Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. et al. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary represented by Hon.

Alberto
Romulo, Department of Foreign Affairs represented by Hon. Blas Ople
G. R. No. 158088. July 6, 2005
FACTS:
On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute was opened for signature at its headquarter in New York. On
December 28, 2000, three days before its deadline for signing, the Philippines through its Charge d
Affairs, Enrique A. Manalo signed the Statute. By its provision, however, it is requiring that it be ratified by
the accepting states.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, file this petition to compel the Hon. Alberto Romulo (Executive Secretary) and
Hon. Blas Ople (Department of Foreign Affairs) respondents in this case to transmit the signed
document to the Senate for ratification.
Hon. Alberto Romulo and Hon. Blas Ople, on the other hand, argue that they as representative of the
Executive Department have no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
ISSUE:
Who has the power to ratify the Rome Statute?
HELD:
The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations
and is the countys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the
President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is
vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.
The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.
Thus, this petition is DISMISSED. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties.

Secretary of Justice vs Judge lantion

GR No 139465 ,Jan 18,2000
FACTS: On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the
criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the
Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the
executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.On November 13,
1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of America"On June 18, 1999, the Department of
Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request
for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.
ISSUE: 1 Whether or not there is a conflict between between the treaty and the due process clause in the
Constitution?
HELD:
1.NO.En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is
no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld.Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due
process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S.
extradition procedures also manifests this silence.In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must
apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will
not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes
these rights from a prospective extraditee.The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should
first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal
law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision.

PETITION is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

BAYAN v. ZAMORA
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements
of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which
culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it
by (2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not
Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires
for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of
the senate.
ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or
facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the
provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose
of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in section
25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

Lim v. Executive Secretary

Lessons Applicable: Locus Standi, International Law v. Muncipal Law, Certiorari, Incorporation Clause,
Treaties
Laws Applicable: Constitution
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of
the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1 on January 2002.
The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in
1951. The exercise is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President
George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the
World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the alQaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino
P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of
Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.
The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of future
violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact
specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1 and no question of
constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not involve tax spending
and there is no proof of direct personal injury.
ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.
HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing
of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts
Doctrine of Importance to the Public
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty,
under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have not abused the discretion
given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this
petition.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of
separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming respect for each
other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact
meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of
undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on
its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must "abstain from any activity
inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All other
activities, in other words, are fair game.

To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article 32 contains
provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from the foregoing that the
cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the
parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of
terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account
alongside the aforesaid context. According to Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction
between the general rule of interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended
rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous method of
interpretation divorced from the general rule.
The meaning of the word activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway
in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the history and
intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as
opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise
participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is actually
petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the United
States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true
nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial. In our considered
opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine
territory. Under the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and
international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987
Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this
case. The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive when it provides
that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least twothirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory Provisions which
shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general.
Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from international
agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the
law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the
municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international
law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: The Supreme Court
shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
Ichong v. Hernandez: provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State
Gonzales v. Hechanova: our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts
with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive
war on Philippine territory.

GR No 148208
Puno, J.
Facts:
RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively replacing the
earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8
2001, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a petition against the Executive
Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain BSP from implementing the last proviso in Section 15
(i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to establishment of a Human resource management system and a
compensation structure as part of the authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall
under SG 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner
contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The
said proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the other
hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided that it is construed

together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and administrative autonomy of the
Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The Solicitor General, as counsel of the
Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of employees is based on real and
actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence
within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence
unconstitutional.
Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it
distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater
benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP
receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the
salary standardization act as provided by the proviso.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST

DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R.
MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE
MARCOS-ARANETA), AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Before us are motions dated August 1, 2003, August 2, 2003 and August 25, 2003 of respondents Imelda
R. Marcos, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Ma. Imelda Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., respectively, seeking
reconsideration of our decision dated July 15, 2003 which ordered the forfeiture in favor of the Republic of
the Philippines of the Swiss deposits in escrow at the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the estimated
aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002.
Respondent Imelda Marcos, in her motion for reconsideration, asks this Court to set aside the aforesaid
decision dated July 15, 2003, premised on the following grounds:
I

THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED RESPONDENT OF

HER CONSTITUTIONALLY ENSHRINED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS ON THE FOLLOWING
GROUNDS:
A. FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS UNDER R.A. 1379, IN RELATION TO THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS
ARE CRIMINAL/PENAL IN NATURE, HENCE, RESPONDENT HAS ALL THE RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF
THE ACCUSED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION; AND THE PROSECUTION HAS THE BURDEN OF
PROVING RESPONDENT'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
B. CONSIDERING THE CRIMINAL/PENAL NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, THE DENIALS RAISED
BY RESPONDENT IN HER ANSWER WERE SUFFICIENT TO TRAVERSE THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
PETITION FOR FORFEITURE.
C. THE PROSECUTION HAD FAILED TO ESTABLISH EVEN A PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST
RESPONDENT, MUCH LESS PROVEN ITS CASE FOR FORFEITURE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
D. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE, A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT CANNOT BE RENDERED IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. RESPONDENT
HAS THE RIGHT TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO OVERTHROW THE DISPUTABLE
PRESUMPTION.
E. THE FACTUAL FINDING THAT THE FOUNDATIONS INVOLVED IN THE INSTANT FORFEITURE
PROCEEDINGS ARE CONSIDERED BUSINESSES, AND WERE MANAGED BY RESPONDENT
TOGETHER WITH HER LATE HUSBAND, WILL PERNICIOUSLY AFFECT THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS FILED BY THE REPUBLIC AGAINST RESPONDENT.
II
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT, WHICH IMPROPERLY CONVERTED THE SPECIAL
CIVIL ACTION INTO A REGULAR APPEAL, DIVESTED RESPONDENT OF HER RIGHT TO
APPEAL THE CASE ON THE MERITS, THEREBY DEPRIVING HER OF DUE PROCESS.
A. THE RESOLUTION DATED 31 JANUARY 2002 RAISED BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT ON A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, WAS OBVIOUSLY A MERE INTERLOCUTORY ORDER. THE DECISION
OF THIS HONORABLE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DELVED ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE, IN
DIRECT VIOLATION OF RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO APPEAL, WHICH IS EXPRESSLY CONFERRED
BY THE RULES.
Respondent Imelda Marcos further alleges that our July 15, 2003 decision will prejudice the criminal
cases filed against her.

Respondents Ferdinand, Jr. and Imee Marcos also pray that the said decision be set aside and the case
be remanded to the Sandiganbayan to give petitioner Republic the opportunity to present witnesses and
documents and to afford respondent Marcoses the chance to present controverting evidence, based on
the following:
I
THE LETTER AND INTENT OF RA 1379 FORBID/PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THE
PROCESS TO DECIDE FORFEITURE UNDER RA 1379. THUS, IT PROVIDES FOR SPECIFIC
JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE PETITION AND MANDATES A WELL-DEFINED
PROCEDURE TO BE STRICTLY OBSERVED BEFORE FORFEITURE JUDGMENT MAY BE
RENDERED.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE DECISION UNDER RECONSIDERATION DIMINISHES/MODIFIES OR
REPEALS VIA JUDICIAL LEGISLATION SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS GRANTED AND
GUARANTEED BY RA 1379 AND IS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
III
THE DECISION IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID FOR FAILURE TO EXPRESS CLEARLY AND
DISTINCTLY THE TRUE/GENUINE STATEMENT OF FACTS (ADDUCED AFTER TRIAL/
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE) ON WHICH IT IS BASED.
IV
THE LAW(S) ON WHICH THE DECISION IS BASED IS/ARE NOT APPLICABLE/PROPER AND/OR ARE
FORCEFULLY STRAINED TO JUSTIFY THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSIONS REACHED, VIOLATIVE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY INJUNCTIONS.
V
THERE BEING A DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS, THE COURT AXIOMATICALLY OUSTED ITSELF
OF JURISDICTION. HENCE, THE DECISION IS VOID.
VI
ASSUMING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPLICABLE AND PROPER, IT IS NOT WARRANTED UNDER
THE PREMISES.
VII

ASSUMING THAT A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER, THE AVERMENTS OF THE PETITION

FORFEITURE ARE INCOMPLETE AND INCONCLUSIVE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUISITE
IMPERATIVES. JUDGMENT VIOLATES THE CONDITIONS SINE QUA NON TO BE OBSERVED
TO RENDER A VALID DECISION OF FORFEITURE UNDER RA 1379.
VIII
THE STATEMENT OF OPERATIVE FACTS/FACTUAL NARRATION AS WELL AS THE
CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE DECISION ARE CONTRADICTED OR REFUTED BY THE
PLEADINGS OF THE PARTIES, THE JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS OF PETITIONER, THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE ORDERS ISSUED.
Respondent Irene Araneta, in her motion for reconsideration, merely reiterates the arguments previously
raised in the pleadings she filed in this Court and prays that the Courts decision dated July 15, 2003 be
set aside.
In its consolidated comment dated September 29, 2003, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that:
I
THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION DO NOT RAISE ANY NEW MATTER AND WERE FILED
MANIFESTLY TO DELAY THE EXECUTION OF THE DECISION DATED JULY 15, 2003.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPLICABLE TO A PETITION FOR FORFEITURE, AS LONG AS
THERE IS NO GENUINE FACTUAL ISSUE WHICH WOULD CALL FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS.
III
THE DECISION DATED JULY 15, 2003 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT CLEARLY EXPRESSED
THE FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED, MOST OF WHICH WERE ADMITTED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS SUBMITTED TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND IN THE
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
IV
CERTIORARI IS THE APPROPRIATE AND SPEEDY REMEDY OF PETITIONER REPUBLIC,
GIVEN

THE

GRAVE

ABUSE

OF

DISCRETION

COMMITTED

BY

RESPONDENT

SANDIGANBAYAN IN TOTALLY REVERSING ITS OWN DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 19, 2000
AND IN ISSUING THE SUBJECT RESOLUTION DATED JANUARY 31, 2002, AND CONSIDERING

THAT THE CASE IS IMBUED WITH IMMENSE PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC POLICY AND DEEP
HISTORICAL REPERCUSSIONS.
V
A FORFEITURE PROCEEDING UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1379 IS CIVIL AND NOT CRIMINAL IN
NATURE.
VI
THE DECISION DATED JULY 15, 2003 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WILL NOT PREJUDICE
THE CRIMINAL ACTIONS FILED AGAINST RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS FOR VIOLATION
OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.
On October 6, 2003, respondents Marcos, Jr. and Imee Marcos filed a motion for leave to file a reply to
petitioner Republic's consolidated comment, which this Court granted. On October 22, 2003, they filed
their reply to the consolidated comment.
As the aforequoted issues are interwoven, the Court shall discuss them together.
At the outset, we note that respondents, in their motions for reconsideration, do not raise any new matters
for the Court to resolve. The arguments in their motions for reconsideration are mere reiterations of their
contentions fully articulated in their previous pleadings, and exhaustively probed and passed upon by the
Court.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS
Respondent Marcoses argue that the letter and intent of RA 1379 forbid and preclude summary judgment
as the process to decide forfeiture cases under the law. It provides for specific jurisdictional allegations in
the petition and mandates a well-defined procedure to be strictly observed before a judgment of forfeiture
may be rendered.
According to respondents, Section 5 of RA 1379 requires the court to set a date for hearing during which
respondents shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how they
acquired the property. They contend that the proceedings under RA 1379 are criminal in character, thus
they have all the rights of an accused under the Constitution such as the right to adduce evidence and the
right to a hearing. They claim that it is petitioner which has the burden of proving respondents' guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and that forfeiture of property should depend not on the weakness of their
evidence but on the strength of petitioner's. Accordingly, respondents maintain that, due to the criminal
nature of forfeiture proceedings, the denials raised by them were sufficient to traverse all the allegations
in the petition for forfeiture.

The issue of the propriety of summary judgment was painstakingly discussed and settled in our July 15,
2003 decision:
A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it
appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important
questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried
either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any
pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action
where there exists no serious controversy. Summary judgment is a procedural devise for the prompt
disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any
material fact.[1]
IS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FORFEITURE
PROCEEDINGS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS?
The principal contention now of respondent Marcoses is limited to their argument that our aforementioned
decision effectively deprived them of their constitutionally enshrined right to due process.
According to respondents, RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence, they are entitled to the
constitutional safeguards enjoyed by an accused. Respondents further argue that the reinstatement of the
decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 19, 2000, which ordered the forfeiture of the properties
subject of the instant case by summary judgment, diminished or repealed, by judicial legislation,
respondents rights guaranteed by RA 1379 for failure to set a date for hearing to benefit respondents.
We disagree.
Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural due process. In order that a particular
act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance with both
substantive and the procedural requirements thereof. [2]
In the present context, substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with
the rights of a person to his property.[3] On the other hand, procedural due process means compliance
with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of
fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it. [4]
Insofar as substantive due process is concerned, there is no showing that RA 1379 is unfair,
unreasonable or unjust. In other words, respondent Marcoses are not being deprived of their property
through forfeiture for arbitrary reasons or on flimsy grounds. As meticulously explained in the July 15,
2003 decision of the Court, EO No. 1 [5] created the PCGG primarily to assist then President Corazon

Aquino in the recovery, pursuant to RA 1379, of vast government resources amassed and stolen by
former President Ferdinand Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, close associates and other cronies.
These assets were stashed away here and abroad.
A careful study of the provisions of RA 1379 readily discloses that the forfeiture proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan did not violate the substantive rights of respondent Marcoses. These proceedings are
civil in nature, contrary to the claim of the Marcoses that it is penal in character.
In Almeda Sr., et al. vs. Perez, et al., [6] we suggested a test to determine whether the proceeding for
forfeiture is civil or criminal:
. . . Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If
they are under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the
criminal case they are criminal in nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must be
gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature it cannot be considered as
civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged
the proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which specifically so provide, where the act or
omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for
and recovered in a civil action. (37 CJS, Forfeiture, Sec. 5, pp. 15-16)
In the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan and Macario Asistio, Jr.,[7] this Court categorically declared
that:
The rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and therefore civil in nature.
The proceedings under RA 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture
of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the State. Section 6 of said law provides:
x x x If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the
property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue
of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x x
The procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action:
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 3. The petition The petition shall contain the following information:
(a) The name and address of the respondent.
(b) The public office or employment he holds and such other public offices or employments
which he has previously held.

(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past
and present offices and employments.
(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor
General.
(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from
legitimately acquired property, and
(f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether or not the
respondent has unlawfully acquired property during his incumbency.
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 4. Period for the answer. The respondent shall have a period of fifteen days within which to present
his answer.
In short, there is a petition, then an answer and lastly, a hearing. The preliminary investigation required
prior to the filing of the petition, in accordance with Section 2 of the Act, is expressly provided to be similar
to a preliminary investigation in a criminal case. The similarity, however, ends there for, if the investigation
were akin to that in a criminal case but all the other succeeding steps were those for a civil proceeding,
then the process as a whole is definitely not criminal. Were it a criminal proceeding, there would be, after
preliminary investigation, a reading of the information, a plea of guilty or not guilty, a trial and a reading of
judgment in the presence of respondents. But these steps, as above set forth, are clearly not provided for
in the law.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or
for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions. [8]
The proceedings in RA 1379 and EO No. 14 were observed in the prosecution of the petition for forfeiture.
Section 1 of EO No.14-A, dated August 18, 1986, amending Section 3 of EO No.14, provides that civil
suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under RA 1379 may be proven by preponderance of
evidence. Under RA 1379 and EO Nos. 1 and 2, the Government is required only to state the known
lawful income of respondents for the prima facie presumption of illegal provenance to attach. As we fully
explained in our July 15, 2003 decision, petitioner Republic was able to establish this prima facie
presumption. Thus, the burden of proof shifted, by law, to the respondents to show by clear and
convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate
sources of income. This, respondent Marcoses did not do. They failed or rather, refused to raise any
genuine issue of fact warranting a trial for the reception of evidence therefor. For this reason and pursuant

to the State policy to expedite recovery of ill-gotten wealth, petitioner Republic moved for summary
judgment which the Sandiganbayan appropriately acted on.
Respondents also claim that summary judgment denies them their right to a hearing and to present
evidence purposely granted under Section 5 of RA 1379.
Respondents were repeatedly accorded full opportunity to present their case, their defenses and their
pleadings. Not only did they obstinately refuse to do so. Respondents time and again tried to confuse the
issues and the Court itself, and to delay the disposition of the case.
Section 5 of RA 1379 provides:
The court shall set a date for a hearing which may be open to the public, and during which the respondent
shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired the
property in question.
And pursuant to Section 6 of the said law, if the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the
court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property
forfeited in favor of the State.
Respondent Marcoses erroneously understood hearing to be synonymous with trial. The words hearing
and trial have different meanings and connotations. Trial may refer to the reception of evidence and other
processes. It embraces the period for the introduction of evidence by both parties. Hearing, as known in
law, is not confined to trial but embraces the several stages of litigation, including the pre-trial stage. A
hearing does not necessarily mean presentation of evidence. It does not necessarily imply the
presentation of oral or documentary evidence in open court but that the parties are afforded the
opportunity to be heard.
A careful analysis of Section 5 of RA 1379 readily discloses that the word hearing does not always require
the formal introduction of evidence in a trial, only that the parties are given the occasion to participate and
explain how they acquired the property in question. If they are unable to show to the satisfaction of the
court that they lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property
forfeited in favor of the State.[9] There is no provision in the law that a full blown trial ought to be conducted
before the court declares the forfeiture of the subject property. Thus, even if the forfeiture proceedings do
not reach trial, the court is not precluded from determining the nature of the acquisition of the property in
question even in a summary proceeding.
Due process, a constitutional precept, does not therefore always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. The essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
ones evidence in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the absence of previous

notice but the absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.[10] This opportunity was made
completely available to respondents who participated in all stages of the litigation.
When the petition for forfeiture was filed at the Sandiganbayan, respondent Marcoses argued their case
and engaged in all of the lengthy discussions, argumentation, deliberations and conferences, and
submitted their pleadings, documents and other papers. When petitioner Republic moved for summary
judgment, respondent Marcoses filed their demurrer to evidence. They agreed to submit the case for
decision with their opposition to the motion for summary judgment. They moved for the reconsideration of
the Sandiganbayan resolution dated September 19, 2000 which granted petitioner Republics motion for
summary judgment (which was in fact subsequently reversed in its January 31, 2002 resolution.) And
when the case finally reached this Court, respondent Marcoses were given, on every occasion, the
chance to file and submit all the pleadings necessary to defend their case. And even now that the matter
has been finally settled and adjudicated, their motion for reconsideration is being heard by this Court.
For twelve long years, respondent Marcoses tried to stave off this case with nothing but empty claims of
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, or they were not privy to the transactions, or
they could not remember (because the transactions) happened a long time ago or that the assets were
lawfully acquired. And they now allege deprivation of their right to be heard and present evidence in their
defense?
It would be repulsive to our basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow respondents to further delay
the adjudication of this case and defeat the judgment of this Court which was promulgated only after all
the facts, issues and other considerations essential to a fair and just determination had been judiciously
evaluated.
Petitioner Republic has the right to a speedy disposition of this case. It would readily be apparent to a
reasonable mind that respondent Marcoses have been deliberately resorting to every procedural device
to delay the resolution hereof. There is justice waiting to be done.The people and the State are entitled to
favorable judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, the salutary objective being to
restore the ownership of the Swiss deposits to the rightful owner, the Republic of the Philippines, within
the shortest possible time.
The respondent Marcoses cannot deny that the delays in this case have all been made at their instance.
The records can testify to this incontrovertible fact. It will be a mockery of justice to allow them to benefit
from it. By their own deliberate acts not those of the Republic or anybody else they are deemed to
have altogether waived or abandoned their right to proceed to trial.
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos likewise asserts that the factual finding that the foundations involved in the
instant forfeiture proceedings were businesses managed by her and her late husband, will adversely
affect the criminal proceedings filed by the Republic against her.The contention is bereft of merit. The

criminal cases referred to by said respondent are actions in personam, directed against her on the basis
of her personal liability. In criminal cases, the law imposes the burden of proving guilt on the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt, and the trial judge in evaluating the evidence must find that all the elements of
the crime charged have been established by sufficient proof to convict.
But a forfeiture proceeding is an action in rem, against the thing itself instead of against the person. Being
civil in character, it requires no more than a preponderance of evidence. [11] And by preponderance of
evidence is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. [12]
Hence, the factual findings of this Court in its decision dated July 15, 2003 will, as a consequence, neither
affect nor do away with the requirement of having to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the
criminal cases against her.
One final note. We take judicial notice of newspaper accounts that a certain Judge Manuel Real of the US
District Court of Hawaii issued a global freeze order on the Marcos assets, including the Swiss deposits.
We reject this order outrightly because it is a transgression not only of the principle of territoriality in public
international law but also of the jurisdiction of this Court recognized by the parties-in-interest and the
Swiss government itself.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.