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John DiPietro
Week 11 - Bureaucracy
What influence does Congress have on bureaucracies? Most research on bureaucracies
arguably focuses on the executive interactions with them; as bureaucracies are nominally a part
of the executive branch, and thus the hierarchy that descends from the president, they often are
assumed to be solely, or at least primarily, influenced by what the president says and does, and
how his desires are filtered into action via said hierarchy. However, Congress must play some
role; it controls the powers of the purse and can forge laws that create and alter the
bureaucracies, and congressional committees keep tabs on bureaucratic bodies via oversight.
How do these powers fit in to how bureaucracies act, and how does Congress use them to
interact with the bureaucracies (and vice versa)?
The various readings each present different takes on these interactions, in part or in
whole. For instance, Moe argues that the desires of congress and its members shape the beliefs
and actions of the bureaucracies, due to the aforementioned powers that Congress can wield over
the agencies. Though the pattern presented is complicated and occurs in many different
directions within the agency in question, Moes vision ultimately argues that bureaucracies shape
their own actions to meet the expectations of new members in Congress after the membership
has changed. When the body goes more liberal, the NLRB will be more pro-labor; when the
legislature falls into the hands of the Republicans, the Board favors business cases. The specific
mechanics may be messy and involve multiple feedback cycles between the levels of
bureaucracy, the legislature, and the regulated entities, but ultimately, the outcome is simple and
predictable, or at least says Moe.

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However, theres a counter argument, which can be implied from McCubbins and
Schwartz, and which draws on Wood and Waterman, as well. The former pair starts from the
notion that Congress actually engages in fairly little oversight of the bureaucracies; from that
popularly-held notion, they outline a belief that, in fact, Congress engages in plenty of oversight
after-the-fact, when a crisis has already arisen. This oversight, called fire alarm oversight, only
comes up in problematic situations, but is fairly common in the presence of such. Conversely,
police patrol oversight, the constant form that common wisdom claims is lacking, induces heavy
costs, often with little reward; hence, its considered less useful rarely sees use.
If Congress only bothers to concern itself with the actions of bureaucracies when there is
actually a problem, why would bureaucracies suddenly change just because the leadership in
Congress has changed? It would make sense for them to alter in response to a new law actually
being passed, but a switch in the partisan nature in Congress doesnt inherently mean that the
organizations current priorities or practices must change, especially if no problems are actually
arising from either the priorities or practices. Some idealistic members may promise changes in
oversight, particularly recently with the Tea Party and the renewal of small government
movements, but these changes rarely pan out due to practicality. Thus, in the absence of a crisis
or problem to trigger the fire alarm, the status quo should remain the same if the only exogenous
shock is a mere shift in the legislative makeup.
Wood and Waterman support this hypothesis, and offer an alternative explanation to
changes that do coincide with partisan shifts. While changes in Congress can have small effects,
the authors argue that the larger effects come mainly from shifts in leadership. When a new
president comes into office, he is afforded the opportunity to clean house, and replace political
appointees with new ones of his choosing. He shares this power partly with Congress;

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interestingly, only one president since Carter has come into office with the Senate under the
nominal control of the other party (that being George HW Bush). This means that most
presidents have not had to worry as much (in theory) about blocks to their first rounds of
appointments to head up the bureaucracies under his (nominal) control; Clinton could replace
Bush-era nominees (and Reagan Administration holdovers) with more liberal versions, as Obama
could after taking control after Bush. This shift towards the presidents ideal point coincides
with a shift of Congress (particularly the part that controls appointments), but isnt caused by the
latter shift. Similarly, those in termed positions who can still hold another term may shift their
actions in favor of the new status quo; however, it seems more likely that they wish to pre-empt
presidential replacement when their term ends rather than wishing to appease Congress. Later
Congressional shifts may lead to some shifts in bureaucratic action, but only if the bureaucracies
believe that changes in Congress presage changes in the presidency, and the bureaucrats chances
of retaining their positions.
Moe offers an interesting theory, which coordinates well with the notion of subsystems
after all, changes in Congress will change the nature of the committees and their demands, which
should change subsystem interactions. Or should it? Fiorina argues that the nature of
Congressmen to seek re-election will lead to fewer disruptions of the status quo, so long as the
status quo keeps the public happy. Iron triangles may bend a little, but rarely will they
spontaneously break due to a shift in the partisan construction of Congress; it takes pure shocks
to the system to allow for such massive changes. Congress certainly has an influence on
bureaucracies, but that influence cuts both ways (and more), and predicting changes in
bureaucratic behavior purely based on Congressional changes oversimplifies the process and
ignores the other political actors involved in it.