VICENTE URIARTE vs.

CFI OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, CFI OF MANILA, JUAN

ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE
On November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement
of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein,
that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of
said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his
compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros
Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator. The record
discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National Bank never
actually qualified as special administrator.
Higinio Uriarte, one of the private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the petition
alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte who had "executed a Last
Will and Testament in Spain, and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to
commence the intestate proceeding.
On 1962, Juan Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced SP No. 51396 in the
Manila Court for the probate of the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte, and filed in SP
No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1)
there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that
petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate
proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the
Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court
was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte
y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in the Negros Court, petitoner
Vicente filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte, Civil Case No. 6142 to
obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly
inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the action, he had not yet been
acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte. Up to this time, no final judgment to that
effect appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the SP pending before the Negros Court has not gone
farther than the appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine
National Bank who, as aforementioned, failed to qualify.
Likewise, the motion to dismiss the SP pending before the Negros Court filed by Higinio
Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte and of the petition
filed with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start

of the proceeding, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente knew of the existence of the
aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.
The Negros Court sustained Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed SP No. 6344
pending before it.
On the other hand, the Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it
as the last will of Juan Uriarte.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
(Affirmative)

WON the Negros Court correctly dismissed the SP pending before it

Ruling:
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], CFI have original exclusive
jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," whether they died testate or intestate. While
their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or
the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be
commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall
be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any
province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a
non-resident alien like the deceased Juan Uriarte the CFI in provinces where the
deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper
special proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
In the case before Us, these CFI are the Negros and the Manila Courts province and
city where the deceased Juan Uriarte left considerable properties.
It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the
estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession
or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of
his estate. It is equally true, however, that testate proceedings, for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose. Thus, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first
instance it is found that the decedent left a last will, such probate proceeding should
replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is
understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this

is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.
B.) WON private respondent Zamacona should have filed the petition for the
probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte with the Negros Court. (Negative)
It is well settled that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the
light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the Supreme Court held, that
petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by
laches. Petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte when Higinio
Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in SP No. 6344; that petitioner
likewise was served with notice of the existence of the alleged last will in the Philippines
and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court when Zamacona filed
a motion to dismiss SP No. 6344.
All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila
Court an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila
Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said
will to probate on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction
over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings
had in SP No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, this Court is not
inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the
proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated
in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the
objection against said proceedings is raised too late.
In its order for the dismissal of SP No. 6344, the Negros Court said that it is "not inclined
to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner
instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment, such action justifies the
institution by him of this proceedings. The proper thing for him to do would be to
intervene in the testate estate proceedings in the CFI of Manila instead of maintaining an
independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of
his doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory
acknowledgment."
However, the Supreme Court ruled that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No.
6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in SP No. 51396 of the Manila Court so as
to be able to submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural
child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court,
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a
particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child.

ALFREDO BALUYUT vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA.
DE BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO

Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on 1975, leaving an estate allegedly valued at not less
than two million pesos.
His nephew, Petitioner Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the CFI of Quezon City a verified
petition for letters of administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by his
widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the
decedent's estate. Alfredo surmised that the decedent had executed a will. He prayed
that he be appointed regular administrator and in the meantime as special administrator.
The lower court in its order appointed Alfredo Baluyut as special administrator with a
bond of P100,000.
Private Respondent Encarnacion Baluyut in her verified opposition alleged that she was
unaware that her deceased husband executed a will. She characterized as libelous the
allegation as to her mental incapacity. She prayed that she be named administratrix and
that the appointment of Baluyut as special administrator be set aside.
The lower court cancelled Baluyut's appointment as special administrator and found out
that Encarnacion "is healthy and mentally qualified".
On recomsideration, the lower court appointed Alfredo Baluyut and Jose Espino as special
administrators.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified amended opposition that Espino, former governor of Nueva
Vizcaya and an alleged acknowledged natural child of Sotero Baluyut, be appointed
administrator should she not be named administratrix.

The probate court terminated the appointments of Espino and Alfredo G. Baluyut as
special administrators and appointed Mrs. Baluyut as regular administratrix with a bond
of P20,000. The order was based on the fact that as surviving spouse she has a
preferential right to be appointed as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate and
that she is entitled to three-fourths of the conjugal estate: one-half in her own right and
one-fourth as heir of the deceased. The lower court said it was convinced of the widow's
capacity and that her "sufficient understanding" justified her appointment.
Alfredo G. Baluyut filed against respondent Judge, Mrs. Baluyut and the Espino spouses
this special civil action of certiorari in order to set aside the order of the probate court.
This court issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the said
order.
The Espino's in their comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut is aware that Jose Espino
was acknowledged in a notarial instrument by Sotero Baluyut as his natural child.
Mrs. Baluyut's main contention is that it is the probate court and not the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court that should decide the issue as to her competency to act as
administratrix.
Alfredo G. Baluyut in his manifestation disclosed that Sotero Baluyut executed a notarial
will on April 14, 1973. In that will he bequeathed to Mrs. Baluyut his 1/2 share in certain
conjugal assets and 1/4 of the residue of his estate. The remaining 3/4 were bequeated
to his collateral relatives. The testator designated Mrs. Baluyut as executrix. Espino is not
mentioned in that will.
The issue is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing
Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.
We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut as surviving
spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78,
Rules of Court), it does not follow that she should be named administratrix without
conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to discharge that trust.
Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act
as executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to
the issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his
fitness to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the will was
executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the
person to be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his
qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition (Matute vs. Court
of Appeals, L-26106, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 768, 791).

In this case the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated Mrs. Baluyut in order
to satisfy itself on her mental capacity. The court did not give Alfredo G. Baluyut a
chance to contest her qualifications. He had squarely raised the issue as to her
competency. The probate court assumed that Alfredo G. Baluyut had no interest in the
decedent's estate. As it now turned out, he is one of the legatees named in the
decedent's alleged will.
Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a
matter of public policy (Art. 838, Civil Code; See. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Guevara vs.
Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249).
After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and
proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will
should be conducted (Sec. 1, Rule 82, Rules of Court; Cartajena vs. Lijauco and Zaballa,
38 Phil. 620; Rodriguez vs. De Borja, L-21993, 64 O.G. 754, 17 SCRA 418).
Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the interest of the
orderly administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's
fitness to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity should be
given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in summarily
appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo G. Baluyut was
not an interested party. That irregularity became more pronounced after Alfredo G.
Baluyut's revelation that the decedent had executed a will. He anticipated that
development when he articulated in his petition his belief that Sotero Baluyut executed
wills which should be delivered to the court for probate.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix is set
aside. The probate court is directed to conduct further proceedings in consonance with
the guidelines delineated in this decision. Costs against respondent Mrs. Baluyut.

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO vs. HON.

AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIOSANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM,
BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO,
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo Seangio with the RTC of Manila, and praying for the appointment of private
respondent Elisa Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy
Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition.
They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of
Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his
business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as
the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a CPA; and, 4) Segundo left a
holographic will on September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents,
Alfredo Seangio, for cause.
On 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was filed by
petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should
take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, the petitions were consolidated.
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate primarily on the ground that
the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will
under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows

an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo; that all other
compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there
is preterition which would result to intestacy.
RTC dismissed the petition for probate proceeding, ruling that the will clearly shows that
there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia.
However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not
apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
ISSUE:
WON RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT
TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
(Affirmative)
RULING:
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated,
signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition,
private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundos intention of disinheriting his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must
be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard
to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the
Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, presents a sufficient cause for the
disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo
can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundos document conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law.
It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. The disinheritance results
in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would
succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the
form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. Holographic wills, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in law,
should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention
of the testator. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if

captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last

testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a
holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in
the direct line were not preterited in the will. The mere mention of the name of one of
the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal
heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and
his son, Alfredo.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the
law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with.
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus,
unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be
rendered nugatory.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic
will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO GERONA and
DELFIN GERONA vs. CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE
GUZMAN, FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN
and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN
In the complaint, filed with the CFI of Bulacan, petitioners herein, all surnamed Gerona,
alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman;
that the latter, was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife,
Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo married Camila Ramos,
who begot him several children, respondents De Guzman;
Marcelo died on 1945. On 1948, respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently
misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo
de Guzman. Respondents had thereby succeeded in fraudulently causing the TCT to
seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new
transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th
individual interest for each.
Such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only a year before the institution of the
case; that petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their share in said
properties but respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to
the petitioners.

Accordingly, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extrajudicial settlement, ordering the respondents to reconvey to petitioners their share in
said properties; ordering the register of deeds to cancel the transfer certificates of title
secured by respondents; ordering the respondents to render accounts of the income of
said properties and to deliver to petitioners their lawful share therein; and sentencing
respondents to pay damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida
de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being
merely a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners' action is barred by the statute
of limitations.
The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child
of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife, Camila Ramos; and that
petitioners' action has already prescribed and accordingly, dismissed the complaint
without costs. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased
Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to
the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the period of four (4)
years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud
perpetrated by respondents, which took place in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly,
said period had not expired when the present action was commenced on November 4,
1958.
Issue:

WON petitioners action has already prescribed

(Affirmative)

Ruling:
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition
among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not
hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates
as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the
property.
When respondents executed the deed of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that
they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer
certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from the
estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is
why petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground
that the same is tainted with fraud.

Although, there are some decisions to the contrary, it is already settled in this jurisdiction
that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied
trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations.
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial
settlement" upon the ground of fraud, the action therefor may be filed within four (4)
years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in
the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents, for the
registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the
whole world.
As correctly stated in the decision of the trial court:
In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that plaintiffs learned at least
constructively, of the alleged fraud committed against them by defendants on 25 June
1948 when the deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo
de Guzman was registered in the registry of deeds of Bulacan, Plaintiffs' complaint in this
case was filed 4 November 1958, or more than 10 years thereafter. Therefore, petitioners
are now precluded to assail the validity of the TCTs issued in favor of private
respondents.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioners herein. It is so ordered.

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES

CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO
CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ,
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow, herein
petitioner, and their two minor sons, all residing at Quezon City, and by his children of
the first marriage, respondents herein, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI of
Cebu, alleging that the late senator died intestate in Manila; that he was a resident of
Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.

Herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal (Quezon
City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of
letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last
will and testament.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa filed in said
Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Appointment of Special Administrator. The Cebu court issued an order holding in
abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the CFI of Quezon
City shall have acted on the petition for probate of the last will of the deceased Don
Mariano Cuenco. Such order of the Cebu court was neither excepted to nor sought by
respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the
same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss,
assailing the jurisdiction of the said court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate in
view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu Court.
The Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." The said court further
found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at
Quezon City after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the
decedent's last will and of the notary public, Atty. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last
will, and the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates,
income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation). The Quezon City court in its
said order admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament.
Respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with respondent Court of Appeals to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with
the case.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents holding that Section
1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Considering therefore
that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI, it follows that the said court
must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI.
Issue:
WON the appellate court erred in ordering the QC Court to refrain
perpetually from proceeding with the testate proceedings
WON the QC court validly took cognizance and assumed exclusive jurisdiction over
the probate proceedings filed by petitioner
Ruling:

The Court held that CA erred in ordering the Quezon City court to prohibit from
proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders
and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and
testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof.
1.
The Judiciary Act confers original jurisdiction upon all CFI over "all matter of
probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of
the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue. The Rule specifies that "the court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule
73)

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is
not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. It should be
noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
A fair reading of the rule indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed,
must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
2.
This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioners filing with it a motion to
dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on
the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the
petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the
will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely
decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition, and leave the exercise of
jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. The Cebu court
thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding
as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and
venue.
3.
Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the
intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and
assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court,
the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
4.
The recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental with
facts analogous to the present case is authority. In said case, the Court upheld the
doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings.
5.
Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction
over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by
petitioner and finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent,
who had his conjugal home and domicile therein could not be contested except by
appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly
provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could
probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the
Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that
the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
7.
With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken
into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will
must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate
proceedings, "are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
his having left his estate in such province."
The probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite
to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate
is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.
The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction in admitting the decedent's
last will to probate and naming petitioner as executrix thereof.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act
without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of
the intestate petition since the record before it showed the falsity of the allegation in the
intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that
respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's

order deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving
the latter free to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
Since respondents failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of admitting the
will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, the said order has long
since become final and cannot be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.