Kirklees Magistrates' Court and

Family Court Hearing Centre

P.O.Box B37
The Court House
Civic Centre
Huddersfield
West Yorkshire
HD1 2NH

xx xxxxxx
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
XXXX XXX

8 January 2015
Dear Mr Xxxxxx

Re: Summons and Liability Order Costs 2015/16

I am writing in the matter of Kirklees Councils correspondence sent to you on 7 May 2015
regarding its 2015/16 Council Tax court costs calculation.
I have done some research in this area and consequently become familiar with the kind of
expenditure billing authorities in general consider they are entitled to attribute to the costs
recharged to defendants. I have consistently found that Councils claim entitlement to
encompass all expenditure which may be considered attributable to recovery and enforcement
in respect of merely applying for a liability order. This is implied to some extent in the 7 May
2015 correspondence, i.e., the costs on the summons reflect a contribution towards the cost
of administering the collection of unpaid council tax and business rates.
A number of authorities have even gone further by admitting that the cost of administrating
the various recovery methods available to secure payment, once a liability order has been
obtained, is legitimate expenditure to recharge as costs in applying to the court to enforce the
debt. This is also implied in the letter where it sets out the approach with respect to offering a
discount on the amount of costs charged; i.e., this reflects that if the account is paid before
the hearing additional recovery action is not needed therefore the cost to the Council is
reduced. The law is clear that only costs which have reasonably incurred in obtaining the
order are permissible.
Interpreting the law in a way that extends to encompassing all recovery and enforcement
expenditure is generally justified by the fact that it serves to keep the financial burden on the
general taxpayer to a minimum, even though the law in fact provides only for application
costs. Kirklees Council demonstrates this thinking where it states: whilst this figure does not

totally cover the costs of collection and enforcement in cases of non-payment, it ensures that
the council does not burden the majority of taxpayers who pay their bills in a timely manner.
It is noted that the Council has referred to (and supplied) the judgment of R (Nicolson) v
Tottenham Magistrates [2015] EWHC 1252 (Admin) in its 7 May 2015 letter. However, it is
unclear how its costs calculation is referable to the principles set out in the judgment. An
exception perhaps being that paragraph 50 has been considered (to an extent) in the way all
costs are applied at the summons, but in a way which provides an incentive for the taxpayer to
pay up on being issued the summons.
It is noted even in that regard that the calculation uses the number of liability orders obtained
as the dividing figure (25,000) instead of the number of summonses which according to data
for 2013-14 (CIPFA) is recorded at 31,462. The calculation therefore returns a higher level of
costs owing to the gross expenditure being split between a lesser figure. That method is
geared towards the costs of obtaining a liability order, but applied in respect of instituting the
complaint (summons costs). Paragraph 50 of the High Court judgment is clear that what
matters is that the costs that it does decide to claim are properly referable to the enforcement
process. The Council is effectively applying front loaded costs to the summons to use an
inflated sum as a threat to encourage payment. It is well established that costs should be
awarded as compensation, not as punishment. In R v Highgate Justices ex parte Petrou [1954]
1 ALL ER 406 it was held that costs should not exceed the proper costs incurred and should
not be a penalty.
Standard charge levied in all cases
It is assumed that the Council seeks reliance on the judgment (paras 45-46) in its approach of
levying a standard sum of costs across the board, thus having no obligation to calculate costs
individually on a case by case basis. Though that is the general guidance, it must also be
applied taking on board Mrs Justice Andrews opinion that in principle, it may be a legitimate
approach, 'provided that the right types of costs and expenses are taken into account'.
J Andrews expressed at para 46 that it may be a legitimate approach to apply a standard sum
in all cases. However, if wanting to take that approach (and do so lawfully) the standard sum
would also have to be properly referable to the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992 (regs 34 and 35). If there is any doubt as to what these
regulations provide, clarification has been provided in the Council Tax Practice Note 9:

Recovery and Enforcement, produced by the Department of the Environment (1993) and more
recently in the 2013 Government good practice guide, for the collection of Council Tax
arrears. Both state that the amount claimed by way of costs in any individual case is no more
than that reasonably incurred by the authority.
Given that the amount claimed by way of costs in any individual case must be no more than
that reasonably incurred by the billing authority, if the Council wanted to take advantage of
streamlining the administration process by applying a standard sum in all cases, in order for it
to be done lawfully, it would need to forfeit each element of expenditure it incurs that is not
common to every application. So in this, and all similar breakdowns, that would account for
the largest element of expenditure.
In other words, a standard sum could not exceed that incurred by the authority in a case where
the least expenditure is attributed. In practice, that would be a taxpayer who simply settles his
outstanding debt on receipt of a summons, but without contacting (thereby burdening) the
Council on any issue. Deriving a figure therefore from the gross costs, which is split between
an estimated number of defendants, can not be lawful; even less so if that number is reduced
to account for liability orders rather than summonses.
The least cost case is the only basis on which to determine a standard sum if the aim is to
eliminate the administrative burden of calculating the costs in each case, whilst at the same
time complying with the regulations which require that the costs be no more than that
incurred by the authority in any individual case.
I hope the above information will be of use for the court to determine in future a suitable level
of costs which are in accordance with the relevant provisions.
Should you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely

X. Xxxxxx