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Of Menace and Mimicry: The 2008 Beijing Olympics

Jennifer Hubbert
Modern China 2013 39: 408 originally published online 3 April 2013
DOI: 10.1177/0097700413481764
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Of Menace and
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Beijing Olympics
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DOI: 10.1177/0097700413481764
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Jennifer Hubbert1
Abstract
This article examines the Olympic narratives of young, educated urbanites
in China to consider the 2008 Beijing Olympics role as a diagnostic event
through which global conflicts and controversies coalesce and national
identities are constructed. It illustrates how students and young professionals
analyzed the Beijing Olympics to invoke discourses of similarity in the form
of Western economic development models and difference in the form of
essentialized tropes of Chinese culture to counter global images of China
as a threat to international well-being. Exploring theories of mimicry to
understand these appeals to similarity as a form of national value, this article
also reveals how students and young professionals in China recommended
the forms of culture manifest in the Olympics as an expression of difference
to question and reformulate hierarchies of global power.
Keywords
Beijing Olympics, China, mimicry, nationalism, culture
The Olympic games are a badge of nationhood and a story of the country
(Roche, 2000: 6, 135), a stage upon which host nations present themselves to
the global community. This is particularly true of developing countries whose
1Lewis
& Clark College, Portland, OR, USA
Corresponding Author:
Jennifer Hubbert, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Department of East Asian
Studies, Lewis & Clark College, 0615 SW Palatine Hill Road, Box 60, Portland, OR 97219, USA.
Email: hubbert@lclark.edu
409
Hubbert
economic growth has paved the way for greater inclusion in global hierarchies of power, and for whom the Olympics have often been posed as a debutante ball or coming out party in which ones status as host symbolizes
global embrace.
The first two Olympics in Asia, Japan in 1964 and South Korea in 1988,
offer a valuable example. Publicly affirming Japans postwar success, the
New York Times offered these words:
The crushing defeat of 1945 was not only a physical, but also a psychological blow
from which they [the Japanese] are only now recovering. Warm-hearted and
chivalrous by nature they have yearned to be accepted again by the nations they
once opposed. . . . Two events, one the 105-nation International Monetary Fund
conference, and now the Olympics, both staged in Tokyo, symbolize for the
Japanese the final absolution, the total welcome back into the family of nations.
(Japanese Throwing off Cloak, 1964)
Seouls 1988 Olympic games garnered comparable attention. The New York
Times emphasized, for example, how South Koreas 1988 Olympics would
reflect the nations extraordinary economic growth and recent progress
toward democracy. . . . The Olympics . . . [would] show the scoffers that
South Korea is more than a nation of grocers and carmakers and no longer the
land of Pork Chop Hill and M.A.S.H (Chira, 1988).1
Chinas 2008 Olympics, however, hosted with similar aspirations to showcase its economic modernization and growing presence on the global stage
(Hubbert, 2010; Brownell, 2008b; Dong, 2005), often garnered a different
sort of attention. Pulitzer Prize winning columnist Nicholas Kristof draws
this comparison:
The 1964 Tokyo Olympics were the coming-out party for Japan on the international
stage, and the Seoul Olympics in 1988 filled the same role for South Korea. China
. . . sees the Olympics as its moment to regain international respect. Unfortunately,
countries sometimes preen and seek international respect in strange ways. (Kristof,
2008: 18)
Rather than showcase Chinas economic prowess, he proceeded to enumerate its failings, its human rights violations and factory closures (which
ensured clean air when the International Olympic Committee visited during
the bid process), two among many. The final gold medal, a New York
Times editorial argued, to similar effect as Kristofs commentary, could be
safely awarded to Chinas Communist Party leadership, not for its tally of
awards, but for its authoritarian image management (Beijings Bad Faith
Olympics, 2008).
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Modern China 39(4)
Media reports on the 2008 Olympics included their share of debutante

and coming-out party references. Leading up to the summer games in
Beijing, China was cast repeatedly . . . as an emerging global citizen in
light of milestones such as Beijings successful bid for the 2008 summer
Olympics (Schattle, 2008: 138). Indeed, a CNN analyst noted, Perhaps
even more than accession to the World Trade Organization, Olympic status
means China can fully interact with the Western world (Lam, 2001). Yet
such accolades were matched and bested (Gries et al., 2010) by media coverage that represented China as foe rather than friend, as threat rather than
supporting cast.2 Indicative of the tone of much reporting on the 2008
Olympics, dubbed the Beijing Bully Olympics by one reporter (Araton,
2008), commentary on the Olympics opening ceremonies for example,
turned spectacularity and theatrical extravaganza into menace and military
might.3 They know this cold, NBC commentator Bob Costas remarked to
America, speaking in a language of precision, masterful precision,
massive scope, and intimidation, dotted by frequent references to the
massive 1.3 billion population. At one point during the show, co-host
Matt Lauer responded, Bob, a nation of 1.3 billion putting on a show like
this and people at home are not alone if they are saying it is both aweinspiring and perhaps a little intimidating. But they told these drummers
earlier in the rehearsal to smile more and thats taken some of the edge off
of it. The Economist described the opening ceremony as
spectacular, but with touches of the authoritarian. . . . The display begins with
2,008 soldiers dressed in traditional (civilian) gowns banging in unison on drums.
It sets an uncomfortably martial tone. . . . The uniformed goose-stepping soldiers
who raise the Olympic flag do not help alleviate this. (Let the Games Begin,
2008)
Noted film critic Roger Ebert analyzed the ceremony through a language of
individualism and collectivism. Whereas our [Western] emphasis on large
ceremonial productions is on individuals, Chinas was on masses of performers, meticulously trained and coordinated. . . . The closest sight I have
seen to Friday nights spectacle [the 2008 opening ceremony], he claimed
is the sight of all those Germans marching wave upon wave before Hitler in
Triumph of the Will (Ebert, 2008).4 Such reporting has concrete repercussions. Data that Peter Gries et al. collected and subsequently called the
Olympic Effect, reveal that American attitudes toward China hardened
over the course of just two and a half weeks of increased exposure to China
during the Olympic Games and that preferences for a tougher US China
policy all increased (Gries et al., 2010: 226).
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Hubbert
This article considers the Olympics as a diagnostic event (Leinaweaver,

2010: 220; see also Handelman, 1990) for global hierarchies of power,
through which global conflicts and controversies coalesce in one of the
worlds most internationally visible arenas of expression. Although the
Olympics are commonly recognized as a legitimate stage for the articulation
of national position (MacAloon, 1984; Price and Dayan, 2008; Roche, 2000),
the extent of global approval for this articulation is contingent on the particular configuration of global political ideologies and balances of power at the
moment. Japans and South Koreas Olympics showcased their nations modernization, but encountered far more receptive global political hierarchies
than did China (Brownell, 2008a). Even though Japans 1964 games marked
the nations economic achievements, these achievements were represented in
the West as a consequence of postWorld War II Western tutelage and a reaffirmation of liberal democratic capitalism (Kelly, 1991; Tagsold, 2009). The
1988 Seoul Olympics, coming sharply on the heels of massive domestic antistate demonstrations, similarly drew global attention to Koreas economic
growth (Han; 1989; Manheim, 1990). Crowned the reemergence of democracy (Tagsold, 2009), the 1988 Olympics were no less political than the
Beijing Olympics, but met with far more positive acclaim (Tagsold, 2009).
Some even credited the games with bringing democracy to South Korea
(Yates, 1988; see also Brownell, 2009a).
Chinas rapid development and expanding influence have rendered it, like
Japan and Korea earlier, an important player at the table and thus legitimate
host of the Olympic games. Nonetheless, this has also occasioned global discussions of a China threat to, among others, the future of the global economy (Bremmer, 2010: 5), American and regional security (Gertz, 2000; Roy
1996), and the environment (Kim and Turner, 2007; Liu and Diamond, 2005).
Rather than being embraced by the global community, Chinas emergence is
seen to lay siege to many of our [Western] most deeply held notions about
the realities of government and economics (French, 2007, cited in Zhao,
2010: 420).
Voices of the Nation

While global media play a tangible and highly influential role in constructing
images of the nation-state, other significant voices also contribute to these representations, providing alternative and sometimes conflicting accounts of
national value and status. Internationally, the educated elite assume a central
position in articulating public concepts of the nation (Boyer and Lomnitz, 2005).
This article turns to this sector of Chinas population, examining how young,
educated Chinese disputed the China threat theory (weixielun) through
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Modern China 39(4)
invoking the 2008 Beijing Olympic games. They suggested that the 2008
Olympics would showcase the nations glories to mitigate global perceptions
that Chinas growing economic and political importance was a menace to the
well-being of the global community. Particularly important in these narratives
was the role of the Olympics opening ceremony in demonstrating both Chinas
splendors and its intended harmonious approach to international affairs.
Chinese youth protests over unfavorable representations of the nationstate have met globally with accusations of zealous nationalism (Chinas
New Nationalists Revealed, 2008; see also Osnos, 2008) and nationalistic
fervor (Zhao, 2008: 48). Indeed the praise the young Chinese featured in this
article layered on China reflected a strong nationalist sentiment. However,
the negotiations evident in the content and tone of these students and young
professionals discussions about the Beijing Olympics reveal a complicated
and contradictory process of identity construction that despite being framed
through one of the worlds most nationalistic public events, renders the nation
more than the sum of its citizens nationalist endeavors. While these citizens
promoted China as a modern cosmopolitan state, legitimate as a global power
for its similarity to Western, consumer-oriented forms of modernity, they also
promoted traditional forms of Chinese culture in a parallel claim to acceptability.5 Likewise, while they endorsed particular cultural forms as an antidote to perceptions of a China threat, they were frequently critical when the
government engaged in similar promotions.
One of the most important aspects of the complex national identity construction of these students and professionals relates to their desires for China
to attain the same sort of consumer-based, free-market modernity Japan and
Korea had shown to the world through their Olympics decades earlier, and
for Chinas Olympics to demonstrate this modernity to the global public. To
understand both these desires for sameness and how they function to maintain hierarchies of economic, political, and cultural influence, this article
turns to theories of mimicry. Mimicry, Homi Bhabha notes, is one of the
most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge
(1984: 126; see also Anderson, 1991). Emerging nations are haunted,
argues Benedict Anderson (1998), by the inevitability of evaluating and constructing national value against established global standards for belonging
that privilege the dominant domestic practices and values of ascendant
nations (Dirlik, 2008; Ferguson, 2002; Modleski 1999; Munasinghe, 2002;
Rofel 2007). Haunted by this desire for what they do not have, less-powerful
nations mimic the practices of powerful nations to gain access to greater
authority and status.
Theories of mimicry suggest that emerging nations whose practices and
values begin to reach standards of global belonging are perceived as a threat
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Hubbert
by those in power. The ability of these emerging nations to obtain power

through imitation, to truly threaten extant hierarchies of power, is, however,
limited by a culturalizing process (Ferguson, 2002) in which the political/
economic/ritual culture of the lesser player is represented as hindering its
ability to obtain parity. Global discussions about China, for example, often
culturalize the nation to justify disempowering practices, its crony capitalism, gender bias, or authoritarian culture rendering true parity impossible (Chinas Itchy-Footed Rich, 2011; Gendercide, 2010: 11; Halper,
2010). Greater powers thus encourage cultural assimilation while denying
social integration (Cripps, 1977; cited in Modleski, 1999: 209) in a manner
that maintains static global hierarchies of power and influence. Cultural differences allow Westernization but prevent Western identity, concede modernization but preclude modernity. Imitators can only become almost the same,
but not quite (Bhabha, 1984: 127, emphasis in the original).
The desires for similarity expressed in the Olympics narratives of students
and young professionals in China reveal much about how mimicry functions
to maintain hierarchies of power. At the same time, however, a close ethnographic examination of these desires exposes how their lived complexities
and contradictions reveal the limits of mimicry, highlighting how its perceived power is predicated upon insider/outsider divisions of social and political hierarchy that are slowing transforming. The imitations and desires for
sameness of these young adults are complicated by their celebrations of the
distinctiveness of Chinese culture. They are also complicated by a current
historical moment in which difference might be a space of progress rather
than backwardness and by the possibility that Chinas difference has the
potential to undermine mimicrys role in sustaining global hierarchies of
power. This examination of Olympics narratives thus reveals and reinforces
the Olympics position as a diagnostic event. This event not only provides the
public space for the articulation of constructions of the nation, but also provides the public space for the articulation of debates over the changing position of China in the global hierarchy of power.
Methods
This article is based on ethnographic and textual research begun in July 2001
when I arrived in Beijing shortly after the International Olympic Committee
awarded the games to China. Ethnographic research methods included participant observation and focus group, semi-structured and unstructured interviews with Chinese urban high school, college, and graduate students and
young professionals. These occurred in Kunming during the summer of 2006
and in Beijing during the summers of 2007 and 2008.6 Participant-observation
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Modern China 39(4)
research included visits to Olympics venues, Olympics cultural festivals, and

museum exhibits, as well as attendance at an Olympics policy conference in
Beijing. In Kunming, I held focus group interview sessions with one class of
approximately thirty high school juniors at a key high school attached to the
main provincial university; one group of five undergraduate students at a
teachers college; and one group of four graduate students at the provincial
university.7 Each focus group session lasted approximately two hours. I was
able to meet with several members of this last group for more extensive follow-up interviews. In addition, I conducted shorter, informal interviews with
several young professionals whose training and careers ranged from electrical engineering to middle-school teaching. Semi-formal interviews in Beijing
included eight single-session, in-depth individual interviews, ranging from
one to three hours with college students from several local universities; four
multiple-session, in-depth interviews with graduate students and young professionals; and a one-hour focus group session with four undergraduate students that continued through an evening-long discussion about the Olympics
over dinner.8 During these semi-structured focus group and individual interview sessions, I began discussions with a formal interview guide of questions
that were open-ended enough to allow respondents to draw upon personal
experience but closed-ended enough to allow data comparison between different individuals. In this article, I focus on conversations from two of the
group interview sessions and with several specific individuals to provide for
a full range of both representation and particularity. The textually based
research in this article includes analysis of English- and Chinese-language
documents such as official Olympics newsletters, advertising campaigns,
Chinese blogs, and newspaper articles. I analyzed these data through conceptual coding and examining textual and narrative structure with the primary
goal of understanding the geopolitical and historical context of Chinas
Olympic games. This cohorts evaluations of China offer a valuable perspective on the nature of Chinas role in the global community. Their simultaneously assertive and tentative self-representations mirror, in both interesting
and uncanny ways, Chinas rapidly transforming relationship to international
hierarchies of authority and position.
Revolution and Bound Feet

I had only been in China a few days in the summer of 2006 when I was sidelined with the question, Why do you think were a threat? I had begun the
summers research in Kunming, a medium-sized city in southwestern China
where I had lived and worked periodically since the mid-1980s. I contacted a
friend and colleague from the provincial university who introduced me to
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Hubbert
several of her graduate students, who in turn introduced me to undergraduate

students from two colleges in town. That afternoon, I had arranged to meet
with five students from the local teachers college located across the ring road
from my apartment. The conversation that ensued set the tone for several of
the most important aspects of the Olympics narratives of these young Chinese.
First, it established how important the Olympic games were to constructions
of national identity, both domestically and globally. Second, it revealed the
importance of narratives of similarity in establishing national legitimacy and
negating perceptions of a China threat.
My conversation with these students began with Bi Yalan, a student from
Kunming, explaining the Olympics logos and emblems and discussing the
Olympics educational activities that were beginning to appear at elementary
and secondary schools across the nation.9 She noted that the main logo for the
Olympics, a white figure set against a solid red background, was shaped like
the character for culture (wen), but then paused and added that it also
looks a bit like the character for capital (jing) as in Beijing. And it also looks
like an athlete. Bi noted proudly that this symbol combined ancient culture
and modern technology, paused, smiled, and added, Plus, its red, an auspicious color.
I asked Bi how she thought the Olympics were going to help China and
she responded that they would help Chinese communicate with foreigners,
acquire new languages, learn how to face crises (she referred to the bombings
at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics), and benefit China economically. Lots of
people will be doing business in China, so this will help develop China. At
this point, Bi switched to how the Olympics would help the global community understand China. The Olympics will help spread Chinese culture
around the world and help people to understand Chinese culture and China.
This will help [the world] understand China more deeply.
Bis words set off a flood of commentary from her fellow students who
appeared far less concerned about what China would gain from the Olympics
than what foreigners would learn about China. Xu Bingwen, a young graduate student from a rural suburb, offered comments that are worth quoting at
length as their general objective and impressions were repeated often by my
informants over subsequent years.
In some foreigners eyes, they think that China is a threat to the world. The
Olympics will help them to lessen this idea of threat and see that China has a
developed economy. Then they can understand Chinese culture and we can
understand each other. The Olympics will give the world a new view of China. So
many people have never been here before. They only know of China through the
media. This isnt the real China. What the foreigners see is all very negative, or
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Modern China 39(4)
very exoticized, like all that stuff about bound feet. They think that this is China.
Or they think that its all about revolution. Revolution and bound feet.
I later followed up on this conversation with graduate student Huang

Chuntao. How I asked, were people going to reflect differently on China
after attending the Olympics? as Xu had suggested. Huang responded,
When people get to Beijing for the Olympics, it will change their minds about
what China is. The traditional culture that people thought they understood before
they come here isnt visible, for example the clothes, the buildings. What they will
see is that we are just like they are. They will see us the same way as they see
themselves. Its no different. The clothes we wear are the same. The cars we drive
are the same. Beijing has lots of expensive, imported cars; Beijing has lots of
skyscrapers, just like New York. At first glance people will just think its just like
New York.
Huangs and Xus protestations of similarityto being developed and just

like New Yorkwhose truth was to be visually experienced through the
Olympics, reflect a classic strategy of mimicry in which lesser powers imitate
the practices and values of greater powers in order to improve their status, to
claim the rights of full membership (Ferguson, 2002: 555) in a world in
which capitalist, economic prowess is one of the dominant standards for
belonging. As an erstwhile lesser player, whose citizens experienced decades
of material deprivation, China adopts the economic market practices and consumerist values of dominant nations, undergoes rapid economic expansion,
joins the World Trade Organization, bids successfully for the Olympic games,
and consequently joins the ranks of powerful, legitimate world leaders. In
fact, it was Chinas rapid market privatization and dramatic economic growth
that rendered the Beijing Olympic games both initially conceivable and ultimately achievable. By many indices, China is already a major player at the
table (Zoellick, 2005), a full participant in, as the Olympics slogan suggests,
the One World, One Dream of development defined by a nations practices
of capital accumulation and expenditure, with little need to reassert its similarity for legitimacy.
Although Xu and Huang maintained that these games would allow China
to showcase its economic modernity as a marker of common cause, Chinas
attempts to improve its status through similarity have often been perceived as
a menace. Chinas economic miracle, which blends market capitalism with
a single-party, state ideology of socialism, presents a challenge to the ideologies of liberal democracy. If the free choice of liberal democracy is not a
prerequisite for market success, might a global public increasingly threatened
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Hubbert
by economic recession begin to question its value? Indeed, as Dominic Boyer

and Alexei Yurchak note,
Socialism is normally described today as a perverse remnant of modern
authoritarianism, most often invoked as a scare tactic for disciplining citizens into
the conviction that there is no alternative to the contemporary late-liberal, capitalist
order that would not be a thousand times worse. (2010: 180)
Huang and Xus narratives defined similarity and global belonging

through access to the consumer objectthe cars, the clothes, the skyscrapers.
Such assertions of global identity through consumption are not unique to
China. Studies of modernization around the world reveal how consumption
has emerged in the contemporary era as a dominant marker of cosmopolitanism and global belonging (Appadurai, 2000; Hubbert, 2003; Besnier, 2004;
Nelson, 2000; Rofel, 2007). Yet, the words of these students indicated more
than mere exterior commonality, for they also articulated a similarity of value
in which Chinas consumer prosperity signaled its support for a global market
economy, despite the governments explicitly socialist political framework.
Their assertions of similarity offered a safe socialism whose massive economic growth was driven by the desire for designer footwear rather than
nuclear missiles, one that supported the practices and ideals of consumerdriven free market competition rather than the unnatural and unfair
results of planned economies and egalitarian politics.10
Mimicry is effective in reinforcing hierarchies of power because the standards that symbolize and constitute that power remain contingent (culturally,
politically, economically) enough that nations striving to reach them can
never quite attain complete equivalence. Global Olympics media commentary made this evident, reminding China that despite its efforts to use the
Olympics to showcase its similarity, it remained almost the same, but not
quite. Chinas Olympics public campaigns to educate its citizens on global
behavioral expectations for such practices as queuing, expectorating, and
trash disposal, for example, were jumped upon with glee by the Western
press, in tacit acknowledgment of Chinas backwardness.11 As a U.S. correspondent inquired, What if foreign visitors are forced to navigate a minefield of saliva left by local pedestrians spitting on sidewalks? What if lines at
Olympic events dissolve into scrums as local residents jump to the head of
pack? What if Chinese fans serenade rival teams with the guttural, unprintable Beijing curse? (Yardley, 2007).
The visual record of the games often presented parallel juxtapositions of
modernistic skyscrapers resting against traditionally curved rooftops or construction rubble, or of weather-beaten men pedaling rickety three-wheeled
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Modern China 39(4)
carts, piled high with live chickens, down neon-lit pedestrian shopping zones
advertising Prada, Rolex, and Burberry products. Thus, even though Chinas
citizens wore Prada and Rolex, they still expectorated on the sidewalks, failed
to queue properly, and ate scorpion kebabs as an afternoon snack (Wansell,
2008). Through such taming, membership in the global community becomes
culturalized (Ferguson, 2002: 559; Hubbert, forthcoming [2014]) in ways
that render the similarity of consumer-driven, capitalist economic development insufficient for full belonging, leaving the standards for power and hierarchy secure as disciplinary tools of order.
The Color Red

During the summer I was in Kunming, I was invited to hold an Englishlanguage discussion of the Olympicscovered by the local media with a
class of juniors at the high school associated with the university where I lived.
What began as a stilted English-language recitation of official representations of the Olympics, quickly becameonce the reporters departeda
lively, Chinese-language debate over the value of the Olympics and the legitimacy of global representations of China. The change of tone was marked by
the first post-media topic when a young man, Zhou Chanming, asked me
whether I thought China could produce really smart people. Before I had a
chance to answer, he followed with, Then why hasnt it produced a Nobel
Prize winner? A sideways glance from the class teacher and giggles from his
fellow students failed to deter his questioning and Zhou spent the rest of the
afternoon, both during our group discussion and afterward when he
approached me to continue the conversation, countering his fellow students
and engaging me with sharp questions about my position and that of the West.
I recount select segments of this conversation for what they reveal about the
important role of culture in these Olympic narratives, especially how it has
the potential to represent both national stagnation and national liberation. It
was this latter possibilitythe interpretation of Chinese culture as futureoriented rather than backwardthat marked the emerging role of difference in shifting hierarchies of global power.
A discussion of the three official themes of the Beijing Olympics (the
High-Technology Olympics, the Green Olympics, and the Peoples Olympics)
launched our group conversation. The students quickly explained and moved
on from the first two themes, and then spent considerable time discussing
what exactly defined the Peoples Olympics.12
The theme of the Peoples Olympics provides a good chance to show Chinese
culture to the world, to make the world know about Chinese culture. It will also
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Hubbert
bring other cultures to China and let Chinese people see how others live. A great
deal of Chinese culture will be on display for the Olympics. The color red for one.
This is a symbol of Chinese culture. Its an auspicious color, but it also shows how
Chinese culture is cheerful, friendly, happy and warm. People will also be able to
experience Chinese foodwe have a lot of delicious food. But they will also see
how Chinese people are different, how they show respect for their parents, teachers
and elders. China is different from other places. It has a very long history; it
definitely has the longest history of all the Olympic cities. When people get to
Beijing, they will see a mix of the modern and the traditional; this is China.
At this point the class monitor, a young man named Li Zhi, began to discuss
this mix of the contemporary and the ancient.
Beijing was an important capital during the Qing and Ming dynasties. There are
still lots of old, traditional buildings that are symbols of these dynasties. But much
of this is being torn down for the Olympics. . . . Our fear is that people [foreigners]
wont like the old houses. Even when they have been converted to hotels [foreigners
will feel] they arent modern enough, that they wont be that comfortable or have
modern conveniences and that this will reproduce feelings about the backwardness
of China.
When I asked Li where foreigners received such impressions about the

backwardness of China, he responded,
People get these impressions a lot from movies. Like the Zhang Yimou movies.
They see all these beautiful actresses in the movies and think that this is China.
Zhang Yimou has long been criticized for showing all these ugly things about
China. He shows the problems, the dark side.
Lis comments provoked a tense discussion among the students about

Zhang Yimou. Arguably Chinas most globally acclaimed film director,
Zhang had also been appointed director of the 2008 Olympics opening and
closing ceremonies. Zhou, who had earlier questioned me about the Nobel
Prize, jumped in. He should show this side of China. Citizens have a right to
know the conditions. We cant only know the positive side of things. If we
know the problems, then we can fix them.
Li responded,
Yes, but he exaggerates these things on purpose. He does this for a foreign
audience. He exoticizes the problem and then it seems that this is all there is of
China. Foreign audiences are looking for this. Its what they expect. When people
come here [for the Olympics], they will see a lot of modern things and this will
surprise people who are used to the Zhang Yimou representation of China.
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Modern China 39(4)
As will be discussed later, discussions about Zhang Yimou took a different

turn after the opening ceremonies, but before then, Lis words were common
ones. A long conversation about the Olympics with Xu, the graduate student
from Kunming, included several similar observations about Zhangs films
and their representations of China. Xu had earlier been discussing the iconic
Birds Nest stadium in Beijing, expressing her distaste for the design, Its
hideous, and the selection of a non-Chinese architect, These foreign architects just dont understand our design traditions. At that point she jumped to
the topic of Zhang Yimou to express relief.
Its great that there is a Chinese director [of the opening ceremony]. . . . All the
people in the ceremony will be Chinese, they will put on a performance that is full
of Chinese characteristics, like taiji, martial arts. These are traditional Chinese
practices . . . that can show the world something special about Chinese society.
She paused at this point, however, and changed direction.

Well, Zhang Yimou was not a good choice as the director. His films, well, they lack
something. . . . The images are very mechanical. . . . They dont capture reality. His
films are not so popular here. . . . He is good at making beautiful scenes, but the
early films revealed the ugly aspect of Chinese culture to foreigners. It seemed that
this was the only aspect of China that people [foreigners] would see. This was a
very shallow representation of China. The deeper ideas about Chinese culture were
never represented. The films should show deeper ideas about Confucianism and
Daoism. Visually [in the films], China gets represented by the Great Wall and the
Terra Cotta Warriors. This is made-up Chinese culture, not real Chinese culture.
He needs to show a more complete picture. The impressions that people get from
his films are that China is very backward, that people arent open-minded, that
they are very narrow minded. Lots of people will say that he made those films just
to show the ugly sides of China, to attract foreigners attention . . . [and] earn
foreign movie awards.
Zhang Yimous films are known internationally for their opulent representations of Chinese cultureabundant use of the color red, sumptuous banquets, mystical rites, and multigenerational households. The color red can, as
the high school students noted above, indicate cultural exhilaration, whereas
in contrast, Zhangs brilliant scarlets reveal the metaphorical and literal blood
of suicidal concubines (in Raise the Red Lantern) and oppressive, authoritarian regimes (in Red Sorghum). Whereas multigenerational households may
represent the care and respect accorded to elders within the kin group, in
Zhang Yimou films they are recast as a patriarchal power that is repressive,
tyrannical, and authoritarian (as in Judou).13
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Hubbert
These students understood that what they might perceive as long-standing

cultural symbols of respect, sophistication, peace, and value also played
directly into classic, fetishized images of China circulating in the global market, in which the duration and depth of tradition are sometimes interpreted as
stagnation and backwardness rather than temperance, modesty, and respect
(Dirlik, 1997; Liu, 2001; Su and Wang, 1988). They were clearly aware of
how the culturalizing processes of mimicry work, how what Homi Bhabha
calls metonymies of presence (1984: 130), essentialized partial representations of identity, rendering attempts at sameness and thus equality frustratingly difficult. They grasped that juxtaposing scorpion snacks with
skyscrapers might solidify rather than challenge extant structures of power.
Mimicrys ability to maintain hierarchies of status depends on the perpetuation of essentialized visions of identity and on static geopolitical hierarchies.
However, these young citizens were keenly aware of the shifting nature of
contemporary global geopolitics. They were also aware that these conversations about threat and similarity were occurring within an international arena
marked by an increase in competing theories and practices of modernity
(Jacques, 2009; Nonini and Ong, 1997; Ong, 1997), and within which Chinas
experiences and practices were becoming increasingly attractive to developing nations around the globe (Brautigam, 2009; DeHart, 2012; Kurlantzick,
2007). As more nations around the world bypass Western-dominated institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and turn
to China to bolster their development, one may envision how the coming
out of the Olympics is not limited to the realm of athletic prowess. Indeed,
this bypassing indicates a changing power field where being like New York
may no longer portend power. In this case, difference represents growth
rather than lack, suggesting a future of greatness for China rather than
modernitynot quite.
Although the Olympics slogan One World, One Dream suggested the
complementarity of economic growth, a second and equally ubiquitous slogan, New Beijing, New Olympics, hinted at the possibilities for a new
world order in which structures and values other than those of current global
hegemons provide alternative models for global belonging and praxis. In
addition to constructing a narrative of safe socialism in which cars, clothes,
and skyscrapers mark common cause and value, these students and young
professionals also turned to difference as an antidote to menace. These
Olympics were to reveal, in the words of a young Beijing reporter, not only
the success of Chinas marketization but also how China is different from
the world. This is the biggest fortune China can give to the world.
The 2008 opening ceremonies were replete with the symbolic aesthetic
for which Zhangs earlier productions were renownedbrilliant colors,
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Modern China 39(4)
ancient drums, traditional ink paintings, dragons, and images of the Great
Wall dominating the stage. A spectacular production of light, sound, and
visual display, the brilliantly conceived and staged opening ceremony
attracted gee-whiz coverage by newspapers around the world (Moeller,
2008). Yet, such praise was rarely left as the definitive representation of the
event. At the same time as this gee-whiz moment covered a choreography of lights, music and actors [that] won China global admiration (Moeller,
2008), it also posed the drummers and dragons, as noted in the introduction
to this article, as authoritarian and intimidating, comparing the spectacle to Hitlers grand moments of Nazi propaganda and displays of might.
Alternatively, media frequently began with paeans to the program, as did the
New York Times coverage, describing an opening ceremony of soaring fireworks, lavish spectacle and a celebration of Chinese culture and international good will (Yardley, 2008), but then launched into reports of pollution
and tightening security clampdown[s], and commentary on human rights,
code, as Rey Chow reminds us, for what China is lacking (Chow 2002:
20). Such representations perpetuated in the global discursive realm equations of symbolic culture with a devalued politics that marked Chinas
essential nature.
In contrast, the students and young professionals discussed here posited
that the reappearance of such cultural attributes within a new geopolitical
context was an occasion for celebration rather than censure. Faced with protestations to similarity that met with global indifference and even hostility,
and with representations of Chinese culture as stagnant and potentially
destructive, these individuals offered the global spectacle of the ceremonies
as a space for reassessment and praise for difference. When I asked Fang
Meizhen, a graduate student in sports sociology who volunteered at the
Olympic games, why she changed her mind about director Zhang Yimou and
his presentations of Chinese culture, she responded,
In the 2008 Olympics ceremony, under Zhangs direction, we impressed the whole
world. It absolutely met the needs of the Chinese. We showed our nations charms
and were proud of them. I guess thats why we changed our minds after the great
ceremony.
Wang Baojia, a communications major in Beijing, spoke at length and

with conviction about the positive role the Olympics would play in representing China to the world, repeatedly stressing how the 2008 opening ceremony
was an encouraging move in the right direction.14 One of the many who had
earlier expressed dissatisfaction with the artistic endeavors of Zhang Yimou,
he explained his change of heart:
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Hubbert
To be honest, I didnt have too much confidence in him. . . . But after I watched it,
I thought the performance he gave to the world was wonderful. . . . My favorite
parts of the opening ceremony were those that reflected traditional Chinese culture,
particularly the Confucian Analects section, the Chinese brush painting and the
zither. . . . The opening ceremony fully displayed Chinas 5,000-year history. The
goal . . . wasnt about displaying how strong China is but showing the world that
Chinas culture and history are worth learning.
Culture for Wang Baojia was thus not a static, essentialized form of identity, but a live project whose meaning shifted alongside changing geopolitical
contexts and their concomitant values. Within the Olympic spectacle, the
same symbols that had previously been castigated as exoticized, essentialized, and not real, were redefined as glorious and global, giving China a
chance at equivalence and belonging that, to these young Chinese, earlier
Zhang Yimou representations had rendered seemingly impossible. This
changing context also provided Wang with the opportunity to reject the
fetishized and threatening motif of the fire-breathing dragon as a dominant
symbol for the representation of China in lieu of an alternative difference
that of a cultural tradition of harmonyas an antidote to perceptions of
Chinese threat.
One of the things I would like [the Olympics] to share with the world is [that] . . .
China has a great deal of traditional cultural virtues. The dragon, which is a wellknown image, is not the most important one in Chinese civilization and culture.
Rather, China has had thousands of years of civilization marked by a culture of
making friends with people all over the world. If foreigners understood this better,
they would have fewer misunderstandings about China. Then they would not
believe in this China threat theory that they subscribe to just because China is
growing more powerful. Harmony is an important element in Chinas culture.
Whoever doesnt understand that will believe in the China threat theory.
Harmony: Cultural Attribute or Government

Slogan?
Many of the themes and symbols of cultural difference offered by these students and young professionals as antidotes to perceptions of Chinese threat
were articulated in an essentialized language that reflects what Geremie
Barm felicitously calls History Channelfriendly Chinese culture (2008).
History Channelfriendly cultural difference is defined by a range of behavioral traits and symbolic entrapments as typically Chinese, including the
familiar trope of Asian values and the ubiquitous and customary array of
dragons and pandas on glossy Western travel brochures advertising Exotic
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Modern China 39(4)
Asia (see Chow, 1995; Ong 1997; Wang, 2008).15 In many ways, the cursory
and superficial nature of such proclamations of cultural difference reveal little about the content of Chinese culture from the perspective of lived, everyday experience. However, the tactic of appealing to cultural difference as an
antidote to threat speaks volumes to the tensions and ambiguities of Chinas
position as a socialist market economy on the global stage. What matters is
not the definitional task of culturewhat we call culturebut why students
and young professionals instrumentalized Chinese culture to mitigate Chinas
image as threat and what role cultural difference plays on the global front to
mediate hierarchies of power. The Olympics, a notionally apolitical megaevent with global scope, was to offer visitors and viewers a chance to experience China as a peaceful, respectful, and modest nation, not a nation of
advanced weaponry, communism, and Chinese-held G8 debt. Thus, while
Chinas economic growth and its concomitant expanding global reach hint at
the possibilities for the disruption of extant hierarchies of power, these individuals offered Chinese culture as a harmonious alternative.
I encase the word harmonious in quotation marks on purpose, for more
than any other cultural trait, references to Confucian notions of harmony and
harmonious society were evoked to explain how China was not a threat to the
international community. As Wang Baojia claimed above, foreigners will
consider China a threat to their power unless they comprehend the importance of harmony in defining Chinese culture. Harmony as a cultural trait was
seen not only as prescriptive, as a metaphor for China, but also as productive,
through its perceived ability to offer the world a model for peaceful development and global relations (Guo and Guo, 2008). Yet, harmony was central to
these Olympics narratives not only because of the ubiquity with which it was
posited as a threat-mitigating cultural principle. Indeed, how students and
young professionals critically assessed the larger official discourse of harmony was equally essential to how they invoked harmony as a cultural trait
in their effort to undermine global representations of China as a threatening
nation of authoritarian, communist difference.
This concept of harmonious society is part of a widespread campaign
introduced by President Hu Jintao in late 2004. Seemingly prompted by
Chinas widening income gap and the consequent potential for domestic
social instability (Guo and Guo, 2008; Sol-Farrs, 2008), harmonious society has also been used to describe strategies behind Chinas international
relations (Alden and Hughes, 2009; Hubbert, forthcoming [2014]; Callahan,
2004), and educational and environmental policies (Brownell, 2009b; Liao,
2007), to name a few of its potential applications. Representations of harmony took center stage at the Beijing Olympics: official materials promoted
harmony as the core and soul of the games and the torch relay sported the
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Hubbert
title Journey of Harmony. The character for harmony appeared several

times during the opening ceremonies, most spectacularly materializing as a
series of rising and falling blocks that illustrated Chinas invention of moveable type. A graduate student explained to me how the central Olympic slogan itself was a direct reflection of the harmony discourse. She explained,
The slogan One World, One Dream comes from Chinas traditional concept of
great unity: The gentleman seeks harmony but not uniformity, the lesser man
seeks uniformity, not harmony. [People everywhere] may share the same ideals,
but keep the diversity of culture. It is not necessary for us to all be the same.
Harmony was a key theme at an Olympics policy conference I attended

in Beijing in 2007. Sun Deshi, a young administrator in the university
department that hosted the conference, and I were working on an Olympics
translation project together and we spent long hours during the conference
and after discussing the content of the conference and the upcoming
Olympics. Harmony was one of our common topics of conversation. Sun
pointed out,
Honestly, they talk about all this harmony, and the Olympics Charter talks about
world peace, but really, you have to admit that [the Olympics] are all about
competition. [Harmony] is really just a government slogan. What it does is to
make jobs because the government comes up with these slogans and then hires all
these researchers to figure out what to do with it.
Suns cynicism about harmony was common. As a graduate student at the

same university explained to me, Really, Hu Jintao brought it [the concept
of harmony] up in a speech and its all over the newspapers so everyone feels
they have to talk about it, to give him face. However, as Sun and I continued
our discussion about harmony within the context of the Olympics, he also
offered an alternative interpretation. This second perspective reflected Wang
Baojias outlook on harmonys importance as a representation of China, turning mimicrys disempowering culturalizing practice on its head.
China does have this philosophical tradition about harmony, about people being in
harmony with each other and the environment. This really will be the biggest
effect of the Olympics. People are going to come here and see what an incredibly
hospitable people we are, how friendly and courteous. We really do value harmony.
This is the most important part of Chinese culture.
Promotional slogans from government campaigns such as the harmony

one often lead to cynical commentary in China (and elsewhere). Suns cynicism
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Modern China 39(4)
about harmony as a cultural trait, even as he proffered it as representative of

Chinese culture, reflects insight into the imagineering (Barm, 2008) of the
Chinese state and the potential for skeptical reception. However, despite
this cynicism, slogans such as harmonious society, regardless of origin,
become part of public culture, their language configured as a space in which
public opinion is formed, national symbols are debated, and a national
image is set apart (Brownell, 1995: 67).16 In this sense, rather than read
such linguistic protests as some ineluctable resistance to the government
per se, we may also consider how they reflect an awareness of global perceptions of China. Confucian notions of harmony might be interpreted as
reflecting classic Weberian arguments that pose Confucianisms stress on
order and hierarchy as a barrier to modernization.17 In contrast, these students and professionals offered harmony and their response to it not only to
refute negative perceptions of China, but also to locate themselves as members of a cosmopolitan cohort of educated citizens with the right to criticize
their government and consequently to locate China as an equal member
among modern states.
It is important for the specific content of their narratives that these commentators were college-bound high school students at key urban high schools,
university students, graduate students, and postgraduate professionals. The
educated elite of the Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao reforms era
have been far less disenfranchised politically and economically than earlier
cohorts. Their cynical comments may thus be read less necessarily as concrete political critiques and more as confirmation that they belong to a transnational cohort of modern citizens free to raise concerns about the nation-state.
When Fang Meizhen criticized Zhang Yimous films, she was not critical of
what she called his cultural consciousness, his willingness to address
Chinas common social problems. If we deny this history, we betray our
history. What did make her uneasy was his spreading the ugly side . . . all
over the world. However, even though she was not entirely comfortable with
publicizing the ugly of China, she and her cohort were also aware that such
willingness marks a form of global belonging. Their critical commentary
permits them to demonstrate that China, often characterized outside its borders as a threatening communist nation of censorship and authoritarian
oppression, in fact permits its citizens to voice some dissent without fear of
retaliation. As Fang explained,
People in the West, governments in the West, seem to view China as a threat. Now
they will come here [for the Olympics] and see that we are in general a very
friendly people, that we are not a threat. . . . We can now speak very openly about
politics [emphasis added].18
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Hubbert
Harmony, once framed as a sign of Chinas inability to achieve parity,

rematerializes within these narratives as a source of equivalence. First, these
students and young educated adults proposed that harmony (as a cultural difference), on display through the Olympics, mitigated perceptions that Chinas
rise correlates with the downfall of other members of the global community.
Second, and in contrast, their responses to harmony (as an official discourse)
emerged as evidence of Chinas similarity, specifically its membership in a
global community of freethinkers. Critiques of the official harmony discourse
thus had the thought-provoking and ironic effect of supporting rather than
censuring the state itself as they emerged in part to reflect Chinas willingness
to permit criticism. They also, however, offer an equally thought-provoking
example of what Rey Chow has called coercive mimeticism through the
performance of idealized, prescriptive forms of ethnicity that authenticate the
familiar, a voluntary surrender that marks complicity with the guilty verdict that has been declared on them socially long before they speak (Chow,
2002: 115).19
Conclusion
The 2008 Beijing Olympics were a monumental emblem of contemporary
Chinas emergence as a major player in the global order of nation-states.
Although the Olympics function as a platform for both international recognition and domestic splendor, the content of the accompanying narrativesof
both domestic citizens and global mediareveals much about how the platform of this diagnostic event is embedded within conflicting hierarchies of
power. That the Olympics narratives of students and young Chinese professionals simultaneously invoked and revoked historically Western models of
economic modernity, essentialized tropes of Chinese culture, and official discourse suggests that the Olympics as a platform for the constitution of national
identity is not a seamless, taken-for-granted one. The narratives in this article
reveal the tensions and ambiguities of Chinas position on the global stage. On
the one hand, they reflect how Chinas rapid economic growth and penetration
into the world capitalist market, in combination with its continued rule by the
Communist Party, is perceived to threaten Western liberal democracy and
undermine current global hierarchies of power. On the other hand, these narratives also suggest the potential transformation of global positionality as
Cold War anti-communism increasingly confronts an ideological utilitarianism among nations seeking alternative models of development. The contested
nature of the 2008 Olympics opening ceremony and its controversial director
exemplified these tensions and ambiguities. For the individuals featured in
this article, Zhang Yimou served as an important cultural broker, one whose
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Modern China 39(4)
earlier artistic productions were perceived to reinforce Western skepticism

about Chinas modernity, but whose spectacular 2008 ceremony emerged to
embody not only the nations past glories and its current important location in
global geopolitical hierarchies of power but also its future potential.
Nonetheless, the spectacularity of the performance was not a seamless translation for global viewers who, while paying homage to the ceremonys aesthetic
appeal, also stressed its perceived militancy, forgeries, and massive scope,
as if the song and dance routine represented the Chinese nation itself.
The Olympics narratives of these students and young professionals expose
how certain standards for global belonging are fiercely embedded in dominant global practices and consequently how mimicry (desires for sameness)
plays an aggressive role in reinforcing these standards. Yet, a close examination of the narratives and lived practices of imitation reflects the limits of
mimicry to comprehend fully contemporary negotiations of global status and
power. When Huang Chuntao asserted that visitors to the Olympics would
find that Beijing is just like New York and that this would nullify their perceptions of a China threat, she was both reflecting the power of mimicry to
incite desire for these global standards of belonging and giving unintentional
voice to mimicrys fear that Beijing does indeed resemble New York. When
high school students offered difference in the form of History Channel
friendly cultural traits as an antidote to this potential menace, they were
mindful of how mimicry functions to sustain hierarchies. They were also
aware that such practices had been greeted in the international arena as
proof of Chinas inability to obtain parity. When Wang Baojia offered a
different cultural trait as representative of China, that of harmony, he
expressed an awareness of changes in global geopolitics, a tentative intimation that compulsory imitation might no longer represent an exclusive route
to belonging and status. When Sun Deshi referred to harmony as both public
relations nonsense and central to Chinas identity, he revealed how difference
and similarity might coexist as complementary expressions of national identity and value that are recognized both domestically and internationally. Yet,
their mindfulness also reminds us that mimicry functions in part through the
very cultural essentialism that stems from competitions over constructions of
value and hierarchies of power.
Anna Tsing once noted that margins were good places from which to view
the instability of social categories (Tsing, 1994: 279; see also Taussig,
1993).20 Might these Olympics narratives reveal that these margins are not
static but mobile? That what is on the margins can move into the center and
that what is in the center can be displaced? As places of movement, these
complicated and mediated margins perform an equally revelatory function,
destabilizing both the perceived naturalness of global status and the
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Hubbert
perception that global belonging necessitates the perpetuation of uniform

practice and value. Might these Olympics narratives also reveal, however,
how such margins, in their harmonious replications of the banal preconceptions (Chow 2002: 107) expected of them, also become complicit in the
replication of a new form of authoritarian capitalism (iek, 2011) in
which citizen participation in the political process is understood as a hindrance to rather than a condition of economic development and progress?
Acknowledgment
Special thanks go to Monica DeHart and Lisa Hoffman for their observations on earlier versions of this article and to Kathryn Bernhardt and two referees for Modern
China for their insightful comments.
Authors Note
Portions of this article were presented at University of Washington (2008), University
of Puget Sound (2006), Pacific Lutheran University (2010), the 2007 Forum on the
Humanities and Social Sciences and Beijing Olympic Games International Conference,
Beijing (2007), and the American Anthropological Association Annual Meeting in
San Jose, California (2008).
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article:
A travel grant from Lewis & Clark College for a research trip to China.
Notes
1. The upcoming 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro have already been marketed,
both domestically and internationally, as the venue for Brazil to present its new
face to the world (Brazils Gold, 2010) and as an affirmation of its rising global
importance (Barrionuevo, 2009).
2. Jeffrey Wasserstrom divides depictions of Chinas Olympics into two categories.
The pessimists, he argues, often compare the 2008 games to those of Nazi
Germany in 1936, making historical analogies to the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. The optimists, in contrast, suggest that the Beijing Olympics mark
a potential turning point for a China that is on its road to openness and freedom
(2008: 166). I focus here on the threat angle as that was the most prominent
perception in the narratives of the individuals featured in this research.
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Modern China 39(4)
3. Over one billion worldwide viewed the opening ceremonies (Swaine, 2008).
4. Opening ceremony coverage also devoted extensive time to the spectacles
perceived counterfeit nature, for example that the children dressed in ethnic
minority costumes were Han and that the young girl who performed Ode to the
Motherland was actually lip-syncing.
5. Zhao Litao and Tan Soon Heng (2007: 97) discuss the use of culture to lower
the distrust of the international community.
6. I chose these two cities with the intention of comparing perceptions in the capital,
the host city, with those in a smaller, provincial capital. Individuals in Kunming
had less access to the public educational campaigns, but I found the differences
in perception and representation to be miniscule.
7. On the Chinese educational system, see Fong, 2004b.
8. A native-speaking research assistant in Beijing conducted semi-structured follow-up interviews with eight key informants.
9. See Brownell, 2009b, on the Olympics education program. All names and identifying characteristics of informants in this article have been changed.
10. On post-Mao perceptions of the unnatural character of egalitarian politics, see
Rofel, 1999 and 2007; Wang, 2003.
11. These campaigns are part of a domestic conversation about improving the quality (suzhi) of the population. The writings on the subject are vast. See, for example, Anagnost, 2004; Fong, 2007; Hoffman, 2010; Kipnis, 2006; Murphy, 2004;
and Yan, 2003.
12. The following quotation is an amalgamation of the comments of several different students who were addressing the issue all at the same time and with similar
language.
13. On Chinese discussions of Zhang Yimous self-orientalism, see Chu, 2008.
14. Geremie Barm (2009) provides an excellent analysis of the opening ceremonies.
15. Arif Dirlik (2001: 3) suggests that these symbols represent little more than
clichs that render culture as a category of analysis essentially meaningless.
Barm (2008) argues that the artifice of this History Channelfriendly Chinese
culture, engineered by the state, functions to gloss over the more unpalatable
forms of Chinas cultural history.
16. Pal Nyiri and Juan Zhang (2010: 27) argue that the overseas Chinese youth
nationalism surrounding the Olympics was intended to garner the support of other
Chinese youth, not necessarily to support the government. Judith Farquhar and
Qicheng Zhang (2005: 303) also note that the convergence of personal views
with state policies and official propaganda is neither surprising nor problematic.
On the contradictory nature of Chinese youth nationalism, see Fong, 2004a.
17. See, in particular, Weber, [1915] 1951. Aihwa Ong (1993) has written on the
topic in the contemporary era.
18. Couching political policy in terms of Confucian philosophy has other interesting effects. Although Hu Jintaos speeches call for a harmonious society
that features democracy, the rule of law, justice, amity, and vitality, much of
the specifics and ensuing discussions address policies for increased equitable
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Hubbert
development. Harmony thus emerges as a new package for collective socialist principles, a living Maoism (Cheek, 2006: 35) that if represented as a
return to Maoist ideologies of egalitarian development would be considered
unnatural and overtly political in the contemporary political context. Yet,
when couched in a language of Confucian harmony, socialist politics that could
be considered a threat to global hierarchies of power are softened and defanged
by being incorporated into the traditional culture of an ancient civilization.
China as defined by Confucian harmony rather than Maoist socialism allows
the nation the narrative space to offer itself as a model to the rest of the world
focused on solving social tensions (Guo and Guo, 2008: 1) rather than promoting socialist governance. Mao Zedong himself drew upon Confucian concepts of harmony to support his policies (Jiang and Wang, 2007; Mahoney,
2008; Wang, 2007).
19. My appreciation goes to one of Modern Chinas anonymous reviewers for pushing me on this point and its relationship to ieks notion of authoritarian capitalism (see the Conclusion section).
20. Much of the literature on minorities in China offers a similar margins perspective. For example, see Litzinger, 2000, and Schein, 2000.
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Author Biography
Jennifer Hubbert teaches anthropology and is Director of East Asian Studies at
Lewis & Clark College in Portland, Oregon. She is currently writing a book on
Chinese soft power policy and global citizenship.

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Modern

Of Menace and Mimicry: The 2008 Beijing Olympics

>> Version of Record - Jun 4, 2013

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& Clark College, Portland, OR, USA

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Modern China 39(4)

Media reports on the 2008 Olympics included their share of debutante

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This article considers the Olympics as a diagnostic event (Leinaweaver,

Voices of the Nation

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Modern China 39(4)

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by those in power. The ability of these emerging nations to obtain power

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Modern China 39(4)

research included visits to Olympics venues, Olympics cultural festivals, and

Revolution and Bound Feet

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several of her graduate students, who in turn introduced me to undergraduate

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Modern China 39(4)

I later followed up on this conversation with graduate student Huang

Huangs and Xus protestations of similarityto being developed and just

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by economic recession begin to question its value? Indeed, as Dominic Boyer

Huang and Xus narratives defined similarity and global belonging

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Modern China 39(4)

The Color Red

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When I asked Li where foreigners received such impressions about the

Lis comments provoked a tense discussion among the students about

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Modern China 39(4)

As will be discussed later, discussions about Zhang Yimou took a different

She paused at this point, however, and changed direction.

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These students understood that what they might perceive as long-standing

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Modern China 39(4)

Wang Baojia, a communications major in Beijing, spoke at length and

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Harmony: Cultural Attribute or Government

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Modern China 39(4)

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title Journey of Harmony. The character for harmony appeared several

Harmony was a key theme at an Olympics policy conference I attended

Suns cynicism about harmony was common. As a graduate student at the

Promotional slogans from government campaigns such as the harmony

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Modern China 39(4)

about harmony as a cultural trait, even as he proffered it as representative of

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Harmony, once framed as a sign of Chinas inability to achieve parity,

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Modern China 39(4)

earlier artistic productions were perceived to reinforce Western skepticism

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perception that global belonging necessitates the perpetuation of uniform