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CERVANTES vs AUDITOR GENERAL

FACTS:
> Petitioner was the manager of the NAFCO with a salary of
P15,000 a year. By a resolution of the Board of Directors of this
corporation, he was granted quarters allowance of not exceeding
P400 a month effective the first of that month. Submitted the
Control Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for
approval, the said resolution was disapproved by the said
Committee on strength of the recommendation of the NAFCO
auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, (1) that quarters
allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the
charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general
manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a year, and
(2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did
not warrant the granting of such allowance.
> Petitioner asked the Control Committee to reconsider who
reaffirmed his previous recommendation and emphasized that the
fact that the corporation's finances had not improved.
> Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O 93 is unconstitutional as an illegal
delegation of legislature power to executive?
RULING:
NO.
With its controlling stock owned by the Government and the
power of appointing its directors vested in the President of the
Philippines, there can be no question that the NAFCO is
Government controlled corporation subject to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 51 and the executive order (No. 93) promulgated
in accordance therewith. Consequently, it was also subject to the
powers of the Control Committee created in said executive order,
among which is the power of supervision for the purpose of
insuring efficiency and economy in the operations of the
corporation and also the power to pass upon the program of
activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the
board of directors. It can hardly be questioned that under these
powers the Control Committee had the right to pass upon, and
consequently to approve or disapprove, the resolution of the
NAFCO board of directors granting quarters allowance to the

petitioners as such allowance necessarily constitute an item of

expenditure in the corporation's budget. That the Control
Committee had good grounds for disapproving the resolution is
also clear, for, as pointed out by the Auditor General and the
NAFCO auditor, the granting of the allowance amounted to an
illegal increase of petitioner's salary beyond the limit fixed in the
corporate charter and was furthermore not justified by the
precarious financial condition of the corporation.
The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and
a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue
delegation. Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the
Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in
government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and
policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant
upon the establishment of the free and independent government
of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and
efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy
fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by
promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the
rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power.
It is also contended that the quarters allowance is not
compensation and so the granting of it to the petitioner by the
NAFCO board of directors does not contravene the provisions of
the NAFCO charter.

PEOPLE vs JOLLIFFE
FACTS:
> The accused, Mr. William Ernest Jolliffe is a Canadian subject,
born in china and residing permanently in Hongkong.
> The accused had made several trips to Manila. He also came to
collect the debt owed to him by one T. W. Woo, a prominent
businessman in Hongkong. He came back to Manila to try to
collect the debt owed him by T. Y. Woo. although he had no idea
how said debt was to be paid, whether in peso or in gold. He was
paid in gold which be brought with him by messenger to his room
in the Bay View Hotel. At about plane time he went to his hotel
room and carried his gold around his body underneath his shirt.
When he was going towards the door leading to the runway he
was accosted by a woman, Amanda Arimbay, a secret service
agent, and was told to go the search room.
> When the accused was searched four pieces of gold bullion
were found tied to his body a few inches above the waist. There
was also found in his possession a $100.00 travelers check.
While he was under arrest made an offer to settle the case by
offering to pay the agents who were then arresting him.
> According to the Deputy of Custom, when the accused was
about to be searched he offered him P30,000.00 provided the
case be settled and forgotten.
> Central Bank Circular No. 21 - Any person desiring to export
gold in any form, including jewelry, whether for refining abroad or
otherwise, must obtain a license from the Central Bank. Applicant
for export license must present satisfactory evidence that the
import of the gold into the country of the importer will not be in
violation of the rules and regulations of such country.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Circular 21 is a valid law?
RULING:
YES. The legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the
ground that the grant of authority to issue the same constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our
system of government, said power may not be delegated except
to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power
to determine what the law shall be and another thing to delegate
the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a
policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the

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delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law
authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which
"sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act
so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in
compliance with the legislative will." Referring the case at bar,
section 74 of Republic Act No. 265 conferred upon the Monetary
Board and the President the power to subject to licensing all
transactions in gold and foreign exchange "in order to protect the
international reserve of the Central Bank during an exchange
crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in
which to take constructive measures to combat such crisis." The
Board is, likewise, authorized "to take such appropriate remedial
measures" to protect the international stability of the peso,
"whether the international reserve is falling, as a result of payment
or remittances abroad which, in the opinion of the Monetary
Board, are contrary to the national welfare" (section 70, Rep. Act
No. 265). It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must
be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law
creating the Central Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain
monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to promote a rising
level of production, employment and real income in the
Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265.) These standards are
sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority
the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the
law and to place the grant of said authority beyond the category of
a delegation of legislative powers.

DARIO vs MISON

CRISOSTOMO vs CA

FACTS:

FACTS:

> A total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs

were given individual notices of separation. A number supposedly
sought reinstatement with the Reorganization Appeals Board
while others went to the Civil Service Commission. The first thirtyone mentioned above came directly to this Court.
> Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the
reinstatement of the 279 employees.
> Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor General, filed
a motion for reconsideration Acting on the motion, the Civil
Service Commission denied reconsideration.
> Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings.

> Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine

College of Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that
position by the President of the Philippines.
> During his incumbency as president of the PCC, two
administrative cases were filed against petitioner for illegal use of
government vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials
belonging to the college, oppression and harassment, grave
misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The administrative cases,
which were filed with the Office of the President, were
subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation.
> Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019,
as amended) were also filed against him.
> Petitioner was preventively suspended from office pursuant to
R.A. No. 3019, 13, as amended. In his place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo,
Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge.
> P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF
COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING
ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTIONS,
AND
EXPANDING
ITS
CURRICULAR
OFFERINGS.
> Mateo continued as the head of the new University and was
appointed Acting President.
> Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment acquitting
petitioner of the charges against him.
> Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for
execution of the judgment, particularly the part ordering his
reinstatement to the position of president of the PUP and the
payment of his salaries and other benefits during the period of
suspension.
> However, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime
Gellor as acting president of the PUP, following the expiration of
the term of office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded
Dr. Mateo.
> RTC issued a writ of execution, ordering the sheriff to implement
the order of reinstatement of the petitioner, but Gellor refused to
vacate the office.
> CA issued an order setting aside the restatement order of the
RTC.
> Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which
converted the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He
contends that if the law had intended the PCC to lose its
existence, it would have specified that the PCC was being

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Reorganization is valid?
RULING:
NO. Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been
regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is
for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to
exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese
wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but
a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely
to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid
"abolition' takes place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab
initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a
change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.
It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the
yardstick of good faith, we are not, as a consequence, imposing a
"cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a
reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for cause," if by
"cause" we refer to "grounds" or conditions that call for
disciplinary action.**
Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a
constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case.

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abolished rather than converted and that if the PUP was intended
to be a new institution, the law would have said it was being
created.

the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of

incumbents who were not reappointed.

ISSUE:

FACTS:
Whether or not there was an abolition of office?

RULING:
NO. P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the
former Philippine College of Commerce into what is now the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in the same way that
earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the
Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of
Commerce. What took place was a change in academic status of
the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the
change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and
the changes in its structure and organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish a
department or an office or an organization and to replace it with
another one, the lawmaking authority says so.
The appellate court ruled, however, that the PUP and the PCC are
not one and the same institution but two different entities and that
since petitioner Crisostomos term was coterminous with the legal
existence of the PCC, petitioners term expired upon the abolition
of the PCC. But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an
existing institution and to create a new one. New course offerings
can be added to the curriculum of a school without affecting its
legal existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and
organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new
one. Only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking
authority will.
The law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment
owned by the PCC were being transferred to the PUP but only
that they stand transferred to it. Stand transferred simply means,
for example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to be
understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the
institution.
But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of president of
the PUP could not be ordered by the trial court because on June
10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been promulgated fixing the term of
office of presidents of state universities and colleges at six (6)
years, renewable for another term of six (6) years, and authorizing

JOSON vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

> Private respondents filed with the Office of the President a

letter-complaint charging petitioner with grave misconduct and
abuse of authority. Private respondents alleged that petitioner
belligerently barged into the Hall; petitioner angrily kicked the door
and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at them;
close behind petitioner were several men with long and short
firearms who encircled the area. Private respondents claim that
this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending
legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of
Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine
National Bank; that petitioner's acts were intended to harass them
into approving this loan.
> Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned
petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle the
controversy. The parties entered into an agreement whereby
petitioner promised to maintain peace and order in the province
while private respondents promised to refrain from filing cases
that would adversely affect their peaceful co-existence.
> The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the
private respondents reiterated their letter-complaint.
> On recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President,
placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days
pending investigation of the charges against him.
> Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension
but was dismissed.
> Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the
findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He imposed
on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6)
months without pay.

RULING:
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective
local officials are governed by the Local Government Code of
1991, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, and Administrative Order No. 23
entitled "Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the

Investigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against

Elective Local Officials of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities,
Independent Component Cities, and Cities and Municipalities in
Metropolitan Manila."
An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must
be verified and filed with the proper government office. A
complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be
filed with the Office of the President. A complaint against an
elective municipal official must be filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan while that of a barangay official must be filed before
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.
In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the
province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was
therefore properly filed with the Office of the President. According
to petitioner, however, the letter-complaint failed to conform with
the formal requirements set by the Code. He alleges that the
complaint was not verified by private respondents and was not
supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named
therein; that private respondents later realized these defects and
surreptitiously inserted the verification and sworn statement while
the complaint was still pending with the Office of the President. To
prove his allegations, petitioner submitted: (a) the sworn
statement of private respondent Solita C. Santos attesting to the
alleged fact that after the letter-complaint was filed, Vice-Governor
Tinio made her and the other members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan sign an additional page which he had later
notarized; and (b) the fact that the verification of the lettercomplaint and the joint affidavit of the witnesses do not indicate
the document, page or book number of the notarial register of the
notary public before whom they were made.
We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. The absence
of the document, page or book number of the notarial register of
the subscribing officer is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim.
The lack of these entries may constitute proof of neglect on the
part of the subscribing officer in complying with the requirements
for notarization and proper verification. They may give grounds for
the revocation of his notarial commission. But they do not
indubitably prove that the verification was inserted or intercalated
after the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the President.
Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter-complaint was unverified
when submitted to the Office of the President, the defect was not
fatal. The requirement of verification was deemed waived by the
President himself when he acted on the complaint.
Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Verification is
mainly intended to secure an assurance that the allegations
therein made are done in good faith or are true and correct and

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not mere speculation. The lack of verification is a mere formal
defect. The court may order the correction of the pleading, if not
verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may
be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against
elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining
Authority and the Investigating Authority. This is explicit from A.O.
No. 23, to wit:
Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly
verified, against elective local officials mentioned in the preceding
Section shall be acted upon by the President. The President, who
may act through the Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be
referred to as the Disciplining Authority.
Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government is hereby designated as the Investigating
Authority. He may constitute an Investigating Committee in the
Department of the Interior and Local Government for the purpose.
The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the
service, constitute a Special Investigating Committee in lieu of the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.
Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the
President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through
the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself
or constitute an Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the
DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu
of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplinary Authority may designate a
Special Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases
against elective local officials is derived from his power of general
supervision over local governments.
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to
investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the
power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate
complaints against local government officials.
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative
complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of
qualified political agency.

CALALANG vs WILLIAMS
FACTS:
> Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a
taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ
of prohibition against the respondents.
> Alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in
its resolution of resolved to recommend to the Director of Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30
p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m.
to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening
of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
> To promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the
use of and traffic on national roads.
> That as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners
but of the riding public as well.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers?
RULING:
NO. It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth
Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the
regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads
and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable.

C.A. No. 548 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and
under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of
the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to
any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or
the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest. The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law is to be predicated. To
promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and
to determine when and how long a national road should be closed
to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some
other government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the
law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is
the making of the law.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained
of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of
the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly
was prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic.
which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and
the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere
with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds
of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state.