Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ilil1
]b exJ
ll
ftn-
lntroduction to Eaok
a conlext of global
charge,
llese objectives
coursc
arc reflected
in
the
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2
The
Europe o
Hisnr)
oJ tue
ldea of Europe is
UK
We bave haDed the ulie of the series as questioD - lylut ir Errope? - yet rte
^
are u der no illusion lhat fiere ls a simple, straigh$orward answer, or even a series of agreed definitioos that sahsfy. Nor are we rnalring $e assumptron that
tiurope is sr-amped with a unique identrty, or that lt has a marufest destiny, or (hat
a slngrl,I meaoi g is revealed iD ill history
folow in lie tootstcps of Hugh Setou Watso , ,'vho tells us that ihc word "Europc" hrs been used and misused, rnterprcted and misinteryreted rn as many different meanings as almost llny word in atry langnage- There have bectr and are many
Europes 'r The question, then, is a provocative device to set you thid(lng, and lo
prornpl hrnher questions lnstead of rDshin8 jnto detuitions we bave approached
ihe toplc from a number of pornts of vjew and liom fte slandpoint of various mEth
odologies, rdising quesdons as we go aboul how 'Europe' has been conceptualized,
orgaruzed, stilctued md utilized, both itr the pa5t and in the present. The conlrlbu
lors to lhrs series do ot bayc any particular ares 1lr grind The essays are oot propaganda pieces for a 'EDropean sprit', cultural uDiry, a single market, political udor,
or any other European projecl- Or the contr ry, lhey are scholarly explorations
designed to eDhance onl Dlderslanding of the many facets of European identity
We
aM present; wilh
Lffercot aspects
ltrml unifomity or acceduabng cultural difference; with a politrcat culture fou ded
onpublic opimoD,law axd democmcy; and wilh Europe's reladonship \r'rththe U ted
S\ates, Russia rnd the del,elopiDg countrie$ and with its place in the world econo,ny
cu
The series as a whoLe presents Europe as a work in progress rather rban a finished
product, aconstruction yard rather than a nuseum As a project Europe car Deverbe
compleled Itwiitalways need tobre madc, emancipateil from the past, re-invenled
Irvcstigalions into the mearling of Exrope, iDlo Europeau valDes, iDlo European
idenhty jnevitably hale raised - and continue to pose a numbff of con8iciing
questions. Does rhe Europear'prole!t', as represented by the European Llnion,
ultim^tely rest oD a snJicietrcy of shared values, culturc ar lxsiory? Does thrs
conmoDaLily cxplain why we have come so far; is it a precondrtroD tor lhe slabilily of a European conmuFty thrt rt rs rooted in a cullrral untty, ilr a snong
sc$e of Europeao ness ? Or rs the Europear project deslined to corne to gncf on
lhe rocks of lhe nation slales'l Is the rDailspring ol Europeanness (he very diversity of national and regional cullules aDd, if so, is not tbe pursuii of irre Europeao
identrr] p.r rc a chimera? Are shared values mainly ro be found al the level of
plitical pri cilles thc strite rmder lhe mle of lxw, deuocracy, hllmJn ri8h1s
and nol in political nud sociai practices? Does the nakiDg of Europe depend on
hnd g solutions to cer(air) inheriled problems ' lhe problem of nationalism for
cxalnplc? Or ca dre buropean Union, ns the laLesL nanifeslaLion of x Europea
proiecl be drivel by a desjre 10 build a new Errrope, the legi[macy of whtch is
geared ro the fuhrre dnd not to lhe past? SLrch qucstrons polnt 1(J shrply contrastirg no[oDs of what Europe represeDts but, irespecliv o[ the answe.s, they rest o
Lhe r$sumphon ihal the idea of Europe is enbedded ir a nix oI tlrec related con
ftere ;r sometbinC called Europe' (some kio(l oi Europern 'specrficalron )EuroFars frold a perception of themselves as being ELropean (they have
sometl[rg of
' setru warSON, H (1985) 'W)ar is E!ro!e, phere s lurope? fronr n,ysrnt,o
politxtre , Enco!"/e/, luly/August, vol l,X, No 2, p 9
ffi
re-connecting westcm nnd eastcm Europe; and lhc quic:kctrurg oi ilrLegnLrott I)'o
cesseswi6in dre Europeln Cornmunity/Union bas raiscdlhe prospecLs oi ecor)on'rc:'
monetary atrd pohllcal uDion. W}lal kiDd ofljurope ate we btrildins a.d w]lv / llow
does lnis new Durope.elate to th; patterns and eiPenences of l-uroPeal histolv? Are
rhere drstlncti!e tsuropsan value.s? Is thcre a cohereLrt, recogmsable |utoperlr iderlt
ily? What do Europe a d being European meaD? These issucs arc Dor ncw blrt since
they are now being variously addressed by Pollicians, iournaLsts and acadenncs
borh inside aud outsidcEuope - fiey have a shaD coDtemporary relevance
.
.
ffi
ffi
Iirropc oflhe 1990s Lrrs becorne ll nlalor licus oi prrbhc {hscorrrsr lhD crrd t)l
the Cold War irnd the collapse of lhe Sovrcr tJDiur htus oPcnD(l uP lhc Pr)ssrl)ilities {)l
'[Lre
r,,
a Eluopean
'self-iderltity )
/o/
and
in tlrc nune of
llr
do
d
out
irlea oi Europe within a weller of political, socidl
so doing, mevitably raise qucslons that cross the
'lhe
ot
essays in th$ book rccoglrlze but
positivc asslrmphoDs. Instead tbe aulhors set
'Itof"'"hi,
the
and, in
cullure
aDd pohlics.
In the frrst cssay lrrn tlen Boer arsxes that a drstlnct sef-refleciive idea of a
jls own oniv emerges with the French
Europe wiG a history and me^Di'g of
the t.lm Europe lrad ben utilized as
Revolution
French
Ilefore
lhc
Rerolurior.
a geographical concept and had been assoclated witll iLre concepr of libedv in
$e-;e of the ancient Grecks, with ChtisteDdom in the fifteenth centxry' wrth
sxte
tUrY. Brt these notious
e ts lhaL etrtcl ard then
torical stages Aftd Lhe
er Politics iionl the
ith
assesses lhe
of Eurcpean
ffi
l
I
as
di
And
lurbulence alld cha ge, it becme nomal to look lnsroricalv at Pheuomena
was
concepts as ltre producls of Ltjstorical development An hisioricai vision
qro and lo
userj both to dcfend lradilional European values and ihe rtdl,/r
F]rlr den Eocr
Etrope in lne
chrnges ln thc
e also indicates
ext ol vanous
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T
Iliilcr\
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Essay 1
Europe to 1914:
the making of an idea
Prepared for the Course Team by Pim den Boer
Professor of Cultunt History, LJniversiteit van
Amsterdam
lntroduction
The term 'Europe' has a long history, but rhe idea of Europe is a recent phenomenon. Ir was not until the begiming of the nineleenih cenrury that this idea, as a
result of a new outlook on the narure and origfus of Europe, cane to have clear
oudircs. It is in paflicular the FreDch Revolution that marks the watershed in
thinking about Europe
The name Euope had exisred for dDusands of years and for cennrries rt had been
somthing more thai a neDtsal geogaphrcal expression. Nevefiheless, until the
end of l}te eighteenth century, Europe was a notior covering certain implicit and
explicit assumptions rather than a concept wrth a clea.rly defned meadng.
Search$g for lbe idea of E rope over tle centDries tums the histoian into somethitrg of ar archaeologiqt peeling away the layors of meaning that have accumulated arcund the (Incepr in differcnt historical priods. Lioguistic usages jn
various hislorical contexls suggest a certain Eu(opem self rwareness, that is to
sal, ar a$/areDss of being pan of Burope and of Europe beilg the discrimilating
elemenr, bul the leIm ifseif has covered a variety of meanings, wbich have
changed with the changing hislorical circumsrrncs.
In this essay I have indicated tluee mailr elemenrs in the history of the idea of
Europe: the identiication of Europe wift liberty, with ChrisreDdom and wirh
civilization. Each of these had its own origin disapparog for a consideraue
length of time before r-sDdacing agaiA. The association of Europe wirh political
ftedom was 6rst made in ancient Greere, in the nfth century Bc, r*bile ir was not
until &e fiJteenth century that Europe came to be identified widr Cluistendom.
Then, dudng the EDtightenmnt of Ue eighteenrh ceDrury, Europe was for 0re firsr
time idenb-fied with crvilization. Howevet it was in the ninereenih cenNry that
drcse various identrfrca[ons of Europe were not or y rediscovered, bur also reassessed and given unprecedenlf,d promineoce.
il
and ron Ilellenes rlike who lived in Asra, buL \,rcre noL groaning under despotisn,
wcrc jrsl as hcllcose ,rs ary oLhcr ncople ll1 the world
ilil
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Greek colonisl-s settled or the wesL coart of Asia Minor, the Ionian coast The
Acgcai Sea had for cerluies been a connecting route which made possible inten_
sivc co rmercial contacl. Colonization incle$ed the awareness of the drfferences
betwen Heuenes ard non Helenes. The lmg age sPoken by the latter souDded
very slrarge lo the Greeks, and to characieriz ihis gibbeish they calted the nonGrcks 'barbdrtuns' pcople wiro could male or y an unlntelligrble 'bar bar'
nolse 'fhe designahon barbari&s' did nol at first have a negative meaning; the
pejorative connotaron developed only later
The exp.rnsion of lhe Persian empire gave rise to thc revolt of the Iooiar cityslates, which soughL lrelp ftom lher Greek homeland Thus begzn $e wars b
lween the Grecks
ffi
ffi
ffi
aid
the Pelsians.
It is in llis historical context that Crerk authols from the fifth cenrury Bc tEgan to
co nect ihe geographical concepts of EuroPe and Asia not only with d lerences in
language, custonrs atrd characteristics but also with distinct systems of govefl
nent The cny-state of Ahens becane dre symbol of Grek fteedom, whiie Persta
was seen as Lhe immeme ernpire oi an absolule ruler who re+ected neither god
nor law Th opposllion between Greece ard Persia was viewed by the Grceks 3-s
represenriDg thaL be(wee Europe and As;a, and stood for ftedom a1 opposed to
antiqDiry,
165)
t6
lLc cornpuison of lhe clnnates ald poljticaL systems oI Europc on 0re one hnnd
and Asu oLl the other, cootinued lo play a rolc ever when dle lxstorcal srluation
charged draiLically in rhe fourth century Rc, after Lbe subjecLion of Greece by
Philip oI MacedoD. Hippocrates' argxmenlation evidently rnllue ced lire lrlr4.r.
Lhc polirical disserLation by the th osopher Arisrollc (181-322 BO, bur it wits
i.ruIfip,l do,l Jdal red to r,'r, .^,'rcn,|^rJtr.iru'ion
According Lo Adstolle, the p.oplcs (r1 Europe, products of a col(l c1inr0te, Nrc
courageo s but noi particularly skilled or wisc Tlns is wly they arc usurlly nrilc
pendent. there is little cobesion betweeD them. and drey rre umblE Lo rulc olhcrs
lnbabilants of Asia, on lhe olher hdnd, have the brains Nnd r-he skills, but lack rhe
coLrrage and sirenglh of wil]. Thr! is why they remain serviLe alld subjccr t,coplcs
Thus far, Anstolle follows Hippocrarcs' trarn of thauSht, but theu colnes aI ilnportail difere ce In Aristotlc's vicw, the Greeks have m j tennediate gographi
cal position between the Europcrns and the Asims That is \,\.hy rhey combine in
themselves dre positive charactenstrcs of rhc pcoples of bolh connnents lhe
Greeks, according lo Ansbtle, are ftee, tbey have the best politjcal nNitutio s
and drey are capable of nrling ,[] ot]er people
the
Greeks bad adnxttedly been oonqxered by thc Macedonids fiom rhe cold
Nonh, but l[ey soon becnne insnlctors of the ]aller in rll intel]eclu,rl mrttcrs.
Aristode hhlseff beane tutor to Alexand% son of Philip of Macedol the
Alexander uho conquered enormous stetchcs of Asia layng them open Lo
Hellenic i]lllueoce ln a way, the Greeks could fccl that by means of Alexander's
coDquesls they were avenging theDselves on PersLa tbr the damage dorre to thenr
jn the pasL
Under these cirrrmstarces a feeh g ol superioriry uncooDecrcd wiih Burcpe may
have developed, srnce it was rhe Greeks who had proved ro be the best 'politic.Ll
dxmals', in an ideal nterrrediate position between dre ferocnus and w"rlike
N{acedoniars (Europeant on one side rnd dre skilled bur servilc Asians ofl thc
trur
-d
lrecious
I
t
wild animals.
but not very cfltLry AD, Etrrope is
se not a third, but
to rhe knowledge
rng rDurished lhe
ceriur] Bc
*tt
t'
d
al
I
"on'
amenL and
of the city
sidered
as
/-x.opPdn (lpansion.
e
did
id
r.
Euopeans.
"",i*
Ronm citi
lre thcre was
shared bv ali
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t
mation is lacking.
19
18
I
t
l,,ii
nrry oI rhe Jewish pLolle, usnally rcferred to as Je\|th A tuluities fll.e \:nttct
nrjor work is ao ancmpL to prnve the liq tty and Brcahess of lhe Jcwish people
in a world donrinaled rDilitdrly by the Romans alld mtellectoally by the {ireeks
Joscphur
Don
Iili
ffi
I
t
il
m
ffi
progcny spread o'r( to populabe lhe wbole e3nh, ihe interior par6' the coasts Dd
the rlands. Accordirg to Josephus, some people slill bear the name thir forefathers gave tl,em, while olher names have cbanged. IL was ihe Greeks who
brcught about this in nomerclalure. WheD, long afler the
powerful, they also appropriared to themselves the glory
Grk names to lhe various poples. Josephns then give
together wrth what he considers to be the conGmporary GreEk equivtlents'
It is Josephus \tlo was thc first to local[e the way m whish Noah's Fogeny
spread out over 01e world, using the &ek geogrdphical telms. The seven sons of
Japheth sefled in the mountaiDs of Asia Minol and sprcad nonh as far as lh
Rivcr Don They dso settled in Europe, right across as fff as Cidiz Josephirs
points out how dre Greek names with whicb his readers were famill3r have dis
placed rhc Biblrcal ndres. The children and grodchildren of Shem md Ham are
also localired by losephus, Jnd lle also gives their later Grcek names. Africa was
inhabited by the descendants of Ham, and Asia, from rhe Euphrates l,o the lndian
Oce l, by those of Shem
AccordinS to Josephus, therofore, Europe vas populaEd exclusivelv bv the descetrdanis of Japbeth, and Africa exclusively by dlose of Ham. Parts of Asia were
also taken by Japhelh and Ham, but the greaier pan, to de east, fell lo Shem and
his lribe Josephus also, of course, tells the story of the cxrse placed oD Han's
progery as a rcsult oa his ridiculmg his falhr when the lalter had falen asleep
drunk and naked Ho*evet nowhere does Josephus speak more higl y of any one
continent than aoother In fact, he does no more and no less thall combine Jewish
S.ncdl"Brcal hisrory with Greek 6eo$dphy
his exegesN, the most erudite of the Church Falhers, Saint Ierome (348+20),
whose rDlhonty was unquestioned fbr centuries, lales over Josephus' icxl atBosr
lirernlly a d translates it into Latro. Jerome adds that the name Japhe$ signitres
ffi
'er argement' or 'spreading oui' and that rhe text rn Genesis: 9,27 ftat laphedr
'shall dwel in the tents of Shm' conlains the prophecy i]at the Jews, who are
descended from sbe r, will b oLrstd in erudition atrd knowledge of thc Bible by
us Chnstians, the desccndants of Japhefi.
lr
ffi
ru
Alolher extremely influential Church Farier, Sdlnt Augustine (354 430), expalds
yet tunher on the prophetic implicahons of the tralrres of ihe so'ts of NoJr
Augustine was of Berber descent, and was bom in Tagaste, in Numidi4 in $e
Romarued [)art of Africa. He spen( a Iong period h ltaly and lLen became lhe
brshop of Hippo Reglus, an imponart port on the north+ast coast of what is now
2A
Atgeria After the sa.k o{ Romc by the Goihs in 410, x srrerm of refilgees made
lhet way to Africa and there wet many who bLamed Clnistimily lor thc l^ck oi
hghting sprrit shown by the once so powerful Rorlran llmpire Agarnst liris hrckground Augusrine set out to write a lirdication of fte Christixn chrirch an.l L{r dis
prove lhe cJassic:r] (pagtut) world view The work he pro,Jtcetl, in 22 books, we
trto\\ ts De Ci,udte Dei .o ra taldnas or The Ot| oi Gorl iSautst the p.liant
(4r:1 426)
Ir
fttl
s sleted thet
his readtrg of rhe clarsical histori.rns had led hirn to the discovery lhaf carlier times
were not only just as djrc as lfs own, but were cver more unJorlunate in that man
var fuflier irom $e comJorts of the Ilxe religion (Hirlonde I, p- 9). He wished to
desrib rhe vicissirudes of the human lace from tbe Creation to the foundation of
Ronlc, hom therc to the rule ofJulius Caesar dnd the bidr of Cbrist, right up to h]s
own Limcs (p r2). So as Lo enable lhe reader to udentand beiter where lhe various
orly
knowlcdge of
llx
ffi
called the
l,lt
scholar
lsiilore
ha-q l)een
aurhor
popu
ry
Prov
p!
13-14)'
is wjs
ces
long
tatjons
1o dre conclusion
t
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the
atrd
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fact iDdlcate sucb a neat di1,isioD 'Ihe onginal' early sevenlh centDry manu/cru\Lriot has trol survi\ed and so we catrnot be enlirely crndrn whel}ler Isjdore
latr
addiuon'
prul'abl)
;
mosl
ll
is
hmsef
world
of
lhe
.iiv'p'ot*.a thr\ map
howwa The map is enttreiv in ,.cordance widr the description provided bv
ir
an, thaL
bY the
f A:ov
The $,hole worLl is sunounded by lhe Oceao (se Figure 1)
oq
t.
MER.
3EP.
I
I
I
tr*r{filrr
noe
pcft drlunun
oc6'
Saint Gall Motwstic
tqr
Lt
Pe M.drtdi, VollnE Vl
(s
ni....
I
t
Whal is probably lne oldest survivrng rnaP, tiom the lale sevenrh century, does not
indrcate the Ocean, bur does show an uninhabited parr of the world The exislence
ol antipodes was already drspuled by AugDstine, rs was the spherjcal shape of the
world Gee Figure 2)
oJ
Mi
19s1,
165)
The idea that each of the sons ol Noall popuLaLcd one oI dre three continents is ri
ts now rePlme
simp
elm ilrdicaring
tiuc
occasions but
nevertheless
wiLh
come
of the wor
ld.
ir
pictorial represcn
larer sections
at ihe
Ilr oul search for a concept of Europe ir is woin lookine in solne detail
srea ws
brokcn up The
cen
decisive faclor was the enomrous Arab exlansion which cornmenced in fiat
tlis it is tecessary
10
Mag
had by no means disappeared
hands o{ the Moors. Not or Y
rei$, but also the islands of M
world
ill
the
Alri'a
Their
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26
tssay
ii
lrnrrll}, ol l5 JUly l0')9, Jcrusnlem w s taLen and
'rrxrrlrs
( lrrsr[n
I u((krDs w(!c lirtrdcd or) the |rcnch Inodcl.
i,,s scv{r,
i
,lt
L
ri
tii
ffi
l
I
I
t
')rrll
ll,c,c urc
rnber
of
tutaPe ro 1t14
tne ta
tng at an toea
ChrisLendol1r
aFPeal,
brt
(lhrlstrns, bearers of the Cross, had some inte(ests in common. Uniry wds oftn
h,r{l ro lind, bui there were nevenheless cornmunal synbols, gestures, spintDal
idcals and earthly morives It is of hterest that the Pope, the leader of Latin
Chnstendom, states that dr geograpbical location for this form of coDrnuDal
rdentity was !o be found in Eurcp, if only in part of it Within Europe, the Dodlem brrbarians were considered as behg excl dd. Ouiside Europe, the Chdstian
Ch rch's loss of Afrrca was regretled, and a call was made for the conquest of lhe
distanl Jcr salem. But a! this stage, despite some association between Euope arrd
ln lhe course oi lhe lwelllh cenl[ry, t]lc tlueat to Llhrislendon tio r rhe North aorl
East bccaoe less A ring ol I-aLin Cbislian princip,lilies .arnc iDro exNLence
Norway, Sweden Nnd Deumark ,n thc Norrh, PDlmd, Bobemir dld tlun8ary io drc
E t The Normans, who nr the ninti fid lenth centones had coDfined tlemselves
to destuctve raids, played n leading role in the eleventlr and F{elfth centrries ir
sEcnglhening d;e position ofLatin Christendon (Southcm, 1953. pP 25 5)
In thc co rse of the tweuth cenhuy, wesrem mllitary sDccesses in fio E st found
expressjon in theological writings and sccular poelry Ollo. Bishop of Freising,
(1113-1158), writes i his {e I Chranicle of the World Lh^I'Jll human wisdonl
and power begins in the East and enG in re Wcsr' (Olto ol Freising, Clronica V
prcL. MGH, Scnpt 20, 213. .f vm Laarhoven, 32) Otto ol Freisilg was well
comcted. His mother was a daughter of the Gennan Emperor and his brother had
married inlo the farnily of the Greek Emperor in Byzantirm- His Cbronicle is
greatly inspired by A$gustine, but itl Augustine\ thinking there is nothing shrlar
lo. OLLo\ idea of the superiodty of tle West Clrdtien de Troyes, Lhe Poet of
counly romance, sang the praises of Paris as successor to Athens and Rome Even
nysric.il writrngs mdicale $e shjft om East 10 West and attempt to explair it allegorcally. If we are to believe Hugh of St Vlctor liom Paris. the bows of Noahh
.{.k faced Erst aod irs stem West, expressing where I'aradise lay al the beginn g
ot tinc, namely in the Basl, and where tbe Day of J\idgment would tate place at
the end of lime, namely in the West (Brincken, 1973, p. 304)
is perhaps going bo far to posit a conneclion blween such tleological speculation and a gowing self-confllence n\ $e Wes|lt is probab]y more jusiinable to
speak of a growing self-awareness Be fiat as il may, these twelllh ceotury ideas
ire stabd ir tems of ar East West dichotoDy reaching far back in history. A conncltion bcnveen the growing sel-i-awareness and the geographical concep! of
Errope is stiil idrequenl; however, there are sraws jn lhe wind-
Tt
ffi
flm
ilfr
lirhi \i
,.,iei!&.:
,1
Fi8urc
Floridus,
,rber
(ed
p.
t968,
l lsv
Afric' ro
drv,d-o r' rl'e ! LIromJn ndner wi r Asia 'n rle upper hall
ll
Frgule
ru
lefl
ure
hurope
riphr ald or,ow and
'cee
l'tr
I.
,q""-.ai"g
2.provnc
citles,21
wnrers,
30
xr
lhe
seas' 40 islards'
:":3::J::,ili
ns of Noah is not
(see
Fiilo'c 4)
L\be
), (ihent,
481 ,
Il
lt-
Fol.24
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E sty
The
coDsolation
were
ln
facL
to havellers,
lhere
for a
re.
Etliopiu
how their country was ruled by dre pnest-kilg Presrer Jolm lBrincken, 1965,
p. 29). More than 4 ccnirry laier. Walsperger places lhis Legendary 'olher'
Cbristian kingdom in Asia (se Fig'rre 5).
sec
I
I
t
I
A line exanple of
i'r
l
representcd as a medieval walled cily with many towers, and sibated at the fur_
thermost eastem point of the map The map rs aligDed bwards $e north. EuroPe
has become smaller than the tndlional one quarter of the world. What is particutarly tuteresting is the way in which the distrrbution of Cbristendom is shown
'Ihis is probably the first example of tne carlograPhic localizauon of the small
Ctrristran cornnru ity surrounded by thc unbelieven'rho inhabi! th major part of
the world. Wa-Ispelger colouls the Christian cities red atrd those of th unbelievers
btack. Europe is pe aps no longer as extensive as it used to be, but he is nevertheless able to colour all irs cities rcd, in other words Chdstran. Ou$ide Elrrope,
he llas also indrcated a few legendary places in rcA such as 'Portana or Nvessa'
tbe capital city of the Indians, where Prester John resids'. It must have been somo
I igule
An/lreas Walsperset
Do practical nse
be,
sludie{l, a$enilcd and rnarvclled at in moneslic libraries, there wcre of course also
the navigation charls used by mariners- These so called porlaldni record coaslrl
rcutes vith remarkable accuracy and precisjoi. marking tbe Politlcal identily of
Lhe vanous towns and rcgrons widl tittle flags and coats oi anns (HDy, 1951; 1968
edn, p. 93) Such nfomation, which vas oi litera y vilrl impofance to mariners,
in earlier pedods presum^bly l1arl been lassed on bv word of mouth Drawing the
boundaries ofrhe Christian lvorld oD a map rnade it Possible to visualize them and
to express them D concrete form The su iving pdrlold4t de naturaltv not tbe
ones aclually used on board ship, but are parliculartv frne coPies intended to be
consulted back home rn port Thcy are, however, maps drawn for practical and Dot
for ideological pulroses Nevertheless, ihey too are a means oI reinforcing visually the idenlfication of gurope with Christendom-
It was not only Italians, bnt also nraDy olhcr Ctuistians who considered it scardal
ous ihat the Pope had chosen to reside in Avtgnon rn prefercncc to Romc the
ELemal City, where Peter had been crucfied znd buried. A dispute arose in whjch
tie French defeD(led themselves with grcat ilventiveDess on the basis ol geo
graphical arguments. One
otr the groundr fiat it was
(latholic Chuch. ard thal
tual consolation more easily if he resrded lnerc (Hav, 195?; 1968 edn' P 74) Hc
added rhat Avignon lry closer to tlre scholals of Paris than did Roine Another
Frcnch advocat of Avignon bcgan by stating that Europe, the lrherilance ot
Japhedr, was one of the tlree pafls making W tbe world atrd that Christians cur
relltly lived in Europe, there being virtua y no Cbristian rulers oulside drat continent. If onc calculated the dimensions of the Christian area (excepting Greece)'
to
one lbu3d that Marsetles was the cDtre- The Vicr of Chrisr on Eanh oogbt
rcside at the celtre of the Chrisnan world. ClFis! himseH had lived ard died ai thc
centre of the whole world- Rone had been chosen as the seat of the Papacy bmetu'r
cause at tha! timc i1 was ccntnl Curredly Marseiles was dre centra] poinl
i g that Avi$on was a suitable residence And nr ani case' as the familiar
papa ibi Roma'indicated' Rome was to be found wherever the
"xp**i""'"ti
Popc was (Hay, 195?; 1968
The urbinizaLion
edn,
ii lor
anorher
lifly
I
I
yeats
Besides the Holy Roman EmpiJe, thc second Ercat rnedicval Power with Lrniversal
The hercsiEs of Wycliflc nr
prctensions, the Papacy,
sbook the Chlrrch to its vcry
Lngland and Jan Fhs
also
among
foundations. Tbe universar c1
I
I
I
g power of separate states, with these resiriclions bcnrg hid down in national
concoraats. Tte $onastic orders, which had been suclr ll signincant uritvirrg
factor ln lhe Lalin Chwcir in previous centuries, came ro be o'8anir'ed on n much
the begirning of the fotrrp of Bordcarrx, trrnsfercd
ession oi Pofcs ol Frenoh
s- onc i ltonrc and ore irr
cirurc l(J ,rrr ur(l fatlY Y(rirrs
later at the Council of Constance (141+13)
j^
P 75)
I
I
ffi
ffi
tilil
lltill
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
ffi
ffi
ffi
It
wns
consLituted
a tiny
sectron
oI
Lhe
toLal
population
A feeting of solidarily was created tlvough the fact that scholars and inlelle{(uals dank in knowledge ,t rhe same classical sprhg. Tbe cotrcept of a
'Respublica litterorio' developed, paraUel to tie older ldea of a 'Rerpublnrd
christidna', which continued to exjst and was by no meaJrs always in con
The classical word Europe became more and more usual Petrarch, the ardent
propagandist of mainly Latrn audrors (h panicular his idol Cicro), lrses the term
repeaLerly. Even so, for the very Prince of Hlmrarists, Desiderius Erasmus of
Ronerdan (1466 1536), the term Europe in iiselJ had not yet any particular sig
nrlicturce. Hc usd it as a matter of course arld ften or y infreque ly. For
Brasrnus, rhe Rcspublica Iitrcturia was also a network of humadstic rulers and
schohrs, wluch visits ard conespondence could serve to maintai! The humdisln
oi lr)asmus, however unlike tbat of ltaly, is prirDarily a Christitn Eld not a
Iluropcm phcDolJlenon. As early as in his E .rrr;dion Mititis Ch,istiani (lso4'], a
litLle mamral for dre wador of Christ, in which he attempted lo preseot de art of
prely, he greatiy lamenLed the lutd that kept Chnstrans divided He mentions a
whole series of antitheses, such as Lhose blweD peasanB and buBesses, rich ard
poor, powertul and weak, b t also natioral rivalries Llrc ltalian hatEs the German,
rhe Flerchman the Bnglishnar, and the Eoglisbman the Scot (FesrugrEre, 1971,
p. 178). He scems to lind these clashes deplorable bcause all concemed are
Chrislians. What is clear is that for hlm Europe is lhe Chnstiar continent The
Eathiridion ]F"cam. widely known firough Fanslations of dte original Lalrn rnlo
English, Czech, Gennan, Dutch, SpAnish and French.
36
ln
aud
&dce
ag
Lr:
vdio!s
How vcry rvrong this isi A SeogrrPhical oame oI Iio imporlaDcc (ltvidcs
ttreln... In earLier tiDles the Rline drvr cd lhe Frctrch aDd thc Gernrrtrs
but ri does ol seprnlo one Christjan l,om anorhe. Thc l'vrc eas
seprate Spmtirds and FrenchtneD, bri tl)ey do not uDdo rhe
cornflunxlrtv of Lhe chulch The sea llows belweert the llnglish ind rhc
Frerch but can in no way sllil lhe u t! of tarth
116)
For Erasmls, rt is the rnity oI OrdsteDdon wbi.h is Pnnl^tf' rnd rlowhcLc does
lre spe3k
It is specillcalty wilhin the conlext of the TDrkrsh threat ir the E st lbat Euope
becornes a syuo yl]r Ior the Cbnstian 11'orld- This is also lrtrc in the works oI
Frasmus Belgrade fell in 1521 aud rD l-522 Rlrodes was conqxered (an event oI
end to
great significance for trade); lhe Tu osh viclory it Mohacs (152(t pul
Hunsarian indepe dence md opened up ihe way to Vicnna, which dre ltrtts besieged tur lhe fi1st tiroe ilr 15?9 A]l these eveots mrde Elasmus and hjs conteru
poranes fear Lhe worst for Aushia, Poland and the neighbouring countries,
pe ups even for kaly In one of his lelters to dn English patror in Septenrber
1529. Erarmus wrote that 'it is fortunate lbat perce ldre treaty of Kameijk] had
been concluded between the most powertul pnnces f.om all of Europe' (Gerlo'
1979, p 359) The home of ClnsLeDdom, as a manet of course. h,rd come to be
Europe.
t\rother matol hunaDsr, Juan l-u,s Vives (1492-1540), drew ,l pttrillel betvDc-r
oftlle lrks and llLe distinction ruade by tlre classical Greeks beiweefl
Europe ud Asi^, long before lhe Christran pe od In his didloguc about the drs
rhe rdvancc
,'
putes m Europe and lhe war agaiDst the Turk. De Europae disstdis et beLLa t
ci.a diLtlogus (1526). he relates how every Asiatic invaslon ofEurope h.rs alwavs
endcd in the complctc defeat of the invadrlg ibrces He $ves as examPles
Miltiades at the Balllc of Marathon. 'l'hellnslocles at ihe Ballle of Salantln, and tht
Ronan consuL Solla who, at Chaeronea ln 86 Dc, defcrted Mi xadatcs, suppos
edly a desccndrnt of the kIjlBS of Pcrsra lrr ali these battles no more thrn a few
thousand Europeans had sDcceeded in defeating Asrahc forccs numbering many
thor$aDds, even huDdreds of thousa'ds (Vrves, Obras Co,npletat Il, Madid 194tj,
pp 56-l)
Mves, of Spnnish Jewislr exLractron w a Chistran believer, brt saw the stmts
gle against the Turks $ lhe context oI Lhe classical distinction between ilurope
and Asi., wlxch naturally had noilinS to do lviLh Chnstendon. A few years
earlier, however, LIl 1522, he had wrltten lo Pofe .A.l.ian Vl about ihe turmo
EuroDe, saying thal'Christ dcmaded of Lrs tlnt this extensive and sono*4ul
lilil
Eurole, inlemiily
body' (ibid., p 18
it
now
ciLaliorr
oPe
i\
the
ffi
id
Chistendorn
lhis
gro
look llace
processes I
unity
liBioD-s
'f
oths re
on of EuroPc
lY bc sccr as
ailh
ln
lraLrl
Furthermore, thcrc were sizable nurorities, for cxa rplc tire Jews and
in
other dLsseoters, but they wcre tolelated onlv to a very limited exlcnl and
Item cohesion of rellgons
or no Peaccful coerislenc
ion, fragmenlation and disuni
ot EurcPe with Cluisterrdonl
power
Machiavelli
'fhe idea that a dillerent potiticd resime Qplies in Europe irom rhat in Asia' rs
more m
tommlated in mtiqDjty at the timc of the Persian Wars rs ml \ iih once
Renarssarce
lhe
Lhe political tleory of
38
ialls as
rhe Persian
Princc, ChApte(
A)
32)
chiavelli is
1oo'
I
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I
t
ffi
i
,]
hlgc par
1iilt
I
I
t
I
I
T
t
ffi
The mvasioo of Italy by fo.eisn mies bad disastous results In t500' the King
of Frace occupied Mjlan, and Naples lost iis indePendence, being transferred to
rhe King ot SpaiD This ira.s the stafl of the Spadsh-Habsburg domination of
It y ln 1525, fte Klng of Fmnce was decisircly defeated at Pavia and taken pris
oner, ihus putting an eDd to the geat inflIence of France iD ltaly. In 1527 lhe
Pope was taken pnsoner atrd Rome was PluDdered by the Drerceoary arNes of the
Habsburgs. The etrormous power which the House of Habsburg suoceeded in
achievmg iD Ilaly, ns possessior of the throne of SPain and that of the Gcrman
Empire, and the fact that it also ruled Bulgundy and the Low Countdes, resulted
in lhe other pdnces of Errope, pflmarily the Habsburg's arch nval, the King of
France, srriving towards the crealioo of aliances in order lo counterbalaoce the
power of the HabsburBs
the mid sixteeDth century Veneriatr diplomats also exPlicitly described dre on
going struggle between the Spanish Habsburgs aM Lhe F{ench Valors ir terms of
a balancc which, in Ure interests of peace in EuroPe, had 10 bc kepr itr a state of
equilibrium (Kaeber pp 15ft). Ihe coflcept of the balance of po\aer, which in
the lifteenth cenhrry lrad stil beeD used only lor tbe situation ir Itrly, came to
be apptied in the secoDd half of the sirlecnlh ce tury to the situation in Europe
ln
il
40
Tlus \vas the context ol tul aridnjss di'ccted lo the Kirrg ot ltiurce In
clearly srale
tlre balance
md
world,. Thc
I.'mnce
i'rl
r,ur tt rs.
l564 wlrch
Pcu(ls orr
llxrsc ol'
('hrislitrD
n,
qrrrh,rr
lrr'rrr
|r
$ri'l(1,
ha!i(
ll"l' rrr.'
dllr sl':
rrr
rrr x
IIr
ir
(rr rltr:
wcre dre scdLes in lhe Lralince ol l-uopc and lirglxn(i lllc ntrrNu(
holder of tbe halarce
(Qttot(t ut t:n'ltt lr )t ]otL ))
Lkelihood. thc dosltuctio o{ rltc SPtuush Arnrx(l (1588) w s lhc r':is'r l(n
tbe Queen of Englaod bcrng credrtcd willr thc losiLion ilr ljrrroF which l'orcnzo
lhe Magnificent had Iulfillcd in Lhc nricrocosnr ol ltalv I cenrury errlicr
ltr
r[
The balance of
'lhe ilcstructior ol the Affudu was a serious lelback lor fie House ol Hatrsburg
to bc
buL at the beginniDg of lhc seventcenLll century iLs uower wrs still considered
Lhe
After the abdicadon and death of Charles V h 1558, bis brother Ferdlnand bocatrre
CermaD Emperor and lis son Phtllp I received drc Spanisir Throne, togelher with
ffi
ELrroPc
hr
Cardinal Ricbelieu, thc effcctive ruler oI Fialrce, wrs much prcocc Pied wrlh the
Ilugxenor rcbels, but succeeded nevedheless in persuadiog thc Kings oI firsr
Dermrark and rhen SwF.den to intervene wlthn the Gernar Ernpirc against the
Emperor ln 1631, lhe CathoLc French cardural concluded I s bsidv trealy with
rhe grcat Lutlreran Ki g of Sweden, Gustavus Adolpl s, who won victory aller
victory over fie knperial hoops, but was hinlsoll slair) al the siege of Lulzen in
1632. Aher a number of victorie-s in the next few yerJs, EmPeror Fedinand tr wxs
oncc more dll powedD] rnd Ricilieu, in hrs own vieq wds lorced to dcLlarc
open war on the Habsbugs
Pohtical writings of tLre time rcpeatedLy refer to thc rolc of Frarcc rs ubihalor in
the Gcrman question- State interesl clearly prevailed above tlle orutual Lres be
twec rlle Catholic prnrces Il wrs even pointed orrl that it was in thc rnlerests o[
the Pop! hjmself thrt rhere should be a baimce of power in which ProteslanL tels also ibrmed part of the Catholic Habsburgs (Kaebr, p :12)
ililil
the second haLi of (he seventeenth ccrLlury, the intemational Pohtical situalion
wlrs derennined by lhe expa.sionist alms oi I-ouis XIV'nr power of the House
of Ilabsburg becarne nuch lcss domil aDt rnd raduallv France came to bc seen as
the Inost significant thrcai to the balalce of Power ir Durope. Thc firs! pcrson to
Anltrirn sLalesmNn Franz Paul Baro
point the 6nger
166? in French, Ceman and EDglish
Lisola, in a pub
arxt to allv itsell witlt Austi and to
rnd which was
want Protestart rulcrs of rhc F.encLr King's PJsns (Schmidt, 1966, p 173) l'isoLa
adopts in its enrirety the theory of the bdlturcc oI Power as fbmrulatcd d lv veals
bef;re by tle Duke of Rohan, but rtses il against France ln his view' the Kjrg oI
Fraoce wished to estalrlish a uiivers'rl monarchv and had L\ercn)re become a
tlneat to 1|e frccdorn of Europc, lo retigion and to frde LisDla couplcs lhe idca oI
ihe balarce ol power in Europe nor only willt peace but' also wiih frcedon ol rc-
17]).
XtV's altack ol1 thc Udted Provi ces (the Drtch ReprLbtic)
1672 rcsultcd
By around 1700, Europe had L'ecome ihe srafldard framework for lolidcal think
ing The theory of rhe balance of power lrad found broad ac@Itance nnd bad be
come closely associated wr& fie ideal of freedom (or frEedoms) for Europe.
'tsurope', wtuch in (he suteenth cer ury had sti[ been a some\lhat unusual slnonym for Chistendom, had by lhe end of the sevenieent\cenl ry come to be the
Feferred telm At least in Anglo-Dutch and Protestanl ctcles.
coDrse
the idea
tbe
instance, raught the system of the baLance of power to tbeir students' and leamed
trealises were pubtishcd on the subject. In Ergland, ihe phrase 'Libeny religron
md tade' was associated with the theory Frecdom for a nomter of staLes, each
evrtb eqBal right!, the fre pmctice of the Prolestant religion and the unhndered
development of English lrade were all enconlassed Liv rhe notion of th balauce
!'l pow"r.
level
dre sphere of political practice, the old system in which England's role was to
kep the balarce between the Bourbons and the Habsbu4s was in thc otid
eighlenth cenhrry disturbed by the rapid nse of the power of Prossia and bv thc
growing il luence of R ssla Fede.lck th Grea!'s conquest ol S esia wi-s dle
slart ol a long coDflict wtth Austna ln 1756 the so called 'Diplotna(ic
ln
RelolDtior' took place, with tie arch-enemies Bou$on and Habsburg forning I
coalition againsi kussia which was supported bt EnglaDd The result wAs uitia new and far more complex system, which even nl
coofusirS. wllat
czme into being
teenlh centtry,
Napoleon. The
mrtely
Lhe
time was
ttlt
to be
Russia.
pose of Christcndom'
(Schm t,
l.
174)
(Kurt von Rflumer Ewr|er Friede Friedensrufe und FtiedensPkine seit det
lcflaBsdnc ( eLemal peac: hoPes ard plans for p'eace sirce thc Renaissance')'
ot
l
42
ffit
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
n
ffi
Lssay t
Essay
fitukig
Eutayc tu
af an idea
of
the
WorLd
wifi distafll {lesthations .' lhe Anericas' Asih, Africa - ptovidcd LrD lrnPuLs!
for dre econony ard wds the cataLyst of r Slobal molretrrv svslem in whiclL b^r1er'
cJsh, and (jn panicular) credi! werc iil,erwovcn wilh one olber As r result concentrations of fiDancial power were crealDd upo whrch Eu(opcJrl tlllers were to r
greaL extent alependent, dnd which detennjned die progrcss ot European cxp r-
Trade
ffi
I
I
I
develolnent ol cartogaphy
Ddrjng the course of the lifteenih century the Portuguese were the first to sarl
along the coart of west Alricr and rhe voyagcs oi Colonbus to Amenca (1492),
Vasco da Gami 10 India vir the CaPe ol Good Ilope (1498) d Magcllan' the nrst
to circururavigate Lhe world (1519 2i) &astica y lrlulsfonned geograPbical
knowledge Addjtiorally Lhe inve tion oI Prjnti g increascd the disLribrlion ol
Overseas exploralion gleatly encc'$aged the lLtrther
il
nMps
'l\e Low
il
also prodrccd the tu31 oroderD ll]ap of Lurope, io fifteen pNrls ard iledicrled t{)
Granvelle, Ge trusred adviser of Charles V and Philip ll (Mdcntor EuroPa (Dris-
inseparably
ffi
il
ffi
essence.
na
Representations of EuroPe
The expansion of EuroPe
PaGllel !o $e forDrafion o{ po]itical concptl, derermmed to a very considerable
exlent by the problems within Europe itself- and which, as we have sn, impled
ffiil
tilm
Stadsbjbliothek
ar Breslat
ftr
in
Bdkunde
der
zn
Berlio (1891))
I!
ffi
ry
lJDe, that EDrope was the smallesl
descnbed
it
no uncertain tems
E;!-
*i
:!
$E
S-
edn,
pp
109-10)
dE
way
iJes
o{
A$
and
onlv
Europeao
uar
p ll0)
lndtrPts (
4I
46
t
I
t
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
Itlll
W
Clearly ihe Europexns are al)le lo ccll llle shois Chnstianity' lrade nnd colodzitrion arc the clernenls io European xp.lrsion which foiDed the basis for unequivo
c l feelngs of slrperiorily
Europe crowned
W
I
t
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
il
H
ll,ere was of cource a rich tradilon of Portmvals of the m)'th of the Rape of
Europa, not only in aotiquity but aiso in the Middle Ages: Europa and t'\e BUI- it
rs [aiurally a movrng tale and an inexiauslible molrve for artistic represeDtation'
a continent
We know of no more thar a singte object fiom the whole medieval pedod on
ard
przzling
later periods but this early association of Eruope and war is somewhat
aPpear to dat'e from around 1500
century rhat allegoncal represenwith standdd afiibutes and syma woman
bols becarne popDlar (Knipping, 197a, P- 361). Europ is ponrayed as
allegodcal
but it is oflly in the
tations of coDtinents
The 6rst
48
Figurc 7 The cot tnemoration ia stone oJ the *ars betu,ee the Romans atul the
Parthions in the second centuO AD From Lexrcan lconograplicum MylLrologiae
Classrcae. (Photo: AshmoLean Mueum, orford )
ffi
qednrp d rrown. \he alone ,' .- .-nstreJ. wlrrle Ln. urher coDlmeni! JJE,nor'
By dound l)80 turor'e crcwneo hnJ become a ni'mrJ rnolrl irr PnnLs Gee lul
exmple, Ftsue 9).
Even earliei in 1537, ar extremely ctrious nrap ol !un4e, in dte form of a w(nna4
uas protluced by the Intrsbruck humanist Johanncs Archduke of Aushia' Holy
Roman Emperor, King of HMgary and Bohemia (only copy now in Mlise m
I Twellh centurJ
candelab a Jron Liese
Ttu threc conti ents ale
dcpicted on the foot
(Phota: ZPnt l Institut lat
Fqute
50
Fisure
ci;a
EutuPe noflned
(Photo
1580, RijksPrentenkabinet, Riik:nuscum Az'Jterdam
f
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I
I
L.SSay
1 L\rope
ScrCIofmogropfp.
ilur
t[i
I
I
I
I
I
I
co[rbined forces
of
Grcece
At the etrd of the sixteenth century Cesue fupa in lis lconologia (lsted Rome,
>a&*Fi
like valour. the book atrd the owl for scholarshiP, the musical inslruments for lhe
liberal arts. The carpenter's square, brushes and chisels indicate lhe excellence of
the Grceks and Romans and other peoples (all European) in parnting' sculplure
and llchitecturc- A later Dutch edition (1644) adds lavigation and priotirrg lo Lhe
series of images associated with Europe (ltipa, Iconolngia, Dulch fianslation,
An$lerdam 1644, pP. 602-{3).
Ripa's influence was considerable but with respect to the portrayal of fte contiIlents, iLl particrlar, ooe fiDds a great deal of varicry - no doubt Lhe aims and anr
bitions oI dre dilferent cornmissioning agents. We have already seen how such
symbolic poftrayals could sefle ihe purposes of Habsburg, imperial, propaganda
(cf. o\ejvrc].v Allt'ibuten, Reallericon zur rleutsclrcn Kunttgeschtchte (RDI) 1961,
pp 116Gi8). A well knowr example is the allegory pailtcd in 1636 by Franz
F|alcken showing rhe abdicatioD of Charles V in 1555, in which the continents arc
t
n
Aparl from
ffi
phia
ffi
of
brury )
with gilts
of
the
superiority
separately,
llre
depicted
ll)e conthents
whereas lhe other conlinents stalrd or kneel before her, honottring lter
(RDK V, p. 1161) lf
[rrrope is crprcs:eJ by mcrns ol r.unrparison.
This can be seen, for example, in dre splendid neo-classical adaPtation of Rjpa in
the second half of the eighteenth century by the architect George Richardson ln the
infioductiori of his lconology (London, 1779)' fuchardson clearly states that' by
classifying and cottrastilg the altegorical porfiayals, he wishes to 'give to llle ex
planations md priols a more striking opposition and variery'. The fanriliar symbolic
ntrtibot"a o" natumlly illustrated. The charger and weapons stand tbr ondaunted
jnstruments of all sorts for tho liberal
valour, the owl and the book for scholarship,
garments
a-rts (see Figure 15). The Hom of Ptenty inuicates fertiliry' her luxurious
mark her superior riches, and her crown makes her the Queerl of the World
style different f?onl Ripa's bul the tone $ as wcl] Ii'r
Richardson, it is the superiority of Etuope in the arts and sciences which is prjmary'
For leaming and arts, the Eurcpeans have been most reoowned; all dre
scholaslic sciences they havc brought to great pedectlpn and the
invention and improvement of lnany uscful and ingenious arts,
Not o
4
lsdbelta
ussischer
Lep
Riaoy
nuseum, Staatl
cted on
a
Ilaute af
nperor
ly is Richardson's
on calrvrs. The fo
In the course of
posr
re
Figure
(
t 644
12
(P
hoto
55
ililil
ru
t
I
I
I
I
I
t
I
anil Asia's enslavement. It is fol this reasotl that ill Asia the exlcrrl ol lrcc{l(nD
(n
never increases, whercas iI Europe, depending olr circumstances, il wllxcs
tho
irl
EuroPL
of
wancs (Livre 17, Ch. 3). The above ideas concem the freedom
context of rnlemational retations. However, he also fomlulates the Pri[ciple of the
l)irrrieLrl^rly orvitsilliLn, alc wholLy owing to the genius alid hrlustry of),
llr(. illllahitanls in this principal pa of the world
(llicharrlson, 1779, pp j0-.31)
Eurolxr row sL^nds next lo an elegant temple rather lhan holding one in her hand.
This, according to the ei8hteenih ccntury exPlication, irldicates not oI y 'the sanc_
tiLy of tireir religior' but also 'the wrsdom aDd ingenuity of the inhabitants and the
excellency of lheir governmeni' (Richardson, p. 31). Ril.r mentions here only thal
Europe was the continent with thc most powerful fotentates, the EmPerol a d the
Pope. The explanatory text of this emblematic book is therefore anended by
Richardson according to the ideas of the Er ightenmenl the imagc of Europc
wearing a crown was polished and lefined inlo an ideal of civilizatbn Tt is to this
ll
potjsm
ftivre I l.
Cb. 6).
of Furope from
prim:Uily poliri
ffi
Clrislianity conlinued to play a role in the sell imagc of Europeans during lhe
eighteenth cenhry but it was no lofl8er the dominant forcc that it had been in pre
vious centudes. By the end of fhc eighteerltl century Europe and Christendonl
werc no longer sytlonyms. Eur-opean feelings of supedoflty were basetl on a con
glomeration of ideiu proceeding from IIlc E ightenment which, r tutn, came lo
be associated wiih the notlon of civilization. In charting ihe progrcss we rrced to
consicler the ideas of several philosophers and poiitical theorists
ffi
ffi
es
Montesquieu
Montcsquieu in 1748 in De I'erpnt l.J lois ('Thc Spiril of I-aws') provitles I
commentary on ihe political signifcallcc of Europe and at lbc siLrne tinlc xlen'lc
and gives greater depth lo it. Mo tcsquieu is very much 1n the finditlon of those
who, fiom Machiavelli onwards, regard Europe as a secular concept unconnccted
lvith the notion of Christendon and who identfy Europe with the idea of freedom-
Lr this book an attempt is made to explain the peculiar llature of Europe, esoing thrs
peciatty by compari(on with Asia.
Montesquieu is following ln lllo footst
years before (see abovc), in deahng w
dilfer from onc another according to the clinrate in which thcy live''
of an
Such remarks have been viewed as conslifirting the first impetus for theodes
ethic, and even capitalisrn of Europe and
alisparate
trilil
ffi
ffi
thousard
y Peoples
ffi
In his own
extensiue, even though the clirnates of Spain and Scandirlavia difler greatly
Asia, poweriul nalions in
Tn
ilri
t_
flli
Europe^n
lli
tt
m'
Eqsay t
Lssay
Voltaire
'l he clear idea oI commuoal lluropean custoDs and mtuInels is also to Lre lbund lll
the wolks of a far more popular contemporary of Montesquier, ramely Voltaire
ll Lc riicle de Louis XIV (1751), he writes that 'Christian Europe' can be viewed
liliI
Wil
ln
itilil
provide mutual support. The academies in the various siates together fomr
European republic of artists and scholars:
The English, the Germans arrd the French go to Iryden to study The
famous doctor Boerhaave was consulted by both the Pope and the'l"sar
We have already seen that, alongside ChristeDdom' humanism was one of dre fac
tors uniting the dlites of tlle various countties of Europe- ln dre sixteenth ceDtury,
l'eeling ol conrnunity had grown up between all rhose who enjoyed the same
sort of ct.lssici educaholl. Voltaire's idea-s quile clearly spring from fis human
rsri. u(x)cq)li(n of the R)cspublica litlerdrid, btJl contain a new dlrnension in fhat
lrivc years ier the Le siicle de lauis XIV, Voltaire published lus much mote exilfl
ii
t1
Spirit of the Nations,1756, ed. Pomeau 1963), 1be first attempt to provid a 8eneral ove.view of lhe whole of human history up to the cenflry of Louis XIY as
seen from lhe perspective of the history of civitzaLron. It is a major attemPi to
write a new sort of world lustory according to the ideals of rhe Enlightenmeut, wiih
the witel drstancing himself from the Bible, which until thm had formed the standard frame of reference- Voltaire rMkes plain that the histories of Egypr and China
iue more anciel]l and important than those Presenled h the Bible. He states ihat
Europe, 'ow Europe', has become incomparably more populous, dcl), aDd civiliTed
since the days of Chiflemagne, even in comparison with dre Roman Empire (Es.rai, R6sun6 811). Europe has become the continent of tlie Enlightenment,
although sone parts are srill shrouded in darkness However, civillzation and thc
development of science and scholarship had originated rn lhe East - Vollaicc cs
pecially admtres China - and in 'otr Europe' are of only rcce]lt ddlc60
Alnllohy and d.ukness donrinated Errope for celituries, Vollaule rnainlrhs, but at
re elld of the Middle Ages its peoplcs demalrded such I meftsurc of tieedom
^rd
dghts drat cverrtnally the blirb ric syslern based on slavery was olerturned Th'
\\'crc
irlr
their
inhtrbj!3its
gaineLl
then
their fieedoor, alcl froln
tatioDs of Europe
considered to be peoplc rather than slavcs Ncverlheless, Vollaire ls of lhe opilllon
(Lat this was rot yet sulficient to makc lhcm crvllized and colrghtencd (VolLaire iLl
Porrlcau, 196J, pp.11{' 19) That process woukl takc cenluries
Voltaire conside$ the Enropc of his'own lil]rc to be the most civihzed ionlinenl,
but he often uses rb example of no -Euopean cou Lries as a Lneans of exposing
Europeao abnses and evils. FIe assumes that human natu.e is basically dre same ell
over tlre world, and lhat the dillercnces between peoplcs result lron tlte difJedng
extent to wlrich rcason hlrs been 'cultivated'. By nirlure Lhcy arc all equaL; dre difIerences between thenl are the res|lt of thcir level oI cultivation How splendidly
Europe wou)d flourish, were it not for incessaDl unnecessary wars! Anal how
wrdesplead would be the afls and screnccs, were it noL that such a great number (l1'
lrlen end wometr are bried alive as morks and nuns! Thus Vollaire. who calnot
resist comparing the danlage done to liurope by wrlrrc with the nef rious ellects
he altibutes to thc monastic lil-e.
The concept of Europe propagated by VolLaire is an anticlcdcal oDe He sees the
dominant position Europe has flained in thc wo.ld :Ls being based on the develop
rricnt of rhe arts irnd sciences- Indeed, that is ultimately the consolation he offers in
the lace of dispiritjng evenls, includiDg those of his owlr day- 'lhe nations of
Etlrope have always managed to rise frorn the ashes ol various disasters and civil
wars, due to tleir knowledge ol the iuls :rncl scieoces (Porrlcau, Pp. 8t0 12).
Adam Smith
The growjng awiuenegs of r European cjvilizatiol wrs based on a tallglble in
crease il the wealth ol uations, which could ifford to financo costly standing armies a1ld expensive artit]ery The dreorisL nnd propagandist of a new liberal
economic order, m which mateial self-inlerest was coolly &rd sobelly made the
basrc principle of economics, was Adanr Smrth (1723 90).
Lt lis Inquiry into the Nat re antl Cuuses aJ the Wealth of Natiot s (l'l'16),ll\e
Lo consider-flrcarms advanLageous to civlli
zation, since they aro expenslve rd complicated to rrarNfrclxre ard therefolc
sdmulate economic activrty rnore thar thlr bow and arow irnd rhe catapult (Sehgmarxr (ed.), 1947, p. 198). Montesquicu, by confiast, had pointed out the disastrous
economic efJects of maintaining large eunries of rnerceoaries In the sarne line of
thorghi, Voltaire had lamented the growth of standing arlnies, althoogh he added
thc positive note that warfare berween zumies of mercenaries might spare the civjhan populatron to a greater extent. As hc rcmarks lightheartedly il1 the Es.rar,
The citjzens of besieged citics arc sometines tr nsferred iiom one rulct
to auother wlthout it costing the lite 01'a single one of them. They are
rnercly the wilner's prizc, gaircd hy whoever has the most soldiers,
(Ponrcau, 1963,
812)
srrnllrlLrslr)lhcc(:(xrollly,irrl(ilhrrsLo'theextcnsionolcivilisation'IIisspellingoF
's') suggcsls that the word is taken from the F-rench
'civilisarirrlr' (wilh
^
For au inslghl into the intellectual clinlate of dre
concept
'('ivilisrtion' is a kcy
ciglrleertb cclrtury wc need fo tease out its rnca illg But lirst of all we need to
hrve a look xt tLle relatcd concePt o[ culture
'c lture'
roots of the
Lu.
Polit, ssc
tially non
i" rcr
Europcau
birth to c
et I'oisivit6 fait nail
Lurn glves
rNl
The concePt
ol 'civilization'
the
The social dirnension which the concept of culture gained in the course of
the
French
was
andit
Enhghtenrnent
the
product
of
'xord
eiglrteerth cenhrry, is a
';itsalion' which came into being to desqibe it The word was coined i[ the
'culrure de l'esprit' (Ersars, Livre I, Ch- )C{V)' and scveral of his contemporanes
form followmg it'
use the word 'cullure' m the sane sense bul withouL a genitive
'civilisatiott"
tn
Peason
t6'), .md
wds nlade
licrs- Outw
tural I
iated
ancl
iely
coutliness
s good manners
a social dimen
as
l(olnPlar
of
courtly
popDlar durirtg
is also clearly associated with the belief in progress that became
phascs of
the course of the Enlighterunent. In this way the idea of levels or
one
'civilisation' rapidly became a familiar
Tire new word enlered tbe English lznguage as
users
objectcd to
Jffi
t
I
I
I
t
t
I
m
il
ffi
1, Ch- 30)
Tn
a C) became
irlo
lhe
in the course ol
63
62
Lssay t
Lssay
to-Da
Voltaire
illil[
rililfl
'Ihe clcar idca of communal Eulopcan cusioms mLl maLrners is also to be ibund Ln
lhe wolts ol a fat more populaa co fempoftry of Montesquieu, namely Vollrire
Lt Le siicle de Louis XN (1151), he urites that 'Christian Europe' can be viewed
a5 a large colmonwealth of different states, some of them monarchies alld others
having a mixed system of govemment, but all of them intercorurected All
European states have the s-ame religious background, despite rhis being divided
into a variety of sects, aod all have the same principles of civil law and politics,
wh;ch are rnrknown elsewhere in the world It is because of these principles that
European natrons do nol tum prisoners of war into slaves, that lhey respect the
alnbassadors of hoslile latioLrs and tbat tiey senslbly attempt to maitrtair a comnunal balalce of power (Voltaire in Adarn (ed.), 1966' p- 40)
Il1 a section dealing with the arts and sciences a cultural ilterpretation of ihe tenn
Europe comes to the fore. Voltaire's thesis is that despite dre wars and reLigious
drscord which have afflicted it, Europe has seen the rise of a 'r6publique litt6raire'
(Adarn, p. ?0; ci Chdbod, p- 30). The arts and sctences reilforce one aaother and
provide mutual support. Tbe academies ilr the variotls sfates togelher fomr
irilfl
rilil
ril
il
i[ilfr
ll
rl
The English, ihe Germans and the Frcnch go to l-eyden to shrdy. The
faDous doctor Boerhaave was consulted by both the Pope and dre'l\aLr.
His pupils attracted foreigners who became doctors elsewhere
each discipline have strengtheled the lies xDiiing tlis great
scientillc and aflistlc community of Europe This, says Voltaire, is a great comfnrt
ln a world in which ambitiolr and Politics cause so much ill
We have already seen that, alongside Christendom, humanism was one of the factors u iting the 6lites of the vadous countdes of Euope Itr tJle sixteenth century,
l'(rclilg of conmunity had grown up between all those who enjoyed the same
sorr of classical eclucation. Voltaire's ideas quite clearly spring Aom dris humanislic concoption of thc Rispubfica lilteraria, bnl coDtain a new dime-nsion irr drat
llrc arLrral sciences ate in his vlcw so very mrporlant,
Irivc yerus after the Le siicle tle lauis X1l4 Voltdre published his much rnore extcnsive E'ssai :ur les moeurs et I'asprit des Mlions (Essot on the Custotns dnd
Spirit of the Nations,1756, ed. Pomeau 1963), the first attempt to provide a gen
eral overview of lhe whole of human bistory up lo the cenlury of Louis XIV, as
seen from fhe perspeclive of the hislory of civilization lt is a major attempt to
write a new sort of world tltstory according to the ideals of dre EdrghteDmeDt, with
the writer distancing himself from the Bible, which until then had formed $e standard frame of reference. Voltaire makes plain that the bisto es of Egypt aud China
are more ancient and important th?dr those presented in the Bible. He states ral
Europe, 'our Europe', has become incornparably more populous, rich, and civiliTed
slnce the days of Clrarlenagne, even in compaison with the Roman Empire (Er
8lt).
Ararchy aDd darkncss doninaled lrLrropc for ccnluries, Voltaire uaintiins, but at
tie eod of tlie N4iddle Agcs its peoplcs deman.led s[ch a measrre ot lieedom arld
dghl-s tllat eventuxlly the brrberic syslem |esed on slavcry was o\rertumed. Thc
nations of Europe garned their ireedom, ;urcl liorn tlen on their inhabiLants were
considerdd b bc pcople rather dlan slaves. Ncve heLess, Voltaire ls oI llle opinion
that ihls was nol yet sufncient to urake 01em ci\.ilized and enLightened (Volkriro irr
Pomcau, 1963, pp. 776-79). That process would lake certudes
Voltajre considcrs the Europe of his'own time to be the most civiLized continent,
but he oftcD uses the example of roll-Europcan countries as a neans of exposlng
European abuses and cvils. He assumes that hurnan nalure is Lrasically dre same al1
over the world, and that Lbe dlffercnces betweeD peoples result ftom the differirg
extent to whlch rcason has been 'cultivated'. By natu(c L\ey are all equal; the dif
ferences between them are the resull of thef Level of cultivation. How splendidt)
Europe would flounsh, were rt not for incessdDl unnecessary w s! And how
wrdespread would be the afls md scicnces, were il not that soch a gleat n[mber of
lrlen and wornen are buried alive as morks and nuns! Thus Voltaire. who c lnot
resist conparing the damage done to ljurope by wufare wilh thc ocianous efl-ects
he attributes to the monlstic life
The conccpt of Europe propagated by Voltaire is an aDticledcal one- Iile sees the
donrinanr posilion Europe has gaine.l in lhe world as being based on the develop
mcnt of lhe irts and sciences. I[deed, tha! is ultimate]y the consolation he ofters r
the lace of dispiriting events, including those oI his own day The nations of
Europe have always rnanaged to rise from the ashes of various disasters and civil
wars, due to their knowled8e of lhe :u1s i ld scierces (Pomeau, pp. 810-12).
Adam Smith
The growing awaEness of a European civilization was based on a tangrble increase in Lhe wealth of nalions, which could atford to finance coslly $tanding armies alld expensive fili]lery- The theorist and frof,igandrst cl1 a new lrberal
e.conomic orcNer, in rvhich maLerial self-inleresl was coolly ?urd soberly Dade the
basic princrple of economics, was Adarn ,Smitb (J723-90).
bt lis Inquiry into 0rc Ndture and Causes of th" Wealth af Ndtions (U76), tbe
Glasgow pmfessor even goes so far as to colsider lireanns advanlageous to crvrli
zation, sinoe they are expensive auld complicafed to nanufrcturc ard therefore
sljmulate econonic acliviLy more thar thc bow and arrow and the catapult (SeLig
marxr (ed ), 1947, p 19E) Montesquicu, by contrast, h^d poiDted out the disastrors
economic el-lecLs of nainfaining large arnues of mercenaries- In the same line of
thought, Voltaire had lamentcd ihe growth of standing armies, although he addcd
the positivc note dut waJfare between :fnries of nercenaries Inight spare lLre civ
iliar population io a grealer extent As hc remarks lightheartedly in the -Etsai,
of the
EnlightenJncnt,
aldrougll some parts are still shrouded in darkness. However, civilization and the
development of science aBd scholarsl p had oiginated in the E^st Voltairc es
pecialty admrres China and in 'our Europe' are of only recellt datc.
sai, R6sum6
The citizens of besieged cities ere sometimes lrarrsfelred liom one mler
to another without it cosiing the li{e of a single one o[ them. They are
rncrely the winner's prize, gaincd hy whoever has thc nlost soldiers,
camon and money
(l'oncau, 196j, p 812)
Elley
Ltnope to te
t4
Lssay
the eitlrteenth ccrlury tbe synonynr for 'cililisation'. '[he word therefi)rc came lo
b(] used in G(]rfian to rcfcr ot only to the original concept of the cuhure ol individual persons, synonymous wllb Bildung, but also to refer 1i] thc social concepi'
wo,d Zivilisation was indeed adopted from ihe Frcoch, but was consideled to be a
rather unfortlnate loan word. (See the following essay by Peter Brgge as regards
1 LurapeIa trt:t
In the coufte oI llte rinctccll{h culltlly, iln cnorllxnls cll'illlsloli itl lll{ lrrj( trl
((
nleanlng of tlie Lcrlu clvllizalioo took Irllcc IIlc rrrrtclcclllll is irr(l(1:tl lll(: lllrrry
wltll
IirroDc
civtlizirLion
ol
idenlilicallotl
the
Iotal
of
and
Zivilisation).
European civilization
Europe
Twenty years separaie the 'spintual' sketcir of the manners and mentalities of nations by the Frcnch philosophe Volt^ie ard the 'materialistic' study of tho wealdr
of nations by the Scottish ecooomist Adam Smith Durng those two decades,
loughly the third quarter of the eighteenlh century, it became usual to associalc
EIrope ard civilization with one another' the expression'La civilisation eu
rop6enne' was first used ilr 1766 (see J Moras Ursprung) n a work on the Frelrch
colonres in North America probabiy witten by lhe Frcnch Physiocrat, dre Abbd
Baudeau He recommends not only converting the American Indians lo
Christianity but also to E ropearl civi]ization m order to make real Frenchmen ol
thcln! (' . convertir ces naturels non seulcment AL la foi chrdtrenn, mais encore i
la civilisation europ6enne, en faire i peu prds de vrais ftangais par adoption...')
(quolo(l ir) Moras, 1930, p. 47). It is notable that for him Europeal civilizaiion and
Cllrrisliitnity are not one a]rd the same thlng. It would seem, howevet drat he, as a
lircnchnrur, considered that crvilizatio! and France were indeed one and the same.
Iirlurce had a univcrsal vocation to fullil, not only to Christianize but also to civilize. In this context, the expression 'Europcan civilzatioo' presupposes a confton_
tarlon with non Europeans afler a procss of colquest ald colonizatron
Christianity can folm part of this, but Euopean civilizatiofi is nevertheless more
than Chistendom alone. 'fhis is a remarkable chanSe, for we have seen how tle
concepts of Europe and Clrristianity were previously more or less associated
Civilization, then a relatively l]ew wo(d, becoms a slnonym for Europe (and for
the Frcnch, thereforc, for France itscll).
should especially be ooted that the concept civilization had a clear and positive
cofflotation, comcidirg with a growing feeling of European superiority However,
It
tl
feeling did not sland in thc way of an increasing interesl iD areas outside Europe
'l'his seening contradiction is made understandable if one realizcs dlat lhc colcept
of crvilizatron should not be conceived ds fixed, but rathel as a process directed
towa:rds an ideal state lt was the growiog popularity of the idea of progress, men-
'l'he Frencli Revolution was a wate$hed il] socjal md political thinkjng and its inrpact was felt all ovcr Eulope Until lhe Rcvolution, lhe Peasants, who continued to
constltute the largest siDgle categoty in the PopuLAtion of Weslerll EuroPe Unlil
to the nineteenlh cenlury, slill Lived 1 thc shadow of feudalism. Their siN
atron w.N not as h^d as thal ol. their lellows in CenlTxl ald l-,2stem EuroPe, but;r
g.6al n'raDy of them continued to scrue anLl work tlle land for feudal ma-ste6 The
seeds of levolutiotl were aLrcady present in mirny oi the countries oi Westcm
Europe In the words ol Tocqueville, in what is slill a furdamental analysis of lhe
Ancien R6gine tuId the Revolutlon, Iiraitce was not the god wlich created lhe
well
was
ir
enderNc
(A
de'lbcqueville,
the
certain conti rily rcm^ined, however- For cxample, the Revolution meant a
contiouation rrrdrer than a brcak with the traditio al centralized irllemal stflchrre
of the counlry, and the monarchy and Churcb suwrved in a modifred foam.
Ncvertheless, the feuda] legal slruchlre had gone for cver It is Lnre drat, in certar
remotc backwaters, rcmDants oI the fcudal system sldbbornly remained riSht inlo
fhe twentieth century, bllt lltey were feudal ltavisrns, expelience(l al] the rnore bil
terly by the peasanky because of llle lact thai Lhe principles of rhe Revolution
were famiialr lo Lhem .urd were enshrined ro lc8isLation.
'N{cn are bonr free and with equaL flghts, and renain so'. according to the fanlolls
decLuation of 26 August 1789. In the legal sbxclure and fhe rnental atmosPhere of
feudal society, this Dew lreedom crld equality of dll citizens was Don existent (J
Codechot, Le,r (onsitutbns de la [;rance depuis )789 (l'aris, 1979) DlcLdratL(]n
det lroits
dt
I'
homtnt)
ideas and
the
Lhat full sovereign
ority ln the name
tiors' such as 'est
oppressron ilre
ienable rights of
nation alld that t
sovere:igoly,
all
afes
ulh
titunot
irr
linds its expression in the Law (singula-r) l'hc king's atlen]pt to flee the counhl
(1792) lcd
with
fte
war
and
at
Varennes,
capture
his
in
whiciir
ended
1?91,
'\ustria
to the escalation of the llevolution The lirtherland was in dalger and the king was
the
considered a taitor A tumirlg polr)t came in 1792, whell lhe Prussians and
custonts tuid local establishments. The natioN of Europe have had the
very saote Cllristian religion, agreeing in the fuirdamental Parts, varying^
re ceremonies and ill the subordinate doctines The wholc of
a liitle
the polity and economy of every country in Europe derived.fTon the
aorni .ou.""r. It was drawn from llte old Getmanick or Gothick
custornsry, from the feudal instituticns \thich must be considere-d as an
emanation from that customary; and tire whole iras bcen improved and
digested into system and disciplire by the Roman law From hence
arise the several orders, with ol without a monarch in every European
system of maturels and of
country...
this quarter of the globe; and
education
the colours of the wLolewhich
There was little dillerence in the form of the universities for the
ealucation of their yolrth, \thether \"r'ith regard to faculties to sciences, or
in
From
which
softened,
ffi
drat:
(B'urke, Three letters on the Proposals ;for peace itilh the ReBK:ide
299)
Directory of France, 1796; in Ro|ers (ed ) 1850.
baplizcd
Revolutio0 is to falsify historyi lhe principle of eclual rtghts for alL was
blue
always
llo
rneans
by
was
thdt
blood
and
victims,
of
the
wrth thc blood
ard
The ideals of tbe F-rencll Rcvolutiqr hdrl a Bleal impacl Lluoughout EuroPe'
rio
in
others
wcre
enthusiasor
wilh
lrrrch
greetcd
al
lirst
places
though In solne
lentli opposed. iiberty, equality lnd lrateruiry werc trtnlpeted evelywhcre The
*noi" i tl" old Europe was shaken, lo lhe hofior of Nany witil established irr
Burke writes about lhis EuroPe in the past tense_ The French Rcvolutiol) has
brokeir with the state based on thc system of'estales', with the Cl[istian chtuch
and with the ancient universities. France is the centre of Jacobinisrn' therc e
I
t
t
m
t
t
ffi
(ed.), p.306).
goocl exrunPle
French Retolutio
Ilis aistocratic
l\s
Hil
ftflt
67
66
ffir
Lssay
Rcvolutiofi had irfroduced and rcPlacc{l lleti) by the ProlccLioll of plivatc Properly; Devertheless, all becarne equal before the lnw and feudalism was abolishcd'
I-ikewise all privileges and corPJ intenniLliaires (intemre.iiary bodjcs or irsti-
ililil
Napoleollic expanston was the result of Frelch national fervour' and zner the initial enihusiastic reception of the liberatiofl al:mies io Belgium, the Netherlands,
Ccrmany ard Italy, it unleashed nationalist movements everywllere At the ptn
nacle of his power, Napoleon announced the Continental System, aimed at lhe
arch-enemy Ergland, which had begun a naval blockade. Russia jomed the sys
tem. Onc could therefore trxly speak of a 'Fofiress Europe' The Austrian
Emperor gave Napoleon his daughter's hand in marriage (1810)' thus uniting the
Corsican l3uonaparte clan wiih tLe imPe.ial Habsburg dynasty'
ffi
ffi
1ffiil
Never beforc had fhere beeo suclt a concenlration of power in Europe- Besides ie
Grand Empire, therc was a cftcle of subservient states ruled by members of
Napoleol's farnily. On tle continent itself, only Sweden' Denmark, Norway'
Austria, Russia and the Ottoman cmpire were not directly wirhin the Napoleonie
sp)rere of influence The Russian carnpaign of 1812 was a tummg Point which led
1(] the collapse of the Grand Empire, but it was only in 1815 that NapoleoD was
linally <lefeated at the Battle of Waierloo- The uniry' under French dominahon'
which he had wished to imPose on EuroPe was rePlaced by the old idea of tlrc
il1flil
Lr August 1816, when Napoleon had linally beeo defeated ard was an exile on
Saint Helena, he looked back on his life znd refered to himself (nanrrally making
cverything 6ner than it had aclually beeD) as the'mediateur natural entre I'ancien
et le no vel ordre' ('the natural iDtemediary between the old and the new order':
Walter (ed ), 1963, p. 1075). He had wished to bing aboul an 'as
socratrcn europdcnc' which would have brought prosperity arid happness to the
colllrncnl- 'llrcrc would have bcen rhe samc system lhroughout Europe, wiLh tlte
siu)rc pllnc:il)lcs: 'un code europ6en, une cour de cassation europ6eme' redressant
|(nlr l()rs lcs crrc.trs,..- ('one European code, one Europeiu coufl oI appeal
Tlrere would have beeD a single EuroPean currency, a uni
retlressirrg all
"r,ors;;.
linnr systenr of weights and measrues, the same laws Napolol also proposed a
Ijrrropean Academy and European pdzes to slimulate scientilic research. Europe
wlrs to become o e family and one people, and havellers would have found them.lr/ent (see also Mlmorial lJ, p 345,
selves in a cornmoD fatherland wherever they
6 Novemtrer 1816)
ltlimorialI, in
I
il
ilflil
Il,
historical
f ou ndati o n s
Eu ro pe's
ii
The most impoflaot result of the Revolutionary turmoil for fhe concept of Europe
was that il rcceived an hNtorical credence, which had previously been lacking
The Eemendous break with tradition as such was iflcomprehensible. Aftel some
time Lhe turbulent events, the chaotic succession of regirnes werc sccfl as historioal
Ll
LssLly
1 tutape Ia t9t4:
necessitics- All thesc uPhealals lvere thc catalysls oI changd ill thc iltellcclua] clinlate, whicLr lnade it norDal lo see a wholc range ol phenoNena as the result ol
lislorical cievclopmeol. ln this post rcvolutiontry peliod quiLe a nunber of no
tions. which had been lltoreticxl and abstract, became Listo cal concepa This
histo.ical way o{ rhiJ djrg enrichcd and deepened the colcePt of EuroPe The terDl
'Itulope' carne to be [sed in a ILlucil more consciotts rnarurer' It l]ad a familiiir rilrg
pollor centu es Lrut now came 1(l be eodoweil wilh bistorical irlterpretaLions
'uld
itical ideas. 'fhe idea of Europe bpcame more signilicant, but there wal no ques
tioll of a ve$ion that commanded gencral agree lenl Various lFoupulgs had their
own idea of what Europe ha{l bcen rnd oughl 10 be.
Europa Christiana
'Es waren schdne gliinzende Zeiten, wo }r-uropa ein christlir:hes Land war' ('they
were splendid times when Europc was a Ctristiitn l-and') is lhe first linc of the
famcrus essay Die C,lristcnlrcil oCer EurcPa wirich Novalis2 wrote ii l?99 (Novalis, in Kluckhotm aDcl Sa]nrrel (eds), 1983, p 501). The work ls a Poetical exhor
tahon lo religious revival iui.l is full of nostalgia Accordng to Novalis, medieval
Europc hdd beeo one large Chrisrian comrnunity with a single splritual leader: the
Pope The Papacy had now been destroyed (Lhe Pope havug being irnprisoned'
irnd dre Papal States lunted jnto a rcpublic in 1?98) The Middlc Ages shorrld
serve as a soLucc of inspirafioo fbr the Pvivat of the CkistiaD lai(h aod the visible
Church. witirout national borders beiDg considercd
hr France too, the country where (he sharPest orilicisn of the church had beelr expressed and where ir Dercjlessly articlericll policy ha(l been pursued, thcre was a
riLdical change in thc value attributed b Cltristendom and lhe Middle,\gcs
Chateauhianclr lrad an enormoLrs effcct with his Gltie du christiLlnis te (1802). in
which he sang thc praises of Lhe influence of Clxislendom on poery, [teralure,
music, ifchifecture. theology aDd fonns of worslup. Chrjstianity hxd a fonnalrve,
salutary effect rn all areas of lit! Conpared lo classical Antiquity, tle Christiiur
Middle Ages had an unnlistakabLe moral suPcrio ty Were not infanticide and div
orce common in,Artiqllity, and was it not the case tLrilt bfole the rise ol
Clristianity rhere had beeo no polrfic.rl cohesicrnl 'l-es soci6l6s llotlarent 6temelie
ment enfe 1'anarchie populaire el le despotisrnc' ('Socielies cont[rually llucluatcd
between popular ararchy.md despolisrn'; Reboul (cd), 1966, p 250)
The reassessment of the Chnslian Middle Ages gave the concept of Europe a his
toical fo[ndahon The idea of Europe was lhus given a clear'ly delined and devel_
oped historical perspective, which had been lackirrg even as late as the eighleenth
century. Thc concepl oI Europeal cultr.rre llas indeed arisen in the eighteenth cen
t[ry, bul lhe hirlory of European cullure as an idea m itself origirated only in rhe
Novaiis was fie pen-name o{ Fncdrich von Hardenberg (1772-1801), a Gclmau
rom nlrc poet who was called the 'Prophet of Romariicisn'
'z
Ilis
lio
ol Europe became
Eulope was one single fatherland (Chabod, p. 109). After the Napoleodc period,
he had become more conscious than ever of the mutual interdependence of the
states of Erlrope, In Meltemich, and in othd ProPonents of Realpolitik r tte
Restoration period, otre finds not a romantic--*eligrous e[thusiasm but rather the
ialea of Europe as a cormonwealth of states, which must see to it that a balance of
power is presewed, along the lines that had existed between ihe sixteenth and the
eighteenth ceDtdry. Mettemich. who attempte4 to pu[ t]re strings of the pentarchy"
the five n ing staies Etrglan4 France, Austria, Prussia and Russia, was mocked as
the 'Baron de balance'.
The Restoration thus saw a gigantic alliance to counter dre revolution The oP
ponents of the rcvolution could be motrvate.d by entirely different considerations'
it is therefore possible to hace two completely divergent visions of EDroPe that
of Christian unity among the romantics and that of the balance of power among
the conservative realists
of EuroPe Yet
a vision of the
was opposed to
that of the reactionary romantics lt coresPonded' however, with the latter when
the interpretation oI ihe history of Europe became the topic of a debate in which
historical arguments were Dsed to rcinforce current political ideas and ideals'
authom were already making a distuction between Wesi
anrl East European powers (Gollwitzer, P. 220)- One of them even speaks of a div
ision of Europe into 'ileux z6nes de sociabilit6', a westem one which is Iiberal and
an eastem one which is conservative- The distinction can be seen a,s one between
mo
susPension
I
I
t
jnto decay
Clfistian civilization, which in tbe West has fallen
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
71
70
I
I
ilil|l
ru
ilil
ffi
ilili
iill
iilt
annot
t"Ilir
P 77) With the fall of
and
the establishment of lhe Clristian chNch led to a divorce betweer worldly
be
divorce
This
klown
never
had
civilizations
othcr
which
spiritual authority,
tweeo the world of deeds and the world of thought is, in Guizot's view' the tuntlarnental source of the faeedom of conscience for wluch so many struggles tuid so
oluch suffering had taken place in EuroPe afld which had only been victorious aL a
late stage, often against the wishcs of rhe clergy
Destnte h.is respect for lhe Ctrurch, ihe proteslant Guizot does not idealize the
Micldle Ages. LIe sees re Reformation of the sixtcenth cenlury as the rebellion ot'
thc human spirit against absolute authonty in the spiritMl freld Guizot considers
the Rcfomatron as ut'ilan de liberti' ('otrtb]otrst of liberty'; p 262) aDd as an
ellonnous step forward towards fteedom of thought and tlre emancipalion of llre
human spirit (p. 264)
r1.n) ., lrrlrl
Alongsidc the libelal vtsjon of the historic l (lcvcloPnrcnt ol IiIo|e, il d()Di)cr rliL
vision of hislory came illlo exislence which, as in lllc caso Lil lhc roilcltolliu ics irrrrl
the liberals, was aLso closcly associatcd wllh cullenl Politic l lll(l soclill iLl(ils irnrl
ideals h 1848 lhe ycar oI revolulion$, vlsi()rrl\'res lurncd ilclivisls
It
rnary factor in lhe developmenl of civiliTationlargely io the context of lhe natlon. Tbe concept
had been almosl synonymous wrth Europe as a
with natlonal borders lluroPean civillzation wils subdivi.led inLo valious rational
cultures.
The increashrgly louder caLl lor an extension ol the right to vote aDd for socill refonn also had a lal8ely natiollal iiNncwork oI lctiJrence- Mary advocales of
demociacy hoped ior the elevation of the people on I niLdonal sc^le.
During the lirst hall of the nineteenlh century, national Dovernents had a
predomutantly rofilerttic bias WhiLe the rcactiolary rumanlicists glonficd the
Cafholc Mi.ldle Agps and praised dle union of [ilone and altar, the progressive
romanticists lound tlreir hspiratlon in the ideals of Lhc French Revolulion, idets
let loose by the French llevolutior. A good examPle is Giuseppe Mazzru
(1805 72), the chaltrpion of the ILalian ,4rsorg;men ro llis ideai was tllal of an jn
dependent (arti Habsburg), [bel{ (anti clerical) and classless (anti feudal) unitecl
Italy After the failure of the 1830 revolt, he lled to MarseiLles where he fomded
the Yourg Italy lvlovement ln 1834 he started an IntemahoDal of progressivc
oationalists iD Switzerland 'fbis Drovement, whicb took the nar\te younq Europe'
included such Sroups as fornS Gernnny, Yttung Polattd and Youn1 ltdb'. Lrke \e
Jacobins of the French Revol tion, thcy believed in u versal h0nian rights and
the equality and lialemity of aLl peoples ([listoire tle I'Europe, p.325, cJGollwilzer, pp. 304 5)
l''l
We have already noted (see above) thlt tle national awareness and ideals of cos'
rnopolitanism of the laLe eightec fh cerLu.y revolutionary mentality seemed to
leave hardly any roon1 lbr the idea of Etuope It is rem.rkablc, lherefore. lhat haLI
a cenfury later the concept of liurope has d very prominent Positjon io rhe meli-
Thc rcvolution of 1830 rn Paris meant the eild of ihe ulira-royalisf regime of lhe
Rorrrhons and established lhe constituiional C)rl6anist monilrchy, in which Guizot
played a key role as chief miflister Events seemed to justify the liberal vrsion of
72
rrr
'fire nrcreasing denuutl lor JcnrocLacy and lor soci'l 'clomrs to hvr)rrr rh': b'{)r'l
Lower classes ol die poP lalior wetc also reurlbrccct l)v ctrlliog oIr Iiist(nv
'l'lrc i(lc^s of lhe Eulighlcnmc t ill lhe eighteenth century are also seen by Gulzot
ls progress, as a stage iD the liberalion of the human spirit. Neveflheless' he also
poirlts ottt lrow, ciuring the French Revolution, the absolute rule of radical ideas.
wiLhout account being late of other rights, made it possible for tyrarury to anse
Qlosanvallon, pp. 300 3).
ll
to
alion'
fltft
il
the (leleloplrerll ol Europc, bul in tilc late 1340s powerttrl clernocl-alic movements'
I
'
lrles Michelet (1798 1874) at one Iilne collaboratcd tnth Clujzot at ttre Sorbc'rne His
LlLnoire
worts were his monxrten(al llistoire de ltraNe (2,1 vols, 1833 57)
^t\d
tc la Rirolution (1 voLs, 18,17 53)
grcatesr
73
tllily of lhorclolutionarjcsoflS'18'lircliberaliorlofthecitizcflisLotakeP]ace.
withir lbD rri(xr rn(l vast layers of the populatiol are to ta](e part fu the national
c'rltLlle: lhe couotLf should reconcilc the socjal classes with olle anodlel
Srrbscqucnlly, ho\tovcr, lhcsc rcbom natiolls should becDme
ffi
Ulliler the inJluence of democratic ideals, an illportant change took Place iD lhe
historical perspechve of the i.l
century, the oriSin of EurcPe w
Fmpire. 'lhe eslablishment oI
considered to nark the starting
enth
wns
only
n
the nileteenth ccntury
The era of romantic idealism was over' The second half of
*^]l
civilization Grote' who had bccn a Member of Parliamenl
of widespreail deflocIatizalion' was the lirst to point out
the politicaL sig ilicance of Athens as lhe cradle of democracy
It is tfle rhat Greok civilLzalion had bcen hailed for |l lon8 time as tlre mothe' olthe cradle of EuroPean
and a fe(ent a(lvocote
movements 2lso
ao.t,inot"a by political realism The national liberalion
ffi
few years.
ffi
civiliza
nish the revolutionary appodl ol the collcelt of lbe history of a !'uropearl
in
Rorne
lhan
tion, with its ealliest roots in Alhens ralher
ffi
indicator'
We have come full circle Eulope iniLrally no more lhan a geographic
after
Centunes
warsthe
Persian
of
co[tert
the
in
lieedom
was lirst idcntified with
ilis identificatio had clisappeaLetl. it was replaced by the identi{ication of Europe
with Cluistendom tul(l strbsequently, in lhe erghtccnth century' with civilizatlon'
ffi
ffi
itil
ritfll
t:ssay I
ltrnce, Ilngland and the Nethcrlands were tumed irlto ationid citizens honl thc
half of 1be nineteenth century onwards. The entire educational system.
si:concl
ililr
fl
ffi
l)uilcling. Historical education ptayed arl important role in this process The srudy
of history had expanded enonDously during the nineteenth century atrd was now
being greatly encouraged arld filunced by national govemmelts Historiography
of
ancl ihe teaching of hisrory were given a lational resonance in the countries
Europe, whicb they still retain, Reflecting on the past was inseparable from lhe
perv;ive process of nation-buildilg. Ilistoriography became a kind of national
gerealogy, with cootemporarJ Politics as the starting point and the history of literature and art being viewed thJough the nineteenth century nationallst looking-glass-
l'he penod between 1871 and 1914 was one of amed peace The issue of
ffi
ffi
flil
ffin
ffiil
ill
,l
1li
'l'he creation of a 'United States of Europe' was propagate(l with cnthusi?rslic l"r
ln I848, but such ideas were votced even m ch later' for exarllP]c whcn lhc I'olislr
il
Fssay
revoll was crushed by the l{ussiarrs l| 1863 a]1d when the Solbians rose against
'Iurkish domination in 1876 The laller bloody event prompted Mctor Hugo to trrguc once nrorc in l'avour of the nccessity ol creating a Eur-oPcan lederation, 'on
*tri.tr n.....iry all phiLosophers agroe' The acts ol cixelty cor nitte(l in Scrtrir
prove thal Europe needs'Llne nationalit6 europdene, un gollvememelrl unl' trll lrllme se arbiftage frltemal, la a]6nlocratie en paix avec ellg-m6nlc.. ' ( li llnropejln
nationality, onited govemrnenl, grcal frirtemal arbilratlon democmcy llt Pcacc
with ltself') And Victor Hugo woqtd nof have been a true Frclchnral] lf he had
not slrggested Paris as the caP-li\I (Hisloire tle L Durope' Caq)cn{ier dnd Lebrulr
(eds), 1990,
pp
363-64)
'lhcre were other pleas like VicLor lluSo's. but dley had little el'fecL on Eurolean
polltics. I-eading politlcians considered theD unrcalistic iclens lroln fhe past, ong_
inating fro tirir naive jdeaLism ol 1848. Thal lhese idea's of a United States of
Europe, however old-fashiolred, would become very ]elcvant agdn r tlre t\'cnti
eth oentury. alter the horrols o[ two wol]d wara, could noL be lLnlicipated- DururB
the heyday of lralionlr.hs r, lberc lvls rlo r(x)r]] for supranltional organizalidlshis did rlot mean, ol'coursc, that Europee s lircked sell-conndelrce as EuropearsIl is rema-rkablc that in Gerrnimy, France, Iingland, Iraly, and elsewhere, therc ex
iste(l a decp rooted awareness of one's owll Ilation sh4ring a vague but comD)oll
Ijurcpcan destiny. Even tite ruost ardelt nationalistic polemics contained an el
cnlent o[ what one rnight call a 'EuroPean sous-cniendu' (ilnPlicit un.lerstandiLg
about Durolc): the idea that the lllropcal nrtions had in conmor their superionty
over non-E ropean naliorls PIovlcled the irnpetus for thcit rapi(l cxpitnsion olltsrde
"l
rope.
This leads to tho paradoxical conclusion fhat tht] era ol dsiDg Dationalism rs also
thc hrne oI boundless beliel in Eur'opeau sLrPrcililcy aLnd unlirniled Europcan self_
conndence lt was the Fra of ulprccedenled Europcan expansion. Progress calne Lo
be regarded as almost syronymous wjth E roPean civilizatioll lhe rdca was
widely held that the hisLory of tlre world had rcached it-\ highcsl level ol dcvelopnlnt ir1 EuropeDll civillzation- ErlroPeans were to lc^d the way clscwhcre as rhc
worid movecl lowilrds progrcss and crvrlizatiolt.
Europe's self-co {kleocc flourished, however, the secret underflining of
cultural assuledoess had begun Both wlltlin and outsjde EuroPe, new civllizations
were discovered. We have already iroted the emergence of Popular cultLlre in
Europe during the 1840s. Ar the encl of thc nincteendr centllry, non-Ifurope^n
peoples became lhe object ol exterNivc cthnographic studies, wlich accomPaoied
t}Ie colorization process 'l hese peoples also apPeared 1(] Posscss civilizalion m
wlile
At the begiruing oi thc nineleendr cenLrtry it was higitly untlsual lo use the plural
fomr o[ the tenn 'civilizatiorl' Durmg the sccond haif of the nheieeDlLl ceDtrry,
liowcyer, Ihe rllor,rls aid cusfoms o['prinitive' peolles also came to bc worthy of
the name cllt re. Besides Eur-opcan civilizatior, lhere ts a Ptimitive Cultt.[e,
whrch is also the title of Edward B. Nlor's Lamous antJrropological work. II mllst
bc ldrnitted, though, thrt i the EngLand oI 1871 lli! was still regarded as inl u u.sual application
abseDt
ilr'lylor's
work an(l he rcmalled faitlful to the idea of progress and EuroPean civilization.
'lb hull and rnost other ethnologists, etluology was a sciencc which sened the la_
horious, but nccessary and steady elevahon oi primitive peoples towards the blessings of European civilization. (E.B Ty1or, Prinitive Culture, Researches into the
derelopment of mythology, phiLosophJ, religion, drt and cuslom,2 vols London
1871) CI J. Leopold, Culturc in comparative and evolutionary perspect^)e: E.B
'Iilor and the makinS of primitive culnzre (Berlin, 1980).
It
of
Europe and .ivilLation ceased lo exrsl as a domrnant idea. The awareness oI crisis
was all-pervasive. even in ihose countries not directly involved in the war. Could
anybody be so insare as to still believe in uninterupted prcgress and the values of
so called civilizaiion after the hell of Verdtn? A sense of doom Prvaded Europe.
Europe was associated with degeneration arld decline. Yel even this feli]rg of de_
spair, that touched so maly, was a form of European self-awareness.
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tt
Frankretc h f 1756-,lE.l0),
PHII-IPS GAI-l-il
NOVALTS
an idea,Ednbutgh. Editburgil
L,lchtdruk
M[.LER,
GOLLWITZER,
taea
Paris, Galhmard
Garnier Flammarion.
ffi
MliRcAfoR, Eurtpa
StePlzen, Lomlon
(c{1.) (1947) Ad^nr Snrith: /,rqrrrf tuta the Nr,ture and Cousi|
sn.r(iMAN, rj. r(.
^.
I-ortdon.
ol rtu Weatrh o/ Natrr,'rrr,
sMrIH. A])AM scc: SELTGMAN, F- r{ A (cd.) (19a7)
it
II (Madrid,
1948)
Essay 2
The nation suqreme
The idea of EuroPe
1914-1945
Li
ll
ffi
lntroduction
lh
Professor den Boer demonstrated in the first essay how, from the late eiglrtee
a
nowas
de"J
It
of
in
the
shape
emerged
of
Europc
century onwards, a notion
each
I
I
t
m
fiorn
ffi
ffi
ffi
so are ttref perceptions of Europe itself
have just drawn a ilistinction between
Ettrope ard this will shaPe tbe argumer)t
Lwopel ntean how Europe is scen, how
82
afud
projects fL'r
R'J perceptions
of
Essay
Essay
1915
silce !!e resldct ourselves to discllssing how llulo|e ns lheolsclvcs have looked at
l]urope, I coukl also say Lhat thc irnagc covers a liuropcalr se]l underslanding, ol
growiig
suggcstlons
for change.'
ffiil
ffi
ffi
iltr
ilffir
ii
li
ilr
rnasses r-enralned
in-
ma11y
symparhedc illtellecruals could cven see a 'new Proletarjalr Europcan Lype' en]erge
in the discrpliled workel orgalized in the ]Ion-naiiondisl, all-Europea Seconrl
Lllemational.
man lookdcl pla[sib]e: newspapers, tclcBrePhi, trains aDd
tr^vel brought people closer'lo cach othct arrd the worLd almost visibly seemed to
shrink. Stetar Zweig givcs ar excellenl descnption of the infellcctual nlood:
,{ new brotherirood of
as
if
To many post wat observers, the last decades before tie outbreal of war in 1914
looked like a haven of innocence. These years have been described as a golden
era: 'obvionsly tie happiest time in the development of the European society'
(KrejEi, 1931, p 214)- There is dfinitely more than a tinge of rostalgia in such
staternents, bnt the conlrast in atrnospherc before and after the war must have been
huge At thc tum of the century, a feeling of oplimism and firm belief ir progrcss
seems to have prcvailed in most European counries: impresswe technological ancl
scientific advances allowed for a huge overall increase in wealth, which gave lhe
tw
Europahild
approxinately from
'
l)eL.deen
lo eoloy s[ch
In \tenoa we shoutcd wilh joy when 816 ot flew over thc Channei
he had bec| our o\an hero; becausc of our pride jn the successtvc
chiulce
Euope 1911-1945
counties sociat legislation bad been adoPled and ,rs the social
dcrnocratrc pades tume.i 'refomisa and were lolerated in the poliLrcal syslem,
tr
ffi
^
bathrooms. and lelephones The
rnense, Lrut
It\
iddlc classes
'idea of Europe'
inspired bv Heinz G
p
while
(Gollwitzer, 196'1,
lstes
e of Europe"
es
However, tbis was oDly half fie lruth. Thc process oI tapid rndustnalizatron,
whicb revolunonied all aspec$ of liie m thc nineteenlh century, helped both lo
create and to dcstroy a feeliog of 'European ness'. It fostered rf tfuougb soch
things as compulsorJ schooling irnd inrproved communications, which gavc increasilg nurnbers of pl]oplc a rudlmentarJ knowledge oi Europe geography and
politlcs It also helped to undennile it because, as r.vc have seen in Pim den Boer's
essay, lndustnalizatid[ was bouud up with the process of nation building and
this drd Dor lead to European soli(Lrity but t.i a lierce lationalism, replacirLg lhe
castnopalitdnism of elrlier ccnturics.
the
'l'rue,
upon Lhe cirLt of naked lorce in inlcrnationll relations.
nineteenth cenfury colsti(utionalism and respcct lor thc law appeajed to
contribute aLl elleclivc salegLrard of lntemlL ]ihefiy and secudty Yet, if
tlre inlemaiiotral systetD \{as exposed lo the caprice of fbrcc' intemal
ecoDomic and political secudly was nre!itablY ieoprrdized
'lielly was lhnost uliibntrly fslt as il gteat inj stice in Germrny and its re
visio hecirnle a rnaior polilical obieclive atl tluougtr the inter_war periocl
The rcstoration of Poiand was part of a national reconstruction ol turope'
which took placc in the name of lhe Wilsonia[ principtes of nationa] self
.letemrination- A whole number of small lalion states were creatd on the
ruins of the Tsnrist and the Hapsburg Empircs; but, o[tcn' thefu borders were
ihawn to weaken the losers Gemany, Hungary, tuld Austaia rather than to
satrsfy ethnic cnteria. In faci, the establishment of a smallr Austria was a se
lire violatioD of the principle of nltiodal self-determination since an over
\ahelming part of the cottnlry's population preferred an Anrcihrsr (co rection)
'ri
with Germany.
mins.
Il
Wilson (185G.1924).
The intervenLion o[ the USA o the side of fle Allics had a dccisrve iln|act on the
war and demonstraled that the old Duropean era was grlduaLly giving way lo a
new Westem oI Atlantic one- Aiso, Wilson introduced a new elemenl in worlLl
polihcs: politics bascd on mor-al pdnciPlcs, raiher than on lraditional powci To
irini, the goal oI the war w^s rrot so much b deieat Gennany as to iDal the
'lbis was most
world safe lor clemocracy', i c to orelte a new' jusi, workl order'
proloundly exFessed ill Wiison's idealistic 'lourteen poirrts' speech to Congress
ol 8 lonuoty 1918, which demanded the greatest possible autonomy lor tle peoples oI Europe and the ccssion of Gc ran colonies il Aliica IIcc trade and d;c
arnament ancl fiDally tlic creation of ^ I eague ry' Ndlionr to ])lotect the liberly of
all alioDs alrd to secure world pcacc lhough based irl Geneva and heavily domi
at a
Dated by the European powers, the Lel8ue of Natio s represe ted xn attemPt
I
Jrad
The
l'eague
soLution
Etuopean
a
specifically
than
orcler
tather
global peace
iertain modesi success during the lg20s, but as intemdiional confficts got tougher
in the mid-1930s its impotence becarne obvious And lrom the very beginning it
the
w^s a severe blow 10 WilsoD ard the League that the USA refused lo ratify
covenarlt. lnsicad the USA withdrcw into isolalionism for two decades
'l'lro Covenant o[ ihe l,caglre oi Natiolls was Pan oI the Versailles lieaty, bui ur
spite of tLre rbetorjc the Peace featy was wrllten more in t]re tradltronal spirit
nl *inn"rs nnd losels tlnn in the spirit of idealtsm Bntain aDd Fr:artce insisied
ol
oo inposrng veLl harsl conclitions on the beaten encN) wiih the Purpose
re_
tbc
whole
givetl
wirs
Cermany
*"ot"uing C",-ouy :rs rnuctr as Posslblesponsibility for tLle war, and the counlrl had to accept to Pay enonnoLrs relAr
tu th" victorious powers. lirlrthermolc, bits of whaL had lraditioDally beetr
"iiou,
regarded as Gcrman te[itory hacl to be ceded io Po]and and severe restriclioos
*J.e p.'t on the size oi lhe (;erman amly Not sutPrisirgly. the
86
Versailles
'lhe jrnmediate resDli of bo r rhe war alld the following peacc treary was courplete
years fle
chaos in Gcrmany and most of the newly established countries For four
lrench rernained intransrgent io their demands for repararions alfiough it was oll
vious that a Germany ridden by hyperinflation and extreme Political instability
could not possibly pay. ln Jmuary 1923 French lroops cven occupied thc Ruhr
Basin, butlt was an opcrarion from which they reaped nothi-ng positive
Ilut
new
nations, the Bolsheviks called for a class war in every counry, ald so dre rnete
existe ce of tie Soviet state became a direct challenge to liberal denocrats ilnd k'
nationalisls of all kinds.
2
Conmrunism prcsenlcd rtself as a modern phelomenon' an ideology that offercd
prescription for lhe futurc The sarne is txe for Fascism, the most mdical anli
bohhwik movernent bom after fhe war- Fascists in ltaly and elsewhere' aud later
Neiional Socialists in Gelmany, colNidered lhemselves to be the most efficienl
'nd
expression
of
ffi
I
t
t
ffi
n
ffi
ilffi
ilil
ruPet'te
w'
ntc 'eaa
'-utaPc
tJt+-tJ+J
A civ;l war with Europear implications (lhough fL,ught rnore io the ramc of ideol
ogics than in the anle of EuroPe) did tzke Place lr Spairl 1936-1939 All lhu
SoYlet Union and Nazi Gemany gave
aclivc supporl to the Republican and !'ascist causes respectively' but the liberal
clemocracres refused to help tlre Republican government in Madnd and, accord
ingly, were accused by pro-Republican activists of indirectly supPorling Franco
maJor E[ropean powers were involved.
fhe
I
flilil
fr
ffi
tffi
Septernber 1939 a new European war broke out when Hiller attacked Polturd
slral:lge rapprochmeta between Gennaiy llnd
^
tlre Soviet Udo , as Molotov and Ribbentrop in August 1939 signcd a treaty of
nofl-aggression, which secret]y divided Poland and the rcst of edst-central Europe
inlo 'spheaes of influence' and paved the way for Hitler's war. In spite of fierce
British resistarce it looked as if Iltler was close 10 complete victory' but his a-s
sault on the Soviet Union in June 1941 proved less successful ihan filst expecled
The Brirish-soviet alliance that ensued was reinforced by the USA a{ter the
Japanesc attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. Once agarn Europe ha(l1o
rcly on outside forces until American and Soviet soldiN $hook hands in Berlin
(May 1945), thereby signalling the complete defeat of Nazi Germaly and dre enrl
of the Fascist epoch. ranco's rcgimc persisted rn Spain rntll his death io 1975'
but it became incEasinlly obvious ttrat its survival was an anachronism, and thc
same might be sard of Salazalr's Fascist regime in Portugal, w]rlch cmmbled after
his retirement in 1968.)
Also .roc,.rlirr
p.
162).
ernaLiar,rtlisnt as explessed
in the
Second
Inlenational quickly
evaporated as the ParliamenLary Social Demouatic parties all voted for wm Sorne
socialists, especrally in the shong Ge[nan and Auskian pafiies, even saw lhe wiu
l$ a short cut lo soclalism since wartime economy would require strong state plan
corld be jusiilied ar
Diog and cootrol And so the war aod a Gema. victory
an histolically progressive and necessary step towards the desired goal' In tlre first
years of the war, socialist opposilion to it was uNignificant.
lilH
ilffi
iil
flffi
il
I
1l
flt
'Ihe First World War sent m lioos of young men to their slaughter; but io ad
dition, on the home fronts, the whole populahons of the walriug counkies were
mobifzed and involved to a degree hithefio ulknown
This had sevcre ideological repercussioDs. The values of nineteendl century liber
isrn were swep! aside ds war hysteria SnPped lhe combatants. Nationalists saw
in lhe war al opportunity to purify the nation and to fnd a new spiritual commun1ly above thc hite and petty conflicts of everyday ]ife. National self worship and
the call for uiity Led to demands for disoipline ald stro[8 men-'Ihe enemy was
srneared in every possible way: in Germaly, a 'Hassgesang gegen England' (i.e.,
BB
It is
'Ihe 'war's economic prison' mentioned is the economic blockade upheld by thc
Since
secondly, Mifteleuropa was just one arnong many Gcmran foreign Dolicy options
md noithe most inlluential- Wrlhelnine policies during the war had other aims'
the rlirect poljtical impacl of Naumano's proposals We will in
whiih modified
fact meet a toetic vision of Euope rathcr lhan a htlL lolidcal Proiect'
/i/rr?nle powe$, and primarily Britain, agaiNt the Central Powe$. lt added economic warfare to thc long list of means ernployed in the conflict and contribuied
severely to the want and starvation;n Germany and Austrra in the later yea$ of
the war. lhe blockade meant an end to Gennany's colonial dreams and demonstratetl how much Gemany and Austria werc dependent on domestic resources'
Naumzmn propounclecl ihat the more or less accidental military union o[ Gennany
end Aust a-Hungary could be tumed into associations of real solidarity leading to
a better po
a political
the fuhue,
economic cooperation. Naumann did not exPect the war to lead to lastir)g peace or
harmony
in
he welcomed thc Balkan States and, perlups later, belligerent Italy ilr
il.ii
ilil
llilil
his
Mitteleuropa.
Naumann was careful not to go inlo conslituilonal niceties and lett quEstions srrch
as nationality problems to the separate states, but ihe Or?/rtdl ('overstate') hc
euvisaged was a somewhat loose coDfederation deaiing first of all with ecoootnic
A Gennan'MilteleuroPa' ot a 'Mitleleuropean'
ilenlions hate nat
antl opponents ol hit
I question
oJ
lllillt
tl
tiill
-^i"'."ono.i"
togelhe(!
to live
prisnn,
*.
edn'
2137)
Gemran rationalisrn
9l
90
l,,i
Lssay
lhe ualion
tl
Lssay
ha[nful and un
fl
does not
lere we find the manl problem in Naumann's argumelt: Naumalu hirnsell
to
rnake it clear whether ihe confederation envisaged was a goal ir itselt or a mears
granted
fbr
much
so
hegemony
sccrrre German interests. Naumann took German
Europearr peo
llllrt lre was completely unable to
ld not lead to a
ples tlrrrt tbe tbreseen German
s obvious:
tlirect Germal Herlrclaf ('rule'). In
I
ffi
persuad
Vorherrsch
this
ililr
ffi
lu'
tirreatened
(Naumann, 1gr5;
1g16
e.rn, p ttrJ)
lll
book
Natronalisis attacked hrm lbr giving up 'natural' Gemran irnperialisr demands and
lirr weakeniug the Gelman race, whereas the Social Democrats found his project
irrrperia]istic, even though they were generally moderatc in theh condemnatio s'
Ycr otlrers crttLcizerl him ftir stuving so hard for Miileleuropean self-sufficiency
that it woukl leave the rcgion isolated fiorn futemational free Lrade, an argument
Naumann later tried to parry' In spite of such citicism and his own political misfoflulrcs, Naumarn never gave up his vislon. In an article written after the collapse
of Germany alld Austria Hungary he very unsentimenta]ly bade 'auf Wiedersehen'
Lo Mitteleuropa while still believing tbat the lives a.nd economies of Getmans,
Czechs, Hunganans and South Sldvs would continue to be sufficiently inteltwined
to make some kind of supranational coopera(on Decessary (Naumann, 1918, 1964
edn, pp. 976j0.
T. G. MasaryR's 'New
'l
(i
I)hrlosoPlr(:r
Masaryk (1850-1937), wbo lr 1914 had gone roto cxile lo fighl lor ln lrtilcp(rt
dent Czechoslovakia. Masulk Llltcw very woil llllll wiLhotrl 'r (:oltlPlclo tc
organization of east centr al Europe brs drcaln lbr I rn(leperlllcnl alzechoslovirlir
would rernain unreahzed, so hc tried lo prese[l his ob]cctivcs in il broa(ler
European frrmework- Florn February 1916 tbe hiskli:ur R. W Seton Walson irn'l
other Britrsh supporters oI thc sllall Slavic peofles Published' af Masaryk's te
quesl, a joutnal. l-he Nc\r, EuroPe llorvever, Ibr a long tlme it wa's hal(l to sup_
pLet1]ent the entl AusLnan Ptopagumda wrtll !iable altematrves sincc llritam,
France and Russia had co[flictiDg ambilions ill the region. But the collapse of tlx]
formltion liom merlieval and arthoritfiiao fonns of rule (which lic lerned
'lheocracy') to rnode democracies ln modem demociacy, he said, freedorn
Masaryk described a Europe in the [udst of a hugc cultural and polilical lrans-
ffi
ffiflr
ltE
ClDe
ill,l
Euroqe'
NaumaDn's book was aLnost unmediately translated into EnSlish In Bilair rnd
clsewlrcre, Mitleleuropd was prcsented as a piece of exteme Geman irnPerialisln ard a pan-Geman threat io Allied national interests. The main war objective of the Entente powels was to preveut German hegernony in Europe' btt
when il carne Lo Austria_Hungary their inlentions were less cleal The general
lrend was to support any split belwecll lhc lwo Contlal Powers buf not to allow
In colrtrast, Bntan, France and, not least, Wilson's USA were presented as em_
bodiments of modern democlalic pnnciples at all levels of society So MasaJyk
could iDlerpret the war as nothing less than the logical culmrnation oI llre confllct
betwccn 'theocracy' and democracy So long as l{ussia had a Tsarist regine, hs
Lhcory dld rot fully hold Hence the Russian revolutioo ol March 1917 was highly
we]comed by Masaryk Russia could now be preseDted - with a iot of wishlirl
ilnDking - as belng otr the road (o democracy Also the Bolshevik L,lkeover in
November 1917 was a lurther boost Thlr Bolshev {s initially supPorted dre principle of national self deleminatron, and the revolutionary cbaos rn R ssie made it
acutely necessary for ihe Allies 1(] have reliable fnends belween hoslile Germarly
zrnd red Rrssia
'Drang nach Osten', oflginaly rreanng )ddrnrlrs for thc tsast, has also col11e lo
mcan erpatLtLon, N 'p sh' towards dre East, with the sense of breaking oui of a
restdcted aroa lo a llace where ltrere wrll be n)orc sp^cc furd freedom, at LeL)enstaunl
'?
(hviag space)
of
oI a larger nation livinS, outside thsir compatriots' tedtory, who h the-interosts.
protection
fu1l
that
and
suggested
full nartns would hav; to accept minority status)
of these mirorities' rights would suffice to avoid conflicts
ment,
no clear mandate from Europe it restricted itself to calls for economic cooper
ation as a basic conclition for later fedral measures_ Il soon fell aPa'l when news
about clashes between rival national interes(s in EuroPe reached the delegates'
hacl
Though making plans for Europe' Masaryk put gleat emphasis on America's .politicaliole in the conmon Euro Amencan civilization, and in this resPect his views
ale more 'Westem' than lraditionally 'Erxopean' But like most ofhis contempor
European
aries, his horizon never hanscended cullures based oD Christianity and
trarlitions He condemn ed Turkey aE kultu'fTemd und borbartsch ('alien to culture
aboDt extending the
and barbarian'), and said nothing about the colonial system or
chltures
non-ENopean
to
pnnciple of lational self_determination
and
In both Naumam's and Masaryk's Proglammes the elements of exPediency
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I
I
I
Post-war plans for European unity (1923-1930)
i!
Preussischer Kulturbesitz Berlin)
94
iuppor"Afy,'ttti
I
I
t
t
I
I
I
I
I
I
Essay
cult[res
i[
reality minority
proble$s, murual drstrLrst and Post war economic collapse soon exposed tle difficulty of drawing the line betweon nalional self-realization and nalionalistic expansionism. Little became of disarmament Plaffi and economrc cooperation as the
tholsands of miles of new borders in Europe were soon follified with amries and
customs barriers The ljbral Italian ex prefiuer Francesco Ntti in 1922 lamented
trc thorou|h Balkanization of Europe (Nird, 1922, p- 51) and post war EuroPe
seemed hardly on the verge of becoming a pluralislic and prosPelous community'
Nevefiheless, the Pinciple of democracy wdr streDgihened ir Europe after the
First World War, and optimistic spirits could hope that war and the succeding difRculties had made all Europeans understand t]re ne.ed for cooperation ln the years
of European rccovery after 1923 a number of programmes for a united Europe was
introdu;ed, the most influential being the one sponsored by the founder of the
Pan-European Union, Count fuchard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894-1972) We will
ftrst of all exarune Coudenhove-Kalergi's ideas and then show how his proposals
were given political welght by the Frerch politician Aristide Briard.
l
t
t
I
The necessary nroder[rzalion of lhe political systen of Europe would havc lo con-
be
ii
peaceful world. He was, however, soor disaPpointed by both the lag e and the
disruptions in Europe and he became convinced that only a politically united
Europe could overcome the continent's Foubles. A convinced activist,
Coudenhove-Kalergi argued for the creation of a Pan-European Uniot as an international pressure group, in his innrelri'al Paneuropa, fust published in 1923.
Coudcnhouve-Kalergi's approach was essentially Polilicat: although he frequently
used llistorical analogies and argumenfs, he did not use the past itself as a basis for
his ideas. He seemed to take Europe so much for granted that he never had to ask
',) this entity ought to be sfiong. He obsefled that the historical era of European
world supremacy was ovet and tbat tbe supremacy of the white race had beEn
broken. But the decline of Europe boih could and should b halted in order to pre
vent the continent ftom becoming a mere plaltiing of world politics lo an indirect reply to the Gemar philosoPher Oswald Spengler (188G-1936) and his
iryunensely popula.r book Unterlan| dcs Abendlandes (The Decline of the West,
1918), he alluded to the root of the problem as well as the cure:
The cause of Europe's decline is political, not biological Europe is not
dying of old age, but because its inhabitants are killing and destroying
one another wiih the insmrments of modem science. The peoPles of
Euope are not senile it is only thek political sysiem that is senile. As
soon as the latter has been radically changed, the complete recovery of
the ailing Conlinent can and must ensue.
(Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923; 1926 dn, p xii)
Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in his hefi'tJ in the late 1920s .indefatigable in his agitation for d united Europe (credrt: Sulde tscher Verlag,
!4unich)
orlr.r l)rrls ol llrc worl(1. llrilirin by controllilg the coloDics, rud Paleuropirby
proritlirrg llrc IrLrrnarr rrtw lnrttritl lor lheir dcveloPmerlt. Brilam also was [o scr've
ns a rncrliator bdwcclr I'rrrtnlclicr and Paneurofa, shce all ttnee shar-ed the samc
culturc and thc silmc dcllloclat'rc vflltles And if Bdtain sbouLd somehow lose its
empire, its inclusiod iD I'itncuropa wo ld seelrl natural ld obvious'
Coualenhove
Itr
ffi
I
fi
Great
ffi
ffi
chalgeable.
ffi
ffi
bal economy
rm
s8
iiill,
lill
I
uPtc)tc
Lssay
the naItoD
'uprcn1e:
lttl tu4'
'is
ilii
to
philosophy are obvious, but Cotldenlrove-Kalergi makes Europe Dot the nation
the conslitunt socio-cultual enlity and he does allow for historical charlge: irr
1923 he was jn doubt about wheE to place l\rkey, but in his 193'1 book Kemal
Atatitut's new'I'ulkey is bade welcome in pohtical and cultulal Europe!
..s
.9S
.6h
<L
d:
!
E
l
I
I
I
I
t
I
ff rG
3 St
e i.:
E
EI
.: d2
S": $
qF !:
!sq
.c,
i Fr
*ol. _:
*TU'
t' '-n
G.ri
Y
tss
:!\\
r:e
t !2
];a<
gh;:
i J-n
.9
-d
ffi
YSF
flffi
ffiil
Y:e.
ia\-!1.
l!s;
: s]l
and patriot. For small concessions of sovercignty all countrics woul'l prosfer
economically and obtaln a lasting peace, aDd ther nalional culnues would benclil
fiom the free exchange with all the otier European schools. Conversely, the cnenrics of Paneuropa would be {ound to the exireme left (among the Communists) nnd
to the right (among the miltajists and national chauvinists), but predominantly
among those groups who were economically dependent upon customs borders nnd
cconomic protectionism. Coudcnlrove-Kalergi had great confidence in the soclal
democrats, so l s main appeal in 1923 was lo the denocratic non-socialist pilrtie\
iu Germany and Fmnce to abslain from revanchism or rcvengo A huge coalifion
'' of democrats across all Europeall borders was needed in a common defencc
rgninst deshuctive extrenists.
In sum, Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pineuola was an astonishing mlxhrle of largescale Utopianism, potent polilical analysls and clear-sighted pragmatism: for instarce, he suggested the use of Engiish as a corDnlon second laDgxage in Europe,
since it would be irnpossible to solve the rivabies between the major conlinental
languages and he prodicted that EngLish wolrld become the pre-eminert global
mears of communication an1'way. Idea[stic in his belief in EuroPean brotherhood
and in the possibility of global harmony through some balance of the suPerpower$,
he also unlesitatingly accepted lhe colonial system, perhaps with some underlying
assumpfior that Aftica (blus natlve America rrd Australia) had produced no cul
mre comparable to the four world cullutes that he rccognized: European, Arab,
Indian, and Chinese.
The stratcgy of inlLrencilg first of all the political and clrltural 6lites Proved fruitlul, and in France Coudenlove-Kalergi nanagcd to wln fie sympathy ot two lead_
ing politicians, 6douard Hetriol (1872-1957) and Aristide Briand (1862 1932).
the
honorary president
Brrand
1927 er/en accepted thc position
Pan-European Union- And generally, ftom the nid 1920s France pioneered poL{ical effortJ io establish networks of brord, institntiolalized Europeal cooperation.
in
oI
of
The First World War had a profound impact on French lotrons of Europe. For four
ye4Js, French teiriiory had been lhe nain birttlelield alrd le coufltry had suffered
ln
nfil
ffi
T
T
I
I
I
4t$trJt
BriLt d-
rcn, h
inn
Pari.r).
102
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Lsrdf
rt)c
ttatutt.LrlJtc)tlE
t')-
^'cd
lt
LLtuPc
tit+
tal'|
iLI
ScnoDs pan-European initiatives had to wait until Aristide Briand took the lead in
the late 1920s In a speech to the Irague of Nations in Geneva on 5 Septernber
1929 hc called for the creation of a sorl of federul link belween the European na
tions. Briand fust of all stressed that the time was ripe for closer economic cooP- '
eration- Four days later, the speech was lbllowed by a dirBct political idtiative as
Briand invited a]l Europea[ forcign [unisters represented in the League of Nation$
to infomral discussions on the subject of Euopear unity Bnald's proposals were
well aeceived in a ooncofirmittal way and he was authoized to prcpare an ofiicial'
memorandum wiLh specilic proposals for thc EuroPean governments to con$ider'
iffi
flfli
ilil
tl
I
I
il
Briand's memorandum was ready by I May 1930 In his prefatory remarks, B tuid
mentlons the danger to stabiliry and security inherent in the present division of
Burope into a Large number of competing small states Awareless of such factors
as commolr racial backgrourd, common civilizatlon and geographical proximity
should point these stales in thc direction of cooperation rather than conlenliorl
Ilowevet despitc hrc high-flown visions, Bnald's specilic proposals werc modesl
Firsl, lhe European govenxnents were to prepare and ratify a treaty, establishirlg
lhc p.mciple of r European 'moral union' and confirming the solidifity of lhe
govemirents to
l)arhrers involved Funller, the reary was to oblige the EuoPean
holcl rcgular rneetlngs. The main organ for this cooperatioD w;ls to be a 'EuroPean
corrlerence'for all participarltJ. Between ifs sessions a smaller, pelmment'Politi
cal corumitlee' with rts own secretariat was to take carc of day to day business.
Finalty, the goals and the motives behind this cooperation were to be formally
confimed. aud Briand listed a whole number of issues ralging from customs ar
rangemenls to hygiene to academic and political exchange programmes, which
co ld be treated iD this Europeao forum. Unlike his Geneva spe,ech, Briand now
gave absolute prcfereuce to political issues, especially peace aod secunry, and dernanded tlre subordination of economic mafters to politics. A potitlcal rapprochemzrl was seen as a precondition for the creaLioD of a Europeall common market
But suryrisingly, Briand hardty gave the proposed European associatiol any
competeDce at all- Ffst of all, Briand rcpeatedly sbessed that by no meaos was
his assocration lo compete with thc Irague of Nations On the contrary, Le deDranded a 'subordination of the European association to the kague of Natiolls',
iurd rnade membership of the League a prerequisirc for participation m the
Union Nor was the European association to take over any responsibilities of the
League
ir
ljr his political desiglrs, Briam! pul !lrcxl cIrrl)h sis (nr I]rilrslr
process
ttoubtedly rootect
ln
at
reir crpettse
Briand's memoraldun was passe{] lo the Europcan govcllllnells, who wcrc asketl
to rcspond- Simultaneously, suppolters of the proposal c P^igned wiclely oLr its
bchalf and debale irl the Elr(opean press wir's Lively Bli^nd was hefcd by hts t:olol'
league Eclouard llonlot, who pubLsltcd a lengthy and dctailed sttrcly in suPporl
partthe
of
lhe
suPpofiers
the
very
leasl'
(Eurttpe,
At
1930\'
Bdand's ptoposals
Eulopealr rdea were successflll in maKng all Eutopean govemments glve serious
pere received
consider^tion to the question, alld in thc fbllowing monlhs lepiies
lrorn all thc twenty_six govemrnents who had becn asked
The resDlt was prcsenled by France in a report of 8 September 1930 General1y
speakmg the recepLiorr was poljte, but lar tiom ovcrwhelming. There was a willingness to go on with the talks, b t rl was obvious that the adherenfs of lhe
Leagxe ol NatioDs teft no need to supPort a Po"ential lival. Technically, mosl
governments cniicizeal tlie strborihnation of politios to ecooomics Some de
(Jfhers stessed rhe ju
malded that eco;oDic jssues be accorded a clcar p oriry.
of
slates asked for tlre
number
poLiLtcs
A
and
of
econornics
terdependence
incluiion of Turkey iD the process, while Cermimy .rnd llaly requested the ifclusion of tbe Soviet flruon as well- Most hesitant ir lLer overall approach to
Bnarcl's suggestions were Itely and the lIK. A {ew days latcr in Geneva, Bnand
lried to persuilde the League ol Nalions to cstablish a 'Europcan Council' as a first
slep in the process, bul British resistance allowe.l for no nlore than a 'Study
Comnission for tho European Union' under Lhe auspjces of lhe League and wit)r
Briand as president 'Ihe commission hlld a coLlple of Deetings over tlle next year
before
it wound up its
acr.ivilics-
llcrur 13rugttrarr. Listo ttvc tea.on' wh) rlolhing c:lmc ol lbls p-m Eulopc.ur inilial
ivo (BruBmans, 1965, P1l. 56i'.):
1 The mai advocates of the proposal quickly i-lisappeared from lhe scene:
Stresemann died in 1929, and Bri.rod gradually faded froN the political sce e
belore dying itr 1932.
rlld lcw
wele
villirg
lo
,l 'l'hc ccononrLc *orLLl crisis scl il1 reusi g lrlilss unelnPloyment arxl unrcsl nrr']
lorLlnP !uv.nl'rrenl l' l rA' lrrolP',i"lr; rr'" lrlt \
5 Partly ns a resrtLt of tlris, National Srualism began ro gain gourd in Gennany
ilr
with its virulcnt natiorlllljsrn alrd rcvanchisln- Once the Nazis scized Irower
a
or
a
Briand
ideirs
of
fcderal
tol
lbe
ltdt
uas
uo
roorn
1933,
lherc
January
Couclcnhovc Kalcrgi.
ol
To these file reaso[s we nrusi add a si,rth thc resjslalce of fhe Leaguc
dlal
to
a
btre|ucracy
Nxtions
fotential
lt
It coll(l bc clllirlleLl lhore was filore scope lor discussions about [ulopeanism ltl
l\4ussolini's llxly than rn Ijitler's Gernany- Although Mussoiini boasted abort lhc
crcaLion oI a stoLo tohlildria ('totalitaria state'), lhe intensity of totalitarian con
trol llr ltiJy rever got ne2tr lhe level expeienced in GennaDy. But, orl tire other
hand, the w soon dcmonsbated that only the opi iol of Nazi Germany lltrltcled-
Nazi 'Neuropa'
B.rsically, National Smialism was a Prograrnme for Gennany and not for
llurope. Ililler had lwo prirnary goals: ta cleanse the Gennan racc lion't irltcri'rt
elernelts, such as Jews ancl Gypsics (and German life from the irllue'Dce ol
Jevish Folshevrk thi kiDB) and to create t Germat Lebensrttum by cxPT ndirg Lo
thc !ast. This exheme B/rll uwl Boden nationalismus ('blood and soil nalrcoil
ism') coul(l nol toleratc ideas of trans national conrnunities, and 'Paleutopir'
and simitar projecls were coldenmcd by }litler as degeneraie Jewish attenPts lo
subvert thc Gennan people by raciaL mixture
The qncst lot racial purity was so extrcme that Ilitler cbndemned any ilrtegr'ali('rr
even beLwecn'blood relatcd'peoplcs like dre Germalic. He dismissed suggestioos
thili onc oJ the 'racially valuable' EuroPeao great Powers could by force and assLuilation create a Lmited Burope with the argtDent that suclr a ntxtlrrc even il
il only includc(l related taces .. would lead to fhe degeneraiion of ttre rrrling trce
and tlrrs i.leplivc the project oI any possible value (Foerster, 196), yt 24'l)'
fron
E rope,
(ier nran
marked,
w;rs r(:rrl
Itrrd the
lhc
ti(,xs rro
f llrrroPe
into two Living spaces, a pa1r German and a Mediteranean pan-ltaliau, but he care(i
ol
httie about the soullt.'l'ollitler, o ly a Gcrnan dimerlsion mattoled; thc ellorfs
dilferclt
SS idco]ogNts ro lacially deterDine a d assess the quality of lhe
Gerf]anic tril)es in F.uroPe was more lo Himmler's tnste LhaD io thc F'iihrer's
tle
With tiis in
lalcr
1o
nf
a-sk
lalnent:
cr'ist'"tl
1l/n\/,'v /,roJ,
,L/2J
o7
106
tl
I)unn8 the war, lhe concept of Iiuropc ^PPcnrs
rn Geman propa8anda ralr by drc Allics-
tu)
Iniiially, lollowing
thal
atrty h:rzy about qosstions concernlng lhe lcvel of Political indePendence
common
to
a
Fferences
coun'Jies
AnLl
Cennan
non
to
llle
be
would
Branted
Europe wer" systenatically omilled froll-i doncstic German lrolaganda'
agam purely in
The atLack on the Sovict Union brought aboul yct anolher cltange,
p
(i955'
259)' that rhe
notes
srumental, ill Nazi Buropean propagalda Kluke
o[ Europe, and iD a 1936 speech Hrtlel even used an expression that, much laler'
ililfr
a housc
In many countries, and not least in Britaln, this propaganda was not without
t
ffi
ffi
ffi
tffi
ffi
ffi
lrlllh
rl
lii
il
tr)
suc
cess. ln 1918 19 Bdtain had ben more reluctant than France and lhe USA to en
dorse the splifiurg up of central and eastem Europe, aDd
'New Europe' remailed low. The incalculable consequence
tional self-deteftunation looked ralher less attract(ve than
soml. European great power accord or equilibrium ln 1938 several aftempts were
made to persuade Germany io accept her share of responsibility fbr tbe Europem
order, culminating in the Munich crisis of September 1938, when Germany, Italy,
France, and Britain decided upon the fate of independent Czechoslovakia without
reference to that unfoffunate country. Two commeots illusrate the level of official
British c gagement in Europe at that timel Neville Chamberlarn, talking about
Ci eahoslovaki4 refered to 'a qudrrel ill a far-away country belween people of
whom we know notlung', and his brother Austen Chamberlan, echoing Bismarck,
had earlier spoken complacently of a place 'for which no British GovefiIment ever
will or ever can nsk the bones of a Bdtish grenadter' (he was referrinB to the
Potish corridor in 1925). The deshuclion of democratic Czechoslovakra was not
considcred an issue big enough 1o justify a new war'
fteedom.
Denrnark
(All tlrese exptessions are taken from a Nazi leaflel' published ill
in 1941.)
Aftcr some uritial success, the ability to mobilize people rn the occupied countries
declined as it bocame evident lhat slogans aboui the comolon Erropcao economy
masked an ever nlore ruLI ess Geman exploilalion- The proPaganda was rornnrk
'Behind the en(m\/ po\rets - lhe Iew German!'s politital and ilitory enemies
trig,ht change, hut Nazi prapaganda nerer forSot the racist care oI its illcology
(r:rciit: Biltlarcluv ['t eussischer Kulturbesilz Berli]1)
rotivc ol 'tlrc slrtiSglc oi dlc pcollcs of Ilulolc agaillsl bolshevism" di(l not +
pcrr in Gcrnra[ propagand^ utrtrl it vas rcpo ed that some rlon colununisl circles
rn the occupicd co ntries wclcomcd the assault Ftorl then on- Hider could he
'markerr.d' as the stardard bcrrer oJ E roPean cultwe and, aftr Staliogmd, as
Europe's delender hon lhe Eastern menaoe. In a speech il Ber)in on 30 January
1942.
Hitier said:
This tin]e it is not a war we arc hghtlng just on behalf of our owo
German people. bxt a struggle lor the whole of Europe and thus for the
whole of civilizcd hurn:urity
(Ili
er. quote.l
in Schlrc, )992)
In tiris way Geman soldiers, and SS volufltee$ (WafTen SS) from olhcr countries,
werc actually seot to dic 'for GerDany and for Europe' a1 Statingrad and in Berlin.
Once again, the Nazi use
10
cus lir liuropo wide, anti-Fascist agitatior' Generally speakiDg' public ilrlerest rn
und support for lede|alist proliramnles for Europe reached an absolule low in the
1930s
Only the rvar led fo a revitalizatior of the plans fot European unity Walter
Lipgeru, in a vely thorough study (Lipgens' 1968)' describes how the voice of
rrnity was echoed in almost all European resistance nrovements and how the demands for a federal European order werc expressed with quite a differcnt accent
from that oI the interwar years They were all primarily motivated by mo'al or
ideologrcal arguments, which shessed ttle need to overcome the narow and de_
structive pover of the nation state and tbe need to secure bumal dghts and indivrdual frcedom against all instif tions. '
iil
limiteil centralist German rule on the contiDeni But we should not fall
how attractive this propaganda was in its various phases.
ffi
Anlisemitism was not confined to Nazism, and cal1s lor dictatorial l^w and order
in the building of a new EuroPe or-in lhe struggle against Bolshevism appealed to
a1l too nratry.
ilosley
such priociples but his belief in the existence of such opportu ties sewes as
v/ert not pro Fascist couaborators about the viabfity of creating a new Europc
in cooperation with Gennany.
As the colsequcnces of Nazi rule became obvious' the exPerience of the collapse
of the old ortler led to the inevitable conclusion thai national pride and vaniLy
ffi
salutary war:ning.
Ihion
In many clandcstine documents the need was slressed to include the Cetnlirns 'rlrtl
to avoi(l natronalistic revenge 'lJle Manfeslo of lhe E roPean llesisla (c, pnl'
lished in Geneva in July 1944 by members of the Resistanco ftom Ilillc separdlc
couDtrjcs. called for a federal union of the EuroPean Dations; lhe nairr argumenls
(a)
(b)
Coudenhove-Kalergi and other adherents oI a federal Europe had to face lhe fact
thai, as Iong as this regime was in Power h Germany, no such union was Possible
apa frorn under Nazi ruie. The Pan_Europea! Union with its headquarters in
Vicnna concentrated in the following yeal.S upon presewipg Austrian irdependence and establishing regroDal economic cooperalion among the Danube countries backed by lLrly and France In doing so' the movement had to compronrise
with lbrces lar lrom the democratic ideals of dle pro8ranrmes of the 1920s, and a
split occurred betlvecn Coudenllove-Kalergi' who remained fiercely anti-Bolshevik
as $rell as anti_Nazi, and left-wing intellectuals who saw in the Soviet Uniol a fo_
'
uul'
thE
the necessity to have the Germals participate in European lifc without tlucal
cDing their neighbours;
in
the need to protect national minorities afld avoid the abuse oI minority
ilil
liii
riil
(c)
111
110
lliltl
l|lH
nnl
Lssay
2!
Italy or
Fr rce
lil
lLrr'
Suppoflers ot fomlllized Eurcpciltl coopcIaljon sccnled to llilv{: ll(lvililL:cLl rl{)
ur 1919, bul neveflheless a lesson had bccrr teiuned lhc tltscrcrliling ol
ther- than
|ilil
'llle attitude of
llilt
Ferceptions af Eu{ooe
iilr
conWe have scen how in lhe nilreteenth cel]tury rival per'ceptions of Europe were
'fLre
con
relercnces
of
hisLoncal
a
set
on
specific
structed, each of them Lllawing
in
rools
hcle
have
presented
themes
Many
Lhensincc
dinuDished
lias
not
tusion
llr
lrll
jfl
rlre ultra nationalist order of thc ioiel_war period wirs nol lorgotlorl iln(l irs
Europe obviously coulcl not jump direclly {rom lhe ho[ors o[ wllr lo a lc(lcral
puaclise the neetl for a tnnctional lpproach fbcusing, llrst of all' on ecollolluc
collaboratioD in thc reconstmcho o[ Europe bcgfu1 lo be slressed at the exPensc
these
ll9-43)
As SovicL rule beoame a rcalily, suclr thescs proved highly adaptable to thlr foreign
Fmt, we will
co rected wi
we silali sec
war.
Then
re
haditionally
with
Lhe perceptioDs
of
Wcs
rc
r-emained unchanged
We have seen, in ltim delr Boet's cssay, how ll1 the ]atc eighteenth cenlury the
concepts
according
to
thc
112
syllonymolls- Ilowever' in
standar{l
justify the wa{ The dis! lcion suwrved thc war and it appe?Lrs discussions of
Europeanness even today - an indicaliotr oi its relevMce in frequcnt altempts To
Llefine the naturc of ELrrope. We eet lhe disthclion in EdgiI Morin's Penser
the
Jcwish-Christian {ireek l-aLin cultural foundahons of Etrrope, whereas 'civilizalioD' covcrs homanisrn, ralionality, science ald lreedont hr dlis se se' civilizxtion
r:orres lllcr- cullute.
J]
i
looks
il
ll;rliorl
'cll 73)
'
o[
Let us have a closer look al the l'altirne use
r'
ffi
geography or mce.
I
t
t
tLrese concepts
ffi
ffi
t2'1ffl.
ffi
ffi
Geirnan wartime ProPaganda
ffiil
Max Scheler
During rhe First World
tbe war
w'r'
ci,,us,!es
114
'tbScheler'this.Iirrglishcapitalistdisease'hadspreaddangerouslyallover
il;;-;;;At
*t
Lssay
Es:)ay 2
rit,,
It
1tr4 tt
IcnlilY 'rl'
thrjir slii(j :s iul (il)cri0rll\(lllajru Wiilcrrsicx!1li I l lrirrrs- ll(livl(luill
will'),
",,ppu"..fty
of uLrlitarralisru
Scheler
wrrs ol
Nlorrc rn
L1r
rrs
lrrLlq
irl I'
'rr'1
which
light the
lbr the war to become a ?unfying flame' in who-se briShl
Iderlistjc Ciermro
again
clear
beconle
would
lope
ll
of
,,".
[or' arrd hope
.,rf,,i"i- *"tfa soon understand the values tley tiskcd thet lives
tire front li'c
of
sidc
other
lhe
ol
sokliers
zuiiv-iL
v idealistic young
"q".
demiDd ful Nll
ajrd
var
r
to
Lhe
led
had
orat
ct.ceii
tbe
t""ligttr"
ScheLer hopcd
.tpi",it"r values
*",1t.1-
Wilhehrile
stafc
mankiir(l,madeitnalulalforthecountrytoleadthestruggleforthespirifual'alrd
vi ues
uoti,i.tt ut,r,u ol [urope. Suhelcr calls such a brotbe
lonned
Callolic
the
tlat
h.
lropes
7- t,'ri"rrr:^i,^rnu7, ond
In this'
become the cornmon ora
,*nr r"r,iuor will ag^in
-ilspiration
oI
Catholicisnr
torn
rcligior'rs
in tl)e deep, iurer
th" Cltu,.h can iinrl
fclt in Cieflnany.
Agrinst
Mongolian
ald so on
A Communist interqrctation
lI
rll br
as lragic and-des[xurive
surn, Scheler sees the spread oL capittlist civilizalton
l{
ssia
flscinaiing interPreliltiul ol the oi$e llr his tullcl 'O1cl anrl New
b0t
CLrlturc'. Capitalism, Luk:ics notcd, was lhe ctllnlilliltion ol clvilizatloo so fal'
'Clullure" wc
al the sarDe tirDc it was ir li)r cc that dcslrovcd all gclnrine cnlntre
should noLicc, is ooL Llsed here'irl tlle (ienran sense; l'ukics defines it as crr:t1_
thi g that is d!:ttheLi&llv antl ulncultv |altxlbk in Pralu( ts Q A ahilitic: lxvontl
theit fun( li.rlal ne.rr.! il) Ther. rvete scveral rcasons lor lhis
Ll 19l9
(a)
he gave
1r
relity
Iea0s
Ll
l lhc ru
e'
theY
irlLrl Lrcconre a
3o^l iu llsell
(b)
liitlc
LLrkiics says
;;t od ; ;^,
As
products
rll
were dugged
(c) hr
agpeat
iilil
commeDtato$ seomed
to
agrce
drat
were rnrer
of Europe as a patient lying feverishly on the deathbed
war to the
the
during
Brandes
G"otg
lit"'ory
fro* tt D-irit
"iiti"
1988'
"
(Do11-Joharsen'
"r,,--r*itt
Romains more lhan two decades 'ldter
_tcJ,ir"tiit,?.t[t
of
collapsc
near
thc
about
^f".
intellectuals were iust as convinced
"'t uropearVnur,n
ptogtess
continuuus
its
abolll
been
had
parcrtts
civilir.ation as tllerr
l"Gption"
real ctllture
onebookbecamednilrunecliatesFnbolofallthesesentimcntJ:nrstpublishedin
(lntergang der
,"'rir"a a few years later, oswald SPngler's Dr
iSl Sthe leasi
"";
perhaps
ii.-ai"ra", tin" o"cline if rhe werl) became a bestseller - the moodnotof a whole
to
gave
trame
tft" *p*tly complling title which
t
""^t." "i
fl
ffi
ffi
gnerauon.
q
B
;ith a multiplicity
?ltempt at an
world culturcs
Spengler's book
ophy of historY.
histo
ffiil
tible cr tures)
according to
fo r sea
;;;; ,"-;;',bt t;-a
even
spensler
analvsis'
this
;;;;,-;, il;r, to life cvcle on the basis of over
next
the
f"-*Lt ^ble ro predict developmeots
lY',*il"lli""*ia.*a
a powerful mythlcrl-rclrglous
C.rfto.", f*" youthful sping, is the time of
a number of phases compared sometimes to ihe
(t,ukit.t, l9t9,p
it,
tf..ro."i"g
tli
tru";;;;.
'
Ior
fr"r*".n-iit" iiofiti""f,
arcc
ch Revol tioo therc brielly exNied a
of
feudal
dcsirxcuon
rd
the
cituens
ol
emanciprtion
i i"oLogical
lre
hnce
zenifh, takes on a fuller and a mole serene aPpe
"t
with I sweetness
the creativity of any cullure is mosl subLime
;";;; ;;"t","hi"h,
the culture's soul dies
e
oI
lhe
f
eod'
the
in
Bnt
;;t;;;;-"0;t $elancholl
barbarians
l[ffi1
rilf,t
ilfli
flffi1
sptng
made br
Empirc)
ding to
'rinete"n
of antiquity.
(lea'L
occidcntal
fransrlron
are called
ilt
lillr
I
118
ii
tilfi
flil
iltil
iill
itilt
19IE; 1926
edn,
32)
At first glancc, Spengler grves the imprcssion of being just another culrural pessimist. His main symbol of civilization was the metropolis, the cosmopolita! centre
of rootless, depersonalized masses. His epoch was charactedzed by a loss of religiousness and sense of purposc. Money ruled supreme, accompanied by Political
cyrricrrn and philosophical scepticismBut civilization was not only the manifestation of decay aid disaster; its end was
also tle birth of something new Spcogler held that civilizalions could maoifest
themselves actively: if'civilizatioo man', as SPenSler called him, could not direcl
lris euergy inwards, an outwards expansion was possible _ its name being imperialism. To Spengler, Cecrl Rhodes was the fust herald of a new age which was to
uiique
cuhninate in the next two centuries. Also, occidental culture had ce
^in
features in being furure oriente.d ?rnd with aspirations towards etemity Its spint
had manifested itself in a technical inveDtivenss, wluch has allorved E[roPean
culture in its civitized phase to spread all over the world. Since the spreading of
civilization was rnevitable, one could just as weil make the most of it, for instance
by engaging in impeflallst cooquest radiq thari succumbing to decadent pseudo
philosophies like pacifism or scepticism Spengler did in facL -find a limeless tnrlh
beyond all morphotogical change, a principle thal offercd a last resort frcm the
decadence of world history. This hxth had a lot in commor with the then fashionable Social I)arwinism (Nolte, 1991, p. 221), dressed up in Nietzsche. In
Spengler's words:
iilt
will{o powcr
signilics
(Spen9ler, 1922, 1928 etln,
ilt
Thc coming of Cesarism breaks the dlctature of moDey and its political
weapon democncy. After a long triumph of world ciry economy and its
urterests over political creative force, the political side of life manifests
itsclf after all as the stronger of the two. The sword is victorious over
the money, lhe rnaster-will subdues agail the plullderer-w]ll. If we caU
these money-powers 'Capitalism', dren we may designate as Socialism
the will to call into life a mighty polilico-economic order that
I
I
p.507)
Spcoglcr's book (whose lirst edition was published early in 1918 the frrsl volume only; the second volume was published in 1922 - in expectation of a Geman
victory) czLn therefore also be read as a piece of warlime propaganda Eiving philosopfucal absolution to the Gernan war effort. IIr common with his above merl
troned colleagues, SpeDgler colsidered the co lict to be the inevitable rosult of
the historical lftmsformations of the t[ne, a conflict in which 'Inoney' (lie UK)
was fightiDg against 'blood' (Germa[y). Spengler was not iI doubt aboot the out
i'1
120
Spcngler's socialisrrr, to be sure, hirs litLle to do wilh Marxtsm and even less witlr
the Utopido socialism ol the nircteenlh century. It found its fuxe expression r the
Prussian Orgnnisatrolsslalrl with ils abi.lify to mobilize ail resources in the imperl
llist shrggle. So, conlrary to traditidlal intcrpretations, Spengler was ro( a pessl
misl Hrs lristoricaL detennioism was nol defeatisrnj be Lad written off one cullulc,
but only i[ the lrope rat a rlirw one vital, dynarnlc, and ruLl]ess in a Nietzscheart
way - could be bom in Westem Europc- Thts is fie cssence of his recomlncn
datlon to yotlng geleratiots lo give up cullure aid philosophy ilr favour of letlr
no)ogy, military fbrce, and tlrc politics of power (Spengler, 1918, p. 57)
vitality to
Many young intcllectuals, who had cither wltressed 1he senseless losses at the
front ljne, or the famine, deprivatro[s and corruption at hotrie, felt lhat the liberal
system that had lcd tb this wadare haij lost all credibilily. These feelings arc
strongly cxpressed rn a pocn by Ezra PoLrnC (1835-1972) and in fhe harshness
and uglioess of the inmediate post-war drawings of George Glosz (1893-1959)Conseq[ently, both lDe[ (anLl with them many of thc new, young generation)
looked for radical solutions. I'ound in liascism aod Grosz in Commuusm.
iI
any case,
These louglit
iurd some believing,
lro
somc in
{.ir.
lcarn
itr,
noLl'dlllcc' o['el
{le(]or".
in public
p'races
Darilg
ibfiilrde
as never belorc
W
Scheler
in
i{
Noli
ffi
There diecl a rnYriad,
And of the best, amol1g thcln,
For arl old bitch gore i the teeth,
For a botched civilizalion.
Charm, srnilirg
a1
ltilil
iliffi
llril
tilil
European-nirtded
iellecluals:
We
cal
lirLrl
filr fion
i\
somc 9otslaughleredan'(]alhersSol,'i,'h'Geo3eGroszgraphictilyillu\lro|esl]vhorroro
ulti,n n.[ nn'' r"dit Akad.nie !'t Kiintt"' Bctlinl
' on
"
1?3
122
iti
riri
to thc lield of culture, lhe loss would be i lte in r:ourparison to lhe loss of a
European nation such as France or Italy, at le;Lst so far as qualily was collcemed
(Scheler, 1915, p 287). Fifteen years and a peace settle e t later, Ortega y Gassct
Doted (ibid-, p 20), that the living stardard of the average American nfght be
higher thar jn Europe but, by companson with Europe, the level of thei 'selecl
rninoitics' (i.e their intellectual 6lites) was stlll relatrvely low.
Lrte
liiiliI
Despite this, Eu.opearrs still felt somewhat defensive: the Czech wriler Karel
Capek (189G-1938) in a letter to Lhe New York Times fried, in 1926, to explarn
why he would find it dangeroBs i[ American idea]s were to spread to Europe.
Some aspects of the American way of life particulatly alarmed him. Fist, the
speed and bustle, since for Capek work efficiency was not the be-all and end all in
life, and also because most of what was valuable in Europe was the product of
people who werc not in a hurry:
'l'he dilfercnce bclween cultllre and civilization was very visible in the caso of thc
in lhe
bLLsic scnsc
oi carc lirr
vlrlLrL:s
(Krclii' l9ll'
Europe wasted its time for drousands of years; drat is where its
inexhaustibilrty aod fertilily comes from.
(Copek, J926,
p. 18)
ril
takes a certain laziness to fully appreciate life, 6apek noted, and ir the same lein
he courplained about the American cult of success. Europeans used to have a heroic
tradition, they died for their faith, for love, for truth or for similar irrational tlings.
Il1 its craziness Europe had managed to carc for thousands of other things besides
success, and while these-things remained, the devil took whatever there was oI success in history. Fi ally, Capck found it hard to accept the cult of quantity:
It
rffi
fifi
I
I
flil
iir
1i
i
it
The Creaior of Europ made her small al1d even split her up irto hltlc
parts, so that ow hearts could lind joy not in size but in plurality
(lbid., p. 50 author's translation Jrom Czech)
i-apck was a liberirl democrat, a pragmatist, but dris did not prcclude a touch of
ostalgia and rotlanticism rnmlding in his view of Europe. Once agaio, onc woD.:r|itrlrsrrr wrs not alter rll a Luropeiur ilvention
'lrrs it
lrirciDg the same pfoblems, and explicitly basirg his analysis on the dichoiomy of
cullure and civilization, CaIJck's countrlman, lhe wifer and literary critic F V
Krejdi (1867-l9al), in his book Czechhood and Europednnds (1931), hied to
analyse the essence of Euope.
CivilizatioD, he said, was easily transferable as could tre seen from tle way
Europear civilization in its specific Anglo Saxon version - had conquered all
continents- Culture in contBst was specilic ard histoncal, it was a slr ctrre of aesthetic, ethical and intellectual norns and practices generated over centuries.
According io lkejLi Europe, since antrquity, had proved to possess a speclal abil
ity to open new dimensioni for all huma ty and even now its moral and social
fhinking incamated the conscience of humaniry Always - and lhe exact sciences
had added new dimensions to th1s - Europe had sought to make the ftuits of its
spiri( bl:come a li,ed experience, a daily affirmation of the virtues of
Buropeanness. When successlul in ttis, culture arrd civilization beoame one, as
could be scen in Westeflr Europe aM parts of Central Europe.
Lo avord
emocrats
fadition
lew dec
irr
to
of
ld'
of
re Past'
Iu Rosenberg's cyes, fhcsc thrce powcrs were fighting 'um die Seele eines jeAgn
Europaers'('aboul the soul of every single European' Rosenberg, 1930, p. 118),
ard tie war had shown that no coexistence between them wa,s possible.
Everywbere, all forces had to conceDhate on cleausing the lational spi t of ideo
logical dregs ard the national body of racially aliel elements. FGnce, for instaoce,
q,ould have to desist froln racial degeneration before lhe country could rightfully
claim its rahfal position in EDrope. In this racia] and ideologrcal struEgle,
Rosenberg called all 'rcal' Eurcpeans to ams:
l
I
I
t
I
I
640)
l
plutocracy without nadonal identity'
I
I
I
I
t
126
tr t4re
Essay z
tJt4-t14J
had allowed nrany pcople to obt n a staodard of living, wlxch only a few dccadcs
ago would h.rvc bcen lhe cxclusive privilcgc of thc wealthy Iew. Now nothing see
rled to prevent a life of frecdom and luxury
But
if
the masses possesscd modenl teclmiques, ftey still lagged far belund in
Droral upbritrging. They were like spoiled children who considercd the whole complicated material and social orga zation of society, from which they benellted,
natural like fresh atr, instead of realizing that it was the lrail product of a specific
il
fri
l'
l!
and experimental science had made the explosive social progress porisible. tsu1
'mdss people' hated the nobility afld generosity of hberaL democracy, since they
had an antipathy to values that were different from their own, to everything that
was unfamllid to them- They rcfused to listen ard leam and favoured lhe lyranny
of mediocrity, devoid of ideas aDd values Politically, they could only express
themselves in 'direct actiol' or violence, si0ce any dialogue would imply sornc
higher 'rules of the game' a principle unacceptable to 'mass-.people'
No wonder, then, that 'nass people' fell athacted to the nililism of Fascism
and
Bolshevrsm, two rnoverlents cynlcally mocking the plinciple of heedoor drat htu1
oradc dcrn possible Bolshevism and Fascism were symptoms of decay; they werc
anachaonistic and offered nothing but a retum to an outlived archaic world, which
had once beelr defeated by liberalism. They were empty, but dangerous sirce the
masses could now usurp the state apparatus lwhich had grown alarmiogly in irnportmce) aod tum it into a perfect apparatus of violence and exploltalion. If ir
happened, it would be the end of historical spontaneily and the death of Eurofe.
a.lone were
lrorn 'certajD radical yices', since it had brought into beirg such characters ns
'nrass people' who were iD revolt-
Liberalism hacl somehow lost its alertness and forgottetr its nced of a dynamic pro
j:l
I
i
1
granrme; probably
tion had made even scientists 'mass-people', absorbed in their own little worlds
wifhoutknowing the iDner philosophy of the science they cultrvated. The lack of ei
enrentary historical knowledge left pople without 1ilm guide]ines; they had become
roo[ess, aware of their possibi]ities but uncqtain ofhow to use thelll. Petty rationa[,
1sm, which had become so influential after the war, was just o e proof of this.
Ortega y Gassel was convmced that the decline of Europe was essentially a myth
perpetuaied by the Europeans on themselves, and that it only revealed tler own
lack of a prografime. Without the will to progress, all Europeafl values and all tl-s
crealivify would disappear. It would nor have manered so much if only some other
had been ready to take over, but so fat nothing new wds in sight. Europe
^rltho.ity
had
landed ilself ilr a vacuum, but perhnps the present cflsis could lead to a rc,
newal of i1s most valuable priDciples. Europe still trad a missioo to perform; ir
only needed a ew plrilosophy rfid a goal.
128
'Jti
tJ
ir
Ortega y Gassel suggested a Progrdrltne of l.uge-scale Polirical rclbrn r1mLn8
sleit(l
dre cieation of a 'United StaEs of Europe" Technical developmenls and ihc
ily Browing excharge of ideas had made *re ation slale obsolete. aod sincc a rir
tional community was basically a futue oriented ideological product il ought lo h(r
possible to make EwoPc into a Dalional concePt. This would be lhe only w'ry lo
ievitaLze Europe an.l to present a genuinc, rnomlly suPenor altmiltive to Sovi( l
Comounism,
In sum, althorgh Ortegr y Gasset blaroed modem civilization and the technjcrl
specialization inhcre t in it for the se of the new barbarians the 'mass peoplc'
political level (aicribii8 only a mhor rolo to
tiro rletnmelltal effects of tecbnological development itself) though t]re uniication
of Eorope in a new nation s1ate. 'Mass people' wele mole a sympiom raD ihc
crisis, he said, but he abstained fioln detailed aualysis of the Raws jo
he marnly sought a soluuon on the
of the
rnodem European cllllure lhal wele really to blame
cause
a billjant essay, A.htun|, Europa! (1935), Thomas Mann unmasked the bruraliry an.l the ties on wirich Fascism was built Accepting Ortega y Gasset's mx;n
In
anaiysis
ha.l undennined its own foundations: Marx and Nietzsche were Doble idealists, bllt
they (or rather thcir later interprete$) had lacked a sense of responsibiLiry sirce
they dld Dot see the danger of arlti intellecrual romaDticizing inherent llr their
thinkmg- As thc masses leaned about llle dethroning of spuit and reason, nolhilrg
could prevert them frorD revellDg iD cheap inationalism and intellecnral fTatld To
M.uxr, the cult of the irrahonal oI tle 1920s and 1930s wal utterly Patielic-
Maflr
As mentioned above, Marn had in 191? been an ardalt defender of culture (authenticity) in its struSSle with civilizatior (Political convenience without deePcr sPiritu
ality). It is therefore tempting to hterpret lhs later defence of civilization as a
'deJection' to the other side, but Mam's later work can be seerr as an attempt al ^
synthesis (I.{olte, 1991, p. 61
Sieg der Denokratie ('The
democracy to the temporary
of Fascism being its 'youth
fis
spiritual dimension,
mechanical democmcy or 'lhe rule of the people' was not worthy-of its name:
We must defne democmcy as that fonn of govemment and of society
which is inspired above every other viih the feeling and consciousness
of the dignity of man.
(Mann, 1937, P. )21)
l
I
I
I
Catholic dilemmas
a demoThomas Mann's tioughts indicated tlat there werc intimate ties between
al
cratic hurnanism aware of its transcendental roots and Cbistianity But the
Liance was
intellectuals
Cbristiairity
cles
were
rcverse.6
oi(lEsl-lsdl)
Stuat, StuftRar,
130
Europe
18)
131
I
I
I
Lj-dy i
ti
I
tY4c
towr s
tlc
Brirish
ol lhc
a
conrplex
discussion
(1889-1970)
preseated
Catholic Chistopher Dawson
problems of Europe in hts bookThe Judgement of the Nations (1941). In 1945, his
book was lranslated into German ard published in Switzerland. With his thotough
alalysis of the dangers of a secular civilization and rccornmendations tbr Christian
social polihcs, Dawson became an imporlanl representalve of all Abendldn l lrend
in Catholic thought, which became inllintial in Weslem and Southe Europe af-
trberalism,
Bur
l,e,,rrse ir
west hrs
lrinciplcs by which rhe
n,..,n..l.rrl',
Dawso
'rrd
Lived
(Da*stn, l9llt,
4i))
hLrl
'westcr'lr crvilizarrort' it
ii'i" tini* (ana m. irs,A.) are clelinitely part of the
lsles
Britistr
the
less obvious il 'EuroPe' also includes
i\
t
ffi
ffi
ffi
ffi
ffi
So fdr. little has been said abouL British views on Europe. Of course, Bntish ill
Lcrcst in questions of Europe and Europeanness was not absent, but all the literature I have consulted suggests that it was geflerally low. Europe was 'somewhere
else', so to speak- Exceptions were rnainly found among Catholics such as Ifilaire
283), as they had obvious re
Bclloc and G. K. Chesterton (Droselte, 1965,
who
had publi$hed his lisloriDawson,
Christopher
ties
ro
the
Contrnent,
litsrous
ca1 stt:lJy The Making of Europe in 1932, was no exception to ihe rule In contrast,
most of their countymen were more co[cemed about the future of the British
Enpire
To Dawson, lhe decades after the First World War had seen the total collapse oi
all the optrmistic illusions of nineteenth-centrry liberalism. Westem civilization
aDd through it all of humanity was being exposed lo a destructive totalitifian nihilisnr, which threatened to annihilate it The dreat left no room for
Deutralityi 1irst, the evil came from inside Westem civilization as a result of ils
own dec^y and, secondly, the totalitarian systems had the power to control
rninds as well as bodies, to bninwash people and destroy everything good in
them This danger was more serious for Christiarity than any eallier i[vasioD of
barbarians, since the new evil was dcpersonalized and inspired lrot by the nalve
cruelty of primltrve watiors but by wha! I)awson called 'the perverted scie ce
of a cor-rupt civiLization'- Civil;ation itself had becorne dubious, since ils matcriNl power rurd wcalth was growi g rapidly while simultaneously lts moral
f()undiltions weie eroded. Ihe more the power, the morc complele lhe dest c-
li()n. it scemcd.
-lhe evil flrreatenl g Europe wins essentially of a spiritual kind; and Hitler and
Stalin were its 'creatures, not its creators'. But since 1918, such ev had been hr-
ilffi
ill
ill
stitutionalized in the totalitarian staie, which had corne iflto bing as two reactions
against liberal democracy came togelher- Indivldual liberalism was threatened
liom inside by the mechanization of culture, and extemally it was faced with na_
tiona.I opposrEon in countries without democratic traditiots. To Dawson, the totaLi
tarian idea was distinctively Russian bfore it became German or Italiarr, and he
explains the appeal of Commurrist collectivism by placing it in the context of
Russia's theocratic ideals of Orthodoxy and Tsarism.
Dawson's 'real' Europe was only the pafis with a Roman Catholic past, and evefl
here he makes a distincrion betweerl 'Westem civilization' and what is at tines
called Central, at limes Eastem Eurcpe, evifiln which he includes (iennany.
I)awson was sceptical about th,1s region, which he found cullurally susceptible to
the spint of aulhodtarianism and collectivism:
133
132
does
iLr
I-l
Cleltra]
ffi
ffir
huanians,
such sen_
at
times'
Altd
dre
European
the
Poles
the
Russians,
iuld
iims,
(Krol
ir
to a scll-asserlivc
anti-Western natiotalism
I-IodZa expecled
rt to
de
for
itical expediency,
ing. For instance,
Europe', and rnan
to Cenual Europe.
3
tr
Turanial langLrrgcs
Lhe
frmiLy ol lturguagcs
relrt'tl to lirrkish
v
it
li
yarizatron-
istically
il]t
li
ovak
nshiP'
135
134
ffi
ration. PoliticallY
West and lhe Russiar East.
Hodza's plans
ffi
Hod;a's Central Europe was the land betwecn Russia and Gemrany The East he
ted as a Part oI Wcsleln
gins with Russia, he
The agrarian character of
Europc or perhaps as
(Caiholic)
'Messiah
inter_war period
ry
ffiil
ol
ophre c'
in the
ililfr
unite spiritually and economically (HodZa, 1931' Pp. 384n' Without such cooPcr
ation, all Cenfirl Europear nations would some day be ground bcFveen thc Inillslones 6f Russia and Germany.
'rre'lr
e was the
Ukrai
,.1
of thcse oountries
tilr1cnts li3d
war Czech patriots hail striven to emancipate the nation lrom its solid embedment
in Gennan culture. In their sometimes exaggeraied search for non-German rnspi
lations, the Czelhs tumed in various directions from Russia to France and, as an
independent national life began to flourish, the Czechs fbund thcmselves in the
so ewhat unenviable position of 'knowing all about Euope and being completely
unknown io het' (XJejii, 1931, P. 208)- As the war changed that, most Czechs rnd
Slovaks s^w the creation of CzeChoslovakia as a cuknination of a progressile
hend in dre European civilizatior they felt pafi od' They alt knew Lltat the survivaL
of their state was dependent on lhe presewation of the post-war inlenrattonal or
der. So, polilically, Czechoslovakia had great interesi in European cooperation and
the counfy played a very lctive rolc in the League of Nations and ln different rcgional orgaluzirtions.
in
hc bulwiuk
thc
be the best and only vtable - fourdation for any 'Paneuropa'- Hodza argued lh^t
all Central European nalions shared the same histodcal experierce, in which they
had been more objects than subjects of tleir own history aod, to avoid national
istic confiicts and economic chaos, tie new nations in the region woukl have k)
Essdy
tl
I
frilil
fl
l,l
z tietauo,tsugettte
Essay
1t)e ttatutt
Europe.
tlis frst axis, wherc EuIoPe was a hved exPedence, a new Ccntral
European cultural axis passhg fiom Scandinavia tluough Germany to the Austnan
Empre began to make itself felt with Germany in the lead. The region's sincere.
So adloinilg
ffi
ffi
ffi
ffi
introverted arld pefiaps slightly gross spirit gave Europe dre Reformation, for
which the region paid dearly in the Thirty Years'Wdr. As Gennar cultue finally
recovercd a cenhrry and a half later, the lifestyle of the German elites had nolre of
IIfr
lfr.i
ll'
I
lairs
Freuch lldn. No wonder, then, that fhe culhne of the region became speculatrve and romantic- In this axis, Europe was first of all an idea _ a dream and a fir
lure proiect.
Tied to tlrc continent, the Germarrs were fully aware of rlot being alone in
Europe, aDd they soon bccame preoccupied with the pnnctple of nationality.
Knowledge of Europe became a means to Iea]ize the idea of Europe atld, as
Krcjdi put rt aphoristically, the French drought they oere EItrope, whereas the
Gemrans t(ied lo know her Much of the same was hue about lhe Czechs who
corild not escape a close cnltural relationship with thc Cermans. The Czechs
in r diflicult
ffi
Europeal
Lhe
were put
ffi
ftllly
culturc sirce the accepta[ce of Christiadty, the Czechs had been reluctant to
acccpt Westem civitization, as it usually came duough German mediatiotr and
contained a danger of assimilation. Only in recent years had dre Czechs become
sirong enolgh to grve up romaotic Pan Slav nostalgia and vote for a fully
intcgrated Europe.
'savioul' of
EuroPe-
1s7
tvo lx)wcrs woLrl(l (frrcll c:ollft)l thc lile oI their ha11 ol lhe gLobL
( t,schi7$vski.i, 1959, l)p l l, l0N), l)ul rl tlrc turn of tLre century such a notion wes
bcconling i crcasrngly coDrr ul
th(i
The Bolshevik takeovcr seerrled to lnatrie the tlrsk casv ior most European ob
serveN A political and cultural pariah, Russia requitcd iitde elTort to tre cxcludeci
from cuitural Euope proper. Ilardly any of the texts discussed here accept Russia
uoconditiooally as pdrt oi Europe, the gelleral teldency being to see in Russia a
worid of its own. Some took into account socialism's European ongtrs, but dis
missed the Soviet version as prfmtrve and alien ancl tleeply nrarked by the Asiatic
or Orthodox tradilions o[ Russial hislory.
Somcwhat pitradoxically, this repudiafion of Russia took place at a time when thc
challengc of the revolutiotl and the res[lting wavc of Russiao immignxts E:rearly
i[creased Europcar inlerest ilr Russia ilnd colltaci with its culture. Also the ellri
grflnts Lhemselves had iirely views and one grouP, reprcscnted here by the linguist
N. S Trubeckoj (1890 1938), brought the notion of the olhemess of Russia to ils
logical extreme. For thc iiffl time Russians plesellted Russja as being lundamel
taJly outside the European cull ral world. Though poliiically often just as critical
of the Wcst as the Slavophiles, lhe 'Eunsians' used no(lcm scientilic rnethods jll
dreir an^lysis, which gavc dreir work a curious blend ol itlecjhgy and seious aca
demic resenrch- An arca tpproximately coincidirg with thc Soviet tcrritory was
idenlified as il cohcsrve geographlcal unit that neither belonged lo Eulope nor to
Asia and which was temred tll7-d.fid. Furthennorc, hjstodcally, culturaliy and an
tluopologicdlly this Eurasi r melting pot had fomed an indcpendent workl' and
Trubeckoj could quite agree witir the Westemers who found that the war axd the
rcvolution hrd torn the Eu.opeal mask off thc Russian facc. He made a sharp d]slinclion belween tle Russiaus (whom lte callcd 'T|ranian') and the Slavs an(l
placed the border bel',leen thc West and thc Easl beiwce the two (Trubec[oj.
1927, tr TschiZewskii, 1959, p. 523).
But morc mflueDlial
il
settled
hi s
ilisLked weste
history, iike nalute, moved rh)'thmically, aod now the world (ie. tile Chnslirn
world he has Do jntcr-est in thc rest) Iaced a dew Middle Ages The war and the
rcvolution i Russie proved thai the nrod.in em wil's sPintually bumt out and thlt
the old liberal principlcs could no longer be rcstored Some good elenenis of the
nlodem ert would live on into the rlexl cpoch, but while humanism had ljberated
man /rdl, somethilr8 - from lhe thcocr'acy ol' the old Middle Ages, for examplc
it had been completely unable to raise man ro x new spiJitu^l awareness- The
whole theory of clemocracy was based on ihe absence oi'a]ly higber truth and hrr
rnanisrn's pricle had bro ght ils downfall, sincc il God dici nol cxisl' neithcr did
was-a logicaLje'l'his was reflected in Berdyaev's views on ideologies Soci'lismol God But
the
denial
and
Marnmon
of
cult
urta both sh:ted tbe
,uiiof
was righi in.Pltttung
and
"npi,"1,..,
vision
a
had
il
dynsmic;
was
,-ft*" i"lti,^ti.., socralism
or
f"aa But its lnessiarism w rs false and allowed the proletariatdes
a^n".
tyranl'
absolutist
"i'"""
a
Inonsbor'rs'
to become
L-ovirg
^U
vanguarcl
,pitituof freedom in rhe name
lI
of an empty goal
ffi,
ffi
r^tionality of bourgeois
Communism had much
are spiritu
histolY' the
D l;o) Apocalvplic as lhev were' rhe Rus\ian'
in chri't or r conuadeship In Anrichrisr' Rerdvac\
unrlersland lheir sirl{
lPnor of lhe Ievollllion lo tnrke lhe Russians
to the wlole
an
example
be
would
tni'
'"n"'"al
'6'iL"ut
if
Cluiste'rlonr
peoPles
"nJ
all
in
waken
to
have
would
dernocracy:
Lr lhe
^nlv
:;:1 ,:::
;:;;;i;";""".","n ,f*
;::';;;;;;.,'
;;;;;-;.;'r;tsalism
was to r umPh And:
ill
il
sm' bY negatlon'
1an
Ea,st',
th
the end of
ald tle conring of a new era (Eastem
Bolshevisrn indirectly Paved the way'
il
t
lr
1938),
t
I
'll!:I-lt:^"i"r
the USSR)
I
I
people found
'disappeared'in
the soul of dre
'l
t
ffi
Predictecl
T,T::;
139
138
ffi
tssay 2
Lssay 2
tilt
iil
Tbe anh-liberal German stance with its emphasis on culhrre and traditjon almost
'had io' produce theories of European singxlarity, but even in libenl thought we
olten meet notions of a unique - mostly supedor Europeamess rooted in culture
or race. Aristide Briand's memorandum of I May 1930 mentions Euopean 'mcial
afhnities and cornmon ideals of civilizaLio ' (quoted in Coudenhove-Kzrlergi'
1934, p I l5)- In 1953, the first half of tbe same se[tence in a publication from the
Germar Foreign Ofnce has 'technische Zusammengehdrigkeit' ('technical affinitics') (Europa,1953, p. 33).
This piece of reinterPretation (or'censorship') is hardly accidental. To any Post
Auschwitz observer it is striking how fTequently the colcept of race appeared in
pre-war texts. It was in no way taboo, Dor was it reserved to fte NMis Vital to
so[rc and marginal to otherc rt was widely accepted as at ]east one elemelt relevlnt to the understanding of Europeanness. Somelimes the co cept was used at
the level of nations (the German, Russian, Fiench, etc race)' ard some people
spoke of a European (Caucaslal, white, etc.) race as a wlrole Some cxanPles
serve to illuslratc this Ia ge:
'l hc whole of Europe forms one single race, one single blood fratemily'
wl'x I' is 'lrvidcd inlo manY sLains
tr'ctudenhove Karcrgi, l'tJ1. p. 2/Jt
. tlre disuDity and lack of balalce that marks Lhe German national
temperament is rooted in the racial and historical origins of tle Geman
mtioral being.
(Dawson, 1913, P 20)
fl[[
.even
il"l
li
ti
i]I
te
t4- 1e4'
subieclive ta
l1)2) lt)2[]
rtbt,l l.tl)
GiNset:
of ilcompatible cultures
ililfi
tutope
1ilil
ilil[
ffi
iI
well as the merits of the whole race are rDore intensly manifested
as
Medite[anean face.
(Schcter, 1915,
293)
ha-s
season is compclsatcd
by.
(lt)30; 196l
uJn,
77)
between
It is worth remembering that Europe between the wars was still overwhelnmgly
'wh.ite' and in a 'global' sense etlnicaliy ralher homogeneous (though of coursc
migration took place, and Danes in 1910 felt no less disfarce from the alien Polish
creatures irnPofted to pick sugar beet thin they do to the Turks today) Japanese
tounsts were llot a fiequenl sight, and people from the Europeal colonies had noL
yet begun to move 1n Sreat numbers to the colonial ceDlres. This Perceived hom_
ogeneity may be one reason for the Sreat intercst devoted to the 'Jewish question'
These very vlsible 'intemal fcrreigners' were (lro firattel for how many centlrries
the Jews had been present m a counlry) a pennaDent remuder of Lhe 'othemess' ol:
the world and posed a problem Qf iiterpreladon ln the fust halJ of this cen ry
racial terminology was conunonplace and, as the quoration above by Srefan Zweig
shows (.lre hinrself a Jew), this was once agnin no Nazi nooopoly
Buf for any discussion on the Jews in EuroPe it is helpful to go back to Friedriclr
Nietzsche (1844-1900) Nietzscbe, in his remarkably allti-nationalistic rellections,
illfoduced the concept of the 'good EuroPean' ard lie belicved thal the European
fcoples would fuse into a new supcnor 'Misohrasse' (rnixed race). This process
141
Ily
fca
rt of
hose
rnirjur
lm
in occiden,ruizing rt rgain
(Quttted Jrom Goll\rit1er, I95l
; 1964 etln pp
Europe's pride, its belief in its own intellectual superionty, ard its conterlpt lt)r
the 'loli'el races' is sumr ed uP in the quotation below from thc
327f1)
oil
Bo
lus
spi
to
the fact thal Luropelill history was takiog a shape very fa,rnilia'
1(r
the dcepest
were oficn
a
p 24) Jews
rhe
'ie
e_
of
since it alone has defined itself as an 'historical teleology of all unendiflg sedes
Jewry
European
fate
of
us
that
the
also
remind
goals of rea-son'. The quotation car
'inter
this people 'above EurcPe' was tragically mirrored in the fate of otber
rl
ffi
I
t
il
ffit
ffi
Lessing'
pp. 31q/fl. ThouSlr repeatedly refclring to tbe Jewish will to be diftcrent
disapPearancc
t]re
ass[nred
p
399),
iike Ni"its.h" and Spclrgler (Spengler' 1918'
the risirlS cosrnopolitan'
(Westem) European Jewry through assirnilation
ir
of
spjitual thno"/trrr",
r,
Ig35;
1g70 edn,
273)
ffil
secular civilizatiort.
Conclusions
ffi
fiffi
cnt
,rLs
143
142
llli
tfr]l
Essay
Firsl, the politicat life of the period was mled by a disastrously triumphant
nationalism lt accompanted rf not fostered both the wars, and in the il)ter'
wru period it characterized lhe behavrour of most actors on lhe European
il
tililil
ru
Seconrily, even people devoid of nationalistic chauvinism uncolditionally accepted 'the national principle'. Thc Europe of Versailles vas ibulded on it and
was for many protagonists a vital step iI the realization of the ancient EuropeaD
ideas of fieedom and equality. If cultural Europe was primarily comPosed of irs
ational culturcs, therl political Europe ought to be ihe sum of its natiol states We
saw how the main political initiative towards European unity between the wars,
thxt of B.iand, did not even dream of violating the principle of national sovercignry, and the prestiBe of lhe nation in the hierarchy of values is perhaPs best de
.."it",j ty tt i" qnootion from Briand's loyal suppofier, Edouard Herriot:
esuh['hed.
ffi
(Herriot,
ffi
ffi
iilt
Itfi
ffi
tFi
iilll!
I
i:rr
l!!ilr
l;i
lr
1930,
5A)
pry1"
Thlrdly, those who warned against nation stale Pettiness were also deeply in
fluenced by this Line of thought Coudenhove-Kalergi and Ortega y Gasset - major
advocates of a 'Uniied States of Europe' both considered the nation state as arr
intermealiate step on fhe way to the creation of a common European nation, one 1{)
which all inhabitants werc Lo feel nationallJ nttached, In Italy in 1932' the inllrlen-
of the Nazis
Mos[ plans tor' European Lrniry liom \'au]ntulD lo the propagancla
a world of
lo
adjustment
an
anC
fbr
for economjc cooperalion
sress;
Lhe neecl
thal which they had been, but by elevating it and incorporating it into
lhxt new existenQe, so will the French, Germans aDd Italians and all the
olhers clevatc themselves to b-come Europeans and their thoughts will
trrm to Europe, and rheir hearts will beat for it, as they had done for
their sntlller fatberlands, which they wilt not have fbrgolten, but love
lhe more.
(Quozd from Rijksbaron, 1987, p. 67)
Lo
na-
Once again people's loyalties were seen lo be arrarged in concenhic circles, and
only atter leaming to behave as Europeaos could tlirere be a stitrt to discussion
about the possibility of a truly 8lobal civilizaiioD stan
Europe was regarded prirnarily as an irlerplay of nations tather than of, say,
groups of consumrs or Producers, regional communities or intelest groups de
voted to spccilic issues, and so on. There were, of cotrlse. attempls to sfess non
or [ans-nalional conmuoities of ilterests (for irstance, the German Social
Democrats had a 'United States of Europe' in theK Party progranme) but, in geoeral, the perspective in sucb claims as the solidarity of workers, Catholics, patiJists, and so on, almost inevitably ended uP being global rather than Enropean
('The Bratest daneier to Europe is tircd ess')' said Ilusserl (1935; 1954 edn' p
i+t), tut tu. cadls for a reb-Lrth of EuroPe through a 'heroism oI reasol' had no
more effect thar Mann's desired new 'rnililant European humanisn"
glohi
powerfields, a conditioll
\r()IrtUchcnded.
il all its pncic ruuJ artogalico, wns mi\cd wilh arl almost paranoid wish lo Protect a
culture thaL hacl suddcrrty discoYered htimations of its own mortality
een projects and PercePtions ol
concepts. The aim was lo clat
L olvioNSIY lhc two di rensions
has turned out to be reasonably
is perhaps because the political projects
ng a diagnosis that
1945, dte'doclors'
moved in fi-om abroad.
Reterences
BARr{ACLoUGH,
Blackwell
constmction
BAssrN, M. (i991) 'Russia between Europe and Asia: the rdeological
(1).
pp
1-17
50
Relieu',
in
Slavic
ol geographical space',
(1990) 'Je Masarykovo pojeti NEmecka jeitd aktudlni" in
BEI-oHRADSKf,
Prague
1,
1990,
Plitomnost
edl) The End of Our Time' London' Sheed and Warl
(1924;1933
N.
ilili
ru
BERTYAEV,
BDRDYAEV,
N (7935\
BOLL JOHANSEN,
and
HARBSMEIER,
Zii
ch Wien
IriPzig
(E
c. (1943) The Juttgettenl of the Nations' London' Sheed and Ward(1931) A'?erica /lP
DUHAMBL, c (1930) Scines r1e Ia vie furure, Pais; kanslated
DAwsoN.
Menace , Londort,
DURosEl-LE,
Sulukamp.Bo]nn'
EuropLr (.1953) Dokumente zB Frage der europdist:hen Einigung'
Mttnich
FoERSTER, R H. (Ed ) (1963) Die ldee Europa 1300-1946'
GOLLWITZBR, H.
unl
Europagetlanke' Murich
t
I
I
I
l
I
I
Zeit eeschichte, 3, pp. 240J 5
KREJai, F.
'146
I
t
I
l'l
LJ.-d!Lll|c)lalullJuPlellleu]ellled
ilr,li
LENIN,
liiliil
Lssa)/
illtiI
I
I
I
I
I
t
I
940
I 945 ,
Mnnich
oRI[(;i y
iriarrt,
EanslaLed
I Jrrwi
ffi
ffi
ROSENBERG, A_
scHUBARr, w. (1938) Europa uru1 die Seele des Oslens, Lucetne; translated (1950)
Russia and. Western Man, New York, F Ungar
SCTTLTLZE,
ililil
fr
148
I1. (1990)
\e
Actu/ttiry;\t,t.
t'ers\
ctiver
7'r''
Declinc
ol
!h('
\l$|
llntrtgilt..l les
^sD(t
W;tti,t"t";, o9Lg\; ll Wetlltslr,rivlte
Ahendlantles
Perspektitun
lJtvin
,(liirst
(;e.sl.lLl
unl
(1922)' -Munich' C ll
Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlur,S
lrxAcs, c. (1919;
sPENcl-r-'lR,
lbxte zum
TsclrlzEwsKtj D and GRoH 0 tF''ls) (t959) Eurolto und RtlJsLund DannsLadt
Jslt'ttver'rld/1dDr'ljes'
tttul
tttssischen
Problcnt des wesrcuropiischct
vAnDY,
of war
canre back, as
il
Probably, one
were, by dclautt.
ilill
of
oationalisIn.
In
te
wlut
r
I
s
I
,,
ll
ni)tron.rl
trerng rooL
tlrerelorc s
cortr
d not stoP
accused o[
n l\c lulue
)r'rudfies
..v,,:,ti"cd
u ry
B70ff.)
was left behind, even anong nations on dre winning side, was a general
fscling of defeat.
ffi
rr
(Ho[fun, ]966, pp
tr
ol
lt:
condrnons
Gennany aud Italy - nationalism had beeD associatcd \tith the regmres thal had
led dre nations into war, defeat and destruction. I[ the words of Stanley Hoffman:
,]
'Zero Hour'
force
ol
tice and criminaliLy (for exar
/lesenrrJr riuring lhe 1950s, w
s,,ience as ,r v"lricle for social
fllili
and
for lingla.ncl
ilil
'lhis thion
in
the
ffi
Le
du
in
r.
4)
lt
l,
iL
ti
'This aspect of r'esisfatrce looked not towards the history of Europe, but rather ro
the promise of Europe which ight mean the possibihry of freeing oneself hom
lhe old Europe. People were rcady lo learn something rcw; irr certain quarters
therc was a feeling of generdl preparedness fbr redefir)ing basrc allegiances, for
changing course.'nle lirst attempts ro rnstrtuLionalize a llew Europcan nlegralion
ln
153
Essay
Essay
had becn liberrled by the Soviel Rcd Army and this would have a profou effect on the politicai realircs of the regioo- Thc borde.line between ihe USSR aDd
the rest of Europe, which to mmy Euopean observers in the inter-war period
had been the border beiween Europe proPff and some alien world, moved more
than a huoclred miles lo thc wesi The Soviet UnioD kept what it lrad been
granted by the Ribbenhop-Mololov aBreemenls of 1939, and morc. The Baltic
repubLics re rained linnly ill Ore USSR, ard pans of Gemuny (East Prussia),
Poland, Czcchoslovakia atd Romafli,l, too, were anndxed. Poland, by way of
C
coDlpcnsation (probably as a means of weakenflg
d
Poland preoccupied with r possible German 'r
8
mrch former Cierman terntory. Morcover, all the
(except lor the three Ballic republics) were allowed to re-establish their slate
sovereigtrLY
-fhis sovereigtrty soon proved lo hare very narrow lirnits Steadily, regmes totally
loyal to ard dependent on Moscow were rnstalled in all countries liberated by the
Red AJmy (except for Austna) h Czcchoslovakia (the counry with lie skongest
pre-war demoqatio lraditiol ard lhe one that took dle longest to bgcome a 'peo_
ple's demodacy'), some non Communists sought to adjust to tlrc rew realities by
ie-launctring tbe idea of Czechoslovakia as r bridge berween Russil and the west
rDil not just between iheir Two social systems - but it soon became obvious that
lhe Soviet Union had no intenlion of experimcnting with arry such east-cenhal
Europeal 'third way'Politics itr easLcn ELuope were subjccted to m inrlial transfonnaLior according to
the o ld developect ln the Sovict Unior under Sratin. There has been much discussion arnongst hNtoiians of the Cold War on Lhc degree lo which this sJraputg
sremme.l froln aclion or reaction. from a Soviet d.ive for expansion or a westem
plesswe on an essentiatly rlefensive Soviet Union Btt even iJ olte leans towards
ihe latler interpreration as to security/powu Politics (ie the West being the
slronger side), rt is uDdeniable that the uniformization 01 'easlem' Europe was
d.iven also by the iruer logic of'Soviet-lype societies' (Lemailre' 1989)
'fhe re-creatrol of easrcentral Europe in the image of the Soviet Union leflecled
the logic oI Sial$ist ideology HoldlDg a mo[opoly on lruth dedved ftom
Marxis; Iflinisrn. fte Conrormist Party wielded absolute power' Whatever the ef-
fects ol tLre Cold War, the unifomizalion of'eastem europe'was deliberaie and
systematic.'fhe Soviet Union harl. since the 1930s' purged all 'eastem' European
iornmunist Parties: Ior rnstance, most of the Polish Panv leadership was elimi
nated to ensure lhai no indePendent national leadership cotld emerge Moscow
iafluence
gree
:#f-tr;;
ol unitormilv
ietastating
i"p O.n,"V
results*-t"", *y
regaral
for the
ne
was glven
produclion
ffi^it
both
"- ",
the Cornmlmist
in
-n'""t.."""t
propaganda and
(ontributed lo dlF
.cnlv lo westem cLDlomrlic and economic iniljarivcs and
rexliries
uniJnrmrty
of
blanker
Ihe
,"i,i. .t .r.* intierauon B.rt beneadr
jnrendrd rand claimedr homogeneirv nevcr
rhe
and
;;;:-t;t";;tuli.;d'
BerlinWall, Atg
1961 The worke
oJ DM) 28 (Phor
Deutsche
I
t
I
I
I
I
155
154
li
il
wcnl bclow dre level of the power 6lite (Kusy in Hertench and Semle!
1989,
p.
190)
the atlonal
The Limitcd access to Favel w,l one fcaru tbar helPd to Prcserve
peculiarities of ine easrem Europcan states Another was fie f3c! tMt rn dre whole
Th(
Ot:t
Sov
inl
ffi
Essay
Essay
I
I
I
I
t
Resistance lehters
Hunlulan
freedom
comse lrom the West) was a stranBe lack of mterest ln the struSgles lbr
be
could
which
a
phenomeron
coontries,
the
ncighbouring
ond indpendetrce in
159
158
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t:ss,.ty
in 1956, 1968 and once again in t9110 81 irr thc behaviour of Ilrrngary's,
Czechoslovakra's aud Polull's neiShbours (Vajda h ll & S, 1989, p 129).
secr
ll
i
lil
Where does this leave the concept of'Europe' in eastern Eurcpe? Quite smply,
rcpressed As indicated in Essay 2, the attitude to 'Europe' had been different in
each of lhe east central European countries in Lhe mter_war peiod, partly 2ts a
res lt of thei-r rcspoose to the Versailles settlemert- Similar clifferences could be
seen in 1945, but in geneml the prestige of the Soviet Union in lhese counties
was greatly eDhanced and westem Euope was more or less discredited, belng
charactcnzed as decadent and having shown itself to be impolent in the face of
N^zism, a feahrre aptly used by dre Commu ists lo argue for a new (al tlmes
cve.n 'slavic') ea-stern brolherhood. In this kind of argument, 'Europeanness' was
neither used, or needed.
il
ilit
lill
j
I
lr
Thus fhe hadilional problcm of'east-cenlral EuroPe's' sLanrs a,s 'borderland' between the East and West seemed to be decided in favour of an 'eastem' attachment
and ii must be said that, initially, thi$ association receiYed domestic supporl, not
least in intellectual ci-rcles- However, the harsh realities of 'Sovitification' sooD
led to a rc-articulation of the border problem, sillce the new superimposed socio
potiticat sysiem (with its Stalinist terror and brutaliry) became unavoidably ident
ilied with the country ftom which it originated, that is to say ihe Soviet Uuion or,
rather, Russia. Communism became Soviet Communism, and Soviet Comrunism
was interprcted in terms of the Russian tradition of absolutisrn, orthodoxy Geligious and later ideological) and brutality. Any rebellion against this system seerDcLl ((hrc ro the bi-polar logic of dle time) to imply a concession to (westem)
I.iurolrall values. Mihily Vajda accumtely expresses dris feeling when he wtlles
thilt the goal of all the rcbellions h easl-central Europe (i.e. Poland,
Czechoslovakia aria Hungary) is not so rDDch a challenge to thc polilical status
quo in Europe (with Hungary perhaps as an exception), but a means of 'die
F-rmciglichung des Eurcpeeftums' - 'making possible European-ness' (Vajda,
1989,
p. 120).
In ihe puticular
the combination of (wesiem) European cultural roots and socialist principles gave
Czochoslovakia excellent prospects of becoming a model for lhe whole world
Kundera was later t() lose both his Party membe$hip and many of his illusiuns
about this kiDd of 'liird way'.
'Reform CommUnism' rcfers to the wrng ir$ide tle Cornmunist Party drat tned lo
carry out denocratic and/or market reforns; most ofterL the refercuce is to the Prague
Splng of 1968, ar it is in dris casc
,il
160
EuluPe 5nn
1 the rcglmes in e^stcru EuroPc, t]]c concePL oi EtLopc rvas oflen met wrlh
susprcron, but allowerl as a troticrl lool lor l()liticitl devcloPrl)enls or, lo fut iI
bllrntly, as a loreign pollcy ilrslrument lor lho Soviet Unl{nl in rcllrtiot] tu wcstern
Europea s l-fller such e strau!-cnr coutti bc clcploye(l xllxlnsl oll)cr lalll(:ls For-irr
slance, Flungary rnd lhe Gl)ll in lhe l9E0s legitirnrzcd a lirlcign policv dcviaLirrg
from thal of the Sovicr Union witl relcre'rce to dre condilio s ol 'sru ll llnd
WiLl
mediurn-sized stales in -Flutope'. Mren Polaud ill thc 1970s Preseotcd Proposals
for nuclear weapon-flee zones ilt cc|tral Europc with r sPecrlic celtral tsulopean
argumentatiou - tlfs was in prhciple x part of the Soviet scheme, bul it w^s cerl^inly done with a vehemence and a lwist which originated in Warsaw, not
Moscow 'l'he exetcrse was paflly rcpeated by BulSture i reliltion to II Balkan nu
olear weapon ftcc zone in tlte 1980s (whetr lhe Bulgiuians cultivated lII .s with
Greece
eastern
Western Eurcpe
in
Ilr the post war siluation, thc Uniled States played a crucidl role in the recovery of
westem Europe Thc llSA noL only helped western EuropcM counfries 10 get o,
their l-eef agarn (wilh tlre Mflrsh.ill Plan and Orgtuuzalion for Eulopean Econonrit:
Co-operation), but it also supportcd thc prinoiple of European union/integration
However, lhere were vanous Arricrican ideas about whal fomls European inte
gration should or should not take, so the role of tlre USA mtst be seen also as a
facidr that set linuts or integiation Wrth hindsight, it is eirsy to see how all major
steps in European jnlegratron have becn dcpcnde[t on Aorcrical initialives or suP
port |tr/allacc, 1990; I(ummel atd Sclxnidt, 1990). The original EC projecl had
strong Arnerical backing and the Limes wTe-n the ptojecl Prospered, until recenlly,
werc always pedods when the Us adninistratrorl was clearly positive towards rn
tegratron,
The curious dialeclrc of Atlanticisl and Europealrist was alPatent in one key fgure, Jeal Monnetz Charles de Gaulle aLld others suspected lhat Lre was only an
Arnerjcan influenced factllitator m Europe and oertairlly he worked to make sue
that European integration took forms compatible wilh Amelican policy. I{owever,
he also worked to inspirc American pohcy. He was, in fact, a key actor in a sfiong
transadantic networ*, iobbying lbr co-operatjve slmchrres witlin which westerl,
pp
101 6).
the post-war history of westem Europe thcre ha-s been a tension between
Atlartic co operation and specrfic westenl European co-opcratiol, but in the security lield rn particular, tbe Atlantic 0{AIO) lmc has dominated 'lhere have becn
oDl-v rclalively weak moves lowards clear western Eurnpean co-opcration in the
In
'7
161
Commu ty.
ccoDomic field, howeler, the reiationship wilh Atlantic/American
stflrctures lemains complex- The ilnnediale successes of wesi European gowih
inteand rcconstruction, as well as the more long_telm evoltrlion of west EuropeaD
gration, happened inside US_sponsored global institutions of i tematioDal finance
ind trad", su.tt as the dollar rcgime:mcl GATT (the General Agreement or TFde
Even
in the
and Tariffs).
no dtect
lnokiog back ftom a vantage point of rhe 1990s, lt is tempting to see ihe movement towads political and economic integration in post-war Etlrope as a senes of
straighrforward steps, with the occasional sideways move (see Table 1). ln fact,
such a bald catalogue masks some very diflerent visiols of Europe; it skates over
different vie.,vs of European inte8ratiofl and conceals the cut and thrust of
Enropean politics as govemments wrestled with questiols of national self-lnterest
in the context of European economic and political integration
1945 Winston Churcbilt, though lut of oflice, was widely seen as a key figurc
for post-war Ewope and a fedemlist into the bargain. In 1940 he had proposed
In
an Anglo-French Union just before the fall of Fftmce; 'there shall no lorrger tn
two nations, but one Franco Bitish union' (U in, 1991, pp. 9ff, 29 35). During
the war be had argued for a Council of EuroPe. The British Seneral election of
of
in the affairs of
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I
I
pos!war Penod.
a ploject' lhereby
Anolher possibility for ihe fulule was to re-dellne Europe as
turn
now
process
we
overcomiDg the European pasl, it is to li1is
ChurchIll. Roosewlt and Sl\lin al lhe Yalta Conference, February 1945 (photo: IlultonlDt
163
162
rssay
lable I
i
:
ffiil
fl
ffi
ffi
ffi
flil
ffiii
ffi
{l
ii
lLll1l
ili
li
l98l
accession
of Grcece to EC
forum
1985 European Council adopts llte Single European Act (SEA) agreement
on an intemal single rnartet by the end of 1992
1986 accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC
1989 proposals for ar EC charler of FundamentaL Social Rights
1990 as a res lt of German unification, East Germany eniers the EC
1992 signing of the Treaty of Maasticht - fudier steps towatds econonic
and political uniou
enLi
gove|Ixnent.
a major spcoch ro Zulich (whcll hild becrt Lliscussed
with C-'ouder lovc-Kalergr bcforehand) Lhat il w^s nnperalivo Lo r'.slablish a []ritcd
States ot' Europe. Churchjll's argumenl wils, however, nrorc h slmnH slrllclrcnt Ic
garding lhe appropriate policics to bc ibllowcd on thc conlincnl, raLhcr lhrr,r iirr os
pousal of a British Europeal policy rr(lic^lly dilfcreDl lrolr th;rl ol Alllcc's
Churchill |r spite of his'1940 strilgcstion {lid nol no* cortsrtk:r :rrr
Anglo French union LIre core of Europciul ullity Alotl8 wllh Molrllcl, l((nl'illl
ALlenaus and many olhen, he oow bclieved tltal Irt ilttL:o_( ict ttllllt Iotl)lx llrillrr)rr
had to be the starting point, and in thc Zurich speech hc sai(l:
The lirsL slep in the re-creation of the Europcdn tiuDily Illllsl llc il
parfiership between France and Germarty. Iu tltis way only call Iiiulco
recover the moral leadership of Europc- 'fhcrc crlD l* no rcvivlrl ol
Europe without a spiritually grcat Francc iurd a spiritually Srcirt
Germany...Great Britain, the Bntish Commonwcallh ol Nrlrons, rlliShly
America, and I trust Soviet Russia ..must be (hc liientis lnd sPolsors ol'
the new Euope and must champion its righl to livc iL[d shi c.
( inlton Chrrchill, I9:iq)temLcr 1946,7'nith IJ i,!:Isity)
Thus, the widespread hopes that Britail would lcad European unificdlion were to
be thwarted, and the core movcd elscwhcre, while Blitain coDcenhated on security
matters and the partnershrp with the US Thc Britlsh emphasis on i1s 'special rela
tionghip' widr Washington was alanDing to the French, meking the UK a potential
Trojan horse.
wift
the advent of the Cold War and the division of Europe and GermaDy, platrs
for an all-European unilication became uffealistic and hopes {or turification came
to be centred on lsepaJate easlem and westem arrangemenis. On lbe western side,
fto:'., 194'7, ihe US was actively engaged in strengtlening westem Europe. In 1948
so-c^lled
in ihe area of secunty and defencc, but this affingement was quickly overtaker by the formation in 1949 of
NAIO.3
In westeflr Europe a major objecfive for thc adherents of lluropean federaLism was
to conslruct a supra-nalionaL organization out of what l)ecane, in 1949, the
Council of Eurcpe. Opirion was split between federalist plans from France aDd
Belgiuir and more rnhimslist plans, in particular from Britain- 'fhis split parallels
the laler diffcrence betweeD the EEC and tlc l.;uropean ]iee 'Itade Associarion
GFIA) 1l1 lheir attiftrde towards politrcal integration versus frec trade. Beiause of
these differences the Council of Etropc was not shaped its a supra-national body
r Ir t9S4, thc grussets Treaty c[anged inlo Lhc Wesrem Euopean UDion (l aBfI), also
j cluding Wesl Cernrury and ltaly- But this love was only to pave rhe way for fie
rnclusion of West Germa ] in NAI'O Ilre WEU remamed nargrnal until ihe begiming of
Lhe 1980s, when it gai ed inportancc as a possible velucle
European scurity co-operatlon
ol
iltill
il
state mosarc.
The most imporbnt development towmds westem European integration' the process of {omring ihe European Economic Cornmunity' subsequently the EuroPean
Community, got under way in 1951 in Paris, when six countries (France, Belglum,
the Netherlandi, Luxembourg, Italy and West Germany) signed a treaty creating
muer (
187
( lnion) and
fotntk:r ttf tlrc CD(l (Christidn .Demo'.roti'
his
reLtrenlctlt
of
rhe
itr
htttl
shot's
lear
lsas to iga:. rhit ptcu'Lre
6-1967 ), Mdyor of
i'tn*ru* t ii
alogtrc,
: HultonlDeutsch)
167
166
ru
ru
I
I
I
I
Lr-at
LUtoPe
Iy .
stttL
Lu'uP|'
-,tee
rilil
ilt[
lu rlt
I
I
t
t
t
I
Ce(nany. War between the two should be made not only unimagnrable - but also
materially impractical'- The plan also had an econornic dimeosior - alron!:st olhor
things the French stoel industry leeded safe supplies of coal
The formal opeoirg shot for the process had been a Press conlbrcrlcc jn 1950 by
the Frenctr Foreign Ministel Robert Schumail. Ilis proposal was lhat coal and
steel resouces in westem Europe should be pooled and co-administered by a
s pra-national authority. This should improve the market by reducing tariffs and
other barriers, and spcincaUy would handle the instability caused by the shoflage
of coal and oversupply of sleel. As a first step towards more Seneral Political integration, a Franco-.GemaJ. rapprochement was seetr as the essentiaLrelqqionship of
tlre union- The plan acfually stated:
The French Govemment proposes that the entire Frelch Cerman coal
and steel production be placed under a joint High Aut]rcrity wiLlfn the
framework of an organization which would also be opelr to the
paJticipation of the other countries of Europe.
(Grosser, 1980, p 119)
The plan was dratted by Jean Momet, who was then head of the FrencL Plaming
Comflission In his conception rle coal and steel union should be only the fust
step towzrrds political lntegation.
The European Coal and Steel Cornmuniry contained various instituhonal inno
vations of lasling importance: a supra-national authority (the High Au lonry) with
considerable powers, dircct ircome for the community in the form of taxation and
thereby less dependence on the member countdes, a Common AssembLy which
was 'thc nrst intemational assembly in Europe with legally guaranteed powers'
(Urwi , 1991, p. 50), and a Co'irt of Justice with the task of ruling on the legality
ol ary lligh Authority action 'by rcotiog the whole ECSC strudure in the last
rcsort ln the rule of law, the drafters of the treaty introduced a concept which was
lo hc of trenendous lmportance for Europeal integratiorl as a whole' (Urwin,
lq9l, p 5l).
'lhe trcrd lowardi economic integration coDtinued. ID 1958 an importiurt step forward was marked with the foamation of ttre EEC and Elrlatom. But those who
.hcw up the Treary of Rome (195?), tbereby paving tlre way lor the EEC, had a
pohtical as weu as am economic agenda. In the words of Waltcr Hallsteh, the fust
president of lhe EEC:
We are not just integrating economies, \te are inie8rating politics- We
are not just sharing our fumiture, we are building a new and bigger
house,
ffi
ffi
of ecolomic inle-
glatlon.
the United Srates. The majoa transatlantic conroversies were played out with the
US and FIaIIce as the main cornbatants, arrd West Germany as the major variable
168
o
lllxnlc(l iltt(x
l')5(| 54 lhi
l) ()l)l)()srrrll lll
ic(s ovo' co
l\
lr|r'rrttrr"'l ttr
tttt
'u'
plicltiorrs lirr lr'cndr r"ilillry sovr,r,'i11nrv Ir)rrl'rrrl ll'r: pr'"'rr' l"l irr 11)'r\' t'r
Wrsl (iorrIrI'y srgrrirrg tlrr: ll'rrss(:ls Ii(:i'ry rrrrrl lrrrrrrrirrll ir rrrr r l' r t'l N/\l(
'
t ir rrrrrrrr l(){r
I lrlv:r't
A further complication
of
FIom 1969, Wily Brurdr's social liberal coalition govelnment in West Germa.ry
wa-s less suppoflive of the idea of a supft-nationaL westem EuroPeaD irtegration
tllarl iis predecessors. lnstead, the all-Europeiur onentation (r.e includurg eastem
Europe) and a confederala view on tlie EC Played a comparatively larger rcle in
'West Germar thinking. Bmndl and bis pany 'slressed the role of the ration-slate
for the central Europear peace order' (Ilacke, 1988, p 169) This seemed to bl3
derived from lhe emphasis or Gemar policy atul OsQolilikldilente
a 'Confederal'
'federal'
.r
Kissinger's nremoirs, T&eWhite House Years, 1979, pp.405-12) The whole logic
of Brandt's opling towards the East implied that he could no longer just concelrate on integration in the West and hope for this to exercise magletism in the
East; he had to start working for some kind of all European framewotk (Frieden
sorilnung, 'peace order') in which Germany rDight eventually reach unificatiotr'
and in which Lhe improved relaiions tovfids lhe East could be tocated as well
as a whole experienced
omjc alevelopment. The economic set-backs at the beginning of the 1970s, which
were ilramatically worseneil in l9?3 by the oil crisis' hit westem Europe very
hard. Econornic problems persisted *lroughout the 1970s' furthered by the seconrl
oil crisis i! 197&-79. Against thil background' tensions developed between the
EC countries and the USA, mainly because of the economic policy of the USA
(leading to their budget dencit) and the fluctuations of the dollar. Ore consequence of this was that West Gemary gave up supporting the dollar and togedrer
with France, at the end of i}le 1970s, initiated lhe EuoPean Monetary System
the
@MS). The rclative economic stagnalion in westem Europe continued into
early 1980s. A major economic lalking Point duriDg this penod was 'Etuosclero_
sis', a condition that resulted in Europe lagging behind in the intemational econ
omy. This, perhaps, was a factor in stimulating EC countries into renewed
aftempts at integration in rhe secolrd half of the 1980s.
its
By
Willy Brandt (1913 1992), German Chancellor from
1964 to 1974 and winner of the
l97l
Nobel Peace
ed
in
1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986 and, in 1990' the former GDR was brought into
the fold tluough uniication with West Gerrnany. The collapse of dictalorships in
southem Elrlope in the 1970s did more than just Promote the cause of the newlyestabtshed democracies jn Spain and Portugal with lhe EuroPean Community lt
meant, as far as westem Europ was concemed, a teturn to a EuroPe that was pol
itically and culhnally accePtable in the wider world wrth the admission ol more
of southem Europe, the EC could claim to include more of ItiJtoricdl Europe than
hitherto. It became entitled to parade as lhe EuroPean Community, when il in
cluded Greece, the cradle of democracy, arid Spain, a major actor in European history and expansion- The image of westem Eurcpe thus became less problematic
and this in tum served to prcmote European identity and strengthen the European
idea-
Integration theory
The process of European integlatiolr managed to give birth to a theory almost a
integration tiory'' It seems appropriate to dwell oD thls'
oisciptine of its o*i
shor'rld
il
171
174
I
I
T
I
t
I
I
I
t
l
I
Essay r
EuIUP- -''e
$
W
ffi
flil
ltill
To some extent this could be presented as the reality of the 1950s and early 1960s,
since a stable context was created by the supcrpowers, and iDside this it was possible to operale as if security and high politics did not exist. Because the basic con
flict wa-s now bet\reen the USA and l-he USSR and these superpowerc dominated
Europcan) integratio'l theory since it does not stan out &om a fixed regjonal set-np, but
instead firvoLlrs llexibrhty as to scale. The aim is to bandle issues at f]re point wher il rs
Dos( r;rliorLal for them to be addressed and hence the nation-state is not always th most
s|ilnble vehicle Func[onalism har a stro g flavour of technocratic ideology: the main
poull rs lo prevent the hadling of issues from beng contaminated by polirics. In an
nrcre.rsingly iuterdepe ent world rt will be in the interest of everyone to a1low issrcs to
bc orsanized accordins to lheir nature: form should folow fimction
ilffir
0r)
Neo lirnchonalism is much more clearly a theory of regional ntegation (taking the
a,\ the sbnrng point); actually
nei) functionalism is the most important and influeotial theory of regional integration lL
lates from tunclionalism thc rdea of avording too much politicizarion ard tryhg to focus
on concrete co operation, but thrs slrategy is lioted 10 a theory which actually rccogDrzes
political prccesses and especrally focuses on lhe role of 6Li1es ard their capacity for
gradual teardng, i.e. how a process can become self-reinforcirg by chadging the way
aclors deftoe their inierests and interprehrions. Thus, it avoids the idealist assumptior
about altrurs8c actofi, but aJsumes thal the process of integation can carry along lhe
politicd (and other) 6lites in rcdefining their own rational seif interest m ways that
increasiogly make dre supra naLional insLitutions ther referent iNtead of the DatioD.state
{ffi
[i:ii
,:;iii
'I
;l
somc
(i)
(iii)
Federalism is (in ihis context) less of a reory itnd more of a strltegy Itr conrftsi to
tne 6[te-approach of neo-tunctionalism, it stresses the (occasiornl) mobilizatior of the
masses- Tlle 6lites are wedded to the existirg (i-e. nation state) strucbrres but, since
integration actoally will b in the interesl of all, the people world choose a Eoropean
coDstruceou if they got the chance Therefore, one sbould nol (as the neo-funchonalists
want) avoid politicization, bur nrobilize pDople for ihc decisive move where power an(i
authority can be traDsfened to a new constil'nion, a new supra-natioral rnit
172
il
d
as Jeao Monoel put
themselves, but by
If
pressed oD
this
integrationisls rePlied
g creaied by others or'
t drawn uP by the Six
in them' (cf
Wallace'
173
much in {crms ol the US beinB a negative, extemiLl power but more in the sense
(h^t Eur'opeilrl integration was, at the same lime, a pafl of and a resistance to the
Arnerican order.
i990, p. 111).'fhis is somewhaL rlisi gcrriLi)xi [)cc^usL:, as L]ritain lbund to ils cost
in 1963. a tlistinr:-i,on rrccrls L(J l)c madc bcrwecn those counlries that decli ed
membershlp tutd those lhat were refused membership. Nevertheless it is fair to say
that the posl-war politicians who, within dre linits set by the superpowers, set orrt
to re buiid Europc, were 'iess inclined 10 describe the outer boundaries of their
imagheci Europe than to organizc the counfiies at its corc' (Wallace, 1990, p 20)For Monnet. a pdnciPal ilrchitcct of Europear inlegralion, Europe's corc consisted
ol Fralce, Britaur and CermanY.
(vi)
This d1d ot mean that vis:ions ()1- a wider Europe werc tolally obscured, but that the
rcality oI the siluation demanded thnt western Europe reorgamze itself in the first
rstance. A way of prising eastem Europc out of thc SovieL gip was to strengthen
integr^iioD, pcace ancl plosperity i[ lbe westelll part of lhe conthent Although the
division betweell eastern and westeflr Eurolc was rcgarded as artificial, lloDe fhe
less the practice of Norkrng within a west luropean frzrle of refeluce for decades
producecl a mcntaL map wherejn 'EuroPe' was olten taken to mea0 either westem
Europe or even thal part of Europc beloDgmg to ihe Europeiur Corrrmu ty
(ii)
Content
can be
war
flarding tlrc differcnce betwen ihe intcr war ard post war period' In the inter
years. perception and project often meant a split betwecn rmages of a desperatc
situation and gland designs for their sol tion ln the post war period the frrn
damenral difference is that there actually is a process oI EuroPean integration arld
'project' rlow means taking port in alld mJluencing the process rathcr than issuing
stirring cftlls for radical change- PerceptioN and projects move closer and it nakes
sense to lreat them together Applying this temiDology to the peiod 1950 to 1980
it could be said that the domiDarlt perception of Europe is one of a regional grouP
of peoples leaming from their histodes that they should lollow either a co
operative way (Britain, Scandinavia) or a suPra-Dational way (Contulental, Ewope
of the Six) down a less nationalistic road. This is not the doomed rror driven
As 1() corlent, the EC project has focused otL blead-and FutLer political an(l ecolromrc iss es and the promotion ol Peacc and prospcrity rather than on hiEfsouodjng abshactioll anci g.andiosc historical and culiurrl clairns
(iii)
Merhod
The nreLhod oI ilitegralion has beer a Lnix ol
functionalism)
asking them t
grand federtrl
fur
c ti
(iv)
oPle'
rn
Economic and political integration would provide peace and Prosperity and may
well lead to a sftonger say in world politics bnt not a unique or dominanl rolcFurthemrore, the project is in itself a process - a course of action wbich llorrlr)les
European jntegration not by high-sounding rhctoic' but by Prirctical, down-lo'
eardr co operalion
i1
hl
liiiil
t
I
I
n
neo-
onalism
ldeological/philosophical basis
During
(v)
rl
Obstacles
opirioL 'Europe'
r
U
il
ffi
ffi
175
1f4
ililill
colrl.l be delected At the level ot culture, ideol-rgy :md identity, Elrrope from thc
nrid 1980s seemed to be regafuing a selsc of dynamism lJurope was once rnore
en]elging as a positive idea, solllethiJlg llrat Europreans should seek to rcalize' Preserve and defend. It was against this backdrop that le process ot ntegratlon wt
thin the European Community gained a new mome tum'
ilrl
ilffi
ililii
nili
By contrast the mood of the late 1970s and early 1980s had been much rnore tentative and uncertain. Pelceptions of the EC were dominated by f-he conhove$ial
Cornmon Agdcultural Policy and concems about the growrng buleauclacy io
Bmssels. The EC could be cornpared with a cyclist- It had to sustain the mornenlum of inteSralion or fall iI this case, not to the Sround but at lcasl to the baselinc of a customs union (Ka$er et al , 1983) In thrs respect we have atready
touched on the debate about'Eurosclerosis', reflectiJrg the fear that Euope wolrld
fall behind in the new technological revolution and lose its Elative Position 1r lhe
world economy. These fears, coupled perhaps with concems arisilg ftom superpower tension, were lo be the mam diving-force behifld an attempt in fte middle
oI thc 1980s to give new impetus to Lhe process of integration The most imporF
aot initiative was ihe series of meetings of the European Cou cil rn 1985 wbich
agreed plals for rJrstitutional reform of the EC and the plan for an intemal smgle
rnzfket by 31 December 1992. In a masteryiece of symbolic politics a oarne and n
ileadline for the re-laurlch of old ideas wa-s created At a sfroke, a political reality 1992 - wa$ conjured up and all acto6 in iniemational as well as domestic polilics
were compelled Lo relate to it. Though it was assumed that the total prograrnme
by 1992 the iflpelus of the projecr hiis had a selfreinforcing effect. lo 1988 {9, the project was expalded further with dre so-called
Delors plan for a rnooetary union GM[D. Thus it was not urtil the end of the
1980s that west European co operatton, lateflt ill the European Monet'rry System
would be inplemented
flli
iii
il'
since the end of the 1970s, was put into practice tioogh it should be said thal il
was only witir some difficulty that agreemeDt was reached on the first phase Early
ru 1990 these plans were suPPlelnented by a Franco-Gemall proposal for a politicul union of the EC Crcat difliculties, es?ecially wift the tIK, were experielced
nr rcgir(l to these irririattves, but at the Maashicllt sullrmit ln December 1991, de
spitc a number of caveats atld rcservations, a corllse was set tbr economic and pol_
iticd union. Silrce then the Danish referendum oI Julre 1992, rejecting lhe
Maastricht Treafy, and lhe moDetiry crisis ir Octobei, which led to Italy and thc
UK leaving the Echange Rate Mechanism, hrve generated some ulcefiainty but
whatever ihc political fall-out arisilg from this, it can be said that, from thc
rnict-1980s, the EC has undertaken siSnificant irew iDitiatives and created bold
prospecli for itself.
Although the 1970s have been characterized as a time when Europe seemed 1{) he
losing some of its dynarnism, there was surPrisingly some success in the forcign
policy field- European Political Co-oPeralion CEPC) had beer se! uP through de
cisiods laken in the early t970s, and enjoyed a clear inler govemneltal statusEPC worked well i[ fie early rounds of the Cooference on Secunty and
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), known as the Helsinh Process-6
The CSCE hos something of a loog history.It grew out of dre various, mainly Soviel
plans of tle 1950s and 1960s for a European confercnce to sancdry the outcome of the
1'16
177
lished nalional states, In projecting Eulope as such a single, hansnatlonal' m llifaceted local society the concept acquires an anti-establishment hue. Thus Europe
is lined up in social movements that are against state, Politics ard pottical pa ies
ol
For much of the post-war period, the politicavsecurity debate ovel Europe was
couchecl in East West temls. From the early 1980s, this situation began to change,
as instanced by Gorbachev's notions of a 'conmon European horne' and the wave
of litenture coming from France about Europe. Europe was frequenoy on the ton
gue of Russian, French and Gennan commentaiors and with different voices singd ask ourselves: did this represent a
ing in the n
The answer is no lf we scratch thc
sudden alral
were not all refeming to thc sanre
surface we
oundanes from the West as well as the
l1u
dilfelent 'European' values (J0]n et al ,
Ea
me, EuroPe stretched from ihe Atlantic
19
to rhe Urals, i e. a coclevord for excluding the Amedcans, while otheIs hypoiheians were excluded To some'
of a shong centre (Brussels),
its very lack of a centle.
The tendency to see security and politics as questrons of Earope becarne much
more obvious after the conclusion of the INF treaty ia 1987 (dismantling thc highly
il
I
t
I
I
I
T
(to ge-
alrnost
's essav
179
178
I
I
t
I
t
t
I
I
and alocumentation of the diffe@nt Europes, see Wnver 1989, 1990 and Wever et
al., forthcoming.)
For the sake of argumenl, tbis Presentalion is made as if one cor'tId talk of ltd
French or the Russl^n way of thinking about |urope. Thj.s is obviously not $e
I
I
case; a more comprehensive study would show how each sational discourse is, in
reality, a layered structure, where d(fferent groups disagree lwildly oll certain is
sucs, but may then shife a more basic code and set of concefm. Thls in nrm might
be contested by some margirul groups; and with lhese th? majorily would then
share a yet more absfact, more basic concePtion of stale, Iladon and Europe (for
methodology, see WiEver et al., forthcoming, Chapter 1) Thbsc Europes do not rc
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Mihail
politwl
ftottrer had been wrongly placed between wesiem Europe and centml
Iiurope, which territory came to be seen as'eastem Europe'. The solution, of
course, would be to redress this mistake, and move the political botder to its correcl location, between Russia and Europe
Furlhermore, the original central Europe discourse had a peculiarly indeterminale
nature. Central Eurcpe is neitber geography, Iror history, neither a place, nor a progranme but 'a way of thinking' (Milosz); 'a cultumlly connected area' (leszek
Kotakowski); 'a culture idea - or fate' (Kundera); it 'only exists as a state of
mind' (Stefan KaszyrNki). In a fleld where no political action seemed realistic, and
no altemative was allowed, intellectual and cultural exchange was drc or y means
of opening ?olitical space. (Later, when 'ordinary' politics had re-emerged rn lhese
countries, tbis specific mixture of culture, history and geography with all ils am
bivalences was no longer seen to be a prcrequisite for articulating a voice in tlie
region ) More important then was the notion of a 'rclum to Europe' taking cerlral Europe to Europe, or even fo the West an idea fhat had been mpliclt ill the
ceotal Europc d$course all along-
180
fer to-public opinion nor to the average citizen, but to Pollfical discourse,lo lhe
logic of political argumentatron which is shared among opponents in the settng of
a national, political cultue.
That lhere 4re such national differences as lo what is generally emphasized in a
cultwe, ald thereby what is meant by Burope, can be seen ftom the sel of four
books comprismg Lhis course Who is writiog what?'l'he French wite abodt ilrsti
tutions,lhe Germans about grass roots and society, Lhe Bdtish about rclations with
the outside wo d. and L\e critrcal task of deconsrirlcting the concept
given to tlre small nations, the Dutch and the Danes!
of EuroPe
is
German 'Eurcpe'
Germary, Lhe cenhal Europe debate was transtbmed into a debate about
Mitteleuropa One rcason for this is that Cermans tend, quite natnratly, to speak in
German. The change of word was, howevet, more than a matter of lranslalion
Whereas for Milan Kundera 'cenlral Europe' was the afta be )een Germany ald
Russia aD area etemally weak and shaped by resisLance to its powerful neiEhbolf]s lbe Mitteleurcpa dlsct$sed in Germany was one that (surPdse, surprise!)
contained Germany. -flte Mitteleuropa concepl thus refered to a real area with a
decisive political weight, rather than being a question of Purety cultural idenr.ity.
lllevitably, Mitteleurapd has connolatiorls of 'Getmany alld its suroundings', ihe
Geman area. (On the difference betweel cenhal Europe and Mitteleuropa, see
Waver, 1980, pp. 49 51; Ganon Ash, 1990; Rupnick, 1990. The social demo-
In
181
crrlrr.iourral l.tiI'
ttttt
N.rrurrann's bool. M
iLl c I
(;,1ialln-tltitft
u[al(r)
in
h
tures that these borde$ contailr.
border
rnirority rights
rs
il
lill
iiiil
n
T
T
the
Empire').
'Germany'. Federal Germany remarlrs passive arld a Getmur Mittele&roPd is construc{ed by irms, tjrder and individuals lnking up in a tight pattcnr of ilrterac]tion.
I
n
t
1986)
too strong nor too weak. Poiilicat thinking has remained linked to the conccpt oI
the state - fiot to lhe idea of the state as the embodiment of power and will but to
the notion of thc state and power as a practical rssue that requircs handling or Inay
even lle secn as a potential throat to be crlnailed (Weever cI r''l ' forthcorning)
ffi
ffi
183
182
ililfi
-ssay a
tl
it
it
ffi
I
t
t
ilt
ffi
Lulope 5rL
Thus, nalurilly, the concept of LwoP has been relalcd to Processcs wherc fbmitl
'lhe less the natid)_
statc st ctr]rc; anal state action begin to losc Lheil lnPortarlce
(cf
Stiioner 1990) ln
slates signjfy rn a fulure Lurope, thc better lor Gemany
where pol
thus
be
fullilled
can
Europe
and
G".m- thinti,tg, Projecls for nation
absent
weak
or
are
itical sbxctures
ing constituled afld actiog in a way that is Frcoch'
French'Europe'
For the French, this kind
cal thinking has to be ab
will. In most variants of
ca
lf
ln the lune of cie Gaulle, the slogan (dlough not actually his expression) was
('slale
L'Europe des pdrri?i, respectmg the full sovereignty of tE etut nation
the
state
nation
of
th
to
lhe
pedigree
nation'). This seemed logrcal in relation
ln
built
could
be
EuroPe
the
lrew
whicb
on
the
only
foundatlol
was
state-nation
ro
1983-4 there came a drarnatic shift in French European policy Francc started
areas
as
many
in
role
exercise a state-like
prcss for th
actor with a defence identity and a culhrt'rl
as possible
experienced a volte-face On the corltrary,mission. It
fhe political thinking was the same just one level up Now Europe had lo hc
whai France had always wanted to be France had bccome too small' and ils 'nis
sron must be liiken over by 'EuroPe' (Schubert 1988) Thus dre French conccllt
of lhe state is lepeated at the level of Europe, and the apparent lum-round ol
1983 -4 in reality is bascd on continuity at the level of political druking' Enrope
musl now be what France should have been and could somehort remain ll musl
includc a politjcal and defence identity, its owll values and rccognition hy exleral aclors.
'l his sccrns rncornprehcnsible to the Danes and probably to the British, who thillk
ffi
ffi
ffi
ill
Europe
tlul is
iiom others.
l,o clo
Europe Not in France, where 6 Mitterand can say: 'The more Europe ihere wili
be- the more Fmnce'. the explanation lies in Frenclr thinking about the nidon,
which implies that the nauon has a mission atrd that it has to act and be recoglrizerl by others, fust on the EuroPean and then on the intemational scene This is
not to suggest that lhe French regard themselves as a chosen people wirh a rnis
sion. The French idea of France is not that the French people are s[perior in prirres: hu$an dghts, political
ciple; but the values France
seclion on the eighteenth
of
the
and
the
rdea
rights,
Our action is directed toward goals which are connected alrd which,
because they are French, rellect the desire of all men.
(Grosser, 1978;
tili
Grman
Three LuroPes
185
ffi
184
Russian'Europe'
llrc ltrrssian rll!sbatiol rs ll box Lct me explaill. Lr the Soviet
lrlurot,e
logic'
Mosco
violory
The 'box
discoursc
oLr
(or
'horne') The Soviet Union had latrched many poslwar European pro1ects but the
Wcst had alwlys been suspicious of the line lhat wc EuroPans should stand
together in peace, but we are being thwafied by the int sive presence of lhe
Americans in Europe So when Gotbachev staned singing tlle praises of a 'com
mor Er.rropean ho se', fhc West inttially heard the sanre old song. However' lwo
novel features soon emerged- Irirsl, in Gorbachev's version, the emphasis rvzr-s
much mme clearly placed on culnual and histoncal algumenls. We Europea s, it
is argDed, belong together because of a sharcd culftre and history This is a way ol'
estab[shing a tundamental basis for a specillc loLitica] arranggment, bul il also
cerltrc o[
cisivc
the
de-
of
Europeanizahon
,iiilil
iiiill
culs the othcr way so as to establish ccrtain values and traditions as bindrg on the
Soviet Union. The will to takc this on boerd relales io thc use of the 'European
home' argurnent ilr SovietA{ussian Politics (probably no less llnpo ani dran its cx
in the
temal use). It wlls a slogan of the FuroPeirn lirLc or the Westenlisers
is to
tion to dEvelopments in Gemany in the autumn aJld winter of 1989 90 an(l it
we
now
lum.
aspecl
lhat
this
Soviet Uniou.
Europeanizations
toilg
and
house).
confuse(l
Frenclr reachon to events in Germany in 1989-90 has been somewhat
t
I
T
sfuggle was not intelded to increase influence in westem EuroPc, but t']
ndnimize the /oss of influence in eastem as well as westem EuroPe As one
Sovielologisl has put it:
'I'bere
lhe 'corlmon
Ijnioo
fo
-
h Europe wiib
ffi
icipatuo" in
ss (Despite
the Sorier
ire orte of thc fuw consta ts
ir
lhe torei8n
policy of Moscow.)
1A7
186
Esray r
ll
l:ssay
Lurope stnce
ffil
ru
I
I
n
ffi
ul tlu,
WdU
irg on 'Projcct Europe' the EC wa-s the end as well as the means. Now that the
airn is widened 10 iuqlude all of Europe in a conJedemtion, lhere is an increased
ncc(l lix an liC capable of bringing this aboDt- In order to be a forse in wider
Firrolle, thc L,C must exercise greater political clout only thJough political mcans
ibelf. This
is Mrlterand's grand dessin.
political
project
es
Tlre French stress or the Comrnunity's Ostpolitik is very logical, because this is
the only way to counterbalamce German economic dominance in eastern Europe
German lirms act without a covering policy - fieir economic calculdtions lead
ffi
188
eastern
Europe
of Reconstntction and
from the John F. Kennedy School in Berlin carry off souvenirs tl",at had
'falletl off' the WaIL Notember 1989 (photo: Deutsche Press'Agentur)
Studenls
Development emalate liom Paris (while Gennany is doins a lot mor bilaterally
eastenr European countdes that were prein assisting fomrer Soviel republics
^nd
viously conirolled by the Soviet Union). For an understanding of the French position, it is importmt to nolice the way in which easLem-Europe is now beiog
rncluded iD the EurcPc projeot. Eastem Europe is percerved not as a part of
Europe in action, but as the missiotl, the r.l.t]i for westem EuroPe.
Germany the imtitrl fedeml Sovemn]el]t response lo the breachhg of dre wall
was glidcd by fear ol provoking rcaclions from the lorr A]lied Powers, Britain,
ln
Essay r
I
I
oo 'Project Europe' the EC war the end as well as the means- Now that the
aim is widened to inalude all of Europe in a conJederation, there is an increased
Decd lbr ai EC capable of bringing ftis about. In ordel to be a force in wider
Europe, thc EC musi xercise greater political clout only tkough Political means
can rle EC create a Europe larger lhan itself. This - the strengthening of the EC as
a political project is Mitterand's grand dessiniDg
I
T
t
T
Tlre French srress on the Community's Ostpolitik ts very logical, because this is
the only way to counterbalance German economic dorninance iD eastem Euope.
German 6rms act without a covering policy their economic calculations lead
them to make specific iovestrnents. Gennan economic expansion iherefore grows
ftom laissez-faire, i.e- non state processes. French companies, on the other hand,
have neilher the srengdr lror the motive for comparable investmetrt. Thus, [re less
potirical'help' is extended to eastem Ewope, the more German economic dominance will take hold. The place for France to be, threforc, is at the head of the
EC's policy towards the East. Eastem Europe should not be left to chance (for
chance, read Gemany), ttut helped/qranaged/controlled by io.nl political acliou.
Eastem Europe becomes politicized and multilateralized. Proposals for big EC
joint prcjects for eastem Europe - such as the Bank of Reconstnction and
188
i,,l
jncluded
L]
I
ffi[
tilr
il
I
I
I
il
tsrilish reticerrce over Europe has meant that she is flot part of ihat Saurc OnLy
when one talks of defence and secudty in nattow terru does llrilain cntcr Lhe
$tage, sinoe she claims a mediatng role between the USA and Europe.
The UnitEd States, wrth more justrce, could be iflcluded. US policy lras playcd an
active and constructive role rn the German-EDropean uniication process (the US
belflg the most pro-uoilicatioo of the four'), aDd has fi.lrthefmore succeeded in
securing iD the new Europe a surprisingly strong position for NATO, and ao acceptable shape for the CSCE as a fall-back option, should NAIO later be Inarginalized. NAIO and the CSCE in some ways are movrng in parallel as truly
inter-govemmental, all European, consensus-based 'safety nets' with a specnl rolc
ior the 'quasr European' Russians and Americans- Thus, paradoxictrlly, the USA
carr be included iu tLre aralysis by replacing references on the previous pages lo
'Russia' with'Russia and to some extent the US' and'the CSCE' with 'NA|O
and the CSCE'.
t
ffi
NAIO (USSR/Russrr
and
tlSA);
in Europe
We are nol so much witrressiag a concenlration of Power
gf"
U-a*tL-tion'
ver]sus nadonal
iliversity
nor a strug
A neo-medieve! F-uroPe?
146)
ll
Searching
ffir
.
.
.
Tlre logrc of this is capture.d when we rccognize that we are Dow actuaLly mikirts
somedrilg akin to a peace settlemenl Its stability depends on not Putting the
Loser in loo degraded a position. At th$ point, more than fbrty five years irfter
the war, the losers of the war, Gennany and Japan, have wol the peace The
prublem for lhe peace seltlement will b whetber rt rs acceptable to the losers of
the post-war pcacc, France and Russia, who will see a reladvely high and privi
leged position decrease unless they can find new channels for what they deenl
[realingful to their rlation, state, politics and secuity. As HeIuy Kissingcr
pointed out, in his 1954 disscrtation on Europe after the Napoleonic wam, a state
may not be treated only lTom the outside a-s a factor in the birlance - an arrangement rs only stable if all major powers can perceive the Dew order as cornpatible
wllh ils own vrsion:
(Kissinger, 1957,
construction than any junior security expefi or political scientist co ld draw ul. A
ncatcr Europeao archrtechrre is easy io imagi e. But politics is different A Donstellation of interacting projects, each containing their 'Europe' is actnally the il
logrcii ELrupe rn whi.h we aJe living.
NAlo mitiative
'Ihcre are dilferent ways o{ looking at presetlt day trelrds in Europe ls the EC the
real sovereign slate while lhe merlbcr sta(es e actually becoming iicreasingly
'1S3
tlr
territorial state has de-fined tbe modem epoch in conftast to tle medieval), but
most debate phrases possible change in tefins of the likely end of lhe ution-state,
which is a diffeEnt debate. The natiotral idea arrived on the scene in the lateeighteerth century and was fused with Lhe already existing principle of the territoriat state (which had so far been based not on [ationa] but dynastic legrtimacy)
For the last two hundred years or so thc teritonal statc has thercfore been combined with the national idea (making up the oalion-stat), but if we focus on the
nalion-state we end up in a iliscussion of nationalism, and dre natiooal idea persists. However, change ir tating place, but al an even deeper level: that is to say at
the level of sovereignty and fte territorial state. Thus nations continue but the
states that they relate to aje oot what tbey used to be, since the tlale is chaoging,
with authority being dispersed across several levels in our 'new middle ages'
Hence present west-Europeatr developments entail deciCive changes betweel the
unit of identification (rle nation) and the unit of political organization/authority
(the state - and incrcasingly the EC)
hatl no fixed idea of intemalional relations' or 'foreign policy', as an activity limiled Lo a specrlic kiod of urft (state) and ooly to be coDducted among these and on
between emperors,
thc basis of equality. Of couse, to the
d hights might rcpopes, kings, archbishops, barons,
semble
ca
cities,
intemational Elations. All, fot
agreements, sent diplomatic missions, settled their disPutes by arbihation and war
and regulateil at teast part of their behaviour in accordance with cornmonly ac
cepted laws and cusioms. However, ii would be vrong to suppose that these re
intematio[al, in the modem sense of the telm, for they occured rol
individuals and '
between sovereign t
temational' and
corpomte grouPs- A
in medieval Europe'
'domestic' relalions
(Htizgrefe, 1989, pp llf.)
of
(i)
In rhis Europe, societal security wiil be high on the agenda Because of the chang_
ing relationship between stale and society thcre will be more and more security
pr-oblems, demanding securitl policies of a new kind What can a nation/society
io when it feels tlreatened as a nation/society aad vhen it is less able to use lhe
insfuments of the state to cootain people' ideas and technological developments
that are felt to be undenniDing the sense of national cohesion? It will be com_
alebate on
Orc can talk of a 'region' as the unit smaller than the existitlg state (as for
instance in the Swedish sense of 'rcsionalpolitik' - potitics dealing with the
regions; especially the weaker ones).
(ii)
ile form of
(iiD
*..,i'ii"",lit3fr,
al and economic
will
need culrure.
potcldally move away ftom each ottrer and societies become seclfirly dctors in thei'- own right. Tbis is where the parallel to the Middle Ages
one
comes in. In the medieval system in conirasl to the modem state system -
net-
works.
it
195
194
Comparisons between our times and the Middle Ages arc of course problematic'
since there are numerous differences. but the various pajallels are first of a'l manifestations of a common difference from the modedl state system. The purpose of
using the medieval metaphor is primarily to fiee our minds ftom the confines of
the mod"- state system. Our concepts and thinking about politics are so deeply
prcjudiced by concepts from the modem system of states, territodality and soverlJvith the present-day fluidity,
eignty, that new developments are almost invisible.
questions.
we need to treat these concePts again as
I
I
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I
I
British rcticence over Europe has meant that she is not parl of that ganre OnLy
whetr one lalks of defence and secudty in narow terms does Britain cntcr Lhc
stage, since she clairns a mediating role between the USA and Europe
I,
i'l
nilffi
fl
ffi
ffi
rffi
The United State$, with more justice, could be included. US policy lras playcd an
activc and constructive role in the Germal Europeao uni-hcation process (the US
being the most pro-unification of ttre four), and has furthermore succeeded in
securing ill the uew Eu(ope a surpnsingly strong positron for NATO, and ao acceptable shape for the CSCE as a fall-back option, should NAIO later be rnarginalized NAIO and the CSCE ur some ways are moving in palallel as huly
inter-govemmental, all-European, coosersus-based 'safery nels' with a special rolc
for the 'quasi-European' Russians and Americans. Thus, paradoxic.rlly, the USA
can be included rn the analysis by replacing references on the Prevlous pages lo
'Russia' with 'Russir - and to some extent the US' and 'the CSCE' wilh 'NAIO
and rhe GSCE'-
.
.
.
gi" ou--
g-tr"llt
"ion'
power and aulhorily across various.levels
A neo-medieval F-uroPe?
1he logic of this is captured wben wc recognize that we are now actually rnailirts
something akin to a peace settlement. Its stability depends on not prlftllrg the
loser in too degraded a posrtion. At this poifi, more than forty five years after
the war, the losers of the war, Germany and Japan, have won the peace. The
problem for the peace settlement will be whether it is acceptable to the losers of
lhe post-war peace, France and Russia, who wrll see a relatively high ard privi
Leged position decreaie unless they can lind new chalnels for what fhey deem
meaniogful to therr nation, statc, politrcs and security. ls Heruy Kissinger
pointed out, rn his 1954 disserlation on Europe after the Napoleonic wars, a stale
may not be treated only f.om the outside a,s a faclor iD the balance - an afiangemenl is only stable i{ all nrajor powers can perceive the new order as compatible
with its owr vision:
No power will submit to a settlement, however well balanced and
however'sccure', which seems totally lo deny its vision of itself
(Kissinger, 1957,
ffi
ffi
1[f
fil[
iil
146)
ul
NAIO hitiative. Some lre undergoing Brxssellization and some are movilg down
other
lowards a Europe of the regrons - networks, local authorjlies, business aid
rnitiatives emerging across state borders
the
There are differcnt ways of Looking at Prcsent-day trerds ln EuroPe Is the llc
rncreasilgly
becoming
aclually
are
states
real sovereign sl^te 1vhile the melxbe!
193
sovereignly,
is haP-
had no fixed idea of intematioml relatiom' or 'foreign policy', as an activity limited lo a speci{ic kind of unit (state) and oDly to be cotrducled among these and on
between emperors,
the basis of
d loights might repopes, kings,
8el lhis
ould be
0[
dchot-
end of the territorial stdte (and thereby the neo-medieval iheme, since tbe
territorial state ha.s de'flned the modem epoch in contrast to the medieval), but
most debate phrases possible change il term s of Irc ltkely end of the nation-stale '
which is a different debate The national idea arrived on the scene in the lateeighteenth cefltury and was fused with the already existing principle of the terri
to;ial state (which had so far teen based not on Dational but dynastic legitimacy)'
For the last t1xo hnndred yeafi or so the teritorial state has thereforc been combined with the national idea (making uP the Dalion state), but if we focus on the
nation-state we end up ]n a discussioD of nationalism, and dre national idea per
or f\e
([he state
equality.
archbis
semble intetnational
aSrcements, sent
and regulated at
cepted laws and
lalions wete
)
Comparisons between our times arrd the Middle Ages are of course Foblenatic'
since there are numerous differences, but the various parallels are 6rst of all manifestations of a colnfiron differeDce from the moderiT state system The purpose of
using the medieval metaphor is primarily to fiee our minds ftom the confines of
the modern state system, Our corcepis and thLking abqut politics are so deeply
prejudiced by concepts from the modem system of states, territoriality- a d,soverttt", tt"* alevelopmeBts arc alrnost invisible. With the present-day fluidity'
"ignty,
(i)
ing relationship between state and society there will be morc and morc secuity
pr-oblems, demanding sec ritJ Policies of a new kind What can a natiory'sociery
io when it feels tkeatened as a nation/society and when it is less able to use the
instnrments of the state to contain people' ideas and technological develolments
comthat are felt to be undemining the sense of national cohesion? It will be
towns, s;a[
states, thereby
fomdng
tcqions'
reglons'
net-
tnic
works.
become seState and society potentrally move a'tay from each other and societies
Ages
the
Middle
to
the
parallel
where
is
rigd
This
own
their
curity acrors in
one
st'ate system
modem
to
the
conrast
in
system
the
medieval
In
in.
comes
194
(iD
all defend ii,seu by activaring :md intensifying its foms of cultrual expression'
Orc cafl ta]k of a 'region' as the uoit smaller than the existing state (as for
instance in the Swedish setse of'regionalpolili't'
regionsi especially the weaker ones).
In this Europe, societal secuity will be 1 8h on the agenda Because of the chang-
I
I
I
I
I
I
The latter is the main iocus of this section, partly because it is a truly new
phenomenon, and partly because it is this kind of region which is likely to take on
division of labour between Europe' tration and re
a specific role in tlre
gion.
"^"tgittg
I
I
I
There has been in recent yedrs an increasirg awareness of new pattems of cooperatlon such as the areas along the Danube; the constellation of Calalonia,
southem France and northem Italy; the eastem Alps (Alpe Adrialrc); the westem
Alps (Arge Atp) and ths Baltic Sea Region. Io some places we see old pattems
beirg rcactivated as co-opetation amo!.E countrizs - for instance the 'hex-
of tbe
'norlhern
the nAlevels;
Ernest
Habsburg
In the case of Baltic co-opratiofl (on which we will conctrfiafe al dre end of this
seclion) there has been talk of 'a ne,,v Haqsa' (referring to a network of ftading
towns in northem Ewope in the fourteenth and f,fteeEth centuries)- The 'Hansa'
metaphor denotes a co-opemtive arraDgement betwen towns, Poits, cosmunilies
not states. Although we might be wihessing a growing co-operation among
,rrales around the Baltic, Baltic co-operation is likely to be expressed, primarily, by
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
a number
In regionalist circles there is a teDdeflcy to present the rcgions as more 'tlue' than
other communilies. This kind of regionalism often looks like 'romantic nation
alism' one level down. The rcgionali$ts love to point out tbat the nation-slates arc
artificial constructs wbere identity and cultute ilere conitructed as Part of a political prcject. It is, however, exacdy ihe same with the regions: they are not given by
nature, just lying there waiting b be discovered. Thete ate no 'nahtral' legiotrs.
We have similarities and commonalities along various dimensions in a complex,
criss-crossilrg network. This does not make the project of a region less valuable or
real. After all, the nations have proved to be emphaticaly real.
Recognizing this political character of regionalization makes con-flict-management
easier, in the sense that one is morc likely to see contrasting views as legitimate.
There is no rcason why the relatiotrship among the emerging regions shor-tld be
harmonious. J. G. Herder and the other early thinkers on nationalism believed that
nationalism was peace-making, because if all people were allowed nalional self
detmination and limited themselves to thet owrl land, ftere would be harmony
As we hrow, it was slightly more complicated than thatl Fi$t, there were prob
lems of &awing dre co[ect bordrs between one land alld another- Secondly, there
were problems of finding out who should be seen as having a legitimate dght io
cotrstitute themselves as a state:'Basques','Catalans',' Corsicans', and'Bretons'
- or 'Spaniards' and 'French'? Bxactly the same problems will emerge if tlle grjp
of the nation-state is loosened and we allow the 'nahrral' regions to unfold. wlrere
is the eastem border of Transylvarnia, the border betwen Macedonians and
196
Russia.
proc
produces
identiflcation
the same
ciassicat rrack of buildiog Lrp overly shong national ldentities' which would rnake
1t difficult for eastem Europe to maximize the beneht from the changes in westem
Europe. A possible altemative could be a strengthening of multiPle identities, lo
cal, regional aod national. This would make it easier lor eastem Europe to link 0p
to EC developments, arld \aould give eastem Europe a chaoce to escape ihe Peren-
nial dilemmas of oational conflict-s and insecurities withfu and betweefl states'
Traos-regionalism might play a decisive rcle in this respect Bemard von Plate
spells orrt in detai the role such regions miSht play ill rclation to the recognitron
oi new slates, arld therefore could have played in the case, for exarnple, of the rec
respective counfries.
Regioualisrn also makes it possible lbr ethnic ninonlies to have more intense con
tacl with their lellows ilr neighbouring countries without raising the issue of
border revisions. Although the secrity factor has been decisive as an openjng
be
move, as a chzmge which makes regionaLizltion p,Jsib/? - tle ddving lorces
to
processes
relating
those
in
hrnd rcgionalization are, paradoxically, to bc lound
European iltegration
not
In tlle fust
o[es: regions
a-s
wortld ap
alional re
1990).
example
Under this heading, it should be noted that tbe relationship betweer 'regions' itr
tte mi('o or linder sense and the Ewopean Community is now becoming more
complex and conftove$:ial- In ihe 1970s there was a tendency to move away {rom
the ;adon-state towalds a simultaneous streDgthening of sub- and suPra-national
or global processes. At that time, however' the movements below the level of existig stut"t '"vere all more or less etbnic projects aimed at sfiengthening smaller
nadJrs such as Scotland, Wales, Brittaly, Corsica, the Basque country and the
Lapp people. These were classical movemenis of secession, ihough sornetimes
to the level of claims for incrcased autooomy for a specific people'
t"ali""A
that
Land, or a paflly autonomous region' Thus ihe arguments of the 1980s
nation
betwee
the
gap
hence
EC
and
to
the
soverei8nty
losing
nation-stafe; \lerc
1S9
198
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I
to bc made' but
old East West border' Not becxuse tllere l(e many tugible galns
it
is now inlercst
c
thcrefor
,r""^"." ,Ut co-oPeratiolr use,t to ire impossiblc and
li
r I'i
]u,
ffi
t
fi
ffi
rllg.
the Corffnunity as'member states" whercas Catalans and Corsicans' Scots and
Lombards will fbrever remain bound to 'regrons'?
Thus
might
"uont
has been found.
sue
slate co-operatlon.
The lesson seems to be that a 'Europe of Regions' when il rneans a Europe built
of hundreds of small communitles ('the Swilzerificalion of EuIoPe')' is probably
rrot as realistic or as workable as its advocates Portray Funhermore, democracy'
citizenship alrd other imPortant gains of modem society have been cultivated in
the nation-state frarnework and this inheritance should not be dismissed too casilyIn the evert, lhe regions are perhaps not as viable a proposition as the trans
regrons.
ffi
ffi
ffi
frlfl
illil
II
We can illustmte
Sea Region
eJ
)? No, on the
But existence of
intellecruals, his_
identirics is Dot statii- Nations
torians and politicians - they did not have a priol existence; but after the projects
of natroD-buildrng had taken their course, they became very real indeed The
Baltic Sea region could take on such a rca-lity There are three roasons why the
Baltic prqect has an impetus at present Gor further elaboration, see Wever
lJnatse
vehicl
es the
1991.)
'llhe lirst reasol is that it is ze]t. The Nordic (Scandinavia) belongs to the ol(t
Europe, the Baltic to the new Or, to put it differently, after 1989 we are suppos
caty living in a 'new Europ', but what in practrce does it mealr to you and me?
We lreed a concrete, local 'new Europe' in which to pariicipate and lhat is why
most of tbe new tegions in Europe have come into existence alollS and acioss The
-.Voftjen is Scandinaviar
memben of the Nordic Coucil: Icel.trd, Norway, Sweden' Finland and Denmark' plus
the semi-urilependen! areas Greenland, Faroe Islands turd Aaland lslands (In
Scandinavian_- and geological - tems, Scandinavia nonnally excludes Frnland, lceland
and somctimes
to g|e the
1ro
the
tiotr of a 'Baltic Region' some legitfnacy- This has created tlle context for
The
oPeratioD
co
lbr
Detwork
'rider discussion of a Baltrc tegion as a flon-state
regloF is
Political
Paltne$'
so it begins to take on the reality ol a nelwork. The two areas in wtuch the Baltic
region lias begun to makc an rmpact dre cultuic and inflasfucturc' Cullure because
A combination of presellt
of
il
lor regionalization
Deffnfik.)
201
200
iffi
Lhe nalion stale As the pull of sovcreigtty weali.ens, regionalization acquires morc
scope. Ilistory and cultural geogaphy are being revised to take accouflt of tl]e
dual proccsses oI Eurcpeanization altd regio alization, which are altedng the gencral skucturc of E-lllopean political space, As part of this process there is sornetimes a tendency to present lhe regions as 'natriral'. Tdts applies to some extent to
tr.uN-border regions, but much rDore to sub national units such as the Germarl
Ltitaler.'f)hey ar-e prcsented as oftenng slrong local identifications for their populations. Of coulsc, this is a nristake Not every Bavarian knows all others, nor flre
they identical. All political commuiilies of dus size are imagined like the nations, and Europcl
graphical situatiotr but as a dcscnPtion of thc political and ecoDomic rci i(itrs ln
post Cold War llurope.
Detinitions of EuroPe
widr Euope very much in the ascendant it is timely to reflect on what Europe means - does it stand for sometiing, does it exe-mPlify cefiain ponciples or values'
does it have a panicular identity?
ili
il
EuroPean
unity' Anthony
T)
nt
ste
se
I
I
:lhe eastem border is thercfore not a liDe (Ukainc in, Russia out; or Moldavla in.
Ukainc out; or the lJalts in, ard so on) it is more Lke an impuisc ihatjust 'runs
out' somewhere on the eastem llains. Thcre is no eastem border just a gradu^l
thinning out This statemont is not rneant as a timeless interpretation of the geo
I
I
l
l
ffi
ffi
ffi
barrlly appropriate counter imagcs for Europe nor is the Third World A disi"
tegrarjng'fhird World miSbt become an objec! for Europeai polilics bttl is
scarcely suiiable for idenriry fbmatiol - a Prcspect rendered evell more unlikely
by the existence of ex-colonial ties.
fltffi
fl
";;;:"J
;iilJ il;"il;';; ii"'""""""",'sell-reflcctiolr on fiIe
rcllectlon
i,
The atteinpt to define Eorope in lelms of iLs opPosites IlaS oot Produced any clearcut solutioDs. Perhaps the currenl absence of a signif,cant exlemal tlreat to Europe
has softened the force of this kind of identity consmrction. It fierefore seems ap
propriate to adopt a more positive approach, looking at Europe Pel re and con_
sidering whether it can be denned by virtue oI intemal characleislics and inhelent
principles.
ilil
rtil
ffi
rliillll
ilIlil
During rhe 1980s and the early 1990s, Europe's political stock has risen consirler
abty. 1'he dual movemeni-\ of EC integmtion on the otre hand and Lhe collapse rrl'
the Soviet Empire on the other are widely seen as a kind of victory for the idea of
Elrlope. The states in the westem part apPear to be willing to hand over sover
eignly to a supranatlonal poliiical construction and the states in the eastem part ale
'ret rBing to Europe' now that Sovrel conrol has been lifted ln this context arBu
ments that use 'Europe' as a baseline have a certain political force and encoluage
speculation about the meaning of Europe, the question of European identily arld
'fhe contemporary quest for ihe meaning of Europe and aul understaading of the
Europan idea need to be set into an histoflcal contexl. We have seen in Pim ilD
Boer's essay how nolions of what constituted Eulope chalged according to his-
iLod
-10-^::1
been aPProccss) lave.
rs
but Svcrker S'jrLin reminds us thdl there
js
fle Wesl'
Bul xgain, sjDce Europe bejng equatcd with
cannot be
stictly rPplied'
lfweresorttohisLoricalandctrlluralexPlcnJtlonsofEurop,:mrdentitythennot
io btrt ''ve ,rlso
to coltend with the drvergencres already referred
*" i."""
""tyi"
seetheresidualslreltglsofthelrd/ejofEuropentd.lotEuropeperse'Thispoint
D Smith:
has been elegirntly been madc by Anthony
rorical circumstances and how. afLer the Frencb Revolution, they became lflked to
a self{onscious historical perspeclive. Petcr Bugge showed how ln an age of
nationnlism, the idea of Europe was expressed in visionary projecls. And cNtirlts
our nli[ds back to 1945, we have seen in ihis essay how dre process of integratlon
was regardcd as a means of avoiding dre disastea of further European cilil war So
wc rrccd to be awari that the Europeatr idea is not a fixed entiry and that it caD ell
conpass sonre wide variations - both democmcy and Fascism have flourished on
European soil- At a time wben Europe is being praised for its pluraliry and its culturi dlversity, it should be remembered thai Euope has oflen served the interest
of particular states, peNons or groups and at times it has beetr suppresslve of dif
ferences and vaaiatioDs.
1[
"-,* "_""*,*t
ni.o',"lrt",. i"*rofrnenls.
Il
ffiil
rs bcios roote.l
lr
Similarly even more abskact notions such as self criticism, doubt aud scepti
cism are advanced as being distilctlvely or lypically European (see the reierences to Modn, Enzensberger and Kundela in the section entitled'One, two,
many Europes' above). There is some basis for pornting to tlesc philosophicdl
204
A EuroPean natian-state?
cetrlury
back
The nineteenth
communiry datring
on stmilar Projection.t
Hirbemrr' and oLltc'.
etemal
"rLT:
u ."u_
bound to laill
iI
It is possible
in a matrix of 'multiPle
modem
idertities', w
post
baker' railway enthusiast, mothcr, conservative, from Hamburg, etc Of course, People alwa)s were
many fhngs, bu
Probably always
tional identily w
Iere t identities.
identities - among these the national and the European (Knudsen, 1989; Buzal cl
al , 1990, pp. 56tr.)
relate to natioDal ialentities? Wi[ the EC then have a EuroPean identity taking ihe
fbfm of the nation'state - a national, EuroPem ideltity - and thercby crush lhe
old, national identities? Or is it not a question of identity at all?
The dilemma of Europe and nalion can be seen as being generated mosl fuorle
thc words of
a Europe
filil
I
I
t
tlut
Yct, the essence ol a naLion is that all iodividuals halc many lhings ilr
coilnnon, ard also thal thcJ have forgoLten many things
(ltenatt, 1882)
I
I
246
ii
T
e
is big enough
and luve
community
be
a
to
enough
and
small
economy
for
basis
to be fte
cultural identity;
Emesl Renan:
plicdtior).
ffi
tte te
emetgence
Tlis
argunent
of neo Nazis iII Germany' the country where peoPle have most
o$'e to Pierre Ha-ssmer
ffi
:,
it
i
Essay
lt
to
Possibly a more reahstic approach thafi the i-nlinite multrplicatlon of identides can
be outlinei in ihe followilg way (although the stability of even this can be questioDed):
ffi
l
I
t
The national level (together with, in some places' the regional one) remains
the focus for cultural identity, for community The 'Gennan' tlTre nalion re
marns a! tbc national level but in its orlSinal Herdedan fonn, where lhe na_
tion is so impo ant that expression in a state becomes umecessarl 0 irver e/
dl , tbfihcoming).
it
clcmanding from people numercus political identities, but tno clearly defioerl posilio s, each attaining a considerable weiSht,in the area where it countl'
loyrlly
frLbhc could plc(lgc lhcit
il
tioDs, calling them, for instance, cilric state notron CFrance) and organic peop[e'
ll.rtion (Germany). Th.en our future could possibly consist of a dualism, w;lfi
Europc as the civic state-nation and our old nation-states as orgimic people
ations Idendty and politics are delioked and refocused. lf fhis process is rcally
under way, rt means lhat orre malot idea of Eutope tn the 1990s will ellrbrace
Europe as a non ethnic, non_organic, Polltical, civic 'natlon' or 'republic''
fr
il
'
idea'
ffi
ffil
ilil1
too clevor and enliBhtened for any of this argumentalion, will try to keeP their
thinking free of such Euro-metaphysics as displayed in this book of essays, while
half-consciously going along with the trotion of a geneml strengthening of the
European seJf-image and the self-evidence of there being a 'Europe', a 'Eulopean
idea' and a 'history of the European idea'.
References
tt Die neue
I
t
2l
(1990) The
BtzAN, B., KEtlrRlJP, M., LEMAITRE, P, TRoMER' E. and wa\TR, o
LolJdon'
era'
War
Cold
the
scenarios
Recast.
Posl
for
European Securit, Order
Pinter.
cARDEt-s,
Be
2j
The New York Times Review of Boofr-s, 21 November 1991' pp- 19
the
American
of
Journal
DEDALIIS:
'Mittelewopa'l'
n
AsH, r. (1990)
tl it
cARToN
GoLLWITZER,
l'
eutschland, Sfrr:tt+a'j.' Klett Cotta'
rIAssNER, P (1968a) 'Change and security
in Europe Part
I: The
II: In
background"
search
of a sys-
210
I
I
Essay
iiffi
rilil
Mol(cljNTl IAU,
AWorki
I
I
!
I
g
ffi
Mifflin.
Books,26
Yotk Review of
'Wt
Thc
MALCOLM, N. (1989b) 'The "corrmoo European home" and Sovret European policy', International Affairs, 65 (4), Aulumn 1989, pp. 659-76.
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ffi
t{ l.
arrd soLDATos,
ffi{
H r ( 1948; 197 8 rev edn) lolllic s amon!, N alnru: lhe sltruggle fot
poi)er anLl peace,New York, Knopf.
f.roRl\, D. (1987) Penser I'Europe, Paris; tlansi.rtel:l (,1991') ConcePts of E roPe'
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Lcben' rn Werke, Volume l, Karl Schlechta, Ila ser Verlag,Ullsiein Matenalen
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Pl-AIts, B von (1991) 'sutiregronalismus: eine Zwischenbene in einer gesamt
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iD Inlemational
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RUMMEI
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irnd scHMIIrr,
(ed
pp
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llRwIN, D. w. (1991) 1'he Communiry ol ErLrope: a history oJ European itegrafiaL
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W/E\.ER,
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WALLACE,
and wEssELs,
Acknowledgements
ll
Ezrr Pound, 'Hugh Selwyn Mauberley' (Section IV' Pari I) ftorn Colletted Shorter
PoenJ, repriuteal by permissioo of Faber & Faber and New Directions Publishing
Corp Inc.
'lhe work of the Htunaruties Programme Cornmiftee of the EADTU has been
carried out with the support of the Commission of the European Community
within the frameworks of the ERASMUS Programme and the Jean Monnet
ru
Prcject
Nofes on contributors
Pim den Boer
Pim deD Boer (b. 1950) stuclied history rn I-eiden and Paris He obtarned lfs doctorate in 1987 in Leiden with a thesls entitled History ds a Profession: lhe pnfes
sianalization of hrstorian.t in France I88A-1940 @nglish translation forthcorning:
the
Princetol Udversity Press). From 1978 to 1988 he was a lechler in history at
ol'
Professor
appointed
he
was
lnstitute of History, Universily of Utrecht ln 1988
of
Amsterdamat
the
Uliversity
the History of Ewopear Culftrre
Peter Bugge
Senior
Universiry. He graduated in 1989
Czechoslovak studies. lle has pu
Peter Bugge (b. 1960) is a
crtlnals oo Czechoslovak Politics and history, and on Czech and central European
Danishinto
essays
ture. He has hanslated most of Vaclav I{avel's
at the Umversity of
rI Tbe
Netherlands
from 1973 to
1988
215
214
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
OIe Waver
Ole Wever (b. 1960) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Peace and
Conflict Research, Copenhagen. He has taught intematiotral relatioN at Aarhus
Index to Book
1
Rntair 191-2
culture ald civilization in I I
and the First world Wa{ 88-
&
a-nd PanewoPa
141
48
Alexander the Great 17' 18 2?' 39,46'
America see United Stales
Relatiors' ; Copenhagen,
Recast: scen^tros for the
Aristotle
Pinter, 1990) and ldeniry, Milation and the New Securit! Agenda in Europe
(with Barry Buzan ef 41 , London, Pinter, 1993)
Broch,Ilermam
127
Bulgaria 161
Burke, Edmu d 66-7
antr-semilism 142-3
1?
Byzan[ne E$Pte 2?
Caesar, Julius 2l 29
'
Atatiirk, Kemal
9?-8
1G17,58
Camden,
Wiliam
41
101
Kevin Wilson
Athedan deBocracy 74
caonib Ism 62
Kevin Wilson studied history at the Udvelsiry of Liverpool (PhD 1965) and edn
cation at the Univenity of Nottingham (MEd 1977) He has worked for lhe Open
the organisation of tulorial
Umve$ity sitrce
fo coulses otr British and
services
support
TU Humamties hograrnme
European history
Open Univqsity l44dl i r
Cornmittee from
N ?Iom?tr\n' s
balance_o{_Power Polilics
and. the concePt of Europe
and EurcPean rulers
MitteletioPu
9L
'
92-3
l0
38-{4
barbaria.os 17
ltil,
3l
see maPs
129
Baudeau, Abb6 64
Belloc, Hilare 1 32
cheste(on, G K. 132
I42-3
Berdyaev, Nikolay Aleksandrovic 138 9'
Bergsor, I{eDri 114
Berlin Crisis (1961) 157
China 141
Christendom, identi-fr catron ol
27
4,32-8,6944
ChnstianitY
Calholic cburch 116, 131-:
EuroPe in biblictl coruner
and Juda6m 143
and liberalism 131-4
PaPal authority and the Cr'
chrchill, ftniton
Cicero 62
Berlin, Isaiatr
151
Boswell, James 63
boundarios of E[rope
civ ilization
15 , 91
'
131
, I7
'
?42
Brandt,
112, 163-
182
i0l-2,
ofEuroPe 58 65
identification of Europe
ir 9
ll
"e
l-. reir
rl
r.r" Sir.
l/'
re 34
141
istopher 45
Irst
EC
ofnaiions, Europe
Gelmany
concept of Europe 181 4, 18
culture aDd civitization m 63
and the Czechs 136
East Wesl Germarl reunr-f ica
Europem Parliament
6l
se
Lncrl
of (141+18) 34
tem
68
202
ution
3 8
144
Erasmus
32
nce on Securiry and Co oPeratiotr io
16 7, 186,192, 193
over 1?2
l7G7
u\d Mitteleuropt
36-7,4l
llratostbencs
Code Napa/'on
rd crvilization
ll,
117-l8
Euratorll168,
Europa 15,4il
113-21
14,123
idenhty 194
from 134' 5
:'s 'New EDroPe' 93-4
Urion
154, 160
Persia 15,48
aph.t,The
he flglrts
dgeinent
aJ the
Nations
ofman (1789) 66
Corl
164, 169
17I
176
EFTA 202
59,63
125
165, 168 9
l2l.
123
Grote, George 74
Grotius, Ilugo 44
Guizot, FranEois
7l
3,74
41 2
75
Gama, Vitsco da 45
169
futtre
Grosz, Georse
193
'olDtion 43
Gregoras, Nftephoros 32
-3
179, 180,
identity 206
Mikha
sse
Greks, allcienl
and cultDr 62
and ihe idea ofEurope 10, I
Rosenberg on 127
in the sevenieenth cetrhrry
t69
lLDd
pa 99
EuropeN.n
) 3l
r on
48 58
Wesl Germr
ofnatioos 11
considered negativelY 203-4
considered positively 175-6, 204-5
delL ng boundaries of 15,9'7 .131 ' 119 ' 202
atld its othe$ 1i
ongiLts as namc ol a continerrt l4-15
rnily in diversily l1
6reat War
as a conmoDwcallh
I1
Gorbachev,
',l
aLlegodcal illuslratiotrs of
9|r.l
169
Europe
67
Giucciardini, Francesco 39
,nd Cluistendom 69
civic state-nation 208
158
90 2, 95.
urification of75, 76
atrd the Ve$ailles Treaty 86
France
Eurasia 118
ion 10.
41
Fracketr, Franz 53
18
Firsr World
culture and civiltzation 114-21
and Cze.hoslovakia 135
effecis of 88-9
and tlle masses 130
72
-58, 63,
r ap
a\d Mittele
fl
19?
ffiil
67
39
ru1ture and civilization 117 19
)Pes 181 7
I76
tsuropem Community
as 11. 7L
9? 8, 179
rope 160
et
lo
'Europeadzatron ofBurope'
of9
i,
on
185
Hitler,
Ador
21s
I
t
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
l-cJr.roLo, LjiLltlc
ol llurofc -16
-pr
ir
oI
(li7l)
I rssing,'lllc0do,u
l'l,l
l1l'dralisrr
iuld Clrlrstianrly
1'l
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