Reading assignment for January 7, 2016:

1. Stock knowledge drill

-Broad and narrow definition of administrative law
-Doctrine of qualified political agency
-Definition of an administrative agency
2. Separation of Powers/Delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies/subordinate legislation (pp.179-240, De Leon)
The doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude a certain degree of admixture of the three powers of government in administrative
agencies.
a. Requisites for the valid delegation of legislative power- Simply stated,what can be delegated is the discretion to determine HOW the law may
be enforced and not WHAT the law shall be.
b. Reasons for increasing trend towards subordinate legislation: 1) growing complexities of modern government 2) the complexities on
multiplication of activities subject to government regulation and 3) increased difficulty of administering the law.
1). Completeness of the law
Read the following cases cited in Mr. De Leons book:
U.S. vs Ang Tang G.R. No. 17122, Edu vs. Ericta G.R. No. L-32096
Read also Section 4, Aricle II and Sections 5 and 6, Article III of Republic Act No. 7925 An Act To Promote The Development Of Philippine
Telecommunications And The Delivery Of Telecommunications Services. It is a good example of a law that states policy, standards and
limitations..
2). Sufficiency in standards
Read the following cases cited in Mr. De Leons book:
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro G.R. No.L-14078, Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of Education G.R.
No.L-5279, Balbuena vs. Secretary of Education G.R. No.L-14283, International Hardwood and Veneer Co., vs. Pangil Federation of Labor G.R.
No. 47178, Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA G.R. No.76633
3. Permissible delegation of legislative power under the Constitution
a. To the President (Sections 23 and 28,Article VI, 1987 Constitution)
b. To local government units (Sections 3,5 and 10, Article X,1987 Constitution)
c. Peoples initiative and referendum (Section 32,Article VI, 1987 Constitution)
d. Autonomous regions (Sections 18 and 20, Article X, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
-JGOracion
For ADMIN LAW: January 14, 2016 reading assignment:
1. Review of past lesson/Stock knowledge drill
-Doctrine of separation of powers
-Delegation of legislative powers/Subordinate legislation
-Requisites/standards for a valid delegation of legislative powers
2. Powers and functions of administrative agencies/Source thereof (pp. 57-178, De Leon)
a. Constitution
b. Statutes under which administrative agency claims to act
3. Scope of powers
a. Investigative or advisory (executive or administrative)
b. quasi-legislative or rule making
c. quasi-judicial, determinative or adjudicatory powers
4. Nature of powers
Jurisdiction and powers are measured and limited by the constitution or law creating them. Administrative bodies possess only such powers and
authority conferred to them by the constitution or specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes and those that may ne necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof or incidental to the attainment of their purposes. Administrative agencies have no inherent powers, their powers
cannot be assumed nor can such powers be conferred by court.
Read: Makati Stock Exchange vs. SEC, 14 SCRA 620, Radio Communications of the Phil., vs. Board of Communications, 80 SCRA
471,Cooperative Development Authority vs. Dolefil Agrarian Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., 382 SCRA 552
1.

Makati Stock Exchange, Inc v Securities and Exchange Commission

14 SCRA 620 (1965)
FACTS:
The SEC in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc permission to operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not
to list for trading on its board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange.

Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. Contends that the Commission has no power to impose it and that
anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory and unjust. The Commissions order or resolution would make impossible, for all practical
purposes, for the Makati Stock Exchange to operate, such that its permission amounted to prohibition.
Issue: Does the Commission have the authority to promulgate the rule in question?
Held: None.
1.

Test for determining the existence of authority

The commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its rule against double listing. It suggests that the power
is necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it. It argues that said rule was approved by the Department
Head before the war and it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act. The approval of the Department, by
itself, adds no weight in judicial litigation.
The test is not whether the Act forbids Commission from imposing a prohibition but whether it empowers the
Commission to prohibit.

2.

Commission without power to impose prohibition

The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the rule which results in discrimination and violation of
constitutional rights. It is fundamental that an administrative officer has such powers as are expressly granted to him by
statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Accordingly, the license of Makati Stock Exchange is
approved without such condition against double listing.
Cooperative Development Authority vs Dolefil Agrarian Beneficiaries Coop Inc.,
FACTS:
Sometime in the later part of 1997, the CDA received from certain members of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative,
Inc. (DARBCI for brevity), an agrarian reform cooperative that owns 8,860 hectares of land in Polomolok, South Cotabato, several
complaints alleging mismanagement and/or misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the then incumbent officers and members of the
board of directors of the cooperative, some of whom are herein private respondents.
The complaints led the CDA to act according to its function and issued a freeze order on the DARBCI funds and creating management
committee to manage the affairs of the said cooperative.
ISSUE:
At the core of the instant petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, 13th Division, in CA-G.R. SP. No.
47933 promulgated on September 9, 1998 and its Resolution 2 dated February 9, 1999 is the issue of whether or not petitioner
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA for brevity) is vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes.
HELD:
ONLY THE STATE, THROUGH ITS APPELLATE COUNSEL, THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG),WHO HAS THE
SOLE RIGHT AND AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS OR THE SUPREME COURT.
The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state
with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines
and the accused. (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, supra note 16, at 514). The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for
the state.
Also in this wise, only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG,(ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Book IV, Title III,
Chapter 12, Section 35 (1); Macasaet v. People, 492 Phil. 355, 375 (2005); Cario v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008, 553
SCRA 688, 696; People v. Puig, G.R. Nos. 173654-765, August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 564, 575) who has the sole right and authority
to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court. (Cario v. De Castro, supra note 24).
As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG. Thus:
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor General, in this
case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the
office is the discernible intent which may be gathered from the term shall x x x
The Court is firmly convinced that considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other logical
interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. (Gonzales v. Chavez, G.R. No. 97351, February 4,

1992, 205 SCRA 816, 832; Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., supra note
12, at 307).
For the above reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, are, as a
rule, (Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., supra note 20, at 334) summarily dismissed

Statutes conferring powers on admin agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with
the legislative purpose.
Read: Matienzo vs. Abellera,162 SCRA 11

MATIENZO V ABELLERA
FACTS Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The respondents, however, admit to operate colorum or kabit
taxis, thus, they applied for legalization of their unauthorized excess tacis citing PD 101. Respondent Board set such applications for hearing and
granted provisional authority to operate. Petitioners argue that the Board cannot do this as the six month period in the Transitory Provision has lapsed
and has become functus officio.
ISSUES W/N the board can grant such permits.
RULING YES. The power vested by PD 101 to BOT was to grant special permits of limited term for the operation of public utility motor vehicles
as may, in the judgment of the Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine operators into legitimate and responsible operators. Such power
remains even after the six months prescribed in the law as such period merely provides for the withdrawal of the States waiver of its right to punish
said colorum operators. Notice and hearing are not required for the grant of such temporary authority because of its provisional nature and that the
primary application shall be given a full hearing. To determine whether a Board or Commission has power, it should be (1) liberally construed in light
of its purpose for which was created and (2) that incidentally necessary to a full implementation of legislative intent as being germane to the law.
Thus, the BOR shall, from time to time, re-study the public need for public utilities in any area in the Phils for the purpose of re-evaluating the
policies.
A.

Investigatory powers
It includes 1) inspection of records and premises 2) investigation of the activities of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction 3)
or securing, requiring the disclosure of information by means of records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses and production of
documents.

B.
It is a useful aid or tool in the agencys performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions (eg., LTFRB re Uber, Grab Car, ERC
re price manipulation of power producers, etc.).
As distinguished from judicial functions, the latter is the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations before it. The power to
investigate consists only of investigating the facts and making findings and recommendations thereto. In admin proceedings, respondent has
the option of engaging the services of counsel or not.
An agency can only compel attendance and presence of witnesses and punish for contempt in case of non-compliance if such powers have
been conferred upon it. In admin proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not required.
Read: Catura vs. Court of Industrial Relations 37 SCRA 303
B.Rule- making powers
It simply means the power to make rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions and to implement the law it is entrusted to enforce.
It is also called administrative legislation, delegated legislation, ordinance making and quasi-legislation. The statutory grant of rule-making
power to administrative agencies is a valid exception on non-delegation of legislative power provided 2 conditions are present namely:
a. The statute is complete in itself, setting forth the policy to be executed by the agency.
b. The statute fixes a standard and fixes the boundaries of the agencys authority.
A valid rule or regulation duly promulgated by an administrative agency has the force and effect of law and is binding on the agency and all
those dealing with the agency.
An administrative agency may make only rules and regulations within the limits of the power s granted to it by the law creating it and in case of
conflict between the basic law and the rule or regulation, the former prevails. Rule promulgation of administrative agencies cannot override,
supplant, modify or amend the law but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.
Legislative and interpretative rules- The power to create new and additional provisions that have the effect of law is legislative while
interpretative rules interpret existing laws and provide guidelines to the law that they interpret (rendering of an opinion, statement of policy). The

distinction is important because due process generally apply to legislative rulings. Legislative rules may require notice and hearing if the law so
requires and the rule adds a burden to the governed. Publication is also required for legislative rulings except if they are internal regulations.
Read: Olsen and Co.,Inc., vs. Aldanese 43 Phil. 259, Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava 108 Phil. 173

Walter E. Olsen & Co. v. Aldanese

G.R. No. L-18740. March 29, 1922
FACTS:
The petitioners assail the validity of the Act No. 2613 of the Philippine Legislature entitled "an act to improve the methods of production and the
quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to develop the export trade therein. The Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to certify to the Insular
Collector of Customs that the standard tobacco exported is the growth and product of the Philippine Islands. Paragraph 5 of the petition alleges that
under clause B of section 6 of the Act, the Collector of Internal Revenue promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection
Regulations," in which it is said:
To be classed as standard, cigars must be manufactured under sanitary conditions from good, clean, selected tobacco, properly cured and seasoned,
of a crop which has been harvested at least six months, exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya. The cigars
must be well made, with suitable spiral wrapper and with long filler, etc.
The petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a certificate of origin covering a consignment of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San
Francisco, and as the petitioner himself stated on making such application that the cigars sought to be exported have been manufactured from shortfiller tobacco which was not the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya. The Collector of Internal Revenue did not deem it
necessary to make an actual examination and inspection of said cigars in view of the fact that the cigars were not made with long-filler nor were they
made from tobacco exclusively the product of any of the three mentioned provinces.
ISSUE: Whether or not A.O No. 35 and Act No. 2613, as well as the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue a certificate of origin, are
constitutional.
HELD: Yes. Under the provisions of Act No. 2613, the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands promulgated Administrative Order
No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspections Regulations." Such rules and regulations, having been promulgated by that officer, the court has a right to
assume that he was acting under such rules and regulations when he refused to issue the certificate of origin. It appears from the record that the cigars
in question were not long-filler cigars, and that they were not manufactured from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces. By the express terms
and provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by the Collector of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to refuse petitioner's request, and
decline the certificate or origin, because the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind, and the court have a right to assume that he performed his
official duty as the understood it. After such refusal and upon such grounds, it would indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of
Internal Revenue to his examined or inspected the cigars. Having refused to issue the certificate of origin for the reason above assigned, it is very
apparent that a request thereafter made examine or inspect the cigars would also have been refused.

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA

FACTS:
Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and injunction against respondent Agrava, the Director of Philippines Patent Office due to a circular the latter
issued scheduling an examination for determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
Petitioner contended that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is
in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation
of the law for requiring such examination as condition precedent before members of the bar may be allowed to represent applicants in the preparation
and prosecution of applications for patents. Undaunted, Agrava argued that that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the
practice of law and that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would
wish to handle cases before the Patent Office.

ISSUE: Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in
the practice of law

HELD: Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons,
and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business
has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in
accordance with law. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge,
training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
As stated in 5 Am. Jur,
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, since much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and
determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts
involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are,
taken to the Supreme Court.

C. Adjudicatory powers
Otherwise known as quasi-judicial function, it is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, et., of public administrative officers or bodies that
are required to investigate facts, ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of judicial nature. A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or awards
that determine the rights of adversarial parties which have the same binding effect as a judgment of a court of law that even the courts of justice
have to respect.
a. Extent/Limitation (pp. 231-235, De Leon)
Depends largely on enabling act and the grant of power must be found in the law itself.
1) A statute passed by Congress must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions, and such
conferment cannot be implied from a mere grant of power to a body or agency.
2) The delegation by Congress to executive or administrative agencies of functions of judicial, or at least quasi-judicial functions which are
incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their executive/administrative powers is not a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Read: Lovina vs. Moreno G.R. No. L-17821, Miller vs. Mardo G.R, No. L-15138,PHILEX Mining Corp. vs. Zaldivia 43 SCRA 479

Lovina vs. Moreno | Reyes, J.B.L., J. (1963)

FACTS- This case started with a petition of numerous residents of Macabebe, Pampanga to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
complaining that the spouses Lovina had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed, under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056.

- After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his decision
ordered that the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the
expense of the respondent.
- The Lovinas filed a petition in the CFI to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent
injunction, which is now the subject of the present appeal by the respondents-appellants, Moreno, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, and Yonzon, the investigator.
- The position of the plaintiffs-appellees is that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is public and
navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts,
thereby Constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS/HELD: WON RA 2056 is unconstitutional. NO

RATIONALE
- (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no
private person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property.
- It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact, such as the
existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the
exercise of the power granted by law.
- This is validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic
Act No. 2056, section 2.
- The delegation by Congress to executive or administrative agencies of judicial or quasi-judicial functions is incidental to the exercise by such
agencies of their executive or administrative powers, and is thus not a violation of the Separation of Powers.
- One important class of cases in which discretion may properly be vested in administrative officers are those cases in which a general rule or
prohibition is laid down and power is vested in an executive officer to determine when particular cases do or do not fall within such rule or
prohibition. Power exercised under such statutes, calling for the exercise of judgment in the execution of a ministerial act, is never judicial in nature
within the sense prohibited by the Constitution.
- A direct precedent can be found in the "Bridge cases" upholding the constitutionality of the U.S. River and Harbor Act, that empowered Secretary of
War to take action, after hearing, for the removal or alteration of bridges unreasonably obstructing navigation. On the issue of undue delegation of
power, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
- The statute itself prescribes the general rule applicable to all navigable waters, and merely charged the Secretary of War with the duty of
ascertaining in each case, upon notice to the parties concerned, whether the particular bridge came within the general rule. This is not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative or judicial power to the Secretary.

Miller vs. Mardo G.R, No. L-15138

Facts: Republic Act 991 provided that the reorganization plan drafted by Department of Labor and Employment and submitted it to the president for
approval shall deemed as approved by the Congress after its adjournment unless in the meantime, Congress by resolution disapproved the plan and
assailed its constitutionality.
Issue: Whether or not enactment of law by legislative inaction is valid?
Decision: The contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate actions of each house. It is contrary to
the settled and well-understood parliamentary law which requires that the two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the
determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other.

Philex Mining Corporation v Zaldivia (Natural Resources)

FACTS:
In a registered deed of assignment, dated 24 September 1955, George T. Scholey, as locator of the aforesaid mining claim, sold, transferred and
assigned all his rights, title and interest therein to Milagros Yrastorza; on 7 December 1959, Yrastorza filed Lode Lease Application No. V-4671
covering the said mining claim, but on 15 October 1963, she sold, transferred and conveyed all her rights and interest in the claim to herein
respondent Luz Zaldivia. The transfer approved by the Director of Mines on 29 December 1966; hence, Lode Lease Application No. V-4671 was
recorded in Zaldivia's name and given due course.
Upon publication of the lease application, herein petitioner Philex Mining Corporation interposed an adverse claim to the lease application, alleging
that it is the beneficial and equitable owner of the mining claim; that it was located on 9 December 1955 by the petitioner corporation's then general
manager for the benefit of the corporation; that when Scholey transferred the claim to Yrastorza, Scholey was still the general manager, while
Yrastorza was also employed by the company; and that Yrastorza and respondent Zaldivia, who had also been an employee of the corporation,
merely acted as agents of Scholey, so that, despite the transfers, petitioner remained the equitable owner.
Respondent Zaldivia moved to dismiss the adverse claim on three (3) grounds, namely: late filing of the adverse claim, lack of jurisdiction of the
Director of Mines to resolve the question of ownership raised by herein petitioner, and the alleged defect of the adverse claim for non-compliance
with certain requirements of the Mining Act, as amended. In the course of an oral argument on the motion to dismiss, only the question of jurisdiction
was submitted for resolution.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * Director of Mines: Bureau had no jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership, because the question was
judicial in character and should be ventilated before the courts. * DENR Secretary: affirmed the order of the Director of Mines.
ISSUE: Is the Director of Mines vested with the jurisdiction over the controverted issues?
HELD: NO.
The issue is one to be resolved in conformity with legal rules and standards governing the powers of an agent, and the law's restrictions upon the
latter's right to act for his own exclusive benefit while the agency is in force. Decision of such questions involves the interpretation and application of
laws and norms of justice established by society and constitutes essentially an exercise of the judicial power under the Constitution is exclusively
allocated to the Supreme Court and such courts as the Legislature may establish and one that mining officials are ill-equipped to deal with.
As already shown, petitioner's adverse claim is not one grounded on overlapping of claims nor is it a mining conflict arising out of mining locations
(there being only one involved) but one originating from the alleged fiduciary or contractual relationship between petitioner and locator Scholey and
his transferees Yrastorza and respondent Zaldivia. As such, the adverse claim is not within the executive or administrative authority of the mining
director solve, but in that of the courts.