Consti Cases Doctrines FINALS

COMPILED CASES FOR POLITICAL LAW| ATTY. SANDOVAL S.Y.
2015-2016
MIDTERMS
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS
DOCTRINE: Filipino First Policy; Self-Executing Provisions of the 1987
Constitution.
RULING:
As to the Self-Executing Provision:
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce
a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the
constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to
be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of
the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in
Art. II of the 1987 Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is
per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right, notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute, especially enacted
to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right, there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As to the Filipino First Policy:
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is
not yet the winning bidder.
The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be
declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy
provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos
the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest
bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not
bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one
with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of
which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding
rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being
violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all
POLITICAL LAW CASE REVIEWER 2015 | UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
COMPILED CASES FOR POLITICAL LAW| ATTY. SANDOVAL S.Y. 2015-2016

laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those
which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section
15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and
judicially enforceable even in their present form.
OPOSA V. FACTORAN
DOCTRINE: Self-Executing Provision Sec. 2 Art II, Right to Balanced and
Healthful Ecology; Cause of Action; Locus Standi of Petitioners
RULING:
As to Right to Balanced and Healthful Ecology;
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution since they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.
If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be
lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment.
Justice Feliciano (Concurring Opinion): As a matter of logic, by finding
petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
As to Cause of Action;
A cause of action is defined as: An act or omission of one party in violation of
the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal
right of the plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the
court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of
the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? In Militante vs. Edrosolano, this
Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care
and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of
the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically
admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that
happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the court found the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis
thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It
bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.
As to Locus Standi;

We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject
matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all
of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created
world in its entirety.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to
say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
TANADA V. ANGARA
DOCTRINE: Declaration of Principles: Reason for Art II being non-executing,
Limitations to Sovereignty; International Agreements and Doctrine of
Incorporation.
RULING:
As to Declaration of Principles;
These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles
ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as
aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws.
When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and healthy
ecology and the right to health are combined with remedial standards as broad
ranging as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into
the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of
the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and experience and professional
qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments -- the legislative and executive
departments -- must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the
courts should intervene.
As to Limitations to Sovereignty;
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners
stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has
traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to
by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the
country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy

of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all
nations." By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental
rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda -- international agreements
must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
obligation, but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state
which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of
the obligations undertaken.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness
of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of
their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a
convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in
pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly
agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have
been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely
diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of
territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the
formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of
claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state,
therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain
restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very
nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations
imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, Today, no
nation can build its destiny alone.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY V. COMELEC

DOCTRINE: Principle
(International Law)
of
Non-discrimination,
Yogyakarta
Principles
RULING:
As to Principles of non-discrimination;
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically
in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For
individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental
support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and
should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms
may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to
protect and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the
principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of
general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons,
regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not
specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article
26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the
reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual
orientation. Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements
As to Yogyakarta principles;
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations,
the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills.
We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the
Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual

Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect binding
principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta
Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are
declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not
reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not
undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged
principles of international law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain
segment of society wants or demands is automatically a human right. This
is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or
subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human
rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social
desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states
to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights,
and is a result of the notion that if wants are couched in rights language, then
they are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of
a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at best de
lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines.
Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the soft
law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote
international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of
which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of
either State practice or opinio juris.
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by
this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the
psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role
is not to impose its own view of acceptable behaviour. Rather, it is to apply the
Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and
confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand
vigorous debate.
SANTIAGO V. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: R.A. 6735 (Initiative and Referendum Law). Delegation of Powers,
Tests for a Valid Delegation.
RULING:
As to right of the people to propose Initiatives and RA 6735;
R.A. NO. 6735 Intended to include the system of Initiative on amendments to
the constitution, but is, unfortunately, inadequate to cover that system.
Curiously, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing
for the details in the implementation of the initiative and referendum on
national and local legislation, thereby giving them special attention, it failed,
rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid.
As to delegation of Powers;
The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated or as expressed
in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. The recognized
exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article
VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies

As to tests for valid legislation;
It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate
(COMPLETENESS TEST); and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions (SUFFICIENT STANDARDS
TEST). A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
affected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned,
R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
HOLY SEE V. ROSARIO

DOCTRINE: The Vatican as a State
RULING:
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy
recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See
over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive
foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter
into treaties according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In
International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).
Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for
ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the
Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is
also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in
conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world.
Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to
make it in a sense an "international state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen,
Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).
One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has
significant implication that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects
essentially different from those pursued by states to be invested with an
international personality (Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International
Law, The American Journal of International Law 308 [1952]).
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into
transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can
conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that is the international
person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a
foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has
had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957
(Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international
relations.
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the
purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence
and of guaranteeing to its indisputable sovereignty also in the field of
international relations" (O'Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]).
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the
attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in
which it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948];
Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states, the

MAGALLONA V. ERMITA
DOCTRINE: Demarcation of the National Territory in accordance with the
UNCLOS.
RULING:
As to Demarcation pursuant to UNCLOS;
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime
zones (i.e., the territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines,
contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines, exclusive economic zone
200 nautical miles from the baselines), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among
United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the
worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic
States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands
along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III
States parties to mark-out specific base points along their coasts from which
baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic
starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental
shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any
clearer:
The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines
drawn in accordance with article 47.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III
States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones
and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in
the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and
non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and

continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the
islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of
Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in
accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in
conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the
boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris, but from the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory
through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing
multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are
instead governed by the rules on general international law. The fact of
sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and
international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law
principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of
the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional
powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters
to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Indeed, bills drawing nautical
highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now
codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations
and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent
passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated
in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory
measures from the international community.

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to
both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them
in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their
territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage
through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through
archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States,
in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters
subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of
archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as
one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands
under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones,
placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles
beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights
of other States under UNCLOS III.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its
exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of
all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime
delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict
observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III,
the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound
by it.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE: Power of Judicial Review, Moot and Academic Principle
(Requirements), Right to self Determination of Peoples
RULING:
As to Power of Judicial Review;
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts
decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned
problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial
review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the
judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.
As to Moot and Academic Principle (Requirements);

(a) There is a grave violation of the Constitution.
(b) The situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is
involved
(c) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
(d) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review
As to Self Determination of Peoples;

The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to selfdetermination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal selfdetermination a peoples pursuit of its political, economic, social and
cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to
external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the
assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of
cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x
External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from
the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or
integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political
status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the
right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis added)
The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a
framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The
various international documents that support the existence of a peoples right
to self-determination also contain parallel statements supportive of the

conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to
prevent threats to an existing states territorial integrity or the stability of
relations between sovereign states.
ARIGO V. SWIFT
DOCTRINE: Locus Standi, State Immunity/Doctrine of Equality of States,
UNCLOS,
RULING:
As to Locus Standi;
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. Specifically, it is a partys personal and substantial interest in
a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the act being challenged, and calls for more than just a generalized
grievance. However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this
Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers
and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject
matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the public right
of citizens to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. We
declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written
in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is
an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors
in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal
standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights; they can do
so in representation of their own and future generations.
As to State Immunity/ Doctrine of Sovereign equality;

In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction,
the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet
imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
celebrated case, unduly vex the peace of nations.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued
in the courts of another State without the formers consent or waiver has
evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity
extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity
is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while
they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction
of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise
of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.
As to UNCLOS;
The international law of the sea is generally defined as a body of treaty rules
and customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its
resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch
of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the
uses of the oceans. The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened
for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was
ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16,
1994
upon
the
submission
of
the
60th ratification.

The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance
State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas
(mare liberum). The freedom to use the worlds marine waters is one of the
oldest customary principles of international law. The UNCLOS gives to the
coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the
sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4)
exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more
or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is
located.
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State
exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international
law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as
to its bed and subsoil.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS V. DENR SECRETARY REYES

DOCTRINE: Legal Standing of Marine Mammals/ Citizen Suit
RULING:
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that
not only natural and juridical persons should be given legal standing because of
the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real
parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation of these animals or
inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental cases have been
dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly
injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our
jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and
jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas's paradigm of legal
standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards simplification
of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino
citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental
laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen
suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the
cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to
manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from
notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a
general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of
said
order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by
their respective provisions. Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in
the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
commented:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules
enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as citizen
suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing
environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The
terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v.
Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn. (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted.)
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules
of procedure "may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no
vested rights in rules of procedure.
The need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting
here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
10

representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and
Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible
violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are
therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that

which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve
purely local matters;
BELGICA V. OCHOA
DOCTRINE: Constitutionality of the PDAF, Separation of Powers
RULING:
As to the Constitutionality of the PDAF;
the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional
because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds
(power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws
this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may
implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening was
that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate
as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation
of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that
pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was
constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork
barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive
will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify
the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on
non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely
lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it
state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But
this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is
approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs.
Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their
own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF,
11

particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, whats
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the
LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs
of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in
the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening
under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal
fund on the part of legislators.
ARAULLO V. AQUINO
DOCTRINE: Constitutionality of the DAP, Separation of Powers, Doctrine of
Operative Fact.
RULING:
PARTIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL; The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art.
VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a
fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section
29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn
from the Treasury otherwise; an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely
being realigned via the DAP.
There is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers
to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no
impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
The transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that
the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of
funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made
within
their
respective
offices.
Thus,
no
cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated
because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further,
transfers
within
their
respective
offices
also
contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the
DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are
non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional
and is without legal basis.
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by
the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur,
among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The
GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving
project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with
under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should
only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are
already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and
then being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the
DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification
was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
As to the Doctrine of Operative Fact;
The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act
prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded
numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be
undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they
received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
12

Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers,
and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
to the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the
petition contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can
sign but they did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments.
LAMBINO V. COMELEC
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not
a mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a
proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed
amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would
enable the would-be parliament to enact more rules.
DOCTRINE: Amendments and Revisions, Requirements for Peoples Initiative

RULING:
As to Amendments (Definition);
Broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved.
Generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
As to Revisions (Definition);
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances.
Alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
As to Peoples Initiative;
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public
officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially
explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the
people. The proponents present favourably their proposal to the people and do
not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no
presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures.
The proponents bear the burden of proving that
they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures
that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories
There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be
decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of
constitutionality so long as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.
NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by
the Lambino Group 10 (ten) Justices of the Supreme Court voted that Republic
Act 6735 is adequate.
HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their
various opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that
Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru
a peoples initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.
See discussion here
RA 6735: An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefore.
13

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY ET AL. V. COMELEC ET AL
DOCTRINE: Party list Requirements, 2% Threshold Requirement, Seats for a
Qualified Party in Congress.
RULING:
As to Party List Requirements;
The twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides
a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties
participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the
party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure
that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress.
As to the 2% Threshold Requirement;
As to Seats for a Qualified Party in Congress;

Step 1: There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank
all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each
party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in
the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of
votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step 2: The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party
is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the
other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only

those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.
This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two
percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the partylist system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are
incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
14

ANG BAGONG BAYANI PARTYLIST ET AL V. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: Inclusion of political parties in the party-list system, Nature of
Party-List System, Enumeration of Marginalized and Underrepresented Sectors
RULING:
As to Inclusion of Political Parties in the Party-List system;
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be
disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members
of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political
parties may be registered under the party-list system.
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.
Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a
regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka, or a
regional party in Mindanao.
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political
party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law
defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members
as candidates for public office.
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of
political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision
below:
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties
on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start
of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in
the party-list system.
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate
in the party-list elections.
As to the Nature of Party-list/ Party-list system;
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law
to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them
to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly
in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the
State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which
now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in
party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the
social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle
that those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system
is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great
masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the
destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change
is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the
opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and
the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification,
open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the
marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the
substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a
mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and
aggravate their marginalization.
15

As to Enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented Sectors;
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not
exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words
and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of
a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in
immediate association
The party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically
those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the
OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the
super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the
party-list system.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in
the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional
politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even
those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House
could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the
OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the
remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also
prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the
intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit
of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to
the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and
prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It
cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other

organizations under the party-list system.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. ET AL. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DOCTRINE: Computation for Number of Seats Available, Grounds for dismissal
of Party lists
RULING:
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as
follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations
do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It
is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
16

indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent
those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been
the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres
really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political
parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so
through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list
elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who
lack well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system
provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their
intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a
political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice
Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the
framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is
that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT
RESERVED for the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who
lack well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack
well-defined political constituencies. The common denominator however is
that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major political
parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can
acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system
of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then
the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for
a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be
understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should
be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its
provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per
se economically marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies as
they are ideologically marginalized.
As to the Number of Seats allocated for Party List Representatices;
where:
S is the number of seats allocated for sectoral representation,
D is the total number of district representatives, and
D / 0.8 is the total number of members of the House.
17

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL V. ERMITA ET AL
DOCTRINE: Congress Power of Inquiry, Executive Privilege, Right to
Information
RULING:
As to Congress power of Inquiry;
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively,
such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.
In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be
had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests
for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion
is essential to obtain what is needed.
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the
Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate.The
matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may
be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation
of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper
subject for investigation.
Power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of
information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive
officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that
subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and
the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
The right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no

less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be
subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry
itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the
constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial
functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result
as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations,
along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation
on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit
filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch.
Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain
at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry
might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed
to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such
instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive
Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.
As to Executive Privilege;
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable
to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary
to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in
maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military
and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate
exercise of the executive domestic decisional and policy making
functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression
necessary
in
intra-governmental
advisory
and
deliberative
communications.
18

The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for
example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all
citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public
interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do
so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution.
The Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the
privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the
privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that
the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally
consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be
wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other
words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such
power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant
case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in
relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a
matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he
must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive
Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in
order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity
to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If,
after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive
Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the
failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the
necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
As to Right of Information;
While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does
not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power
of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in
public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of
information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of
information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be
a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to
information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the
matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their
representatives and other government officials through the various legal means
allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to
the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that
the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only
when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access
to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.107 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of
E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation
of the legislatures power of inquiry.
19

BENGZON V. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS
DOCTRINE: Political Question Doctrine, Justiciable Controversy
RULING:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must
perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t) he
political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate
that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by
no means does away with kthe applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power
of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affirms
in purported aid of legislation.
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article
VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the
afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the
investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the
rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against
one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided

for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination
of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of
future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the
Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
TOLENTINO V. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE
DOCTRINE: Exclusive Powers of the House of Representatives, Power of the
Senate
RULING:
The power of the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full,
plenary and complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are
required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the Senate
cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue
bill is passed and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate certainly can
pass its own version on the same subject matter. This follows from the
coequality of the two chambers of Congress. In sum, while Art. VI, 24 provides
that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments."
In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a
substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a
committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following:
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill
omitting or adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse
an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known as
a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at all.
20

To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to
originate in the House by prescribing that the number of the House bill and its
other parts up to the enacting clause must be preserved although the text of the
Senate amendment may be incorporated in place of the original body of the bill
is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule prescribing this
form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an amendment
of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made.
II. S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that
they assume that S. No. 1630 is an independent and distinct bill. Hence their
repeated references to its certification that it was passed by the Senate
"in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734
and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is something substantially different
between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197. From
this premise, they conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and
in the Senate and that it is the product of two "half-baked bills because neither
H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed by both houses of Congress."
In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear
to be mere amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The
very tabular comparison of the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630
attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of petitioner Tolentino, while
showing differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates that the
provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments to the
House bill.
MACALINTAL V. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: Powers of Congress, Independence of Constitutional Commissions,
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189).
RULING:
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an
independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that
is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct
to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact
election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by
exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the
COMELEC to issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively
implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of
this Act. This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and
regulations to implement a law the legislature grants an administrative
agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it
has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency in its
particular field of operation.47 Once a law is enacted and approved, the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative
function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that body
deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to
approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR
for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope
of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional
mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is
left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a
provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that [t]he
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval, and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25
stating that [i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
21

Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission, whereby Congress, in
both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the
Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional
infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of
the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight
Committee in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the
Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for
the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, only upon review and approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee found in the second paragraph of the
same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of
voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer
upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting
by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the
conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189.48 Otherwise, Congress
would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC.
FINALS
ESTRADA VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
DOCTRINE: Political Question Doctrine, Principle of Non-Liability, Totality
Test, Test of Actual Prejudice
RULING:
I
Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question
Private respondents raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a
political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide.
Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco, where this Court, through former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of
this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government.
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new
provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it
can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
22

Sec. 18 of Article VII, which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or
Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. and related cases to
support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the
government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A
more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In
the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the
result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No
less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance
of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended."
In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful
revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the
government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath
that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution. In her
oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution.
Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency
under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power
II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which
overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress
of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it
cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice
President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political
question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of
speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress
of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not
inappropriate.
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The
principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and
section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under
section 11 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the
right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
II
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable
from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies
he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence,
he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent
Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of
the Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office or resignation of the President, the Vice President
shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In
case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of both the President and Vice President, the
President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice President shall have
been elected and qualified.
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be
considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as
the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal
abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there
must be intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It
23

can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter
of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the afternoon of
January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and
omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency
even at that time.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he
was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured
that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in
the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given
up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not
give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final
act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.
hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable.

But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it cannot
be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process
already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the
opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out,
the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance,
and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to Act as
President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely
temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and
hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in
the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to
adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11
of article VII." This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is
a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the VicePresident as Acting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative

investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We
24

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall
reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile,
should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
within five days to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not
in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its
rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the VicePresident shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
Following Taada v. Cuenco, we hold that this Court cannot pass upon
petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be
decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of
powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit, assuming he
enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, means, simply, that the
governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the
Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the
consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties.
The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly
presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the
Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status
quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such
act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever
country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the
highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary cannot do is mulct
the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the
performance of his official duty; any more than it can a member of the
Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of non-liability mean that the chief executive may
not be personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as
such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore
had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an
analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter
is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority
that he cannot be said to have exercised discretion in determining whether or
not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected
from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his
authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually
used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in determining the
question of his authority, if he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the
question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for
that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of
25

authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its
determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as a private
individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was
not granted immunity from suit, viz "xxx. Action upon important matters of
state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling
litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of
the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder
resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government itself."
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision
on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In
1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive
immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no
suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant
to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President
referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential
Immunity and All The King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions
For Damages," petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College of
Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this
constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote
his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by
enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to
shield the President not only form civil claims but also from criminal cases and
other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of
the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its
coverage so as to include not only the President but also other persons, be they
government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the
President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS
(or absolute immunity defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this
Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move
was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto
Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President
Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced
the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no wrong." The
effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from
office by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was
crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the
1973 Constitution.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a
non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries
the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a nonsitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of
executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987
Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. It declared as a state policy
that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and
take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." it ordained
that "public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."
It set the rule that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
26

transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel." It
maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. It created the office of the
Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to
"investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient." The Office of the Ombudsman was also
given fiscal autonomy. These constitutional policies will be devalued if we
sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from
suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined
due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped
from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the
barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent
Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of
his right to due process.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this
Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.
Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence
and on-camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the
trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation
and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this
standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as
we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar,
the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellants as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial
and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove
that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity,
which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial.

Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged
the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon.
Raul de Leon, etc. and its companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due
process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural
impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their
liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be
avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic
developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can
match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the
preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction
about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the
public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even
the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and
their sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of
media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials
cannot be completely closed to the press and public.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under
certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair
trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a
finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that
will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality
of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of
publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long
experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining
whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their
26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear
27

that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly
adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted
despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated
the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance,
we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ
Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial
publicity.
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to
warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more
than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show
more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against
the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel
of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation
whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of
this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive
prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out
with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman
himself with bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent
Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and
he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs." News
reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman
has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner and it is postulated that the
prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their
superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial.
The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the
subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the
respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of
good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is
entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e.,
that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In
truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure give investigation prosecutors
the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they
are reviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they cannot be
compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words,
investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines.
Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the
petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against
him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper
court.
MANALO VS SISTOZA
DOCTRINE: Powers of the President (Power of Appointment)
RULING:
Petitioner theorizes that Republic Act 6975 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality and that every statute passed by Congress is presumed to have
been carefully studied and considered before its enactment. He maintains that
the respect accorded to each department of the government requires that the
court should avoid as much as possible, deciding constitutional questions.
The Court agrees with petitioner. However, it is equally demanded from the
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, to see to it that every law passed by
Congress is not repugnant to the organic law. Courts have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends
the limit delineated by the fundamental law. When it does, the courts will not
hesitate to strike down such unconstitutional law.
The power to make appointments is vested in the Chief Executive by Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
28

whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Experience showed that when almost all presidential appointments required
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, as was the case under the
1935 Constitution, the commission became a venue of horse-trading and
similar malpractices. On the other hand, placing absolute power to make
appointments in the President with hardly any check by the legislature, as what
happened under 1973 Constitution, leads to abuse of such power. Thus was
perceived the need to establish a middle ground between the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions. The framers of the 1987 Constitution deemed it imperative to
subject certain high positions in the government to the power of confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments and to allow other positions within the
exclusive appointing power of the President.
Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of
officers of the government to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first
group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The
appointments of respondent officers, who are not within the first category,
need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case
of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of
other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Consequently, unconstitutional are Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975
which empower the Commission on Appointments to confirm the
appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the
Constitution to be confirmed. But the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid
sections notwithstanding, the rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled
that when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute
and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity
and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its
voided sections.
It is petitioners submission that the Philippine National Police is akin to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and therefore, the appointments of police
officers whose rank is equal to that of colonel or naval captain require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
This contention is equally untenable. The Philippine National Police is
separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The
Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI
of the 1987 Constitution,
The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a
citizen armed force which shall undergo military training
and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a
regular force necessary for the security of the State.
On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains
that:
The State shall establish and maintain one police force,
which shall be national in scope and civilian in character
to be administered and controlled by a national police
29

commission. The authority of local executives over the
police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
To so distinguish the police force from the armed forces, Congress enacted
Republic Act 6975 which states in part:
Section 2. Declaration of policy - It is hereby declared to
be the policy of the State to promote peace and order,
ensure public safety and further strengthen local
government capability aimed towards the effective
delivery of the basic services to the citizenry through the
establishment of a highly efficient and competent police
force that is national in scope and civilian in character.
xxx
The policy force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the
performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall
be paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor shall any
position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
Thereunder, the police force is different from and independent of the armed
forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine
National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as
the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of
presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
MATIBAG VS BENIPAYO
DOCTRINE: Power of Judicial Review, Nature of Ad Interim Appointment,
Temporary and By-Passed Ad Interim appointments and Reappointment of Ad
Interim appointees.
RULING:
First Issue: Propriety of Judicial Review
Respondents assert that the petition fails to satisfy all the four requisites before
this Court may exercise its power of judicial review in constitutional cases.
Out of respect for the acts of the Executive department, which is co-equal with
this Court, respondents urge this Court to refrain from reviewing the
constitutionality of the ad interim appointments issued by the President to
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason unless all the four requisites are present. These
are: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate controversy; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
issue; (3) the exercise of the judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional issue is the lis mota of the case.
Respondents argue that the second, third and fourth requisites are absent in
this case. Respondents maintain that petitioner does not have a personal and
substantial interest in the case because she has not sustained a direct injury
as a result of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason and
their assumption of office. Respondents point out that petitioner does not claim
to be lawfully entitled to any of the positions assumed by Benipayo, Borra or
Tuason. Neither does petitioner claim to be directly injured by the
appointments of these three respondents.
In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of paramount importance to the
public. The legality of the directives and decisions made by the COMELEC in
the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national elections may be put in doubt if the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner is left unresolved. In keeping with this
Courts duty to determine whether other agencies of government have
remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the
discretion given them, this Court may even brush aside technicalities of
procedure and resolve any constitutional issue raised. Here the petitioner has
30

complied with all the requisite technicalities. Moreover, public interest
requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
Second Issue: The Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment
Petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment to the COMELEC is a
temporary appointment that is prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which provides as follows:
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment can be withdrawn or
revoked by the President at her pleasure, and can even be disapproved or
simply by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. For this reason,
petitioner claims that an ad interim appointment is temporary in character and
consequently prohibited by the last sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
Based on petitioners theory, there can be no ad interim appointment to the
COMELEC or to the other two constitutional commissions, namely the Civil
Service Commission and the Commission on Audit. The last sentence of Section
1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution is also found in Article IX-B and Article IXD providing for the creation of the Civil Service Commission and the
Commission on Audit, respectively. Petitioner interprets the last sentence of
Section 1 (2) of Article IX-C to mean that the ad interim appointee cannot
assume office until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments for only then does his appointment become permanent and no
longer temporary in character.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes

effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once
the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution provides as follows:
The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval
or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or
revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke
at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without
basis.
The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim
appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect
immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a
de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary
of the Commission on Appointments, this Court elaborated on the nature of an ad
interim appointment as follows:
A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential
prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when
Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the President
nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may
the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim
appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and
perform his function without loss of time. His title to such office is complete. In the
language of the Constitution, the appointment is effective until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
31

Thus, the term ad interim appointment, as used in letters of appointment signed
by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President
in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary
appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term,
although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal
meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.
An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that
moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He
enjoys the constitutional protection that [n]o officer or employee in the civil
service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. Thus,
an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the
appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad
interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the
appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or
revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. Once an
appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected
not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for
cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due
process.
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the
Constitution.
The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the
Commission on Appointments.
The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission
on Appointments acting on his appointment.
These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the
Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions
constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad interim
appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself
that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as
provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting
capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing
power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of

tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the
Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three
independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners
to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended
permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to
make appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC shall be independent, this
provision should be harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires
the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before
the appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad
interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to
give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to
the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.
The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution - on the
nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments - did not provide for ad interim appointments. The original
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad interim
appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session
throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However,
because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential government
services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad interim appointments. The
following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
elucidates this:
During an election year, Congress normally goes on voluntary recess
between February and June considering that many of the members of the
House of Representatives and the Senate run for re-election. In 2001, the
Eleventh Congress adjourned from January 9, 2001 to June 3, 2001. Concededly,
32

there was no more time for Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, who were originally
extended ad interim appointments only on March 22, 2001, to be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments before the May 14, 2001 elections.
If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were not extended ad interim appointments to
fill up the three vacancies in the COMELEC, there would only have been one
division functioning in the COMELEC instead of two during the May 2001
elections. Considering that the Constitution requires that all x x x election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, the remaining one division would have
been swamped with election cases. Moreover, since under the Constitution
motions for reconsideration shall be decided by the Commission en banc, the
mere absence of one of the four remaining members would have prevented a
quorum, a less than ideal situation considering that the Commissioners are
expected to travel around the country before, during and after the elections.
There was a great probability that disruptions in the conduct of the May 2001
elections could occur because of the three vacancies in the COMELEC. The
successful conduct of the May 2001 national elections, right after the
tumultuous EDSA II and EDSA III events, was certainly essential in safeguarding
and strengthening our democracy.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional
power to make ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very
evil sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the
President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can
choose either of two modes in appointing officials who are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in
session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and
pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee
cannot qualify and assume office. Second, during the recess of Congress,
the President may extend an ad interim appointment which allows the
appointee to immediately qualify and assume office.
Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or
extend an ad interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the
President because the Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot
inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the President in the exercise of
her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the instant case.
The issuance by Presidents of ad interim appointments to the COMELEC is a
long-standing practice. Former President Corazon Aquino issued an ad interim
appointment to Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg. Former President Fidel V.
Ramos extended ad interim appointments to Commissioners Julio F. Desamito,
Japal M. Guiani, Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall and Manolo F. Gorospe. Former
President Joseph Estrada also extended ad interim appointments to
Commissioners Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar, Luzviminda Tancangco, Mehol K.
Sadain and Ralph C. Lantion.
The Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments may indeed briefly
put the appointee at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers.
This situation, however, is only for a short period - from the time of issuance of
the ad interim appointment until the Commission on Appointments gives or
withholds its consent. The Constitution itself sanctions this situation, as a tradeoff against the evil of disruptions in vital government services. This is also part
of the check-and-balance under the separation of powers, as a trade-off
against the evil of granting the President absolute and sole power to
appoint. The Constitution has wisely subjected the Presidents appointing
power to the checking power of the legislature.
This situation, however, does not compromise the independence of the
COMELEC as a constitutional body. The vacancies in the COMELEC are precisely
staggered to insure that the majority of its members hold confirmed
appointments, and not one President will appoint all the COMELEC members.
In the instant case, the Commission on Appointments had long confirmed four
of the incumbent COMELEC members, comprising a majority, who could now
be removed from office only by impeachment. The special constitutional
safeguards that insure the independence of the COMELEC remain in place. The
COMELEC enjoys fiscal autonomy, appoints its own officials and employees, and
promulgates its own rules on pleadings and practice. Moreover, the salaries of
COMELEC members cannot be decreased during their tenure.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners,
respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
33

Third Issue: The Constitutionality of Renewals of Appointments
Petitioner also agues that assuming the first ad interim appointments and the
first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are constitutional, the
renewal of the their ad interim appointments and their subsequent assumption
of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides as follows:
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and
the last members for three years, without reappointment.
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment.
The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the
exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The
disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on
Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the
appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from
such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as
well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer
renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on
reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure
of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A bypassed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the
merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of
Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments
to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the
Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is recognized in Section
17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which provides as
follows:
Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President.

Nominations or appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines
which are not finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be
returned to the President and, unless new nominations or appointments are
made, shall not again be considered by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed
appointment can be considered again if the President renews the appointment.
In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval by
the Commission, because the incumbent cannot continue holding office over
the positive objection of the Commission. It ceases, also, upon the next
adjournment of the Congress, simply because the President may then issue new
appointments - not because of implied disapproval of the Commission deduced
from its inaction during the session of Congress, for, under the Constitution, the
Commission may affect adversely the interim appointments only by action,
never by omission. If the adjournment of Congress were an implied disapproval
of ad interim appointments made prior thereto, then the President could no
longer appoint those so by-passed by the Commission. But, the fact is that the
President may reappoint them, thus clearly indicating that the reason for said
termination of the ad interim appointments is not the disapproval thereof
allegedly inferred from said omission of the Commission, but the circumstance
that upon said adjournment of the Congress, the President is free to make ad
interim appointments or reappointments. (Emphasis supplied)
Guevara was decided under the 1935 Constitution from where the second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the present Constitution on ad interim
appointments was lifted verbatim. The jurisprudence under the 1935
Constitution governing ad interim appointments by the President is doubtless
applicable to the present Constitution. The established practice under the
present Constitution is that the President can renew the appointments of bypassed ad interim appointees. This is a continuation of the well-recognized
practice under the 1935 Constitution, interrupted only by the 1973
Constitution which did not provide for a Commission on Appointments but
vested sole appointing power in the President.
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim
appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by
34

another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment
is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed
ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment
because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee
serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
There are four situations where this provision will apply.
The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves his full seven-year
term. Such person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a
member or as a chairman, because he will then be actually serving more than
seven years.
The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part
of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such
person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy
arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee
also serving more than seven years.
The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired
term of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the
unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or
chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result
in the appointee also serving more than seven years.
The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of
less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it
will not result in his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of such
person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will
be similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
This provision refers to the first appointees under the Constitution whose
terms of office are less than seven years, but are barred from ever being
reappointed under any situation. Not one of these four situations applies to the
case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.
The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has
served any term of office as COMELEC member whether for a full term of seven
years, a truncated term of five or three years, or even for an unexpired term of
any length of time can no longer be reappointed to the COMELEC.
To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase without reappointment appears
twice in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the present Constitution. The first phrase
prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of
seven years. The second phrase prohibits reappointment of any person
previously appointed for a term of five or three years pursuant to the first set of
appointees under the Constitution. In either case, it does not matter if the
person previously appointed completes his term of office for the intention is to
prohibit any reappointment of any kind.
However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the
Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The
period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it
lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise
would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete
the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the
confirming power of the Commission on Appointments.
The phrase without reappointment applies only to one who has been
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office. There
must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous
appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold
otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the Presidents power to make ad
interim appointments.
In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments usually fails to
act, for lack of time, on the ad interim appointments first issued to appointees. If
such ad interim appointments can no longer be renewed, the President will
certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because most of her
appointees will effectively be disapproved by mere inaction of the Commission
on Appointments. This will nullify the constitutional power of the President to
make ad interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital
35

government services. This Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will
wreak havoc on vital government services.
The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional
commissions. The framers of the present Constitution prohibited
reappointments for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second
appointment for those who have been previously appointed and
confirmed even if they served for less than seven years. The second is to
insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not
serve beyond the fixed term of seven years.
The prohibition on reappointment is intended to insure that there will be
no reappointment of any kind. On the other hand, the prohibition on
temporary or acting appointments is intended to prevent any
circumvention of the prohibition on reappointment that may result in an
appointees total term of office exceeding seven years. The evils sought to be
avoided by the twin prohibitions are very specific - reappointment of any kind
and exceeding ones term in office beyond the maximum period of seven years.
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments
because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous
confirmed appointment. The same ad interim appointments and renewals of
appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit because all the
appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008. Any delay in their confirmation
will not extend the expiry date of their terms of office. Consequently, there is no
danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad interim appointments of these
three respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be exorcised by the
twin prohibitions in the Constitution. The continuing renewal of the ad interim
appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of office
expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments
in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
In Re: Appointments of Valenzuela and. Vallarta

DOCTRINE: Powers of the President (Appointing Power), Midnight
Appointments
RULING:
III. The Relevant Constitutional Provisions
The provision of the Constitution material to the inquiry at bar read as follows:
Section 15, Article VII:
"Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to execute positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety."
Section 4 (1), Article VIII:
"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof."
Section 9, Article VIII:
"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from the list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of the
list."
36

IV. The Court's View
The Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution - "(t)wo months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term" - the President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9
of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in
the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by
Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments
comes into effect only once every six years.
V. Intent of the Constitutional Commission

The journal of the Commission which drew up the present Constitution
discloses that the original proposal was to have an eleven-member Supreme
Court. Commissioner Eulogio Lerum wanted to increase the number of Justices
to fifteen. He also wished to ensure that that number would not be reduced for
any appreciable length of time (even only temporarily), and to this end
proposed that any vacancy "must be filled within two months from the date
that the vacancy occurs." His proposal to have a 15-member Court was not
initially adopted. Persisting however in his desire to make certain that the size
of the Court would not be decreased for any substantial period as a result of
vacancies, Lerum proposed the insertion in the provision (anent the Court's
membership) of the same mandate that "IN CASE OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME
SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF." He
later agreed to suggestions to make the period three, instead of two, months. As
thus amended, the proposal was approved. As it turned out, however, the
Commission ultimately agreed on a fifteen-member Court. Thus it was
that the section fixing the composition of the Supreme Court came to
include a command to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its
occurrence.
In this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction that any
"vacancy shall be filled within ninety days" (in the last sentence of Section 4
(1) of Article VIII) contrasts with the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII,
which is couched in stronger negative language - that "a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments"
The commission later approved a proposal of Commissioner Hilario G. Davide,

Jr. (now a Member of this Court) to add to what is now Section 9 of Article VIII,
the following paragraph: "WITH RESPECT TO LOWER COURTS, THE
PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM
THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST" (of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council to
the President). Davide stated that his purpose was to provide a "uniform rule"
for lower courts. According to him, the 90-day period should be counted
from submission of the list of nominees to the President in view of the
possibility that the President might reject the list submitted to him and
the JBC thus need more time to submit a new one.
On the other hand, Section 15, Article VII - which in effect deprives the
President of his appointing power "two months immediately before the next
presidential elections up to the end of his term" - was approved without
discussion.
VI. Analysis of Provisions
Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan
considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two
months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which
are declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote buying and vote selling - (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises
money or anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment,
franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure,
directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person,
association, corporation, entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the
public in general to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the
election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination of choice of a
candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or
giving salary increases. - During the period of forty five days before a regular
election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or
appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality whether
37

national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who
appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or casual,
or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the
Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is
satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of
the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a
manner that may influence the election.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII
consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it
was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected
President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a "caretaker" administrator whose duty was to
"prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President." Said
the Court:
"The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to
afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the
need for the appointment and appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be
permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned
induction of almost all of them in a few hours before the inauguration of the
new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of
Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan
effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and
thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments."
As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to
important positions which have to be made even after the proclamation of the
new President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to
afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the
need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be made by
the outgoing President. Accordingly, several appointments made by President
Garcia, which were shown to have been well considered, were upheld.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not
unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only "midnight" appointments those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and
the time of their making - but also appointments presumed made for the
purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential election.
On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII - allowing
appointments to be made during the period of the ban therein provided - is
much narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The exception allows only the
making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously,
the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the
period of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in
the courts and the restriction on the President's power of appointment, it is this
Court's view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should
yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils
outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the
disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the
ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only
once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be
filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are longlasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, in fact
influence the results of elections and, for that reason, their making is
considered an election offense.
To the contention that may perhaps be asserted, that Sections 4 (1) and 9 of
Article VIII should prevail over Section 15 of Article VII, because they may
be considered later expressions of the people when they adopted the
Constitution, it suffices to point out that the Constitution must be
construed in its entirety as one, single, instrument.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an
appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in
the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership of the court
be so reduced that it will have no quorum or should the voting on a particularly
important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a
case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Section 4 (1)
and 9 of Article VIII.
38

VII. A Last Word
VIII. Conclusion
A final word, concerning Valenzuela's oath-taking and "reporting for duty" as

Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 62, Bago City, on May 14, 1998. Standing
practice is for the originals of all appointments to the Judiciary - from the
highest to the lowest courts - to be sent by the Office of the President to the
Office of the Chief Justice, the appointments being addressed to the appointees
"Thru: the Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Manila." It is a Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court, in the Chief Justice's behalf, who thereafter advises the
individual appointees of their appointments and also of the date of
commencement of the pre-requisite orientation seminar, to be conducted by
the Philippine Judicial Academy for new Judges. The rationale of this procedure
is salutary and readily perceived. The procedure ensures the authenticity of
the appointments, enables the Court, particularly of the Office of the Court
Administrator, to enter in the appropriate records all appointments to the
Judiciary as well as other relevant data such as the dates of qualification,
the completion by the appointees of their pre-requisite orientation
seminars, their assumption of duty, etc.
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998

(transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 1998) were
unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Consequently, they come
within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are
considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election.
While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public
interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the
making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as
already discussed, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against
appointments made within the period of the ban.
The procedure also precludes the possibility, however remote, of Judges acting
on spurious or otherwise defective appointments. It is obviously not advisable,
to say the least, for a Judge to take his oath of office and enter upon the
performance of his duties on the basis alone of a document purporting to be a
copy of his appointment coming from Malacanang, the authenticity of which
has not been verified from the latter of the Office of the Court Administrator; or
otherwise to begin performing his duties as Judge without the Court
Administrator knowing of that fact. The undesirability of such a situation is
illustrated by the case of Judge Valenzuela who acted, with no little impatience
or rashness, on a mere copy of his supposed appointment, without having
received any formal notice from this Court, and without verifying the
authenticity of the appointment or the propriety of taking oath on the basis
thereof. Had he bothered to inquire about his appointment from the Court
Administrator's Office, he would have been informed of the question
concerning it and the Court's injunction.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID

the appointments signed by His Excellency the President under date of March
30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of
the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan
City, respectively, and to order them, forthwith on being served with notice of
this decision, to forthwith CEASE AND DESIST from discharging the office of
Judge of the Courts to which they were respectively appointed on March 30,
1998. This, without prejudice to their being considered anew by the Judicial
and Bar Council for re-nomination to the same positions.
39

G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ZAMORA
DOCTRINE: Powers of the President (Calling Out Power), Supremacy of the
People, President as Commander-in-Chief.
RULING:
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this
case.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law
and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other
groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP
has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of
the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the
Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve
the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the
deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the
National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a
formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action.
To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying
opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized
the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury
which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental
act.
Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has
sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility
patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that
their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What
the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement
which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more
harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in
character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy
the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a
direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not
possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines.
This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no
standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by
way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to
obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of
legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the
Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.
Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public,
the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a
reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty
and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under
constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly
aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised
in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face
again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to
resolve the issue now, rather than later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the
Marines.
40

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of
the President of the necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the
Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that
the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief
Powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is
the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision.
According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the
calling of the military to assist the police force. It contends that no lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus,
the IBP prays that this Court review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said
troop [Marine] deployment.
Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the
President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that
the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order
and promotion of the general welfare. For one, the realities on the ground do
not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or
anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the
citizenry. a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of
the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:
The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising
the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties
in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the
President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be
said to exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of
the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public
order and security.
Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the Presidents

power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar
result.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter
which is appropriate for court review. It pertains to issues which are
inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law.
Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual
constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for
resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are
political questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or
measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of
the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the
workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the
courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
As Tanada v. Cuenco puts it, political questions refer to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. Thus,
if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for
discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people
themselves then it is held to be a political question.
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing
that (T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose
action is being questioned.
41

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Under this
definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power
to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look
into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of
discretion. A showing that plenary power is granted either department of
government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the
improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable
controversy.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the
framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be
called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However,
this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual
basis.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out
the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition
that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in
such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy
over the military. In the performance of this Courts duty of purposeful
hesitation before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only
where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere
with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the
President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for
the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in
the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing.
42

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or
suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces.
The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where
the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation
or construction, be extended to other matters. That the intent of the
Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully
discretionary to the President.
In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call
out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly
and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not
farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the
insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The
determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to
unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as
such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary

restraining order every time it is exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to
call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in
order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely
abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect
from this Court.
We do not doubt the veracity of the Presidents assessment of the situation,
especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice
of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls,
public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of
deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that
the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law
enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy
clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.
Presiding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the
calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines,
the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Section 3,
Article II of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach
of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself,
which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines
authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in
charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to
the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the
PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police
forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol
43

procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment
of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary
equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers.
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of
the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of
the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article
XVI of the Constitution.
3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;
In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of
the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been
virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision.
The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with
the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such
being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in
the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control
over the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak
of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not
destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than
assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no insidious
incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the
civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various

forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that
it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the
implementation and execution of certain traditionally civil functions. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the multifarious
activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities
that bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of
cooperation, are:
1. Elections
2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;
4. Amateur sports promotion and development;

5. Development of the culture and the arts;
6. Conservation of natural resources;
7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;
8. Enforcement of customs laws;
10. Conduct of licensure examinations;

11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;
12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;
13. Sanitary inspections;
14. Conduct of census work;
15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;
17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units;
This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a

systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
Congress and, yet, never before questioned. What we have here is mutual
support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not
derogation of civilian supremacy.
When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to
mean that military involvement, even when not expressly authorized by the
Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it
actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those
claiming relief. A mere threat of some future injury would be insufficient.
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to
determine whether there is permissible use of the military in civilian law
44

enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court
agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General:
The designation of tasks in Annex A does not constitute the exercise of
regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do
not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6, 8(k) and 9(a) of
Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In
No. 9(d) of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the nearest police
stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply no coercive force.
The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c) of Annex A,
are all low impact and defensive in character. The conclusion is that there
being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military
power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines constitutes no
impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement.
It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed
forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril
our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The
power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed forces. Unless,
petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the
Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his
authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not
inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the factual basis for the
calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000,
not a single citizen has complained that his political or civil rights have been
violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to
safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint
visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom
only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the
shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
KULAYAN VS. TAN

DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Heirarchy of the Courts, Doctrine of Transcendental
Importance, Powers of the President (As Commander-in-Chief), Local Automy
RULING:
I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the Doctrine
of Hierarchy of Courts
We first dispose of respondents invocation of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts which allegedly prevents judicial review by this Court in the present
case, citing for this specific purpose, Montes v. Court of Appeals and Purok
Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco. Simply put, the
doctrine provides that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the CA or the RTC, it is in either of these courts
and not in the Supreme Court, that the specific action for the issuance of
such writ must be sought unless special and important laws are clearly
and specifically set forth in the petition. The reason for this is that this Court
is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to perform the functions
assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. It cannot be
burdened with deciding cases in the first instance.
The said rule, however, is not without exception. In Chavez v. PEA-Amari, the
Court stated:
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief
directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to
cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot
entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises
constitutional questions of transcendental importance to the public. The Court
can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case.
Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We
resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
The instant case stems from a petition for certiorari and prohibition, over
which the Supreme Court possesses original jurisdiction. More crucially, this
case involves acts of a public official which pertain to restrictive custody,
and is thus impressed with transcendental public importance that would
45

warrant the relaxation of the general rule. The Court would be remiss in its
constitutional duties were it to dismiss the present petition solely due to claims
of judicial hierarchy.
hence, the issue is bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is capable
of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better be resolved now for the
education and guidance of all concerned.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court highlighted the transcendental public

importance involved in cases that concern restrictive custody, because judicial
review in these cases serves as "a manifestation of the crucial defense of
civilians in police power cases due to the diminution of their basic liberties
under the guise of a state of emergency." Otherwise, the importance of the high
tribunal as the court of last resort would be put to naught, considering the
nature of "emergency" cases, wherein the proclamations and issuances are
inherently short-lived. In finally disposing of the claim that the issue had
become moot and academic, the Court also cited transcendental public
importance as an exception
Hence, the instant petition is given due course, impressed as it is with

transcendental public importance.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if:
First, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;
Third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and
Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest,
involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has
the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present
petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by
constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are
capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
Evidently, the triple reasons we advanced at the start of our ruling are justified
under the foregoing exceptions. Every bad, unusual incident where police
officers figure in generates public interest and people watch what will be done
or not done to them. Lack of disciplinary steps taken against them erodes public
confidence in the police institution. As petitioners themselves assert, the
restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an existing practice,
II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commanderin-chief of the Republic
i. One executive, one commander-in-chief
As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior, it has already been established that
there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of
the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution
speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else
Corollary, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to
exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the
Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under
Section 7, Article VII thereof.
ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are
exercised by one president
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of one President is
the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be
performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or
prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the
"calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The Presidents Emergency Powers,
on the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as
embodied in the second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution:
Article 6, Sec 23(2). In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
46

Article 7, Sec 18. The President shall be the Commander-inChief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to
the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most

effectual.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following

such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the

President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.
The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme

Courts authority to review the factual basis thereof. By constitutional fiat,
the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare
martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or

suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power
to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification.
Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the
Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the military, making the civilian president the nations supreme military
leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII,
Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and
administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that
the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as
Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and
to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to
delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but
the ultimate power is his. As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct
the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his
In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court had occasion
to rule that the calling-out powers belong solely to the President as
commander-in-chief:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and
from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to
overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to
give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling
out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
In the more recent case of Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia, the Court characterized
these powers as exclusive to the President, precisely because they are of
exceptional import:
These distinctions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our
fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of
fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government.
47

The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power; notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that
demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested
power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the
executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
In addition to being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President
also acts as the leader of the countrys police forces, under the mandate of
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that,
"The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed."
Regarding the countrys police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution
states that:
law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day
situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian
agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes
within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive
control.
iii. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the
President
Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with
the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the
assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared
a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own
Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official,
even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
"The State shall establish and maintain one police force,

which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to
be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police
units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law."
A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational
supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day
operations.
For example, if a local government, a town cannot handle its peace and order
problems or police problems, such as riots, conflagrations or organized crime,
the national government may come in, especially if requested by the local
executives. Under that situation, if they come in under such an extraordinary
situation, they will be in control. But if the day-to-day business of police
investigation of crime, crime prevention, activities, traffic control, is all lodged
in the mayors, and if they are in complete operational control of the day-to-day
business of police service, what the national government would control would
be the administrative aspect.
In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision
it is clear that the framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise
unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without
prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by
48

RISOS-VIDAL VS ESTRADA
DOCTRINE: Powers of the President (Power to Grant Pardon a to the case of
Former President Estrada), Limitation imposed by Congress
RULING:
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Recall that the petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal against former
President Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC), was anchored on Section
40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted
of a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving
moral turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and
hold public elective office notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a
pardon that includes a statement expressing "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights."
Risos-Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is disqualified from
running for Mayor of Manila in the May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains
disqualified to hold any local elective post despite the presidential pardon
extended to him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason that it
(pardon) did not expressly provide for the remission of the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration of his (former President
Estrada) right to vote and be voted upon for public office. She invokes Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and
accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify which political
right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not
deliberately intend to restore former President Estradas rights of suffrage and
to hold public office, or to otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be
upheld based on the pardons text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of
Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power
to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only
instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1)
impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final
conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the
COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of
statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador and Pelobello v. Palatino, which were decided under the
1935 Constitution,wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the
President shared similar phraseology with what is found in the present 1987
Constitution, the Court then unequivocally declared that "subject to the
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be
restricted or controlled by legislative action." The Court reiterated this
pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. thereby establishing that, under
the present Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential prerogative,
49

should not be circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it is unmistakably
the long-standing position of this Court that the exercise of the pardoning
power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by
Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for
by the Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the Presidents
power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was
strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987
Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception
from the pardoning power of the President in the form of "offenses involving
graft and corruption" that would be enumerated and defined by Congress
through the enactment of a law.
However, the power to grant executive clemency for violations of corrupt
practices laws may be limited by legislation.
Nevertheless, as a compromise, we provided here that it will be the Congress
that will provide for the classification as to which convictions will still
require prior recommendation; after all, the Congress could take into
account whether or not the violation of the Corrupt Practices Law is of such
magnitude as to affect the economic life of the country, if it is in the millions or
billions of dollars.
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal Their accessory
penalties. The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall
carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the
sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as proposed by
Risos-Vidal, is unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or unduly restrict the
power of the President to grant executive clemency.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum.
From the words of a statute there should be no departure. It is this Courts firm
view that the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that
former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and political rights"
substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.
The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos Vidal that there
was no express remission and/or restoration of the rights of suffrage and/or to
hold public office in the pardon granted to former President Estrada, as
required by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal provisions
must be followed by the President, as they do not abridge or diminish the
Presidents power to extend clemency. He opines that they do not reduce the
coverage of the Presidents pardoning power. Particularly, he states:
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form. They
only provide a procedural prescription. They are not concerned with areas
where or the instances when the President may grant pardon; they are
only concerned with how he or she is to exercise such power so that no
other governmental instrumentality needs to intervene to give it full
effect.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to
include in the pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public
office, or the remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification, he or she should do so expressly. Articles 36 and 41 only ask
that the President state his or her intentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely,
and unmistakably. To belabor the point, the President retains the power to
make such restoration or remission, subject to a prescription on the manner by
which he or she is to state it.
With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad statement that Congress may
dictate as to how the President may exercise his/her power of executive
clemency. The form or manner by which the President, or Congress for
that matter, should exercise their respective Constitutional powers or
prerogatives cannot be interfered with unless it is so provided in the
Constitution. This is the essence of the principle of separation of powers
deeply ingrained in our system of government which "ordains that each of the
three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme
in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere." More so,
50

this fundamental principle must be observed if noncompliance with the form
imposed by one branch on a co-equal and coordinate branch will result into the
diminution of an exclusive Constitutional prerogative.
For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be
construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive clemency
granted by the President, instead of indulging in an overly strict
interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the import of the
pardon which emanated from the Office of the President and duly signed
by the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal provisions must be
construed to harmonize the power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe
the penalties for such crimes and the power of the President to grant executive
clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the
principal penalty does not carry with it the remission of the accessory
penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties
in the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant
executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty
while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36
and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided upon by the
President on the penalties imposed in accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive
clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment.
The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that
attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the
pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
In this jurisdiction, the right to seek public elective office is recognized by law
as falling under the whole gamut of civil and political rights.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship

Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003," reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they
renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that
oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines
shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which theyare naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in
the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
(Emphases supplied.)
51

No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which
the Philippines is a signatory, acknowledges the existence of said right. Article
25(b) of the Convention states: Article 25
above, the pardon here is consistent with, and not contrary to, the provisions of
Articles 36 and 41.
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in

relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him.
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be

by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors[.]
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any
elective local position. Risos-Vidal argues that former President Estrada is
disqualified under item (a), to wit:
Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective
office is unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence, the Court
reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon granted to former
President Estrada admits no other interpretation other than to mean that,
upon acceptance of the pardon granted to him, he regained his FULL civil
and political rights including the right to seek elective office.
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral

turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence[.]
On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes beyond the plain meaning of
said penal provisions; and prescribes a formal requirement that is not only
unnecessary but, if insisted upon, could be in derogation of the constitutional
prohibition relative to the principle that the exercise of presidential pardon
cannot be affected by legislative action.
Section 12. Disqualifications. x x x unless he has been given plenary

pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphasis supplied.)
Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in Monsanto v.

Factoran, Jr. to justify her argument that an absolute pardon must expressly
state that the right to hold public office has been restored, and that the penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification has been remitted.This is incorrect.
Her reliance on said opinions is utterly misplaced. Although the learned views
of Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano are to be respected,
they do not form part of the controlling doctrine nor to be considered part of
the law of the land. On the contrary, a careful reading of the majority opinion in
Monsanto, penned by no less than Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, reveals no
statement that denotes adherence to a stringent and overly nuanced
application of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code that will in effect
require the President to use a statutorily prescribed language in extending
executive clemency, even if the intent of the President can otherwise be
deduced from the text or words used in the pardon. Furthermore, as explained
Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it

provides for an exception, to wit:
As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that former President Estradas

conviction for plunder disqualifies him from running for the elective local
position of Mayor of the City of Manila under Section 40(a) of the LGC.
However, the subsequent absolute pardon granted to former President
Estrada effectively restored his right to seek public elective office. This is
made possible by reading Section 40(a) of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of
the OEC.
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is
worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape
from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the
latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or
amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or
national position.
Take notice that the applicability of Section 12 of the OEC to candidates running
for local elective positions is not unprecedented. In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, the Court acknowledged the aforementioned provision as one of the
52

legal remedies that may be availed of to disqualify a candidate in a local
election filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but
not later than the date of proclamation. The pertinent ruling in the Jalosjos case
is quoted as follows:
What is indisputably clear is that false material representation of Jalosjos is a
ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false material
representation arises from a crime penalized by prision mayor, a petition under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government
Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his
petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section
40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies
and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to petitioner.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the
pardon, i.e., "whereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon
conditional, nor militates against the conclusion that former President
Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been
restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a
condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil
and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a
preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or
preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually
introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a
statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an
integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone
operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent
upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of
the pardon.
On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant excerpt of COMELEC
Commissioner Maria Gracia Padacas separate concurring opinion in the
assailed April 1, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-211 (DC),
which captured the essence of the legal effect of preambular
paragraphs/whereas clauses, viz:
The present dispute does not raise anything which the 20 January 2010
Resolution did not conclude upon. Here, Petitioner Risos-Vidal raised the same
argument with respect to the 3rd "whereas clause" or preambular paragraph of
the decree of pardon. It states that "Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office." On this contention,
the undersigned reiterates the ruling of the Commission that the 3rd
preambular paragraph does not have any legal or binding effect on the absolute
nature of the pardon extended by former President Arroyo to herein
Respondent. This ruling is consistent with the traditional and customary usage
of preambular paragraphs. In the case of Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, the
Supreme Court ruled on the legal effect of preambular paragraphs or whereas
clauses on statutes. The Court stated, viz.:
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an
introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and
obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its
text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on
Respondents promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to
have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since
former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree
of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular
clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to
former President Estrada.
Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyos silence on former
President Estradas decision to run for President in the May 2010 elections
against, among others, the candidate of the political party of former President
Arroyo, after the latters receipt and acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of
her intention to restore him to his rights to suffrage and to hold public office.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the
President is in issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence available to it,
53

and that is the pardon itself. From a detailed review of the four corners of said
document, nothing therein gives an iota of intimation that the third
Whereas Clause is actually a limitation, proviso, stipulation or condition
on the grant of the pardon, such that the breach of the mentioned
commitment not to seek public office will result in a revocation or
cancellation of said pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a statement of
fact or the prevailing situation at the time the executive clemency was granted.
It was not used as a condition to the efficacy or to delimits the scope of the
pardon.
Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the third Whereas Clause
was one of the reasons to grant the pardon, the pardon itself does not provide
for the attendant consequence of the breach thereof. This Court will be hard put
to discern the resultant effect of an eventual infringement. Just like it will be
hard put to determine which civil or political rights were restored if the Court
were to take the road suggested by Risos-Vidal that the statement "[h]e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights" excludes the restoration of
former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to hold public office. The
aforequoted text of the executive clemency granted does not provide the Court
with any guide as to how and where to draw the line between the included and
excluded political rights.
Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the ultimate issue for resolution is not
whether the pardon is contingent on the condition that former President
Estrada will not seek another elective public office, but it actually concerns the
coverage of the pardon whether the pardon granted to former President
Estrada was so expansive as to have restored all his political rights, inclusive of
the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. Justice Leonen is of the view that
the pardon in question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite the
statement that former President Estrada is "hereby restored to his civil and
political rights," that is, the foregoing statement restored to former President
Estrada all his civil and political rights except the rights denied to him by the
unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification made up of, among
others, the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. He adds that had the
President chosen to be so expansive as to include the rights of suffrage and to
hold public office, she should have been more clear on her intentions.
President Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was
unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in character, as the term "political
rights" adverted to has a settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.
With due respect, I disagree too with Justice Leonen that the omission of the
qualifying word "full" can be construed as excluding the restoration of the
rights of suffrage and to hold public office. There appears to be no distinction as
to the coverage of the term "full political rights" and the term "political rights"
used alone without any qualification. How to ascribe to the latter term the
meaning that it is "partial" and not "full" defies ones understanding. More so, it
will be extremely difficult to identify which of the political rights are restored
by the pardon, when the text of the latter is silent on this matter. Exceptions to
the grant of pardon cannot be presumed from the absence of the qualifying
word "full" when the pardon restored the "political rights" of former President
Estrada without any exclusion or reservation.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon granted
to former President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal
and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support the Presidential
intent to grant a limited pardon.
To reiterate, insofar as its coverage is concerned, the text of the pardon can
withstand close scrutiny even under the provisions of Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-Vidal, the COMELEC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
The Court has consistently held that a petition for certiorari against actions of
the COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process, because the
COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its
domain.
However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,"
to the mind of the Court, is crystal clear the pardon granted to former
54

As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary exercise of
power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law. For an act to be condemned as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, such an abuse must be patent and gross.
The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any
factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were
issued in a "whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts
to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law" or were so
"patent and gross" as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
On the foregoing premises and conclusions, this Court finds it unnecessary to
separately discuss Lim's petition-in-intervention, which substantially
presented the same arguments as Risos-Vidal's petition.
BAYAN VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DOCTRINE: Locus Standi, Doctrine of Transcendental Importance, Power of the
President (to enter treaties and/or executive agreements)
RULING:
LOCUS STANDI
At the outset, respondents challenge petitioners standing to sue, on the ground
that the latter have not shown any interest in the case, and that petitioners
failed to substantiate that they have sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the operation of the VFA. Petitioners, on the other hand, counter that
the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a matter of transcendental importance
which justifies their standing.
A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or
statute must show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or in is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. He must show that he has been, or is about to
be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
complained of.
In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court,
that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not
established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to
a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. Thus, in Bugnay Const. & Development Corp.
vs. Laron, we held:
x x x it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real
party in interest. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must
specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury
55

as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.
Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this
case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are
being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal
standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Taada, Agapito Aquino and Joker Arroyo,
as petitioners-legislators, do not possess the requisite locus standi to
maintain the present suit. While this Court, in Phil. Constitution Association vs.
Hon. Salvador Enriquez, sustained the legal standing of a member of the Senate
and the House of Representatives to question the validity of a presidential veto
or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bull, we cannot, at this
instance, similarly uphold petitioners standing as members of Congress, in the
absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the
institution to which they belong.
Beyond this, the allegations of impairment of legislative power, such as the
delegation of the power of Congress to grant tax exemptions, are more
apparent than real. While it may be true that petitioners pointed to provisions
of the VFA which allegedly impair their legislative powers, petitioners failed
however to sufficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct injury.
In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped
of standing in these cases. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the IBP
lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution
from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence
the present action.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional
significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of
the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency Powers Cases, where we
had occasion to rule:
x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino
although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not
proper parties and ruled that transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if
we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied the exception
in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343). (Underscoring Supplied)
This principle was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales vs. COMELEC,
Daza vs. Singson, and Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corporation, where
we emphatically held:
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in
keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused
the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. x x x
Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled
that in cases of transcendental importance, the Court may relax the
standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no
direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question
based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
departments of the government a becoming respect for each others acts, this
Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of which
provision of the Constitution applies, with regard to the exercise by the senate
of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that
Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its
subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. Respondents,
on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as
the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely
56

the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military
exercises.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the
concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21,
Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under
a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.
Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in
general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or
international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines.
This provision lays down the general rule on treatise or international
agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject
matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treatise or those economic
in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the
Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular
designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be
valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to
treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities
in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only
one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements
and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article
XVIII further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may
be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in
by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and
recognized as such by the other contracting state.
It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from
contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. These
constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus,
are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21
opens with the clause No treaty x x x, and Section 25 contains the phrase shall
not be allowed. Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is
indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and
effective.
To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under
Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the
same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21,
Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that
the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict
constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United
States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the
rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties
involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant
case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of
section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the
sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid
concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.
It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special
provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat generali.
57

Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a
general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is
embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the
general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general
language which are not within the provision of the particular enactment.
In Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we enunciated:
x x x that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that
general legislation must give way to a special legislation on the same subject,
and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special
provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo vs. de los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139),
that a specific statute prevails over a general statute (De Jesus vs. People, 120
SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail (Wil
Wilhensen Inc. vs. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38).
could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities - any
of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article
XVIII.
Moreover, military bases established within the territory of another state is no
longer viable because of the alternatives offered by new means and weapons of
warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels
that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years without returning to
their home country. These military warships are actually used as substitutes for
a land-home base not only of military aircraft but also of military personnel and
facilities. Besides, vessels are mobile as compared to a land-based military
headquarters.
At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the
requirements of Section 25 were complied with when the Senate gave its
concurrence to the VFA.
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to

mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of
structure for the establishment of a military base. On this score, the
Constitution makes no distinction between transient and permanent. Certainly,
we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or
facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in
the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must
be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate
and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting state.
It is a rudiment in legal hermenuetics that when no distinction is made by law,

the Court should not distinguish- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemos.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of
the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the general
requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate mentioned in
Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article requiring ratification
by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary
since Congress has not required it.
In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article
XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign
troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a perusal of said
constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the
entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The
clause does not refer to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities collectively
but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The use of comma and
the disjunctive word or clearly signifies disassociation and independence of one
thing from the others included in the enumeration, such that, the provision
contemplates three different situations - a military treaty the subject of which
As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a
treaty or international agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other
hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be duly
concurred in by the Senate.
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Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence
contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it is
true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treatythe VFA, in the instant case-be duly concurred in by the Senate, it is very true
however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the clear
mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms,
requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made
by a two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25,
Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII.
As noted, the concurrence requirement under Section 25, Article XVIII must be
construed in relation to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more
particular language, the concurrence of the Senate contemplated under Section
25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate
favorably vote to concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant case.
Under these circumstances, the charter provides that the Senate shall be
composed of twenty-four (24) Senators. Without a tinge of doubt, two-thirds
(2/3) of this figure, or not less than sixteen (16) members, favorably
acting on the proposal is an unquestionable compliance with the requisite
number of votes mentioned in Section 21 of Article VII. The fact that there
were actually twenty-three (23) incumbent Senators at the time the voting was
made, will not alter in any significant way the circumstance that more than
two-thirds of the members of the Senate concurred with the proposed VFA,
even if the two-thirds vote requirement is based on this figure of actual
members (23). In this regard, the fundamental law is clear that two-thirds of
the 24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes, suffice so as to render
compliance with the strict constitutional mandate of giving concurrence to the
subject treaty.
In opposition, respondents argue that the letter of United States Ambassador

Hubbard stating that the VFA is binding on the United States Government is
conclusive, on the point that the VFA is recognized as a treaty by the United
States of America. According to respondents, the VFA, to be binding, must only
be accepted as a treaty by the United States.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that
the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.
To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case,
to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should
be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only
as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the
elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be
taken equally as a treaty.
Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25, Article
XVIII are present, we shall now pass upon and delve on the requirement that
the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the United States of America.
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an

international instrument concluded between States in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument
or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular
designation. There are many other terms used for a treaty or international
agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d arbitrage,
concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and
modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that the
names or titles of international agreements included under the general term
treaty have little or no legal significance. Certain terms are useful, but they
furnish little more than mere description.
Petitioners content that the phrase recognized as a treaty, embodied in section

25, Article XVIII, means that the VFA should have the advice and consent of the
United States Senate pursuant to its own constitutional process, and that it
should not be considered merely an executive agreement by the United States.
Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that the provisions of paragraph
1 regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to
the use of those terms, or to the meanings which may be given to them in the
internal law of the State.
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Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. International law
continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements:
they are equally binding obligations upon nations.
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive
agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In
Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, we had occasion to
pronounce:
x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the
necessity of subsequent congressional approval has been confirmed by long
usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, mostfavored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal
and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these
has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador
Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully
committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States
of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further
to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the
concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal
expression of our nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with the
concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied
thereunder.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the
head of the state or of the government, as the case may be, through which
the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its
domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the
State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty
provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the
negotiating States agreed that ratification should be required, (c) the
representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or

(d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification
appears from the full powers of its representative, or was expressed
during the negotiation.
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as
commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and
with the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of
America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the
principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement.
Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound
by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations.
While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not upon
any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its
government, the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations
committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any official
thereof. As an integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to
assure that our government, Constitution and laws will carry out our
international obligation. Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a
convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and
responsibilities under international law.
Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted
by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides: Every State has the duty
to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws
as an excuse for failure to perform this duty.
Equally important is Article 26 of the convention which provides that Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
60

in good faith. This is known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which
preserves the sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most fundamental
principles of positive international law, supported by the jurisprudence of
international tribunals.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In the instant controversy, the President, in effect, is heavily faulted for
exercising a power and performing a task conferred upon him by the
Constitution-the power to enter into and ratify treaties. Through the
expediency of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners in these consolidated
cases impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the chief Executive in
ratifying the VFA, and referring the same to the Senate pursuant to the
provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,
or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as
head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the
country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nations
foreign policy; his dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then)
conceded. Wielding vast powers an influence, his conduct in the external affairs
of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is executive altogether."
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence
of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the
negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are
exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his
vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude,
and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. Consequently, the acts or judgment
calls of the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and
entering into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such
principal acts - squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powers and
thus, may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by this Court, in the
absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.
It is the Courts considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in
submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines
and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no moment
that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and in the
honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave,
patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the President in
his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose
of complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental
law. In doing so, the President merely performed a constitutional task and
exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. Even
if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of
the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred, much
less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some
patent, gross, and capricious manner.
For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution has
broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political
departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it has not
altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the
field of foreign relations. The High Tribunals function, as sanctioned by Article
VIII, Section 1, is merely (to) check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it
erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing (of) grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power. It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error.
As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the same
with the Senate alone. Thus, once the Senate performs that power, or
exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the
Constitution, the concurrence cannot, in like manner, be viewed to
constitute an abuse of power, much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily,
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the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting within the limits of such
power, may not be similarly faulted for having simply performed a task
conferred and sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law.
For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in
character; the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own
erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed
agreement, and whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide
latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of
the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in
keeping the principles of separation of powers and of checks and balances alive
and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to their form
in a democratic government such as ours. The Constitution thus animates,
through this treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthy system of checks
and balances indispensable toward our nations pursuit of political maturity
and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining
to the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the
courts to inquire.
In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents, this Court- as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch
sentinel of the rights of the people - is then without power to conduct an
incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in
character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct
boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three
political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and
essentially conferred to it by law.
VINUYA VS ROMULO
DOCTRINE: Political Question Doctrine, International Treaties, International
Law (Ergo Omnes and Jus Cogens Norms), Power of the Executive Department
to engage in international treaties and settlements.
RULING:
From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
Baker v. Carr remains the starting point for analysis under the political question
doctrine. There the US Supreme Court explained that:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on question.
In Tanada v. Cuenco, we held that political questions refer "to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such
category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "[t]he
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to
the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision." The US Supreme Court has further cautioned that decisions
relating to foreign policy are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people
62

whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the
Judiciary has neither aptitude, nor facilities nor responsibility.
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and
courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to
the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of
such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the
said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the US Supreme Court held that
[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign relations.
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations,
embarrassment -- perhaps serious embarrassment -- is to be avoided and success for
our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through
negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President
a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be
admissible where domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the
better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and
especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He
has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. x x x
This ruling has been incorporated in our jurisprudence through Bayan v.
Executive Secretary and Pimentel v. Executive Secretary; its overreaching principle was,
perhaps, best articulated in (now Chief) Justice Punos dissent in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion:
x x x The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences,
sometimes with life and death significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can
only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the
best available information and can decide with decisiveness. x x x It is also the President
who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about
foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on
meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive
military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and
the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of
foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less
stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international
obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment
and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be
inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with
Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn
the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign
policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed.
In any event, it cannot reasonably be maintained that the Philippine government was
without authority to negotiate the Treaty of Peace with Japan. And it is equally true that,
since time immemorial, when negotiating peace accords and settling international
claims:
x x x [g]overnments have dealt with x x x private claims as their own, treating them as
national assets, and as counters, `chips', in international bargaining. Settlement
agreements have lumped, or linked, claims deriving from private debts with others that
were intergovernmental in origin, and concessions in regard to one category of claims
might be set off against concessions in the other, or against larger political considerations
unrelated to debts.
Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise provide, international settlements
generally wipe out the underlying private claims, thereby terminating any recourse
under domestic law. In Ware v. Hylton, a case brought by a British subject to recover a
debt confiscated by the Commonwealth of Virginia during the war, Justice Chase wrote:
I apprehend that the treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and that after peace
is concluded, neither the matter in dispute, nor the conduct of either party, during the
war, can ever be revived, or brought into contest again. All violence, injuries, or damages
sustained by the government, or people of either, during the war, are buried in oblivion;
and all those things are implied by the very treaty of peace; and therefore not necessary
to be expressed. Hence it follows, that the restitution of, or compensation for, British
63

property confiscated, or extinguished, during the war, by any of the United States, could
only be provided for by the treaty of peace; and if there had been no provision, respecting
these subjects, in the treaty, they could not be agitated after the treaty, by the British
government, much less by her subjects in courts of justice. (Emphasis supplied).
This practice of settling claims by means of a peace treaty is certainly nothing new. For
instance, in Dames & Moore v. Regan the US Supreme Court held:
Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding claims by nationals of one
country against the government of another country are sources of friction between the
two sovereigns. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 225, 62 S.Ct. 552, 563, 86 L.Ed. 796
(1942). To resolve these difficulties, nations have often entered into agreements
settling the claims of their respective nationals. As one treatise writer puts it,
international agreements settling claims by nationals of one state against the
government of another are established international practice reflecting
traditional international theory. L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 262
(1972). Consistent with that principle, the United States has repeatedly exercised its
sovereign authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign countries. x x x
Under such agreements, the President has agreed to renounce or extinguish claims of
United States nationals against foreign governments in return for lump-sum payments
or the establishment of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of these settlements
were encouraged by the United States claimants themselves, since a claimant's only
hope of obtaining any payment at all might lie in having his Government negotiate a
diplomatic settlement on his behalf. But it is also undisputed that the United States has
sometimes disposed of the claims of its citizens without their consent, or even without
consultation with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as
distinguished from those of the nation as a whole. It is clear that the practice of settling
claims continues today.
Respondents explain that the Allied Powers concluded the Peace Treaty with Japan not
necessarily for the complete atonement of the suffering caused by Japanese aggression
during the war, not for the payment of adequate reparations, but for security purposes.
The treaty sought to prevent the spread of communism in Japan, which occupied a
strategic position in the Far East. Thus, the Peace Treaty compromised individual claims
in the collective interest of the free world.
This was also the finding in a similar case involving American victims of Japanese slave
labor during the war. In a consolidated case in the Northern District of California, the
court dismissed the lawsuits filed, relying on the 1951 peace treaty with Japan, because
of the following policy considerations:
The official record of treaty negotiations establishes that a fundamental goal of the
agreement was to settle the reparations issue once and for all. As the statement of
the chief United States negotiator, John Foster Dulles, makes clear, it was well
understood that leaving open the possibility of future claims would be an unacceptable
impediment to a lasting peace.
The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners
claims.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to
bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual
is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. Even
then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but rather, the states own
rights. Nowhere is this position more clearly reflected than in the dictum of the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the 1924 Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions Case:
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action
or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its
own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law. The question, therefore, whether the present dispute originates in an
injury to a private interest, which in point of fact is the case in many international
disputes, is irrelevant from this standpoint. Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of
one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is
sole claimant.
Since the exercise of diplomatic protection is the right of the State, reliance on the right is
within the absolute discretion of states, and the decision whether to exercise the
discretion may invariably be influenced by political considerations other than the
legal merits of the particular claim. As clearly stated by the ICJ in
Barcelona Traction:
The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a
State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever
extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural
64

or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately
protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national
law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress.
The municipal legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to protect its citizens
abroad, and may also confer upon the national a right to demand the performance of that
obligation, and clothe the right with corresponding sanctions. However, all these
questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position
internationally.
The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be
granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this
respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by
considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.
The International Law Commissions (ILCs) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection fully
support this traditional view. They (i) state that "the right of diplomatic protection
belongs to or vests in the State, (ii) affirm its discretionary nature by clarifying
that diplomatic protection is a "sovereign prerogative" of the State; and (iii) stress
that the state "has the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a
national. It is under no duty or obligation to do so."
It has been argued, as petitioners argue now, that the State has a duty to protect its
nationals and act on his/her behalf when rights are injured. However, at present,
there is no sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for
States to exercise diplomatic protection of their own nationals abroad. Though,
perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor opinio juris has evolved in such a direction.
If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal duty, and there is no means
of enforcing its fulfillment.
We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally
reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law.
However, petitioners take quite a theoretical leap in claiming that these proscriptions
automatically imply that that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation to
prosecute international crimes, particularly since petitioners do not demand the
imputation of individual criminal liability, but seek to recover monetary reparations
from the state of Japan. Absent the consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or
a directive by the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute
proceedings against Japan. Indeed, precisely because of states reluctance to
directly prosecute claims against another state, recent developments
support the modern trend to empower individuals to directly participate

in suits against perpetrators of international crimes. Nonetheless,
notwithstanding an array of General Assembly resolutions calling for the
prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong policy arguments
warranting such a rule, the practice of states does not yet support the present
existence of an obligation to prosecute international crimes. Of course a customary
duty of prosecution is ideal, but we cannot find enough evidence to reasonably assert its
existence. To the extent that any state practice in this area is widespread, it is in the
practice of granting amnesties, immunity, selective prosecution, or de facto impunity to
those who commit crimes against humanity.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951,
petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the
duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has
attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been
used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the
community of states as a whole. The concept was recognized by the ICJ in Barcelona
Traction:
x x x an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards
the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the
field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all
States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and
racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into
the body of general international law others are conferred by international instruments
of a universal or quasi-universal character.
The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries of those
sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international public order.
However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright.
65

Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full
potential remains to be realized in practice.
The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In
international law, the term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms
that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and
custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are
mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority.
Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s, but peremptory
norms began to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von
Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law. The
recognition of jus cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILCs
preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Though there was
a consensus that certain international norms had attained the status of jus cogens, the ILC
was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory
norms.
After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded
ruefully in 1963 that there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to
identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens. In a
commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated that the prudent
course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State
practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals. Thus, while the existence of
jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance,
beyond a tiny core of principles and rules.
Of course, we greatly sympathize with the cause of petitioners, and we cannot begin to
comprehend the unimaginable horror they underwent at the hands of the Japanese
soldiers. We are also deeply concerned that, in apparent contravention of fundamental
principles of law, the petitioners appear to be without a remedy to challenge those that
have offended them before appropriate fora. Needless to say, our government should
take the lead in protecting its citizens against violation of their fundamental human
rights. Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive Department to
take up the petitioners cause. Ours is only the power to urge and exhort the
Executive Department to take up petitioners cause.
GSIS VS HEIRS CABALLERO

DOCTRINE: Fiscal Autonomy, Independence of the Courts (Judiciary), Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF), Judiciary Development Fund.
RULING:
The petition of the GSIS seeks the review of the CA's Decision insofar as it
deleted the trial court's award of P249,800.00 in its favor representing rentals
collected by Fernando from the CMTC.
In their Memorandum, respondents claim that CMTC cannot purchase real
estate or invest its funds in any purpose other than its primary purpose for
which it was organized in the absence of a corporate board resolution; the bid
award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. T-76183, issued in favor of the CMTC,
should be nullified; the trial court erred in concluding that GSIS personnel have
regularly performed their official duty when they conducted the public bidding;
Fernando, as former owner of the subject property and former member of the
GSIS, has the preemptive right to repurchase the foreclosed property.
These additional averments cannot be taken cognizance by the Court, because
they were substantially respondents arguments in their petition for review on
certiorari earlier filed before us and docketed as G.R. No. 156609. Records show
that said petition was denied by the Court in a Resolution dated April 23, 2003,
for petitioners (respondents herein) failure to sufficiently show that the Court
of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
Said resolution became final and executory on June 9, 2003. Respondents
attempt to re-litigate claims already passed upon and resolved with finality by
the Court in G.R. No. 156609 cannot be allowed.
Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its counterclaim
for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando against petitioner
for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner's counterclaim is
permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the
dismissal of its claim.
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To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has
devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the
claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata
bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or
refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants counterclaim? and (d) Is
there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A
positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.
Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the CA's
view that petitioner's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing
rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The evidence
needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute
sale and TCT is different from that required to establish petitioner's claim for
the recovery of rentals.
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of
absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in
the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the CMTC's rent
payments over the subject property when petitioner became the owner of the
subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in
its favor.
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.
This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of
rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay
the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive
counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered
Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is
considered null and void. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total
nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.
Petitioner further argues that assuming that its counterclaim is permissive, the
trial court has jurisdiction to try and decide the same, considering petitioner's
exemption from all kinds of fees.
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service

Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court ruled that the provision
in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which
exempts it from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds,
cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because,
unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from
Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts.
In said case, the Court ruled that:
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the
claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under
Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the
payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important
institutional safeguard of the Court's independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess
and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141
have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the
Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established
the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to
"guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the
Constitution and public policy." Legal fees therefore do not only constitute
a vital source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise an
essential element of the Court's fiscal independence. Any exemption from
the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or
controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the
JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it
impairs the Court's guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.
67

Petitioner also invoked our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion,
where the Court held that:
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, the Court, in interpreting the third rule laid
down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion regarding awards of claims
not specified in the pleading, held that the same refers only to damages
arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to which the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing
of the complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is true that the
determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to
the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such
damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may
make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate
docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims
although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any
damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for
then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the
amount thereof.
Petitioner's claim for payment of rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC
did not arise after the filing of the complaint; hence, the rule laid down in Sun
Insurance finds no application in the present case.
Due to the non-payment of docket fees on petitioner's counterclaim, the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over it and, thus, there is no need to
discuss the second issue raised by petitioner.
DE CASTRO VS JBC AND ARROYO

DOCTRINE: Locus Standi, Vacancy in the Supreme Court, Appointment of
Justices, Midnight Appointment (Chief Justice Corona)
RULING:
Ruling of the Court
Locus Standi of Petitioners
The preliminary issue to be settled is whether or not the petitioners have locus
standi.
Black defines locus standi as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question. In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often
burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to
the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the
Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the
efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is
required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a
person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that
the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that
the person complaining has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute or act complained of.
68

It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the direct
injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public action had locus
standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of
a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Vera was
followed in Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers
Association v. De la Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, and
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere
procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized
the approach when the cases had transcendental importance. Some notable
controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed
to be treated in the same way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court decided
to resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their far-reaching
implications, even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The
liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in
several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic
organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality or
validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a
supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on
the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such
petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as
are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition
that he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication
of a public right.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or
taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the issue may
appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip
the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the
Court aptly explains why:
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and
taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid
down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in
a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a
citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the

expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the
mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New
York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of
mere public right, however the people are the real parties It
is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to
interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued
and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied. With
respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a
citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to
restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot
be denied.
Petitioners De Castro (G.R. No. 191002), Soriano (G.R. No. 191032) and Peralta
(G.R. No. 191149) all assert their right as citizens filing their petitions on behalf
of the public who are directly affected by the issue of the appointment of the
next Chief Justice. De Castro and Soriano further claim standing as taxpayers,
with Soriano averring that he is affected by the continuing proceedings in the
JBC, which involve unnecessary, if not, illegal disbursement of public funds.
PHILCONSA alleges itself to be a non-stock, non-profit organization existing
under the law for the purpose of defending, protecting, and preserving the
Constitution and promoting its growth and flowering.
They allege that they have the legal standing to enjoin the submission of the list
of nominees by the JBC to the President, for [a]n adjudication of the proper
interpretation and application of the constitutional ban on midnight
appointments with regard to respondent JBCs function in submitting the list of
nominees is well within the concern of petitioners, who are duty bound to
ensure that obedience and respect for the Constitution is upheld, most
especially by government offices, such as respondent JBC, who are specifically
tasked to perform crucial functions in the whole scheme of our democratic
institution. They further allege that, reposed in them as members of the Bar, is a
clear legal interest in the process of selecting the members of the Supreme
Court, and in the selection of the Chief Justice, considering that the person
appointed becomes a member of the body that has constitutional supervision
and authority over them and other members of the legal profession.
The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest
in the outcome of the controversy as to vest them with the requisite locus
standi. The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people as a
whole, and to the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone
69

(including the petitioners), regardless of ones personal interest in life, because
they concern that great doubt about the authority of the incumbent President
to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but
also others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too
great number of vacancies in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country.
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the
short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the
requirement of legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the matter
involved has transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a
liberalization of the requirement.
The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted.
The challenges to the authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination
and to continue the process until the submission of the list of nominees; the
insistence of some of the petitioners to compel the JBC through mandamus to
submit the short list to the incumbent President; the counter-insistence of the
intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the short list to the incumbent
President on the ground that said list should be submitted instead to the next
President; the strong position that the incumbent President is already
prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any appointments,
including those to the Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010;
and the contrary position that the incumbent President is not so prohibited are
only some of the real issues for determination. All such issues establish the
ripeness of the controversy, considering that for some the short list must be
submitted before the vacancy actually occurs by May 17, 2010. The outcome
will not be an abstraction, or a merely hypothetical exercise. The resolution of
the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are
preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or
that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we dispel
the doubt now in order to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution
of the essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not to shirk from
discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle more technical than
otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., we
pointed out: Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in
some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the
definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the
serious constitutional questions raised.
Justiciability
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for
judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the
proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be
submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed
Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet
vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its
rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of
nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes
the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the
public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of
candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.
We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for
the principal issue to ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough
that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but
seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the
occurrence of the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to
afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts
before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues. Herein, the facts are
not in doubt, for only legal issues remain.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred.
70

Substantive Merits
I
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments
to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the
Judiciary
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit
en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano,
Tolentino and Inting, submit that the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the
ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section
15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
The Court agrees with the submission.
First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal
that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging
the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and
arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or
whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention
and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.
The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation

of the awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the
Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments
(Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of
separation of powers that underlies the political structure, as Constitutional
Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna (later a worthy member of the Court) explained
in his sponsorship speech:
We have in the political part of this Constitution opted for
the separation of powers in government because we believe
that the only way to protect freedom and liberty is to
separate and divide the awesome powers of government.
Hence, we return to the separation of powers doctrine and
the legislative, executive and judicial departments.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among
others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the
Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and
qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1)
and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon
the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the
Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of
the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4
(1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
71

Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial
appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not
firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice
Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional
Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the
appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly
mentioned, should prevail.
Relevantly, Valenzuela adverted to the intent of the framers in the genesis of
Section 4 (1), Article VIII, viz:
the initiative of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum, a command [to the President] to

fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence, which even
Valenzuela conceded. The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission on October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a vacancy in the
Supreme Court within the 90-day period was a true mandate for the President.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded.
Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an
appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear
disobedience to the Constitution.
V . Intent of the Constitutional Commission

In this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction
that any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days (in the last
sentence of Section 4 (1) of Article VIII) contrasts with the
prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, which is couched in
stronger negative language - that a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments
The commission later approved a proposal of Commissioner
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) to add to
what is now Section 9 of Article VIII, the following
paragraph: WITH RESPECT TO LOWER COURTS, THE
PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENT WITHIN
NINETY DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST (of
nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council to the President).
Davide stated that his purpose was to provide a uniform
rule for lower courts. According to him, the 90-day
period should be counted from submission of the list of
nominees to the President in view of the possibility that
the President might reject the list submitted to him and
the JBC thus need more time to submit a new one.
On the other hand, Section 15, Article VII - which in effect
deprives the President of his appointing power two months
immediately before the next presidential elections up to
the end of his term - was approved without discussion.
However, the reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did not
advance or support the result in Valenzuela. Far to the contrary, the records
disclosed the express intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution, upon
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to
establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and
cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect
that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger
negative language. Such interpretation even turned out to be conjectural, in
light of the records of the Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section
4 (1), Article VIII.
In this connection, PHILCONSAs urging of a revisit and a review of Valenzuela is
timely and appropriate. Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the
Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand
independently of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII. It
further ignored that the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict,
regardless of Section 15, Article VII being couched in the negative. As judges, we
are not to unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats
the intent of the framers.
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief
Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in
the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should
not be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed. It will not do
to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be reached
herein is entirely incompatible with what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently,
Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and
forgettable.
We reverse Valenzuela.
72

Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments
in the Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of
Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments
from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the
appointments dealt with in the leading case of Aytona v. Castillo. In fact, in
Valenzuela, the Court so observed, stating that:
xxx it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two
types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2)
those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared
election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article
VII consists of the so-called midnight appointments. In Aytona v.
Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado
Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia,
who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a
caretaker administrator whose duty was to prepare for the orderly
transfer of authority to the incoming President. Said the Court:
The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so
spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment and
appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But
the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned
induction of almost all of them in a few hours before the
inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be
regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives,
the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill
all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other
conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of
an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be
appointments to important positions which have to be made even
after the proclamation of the new President. Such appointments,
so long as they are few and so spaced as to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the
need for the appointment and the appointees qualifications,
can be made by the outgoing President. Accordingly, several

appointments made by President Garcia, which were shown to have
been well considered, were upheld.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the
Aytona ruling. It may not unreasonably be deemed to
contemplate not only midnight appointments those
made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their
number and the time of their making but also
appointments presumed made for the purpose of
influencing the outcome of the Presidential election.
On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article
VII allowing appointments to be made during the period of the ban
therein provided is much narrower than that recognized in Aytona.
The exception allows only the making of temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the
President during the period of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling
vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President's power
of appointment, it is this Courts view that, as a general proposition,
in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely,
the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need
for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition
of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban
which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only
once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower
courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited
appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects.
They may, as earlier pointed out, in fact influence the results of
elections and, for that reason, their making is considered an
election offense.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article
VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the
prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers
did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary,
because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate
prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight
appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona
73

were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief
Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the
policies of the incoming President or for partisanship,
The appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC
would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBCs prior processing
of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the
ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the process of
ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the
enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on the law of the statute,
i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be construed with reference to its
intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this
purpose rather than to defeat it.
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments
to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming
presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The
experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even
candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with
the President could not always be assured of being recommended for the
consideration of the President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of
the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely
intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the
intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating process
was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment.
Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to
appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice
Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question
raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the
Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured
that on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban
had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation
was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for
consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.
The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to
the confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on
interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather than on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Much of the unfounded doubt
about the Presidents power to appoint during the period of prohibition in
Section 15, Article VII could have been dispelled since its promulgation on
November 9, 1998, had Valenzuela properly acknowledged and relied on the
confirmation of a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission like

Justice Regalado.
Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and
Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President.
Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke
appointments made by an Acting President, and evidently refers only to
appointments in the Executive Department. It has no application to
appointments in the Judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments can
only undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable
at will. The letter and spirit of the Constitution safeguard that independence.
Also, there is no law in the books that authorizes the revocation of
appointments in the Judiciary. Prior to their mandatory retirement or
resignation, judges of the first and second level courts and the Justices of
the third level courts may only be removed for cause, but the Members of
the Supreme Court may be removed only by impeachment.
Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. Thereby, the Constitutional Commission
restored the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
after the requirement was removed from the 1973 Constitution. Yet, because of
Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored requirement did not include appointments
to the Judiciary.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in
that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14
and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only
to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in
Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to
appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution
of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive
74

and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the
Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the
Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the
new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next
Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because
the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In
contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same
risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will
end by June 30, 2010.
Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for
the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor
of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because
anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section
4(1), Article VIII remaining.
The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy
occurring from Chief Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the
need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.
The argument also rests on the fallacious assumption that there will still be
time remaining in the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII. The fallacy
is easily demonstrable, as the OSG has shown in its comment.
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second
Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at
the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of
the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of
the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the
full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The
result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the
shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period
for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to
comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It
is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended
such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for
the appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the
framers neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against
midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90day period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because they never intended
Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of
the lower courts.
Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on

whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President any President to appoint
a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of
the Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall
be appointed by the President from a list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for any vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court
from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It
speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already
members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been
vetted by the JBC.
Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the Court
as Chief Justice?
The question is not squarely before us at the moment, but it should lend itself
to a deeper analysis if and when circumstances permit. It should be a good
issue for the proposed Constitutional Convention to consider in the light of
Senate President Juan Ponce Enriles statement that the President can appoint
the Chief Justice from among the sitting justices of the Court even without a JBC
list.
75

II
The Judiciary Act of 1948
The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to appoint
the successor of Chief Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948
can still address the situation of having the next President appoint the
successor.
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 states:

Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. In case of
a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his
office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is
first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or
another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This
provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who
succeeds to the office of Chief Justice.
The provision calls for an Acting Chief Justice in the event of a vacancy in the
office of the Chief Justice, or in the event that the Chief Justice is unable to
perform his duties and powers. In either of such circumstances, the duties and
powers of the office of the Chief Justice shall devolve upon the Associate Justice
who is first in precedence until a new Chief Justice is appointed or until the
disability is removed.
Notwithstanding that there is no pressing need to dwell on this peripheral
matter after the Court has hereby resolved the question of consequence, we do
not find it amiss to confront the matter now.
appointed by the President as Chief Justice, and the appointment is never in an

acting capacity. The express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the
framers contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head the membership of the
Supreme Court. Otherwise, they would have simply written so in the
Constitution. Consequently, to rely on Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in
order to forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest
is to defy the plain intent of the Constitution.
For sure, the framers intended the position of Chief Justice to be permanent, not
one to be occupied in an acting or temporary capacity. In relation to the scheme
of things under the present Constitution, Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
only responds to a rare situation in which the new Chief Justice is not yet
appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to perform the
duties and powers of the office. It ought to be remembered, however, that it
was enacted because the Chief Justice appointed under the 1935 Constitution
was subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, and the
confirmation process might take longer than expected.
The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is
preferable to having the Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over.
Under the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive Departments
are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and proclaimed at once become
the leaders of their respective Departments. However, the lack of any appointed
occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary,
because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice
performs functions absolutely significant to the life of the nation. With the
entire Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief
Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the
appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the
incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010,
there is no justification to insist that the successor of Chief Justice Puno be
appointed by the next President.
We cannot agree with the posture.

A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the Supreme Court is
composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices, who all shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by
the JBC for every vacancy, which appointments require no confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is
76

III
Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC
May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President?
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is
proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the
discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the
exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the
plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty
of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the
defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by
law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e)
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at
least three nominees to the President for every vacancy in the Judiciary:
Section 8.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. xxx
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of
the list.
However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the
lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC.
Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy.
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the
President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in
order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day
period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to
submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens
the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the
appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part,
considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the
President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on
the qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before
making the appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the
Presidents mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection
of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the
President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for
mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the
list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to
constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in
performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there
should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the
Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
The distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary one has
been delineated in the following manner:
The distinction between a ministerial and
discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial
act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.
The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the
77

same requires neither the exercise of official discretion
or judgment.
Accordingly, we find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus

and to issue a writ of mandamus against the JBC. The actions for that purpose
are premature, because it is clear that the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the
latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill the
vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno.
IV
Writ of prohibition does not lie against the JBC
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the conclusion is ineluctable that only
the President can appoint the Chief Justice. Hence, Sorianos petition for
prohibition in G.R. No. 191032, which proposes to prevent the JBC from
intervening in the process of nominating the successor of Chief Justice Puno,
lacks merit.
On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is similarly
devoid of merit. The challenge mounted against the composition of the JBC
based on the allegedly unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to the ex officio
members from the Senate and the House of Representatives, thereby
prejudicing the chances of some candidates for nomination by raising the
minimum number of votes required in accordance with the rules of the JBC, is
not based on the petitioners actual interest, because they have not alleged in
their petition that they were nominated to the JBC to fill some vacancies in the
Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners lack locus standi on that issue.
78

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