SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 190710. June 6, 2011.]

JESSE U. LUCAS, petitioner, vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J :
p

Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In
this petition for review on certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench
and the Bar in dealing with a relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this
petition are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated September 25, 2009 and
Resolution dated December 17, 2009.
The antecedents of the case are, as follows:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, led a Petition to Establish Illegitimate
Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) 2 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that,
sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao and
stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a prominent nightspot in
Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got
acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen's workplace, and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on
March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of
petitioner's father was not stated in petitioner's certicate of live birth. However,
Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent. On August 1, 1969,
petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent
allegedly extended nancial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two
years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept
respondent's oer of support and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While
petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to
respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
DCHIAS

Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioner's certicate of live birth;
(b) petitioner's baptismal certicate; (c) petitioner's college diploma, showing that
he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in
Psychology; (d) his Certicate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certicate of
Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings
of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent
learned of the petition to establish liation. His counsel therefore went to the trial
court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition.

Petitioner led with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence,
on September 3, 2007, the RTC, nding the petition to be sucient in form and
substance, issued the Order 3 setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who
has any objection to the petition to le his opposition. The court also directed that
the Order be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be furnished
with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and represent
the State in the case.
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order,
respondent led a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia that:
(1) he did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as
respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was required, he was waiving
service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by
publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the
confidentiality of the subject matter. 4
On September 14, 2007, respondent also led a Manifestation and Comment on
Petitioner's Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Respondent reiterated
that the petition for recognition is adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served
with summons.
2005cdasia

After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent led a motion for
reconsideration. 5 Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and
substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that
were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a
mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner's father. Moreover,
jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondent's motion for reconsideration,
issued an Order 6 dismissing the case. The court remarked that, based on the case of
Herrera v. Alba , 7 there are four signicant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action which the parties have to face: a prima facie case, armative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must rst establish
these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and
liation, which may include incriminating acts or scientic evidence like blood group
test and DNA test results. The court observed that the petition did not show that
these procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie
case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual
relations with respondent, and petitioner's statement as to what his mother told
him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certicate of live birth was not
signed by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent,
there was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the latter
or his family. The court opined that, having failed to establish a prima facie case,
respondent had no obligation to present any armative defenses. The dispositive
portion of the said Order therefore reads:

WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance with the

four procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action in his petition, his
motion for the submission of parties to DNA testing to establish paternity
and filiation is hereby DENIED. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner seasonably led a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30,
2008, which the RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued the
Order 9 setting aside the court's previous order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30, 2008 is
hereby reconsidered and set aside.
cITaCS

Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)
be set for hearing on January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.

10

This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for
ling the petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken
place. The court stressed that the petition was sucient in form and substance. It
was veried, it included a certication against forum shopping, and it contained a
plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which petitioner relies
on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The
court remarked that the allegation that the statements in the petition were not of
petitioner's personal knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also dismissed
respondent's arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA test, and that
jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that
the new Rule on DNA Evidence 11 allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the
court's instance or upon application of any person who has legal interest in the
matter in litigation.
Respondent led a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20, 2008 and
for Dismissal of Petition, 12 reiterating that (a) the petition was not in due form and
substance as no defendant was named in the title, and all the basic allegations were
hearsay; and (b) there was no prima facie case, which made the petition susceptible
to dismissal.
The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and rescheduled
the hearing. 13
Aggrieved, respondent led a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the
Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009.
DAcSIC

On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of
respondent, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being
meritorious. The assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19,
2009 both issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City
in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 is
DISMISSED. 14

The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent,
as no summons had been served on him. Respondent's special appearance could not
be considered as voluntary appearance because it was led only for the purpose of
questioning the jurisdiction of the court over respondent. Although respondent
likewise questioned the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition,
the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person.
HTSIEa

The CA remarked that petitioner led the petition to establish illegitimate liation,
specically seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that
petitioner failed to show that the four signicant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action had been met. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case, thus:
While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be
absolute, the rule could not really have been intended to trample on the
substantive rights of the parties. It could have not meant to be an
instrument to promote disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could have not
been intended to legalize unwarranted expedition to sh for evidence. Such
will be the situation in this particular case if a court may at any time order
the taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in compulsory recognition cases is
immediately available to the petitioner/complainant without requiring rst the
presentation of corroborative proof, then a dire and absurd rule would
result. Such will encourage and promote harassment and extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the
danger of allowing an absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test
even if the plainti/petitioner failed to establish prima facie proof. . . . If at
anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the court can indeed
order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition cases, then the
prominent and well-to-do members of our society will be easy prey for
opportunists and extortionists. For no cause at all, or even for [ sic] casual
sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be used as a means to
harass them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of their children
may just be taking the chances-just in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in
a long past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute and unconditional taking
of DNA test for compulsory recognition case opens wide the opportunities
for extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for scandal. 15

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the
motion for lack of merit. 16

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED
THE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF HEREIN
RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI.
I.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED
THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE
RESPONDENT.
I.B
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED
TO REALIZE THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED
VOLUNTARILY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO .
AIaDcH

I.C
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER THAN
ITS BODY, IS CONTROLLING.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED
THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE MOTION (FILED BY
THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO ) FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA
TESTING.
II.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT DNA TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED
AFTER THE PETITIONER ESTABLISHES PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF
FILIATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED
RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF HERRERA VS. ALBA , ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS
THE 'FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A TRADITIONAL
PATERNITY ACTION.' 17

Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition for
certiorari the court's lack of jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA had no legal
basis to discuss the same, because issues not raised are deemed waived or
abandoned. At any rate, respondent had already voluntarily submitted to the

jurisdiction of the trial court by his ling of several motions asking for armative
relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 3,
2007; (b) Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
November 6, 2007; and (c) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October
20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner points out that respondent even
expressly admitted that he has waived his right to summons in his Manifestation
and Comment on Petitioner's Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence,
the issue is already moot and academic.
Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of
the petition does not state respondent's name, the body of the petition clearly
indicates his name and his known address. He maintains that the body of the
petition is controlling and not the caption.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for
the dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If
the CA entertained any doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have
simply denied the motion. 18 Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence does not require that there must be a prior proof of liation before DNA
testing can be ordered. He adds that the CA erroneously relied on the four
signicant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as enunciated in Herrera v. Alba .
19 Petitioner avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of
the proceedings because they are matters of evidence that should be taken up
during the trial. 20
In his Comment, respondent supports the CA's ruling on most issues raised in the
petition for certiorari and merely reiterates his previous arguments. However, on
the issue of lack of jurisdiction, respondent counters that, contrary to petitioner's
assertion, he raised the issue before the CA in relation to his claim that the petition
was not in due form and substance. Respondent denies that he waived his right to
the service of summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and voluntary
appearance was conditional upon a nding by the court that summons is indeed
required. He avers that the assertion of armative defenses, aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.
cTEICD

The petition is meritorious.

Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders
denying respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate liation. An
order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither
terminates nor nally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the
court before the case is nally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is
that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action
for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an
appeal unless and until a nal judgment or order is rendered. In a number of cases,
the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the

motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 21 In the present case, we discern no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to
dismiss.
ACaEcH

The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the court's lack of
jurisdiction over his person due to the absence of summons, and (b) defect in the
form and substance of the petition to establish illegitimate liation, which is
equivalent to failure to state a cause of action.
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised before the
CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent, or
whether respondent waived his right to the service of summons. We nd that the
primordial issue here is actually whether it was necessary, in the rst place, to serve
summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. In other
words, was the service of summons jurisdictional? The answer to this question
depends on the nature of petitioner's action, that is, whether it is an action in
personam , in rem , or quasi in rem .
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an
action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an
action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that
person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition
directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person,
like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the
birth certificate, is an action in rem . 22
In an action in personam , jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary
for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in
rem , jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result
of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized
and made effective. 23
The herein petition to establish illegitimate liation is an action in rem . By the
simple ling of the petition to establish illegitimate liation before the RTC, which
undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object to bar indenitely all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort to the right sought to be established. 24 Through publication, all
interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the
purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due
process requirements. 25 This is but proper in order to aord the person concerned
the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. 26 Hence, failure to serve

summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In
such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that the
adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to le his opposition, as in this case. We
nd that the due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satised,
considering that he has participated in the proceedings in this case and he has the
opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
To address respondent's contention that the petition should have been adversarial
in form, we further hold that the herein petition to establish liation was sucient
in form. It was indeed adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the
name of a defendant, the failure to implead respondent as defendant, and the nonservice of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is adversarial where the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and aorded the latter an
opportunity to contest it. 27 In this petition classied as an action in rem the
notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satised by the
publication of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as
directed by the trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule
8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and
direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact
is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of
action inadequate. 28 A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the
following elements: (1) the legal right of plainti, (2) the correlative obligation of
the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right. 29
The petition suciently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to
establish his liation to respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the
allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of petitioner's personal
knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that cannot be determined
at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his evidence.
CSHcDT

In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question

submitted to the court for determination is the suciency of the allegations made
in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of
fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint. 30 The inquiry is conned to the four corners of the
complaint, and no other. 31 The test of the suciency of the facts alleged in the
complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. 32
If the allegations of the complaint are sucient in form and substance but their
veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the
motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his
defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the trial
of the case on the merits. 33
The statement in Herrera v. Alba 34 that there are four significant procedural aspects

in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial
stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish liation has been led.
The CA's observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case the rst
procedural aspect in a paternity case is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is
built by a party's evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie
case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been
presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under
the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order
has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for
hearing.
At any rate, the CA's view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing
without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Court's attention. In light
of this observation, we nd that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA
Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in
paternity and other liation cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a
prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
CSaHDT

The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the
introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the
"prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the
proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources
of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as
well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the evidence
gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized eectively and properly,
[and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to
ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the
public." 35
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for
conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA
testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4.
Application for DNA Testing Order . The appropriate court
may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order
shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following:
(a)
(b)

A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the
type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require

confirmation for good reasons;

(c)

HCSEIT

The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

(d)

The DNA testing has the scientic potential to produce new

information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case;
and

(e)

The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may

consider as potentially aecting the accuracy or integrity of the
DNA testing.

This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court
order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies,
before a suit or proceeding is commenced.

This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of
right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a
show cause hearing wherein the applicant must rst present sucient evidence to
establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause"
for the holding of the test. 36 In these states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a nding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement
of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a nding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
eloquently explained
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper
showing of sucient justication under the particular factual circumstances
of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood
test. Courts in various jurisdictions have diered regarding the kind of
procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court
can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and nd that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an
order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there
is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in
which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court
can determine whether there is sucient evidence to establish a prima facie
case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing. 37

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing

order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider
whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only
be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17,
2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and
January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.
HCTAEc

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.

Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with Associate Justices Juan Q.

Enriquez, Jr. and Francisco P. Acosta, concurring; rollo, pp. 35-46.

2.

Id. at 50-59.

3.

Penned by Executive Judge Maria Nena J. Santos.

4.

Rollo, p. 76.

5.

Id. at 156-157.

6.

Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Ma. Belen Ringpis-Liban; id. at 61-64.

7.

499 Phil. 185 (2005).

8.

Rollo, p. 64.

9.

Penned by Judge Nancy Rivas-Palmones; id. at 65-69.

10.

Id. at 69.

11.

A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, October 15, 2007.

12.

Rollo, p. 161.

13.

Id. at 71.

14.

Id. at 46.

15.

Id. at 45-46.

16.

Id. at 49.

17.

Id. at 16-17.

18.

Id. at 23.

19.

Supra note 7.

20.

Rollo, p. 30.

21.

Lu Ym v. Nabua, 492 Phil. 397, 404 (2005).

22.

Alba v. Court of Appeals , 503 Phil. 451, 458-459 (2005).

23.

Id. at 459.

24.

Barco v. Court of Appeals , 465 Phil. 39, 57 (2004).

25.

Alba v. Court of Appeals , supra note 22, at 459.

26.

Ceruila v. Delantar, 513 Phil. 237, 252 (2005).

27.

Republic v. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 76, 85.

28.

Ceroferr Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals , 426 Phil. 522, 528 (2002).

29.

Spouses Diaz v. Diaz , 387 Phil. 314, 329 (2000).

30.

Balo v. Court of Appeals , 508 Phil. 224, 231 (2005).

31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34.

Supra note 7.

35.

Rationale of the Rule on DNA Evidence.

36.

37.

State ex rel. Department of Justice and Division of Child Support v. Spring , 201
Or.App. 367, 120 P.3d 1 (2005); State v. Shaddinger , 702 So.2d 965, (1998);
State in the Interest of A.N.V. v. McCain , 637 So.2d 650 (1994); In the Interest of
J.M., 590 So.2d 565 (1991); Schenectady County Department of Social Services on
Behalf of Maureen E. v. Robert "J," 126 A.D. 2d 786, 510 N.Y.S. 2d 289 (1987);
State ex rel. McGuire v. Howe, 44 Wash. App. 559, 723 P.2d 452 (1986).
In the Interest of J.M., supra, at 568.