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Aytona vs Castillo

Aytona one was of those appointed by outgoing president Garcia during the last minute of his term.
Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank. When Macapagal took his office as
the next president he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytonas position and at the same time he
appointed Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding
claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was validly appointed by
the ex-president. Macapagal averred that the ex-presidents appointments were scandalous, irregular,
hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming
presidency or administration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.
HELD: Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have the right to continue
office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as he is competent enough, his
appointment can nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcias appointments are hurried maneuvers
to subvert the upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a
general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since
his appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is not only
legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs Intermediate Appellate Court

in 1973, Dr. Hernani Esteban was appointed by Dr. Consuelo Blanco as the Vice-President for
Administration in the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM). Estebans appointment was ad interim in
nature (because at that time the PLM Board of Regents was not in session). His appointment was
extended in 1975. However, he later discovered that his name was not included among those
recommended for permanent appointment. He then requested Blanco to make him a permanent
appointee. Blanco, however, appointed Esteban as Professor III instead and his appointment as VP for
Admin was terminated. Esteban brought the case before the Civil Service Commission where he got a
favorable judgment. The trial court reversed the CSC. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the trial
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esteban is a permanent appointee.
HELD: Yes. Hence, he enjoys security of tenure. The Supreme Court explains that the term ad interim
as used in the Philippines does not literally translate to temporary. In this jurisdiction an ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment. This was explained in the landmark case of Summers vs
Ozaeta:
an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides that the President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. It is an appointment permanent in

nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does
not alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other
than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an acting
appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued.
In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the PLM President merely nominates while the Board
issues the appointment. But when the Board is not in session, the President is authorized to issue ad
interim appointments. Such appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board
disapproves them. If confirmed, the appointees term is converted into the regular term inherent in the
position. In the case at bar, apparently, Esteban was confirmed by the Board of Regents in 1975. Blanco
however did not relay this confirmation to Esteban. The latter was made to believe (due to souring
relationship with Blanco) that his appointment was extended but only as an extension of temporary
appointment.

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta AM No. 98-5-01-SC |
November 9, 1998FACTS:
On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuelaand Hon. Placido Vallarta
as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City,respectively. These appointments were deliberated, as it
seemed to be expresslyprohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to theend of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments,except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety."
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss theconstitutionality of
appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of theforthcoming 1998 Presidential elections. Senior
Associate Justice Florenz Regalado,Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, wasin the position that election ban had no application to the CA based on
theCommissions records . This
was then submitted to the President forconsideration together with the Councils nominations for 8
vacancies in the CA.The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from
theExecutive Secretary transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA dulysigned on
(day immediately before the commencement of the banon appointments), which implies that the
Presidents Office did not agree with the
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of the list of final
nominees for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by theConstitution (from Feb 13, date present
vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJsent the reply on May 6 that no session has been scheduled
after the May electionsfor the reason that they apparently did not share the same view
appointments.However, it appeared that the Justice Secretary and the other members of theCouncil took
action without waiting for the CJ reply. This prompted CJ to call for ameeting on May 7. On this day, CJ
received a letter from the President in reply of theMay 6 letter where the President expressed his view that
Article 7 Sec 15 onlyapplied to executive appointments, the whole article being entitled
EXECUTIVEDEPT . He posited that appointments in the Judiciary have special and specificprovisions, as
follows:

Article 8 Sec 4"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from theoccurrence thereof." Article 8 Sec 9"The Members of the
Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall beappointed by the President from the list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)


G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the
presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of
the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the
Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a
resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of
Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a
result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for
that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of
February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not
later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of
Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the
President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The
compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of
the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the
next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In
Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as
Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly
referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the
exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or
2. Whether or
3. Whether or
4. Whether or
by the JBC.

not the petitioners have legal standing.


not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.
not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice.
not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees

HELD:
1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal
standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties
who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the
petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.

2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy
that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for
the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for
consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the
position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing
President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next
steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the
interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle
with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it
already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the
Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the
Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their
intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is
devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in
the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one
addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a
judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be
complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the
defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the
performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and
(e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. et. al vs Office of the Executive Secretary, et. al.
G.R. No. 158088
July 6, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall have the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be

complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. The Statute was
opened for signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained open for signature until
December 31, 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on
December 28, 2000 through Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the
signatory states.
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the Executive Secretary and
the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the
Philippines for ratification.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international
law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of
treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute
under treaty law and customary international law.
Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to
ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.
Issue: W/N the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for
concurrence; or
Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit
to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations even without the signature of the President.
Held:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact
the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of
the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution
also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject
to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse
to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.
Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that

should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be
encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to
enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of
mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of
the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED.