
of
unjust
enrichment
another.
action
that
petitioner
might
have
against
Edna.
Ugalde v Ysasi
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in
the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties
separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains
in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial
court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal partnership between
petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.
Hontiveros vs RTC
GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for
damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora
Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of
land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a
result of the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private
respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio
was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving
petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary,
according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in
question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ
of possession. Trial court denied petitioners motion that while in the
amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.
ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of
efforts exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.
HELD:
SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as
defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the
scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase members of the
same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or
half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not
given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses
of the Hontiveros are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for
purposes of Article 151.
Mondequillo vs Breva
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose
Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong
Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latters name. A
motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential
land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be
enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With
regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the
public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential
house in the present case became a family home by operation of law
under Article 153.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
HELD:
The petitioners contention that it should be considered a family home
from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not
well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the
provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar
as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and
153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences
are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability which
was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the
Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution
provided in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be
made shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
Petition was dismissed.