A.M. No.

1053 August 31, 1981

SANTA PANGAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent.
On November 29, 1971, Santa Pangan filed before this Court a verified complaint charging respondent Atty. Dionisio Ramos
with gross immorality, the latter having misrepresented himself as still "single" when he started courting complainant,
proposed marriage to her and finally succeeded in marrying her even with full consciousness that his first marriage to
his first wife was still valid and subsisting. 1 (A Criminal Case for bigamy was also filed by the complainant against the
respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, docketed asCriminal Case No. 15528).
In his answer to the complaint, respondent denied the material allegations thereof for being without legal or factual basis. He
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state cause of action against respondent. 2
The case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for report, investigation and recommendation. On June 1, 1976,
the Solicitor General submitted his report finding respondent Ramos guilty as charged, with a recommendation for
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. 3 Subsequently, the corresponding complaint for his suspension from the practice of law was filed.
On September 13, 1976, respondent filed his answer to the complaint and moved for the appointment of a commissioner to
hear and take additional evidence in his behalf, which, however, was denied by the Court per its Resolution of October 6,
1976. At the hearing of February 25, 1977, respondent, acting as counsel for his own behalf, moved for the presentation of
additional evidence, which was, however, opposed by complainant's counsel on the ground that respondent is resorting to
dilatory tactics. At the hearing of September 2, 1977, complainant and respondent appeared and the Court set the hearing of
the case for the purpose of reception of additional evidence before its Legal Officer-Investigator.
Meanwhile, on September 7, 1979, the Court, speaking through Justice Felix Antonio, severely REPRIMANDED respondent
Dionisio Ramos, with warning that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspension or disbarment from the
practice of law. 4 The reprimand was administered because respondent used the name "Pedro Dionisio Ramos"
in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906. He averred that he had a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate his name
is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos," and his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro DD Ramos" is
but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw" his other given name and maternal surname. The Court opined that respondent in
effect resorted to deception. He demonstrated "lack of candor in dealing with the courts."
At the hearing of October 23, 1979, Solicitor Celia Reyes appeared submitting the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXI, in Criminal Case No. 15528, acquitting respondent of the charges of bigamy on grounds of insufficiency
of evidence, for having contracted the second marriage with the complainant.
On January 15, 1980, the Legal Officer-Investigator submitted his report concurring in the findings of the SolicitorGeneral,
although he recommended a penalty of a minimum five-year suspension from the practice of law, with prospect for the
imposition of a total disbarment from the practice of law, as the Court finds fit and appropriate. 5
On February 27, 1981, counsel for complainant filed its motion to expedite disposition of the case, further alleging that
respondent Ramos is still using the name of Pedro Dionisio Ramos and PDD Ramos in two pleadings filed before
the Court of First Instance of Manila, disregarding the Resolution of this Court dated September 7, 1979. 6Commenting,
respondent admitted the allegations of complainant's counsel but alleged that he signed the pleadings inadvertently because
of poor eyesight.
The facts, as found by the Solicitor General who investigated the case, and the Legal Officer-Investigator before whom the
additional evidence was presented, are as follows: Respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1964. He was legally
married to and living with Editha Encarnado the marriage with her having been celebrated on September 4, 1963. Both
complainant and respondent were officemates in the Office of Councilor Lito Puyat, City Hall, Manila since 1967. With the
convenience thus offered, respondent, representing himself to be "single," began courting complainant, proposed civil
marriage to her to be later followed with a church celebration after which they will live together as husband and wife. From
January 1968 to February 1971, they had carnal knowledge of each other in variousHOTELS IN MANILA , particularly
the Golden Gate Motel and Salem Motel. Sometime in June 1970, complainant informed respondent that she was pregnant.
Whereupon, both agreed to get a quick marriage. Accordingly, complainant and respondent filed their respective applications
for a marriage license (Exhs. "H", "H-1" and "H-2") and based thereon, they obtained a marriage license issued on June 16,
1970 (Exh. "D") and celebrated their marriage before Minister Isidro Dizon on June 18, 1970 (Exh. "B"). After the marriage,
complainant and respondent agreed to have a church marriage before they live together as husband and wife, although they
continued to have sexual trysts. Respondent was invited by complainant to meet the latter's mother to whom respondent
expressed his desire to marry complainant, to which proposal complainant's mother agreed, provided respondent bring his
parents with him to ask for complainant's hand. Several weeks had passed and respondent failed to bring his parents to
complainant's home. Complainant and her mother became suspicious. They made inquiries about the personal status of
respondent and they ultimately discovered that respondent was already married to one Editha Encarnado (Exhs. "C" and

"E"). After discovering that respondent was a married man, complainant resigned from her job as receptionist from the office
of Councilor Lito Puyat. She stopped having intimate relationship with respondent and because of the humiliation and
embarassment she suffered before her friends and officemates, she filed the present disbarment case.
Upon the other-hand, respondent tried to prove, through his affidavit subscribed before Asst. City Fiscal Primitivo Pearanda
of Manila, that he never misrepresented himself to be "single" and that complainant knew at the outset of his married status;
that it was purely complainant's wish to carry on a love affair with him as described in his affidavit; that he was threatened
and forced to sign blank marriage contract forms and applications for marriagelicense by the brothers of the complainant
who are allegedly notorious police characters; that his signature in themarriage contract (Exh. "B") was forged and falsified;
that the marriage contract was only celebrated as a cover-up of the pregnancy of the complainant; and that the disbarment
proceedings were initiated by complainant because he refused to elope with complainant and abandon his wife Editha
Encarnado and he stopped giving her money and avoided seeing her again.
Upon a review of the record, We are convinced that respondent Dionisio Ramos is guilty of grossly immoral conduct which
warrants proper action from this Court. His own declarations in his affidavit corroborate this imputation of immorality. Thus, in
his affidavit subscribed before Asst. Fiscal Primitive Pearanda of Manila on Feb. 22, 1967, respondent frankly admitted
having carnal relations with complainant for several times. What ismore, respondent claimed that he was threatened and
forced by complainant's brothers to celebrate the marriagedated June 18, 1980, but in the same breath, he admitted having
carnal affairs with complainant after the celebration of the marriage. Worse still, respondent misrepresented his civil status
as "single", courted complainant, proposed marriage to her knowing his legal impediments to marry complainant,
respondent's motives were clearly and grossly immoral won her confidence and married her while his first marriage to his
present wife still validly subsists.
In Villasanta vs. Peralta, 7 where respondent was disbarred because he made love with complainant, procured the
preparation of a false marriage contract and arranged a false wedding with complainant while his first wife was still alive and
their marriage still valid and existing, this Court held: "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage (even his act
in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity."
It is of importance that members of the ancient and learned profession of law must conform with the highest standards of
morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: "The lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against the
admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law
but also the administration of justice." 8
Respondent, however, submits that having been acquitted by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, of the charge
of bigamy, the immorality charges filed against him in this disbarment case should be dismissed. The acquittal of respondent
Ramos upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment
proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. 9
This Court has already severely reprimanded respondent from using a name other than authorized name in the "Roll of
Attorneys" and was warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspension of disbarment from office in
the future. Notwithstanding such reprimand and warning, however, respondent repeated the same overt act of using an
unauthorized name in two pleadings filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila. His explanation that he had done so
inadvertently because of poor eyesight appears unsatisfactory. He should have employed more caution and prudence in filing
pleadings before courts considering the fact that he had already been warned and reprimanded by this Court. Respondent's
conduct, thus, suggests lack of candor and respect in his dealing with this Court. He has violated his oath of office of
assuming the duty of good faith and honorable dealings with the court, of being respectful to it and of being obedient to its
rules and lawful orders.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent committed a grossly immoral act, as found both by the
Solicitor General and this Court's Legal Officer-Investigator, and as recommended by the Solicitor General, respondent is
hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, for gross immorality, and an additional one (1)
year for his willful disregard of a lawful order against his using an unauthorized name, in serious disrespect of this Court.
SO ORDERED.

AMADOR Z. MALHABOUR,
Complainant,
versus
ATTY. ALBERTI R. SARMIENTO,
Respondent.

A.C. No. 5417

Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by Amador Z. Malhabour against Atty. Alberti R. Sarmiento. Complainant was
private respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 50835, HY2LB Shipping & Management Services, Inc. and New Ocean Ltd. v. The
National Labor Relations Commission and Amador Malhabour.
Respondent, then a lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), was complainants counsel in National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Case No. 009719-95. After the respondent retired from the PAO in March 1997, complainant asked him to
continue assisting him in said labor case.
The facts are:
On May 29, 1993, HY2LB Shipping and Management Services, Inc., (HY2LB Shipping), a local manning agency, hired
complainant as electrician for M/V Gold Faith, a vessel owned by New Ocean Ltd., a foreign principal based in
Hongkong. The employment contract was for a period of 12 months and that complainants monthly salary would be six
hundred US dollars ($600.00). He had to work 48 hours a week with 30% overtime pay.
Complainant rendered service on board the vessel for four months and nine days only. On August 5, 1993, HY2LB Shipping
asked him to disembark on the ground that the foreign principal was reducing its personnel. Thus, complainant filed with
the Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration Office (POEA), a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against HY2LB
Shipping, New Ocean Ltd., and Premier Insurance and Surety Corporation.
On June 14, 1995, the POEA Adjudication Office rendered judgment in favor of complainant, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents HY2LB Shipping and Management Services, Inc., New Ocean Ltd. and
Premier Insurance are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay complainant or in Philippine Peso at the exchange rate
prevailing during actual payment, the following:
1.

The sum of US$4,680.00 representing the unexpired portion of the contract;

2.

The sum of US$220.00 representing the unpaid salary of complainant; and

3.

The sum of US$774.00 representing the fixed overtime pay of complainant.

No other pronouncement.
SO ORDERED
On appeal by HY2LB Shipping, New Ocean Ltd., and Premier Insurance and Surety Corporation, the NLRC rendered its
Decision affirming the POEA judgment. Their motions for reconsideration were denied.
HY2LB Shipping then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari against NLRC and complainant.
In its Decision dated June 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed HY2LB Shippings petition, holding that in affirming the
POEA judgment, the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion. HY2LB Shipping filed a Motion for Reconsideration, invoking
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.[2] The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution of February 15, 2000, modified the NLRC Decision, in the
sense that complainant is entitled to only three (3) months salaryconsidering that this is the lesser amount of his one
year employment contract;[3] and overtime pay since this was provided in the parties contract ofemployment.

Immediately upon receipt of the Court of Appeals Resolution, complainant requested respondent to file a motion for
reconsideration. But the latter merely filed a Notice to File Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation to File an Appeal in
case Same is Denied.[4] Respondent advised complainant to accept the Decision of the Court of Appeals and that filing
a motion for reconsideration will just prolong the litigation. Complainant did not heed respondents advice and filed
the motion for reconsideration himself. But it was denied by the Appellate Court for being late by 43 days. [5] At this point,
complainant urged respondent to file with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Respondent agreed but delayed its
filing. On July 24, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution [6] denying complainants petition for being late.
Meantime, unknown to complainant, respondent sent a letter dated April 7, 2000 to the NLRC stating that complainant gave
him a Special Power ofAttorney authorizing him to receive the judgment award. Respondent then filed a Motion for Execution
alleging that complainant decided to terminate the case and will no longer file a motion for reconsideration of the February
15, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.[7]
On June 16, 2000, respondent received from the NLRC a check[8] dated June 14, 2000 in the amount of P99,490.00 which he
deposited with the Ecology Bank, Banawe Branch, under his personal account.

Subsequently, complainant came to know of the NLRC Order dated June 6, 2000 directing the NLRC cashier to release to
respondent the sum ofP99,490.00 representing the money judgment. Thereupon, complainant sought the assistance of the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force.[9] Then he filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint
for estafa thru falsification of a public document. The NBI referred the matter to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City. During their confrontation at the NBI, respondent paid complainant P40,000.00 as partial payment of the P60,000.00
awarded to the latter. Later, or on January 30, 2001, [10] respondent paid complainant only P10,000.00, leaving a balance
of P10,000.00. This prompted complainant to file with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment.
In his Comment dated June 1, 2001, respondent alleged inter alia that this case arose from a quarrel between a client and his
counsel; that after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 50835, HY2LB
Shipping filed with this Court a Petition for Review ofCertiorari; that at this time, he (respondent) filed with the NLRC
a Motion for Execution; that the NLRC partially granted his motion by issuing a check in the amount of P100,000.00 by virtue
of a Special Power of Attorney signed by complainant; that pursuant to their agreement that their shares in the award is on a
40-60 ratio, he (respondent) kept complainants share of P60,000.00; and that he was ready to give complainant his share but
he did not make any demand and refused to receive the balance on June 30, 2001.
On August 27, 2001, this Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. In its Report and Recommendation[11] dated April 15, 2002, the IBP through Investigating Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, made the following findings:
It was apparent that the complainant did not agree with the modified decision of the Court of Appeals and instructed
respondent to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. All the while and without his knowledge and consent,
respondent filed a Motion for Execution with the NLRC who awarded complainant the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00). Respondent admitted that he was able to encash the check awarded to complainant by virtue of a
Special Power of Attorney which complainant denies having executed. x x x.
x x x. When respondent received the amount of money awarded to complainant by the NLRC, he took it upon himself to
divide the money into 60-40 ratio because complainant owed him his attorneys fees; however, he failed to inform
complainant beforehand of his plan, and only when complainant filed a criminal complaint against him that respondent paid
complainant and on installment basis at that. Respondent in fact still has a balance of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00).Respondent claims that complainant exceeded and abused his goodness and kindness but it is the other way
around.
and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for one year.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-397 adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Maala.
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent failed to comply with the above provisions. Records show and as found by Investigating Commissioner,
respondent committed deceit by making it appear that complainant executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him
(respondent) to file with the NLRC a Motion for Execution and to collect the money judgment awarded to the former. Worse,

after receiving from the NLRC cashier the check amounting to P99,490.00, he retained the amount. It was only when
complainant reported the matter to the NBI that respondent paid him P40,000.00 as partial payment of the award. In fact,
there still remains an outstanding balance of P10,000.00. Moreover, as correctly found by IBP Commissioner Maala,
respondent has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally his lawyers lien[12] by dividing the money into 60-40
ratio. Obviously, such conduct is indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. [13] He was clinging to something not his and to
which he had no right.
It bears stressing that as a lawyer, respondent is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has
entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. [14] As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for
others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. [15] This Court has been
exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession[16] and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust
and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. [17] Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege.[18] And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and
gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege. [19] Respondents conduct blemished not only his
integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. His conduct fell short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.
Accordingly, administrative sanction against respondent is warranted. In Lao v. Medel,[20] we considered a lawyers violation
of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as in this case, as an act constituting gross misconduct. In
line with Lao, citing Co v. Bernardino,[21] Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr.,[22] and Saburnido v. Madroo[23] which also involved gross
misconduct of lawyers we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year sufficient.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alberti R. Sarmiento is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, complainant,
vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN,
JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published
telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months,
provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision
thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of
ThePhilippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the
Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and
solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that
the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on

lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he
be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services
offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified. [4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. [5] On June 29,
2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306, [6] finding respondent guilty of violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended
him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt
with moreseverely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, [8] which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo,
Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief,
Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated
March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.[10] Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is
not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of
pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the SupremeCourt for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing
as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. [12] It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy
is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. [13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. [14] The duty
to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. [15] The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a
business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. [16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of
the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings
hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming
that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the
August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be
published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront
on the Courts authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist,
he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society.Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an
annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, [19] he in fact encourages people, who
might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to
the lawyer and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence
address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. [21] Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly
stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasipublic offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer
may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal
or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents
of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the
name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name
oroffice address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution.He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

REYNARIA BARCENAS,Complainant, - versus

- ATTY. ANORLITO A. ALVERO,
Before us is a Complaint[1] dated May 17, 2005 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero filed by
Reynaria Barcenas with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case
No. 05-1452, now Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8159.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio (San Antonio), entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount
ofP300,000.00, which the latter was supposed to give to a certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his deceased father
as tenant of a ricefield located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria, Laguna. The receipt of the money was evidenced by an
acknowledgment receipt[2]dated May 7, 2004. In the said receipt, Atty. Alvero said that he would deposit the money in court
because Amanda Gasta refused to accept the same.[3]
Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of money in cockfights. To check if the money they gave Atty.
Alvero was still intact, Barcenas pretended to borrow P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 and promised to return the amount
when needed or as soon as the case was set for hearing. However, Atty. Alvero allegedly replied, Akala nyo ba ay madali
kunin angPERA pag nasa korte na? Subsequently, Barcenas discovered that Atty. Alvero did not deposit the money in court,
but instead converted and used the same for his personal needs.

In his letters dated August 18, 2004[4] and August 25, 2004,[5] Atty. Atty. Alvero admitted the receipt of the P300,000.00 and
promised to return the money. The pertinent portions of said letters are quoted as follows:
Dahil sa kagustuhan ng iyong amo na maibalik ko ang perang tinanggap ko sa iyo, lumakad ako agad at pilit kong kinukuha
kahit iyon man lang na hiniram sa akin naP80,000.00 pero hindi karakapraka ang lumikom ng gayong halaga. Pero tiniyak sa
akin na sa Martes, ika-24 ng buwan ay ibibigay sa akin.
Bukas ay tutungo ako sa amin upang lumikom pa ng karagdagang halaga upang maisauli ko ang buong P300,000.00.
Nakikiusap ako sa iyo dahil sa ikaw ang nagbigay sa akin ng pera na bigyan mo ako ng kaunting panahon upang malikom ko
ang pera na ipinagkatiwala mo sa akin, hanggang ika-25 ng Agosto, 2004. x x x[6]
Maya-mayang alas nuwebe (9:00) titingnan ang lupang aking ipinagbibili ng Dalawang Milyon. Gustong-gusto ng bibili gusto
lang makita ang lupa dahil malayo, nasa Cavinti. Kung ok na sa bibili pinakamatagal na ang Friday ang bayaran.
Iyong aking sinisingil na isang P344,000.00 at isang P258,000.00 na utang ng taga-Liliw ay darating sa akin ngayong umaga
bago mag alas otso. Kung maydala ng pambayad kahit magkano ay ibibigay ko sa iyo ngayong hapon
Lahat ng pagkakaperahan ko ay aking ginagawa, pati anak ko ay tinawagan ko na. Pakihintay muna lang ng kauting
panahon pa, hindi matatapos ang linggong ito, tapos ang problema ko sa iyo. Pasensiya ka na.[7]
However, as of the filing of the instant complaint, despite repeated demands, Atty. Alvero failed to return the same. Thus,
Barcenas prayed that Atty. Alvero be disbarred for being a disgrace to the legal profession.
On March 30, 2005, the IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Alvero to submit his Answer to the complaint. [8]
In compliance, in his Answer[9] dated April 18, 2005, Atty. Alvero claimed that he did not know Barcenas prior to the filing of
the instant complaint nor did he know thatSan Antonio was an employee of Barcenas. He alleged that he came to know
Barcenas only when the latter went to him to borrow P60,000.00 from the amount entrusted to Rodolfo San Antonio who
entrusted to respondent. At that time, Atty. Alvero claimed that San Antonio was reluctant to grant the request because it
might jeopardize the main and principal cause of action of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) case. Atty. Alvero, however, admitted that he received an amount ofP300,000.00 from San Antonio, though he
claimed that said money was the principal cause of action in the reconveyance action. [10]
Atty. Alvero stressed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and Barcenas. He, however, insisted that the
lawyer-client relationship between him and SanAntonio still subsisted as his service was never severed by the latter. He
further emphasized that he had not breached the trust of his client, since he had, in fact, manifested his willingness
to return the said amount as long as his lawyer-client relationship with San Antonio subsisted. Finally, Atty. Alvero prayed that
the instant complaint be dismissed.
On June 20, 2005, the IBP-CBD notified the parties to appear for the mandatory conference. [11]
Meanwhile, in a separate Affidavit[12] dated September 19, 2005, San Antonio narrated that he indeed sought Atty. Alveros
professional services concerning an agricultural land dispute. He claimed that Atty. Alvero made him believe that he needed
to provide an amount of P300,000.00 in order to file his complaint, as the same would be deposited in
court. San Antonio quoted Atty. Alvero as saying: Hindi pwedeng hindi kasabay angPERA sa pagpa-file ng papel dahil
tubusan yan, kung sakaling ipatubos ay nasa korte na ang pera. Believing that it was the truth, San Antonio was forced to
borrow money from Barcenas in the amount of P300,000.00. Subsequently, San Antonio gave the said amount to Atty. Alvero,
in addition to the professional fees, as shown by an acknowledgment receipt. [13]
San Antonio further corroborated Barcenas allegation that they tried to borrow P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 they gave
to Atty. Alvero after they found out that the latter lost a big amount of money in cockfighting. He reiterated that Atty. Alvero
declined and stated, Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin angPERA pag nasa korte na. Later on, they found out that Atty. Atty.
Alvero lied to them since the money was never deposited in court but was instead used for his personal needs. For several
times, Atty. Alvero promised toreturn the money to them, but consistently failed to do so. San Antonio submitted Atty. Atty.
Alveros letters dated August 18, 2004[14] and August 25, 2004[15] showing the latters promises to return the amount
of P300,000.00.
During the mandatory conference, Atty. Alvero failed to attend despite notice. Thus, he was deemed to have waived his right
to participate in the mandatory conference.
In its Report and Recommendation dated May 21, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Alvero be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year for gross misconduct. Atty. Alvero was, likewise, ordered to immediately account
for and return the amount of P300,000.00 to Barcenas and/or Rodolfo San Antonio. The pertinent portion thereof reads:

The record does not show and no evidence was presented by respondent to prove that the amount of P300,000 which was
entrusted to him was already returned to complainant or Rodolfo San Antonio, by way of justifying his non-return of
the money, respondent claims in his Answer that the P300,000 was the source of the principal cause of action of the
petitioner, Rodolfo San Antonio, in the above-cited DARAB Case No. R-0403-0011-04 as shown by a copy of the Amended
Petition, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex 1 and made an integral part hereof.
A review of Annex 1, which in the Amended Petition dated October 31, 2004 and filed on November 3, 2004, will show that
the Petitioner Rodolfo San Antonio is praying that he be allowed to cultivate the land after the P300,000 is consigned by
Petitioner to the Honorable Adjudication Board. Up to the time of the filing of the instant complaint, no such deposit or
consignment took place and no evidence was presented that respondent deposited the amount in court.
The fact is respondent promised to return the amount (Annex B and C of the Complaint), but he failed to do so. The failure
therefore of respondent to account for and return the amount of P300,000 entrusted or given to him by his client constitute
gross misconduct and would subject him to disciplinary action under the Code.[16]
In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification as to penalty the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it ordered that Atty. Alvero be suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) years and, likewise, ordered him to account for andreturn the amount of P300,000.00 to
complainants within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.
The Office of the Bar Confidant redocketed the instant case as a regular administrative complaint against Atty. Alvero and,
subsequently, recommended that this Court issue an extended resolution for the final disposition of the case.
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read:
CANON 1.
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESS.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16
A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a
lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions
he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
In the instant case, Atty. Alvero admitted to having received the amount of P300,000.00 from San Antonio, specifically for the
purpose of depositing it in court. However, as found by the IBP-CBD, Atty. Alvero presented no evidence that he
had indeed deposited the amount in or consigned it to the court. Neither was there any evidence that he had returned the
amount to Barcenas or San Antonio
From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer receives money from a
client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent
for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to his client.[17] These, Atty. Alvero failed to do.
Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client in the course of his
professional employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon demand. In the
instant case, respondent failed to account for and return the P300,000.00 despite complainants repeated demands. [18]
Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed no attorney-client relationship between him and
Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-clientrelationship existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may
be removed, or otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross

misconduct not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law confer upon him.[19]
Atty. Alveros failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand violated the trust reposed
in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. It gave
rise to the presumption that he converted the money for his own use, and this act constituted a gross violation of
professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.[20] They constitute gross misconduct and gross
unethical behavior for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing
as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
We come to the penalty imposable in this case.
In Small v. Banares,[21] the respondent was suspended for two years for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly for failing to file a case for which the amount of P80,000.00 was given him by the client, and for
failing to return the said amount upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are attendant in thiscase, the Court
finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on respondent a two-year suspension to be in order.
As a final note, we reiterate: the practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral
character. The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. [22] For the practice of law is a profession, a form
of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.
Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and meet the standards of the profession are unworthy
of the privilege to practice law.[23]
WHEREFORE, Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008 of the IBP-CBD Board of Governors, which found
respondent Atty. Anorlito A. AlveroGUILTY of gross misconduct, is AFFIRMED. He is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of two (2)
years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty.
Alvero as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory. So ordered.

Piatt

September 1, 1933

C.E. PIATT, Chief of Police of Manila, complainant,

vs.
PERFECTO ABORDO, respondent.

The Respondent in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
On February 19, 1932, Perfecto Abordo, a member of thePhilippine Bar, accepted the offer of two individuals to sell him a
quantity of opium, a prohibited drug, and agreed to pay P1.50 per tin for the opium. On the afternoon of the same day,
Abordo was picked up at the corner of Taft Avenue extension and Vito Cruz in the City of Manila, by one of the individuals who
had made him the opium proposition, and was taken to Rizal Avenue Extension outside of the city limits where they found a
number of persons awaiting them in an automobile. A can was disclosed to Abordo as containing opium, and believing that it
was opium, he delivered to one Cabrales the amount of P600 in payment of the stuff. The can was loaded in
the automobile which brought Abordo to the scene of the delivery, but in returning to Manila another automobile overtook
them and the parties riding therein, pretending to be constabulary soldiers, told Abordo to stop. Instead Abordo drew his
revolver and commanding the driver of the car to turn into Calle Vito Cruz was able to evade his pursuers and to arrive safely
at his home in Pasay. Once in his home Abordo examined the contents of the can and found it to contain fake opium and
sand. Thereupon Abordo reported to the Luneta Police Station of Manila that he had been robbed of P600. Two individuals
were later arrested, charged with the crime of estafa, and convicted.
Abordo admits that he entered into the transaction detailed above, adding that "he is sincerely sorry for it and vows not to
repeat". His defense is that "there being no evidence in the record establishing the relationship ofattorney and client
between the respondent and the malefactors", and "the act complained of not having been committed in the exercise of his
profession of attorney-at-law", the acts he committed could not affect his status as attorney-at-law and could not, therefore,
constitute a ground for disciplinary action.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the grounds for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer.
Nevertheless, it is well settled that a member of the bar may be suspended or removed from his office as lawyer for other
than statutory grounds. However, as a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to be committed in his private capacity. The exception to the rule is that anattorney will be removed not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him. (In re Pelaez [1923], 44 Phil., 567.)
The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons
whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respect as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.
It will be recalled that Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar, attempted to engage in an opium deal in direct
contravention of the criminal law of the Philippine Islands. All that kept the nefarious plan from succeeding was the
treacherous conduct of his co-conspirators. The intention to flaunt the law was present even if consummation of the overt act
was not accomplished. In the eyes of the canons of professional ethics which govern the conduct of attorneys, the act was as
reprehensible as if it had been brought to a successfulculmination. "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws" said the United States Supreme Court in the well known case of Ex Parte Wall ( [1882],
107 U.S., 265), and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support.
The Solicitor-General submits that the respondent should be reprimanded and warned that a repetition of similar conduct in
the future will be dealt with more severely. To our minds such leniency on the part of the Supreme Court would serve merely
to condone a pernicious example set by a member of the bar, and would result in action entirely inadequate considering the
aggravated nature of the case. In this respect we are not without judicial precedents to guide us. Thus, in the case of In
re Terrel ( [1903], 2 Phil., 266), although the respondent had been acquitted on the charge of estafa, yet it was held that,
since the promotion of an organization for the purpose of violating or evading the penal laws amounted to such malpractice
on the part of an attorney as will justify removal or suspension, the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
term of one year. Again, In re Pelaez, supra, where an attorney-at-law who, as a guardian, pledged the shares
of stock belonging to his ward to guarantee the payment of his personal debt, although this was misconduct committed in his
private capacity, the court nevertheless suspended the respondent from the legal profession for one year. We think the
instant case grave, and meriting as severe a sentence.
It is the order of the court that the respondent Perfecto Abordo be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
year to begin on September 1, 1933.

A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457

February 3, 2015

MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two
cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.
A.C. No. 7973
On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo before the Office of the Bar Confidant.
The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two
children, Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentistand practiced his
profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage, which
was eventually granted.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreo, representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for
support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already
39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When
Sesbreo and Garcias children learned abouthis return, Sesbreo filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia
alleged that he learned that Sesbreo was convicted by theRegional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide
in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime
against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreo should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.
In his Comment, Sesbreo alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint against him before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreo alleged that
Garcias complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he acted as pro bono counsel for Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth.
In the Courts Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation.
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo before
the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreo is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No.
CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that
Sesbreo violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint
against Sesbreo alleging basically the same facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreo alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with the inherent
accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreo argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the
disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreo further alleged that homicide does not involve moral
turpitude. Sesbreo claimed that Garcias complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate
against him for representing Garcias daughters in court.
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed on the sole issue to be resolved:
whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
found Sesbreo guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal,
this Court downgraded the crime to homicide and sentenced Sesbreo to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and
1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD found that
Sesbreo was released from confinement on 27 July 2001 following his acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10 July
2001.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. Citing
International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission, 1 the IBPCBD further ruled that homicide may or
may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of
this Court convicting Sesbreo for the crime of homicide, and found that the circumstances leading to the death of the victim
involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:

Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher Yapchangco was shown to be a foe of respondent and
neither had the victim Luciano nor his companion Christopher shown to have wronged the respondent. They simply
happened to be at the wrong place and time the early morning of June 3, 1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear the earmarks of moral turpitude.
Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the respondent, by his conduct, displayed
extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to be slighted by a couple
of drunks who may have shattered the stillness of the early morning with their boisterous antics, natural display of loud
bravado of drunken men who had one too many. Respondents inordinate over reaction to the ramblings of drunken men who
were not even directed at respondent reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent was
not only vindictive without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority. 2
Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon3 where the respondent was disbarred for having been convicted of
frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreo be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On 6 May 2013, Sesbreo filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD. Sesbreo alleged that the IBP-CBD
misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that the attendant circumstances in Sorianoare disparate,
distinct, and different from his case. He further alleged that there was no condition set on the grant of executive clemency to
him; and thus, he was restored to his full civil and political rights. Finally, Sesbreo alleged that after his wife died in an
ambush, he already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in thecase for bigamy against Garcia and that he already
advised his clients to settle their other cases. He alleged that Garcia already withdrew the complaints against him.
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31 denying Sesbreos motion for
reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014.
CBD Case No. 08-2273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the Courts Resolution dated 30 September 2014,
the Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.
The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013
and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended asattorney by
this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the
appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. 4 Moral turpitude is an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contraryto
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.5
The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was discussed by this Court in International Rice
Research Institute v. NLRC6 where it ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude.1wphi1 Homicide may or may
not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in everycriminal act and is
not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but not always,
crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral
turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which
are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala
prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must
be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached. 7
In People v. Sesbreo,8 the Court found Sesbreo guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H.
Sesbreois hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided by
law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.9
We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances show the presence of moral
turpitude.

The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion Christopher Yapchangco
(Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by Sesbreos house when the latter, without any provocation from the former,
went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at them. According to Yapchangco, theywere about five
meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreo when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they turned
around, they saw Sesbreo aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An
eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he heard shots and opened the window of his house. He saw
Yapchangco and Amparado running away while Sesbreo was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes house in the process.
Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot, then saw Sesbreo in the middle of the street,
carrying a long firearm, and walking back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and
Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by
Sesbreo that eventually led to the death of Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreos argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights. Sesbreo cited
In re Atty. Parcasio10 to bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was granted "an absolute and unconditional
pardon"11 which restored his "full civil and political rights," 12 a circumstance not present inthese cases. Here, the Order of
Commutation13 did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional. The accessory penalties were not mentioned
when the original sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation and they were also not mentioned in stating the
commuted sentence. It only states: By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the original sentence of prisoner RAUL SESBREO Y HERDA convicted
by the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and SupremeCourt and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years and
1 day to 16 years and 4 months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of P50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of P50,000.00.14
Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and restored Sesbreo to his full
civil and political rights.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves, commutations,
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. 15 In this case, the executive clemency merely
"commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on
Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. 16 Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability.17 The
penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was
released from prison. More importantly, the Final Release and Discharge18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x
accessory penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no
application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a full and
unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. 19 It is granted only to those possessing
good moral character.20 A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment. 21
WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to
all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix
the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have
already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent
bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title,
the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for
an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force
and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
1.

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

2.

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;

3.

The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of law
and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down
by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who
can practice law; and

4.

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law
was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to
the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules
of admission to the practice of law.

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi
City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial
Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement
entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your
company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made
said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made
said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the
bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and
closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I
categorically state on record that I amterminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the
need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The
envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group
of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was
payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract'
entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending

circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and
that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia
Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all
of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of
deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the
Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary
in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into
the contracts by "the schemingsales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP
loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the
refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint
dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence
to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be
appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that notices of
resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by
Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an
Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion
that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the
complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio
Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **." [4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones, [5] Alauya requested
the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. [6] He stated that his acts as clerk
of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co.
had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions ofP4,333.10
from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered
"undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking
privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain
letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and
attached to the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money
he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a
title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal,
he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. [11] He was induced to sign a
blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had
since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject of his
supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated; [12] He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from
his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims
that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those
regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever
saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with
unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and
April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M.
Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi)
with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing
her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse
of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued
the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only
what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total ofP26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy
of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. [16] Section 4 of the Code commands
that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."[17] More than once has
this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn
and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." [18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of
others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively
intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi.
The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a
manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." [19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot
justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court,
Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he
may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. [20] As a judicial employee, it
is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should

be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be
mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the
Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. [21] While
one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no
moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately
establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that
any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt withmore severely.
SO ORDERED.

In re Guardianship of the incapacitated Vicente Arevalo FERNANDO ARCE, claimant-appellant,

vs.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, guardian-appellee.
Fernando Arce in his own behalf.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
The question to be decided in this case to do with the determination of the reasonable compensation whichAttorney
Fernando Arce receive for services rendered in connection with the guardianship of the incapacitated Vicente Arevalo. The
guardian of the person of the incapacitated offered to pay the sum of P200 and on the matter coming on for hearing before
the Court of First Instance of Manila it was raised to P400. Appearing from this order, the attorney asks that he be allowed the
sum of P5,000.
Something is made of the manner in which the services of Attorney Arce contracted, but this is beside the point, for it is
evident that the relation of attorney and client existed. The record further shows that in pursuance of such employment,
Attorney Arce prepared a petition praying for the appointment of a guardian of the person of the incapacitated and
a successful conclusion after a hearing in court, conducted certain negotiations with the banks, made the necessary
investigation, and attended to other incidental matters. The inventory of the properties belonging to the incapacitated
Vicente Arevalo showed him to be worth approximately half a million pesos. Predicated on these facts, our opinion is that the
trial court was overly strict in arriving an amount which would adequately compensate Attorney Arce for his legal work.
The law is a profession, not a business. Lawyers are officers of the court. That is true. At the same time professional men are
entitled to have and recover from their clients a reasonable compensation for their services rendered with a view to the

importance of the subject matter of the controversy, to the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of
the lawyer. Pursuant to the power entrusted to the courts to base conclusions on their professional knowledge relative to the
fees which should be rewarded lawyers, courts have constantly to protect clients from unconscionable or unreasonable
claims. On the other hand, the standing of the members of the bar is not enhanced by quibbling relative to just fees,
equivalent to the bargaining had between a prospective purchaser and a merchant in the markets before a sale is
made.lawphi1.net
Taking into consideration the established facts and the factors which determine a reasonable compensation for alawyers, we
believe that Attorney Arce is entitled to P1,000 for his services.
Sustaining the appeal to the above extent, the order in question will be modified and Attorney Fernando Arce allowed the
sum of P1,000 to be paid by the Philippine National Bank as the guardian of the property of the incapacitated out of
the property of the latter. So ordered, with the costs of this instance assessed against the appellee.

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ &
CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO.
ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN,
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K.
TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN,petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE
LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA,
REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5,
1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution
of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of
a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last
paragraph that: t.hqw

The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as
part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such
person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized theadoption of
firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative
authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy a profession requiring the same degree of trust and
confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client to acquire and use a trade name,
strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a
firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of
a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm
name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that: t.hqw
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased partners were wellpublicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify
all leading national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name; 6 there is no
custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm
necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by
U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the
Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was
resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who
has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila
vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene asamicus curiae. Before acting
thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still
being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and
Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued
use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: t.hqw
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of the
name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it
required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name
of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, nopractice should be allowed
which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop
the name "PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are
partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the
Civil Code which provides: t.hqw
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of one or more of the
partners.

Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a
partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living partners
and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil
Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The
heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly
where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to
the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the
future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because
such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor
the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits
accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased partners.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in
the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from
scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased
partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is
that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the
exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts
contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the
deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal
reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of
aprofessional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its
individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot
arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9t.hqw
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to carry
on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial
partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, t.hqw
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of
attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable
such skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as
an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or forbusiness. For
one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with thepractice of
accountancy. 10 t.hqw
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. ... It
is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or businessor of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated
that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining
to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to
Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public
service, no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.

13

"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited
to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only
presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highlypersonal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" in support of their
petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the
firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be
taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former
partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the moreactive
and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law
firms in this country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of
the partnership changed. t.hqw
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it is proper only where
sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner
and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op.
cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be
used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name
appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm
name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in
their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the
present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any
statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein: t.hqw
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory provision or legislative policy.
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association
provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local
custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no
question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the approval of other
attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter and
reached The conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of the firm name herein is also
sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of
conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts
take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as
a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent

evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to
constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts
can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social
custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the
Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners in
their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can
prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any
partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an
ordinary "money-making trade." t.hqw
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal gain;
a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free
competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their
fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his
services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should
be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no
equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with
no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a
prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization
and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical
impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from
their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in
their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672 - v e r s u s ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,

September 4, 2009
This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against
Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients [2] to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce them
to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to
prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange
for a loan ofP50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card: [6]
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card. [7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, [9] found that respondent had
encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 [10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be
reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional practice in violation
of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers services are to
be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. [13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to
commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render
that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.[14]
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. [16]
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR
DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty. [18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by
Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation
on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR
and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal
another lawyersclient nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his
services.[20] Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits
from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed an
unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice.Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or
premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be
adversely affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. [23] Either of these circumstances
may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take

care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.
[24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective
client for the purpose of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from
the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the
sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. [27] For this reason, lawyers are
only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a)

lawyers name;

(b)

name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c)

address;

(d)

telephone number and

(e)

special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who
already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to
lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability.
This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the
absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and
directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines,
and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5712. June 29, 2005]

FRANCISCO LORENZANA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CESAR G. FAJARDO, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Francisco Lorenzana, complainant, charges respondent Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo with violation of the Civil Service Law
and Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and seeks his disbarment from the practice of the law profession.
In a verified complaint dated May 27, 2002, complainant alleged that respondent, while employed as Legal Officer V at the
Urban Settlement Office in Manila, until his retirement on May 15, 2002, was a member of the Peoples Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB) of Quezon City, receiving a monthly honorarium of P4,000.00.[1] He was also a member of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches Proper, also receiving a monthly allowance/ honorarium. [2]
Complainant also alleged that respondent was engaged in the private practice of law, receiving acceptance fees ranging
from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00. He lives in a house and lot owned by complainants family without paying any rental and
refuses to leave the place despite the latters demands.
Asked to comment on the complaint, respondent countered that his membership in the PLEB of Quezon City, representing
the NGO, was without fixed compensation. He reported only once a week in the afternoon for which he received only per
diems allowed under Section 43 par. (c) of Republic Act No. 6975. [3] As regards his designation as a member of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, the same is authorized under Section 406 of the Local Government Code of 1991; and his monthly
allowance/honorarium is allowed under Section 393.
While he received allowances, honoraria and other emoluments as member of the PLEB and of the Lupong Tagapamayapa,
even as he is in the government service, the same is authorized by law. Hence, there was no double compensation. He
admitted having appeared as private counsel in several cases. However, his clients were his relatives and friends, among
them were complainants father and brother Ricardo. He emphasized that his services were pro bono.
Respondent denied that the lot on which his house is built belongs to complainants family. In fact, it is now the subject of
an Accion Publiciana filed against him by one Dionisio delos Reyes before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
100.
In a Resolution dated January 20, 2003, we referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila, who conducted the investigation, found that respondents appointment as a member of
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Town Proper, Novaliches, Quezon City, while concurrently employed as a legal officer
of the Manila Urban Settlements Office is not unlawful. Such appointment is in accordance with the Local Government Code
of 1991. Nor could respondent be found liable for receiving honoraria as a Lupon member, since the Local Government Code
of 1991 authorizes Lupon members to receive honoraria, allowances, and other emoluments. With respect to respondents
appointment as PLEB member, IBP Commissioner Aguila stated that the same is not an exception to the prohibition against
dual appointments or employment of government officials or employees.
IBP Commissioner Aguila found that respondents court appearances as counsel for litigants do not constitute private practice
of law since complainant failed to show that he received compensation. However, respondent should still be held liable for
violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations since he failed to show that he was permitted by his Office to appear as
counsel for his clients.
On August 30, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-93 quoted as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A, and finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and in view of respondents
accepting appointment as Board Member of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board of Quezon City while he was still employed
as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law

for one (1) month and hereby REPRIMANDED with stern WARNING for failing to obtain written permission from his superiors
to appear as counsel to certain relatives and friends as required by Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
The prohibition against government officials and employees, whether elected or appointed, from concurrently holding any
other office or position in the government is contained in Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution which provides:
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or 2employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. [4]
In trying to justify his appointment as PLEB member, respondent invoked Section 43 (c) of R.A. No. 6975[5] quoted below
which, according to him, is the law allowing him to be appointed as such member of the Quezon City PLEB.
Section 43. Peoples Law Enforcement Board
xxxxxxxxx
(c) Compensation, Membership in the PLEB is a civic duty. However, PLEB members may be paid per diem as may be
determined by the city or municipal council from city or municipal funds.
It is clear that this provision pertains only to the compensation of PLEB members. It cannot be construed as an exception to
the Constitutional and statutory prohibition against dual or multiple appointments of appointive public employees.
Respondent also failed to establish that his primary functions as Legal Officer of the Manila Urban Settlements Office allow
his appointment as PLEB member, an exception to dual appointment prohibited by the Constitution and the statutes. Indeed,
respondent, in accepting such appointment, has transgressed the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the
Local Government Code of 1991. Being contra leges, respondent also violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Attorneys Oath.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
These duties are further enshrined in the Attorneys Oath, which every lawyer in this jurisdiction has to take before he is
allowed to practice law. The Attorneys Oath states in part that every lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
The lawyers paramount duty to society is to obey the law. For of all classes and professions, it is the lawyer who is
most sacredly bound to uphold the laws, for he is their sworn servant. [6] Sadly, respondent failed to fulfill this exacting duty.
On respondents appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches Proper, while serving as
Legal Officer V of the Manila UrbanSettlements Office, we agree with the IBP Investigating Commissioner that the same is in
order, being allowed by law.
Section 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members
xxxxxxxxx
(b) The lupon or pangkat members shall serve without compensation, except as provided for in Section 393 and without
prejudice to incentives as provided for in this Section and in Book IV of this Code. The Department of Interior and Local
Government shall provide for a system of granting economic or other incentives to the lupon or pangkat members who
adequately demonstrate the ability to judiciously and expeditiously resolve cases referred to them. While in the
performance of their duties, the lupon or pangkat members, whether in public or private employment, shall be
deemed to be on official time, and shall not suffer from any diminution in compensation or allowance from said
employment by reason thereof.
The above provision allows government officials and employees to sit as lupon or pangkat members. The phrase whether in
public or private employment sustains respondents posture.
We now determine whether respondent engaged in the practice of law while employed as Legal Officer V in the Manila Urban
Settlement Office. Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. [7] Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall

within the prohibition of statutes has been interpreted as customarily habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services.[8]
In the case at bar, respondents appearance as counsel is not merely isolated. Evidence presented by complainant shows that
he had an extensive practice of law. While employed as a Legal Officer in the Urban Resettlement Office of Manila, he
maintained a law office. The pleadings he signed as counsel for his clients filed with the courts indicate his office address as
Room 201 7 JA Building, 244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches, Quezon City. Following is the letter head appearing on the letters and
envelopes[9] sent to his clients:
Cesar G. Fajardo
Attorney and Counsellor-at-Law
Room 201 7 J & A Building
244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches
Quezon City.
Respondent cannot justify his practice of law by claiming that his office (the Manila Urban Resettlement) is not really strict
when it comes to appearing in some private cases as they (employees) were sometimes called to render service even on
holidays without additional compensation. At most, he should have asked written permission from his chief as required by
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules that (n)o officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of the Department.
As to respondents alleged unlawful stay on complainants property affecting his conduct as a member of the Bar, suffice it to
state that any discussion on this issue is premature since the case is still pending in the RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City.
Anent the penalty to be imposed, as mentioned earlier, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be
suspended for one (1) month for accepting a prohibited appointment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City and be
reprimanded for failing to obtain a written permission from his superiors to appear as counsel for certain friends and
relatives. We believe that a heavier penalty should be imposed upon him for he transgressed not only the statutes but the
very fundamental law itself, in violation of his Attorneys Oath and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which is he is required to take before admission to practice, for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice (Stress supplied).
WHEREFORE, for accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City while concurrently employed as Legal
Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, in violation of the Constitution and the statutes, which in turn contravene his
Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility; and by engaging in the illegal practice of law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from notice and is REPRIMANDED and
WARNED that any repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be spread upon the records of Atty. Cesar
G. Fajardo; the Office of the Court Administrator to be furnished to the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

VIVIAN VILLANUEVA,

A.C. No. 7657

Complainant, vs.
ATTY. CORNELIUS M. GONZALES, Promulgated:
The Case
This is a complaint Vivian Villanueva (complainant) filed against Atty. Cornelius M. Gonzales (respondent) for failure to render
legal services and failure toreturn the money, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), and other documents he received from
complainant.
The Facts
Sometime in 2000, complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of transferring the title over a piece
of property located in Talisay, Cebu. Complainant, as mortgagee, wanted to transfer the title to her name because the
mortgagor failed to redeem the property within the redemption period and the sheriff had already issued a sheriffs definite
deed of sale in complainants favor. Complainant gave respondent P8,000 as acceptance fee, the propertys TCT, and other
pertinent documents.[1
After receiving the money, TCT, and other documents, respondent began to avoid complainant. Whenever complainant went
to respondents office at BPI Building, Escario St., Cebu City, respondents secretary would tell her that respondent could not
be disturbed because he was either sleeping or doing something important. [2]
In a letter dated 2 July 2003,[3] complainant told respondent that she had lost her trust and confidence in him and asked him
to return the P8,000, TCT, and other documents. Respondent refused to return the money, TCT, and other documents. After
some time and after complainants daughter confronted him, respondent finally returned the money. However, until now,
respondent has not returned the TCT and other documents. [4] Thus, complainant filed a complaint[5] dated 10 September
2003 against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
In an Order[6] dated 7 October 2003, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered respondent to submit his
answer to the complaint.Respondent did not submit an answer. [7] In an Order[8] dated 21 April 2004, IBP Commissioner for Bar
Discipline Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered respondent to submit his answer to the complaint, and set the mandatory
conference on 2 June 2004. Respondent did not submit an answer or attend the mandatory conference. The Commission on
Bar Discipline considered the case submitted for resolution. [9]
The IBPs Report and Recommendations
In a Report[10] dated 27 October 2006, IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Caesar R. Dulay (Commissioner Dulay) found
respondent guilty of misconduct and negligent behavior: (1) he failed to perform any legal service to his client, (2) he did not
inform his client about the status of the case, (3) he returned theP8,000 acceptance fee without any explanation, and (4) he
was indifferent. Commissioner Dulay found that respondent violated Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year.

In a Resolution[11] dated 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted and approved the Report dated 27
October 2006 with modification.The IBP Board suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months and ordered
him to return to complainant the P2,000, TCT, and the other documents.
As provided in Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,[12] the IBP Board forwarded the instant case to the Court for
final action.
The Courts Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP with modification. Respondent violated Canons 16, 17, and
18, and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent Refused to Account for
and Return His Clients Money
Canon 16 states that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01 of the
Code states that a lawyer shall account for all money received from the client. Rule 16.03 of the Code states that a lawyer
shall deliver the funds of his client when due or upon demand.
In Meneses v. Macalino,[13] the Court held that if [a] lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer
must immediately return the money to the client. In the instant case, respondent demanded P10,000 and received P8,000 as
acceptance fee. Since he did not render any legal service, he should have promptly accounted for and returned the money to
complainant.[14] He did not.
After receiving the money, respondent began to avoid complainant. He asked his secretary to lie to complainant and shoo
her off. When complainant demanded for the return of the money after three years of not hearing from respondent,
respondent opted to ignore the demand. Respondent only returned the money after complainants daughter confronted
him. If complainants daughter had not persisted, respondent would not have returned the money. Respondent did not offer
any explanation as to why he waited for three years to lapse before returning the money. In Macarilay v. Seria,[15] the Court
held that [t]he unjustified withholding of funds belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against
the lawyer.
Respondents failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand violated the trust reposed
in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity[16] and moral soundness,[17] and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.[18] It
gave rise to the presumption that he converted the money to his own use and constituted a gross violation
of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. [19]
Respondent Refuses to Return
His Clients TCT and Other Documents
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall hold in trust all properties of his client that may
come into his possession. Rule16.03 of the Code states that a lawyer shall deliver the property of his client when due or upon
demand.
The TCT and other documents are the properties of complainant. Since respondent did not render any legal service to
complainant, he should have returned complainants properties to her. However, he refuses without any explanation
to return them. Respondent has kept the TCT and other documents in his possession since 2000. He refuses to return them
despite receiving a written demand and being confronted by complainants daughter. In Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose,[20] the
Court held that failure to return the documents to the client is reprehensible: this Court finds reprehensible respondents
failure to heed the request of his client for the return of the case documents. That respondent gave no reasonable
explanation for that failure makes his neglect patent.
Respondent Failed to Serve His Client
with Fidelity, Competence, and Diligence
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client. Canon 18 of
the Code states that [a] lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 of the Code states that
[a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Clearly, respondent did not serve complainant with fidelity, competence, or diligence. He totally neglected complainants
cause. An attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant was established when respondent accepted the

acceptance fee. Since then, he should have exercised due diligence in furthering his clients cause and given it his full
attention.[21] Respondent did not render any service.
Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he is bound by the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In Emiliano Court Townhouses v. Atty.Dioneda,[22] the Court held that the act of receiving money as acceptance
fee for legal services and subsequently failing to render such service is a clear violation of Canons 17 and 18.
Respondent Did Not Keep His Client Informed
of the Status of Her Case and Refused to Respond
to Her Requests for Information
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that [a] lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
Respondent avoided complainant for three years and kept her in the dark. He did not give her any information about
the status of her case or respond to her request for information. After giving the money, complainant never heard from
respondent again. Complainant went to respondents office several times to request for information. Every time, respondent
avoided complainant and gave her the run-around. In her affidavit, complainant stated that:
I often visited him in his office to make a [follow up] of the progress of the transfer x x x only [to be] told by his secretary that
he [was] sleeping and not to be disturbed or [was] doing something important;
x x x For three agonizing years, I x x x never received a feedback from Atty. Gonzales so much so that I was forced
[to write him] a letter which up to present remain[s] unanswered[.] [23] (Emphasis ours)
Respondent unjustifiably denied complainant f her right to be fully informed of the status of her case, and disregarded his
duties as a lawyer.[24]
Respondent Did Not File an Answer or
Attend the Mandatory Hearing Before the IBP
Respondents repeated failure to file an answer to the complaint and to appear at the 2 June 2004 mandatory conference
aggravate his misconduct. These demonstrate his high degree of irresponsibility [25] and lack of respect for the IBP and its
proceedings.[26] His attitude stains the nobility of the legal profession. [
On the Appropriate Penalty
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.[28] The Court finds therecommended penalty inadequate. In Rollon,[29] the Court suspended a lawyer from
the practice of law for two years for failing to render any legal service after receiving money and for failing to return the
money and documents he received. In that case, the Court held that:
The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P8,000 as x x x partial service fee,
respondent failed to render any legal service in relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated
follow-ups from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his clients cause, in brazen disregard of his
duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the
case that had been entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise entrusted to him. [30]
In Small,[31] the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for two years for failing to render any legal service after
receiving money, failing to inform his client of the status of the case, and failing to promptly account for and return the
money he received.
The Court notes that respondent does not have to return any amount to complainant. Complainant gave respondent
only P8,000, not P10,000, and respondent has returned the total amount he received. As stated in complainants affidavit:
For the legal service[s] sought, Atty. Gonzales asked an acceptance fee of P10,000 to which I gave him P8,000 together
with the pertinent [mortgage] documents needed by him for the transfer including the Transfer Certificate of Title;
[D]ue to the persistence of my daughter, Lurina Villanueva, Atty. Gonzales returned the acceptance fee
of P8,000 on August 5, 2003 but never returned the documents mentioned in my letter. [32] (Emphasis ours)

Lawyers are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility because an
attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. Those who violate the
Code must be disciplined.[33] Respondent failed to live up to these standards
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Cornelius M. Gonzales GUILTY of violating Canons 16, 17, and 18, and Rules
16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from
the practice of law for two years effective upon finality of this Decision, ORDERS him to RETURN the TCT and all other
documents to complainant within 15 days from notice of this Decision, and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or
similar offense, including the failure to return the TCT and all other documents as required herein, shall be dealt
with moreseverely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as
attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7434

SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA TEJADA, vs. ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA,
Respondent. August 23, 2007
Petitioners-spouses Rosita and Amador Tejada filed a Complaint Affidavit before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to
initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa for his continued refusal to settle his long
overdue loan obligation to the complainants, in violation of his sworn duty as a lawyer to do justice to every man and Rule
7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
More specifically, the complaint alleges that:
3. Sometime on January, 2001, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana taking advantage of his special knowledge as a lawyer
represented to the petitioners that he has an alleged parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (73196) 16789
and that he needs an amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) so that he could reconstitute the
torrens title on the same;
4. Respondent then induced by sweet promises and assurances petitioners spouses to finance such undertaking with a
solemn commitment on his part that after he has already reconstituted such torrens title, he will deliver the same to the
petitioners spouses as security for the amount they had financed;
Thereafter, petitioner spouses shall earn an amount of P70,000.00 from the P100,000.00 they had financed or all and [sic]
all, respondent lawyer shall pay petitioner spouses a total amount of P170,000.00;
5. The agreement between the petitioner spouses and respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K. Palana in this regard is being partly
evidenced by their written agreement thereon dated January 12, 2001, a xerox copy of which is hereto attached as Annex A.

Likewise, the receipt by the respondent of the P100,000.00 is being evidenced in the bottom part of page 1 of the
agreement;

6. Under the clear terms of their agreement, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana solemnly assured petitioner spouses that
he will reconstitute, deliver the reconstituted title and give the P170,000.00 to the petitioners spouses all within a period of
three months reckoned from their execution of their written agreement dated January 12, 2001;
7. However, after respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K. Palana had gotten the P100,000.00 amount from the petitioner spouses,
respondent from that time on up to the present had intentionally evaded the performance of his due, just, legal and
demandable obligations to petitioner spouses.
It turned out that all his assurances that he had a torrens title, he will reconstitute the same and deliver an amount of
P170,000.00 to petitioner spouses were all fraudulent representations on his part or else were only fictitious in character to
defraud petitioner spouses of their hard owned monies;
9. Legal demands had already been made to respondent lawyer to fulfill all his moral and legal responsibilities to petitioner
spouses but all of said demands simply went unheeded. A xerox copy of the two legal demand letters to respondent lawyer
in this regard is hereto attached as Annex B and C.[1]
Despite due notice, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint as required by the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the IBP. Respondent likewise failed to appear on the scheduled date of the mandatory conference despite due notice.
Thus, on March 10, 2005, the IBP declared respondent to have waived his right to submit evidence and to participate further
in the proceedings of the case.
After a careful consideration of the pleadings and evidence submitted by the complainants ex parte, Investigating
Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano III submitted his February 1, 2006 Report to the IBP Board of Governors, recommending
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.
Based on said Report, petitioners were able to satisfactorily prove the following: that Rosita Tejada and respondent and his
companion executed a written agreement (Annex A); that respondent received the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
(PhP 100,000) from Rosita Tejada pursuant to said agreement; and that petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent
(Annex C), but, until now, respondent has failed to settle his obligation. Petitioners, however, failed to present evidence to
show that respondent fraudulently represented himself to be the owner of the aforesaid lot. Noting respondents indifference
to the proceedings of the case, the Investigating Commissioner cited Ngayan v. Tugade,[2] where the Supreme Court
considered respondents failure to answer the complaint and his failure to appear in four hearings below as evidence of his
flouting resistance to a lawful order of the court, and illustrate his despiciency to his oath of office in violation of Section 3,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, for respondents misconduct, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondents suspension for a period of
three (3) months, guided by Supreme Court rulings in analogous cases, viz: Sanchez v. Somoso,[3] where the lawyer was
suspended for six (6) months for having issued personal checks from a closed bank account and subsequently refused to pay
for his medical expenses despite demand after the checks were dishonored; Constantino v. Saludares,[4] where the lawyer
was suspended for three (3) months for his unwarranted refusal to pay a personal loan despite demand; and Lizaso v.
Amante,[5] where the lawyer was suspended indefinitely for his failure to return and account for the money delivered to him
for investment purposes.[6]
In its November 18, 2006 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner,considering Respondent's continued refusal to settle his obligation to the
complainants and for his failure to participate in the proceedings before the Commission of Bar Discipline.[7]
After a review of the records and especially sans the submittal of any response or evidence from respondent, we find no
reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Soriano. Respondent, like all other members of the bar, is expected to always
live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons, viz:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected
and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that s/he shall be of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but its
continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession. [8] Indeed, the strength of
the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. As previously explained in Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily
reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the
courts and the public. The bar must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing.
Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. To this end, members of the legal fraternity can do nothing that might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. [9]
In the instant case, respondents unjustified withholding of petitioners money years after it became due and demandable
demonstrates his lack of integrity and fairness, and this is further highlighted by his lack of regard for the charges brought
against him. Instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did not bother to file an answer nor did he participate in
the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his conduct.
The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that s/he
denies the charges against him; s/he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him/her. S/he must show proof
that s/he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him/her. [10] Finally, respondents
acts, which violated the Lawyer's Oath to delay no man for money or malice as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility, warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him. With respect to the recommendation to suspend
respondent Palaa for three (3) months, we find that the sanction is not commensurate to the breach committed and
disrespect to the Court exhibited by the erring member of the bar. We increase the suspension to six (6) months in view of
our ruling in Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro.[11]
We find that the complainants could not have been defrauded without the representations of respondent that he can easily
have the torrens title of his lot reconstituted with his special knowledge as a legal practitioner as long as he is provided PhP
100,000 to finance the reconstitution. Respondent knew that his representations were false since the filing fee for a petition
for reconstitution in 2001 was only PhP 3,145, and other expenses including the publication of the filing of the petition could
not have cost more than PhP 20,000. It is clear that he employed deceit in convincing complainants to part with
their hard earned money and the latter could not have been easily swayed to lend the money were it not for his
misrepresentations and failed promises as a member of the bar.Moreover, when he failed to pay his just and legal obligation,
he disobeyed the provisions of the Civil Code which is one of the substantive laws he vowed to uphold when he took his oath
as a lawyer. Lastly, to aggravate his misconduct, he totally ignored the directives of the IBP to answer the complaint when he
fully knew as a lawyer that the compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by this Court to undertake the
investigation of complaints against lawyers, among which is the instant complaint. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in
reality a gross and blatant disrespect to the Court. Lawyers fully know, as respondent is aware or at least is assumed to
know, that lawyers like him cannot disobey the orders and resolutions of the Court. Failing in this duty as a member of the
bar which is being supervised by the Court under the Constitution, we find that a heavier sanction should fall on respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months and is ordered to settle his loan obligation to petitioners-spouses Amador and Rosita Tejada within two (2) months
from the date of this Decisions promulgation. This Decision is immediately executory.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's
decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a
college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an
appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law
by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees
for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St.
23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of
their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for
that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of
an attorney or counselor at law bear anINTIMATE RELATION to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of

the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of
the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one
or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell,
155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term
"practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions
on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications
provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the
Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it
up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer
is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer."Today,
although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private
practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case,
the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining
the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota,
1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to
be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their
entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating
lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall
that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in
this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases
before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has
been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as
in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty.
And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving
to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full
range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly
lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment.
(Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by
the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a
departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and
other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding
that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The

recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need
for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information
flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an
improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the
decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic
effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the
subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through
an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctoratedegree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because
of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business
issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "bigtime" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For
one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of
concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary
(in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he
is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's
work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of
the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs
provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international
law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to
experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the
traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an
incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins
applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer
reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are
required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is
being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units.
Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem
corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside
existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, moreadversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations
has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization.
In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels,
and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context
of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all
lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on
on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration,
thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal
trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms

change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one
of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's
strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified
body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers,
coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate
counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's
aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the
modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting
each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires
next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in
a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 8655%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also
been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in
Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and
since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable
in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod,
in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging
in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and
as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system
for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the
various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating
the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing
Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is
concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Sessionon
Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through
Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law
of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an
international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the
advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International
Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the
contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define
the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis issine qua
non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters,
1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice,
and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission
has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever
it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the
Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for
seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say,
law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition
of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean
by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the
law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose
sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years.
This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground
that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought
against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in
the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave
abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no
occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission,
and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee,
it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved)
for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three
inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved,
Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly
relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

FACTS:
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the
appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law
practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be
a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming Monsods
appointment.
HELD:
1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the
interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged
in the practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court also cited an
article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such
as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or
functions to meet them. These days, for example, most corporation lawyers are involved in management policy formulation.
Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an
investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission
in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyerentrepreneur, etc.

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by
the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the
SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.