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G.R. No.

L-24693

July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,


HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action
for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the
due process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional,
and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such
judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain
an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by
the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its
members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and
general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City
of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and
duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for
the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged
that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection
of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city
authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than
2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It
was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail.
There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the
revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to
motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose
P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class
motels; that the provision in the same section which would require the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house
to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or
other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a

lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname,
given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex,
the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any,
with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to
his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a
certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his
signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it
also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police,
or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for
being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right
to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process
clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies
to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room;
that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less
than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern
or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,
runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty
provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction
would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect
causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once
again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment
declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on
July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the
provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on
statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a
cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a
proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police
power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of
the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination,

with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary
to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of
facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go
Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the
intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the
capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor
and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and
duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of
operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of
the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides
inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one
vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was
submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the
Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05
from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein
petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.1wph1.t
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress
was laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of
showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it,
citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners
against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the

memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the
petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities
and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners
association, and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party,
the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of
law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to
submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without
any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity
on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly
right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance
No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor
and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this
appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for
constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the
lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its
decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive
aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence
to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance.
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor
of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be
lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to
the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity
for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its
face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed
than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where
the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly
summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly

within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground
that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives
the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally
defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The
mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically
aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting
purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise
would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been
properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it
could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public
health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police
power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the
Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of
the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila
traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to
check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by
requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other
amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was
intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other
than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It
would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack
against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its
approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a
vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of

public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and


monte;12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal
holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person
from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where
opium is smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect public
morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest
the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise
of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person
is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered
as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the
courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection
is raised to the question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist
both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or
any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient
to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must
not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus
hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of
officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of
fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a
narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive
inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not
to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to
meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion
an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be
deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to
govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.

To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a
remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A
strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even
attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance
even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due
process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and
hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars,
its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by
the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200%
for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and secondclass motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922
that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating
occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more
in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are
also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from
the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than
in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal
ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the
amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege
taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of
liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the
doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be
made to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had
occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act
of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of
subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and
uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of
Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that
"much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here
the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a
police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with
this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of

the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of
their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the
public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold
storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is
permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community
may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons
licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected
by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged
ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to
lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso
that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again,
such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due
process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary
or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable
existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to
curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute.
Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce
unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable
restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or
otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x
x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall
into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in

his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established
the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of
undue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its
virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way
to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the
liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity
of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground
by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital
in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is
that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain.
Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,
relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain
in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions
referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or
entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time
later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the
maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners
or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to
whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a
full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to
render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the
question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 toAdderley v.
Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute
susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing
of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice
Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying
criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense
in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the
arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity
of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by
this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith. With costs.

G.R. No. L-15972

October 11, 1920

KWONG SING, in his own behalf and in behalf of all others having a common or
general interest in the subject-matter of this action, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellant.
G. E. Campbell for appellant.
City Fiscal Diaz for appellee.

_______________________________________ the following articles


delivered
(Residence.)
to me to be _______________________________________
(Washed, cleaned or dyed.)
"__________________________________________________
"__________________________________________________

MALCOLM, J.:
"__________________________________________________
The validity of Ordinance No. 532 of the city of Manila requiring receipts in duplicate
in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered
by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments, must be decided on this
appeal. The ordinance in question reads as follows:
[ORDINANCE No. 532.]
AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE DELIVERY AND RETURN OF
CLOTHES OR CLOTHS DELIVERED TO BE WASHED IN LAUNDRIES,
DYEING AND CLEANING ESTABLISHMENTS.
Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the city of Manila, that:
SECTION. 1. Every person, firm or corporation in the city of Manila engaged
in laundering, dyeing, or cleaning by any process, cloths or clothes for
compensation, shall issue dyed, or cleaned are received a receipt in
duplicate, in English and Spanish, duly signed, showing the kind and number
of articles delivered, and the duplicate copy of the receipt shall be kept by
the owner of the establishment or person issuing same. This receipt shall be
substantially of the following form:
No. ______________

MANILA, _______________________________________________,
19________

"__________________________________________________
This articles will have been
___________________________________________
(Cleaned, washed or dyed.)
may be taken at ___________m. on the ________ day of ______________,
19 _____ upon payment of P________ the amount of compensation for the
work done.
_________________________________________
(Owner or person in charge.)
Provided, however, That in case the articles to be delivered are so many that it will
take much time to classify them, the owner of the establishment, through the consent
of the person delivering them, may be excused from specifying in the receipt the
kinds of such articles, but he shall state therein only the total number of the articles so
received.
SEC. 2. No person shall take away any cloths or clothes delivered to a person, firm,
or corporation, mentioned in the preceding section, to be washed, dyed or cleaned,
unless he returns the receipt issued by such person, firm, or corporation.
SEC. 3. Violation of any of the provisions of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine
of not exceeding twenty pesos.
SEC. 4. This Ordinance shall take effect on its approval.

Received of Mr.__________________________________________
(Name)

Approved February 25, 1919.

In the lower court, the prayer of the complaint was for a preliminary injunction,
afterwards to be made permanent, prohibiting the city of Manila from enforcing
Ordinance No. 532, and for a declaration by the court that the said ordinance was null
and void. The preliminary injunction was granted. But the permanent injunction was
not granted for, after the trial, judgment was, that the petitioner take nothing by his
action, without special finding as to costs. From this judgment plaintiff has appealed,
assigning two errors as having been committed by the trial court, both intended to
demonstrate that Ordinance No. 532 is invalid.

body is the best judge of whether or not the means adopted are adequate to
accomplish the ends in view.

The government of the city of Manila possesses the power to enact Ordinance No.
532. Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended
by Act No. 2744, section 8, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with
the approval of the mayor of the city:

With these premises conceded, appellant's claim is, that Ordinance No. 532 savors of
class legislation; that it unjustly discriminates between persons in similar
circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. To
an extent, the evidence for the plaintiffs substantial their claims. There are, in the city
of Manila, more than forty Chinese laundries (fifty-two, according to the Collector of
Internal Revenue.) The laundrymen and employees in Chinese laundries do not, as a
rule, speak, read, and write English or Spanish. Some of them are, however, able to
write and read numbers.

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the
following: . . . laundries . . .
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of
the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
chapter. . . .
The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative
Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but
"regulate" should not be construed as synonymous with "supress" or "prohibit."
Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could
make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the employment or business
shall be exercised. And, under the general welfare clause (subsection [ee], section
2444 of the Manila Charter), the business of laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments could be regulated, as this term is above construed, by an ordinance
in the interest of the public health, safety, morals, peace good order, comfort,
convenience, prosperity, and the general welfare.
The purpose of the municipal authorities in adopting the ordinance is fairly evident.
Ordinance No. 532 was enacted, it is said, to avoid disputes between laundrymen
and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher
Chinese characters from being defrauded. The object of the ordinance was,
accordingly, the promotion of peace and good order and the prevention of fraud,
deceit, cheating, and imposition. The convenience of the public would also
presumably be served in a community where there is a Babel of tongues by having
receipts made out in the two official languages. Reasonable restraints of a lawful
business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The legislative

Chinese laundrymen are here the protestants. Their rights, however, are not less
because they may be Chinese aliens. The life, liberty, or property of these persons
cannot be taken without due process of law; they are entitled to the equal protection
of the laws without regard to their race; and treaty rights, as effectuated between the
United States and China, must be accorded them. 1awph!l.net

Plaintiff's contention is also that the ordinance is invalid, because it is arbitrary,


unreasonable, and not justified under the police power of the city. It is, of course, a
familiar legal principle that an ordinance must be reasonable. Not only must it appear
that the interest of the public generally require an interference with private rights, but
the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. If the ordinance appears to the
judicial mind to be partial or oppressive, it must be declared invalid. The presumption
is, however, that the municipal authorities, in enacting the ordinance, did so with a
rational and conscientious regard for the rights of the individual and of the community.
Up to this point, propositions and facts have been stated which are hardly debatable.
The trouble comes in the application of well-known legal rules to individual cases.
Our view, after most thoughtful consideration, is, that the ordinance invades no
fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police
regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance
is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public
laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or
any other nationality. All, without exception, and each everyone of them without
distinction, must comply with the ordinance. There is no privilege, no discrimination,
no distinction. Equally and uniformly the ordinance applies to all engaged in the
laundry business, and, as nearly as may be, the same burdens are cast upon them.
The oppressiveness of the ordinance may have been somewhat exaggerated. The
printing of the laundry receipts need not be expensive. The names of the several
kinds of clothing may be printed in English and Spanish with the equivalent in

Chinese below. With such knowledge of English and Spanish as laundrymen and
their employees now possess, and, certainly, at least one person in every Chinese
laundry must have a vocabulary of a few words, and with ability to read and write
arabic numbers, no great difficulty should be experienced, especially after some
practice, in preparing the receipts required by Ordinance No. 532. It may be
conceded that an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation
affected by the ordinance. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are
subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement
of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the hands of the
legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private
interests for the public welfare.
Numerous authorities are brought to our attention. Many of these cases concern
laundries and find their origin in the State of California. We have examined them all
and find none which impel us to hold Ordinance No. 532 invalid. Not here, as in the
leading decision of the United States Supreme Court, which had the effect of
nullifying an ordinance of the City and Country of San Francisco, California, can there
be any expectation that the ordinance will be administered by public authority "with an
evil eye and an unequal hand." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356, which
compare with Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U. S., 27.)
There is no analogy between the instant case and the former one of Young vs.
Rafferty [1916], 33 Phil., 556). The holding there was that the Internal Revenue Law
did not empower the Collector of Internal Revenue to designate the language in which
the entries in books shall be made by merchants, subject to the percentage tax. In the
course of the decision, the following remark was interpolated: "In reaching this
conclusion, we have carefully avoided using any language which would indicate our
views upon the plaintiffs' second proposition to the effect that if the regulation were an
Act of the Legislature itself, it would be invalid as being in conflict with the paramount
law of the land and treaties regulating certain relations with foreigners." There, the
action was taken by means of administrative regulation; here, by legislative
enactment. There, governmental convenience was the aim; here, the public welfare.
We are convinced that the same justices who participated in the decision in Young vs.
Rafferty [supra] would now agree with the conclusion toward which we are tending.
Our holding is, that the government of the city of Manila had the power to enact
Ordinance No. 532 and that as said ordinance is found not to be oppressive, nor
unequal, nor unjust, it is valid. This statement disposes of both assignments of error,
for the improprietry of the question answered by a witness for the defense over the
objection of plaintiff's attorney can be conceded without affecting the result.
After the case was submitted to this court, counsel for appellants asked that a
preliminary injunction issue, restraining the defendant or any of its officers from
enforcing Ordinance No. 532, pending decisions. It was perfectly proper for the trial

and appellate courts to determine the validity of the municipal ordinance on a


complaint for an injunction, since it was very apparent that irreparable injury was
impending, that a municipality of suits was threatened, and that complainants had no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. But finding that the ordinance is valid, the
general rule to the effect that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal
prosecution should be followed.
Judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-20479

February 6, 1925

YU CONG ENG, ET AL., petitioners,


vs.
W. TRINIDAD, Collector of Internal Revenue, ET AL., respondents.
Gabriel La O, Palma and Leuterio and Gibbs and McDonough for petitioners.
The City Fiscals Revilla, Guevara and Felix for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The issue in these proceedings is the validity of Act No. 2972 of the Philippine
Legislature, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law. It is a question of
paramount importance which the record shows, has been laid before this court
following the failure of diplomatic negotiations and executive pressure to secure from
the local law-making body either the repeal of the law or a modification of its
provisions. It is, moreover, a question which, extensive argument and original
investigation disclose, stands in the shadowland betwixt constitutionality and
unconstitutionality, to the solution of which we propose to give careful consideration.
The petitioners are Chinese merchants claiming to represent themselves and all other
persons similarly situated and affected, particularly twelve thousand Chinese
merchants. The respondents, against whom the petition for prohibition and injunction
is directed, are the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, and
Honorable Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance of Manila. The allegations of
the petition center on the unconstitutionality of Act No. 2972 above-mentioned.
To the petition (later amended), a demurrer was interposed by the respondents which
met squarely the main issue of constitutionality, while raising, in addition, the
preliminary question of jurisdiction. Following oral argument, the court overruled
respondents' demurrer and required them to answer. To respondents' answer to the
amended petition, petitioners presented a demurrer.
In order that the court might be assisted by having before it all possible facts and
circumstances which might aid it in arriving at a correct conclusion, the parties were
permitted to offer evidence to substantiate their claims. Nearly one thousand pages of
testimony, more or less relevant to the issue, have resulted. While all of this testimony
has been gone over with painstaking care, it is not feasible for the court to encumber
the decision with rulings on the multitudinous objections which have perfunctorily
been raised before the commissioner.
Before passing to our principal task, it is necessary to say something about the
preliminary point of jurisdiction argued by counsel, relating to the propriety of the
constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in prohibition.

The Supreme Court is granted both concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with Courts
of First Instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over Courts
of First Instance when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of
their jurisdiction. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 516.) It is a jurisdiction, however,
which must be exercised circumspectly, for otherwise, the court would usurp the
powers of judges of First Instance. The law having given to judges of First Instance
jurisdiction to try criminal cases, the appellate court should not meddle with the
initiation or trial of such cases, except for good reasons, and should not permit the
substitution of extraordinary proceedings for appeal.
As before held by this court, and by the Federal courts, equity has power, to be
exercised in power cases, to restrain criminal prosecutions under unconstitutional
statutes, and to grant preliminary injunctions where the constitutionality of a given
penal law is doubtful and fairly debatable, and permanent injunctions where the laws
are held invalid. The remedy by injunction to restrain the enforcement of
unconstitutional statutes or abuse of authority under a valid statute, seems to be
limited to cases where property rights are threatened with irreparable injury or where
persons would be subjected to a multiplicity of suits.
A more complicated question arises, with reference to what stage of a threatened
criminal prosecution, an accused person shall have the right to test the validity of a
criminal statute by means of original proceedings presented in the appellate court.
We believe the correct principle was announced in Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber
Co. vs. Del Rosario ( [1913], 26 Phil., 192). In other words, as a general rule, the
question of constitutionality must be raised in the lower court and that court must be
given an opportunity to pass upon the question before it may be presented to the
appellate court for resolution. Yet occasionally, under a recently enacted statute
affecting numerous persons and extensive property rights, liable to give rise to a
multiplicity of actions and numerous prosecutions, it is proper, right at the threshold of
a prosecution, to have the validity of a given law determined in the interest of the
accused and of the public, so as to permit of the orderly administration of justice. (Ex
parteYoung [1908], 209 U.S., 123; Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33; Wilson vs.
New and Ferris [1917], 243 U. S., 332; Hammer vs. Dagenhart [1918], 247 U.S., 251;
International News Service vs. Associated Press [1918], 248 U.S., 215; C. A. Weed &
Co. vs. Lockwood [1920], 255 U.S., 104; Terrace vs. Thompson [1923], 263 U.S.,
197; Young vs. Rafferty [1916], 33 Phil., 556; Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila [1920],
41 Phil., 103; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304; and
Fleischmann, Injunctions Restraining Prosecution Under Unconstitutional Statutes, 9
American Bar Associations Journal, March, 1923, p. 169.)
Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants
are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not
yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the
advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of

jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here an
extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule.
We come then to take up the question of the validity of Act No. 2972. Said Act reads
as follows:
No. 2972. AN ACT TO PROVIDE IN WHAT LANGUAGE ACCOUNT BOOKS
SHALL BE KEPT, AND TO ESTABLISH PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership or
corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity for the
purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to
keep its account books in any language other than English, Spanish or any
local dialect.
SEC. 2. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction,
be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment for not more than two years or both.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on November first, nineteen hundred and
twenty-one.
Approved, February 21, 1921.
Subsequently, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 2998, Act No. 2972 was made to
take effect on January 1, 1923. But due to the unavailing efforts of the Secretary of
War, the present Governor-General, and the Chinese Community to have Act No.
2972 repealed, so counsel for the petitioners intimates, its enforcement was
suspended until the adjournment of the Legislature in February, 1923.
On March 2, 1923, the agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in the exercise of
their legitimate functions, inspected the books of account of the Chinese merchant Yu
Cong Eng. Upon finding that said books were not kept in accordance with their
understanding of the provisions of Act No. 2972, they took possession of the
merchant's books and referred the matter to the city fiscal of Manila for appropriate
action.
The city fiscal, considering that Yu Cong Eng had committed a violation of the law, on
March 7, 1923, caused an information to be filed, subscribed, and sworn to before
Judge of First Instance Concepcion, thereby giving rise to criminal case No. 25551 of

the Court of First Instance of Manila. This information alleged in substance that the
accused merchant had kept his books of account "only in Chinese, instead of keeping
or causing them to be kept in English, Spanish, or any local dialect, thus rendering it
difficult for the agents and authorized representatives of the Government of the
Philippine Islands and of the City of Manila, to examine and inspect the
aforementioned books of account, thereby preventing and hindering the investigation
and determination of all the amount that said accused was, is, or will be under
obligation to pay for licenses, permits, and taxes." A warrant of arrest was issued by
the Judge of First Instance before whom the information was filed, and in compliance
therewith, the accused merchant, now become the instant petitioner, was arrested.
The antecedents of these proceedings, therefore, do not affect directly any other
person except the petitioner Yu Cong Eng who says that he neither reads, writes, nor
understands the English or Spanish language or any local dialect, although
inferentially affecting all other merchants in a like situation.
To properly appreciate the situation, we must go back a little further into the history of
the case and must have before us the applicable provisions of Philippine law.
The sales tax has been in force in the Philippines for a number of years. Our law
provides for privilege taxes to be levied on certain businesses and occupations.
These percentage taxes on business are payable at the end of each calendar quarter
in the amount lawfully due on the business transacted during the past quarter. It is
made the duty of every person conducting a business subject to such tax, within the
same period as is allowed for the payment of the quarterly installments of the fixed
taxes without penalty, to make a true and complete return of the amount of the
receipts or earnings of his business during the preceding quarter and pay the tax due
thereon. All merchants not specifically exempted must pay a tax of one and one-half
per cent on the gross value in money of the commodities, goods, wares, merchandise
sold, bartered, exchanged, or consigned abroad by them, such tax to be based on the
actual selling price or value of the things in question at the time they are disposed of
or consigned. (Administrative Code, secs. 1453 et seq.; Act No. 3065.)
The income tax has also been established here for sometime, first pursuant to an Act
of Congress and later pursuant to an Act of the Philippine Legislature (Act No. 2833,
as amended by Act No. 2926). The customary returns are required from individuals
and corporations. The tax is computed and the assessments are made by the
Collector of Internal Revenue and his agents.
The sales tax and the income tax furnish a substantial part of the revenue. Roughly
speaking, about P10,000,000 from the sales tax and about P2,000,000 from the
income tax are secured annually. (Exhibit 13.) Any appreciable leaks in these sources
of governmental revenue would be highly undesirable.

At the time the Internal Revenue Law of the Philippine Islands was originally enacted,
the Spanish Code of Commerce was in force, and this Code still remains the
centerpiece of our commercial system, although considerably battered by amendatory
laws. The Code of Commerce provides that merchants shall keep: (1) A book of
inventories and balances; (2) a daybook; (3) a ledger; (4) a copying book for letters
and telegrams; and (5) the other books required by special laws. These books are
supposed to be presented by merchants to a justice of the peace for authentication.
Merchants may furthermore keep other books that they consider advisable, according
to the system of bookkeeping adopted. (Code of Commerce, arts. 33 et seq.;
Administrative Code, sec. 214; Blanco, Derecho Mercantil, Tomo 1, pp. 561, 562.)
The Spanish Code of Commerce, it is thus seen, is silent as are all the codes which
follow the French system, regarding the language in which books of account must be
kept.
Under the provisions of the Code of Commerce and of the Internal Revenue Law, the
Collector of Internal Revenue had authority "to require the keeping of a daily record of
sales. No one could say with any certainty what the amount of the tax would be
without such data." (Young vs. Rafferty, supra.) The collector of Internal Revenue was
also granted the power to make regulations prescribing the manner in which the
proper books, invoices, and other papers shall be kept, and entries therein made by
the persons subject to the merchant's tax. (Act No. 2339, secs. 5, 6 [j]; Administrative
Code, sec. 1424 [j].)
Taking advantage of his supposed authority, pursuant to the above cited provisions of
law, the Collector of Internal Revenue issued a circular letter on October 8, 1914,
approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, requiring every merchant and the
manufacturer with certain specified exceptions, who was subject to the merchant's
tax, to keep a record of their daily sales either in the English or the Spanish language.
The validity of this regulation was challenged in the case of Young vs. Rafferty, supra.
The defense of the Collector of Internal Revenue was that the regulation issued by
him had for its object the protection of the Government and to prevent the nonpayment of the merchant's and the percentage taxes. Following trial in the lower court
and appeal, the Supreme Court held that sections 5 and 6 of Act No. 2339 did not
empower the Collector of Internal Revenue to designate the language in which the
entries in such books are made by merchants subject to the percentage tax. Omitting
portions of the opinion handed down by Mr. Justice Trent, some of which will be
noticed in other connections, it is only necessary for us to quote the portion which
deals with the subject at hand, namely:
It is also urge that the regulation is designed to protect the Government
against evasion of the percentage tax. If it be necessary to impose such a
burden upon so large a number of the business community in order that the
Government may protect itself from such losses, we apprehend that it was

never intended that the initiative should be taken by the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The condition complained of by the Collector has confronted the
Government ever since the present system of internal revenue taxes was
inaugurated in 1904. It is not for the administrative head of a Government
bureau to say that such an obstacle to the collection of taxes shall be
removed by imposing burdens not specifically authorized in the law itself.
In view of the fact that a particular language is not essential to the recording
of the information desired by the Collector and the enforcement of the
objectionable provisions of his circular would be a very important step in the
solution of the language problem in this country, amounting, we believe, to a
question of public policy which should not be dictated by any administrative
authority, we must conclude that the Collector has exceeded his authority in
this particular. In reaching this conclusion, we have carefully avoided using
any language which would indicate our views upon the plaintiffs' second
proposition to the effect that if the regulation were an Act of the Legislature
itself, it would be invalid as being in conflict with the paramount law of the
land and the treaties regulating certain relations with foreigners. (Emphasis
ours.)
Mr. Justice Carson, in a concurring opinion of some importance as will hereafter be
emphasize, said:
I concur, on the ground that under the order of the Collector, if strictly
enforced, the tens of thousand of merchants, petty storekeepers and others
affected by its terms, both native and foreign, who have no adequate
knowledge of either English or Spanish, would be required in effect not only
to keep a record of the results of their business transactions in English or
Spanish, but also to conduct such transactions in one or other of those
languages.
I do not question the authority of the Collector to prescribe rules for the
keeping of such records or transcripts of records of the results of mercantile
transactions as may be reasonably necessary in order to eliminate fraud or
concealment, and to expedite the labors of those charged with the collection
of taxes: but I do not think that he was any authority to require the keeping of
the original record of the vast number of these transactions in a tongue
unknown to the parties; and I think furthermore that his authority to prescribe
regulations intended to expedite the collection of taxes of this nature, is
necessarily limited to the promulgation of regulations reasonably necessary
to the end.
As will at once be noticed, the Supreme Court limited its decision to the annulment of
the circular of the Collector of Internal Revenue. It left for the Legislature to determine

if a law on the subject should be enacted, without expressing any opinion as to the
validity of such a law.
Following some agitation on the subject, the then Governor-General, in a message to
the Legislature on October 16, 1920, recommended for consideration "Legislation as
already approved by the Senate should require that all business houses keep their
books in English or Spanish, or in any one of the local Philippine dialects, in order to
avoid wholesale frauds upon the Public revenues." The bill was presented in the
House of Representatives by Representative Urgello with the following explanatory
note:
As all of the merchants doing business in the Philippines are not of the same
nationality, some of them keep their books of account in their native
language. The examination of these books by the agents of the Government
for their proper verification, is made with some difficulty, inasmuch as in
many cases it requires the help of a translator which constitutes an expense
to the public treasury.
Uniformity and facility in the examination and investigation of these books
require that the same be kept by the merchants, whether individuals or
corporations, in English or Spanish.
This is the object of the attached bill.
After the Philippine Legislature had passed Act No. 2972, the present GovernorGeneral in a message asked for either the repeal or a modification of the law.
Hearings before committees of the Legislature were permitted. According to the report
prepared and submitted by the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of Laws of
the House of Representatives, which we feel at liberty to take into consideration, at
the hearing before his committee the representatives of the Chinese community
advocated the repeal of Act No. 2972, but this was strongly opposed by the
representatives of the Bureau of Audits, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The
representative of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Mr. Posadas, "gave repeated
assurances before the Committee that due to the unintelligibility of the books of
Chinese merchants, because of the language in which the same was written, the
public treasury was being defrauded annually in several millions of pesos, and that in
order to protect the Government it is necessary to uphold Act No. 2972." (Exhibit 3.)
Eventually, the Philippine Legislature, with the exception that it postponed the taking
effect of the law, refused otherwise to modify it.
There has next followed the instant proceedings, by means of which an expression of
opinion is sought to settle the conflict of views as to the constitutionality of Act No.
2972. The law is attacked by the petitioners as in violation of treaty and constitutional
rights of Chinese merchants, domiciled in the Philippine Islands. It is contended with

marked earnestness, that the law is unreasonable and oppressive in nature, and
repugnant to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and of the corresponding provisions of the Jones Law, the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, guaranteeing to all persons the equal protection of the
laws. The law is defended by the city fiscal of Manila as a proper and reasonable
exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government, and of its power of
taxation.
Four questions suggest themselves for discussion. What would be the probable
effect, if Act No. 2972 was put in operation? What was the purpose of the Legislature
in enacting Act No. 2972? What are the respective legal rights of the Chinese and of
the Government? What is a logical construction of Act No. 2972? In connection with
the first question, it is, of course, undeniable that we cannot declare a legislative Act
void because it conflicts with our opinion of what is just or expedient. Nevertheless,
the effects and consequences enter with more or less force into consideration,
whenever the validity of any law is in issue. (See 2 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory
Construction, pp. 908 et seq.)
The pleadings, the evidence, and the decision in Young vs. Rafferty, supra, disclose
with regard to the mercantile life of the Philippines, the following facts:
There are approximately 85,000 merchants of all nationalities in the Philippines, to
whom Act No. 2972 applies. Of this number, 71,000 are Filipinos who may use their
own dialects, they prefer English or Spanish. Approximately 1,500 are American,
British, or Spanish subjects, who are permitted to use their native languages. Possibly
500 are foreign nationalities most of whom know the English or Spanish language. Of
the remainder, between 10,000 and 12,000 are Chinese. The aggregate commercial
business transacted by the Chinese merchants represents about sixty per cent of the
total business done by all the merchants in the Philippine Islands. According to Mr.
H.B. Pond, vice-president and general manager of the Pacific Commercial Company,
the Chinese "are the principal distributing factors in the Philippine Islands of imported
goods, and the principal gatherers of goods for exportation in the more remote
places," and if the Chinese were driven out of the business, "there would be no other
system of distribution available throughout the Islands." It is further claimed, on the
one hand, that not to exceed one per cent of the Chinese merchants in the Philippine
Islands understand English, Spanish, or a local dialect sufficiently well to be able to
keep or revise their own books of account in any one of these languages, and that not
to exceed ten per cent have even a working knowledge of either English, Spanish, or
a local dialect, and on the other hand, that at least two-thirds of the Chinese
businessmen can easily comply with the law.
Counsel for the petitioners is sponsor for the sweeping statement that "the
enforcement of Act 2972 would probably cause more damage and less good than any
other law which has been enacted in the world." This strong stand is to a certain

extent corroborated by resolutions adopted and signed by the principal business


house in the City of Manila and by a number of chambers of commerce (Exhibits C,
D, E, F, G, H, I, and J, attached to the petition); by the vigorous protest of the Chinese
foreign office (Exhibit K); by the opinions expressed by high officials in the War
Department "that the law is fundamentally unwise" (Exhibit L), and "is obstructive of
good understanding with our neighbors" (Exhibit M); and by the testimony of a large
number of Chinese merchants and of other well qualified persons to the effect that
sufficient bookkeepers are not available, that it would not be possible for many
Chinese merchants, especially the smaller ones, to comply with the law, and that if
the Chinese merchants were compelled to keep their books in any language other
than the Chinese language, it would bring serious embarrassment to the great
majority and might even drive many of them out of business.
Mr. Dee C. Chuan, the President of the China Banking Corporation and of the
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and Honorable Chow Kwo Hsien, Chinese Consul
General for the Philippine Islands, testified that they, in collaboration with Chinese
merchants, had conducted an investigation from which they made the following
estimate of the distribution of sales among the Chinese:
Of the wholesale merchants, 50 had average amount of sales of over P1,000,000;
150, over P500,000; 400, over P100,000, and 2,735, over P40,000. Of the 8,445
retail merchants, the average amount of sales was P5,446.40. Basing their
calculations on the above, it was found that the annual net income of the 8,445
Chinese retail merchants would not exceed P500 each, and of 2,000 of the 3,335
wholesale merchants, not to exceed P1,000. (Exhibit G.) The same investigation
disclosed that not to exceed 12 Chinese firms are actually keeping their books in a
language other than Chinese. The Chinese Consul General further testified that from
his inquiries, he had found that the great majority of the Chinese merchants are
utterly unable to comply with Act No. 2972.
Mr. William T. Nolting, President of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and formerly
Collector of Internal Revenue, testified to the following salient facts: 1. Not over one
per cent of the Chinese merchants are qualified to transact their business in English,
Spanish, or a native dialect; 2. It would be impossible to obtain accounts to assist
them in keeping their books in English, Spanish, or a local dialect, although this
deficiency might be overcome in the future; 3. If the merchant is unable to understand
his accounts and cannot impose extreme confidence; in his bookkeeper, he is in a
precarious position at all times; 4. An attempt to enforce Act No. 2972 would not
facilitate the collection of taxes from the Chinese merchants but on the other hand
might prove prejudicial both to the interests of the Government and of the Chinese; 5.
When he was in charge of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, he never experienced any
difficulty in finding and employing a sufficient number of competent and honest
Chinese accountants to make the necessary inspection of the books of Chinese
merchants; 6. The honesty of the Chinese merchants in making the declarations of

their sales compares favorably with other nationalities in that respect; and 7. To
permit the Chinese merchants to keep two sets of books, one in Chinese and the
other in English, Spanish, or some local dialect, would be a most dangerous practice
because entries might be made in one set that would not be made in the other.
The reply of the fiscal is to the effect that the oppressiveness of the law has been
considerably exaggerated, that it applies as well to Japanese and other foreign
merchants who do not complain, that only a relatively small per cent of the Chinese
merchants seek to obstruct the enforcement of the law, that bookkeepers are
available if the Chinese wish to employ them, and that the new law will facilitate
governmental inspection of merchants' books. Numerous witnesses have been called
and numerous documents have been offered to substantiate the stand taken by the
Government. We will here notice only an indorsement by Wenceslao Trinidad, former
Collector of Internal Revenue, and the testimony of Juan Posadas, the present
Collector of Internal Revenue.
Former Collector Trinidad, in a communication addressed to the Secretary to the
Governor-General on September 22, 1921, said:
During the year 1920, internal revenue tax receipts were issued to 95,363
merchants and manufacturers, 183 printers and publishers, 10,424 common
carriers, 10,967 contractors and warehousemen, 58,942 peddlers of
merchandise and 1,001 brokers. All of the above-mentioned persons are
required to pay percentage taxes on their gross sales or receipts. On
account of the nature of this tax, these persons are required to keep books
of accounts wherein they can enter the amounts of business done by them.
This Bureau has no statistics to show the number of Chinese engaged in
different businesses subject to percentage taxes but it is safe to say that
they represent fully sixty per cent of the numbers stated above. All of these
Chinese merchants keep their accounts in Chinese, with the exception of a
very few large business houses which keep two sets of books of accounts,
one in Chinese and the other in Spanish. There are also other businessmen
who do not keep their books of accounts either in English or Spanish. These
are Germans, Japanese, Syrians and Hindus. Their number cannot be
ascertained due to the lack of statistics but there are many of them in the
Islands, especially the Japanese.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue had up to this time employed 17 Chinese
accountants, two Hindus and one Japanese. All of these accountants have
been separated from the service with the exception of four Chinese
accountants who are at present still employed in the Bureau. Out of the
seventeen Chinese accountants employed, five were discharge for graft,
seven resigned or were forced to resign for their unsatisfactory services

rendered or for suspicion of graft, and one deceased. In spite of this number
of accountants employed, only very little number of Chinese books have
been investigated and audited, and in the majority of them underdeclarations of sales or receipts have been found.
There are also a number of Chinese who are not subject to percentage
taxes, but who have books of accounts that need to be audited for incometax purposes.
It can be seen from the foregoing statements that the law requiring
merchants to keep their books in English, Spanish or any of the local
dialects, is necessary in order to protect the revenues of the Government.
Collector Juan Posadas, in reply to question, and corroborated by other witnesses,
made among others the following interesting statements:

xxx

Mr. FELIX. Has the Bureau of Internal Revenue that sufficient and
competent personnel to audit the books of account of merchants who do not
keep their books in Spanish, English, or some local dialect? Mr.
POSADAS. No, sir, we have only an insignificant number of Chinese
accountants to make examinations of the books of the Chinese merchants.
xxx

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Mr. FELIX. If the Bureau of Internal Revenue were not able as according
to you it is not able to examine properly the books of accounts of
merchants who do not keep their books in English, Spanish, or some local
dialect, may the case arise wherein those merchants who do not keep their
books in the languages permitted by Act No. 2972 would fail to pay the full
amount of taxes due to the internal revenue, even though they were acting in
good faith? ... Mr. POSADAS. Yes, sir, because judging from the audits
even of those books of accounts which are intelligible to the office personnel,
the office has found many differences, or items not declared for the purpose
of taxation.

xxx

Mr. FELIX. Do you know how many returns of merchants were examined in
1922 by the Chinese accountants of the income tax division of your Bureau?
... Mr. POSADAS. During that year, the Chinese accountants in the
income tax division inspected 477 returns of Chinese.
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Mr. FELIX. Do you know whether there were any undeclarations in those
cases, that were inspected that you have referred to? ... Mr. POSADAS.
In the comparison of these returns with the books of account of the
interested parties, differences were found which amount to more than
P600,000 which was not declared.
xxx

Mr. FELIX. If the books of account, not only of the Chinese merchants but of
the other foreign merchants, were kept in their own languages and not in
English, Spanish, or some local dialect, would it be possible to have the
books of accounts of these merchants audited by the agents or employees
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue? ... Mr. POSADAS. It would be
impossible, unless our office had a personnel sufficiently numerous and
competent to make the audits of the books of account in the different
languages in which they were kept.

xxx

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Mr. GIBBS. And, therefore, assuming that it would be possible to employ a


sufficient number of competent Chinese inspectors of books of account,
there would be no advantage in the enforcement of Act No. 2972 except in
so far as it might aid the directors of the Bureau and the chiefs of division in
making the inspections incident to deciding disputes between the inspectors
and the merchants that you have mentioned? Mr. POSADAS. The
advantage of the Accounting Law, which compels merchants to keep their
books in English, Spanish, or some local dialect, lies precisely in the fact that
it would facilitate the inspection of these books of account by the employees
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and enable them to check up the taxes
which have been paid the merchants and ascertain whether or not they
agree with the transactions actually had. This work is at present being done
so far as concerns the merchants who keep their books in languages
comprehensible to the Bureau, and to a certain extent it means that these
merchants are penalized. On the other hand, it has been almost impossible
to do this with regard to those merchants who keep their books entirely in
languages not comprehensible to the office, and the net result therefore is
that while we can collect differences in taxes due from part of the merchants,
it is almost impossible to do so with regard to the other part.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. GIBBS. But supposing that you had also Chinese accountants
competent to act as supervising agents in the provinces, then what
advantage would there be in enforcing Act No. 2972? Mr. POSADAS. The
advantage would consist precisely in the fact that we would avoid the

duplication of personnel, because otherwise we would have to duplicate the


personnel in each district by employing Filipinos and Chinese.

particular nationality as to nullify the law, or whether the judiciary can constitutionally
enforce the law.

Mr. GIBBS. Could you not easily put in a Chinese district inspector and a
Filipino district inspector, leaving it to the Chinese district inspector to inspect
the books of the Chinese and to the Filipino district inspector the books of
the Filipinos and others? Mr. POSADAS. It is physically impossible to
employ Chinese supervisors, in view of the fact that up to this time I have
never known of a Chinese who has qualified himself in the civil service to
occupy the position.

Language is the medium by which thoughts are conveyed from one person to
another. The law before us recognizes as permissible mediums for business and
taxation purposes, English the language of the people of the British Empire and
the Republic of the United States; Spanish the language of the people of Spain;
and local dialects the language of the home in the Philippines. Of these native
dialects, as disclosed in a statement prepared by Dr. T.H. Pardo de Tavera, Director of
the Philippine Library and Museum, there are a grand total of eighty-seven, six with
extensive literature, and the others with little or no literature. (Exhibit F.) The law fails
to take cognizance of the Chinese language, one of the oldest and one of the most
extensively used languages in the world.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. GIBBS. Is it not true, Mr. POSADAS, that the practice of inspecting the
books of the account of the Chinese by means of Chinese accountants has
been followed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in the Philippines for the
past twenty years or more? Mr. POSADAS. To judge from the results of
the inspections made by my Bureau during my incumbency therein, I am led
to believe that the inspections which were formerly made were superficial, in
view of the fact that the Bureau during these latter years, he discovered
large differences which were never declared for the purposes of taxation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. GIBBS. Let's put the question in another form, Mr. Posadas: Is it not a
fact that the only possible benefit which the Bureau of Internal Revenue
would derive from the enforcement of Act No. 2972 would be in so far as it
might assist the Bureau in checking up the information required by its
regulations? Mr. POSADAS. Yes, sir, and to determine whether any items
subject to taxation had been omitted.
Mr. GIBBS. Another question, Mr. Posadas: Don't you think that by means of
Chinese accountants, much more satisfactory kept in Chinese than from
books kept abominably in English or Spanish? Mr. POSADAS. Even
though the books which are kept in a language other than Chinese were
abominably kept, as long as they contain the entries of all the transactions
are carried out by a merchant or by a person subject to taxation, it would
always be better than a book which is incomprehensible to the
administrators of the Bureau.
Some slight consideration of the language question in general and of the language
question in the Philippines in particular, will assist us in determining if the effect of
enforcing Act No. 2972 will cause as much hardship and will be so oppressive on one

The Philippine Organic Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, recognizes for electoral
purposes, "Spanish, English, or a native language." (Sec. 15.) It enumerates as a
qualification for an elective member of the Senate and the House of the Philippine
Legislature, ability "to read and write either the English or Spanish language." (Sec.
13, 14.) The Municipal Law requires as a qualification for an elective municipal officer,
ability to read and write intelligently either Spanish, English, or the local dialect.
(Administrative Code, sec. 2174.) The official language of the courts and their records
is at present either English or Spanish, although in practice, Spanish is used more
extensively in the lower courts, and English in the appellate court. (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 12, as amended by Act No. 2830. ) The official language of the
legislative branch of the Government is either English or Spanish, although in practice
Spanish is more extensively used, while exactly the reverse is true of the executive
branch of the Government. In compliance with the President's Instructions to the
Commission of April 7, 1900, full opportunity has been given to all the people of the
Island to acquire the use of the English language, with the result that English is made
the basis of public and private school instruction. (Administrative Code, sec. 922.) In
the customs service, the law provides that the cargo manifest and each copy thereof
shall be accompanied by a translation into English, if originally written in a language
other than English. (Administrative Code, sec. 1226.)
The above brief description of the language situation at least discloses some of the
difficulties which have beset the attempt to hasten the adoption of a common
language in the Philippines. Yet it is evident, that the Filipino people have cheerfully
imposed upon themselves the burden of acquiring one more languages other than
their native languages and have now, through their elective representatives, sought to
require conformity with governmental policy by a large class of foreign residents.
In the United States during the months immediately following the conclusion of the
World War, a number of States passed statutes in substantially the same form
forbidding the teaching of any modern language except English, to children below the

eight grade in any school. The United States Supreme Court held the statutes
unconstitutional on account of having no reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the State to effect, and on account of violating the constitutional
guarantee of liberty in the Federal Constitution. "The protection of the Constitution
extends to all," it was said, "to those who speak other languages as well as to
those born with English on the tongue." (Meyer vs. Nebraska, Bartels vs. Iowa,
Pohl vs. Ohio, Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod vs. Mckelvie [1923],
262 U.S., 390, 404; XII Michigan Law Review, Jan., 1924, p. 248.)
In other countries, however, notably in the Republics in the Americas, which have had
their institutional law greatly influenced by the United States Constitution, laws are on
the statute books which permit only Spanish to be used in commercial transactions.
This is the system found in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. (Commercial Laws of the World, vols. 1,
2 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, and 20; Manzano, Bonilla y Miana, Codigos de Comercio, Tomos II y
III; Wheless, Compendium of the Laws of Mexico, vol. I; Exhibit 12.)
The purpose of the Legislature in enacting Act No. 2972 is disclosed by the decision
of this court in Young vs. Rafferty, supra, by the messages of the Governor-General,
by the hearings before the committees of the Philippine Legislature, and by other
sources. All these indicate that the Act is a fiscal measure intended to facilitate the
work of the government agents and to prevent fraud in the returns of merchants, in
conformity with the sales tax and the income tax. For instance, in the decision in
Young vs. Rafferty, supra, it was stated: "... It need hardly be said that the record
which merchants are required to keep of their daily sales under the provisions of the
circular letter of the Collector set out in the complaint is simplicity itself, and that it will,
if honestly and faithfully kept, enable the Government to collect the percentage tax
exactly due it. ..."
Conceded that the Chinese handle sixty per cent of the aggregate business of the
Philippines, approximate equality in taxation demands that they pay something like
the same proportion in taxes for the support of the State.
In enacting Act No. 2972, the Philippine Legislature did so pursuant to the wide
authority which is delegated to it by Organic law. The Organic Act, the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, provides "That general legislative power, except as
otherwise herein provided, is hereby granted the Philippine Legislature, authorized by
this Act." (Sec. 8, 12.)
The police power exists in the Philippine Islands in about the same form and to the
same extent as in a State of the American Union. Under the general police power,
persons and property in the Philippines have been subjected to various kinds of
restrictions and burdens, in order to secure the general health, comfort, and
prosperity of all. As indicated by a quotation of petitioners, the police power is not

limited to regulations necessary for the preservation of good order or the public health
and safety, but the prevention of fraud, cheating, and imposition is equally within its
scope.
The rule to follow in the application of the police power is that announced in the
leading case of Lawton vs. Steele ( [1894], 152 U.S., 133), oft quoted with approval
by our Supreme Court, namely:
. . . Large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not
only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests. To justify the state in thus
interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of
protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or
impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. . . .
(See further, U.S. vs. Toribio [1910], 15 Phil., 85; Case vs. Board of Health
and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250; U.S.vs. Gomez Jesus [1915], 31 Phil., 218;
Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; and Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
The power of taxation is, likewise, in the Philippines as in the United States, the
strongest of all the powers of government, practically absolute and unlimited. The
familiar maxim early announced by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall for the United States
Supreme Court and since frequently invoked by the courts is that "the power to tax
involves the power to destroy." (M'Culloch vs. Maryland [1819], 4 Wheat., 316.) It is a
legislative power. All its incidents are within the control of the legislature. It is the
Legislature which must questions of state necessarily involved in ordering a tax,
which must make all the necessary rules and regulations which are to be observed in
order to produce the desired results, and which must decide upon the agencies by
means of which collections shall be made. (1 Cooley on Taxation, pp. 7, 43, 46, 54;
Cowles vs. Brittain [1822], 2 Hawks, 204; Genet vs. City of Brooklyn {1885], 99 N.Y.,
296; Felsenheld vs. U. S. [1902], 186 U.S., Muoz & Co. vs. Hord [1909], 12 Phil.,
624.)
It is equally manifest that the power to tax is not judicial power and that a strong case
is required for the judiciary to declare a law relating to taxation invalid. If, of course, so
great an abuse is manifest as to destroy natural and fundamental rights, it is the duty
of the judiciary to hold such an Act unconstitutional. Nevertheless, certain of the
limitations are such that they must address themselves exclusively to the legislative
department, and be subject only to review by the people who elect the members of
this department.

To use the language of Judge Cooley:


In order to bring taxation imposed by a state, or under its authority, within the
scope of the provision of the fourteenth amendment which prohibits the
deprivation of property without due process of law, the case should be so
clearly and probably an illegal encroachment upon private rights as to leave
no doubt that such taxation by its necessary operation is really spoliation
under the power to tax. ... The inhibition of the amendment was designed to
prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special
subject for discriminating and hostile legislation ... In the construction of the
revenue laws, special consideration is of course to be had of the purpose for
which they are enacted. That purpose is to supply the government with
revenue. But in the proceedings to obtain this it is also intended that no
unnecessary injury shall be inflicted upon the individual taxed. While this is
secondary to the main object the impelling occasion of the law it is
none the less a sacred duty. Care is taken in constitutions to insert
provisions to secure the citizen against injustice in taxation, and all
legislative action is entitled to the presumption that this has been
intended. . . . (1 Cooley on Taxation, pp. 55, 56, 75, 452.)
The petitioners are Chinese subjects. The treaty rights accorded the Chinese are
those of the most favored nation. Their constitutional rights are those accorded all
aliens, which means that the life, liberty, or property of these persons cannot be taken
without due process of law, and that they are entitled to the equal protection of the
laws, without regard to their race. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1885], 118 U.S., 356; Kwong
Sing vs. City of Manila,supra.) Our Code of Commerce and our Corporation Law
permit foreigners, and companies created in a foreign country, to engage in
commerce in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Commerce, art. 15; Act No. 1459, sec.
73.) The rights of these Chinese aliens are not less than the rights of American and
Philippine citizens. Nor more.
Six decisions bearing particularly on the rights of the Chinese, three coming from the
United States Supreme Court, two from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands,
and one from the Supreme Court of Hawaii have at least persuasive application to the
instant proceedings. Two of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court that we
have in mind, Barbier vs. Connolly ( [1884], 113 U.S., 27) and Yick Wo vs. Hopkins
( [1885], 118 U.S., 356), are so well known as merely require citation, while a recent
series of cases on the language question have already been mentioned. We only stop
to quote one significant sentence taken from Mr. Justice Field's opinion, pertaining to
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in the first cited case,
namely:
. . .Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is
prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in

its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons
similarly situated, is not within the Amendment.
The case of Young vs. Rafferty, supra, of Philippine origin we have heretofore noticed.
But later in point of time, a question was raised in the Philippine courts relative to the
power of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532,
requiring receipts in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed, showing the kind
and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments. (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila,supra.) It was held that as said
ordinance was neither oppressive, nor unequal, nor unjust, it was valid. It was said:
The purpose of the municipal authorities in adopting the ordinance is fairly
evident. Ordinance No. 532 was enacted, it is said, to avoid disputes
between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries
who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. The
object of the ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion of peace and good
order and the prevention of fraud, deceit, cheating, and imposition. The
convenience of the public would also presumably be served in a community
where there is a Babel of tongues by having receipts made out in the two
official languages. Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such
purposes are permissible under the police power. The legislative body is the
best judge of whether or not the means adopted are adequate to accomplish
the ends in view.
xxx

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Our view, after most thoughtful consideration, is, that the ordinance invades
no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of
police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal or property
rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its
operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they
belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without
exception, and each and everyone of them without distinction, must comply
with the ordinance. There is no privilege, no discrimination, no distinction.
Equally and uniformly the ordinance applies to all engaged in the laundry
business, and, as nearly as may be, the same burdens are cast upon them.
xxx

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There is no analogy between the instant case and the former one of
Young vs. Rafferty ( [1916], 33 Phil., 556). The holding there was that the
Internal Revenue Law did not empower the Collector of Internal Revenue to
designate the language in which the entries in books shall be made by
merchants subject to the percentage tax. ... There, the action was taken by

means of administrative regulation; here, by legislative enactment. There,


authority was rested on specific delegated powers; here, on both specific
power and the all-pervading police power. There, governmental convenience
was the aim; here, the public welfare. We are convinced that the same
justices who participated in the decision in Young vs. Rafferty (supra) would
now agree with the conclusion toward which we are tending.
The case most directly in line with the facts before us, is that of the King vs. Lau Kiu
( [1888], 7 Hawaii, 489), decided by the Supreme Court of the Hawaii Islands during
the period of the monarchial regime in those Islands. An Act of the Hawaii Legislature
prescribed, that no wholesale or retail license should be granted to any person except
upon the express condition that the licensee shall at all times keep full, true, and
correct books of account of all business transacted by him in connection with such
license, in the English, Hawaii, or some European language. It was contended among
other things that this was legislation against one certain class of subjects in the
Kingdom, to wit, against such subjects (and particularly the Chinese) as do not speak
or write the Hawaiian, English, or any European language, and was not applicable to
all citizens alike. It was held by the Supreme Court that this Act was contrary to
articles 1 and 14 of the Constitution, which secure to all persons the enjoyment of life
and liberty and the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property according
to law. It was held, further, that the Act could not be sustained as an exercise of the
police power of the state, as it had no relation to the health, comfort, safety, or welfare
of the public.
The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. As the United States Supreme
Court in a case of Philippine origin said: "... The function of the legislature is primary,
its exercise fortified by presumption of right and legality, and is not to be interfered
with lightly, nor by any judicial conception of its wisdom or propriety. ..." (Weems vs.
United States [1910], 217 U.S., 349.) This presumption is especially strong in the
case of statutes enacted to promote a public purpose, such as statutes relating to
taxation. To doubt is to sustain.
Only the other day, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Sutherland, said:
The judicial duty of passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress
is one of great gravity and delicacy. The statute here in question has
successfully borne the scrutiny of the legislative branch of the government,
which, by enacting it, has affirmed its validity; and that determination must
be given great weight. This court, by an unbroken line of decisions from
Chief Justice Marshall to the present day, has steadily adhered to the rule
that every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of an act of
Congress until overcome beyond rational doubt. But if, by clear and
indubitable demonstration, a statute be opposed to the Constitution, we have

no choice but to say so. . . . (Adkins vs. Children's Hospital of the District of
Columbia [1923], 261 U.S., 525; 67 Law. ed., 785.)
That the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has consistently followed these
rules is disclosed by the few laws held invalid. During the twenty-three years of the
Supreme Court's existence, it has never held invalid one complete law, while portions
of law have been nullified on but few occasions. (Casanovas vs. Hord [1907], 8 Phil.,
125; Omo vs. Insular Government [1908], 11 Phil., 67; Weigall vs. Morgan Shuster
[1908], 11 Phil., 340; Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44; McGirr vs. Hamilton
and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez [1920], 40 Phil., 883;
Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia
[1922], 44 Phil., 248.)
It may be said to be an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal rule of
construction, applied when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is
susceptible of two constructions one of which will maintain and the other destroy it,
the courts will always adopt the former. Whenever a law can be so construed as to
uphold it, it will be so construed although the construction which is adopted does not
appear to be as natural as another construction. But where the meaning of the Act is
plain, words cannot be read into it or out of it in order to save the law. (1 Lewis'
Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 135, 136; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
184; 6 R.C.L., 78.)
In the early case of United States vs. Coombs ( [1838], 12 Peters, 72), Mr. Justice
Story, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, said:
Before we proceed to the direct consideration of the true import and
interpretation of this section, it seems highly important, if not indispensable,
to say a few words as to the constitutional authority of Congress to pass the
same. For it, upon a just interpretation of the terms thereof, Congress have
exceeded their constitutional authority, it will become our duty to say so, and
to certify our opinion on this points submitted to us in favor of the defendant.
On the other hand, if the section admits of two interpretations, each of which
is within the constitutional authority of Congress, that ought to be adopted
which best conforms to the terms and the objects manifested in the
enactment, and the mischiefs which it was intended to remedy. And again, if
the section admits of two interpretations, one of which brings it within, and
the other presses it beyond the constitutional authority of Congress, it will
become our duty to adopt the former construction; because a presumption
never ought to be indulged that Congress meant to exercise or usurp any
constitutional authority, unless that conclusion is forced upon the court by
language altogether unambiguous. . . .

In the later case of Board of Supervisors of Grenada County vs. Brown ( [1884], 112
U.S., 261), Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, said:
It certainly cannot be said that a different construction is required by the
obvious import of the words of the statute. But if there were room for two
constructions, both equally obvious and reasonable, the court must, in
deference to the Legislature of the State, assume that it did not overlook the
provisions of the Constitution and designed the Act of 1871 to take effect.
Our duty, therefore, is to adopt that construction which, without doing
violence to the fair meaning of the words used, brings the statute into
harmony with the provisions of the Constitution, Cooley Constitutional Law,
184-5; Newland vs. Marsh, 19 Ill., 384; People vs. Supervisors, 17 N.Y., 241;
Colwell vs. Water Power Co., 4 C.E. Green (19 N.J. Eq.), 249. And such is
the rule recognized by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Marshall vs.
Grimes, 41 Miss., 31, in which it was said: "General words in the Act should
not be so construed as to give an effect to it beyond the legislative power,
and thereby render the Act unconstitutional. But, if possible, a construction
should be given to it that will render it free from constitutional objection; and
the presumption must be that the Legislature intended to grant such rights
as are legitimately within its power." Again, in Sykes vs. Mayor, 55
Mississippi, 143: "It ought never to be assumed that the lawmaking
department of the government intended to usurp or assume power
prohibited to it. And such construction, if the words will admit of it, ought to
be put on its legislation as will make it consistent with the supreme law."
Identical canons of statutory construction have often been invoked in the Philippines
to enable the courts to avoid declaring a law unconstitutional. For instance, the
decision in the well known case of In re Guaria ( [1913], 24 Phil., 37, 46), citing
Black on Interpretation of Laws, pp. 87, 93, and 94, is authority for this statement of
the rule: "It is the duty of the courts in construing a statute enacted by the Philippine
Commission (Legislature), not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to
an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another
construction not in conflict with the higher law; and in doing so, contentions touching
the apparent intention of the legislator will be disregarded which would lead to the
conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of an Act of
Congress." Not long since, this court, in the case of Fuentes vs. Director of Prisons,
No. 22449,1 saved Act No. 3104 relating to the death penalty, from a fate similar to its
subject by refusing to give a literal meaning to the phraseology of the law.
We have been enveigled into a much more elaborate discussion of this case than is
at all essential, for two reasons: Firstly, because of the earnestness of counsel who
have impressed on the court with marked ability the merits of their respective cases
and the dangers which lurk in a contrary holding; and secondly, because of the
effectiveness of the background as indicative of executive purpose and legislative

intent. Speaking frankly, however, a majority of the court has all the time had a well
defined opinion which we will now state. We come to the last question suggested, a
construction of Act No. 2972 which allows the court legally to approve it.
A literal application of the law would make it unlawful for any Chinese merchant to
keep his account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or a local
dialect. The petitioners say the law is susceptible of that interpretation. But such
interpretation might, and probably would, cause us to hold the law unconstitutional.
A second interpretation is that the Chinese merchant, while permitted to keep his
books of account in Chinese, must also keep another set of books in either English,
Spanish, or a native dialect. The respondents claim the law is susceptible of such
construction. It occurs to us, however, that this construction might prove as
unsatisfactory as the first. Fraud is possible in any language. An approximation to
governmental convenience and an approximation to equality in taxation is the most
which may be expected.
A third construction which is permissible in view of the history of the legislation and
the wording of the statute, is, that the law only intended to require the keeping of such
books as were necessary in order to facilitate governmental inspection for tax
purposes. It has not escaped our notice that the law does not specify what books
shall be kept. It is stated by competent witnesses that a cash book, a journal, and a
ledger are indispensable books of account for an efficient system of accounting, and
that, in the smaller shops, even simpler entries showing merely the daily record of
sales and record of purchases of merchandise would be sufficient. The keeping of
records of sales and possibly further records of purchases, in English Spanish, or
native dialect, and the filling out of the necessary forms would serve the purpose of
the Government while not being oppressive. Actually, notations in English, Spanish,
or a dialect of all sales in sales books, and of data in other specified forms are
insisted upon by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, although as appears from Exhibit 2,
it is doubtful is all Chinese merchants have complied with these regulations. The
faithful observance of such rules by the Chinese is not far removed from the offer of
cooperation oft made for them by the petitioners or the "translation of the account
books" oft mentioned and explained by the respondents.
The law, in speaking of any person, company, partnership, or corporation, makes use
of the expression "its account books." Does the phrase "its account books" mean that
all the account books of the person, company, partnership, or corporation must be
kept exclusively in English, Spanish, or any local dialect? The petitioners argue that
the law has this meaning. Or does the phrase "its account books" mean that the
persons, company, partnership, or corporation shall keep duplicate sets of account
books, one set in Chinese and the other a translation into English, Spanish, or any
local dialect? Counsel for the respondents urge this construction of the law upon the
court. Or does the phrase "its account books" mean that the person, company,

partnership, or corporation must keep such account books as are necessary for
taxation purposes? This latter interpretation occurs to us as a reasonable one and as
best safeguarding the rights of the accused. And lastly, what effect has Act No. 2972
had upon the provisions of the Code of Commerce on the subject of merchants? Has
the Act repealed or modified any article of the Code of Commerce?
The interrogatories above made at least lead to the deduction that the law is more or
less ambiguous and that it will bear two or more constructions.
Let us repeat: Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure. It should be so construed if possible
as to effectuate legislative intent, as collected from the occasion for the law, the
circumstance under which it was enacted, the mischief to be remedied, and the policy
which dictated its passage. It should be so construed if possible as to avoid conflict
with the constitution, although such construction may not be the most obvious or
natural one. Giving, therefore, to the law a meaning which will carry out the main
governmental purpose and which will permit us to sanction its constitutionality, it
seeks to prohibit not only the Chinese but all merchants of whatever nationality from
making entries in the books of account or forms subject to inspection for taxation
purposes in any other language than either the English or Spanish language or a
local dialect, although permitting all merchants to execute their commercial
transactions or operations in any language or dialect they may prefer, and although
permitting them to keep such other books of account as their personal convenience
may dictate and in a language which will come most easily to them. We would go so
far as to hold that circular No. 467 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue which this court
once held beyond the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to promulgate, and
any other reasonable regulation of a similar nature, as within the power of the
Philippine Legislature to sanction and entirely enforceable.
To any possible plaint by the Government, that this is tantamount to "judicial
legislation," we would say: It is not "judicial legislation" as this phrase is commonly
used in the spirit of antagonistic fault finding. No words are written into the law. No
words are taken out of the law. It is merely a practical judicial construction of a law
where the validity of this law is in issue, which gives to the law a meaning
accomplishing everything needed by the Government for tax purposes, without being
unduly oppressive on the individual, and which permits the courts to uphold the law.
To the petitioners, who by our decision do not obtain all they may wish, we append
this word of advice: Under such a construction as is above indicated, the Chinese will
not be singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation. There
will be no arbitrary deprivation of liberty or arbitrary spoliation of property. There will
be no unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances. The
law will prove oppressive to the extent that all tax laws are oppressive, but not
oppressive to the extent of confiscation. The means to accomplish a necessary
interference with private business are no more oppressive upon individuals than is

necessary to maintain the State. The law is not intended for the convenience of the
trader or the protection of the creditors, but has relation to the public welfare, to the
power of taxation, to the right of the government to exist. The Chinese must bear their
just proportion of the tax burden, however unwelcome it may be, without flinching.
A faint effort has been made by the petitioners to have the court declare Act No. 2972
void because the subject thereof is not expressed in its title. But legislation should not
be embarrassed by such strict construction as is urged by counsel. No distinguishable
variance between the title of the law and the body of the law can be discovered after
microscopic examination. The law is brief in its terms, and neither the Legislature nor
the public need be misled by the title. (Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Municipality of Binalonan and Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia [1915], 32
Phil., 634.)
We construe Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person, company, partnership, or
corporation, engaged in commerce, industry, or any other activity for the purpose of
profit in the Philippine Islands, shall keep its account books, consisting of sales books
and other records and returns required for taxation purposes by regulations of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, in effect when this action was begun, in English,
Spanish, or a local dialect. Agreeable to such construction, we hold Act No. 2972 valid
and constitutional.
The temporary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved although under the
construction given to the law it may well be doubted if the Government will care to
proceed with the criminal prosecution. If the Government should not dismiss the
information, this question may be raised by demurrer in the lower court.
Petition denied without costs.
Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, Acting Chief Justice, took no part.

G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978


MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner.
Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of
respondent Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in
Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner
and against the respondents, declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the
City of Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is made
permanent. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal
Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein
petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON
NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN
ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY
KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE
CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN
EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 3
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to
engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein,
whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit
from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons

employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the


technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign
government, and those working in their respective households, and members of
religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily
or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three
(3) months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than
P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. 5
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in
Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I,
denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No.
6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for
wanting the ordinance declared null and void:
1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of
Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the
rule of the uniformity in taxation;
2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between
useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00
employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of
registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide
and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental
principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only
to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and
property and therefore, violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. 7
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on
September 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void
and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. 8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J.
Villegas filed the present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following
as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of
September 17,1968: 9

I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND
PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO.
6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF
TAXATION.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND
PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO.
6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE
DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND
PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO.
6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null
and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the
rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that
Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police
power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure
because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that
the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the
Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and
approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is
regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as
employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or
justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It
is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of
regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails
to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are
required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien

whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly


employee or a highly paid executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in
the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a
municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the
mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit,
enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus
conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the
issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. 10
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law
granted a government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among
importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power
as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without
a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant
and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised
Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised
within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or
criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to
him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of
the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of
Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic
right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is
true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory,
once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law.
This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the
due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens. 13
The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 15574

September 17, 1919

SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), petitioner,


vs.
JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, respondent.
Ross and Lawrence for petitioner.
Attorney-General Paredes for respondent.
MALCOLM, J.:
A writ of mandamus is prayed for by Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.), against Joaquin
Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, Philippine Islands, to compel him
to issue a certificate of Philippine registry to the petitioner for its motor vessel Bato.
The Attorney-General, acting as counsel for respondent, demurs to the petition on the
general ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
While the facts are thus admitted, and while, moreover, the pertinent provisions of law
are clear and understandable, and interpretative American jurisprudence is found in
abundance, yet the issue submitted is not lightly to be resolved. The question, flatly
presented, is, whether Act. No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid or, more
directly stated, whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its
Legislature, can deny the registry of vessels in its coastwise trade to corporations
having alien stockholders.
FACTS.
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of
a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more
than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the
purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands.
Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of
Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the
certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd.,
were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant
action is the result.
LAW.
The Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, repealing the Shipping Act of April 30, 1906 but
reenacting a portion of section 3 of this Law, and still in force, provides in its section 1:

That until Congress shall have authorized the registry as vessels of the
United States of vessels owned in the Philippine Islands, the Government of
the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized to adopt, from time to time, and
enforce regulations governing the transportation of merchandise and
passengers between ports or places in the Philippine Archipelago. (35 Stat.
at L., 70; Section 3912, U. S. Comp Stat. [1916]; 7 Pub. Laws, 364.)
The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, still in
force, provides in section 3, (first paragraph, first sentence), 6, 7, 8, 10, and 31, as
follows.
SEC. 3. That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws. . . .
SEC. 6. That the laws now in force in the Philippines shall continue in force
and effect, except as altered, amended, or modified herein, until altered,
amended, or repealed by the legislative authority herein provided or by Act
of Congress of the United States.
SEC. 7. That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power,
when not inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter
modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it
may from time to time see fit
This power shall specifically extend with the limitation herein provided as to
the tariff to all laws relating to revenue provided as to the tariff to all laws
relating to revenue and taxation in effect in the Philippines.
SEC. 8. That general legislative power, except as otherwise herein provided,
is hereby granted to the Philippine Legislature, authorized by this Act.
SEC. 10. That while this Act provides that the Philippine government shall
have the authority to enact a tariff law the trade relations between the
islands and the United States shall continue to be governed exclusively by
laws of the Congress of the United States: Provided, That tariff acts or acts
amendatory to the tariff of the Philippine Islands shall not become law until
they shall receive the approval of the President of the United States, nor
shall any act of the Philippine Legislature affecting immigration or the
currency or coinage laws of the Philippines become a law until it has been
approved by the President of the United States: Provided further, That the
President shall approve or disapprove any act mentioned in the foregoing
proviso within six months from and after its enactment and submission for

his approval, and if not disapproved within such time it shall become a law
the same as if it had been specifically approved.
SEC. 31. That all laws or parts of laws applicable to the Philippines not in
conflict with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby continued in force
and effect." (39 Stat at L., 546.)
On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2761. The first
section of this law amended section 1172 of the Administrative Code to read as
follows:
SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. Upon registration of a vessel
of domestic ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of
Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic
ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of
Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.
"Domestic ownership," as used in this section, means ownership vested in
some one or more of the following classes of persons: (a) Citizens or native
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of the United States residing
in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company composed wholly
of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or of both, created
under the laws of the United States, or of any State thereof, or of thereof, or
the managing agent or master of the vessel resides in the Philippine Islands
Any vessel of more than fifteen gross tons which on February eighth,
nineteen hundred and eighteen, had a certificate of Philippine register under
existing law, shall likewise be deemed a vessel of domestic ownership so
long as there shall not be any change in the ownership thereof nor any
transfer of stock of the companies or corporations owning such vessel to
person not included under the last preceding paragraph.
Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 2761 amended sections 1176 and 1202 of the
Administrative Code to read as follows:
SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. No application for a
certificate of Philippine register shall be approved until the collector of
customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or
destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic
ownership as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and
seventy-two of this Code.
The collector of customs may at any time inspect a vessel or examine its
owner, master, crew, or passengers in order to ascertain whether the vessel

is engaged in legitimate trade and is entitled to have or retain the certificate


of Philippine register.
SEC. 1202. Limiting number of foreign officers and engineers on board
vessels. No Philippine vessel operating in the coastwise trade or on the
high seas shall be permitted to have on board more than one master or one
mate and one engineer who are not citizens of the United States or of the
Philippine Islands, even if they hold licenses under section one thousand
one hundred and ninety-nine hereof. No other person who is not a citizen of
the United States or of the Philippine Islands shall be an officer or a member
of the crew of such vessel. Any such vessel which fails to comply with the
terms of this section shall be required to pay an additional tonnage tax of fifty
centavos per net ton per month during the continuance of said failure.
ISSUES.
Predicated on these facts and provisions of law, the issues as above stated recur,
namely, whether Act No 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid in whole or in part
whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can
deny the registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien
stockholders .
OPINION.
1. Considered from a positive standpoint, there can exist no measure of doubt as to
the power of the Philippine Legislature to enact Act No. 2761. The Act of Congress of
April 29, 1908, with its specific delegation of authority to the Government of the
Philippine Islands to regulate the transportation of merchandise and passengers
between ports or places therein, the liberal construction given to the provisions of the
Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, by the courts, and the grant by the
Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, of general legislative power to the Philippine
Legislature, are certainly superabundant authority for such a law. While the Act of the
local legislature may in a way be inconsistent with the Act of Congress regulating the
coasting trade of the Continental United States, yet the general rule that only such
laws of the United States have force in the Philippines as are expressly extended
thereto, and the abnegation of power by Congress in favor of the Philippine Islands
would leave no starting point for convincing argument. As a matter of fact, counsel for
petitioner does not assail legislative action from this direction (See U. S. vs. Bull
[1910], 15 Phil., 7; Sinnot vs. Davenport [1859] 22 How., 227.)
2. It is from the negative, prohibitory standpoint that counsel argues against the
constitutionality of Act No. 2761. The first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights of
the Philippine Bill, repeated again in the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights
as set forth in the Jones Law, provides "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands

which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." Counsel says that Act
No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the laws because it,
in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because classification of
corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is
capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its properly without due
process of law because by the passage of the law company was automatically
deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked
title to a boat it could not use .
The guaranties extended by the Congress of the United States to the Philippine
Islands have been used in the same sense as like provisions found in the United
States Constitution. While the "due process of law and equal protection of the laws"
clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights is couched in slightly different words than the
corresponding clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
the first should be interpreted and given the same force and effect as the latter.
(Kepner vs. U.S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Sierra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S.,.470; U.
S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7.) The meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
announced in classic decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Even at the
expense of restating what is so well known, these basic principles must again be set
down in order to serve as the basis of this decision.
The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their application to all person within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality.
The word "person" includes aliens. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356;
Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33.) Private corporations, likewise, are "persons"
within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is concerned. (Santa
Clara County vs. Southern Pac. R. R. Co. [1886], 118.U. S., 394; Pembina Mining
Co. vs. Pennsylvania [1888],.125 U. S., 181 Covington & L. Turnpike Road
Co. vs. Sandford [1896], 164 U. S., 578.) Classification with the end in view of
providing diversity of treatment may be made among corporations, but must be based
upon some reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary selection (Gulf, Colorado
& Santa Fe Railway Co. vs. Ellis [1897],.165 U. S., 150.) Examples of laws held
unconstitutional because of unlawful discrimination against aliens could be cited.
Generally, these decisions relate to statutes which had attempted arbitrarily to forbid
aliens to engage in ordinary kinds of business to earn their living.
(State vs.Montgomery [1900], 94 Maine, 192, peddling but see.
Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 195 Mass., 262; Templar vs. Board of Examiners of
Barbers [1902], 131 Mich., 254, barbers; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S.,.356,
discrimination against Chinese; Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33; In re Parrott
[1880], 1 Fed , 481; Fraser vs. McConway & Torley Co. [1897], 82 Fed , 257; Juniata
Limestone Co. vs. Fagley [1898], 187 Penn., 193, all relating to the employment of
aliens by private corporations.)

A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would, of course, cause
the inevitable deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to
a corporation, some of whole members are foreigners, of the equal protection of the
laws. Like all beneficient propositions, deeper research discloses provisos. Examples
of a denial of rights to aliens notwithstanding the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment could be cited. (Tragesser vs. Gray [1890], 73 Md., 250, licenses to sell
spirituous liquors denied to persons not citizens of the United States;
Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 195 Mass , 262, excluding aliens from the right to
peddle; Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S. , 138,
prohibiting the killing of any wild bird or animal by any unnaturalized foreign-born
resident; Ex parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla., 442, discriminating in favor of citizens with
reference to the taking for private use of the common property in fish and oysters
found in the public waters of the State; Heim vs. McCall [1915], 239 U. S.,.175, and
Crane vs. New York [1915], 239 U. S., 195, limiting employment on public works by,
or for, the State or a municipality to citizens of the United States.)
One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in
influence is, that neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to
interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its `police power,' to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good
order of the people, and legislate so as to increase the industries of the State,
develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities
of society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often
be had in certain districts." (Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27; New Orleans
Gas Co. vs. Lousiana Light Co. [1885], 115 U.S., 650.) This is the same police power
which the United States Supreme Court say "extends to so dealing with the conditions
which exist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its people."
(Bacon vs.Walker [1907], 204 U.S., 311.) For quite similar reasons, none of the
provision of the Philippine Organic Law could could have had the effect of denying to
the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to
exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police
power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. (U.
S. vs. Toribio [1910], 15 Phil., 85; Churchill and Taitvs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580;
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.) Another notable exception
permits of the regulation or distribution of the public domain or the common property
or resources of the people of the State, so that use may be limited to its citizens. (Ex
parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla., 442; McCready vs.Virginia [1876], 94 U. S., 391;
Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232U. S., 138.) Still another
exception permits of the limitation of employment in the construction of public works
by, or for, the State or a municipality to citizens of the United States or of the State.
(Atkin vs. Kansas [1903],191 U. S., 207; Heim vs.McCall [1915], 239 U.S., 175;
Crane vs. New York [1915], 239 U. S., 195.) Even as to classification, it is admitted
that a State may classify with reference to the evil to be prevented; the question is a

practical one, dependent upon experience. (Patsone vs. Commonwealth of


Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S., 138.)
To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits corporations or companies to
obtain a certificate of Philippine registry only on condition that they be composed
wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or both, as not
infringing Philippine Organic Law, it must be done under some one of the exceptions
here mentioned This must be done, moreover, having particularly in mind what is so
often of controlling effect in this jurisdiction our local experience and our peculiar
local conditions.
To recall a few facts in geography, within the confines of Philippine jurisdictional limits
are found more than three thousand islands. Literally, and absolutely, steamship lines
are, for an Insular territory thus situated, the arteries of commerce. If one be severed,
the life-blood of the nation is lost. If on the other hand these arteries are protected,
then the security of the country and the promotion of the general welfare is sustained.
Time and again, with such conditions confronting it, has the executive branch of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, always later with the sanction of the judicial
branch, taken a firm stand with reference to the presence of undesirable foreigners.
The Government has thus assumed to act for the all-sufficient and primitive reason of
the benefit and protection of its own citizens and of the self-preservation and integrity
of its dominion. (In re Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93; Forbes vs. Chuoco, Tiaco and
Crossfield [1910], 16 Phil., 534;.228 U.S., 549; In re McCulloch Dick [1918], 38 Phil.,
41.) Boats owned by foreigners, particularly by such solid and reputable firms as the
instant claimant, might indeed traverse the waters of the Philippines for ages without
doing any particular harm. Again, some evilminded foreigner might very easily take
advantage of such lavish hospitality to chart Philippine waters, to obtain valuable
information for unfriendly foreign powers, to stir up insurrection, or to prejudice
Filipino or American commerce. Moreover, under the Spanish portion of Philippine
law, the waters within the domestic jurisdiction are deemed part of the national
domain, open to public use. (Book II, Tit. IV, Ch. I, Civil Code; Spanish Law of Waters
of August 3, 1866, arts 1, 2, 3.) Common carriers which in the Philippines as in the
United States and other countries are, as Lord Hale said, "affected with a public
interest," can only be permitted to use these public waters as a privilege and under
such conditions as to the representatives of the people may seem wise. (See De
Villata vs. Stanley [1915], 32 Phil., 541.)
In Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ([1913], 232 U.S., 138), a case herein
before mentioned, Justice Holmes delivering the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court said:
This statute makes it unlawful for any unnaturalized foreign-born resident to
kill any wild bird or animal except in defense of person or property, and `to
that end' makes it unlawful for such foreign-born person to own or be

possessed of a shotgun or rifle; with a penalty of $25 and a forfeiture of the


gun or guns. The plaintiff in error was found guilty and was sentenced to pay
the abovementioned fine. The judgment was affirmed on successive
appeals. (231 Pa., 46; 79 Atl., 928.) He brings the case to this court on the
ground that the statute is contrary to the 14th Amendment and also is in
contravention of the treaty between the United States and Italy, to which
latter country the plaintiff in error belongs .
Under the 14th Amendment the objection is twofold; unjustifiably depriving
the alien of property, and discrimination against such aliens as a class. But
the former really depends upon the latter, since it hardly can be disputed that
if the lawful object, the protection of wild life (Geer vs. Connecticut, 161 U.S.,
519; 40 L. ed., 793; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 600), warrants the discrimination, the,
means adopted for making it effective also might be adopted. . . .
The discrimination undoubtedly presents a more difficult question. But we
start with reference to the evil to be prevented, and that if the class
discriminated against is or reasonably might be considered to define those
from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked out. A
lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The question is a practical one,
dependent upon experience. . . .
The question therefore narrows itself to whether this court can say that the
legislature of Pennsylvania was not warranted in assuming as its premise for
the law that resident unnaturalized aliens were the peculiar source of the evil
that it desired to prevent. (Barrett vs. Indiana,. 229 U.S., 26, 29; 57 L. ed.,
1050, 1052; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 692.)
Obviously the question, so stated, is one of local experience, on which this
court ought to be very slow to declare that the state legislature was wrong in
its facts (Adams vs. Milwaukee, 228 U.S., 572, 583; 57 L. ed., 971,.977; 33
Sup. Ct. Rep., 610.) If we might trust popular speech in some states it was
right; but it is enough that this court has no such knowledge of local
conditions as to be able to say that it was manifestly wrong. . . .
Judgment affirmed.
We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having
alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law and
equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act
No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell
&. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not
belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned,

but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police
power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision.
This opinion might well be brought to a close at this point. It occurs to us, however,
that the legislative history of the United States and the Philippine Islands, and,
probably, the legislative history of other countries, if we were to take the time to
search it out, might disclose similar attempts at restriction on the right to enter the
coastwise trade, and might thus furnish valuable aid by which to ascertain and, if
possible, effectuate legislative intention.
3. The power to regulate commerce, expressly delegated to the Congress by
the Constitution, includes the power to nationalize ships built and owned in
the United States by registries and enrollments, and the recording of the
muniments of title of American vessels. The Congress "may encourage or it
may entirely prohibit such commerce, and it may regulate in any way it may
see fit between these two extremes." (U.S. vs.Craig [1886], 28 Fed., 795;
Gibbons vs. Ogden [1824], 9 Wheat., 1; The Passenger Cases [1849], 7
How., 283.)
Acting within the purview of such power, the first Congress of the United States had
not been long convened before it enacted on September 1, 1789, "An Act for
Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other
purposes." Section 1 of this law provided that for any ship or vessel to obtain the
benefits of American registry, it must belong wholly to a citizen or citizens of the
United States "and no other." (1 Stat. at L., 55.) That Act was shortly after repealed,
but the same idea was carried into the Acts of Congress of December 31, 1792 and
February 18, 1793. (1 Stat. at L., 287, 305.).Section 4 of the Act of 1792 provided that
in order to obtain the registry of any vessel, an oath shall be taken and subscribed by
the owner, or by one of the owners thereof, before the officer authorized to make such
registry, declaring, "that there is no subject or citizen of any foreign prince or state,
directly or indirectly, by way of trust, confidence, or otherwise, interested in such
vessel, or in the profits or issues thereof." Section 32 of the Act of 1793 even went so
far as to say "that if any licensed ship or vessel shall be transferred to any person
who is not at the time of such transfer a citizen of and resident within the United
States, ... every such vessel with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, and the cargo
found on board her, shall be forefeited." In case of alienation to a foreigner, Chief
Justice Marshall said that all the privileges of an American bottom were ipso
facto forfeited. (U.S. vs. Willings and Francis [1807], 4 Cranch, 48.) Even as late as
1873, the Attorney-General of the United States was of the opinion that under the
provisions of the Act of December 31, 1792, no vessel in which a foreigner is directly
or indirectly interested can lawfully be registered as a vessel of the United. States. (14
Op. Atty.-Gen. [U.S.], 340.)

These laws continued in force without contest, although possibly the Act of March 3,
1825, may have affected them, until amended by the Act of May 28, 1896 (29 Stat. at
L., 188) which extended the privileges of registry from vessels wholly owned by a
citizen or citizens of the United States to corporations created under the laws of any
of the states thereof. The law, as amended, made possible the deduction that a
vessel belonging to a domestic corporation was entitled to registry or enrollment even
though some stock of the company be owned by aliens. The right of ownership of
stock in a corporation was thereafter distinct from the right to hold the property by the
corporation (Humphreys vs. McKissock [1890], 140 U.S., 304; Queen vs. Arnaud
[1846], 9 Q. B., 806; 29 Op. Atty.-Gen. [U.S.],188.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, the new government found a substantive
law in operation in the Islands with a civil law history which it wisely continued in force
Article fifteen of the Spanish Code of Commerce permitted any foreigner to engage in
Philippine trade if he had legal capacity to do so under the laws of his nation. When
the Philippine Commission came to enact the Customs Administrative Act (No. 355) in
1902, it returned to the old American policy of limiting the protection and flag of the
United States to vessels owned by citizens of the United States or by native
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (Sec. 117.) Two years later, the same body
reverted to the existing Congressional law by permitting certification to be issued to a
citizen of the United States or to a corporation or company created under the laws of
the United States or of any state thereof or of the Philippine Islands (Act No. 1235,
sec. 3.) The two administration codes repeated the same provisions with the
necessary amplification of inclusion of citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands (Adm. Code of 1916, sec. 1345; Adm. Code of 1917, sec. 1172). And now Act
No. 2761 has returned to the restrictive idea of the original Customs Administrative
Act which in turn was merely a reflection of the statutory language of the first
American Congress.
Provisions such as those in Act No. 2761, which deny to foreigners the right to a
certificate of Philippine registry, are thus found not to be as radical as a first reading
would make them appear.
Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to
be to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to
encourage Philippine ship-building. This, without doubt, has, likewise, been the
intention of the United States Congress in passing navigation or tariff laws on different
occasions. The object of such a law, the United States Supreme Court once said, was
to encourage American trade, navigation, and ship-building by giving American shipowners exclusive privileges. (Old Dominion Steamship Co. vs. Virginia [1905], 198
U.S., 299; Kent's Commentaries, Vol. 3, p. 139.)
In the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in Gibbons vs. Ogden ([1824], 9 Wheat.,
1) is found the following:

Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for
example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc.
The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an
extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping,
and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations.
Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of
its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American
shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this
subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is
granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment.
But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contradistinguished from
foreign; and to preserve the. Government from fraud by foreigners, in
surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as
well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole
system is projected.
The United States Congress in assuming its grave responsibility of legislating wisely
for a new country did so imbued with a spirit of Americanism. Domestic navigation
and trade, it decreed, could only be carried on by citizens of the United States. If the
representatives of the American people acted in this patriotic manner to advance the
national policy, and if their action was accepted without protest in the courts, who can
say that they did not enact such beneficial laws under the all-pervading police power,
with the prime motive of safeguarding the country and of promoting its prosperity?
Quite similarly, the Philippine Legislature made up entirely of Filipinos, representing
the mandate of the Filipino people and the guardian of their rights, acting under
practically autonomous powers, and imbued with a strong sense of Philippinism, has
desired for these Islands safety from foreign interlopers, the use of the common
property exclusively by its citizens and the citizens of the United States, and
protection for the common good of the people. Who can say, therefore, especially can
a court, that with all the facts and circumstances affecting the Filipino people before it,
the Philippine Legislature has erred in the enactment of Act No. 2761?
Surely, the members of the judiciary are not expected to live apart from active life, in
monastic seclusion amidst dusty tomes and ancient records, but, as keen spectators
of passing events and alive to the dictates of the general the national welfare,
can incline the scales of their decisions in favor of that solution which will most
effectively promote the public policy. All the presumption is in favor of the
constitutionally of the law and without good and strong reasons, courts should not
attempt to nullify the action of the Legislature. "In construing a statute enacted by the
Philippine Commission (Legislature), we deem it our duty not to give it a construction
which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is
fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law." (In
re Guaria [1913], 24. Phil., 36; U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1.) That is the true
construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect.

With full consciousness of the importance of the question, we nevertheless are clearly
of the opinion that the limitation of domestic ownership for purposes of obtaining a
certificate of Philippine registry in the coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippine
Islands, and to citizens of the United States, does not violate the provisions of
paragraph 1 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 No treaty right
relied upon Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is held valid and constitutional .
The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street, Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-14078

March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,


vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary
of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with
words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the
present opinion This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of
the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the
constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people,
the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and
proceed first, to introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so
called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of
the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of
their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are
said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the
prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted
resolution No. 25 which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following
resolution:

"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were
all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other
measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no
successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one
place in order to make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which nonChristian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of
Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the
Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares
of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for
the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval
of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of
Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued
executive order No. 2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current
series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for
the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable,
the Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.

"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro,


pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised
Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco
River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place
in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan
Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon
conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance
with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph
1 and the executive order of the governor of the same province copied in
paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes
of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and
to introduce civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling
within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance
with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being
detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue
of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board
thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a
site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved
by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior
as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section
of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which
the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial
governor. With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial
board.

In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759
of the same Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation.
Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully
given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one
hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site
designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a
period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law.
The genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology,
would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397;
section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically
relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This
word, as will later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the
Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to
understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to
the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton
history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with
particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand
are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21,
1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on
September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149
of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and
the evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the blunders of their
ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in

a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and
special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of
these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the
Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new
Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the
year one thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were
actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it
was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in
places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains,
wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein
they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise
to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another.
Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our
predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys,
presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the
concentration of the indios intoreducciones; and to deal with their doctrine
with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so
that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good
treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of their
own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required
to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been
executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that
the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and
the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form
prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx

xxx

xxx

LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10,
1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF
THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should
have the facilities of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress,
husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have
their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.

THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS


PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated
in reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and
granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order
that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to
retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and
profit therefrom.
xxx

xxx

xxx

elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town
inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar,
on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on
July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646.
For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS,
NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.

LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE
KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the
right to alter or to remove thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted
and founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or
the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests,
or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving
information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private
interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be
always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the
judge or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO
SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be
an indio of the same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there
should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town
be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four
aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there
should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually

We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores,


or mestizos to live to live in the reduccionesand towns and towns of
the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade,
live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty
ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to
avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and
provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating
them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs,
idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and
pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation,
increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties
upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be
tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and
courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail
themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As
regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who
are children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their
houses andhaciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be
a harsh thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2,
pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve
the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in
"reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a
territory recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey
the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience
and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that
might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack

of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material
advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection and
vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the
separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the
civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of
depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of
the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied
themselves with this most important question, and that much has been
heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary
fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate
races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and
the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete
the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient
in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus
giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state
of things, taking into account the prestige which the country demands and
the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and
obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the
territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the
most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests
for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political
standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities,
ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also
after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the
Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial
prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos,
Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities,
held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the
inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission
of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only
form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these
objects, I hereby promulgate the following:
DECREE.

1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this
date, to be governed by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed
in this decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the
customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a
part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races
which may be divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which
live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another,
made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely
the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans
shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and
missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in
the work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have
executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed,
from now on, with all the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the
taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already
subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of
local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and
schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication,
endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or
settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at
the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and
obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only
exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render
personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands
appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to
move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a
new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most
convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in
either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with
the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be
established an armed force composed precisely of native Christian, the
organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based
upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).

6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns
understand all the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they
have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products
thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by
the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and
with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from
engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the
violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the
territory of the rebellious indiosshall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond
the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever
convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the
fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight
years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not
subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns
for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families;
concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they
wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year, and
clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so
far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their
own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the
establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall
teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or
facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from contributions and
tributes for ten years and from thequintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years;
and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones
who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the
province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the
advantages offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their
new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which
place them in communication with one another and with the Christians;
provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences,
when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations,
and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be
authorized in the towns already constituted.

11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the
tribes, that, disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered
them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing
from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for
the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the
organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural
guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the
expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and
implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment
shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military
headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to
study the zones where such operations shall take place and everything
conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and
other subordinates to my authorities, local authorities, and other
subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give
the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within
the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the
provinces in the southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the
preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, ViceRoyal Patron, a council or permanent commission which shall attend to and
decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing
regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of
provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to
the foregoing, in brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be
promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective
jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion,
vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question
as to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing
one.
1. Organic law.

The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American
Government in the Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the
Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the
Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have
remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of
particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should
adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our
North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government
and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling
to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise
and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and
active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an
Organic Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to
provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for
the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of
the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over
the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain
exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other nonChristian tribes.

2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the
Philippine Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49
concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal
Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the
city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and government of the
Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397,
the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of
settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of
the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been
carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the
primitive peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9,
1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province
of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855,
1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya,
Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of
these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE
PROVINCE OF MINDORO.

The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred
the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the
Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine
Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the
Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and
Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint
senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the
Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth
district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of nonChristian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the
inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and
representatives( sec. 22).

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine


Commission, that:

Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between
the territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory
which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial
governor is further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and

SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not


progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them
under any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is
authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing
with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their
designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties:
Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess
of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred
and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil
Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."

approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with


such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not
exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of
his province to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for
successful local popular government, and his supervision and control over
them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and
individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any
settlement of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course
practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to
sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as
a township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by
the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the
passage of the same is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of
'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the
enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act
No. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in
general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of
1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a
settled and consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their
advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying
forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the
Commission.

The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes."
These words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the
Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission,
establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine
Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be
mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have
been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the
coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections
2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422,
2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the
Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall
include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec.
2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course
result in giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who
profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess
the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited
section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as
Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt,
"Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan
Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p.
300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to
ascertain what is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be
seen by the provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the
authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands
not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers
similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory
not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has,
time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the
Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code.
The first section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the
article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The specially organized
provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and
Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen
fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly
coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular
representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some
of who are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law
specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception
is likewise inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a
particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular province because of its
location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of
civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words
usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The
Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people under his
jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the
"backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See
Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third
Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People
of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to
provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the
Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is
substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and
sections 701 et seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917.
For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct
"systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view
to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in
civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose
as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code

concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the
point, the court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a
tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes,
celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites
prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the
accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of
intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration
as a second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have
been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of
the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called
Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of
the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all
governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a
letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by
the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether
people who were originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or
who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the
purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or nonChristians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these
islands which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable
designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so
great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act.
It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one
most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much
to legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those
lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage,
be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of
civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of
baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the
member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt
even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain
under the jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of

government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to


which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself
accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who
concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary
instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the
Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this
court, has the following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but
while no other better classification has as yet been made the present
classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the
same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior
(of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization
rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of
religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that
Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the
Collector of Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula
taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the
Interior was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the
interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of the Collector
of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from
the payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has
interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some
form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all
other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons
preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt
from the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans,
Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in
cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is
not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that
decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent
on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the
mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this
question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his
religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe,

would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a


prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from
the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however,
continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs,
Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula
taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities
mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered
throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila
also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore
being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad
ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized
people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter
No. 327, approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial
treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers
regarding cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they
come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming
members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following
clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings
thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by
reason of the fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their
uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be
divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and
uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have had
and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body
politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that
governs the other members of that community and from and after the date
when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other
taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after
the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him
as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen
subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H

cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and
without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in
determining whether or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not
the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his
maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well
known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization
and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this
reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this
office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the
Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no
well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth
are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other
recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal
Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector
of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa,
Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a
transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of
Constabulary request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a nonChristian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions
were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a
Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law
and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No.
1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same authorities
hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is
probable that the person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in
purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same
make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639.

At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the
law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has
in the provisions of the Administrative code which we are studying, we
submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would
include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or
strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized
members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without
home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law
and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the
inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as
distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized
life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs
of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be
occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish
legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of
the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077
and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as
equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only
because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its
lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making
distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De.
David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the
population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes.
(Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director
of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in
the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing
Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the
Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian
tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which
sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different
executive officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian"
refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly,

to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities.

It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be
terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United
States.

E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The
Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the
Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia
de los nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer,"
"pagan," "negro." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great
number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain
inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was
given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three
Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a
sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies
"ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed
back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were
called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and
have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid,
primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The
manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the
preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of
the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy
adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the
Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian
people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United
States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is
insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been
treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government
of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward.

Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore


mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those
humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the
opinion goes on "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian
nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object
by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United
States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of
the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The
court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the
United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion
in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States,
both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has
always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of
American towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies before the
Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in
the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and
hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate
title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or
transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount
authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the
State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was
the only mode in which this could be done. The United States recognized no
right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by
treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally
difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as
States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but
as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State
within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:

It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of


Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are
communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their
daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the
States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling,
the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest
enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in
which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the
power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress,
and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the
General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak
and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government,
because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has
never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to
be considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such
that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands
notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the
reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding their interests and
founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that
during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards
requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in
the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only does the
Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians
tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of
judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized
nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all
dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or
territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the
power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the
subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of
the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488;
U.S.vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra;
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee
Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomasvs. Gay
[1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553;
Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84;

Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S..,
598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever,
therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has
full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to
give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property.
(U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken
line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might
result in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879],
Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas
corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing
Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition
alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the
Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time
previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations
therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then
endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or
assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and
without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were
arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The
substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of,
and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a
reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory had
departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the request of
the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which
required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be
arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal
imprisonment by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater importance,
related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the
purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian
escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government
had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the
court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the
purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain
officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the
reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary
power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be

questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing,
the exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United
States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a
federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be
confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where
he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United
States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the
military department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color
of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to
the Indian Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the
more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass
on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States,
and in violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from
custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as
authority to determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of
the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of theHabeas Corpus Act, and
as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse
[1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not
exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian
reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different
parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any previous
consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been
made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the
country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is
that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the
government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to
upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful

reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different
Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not
delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the
Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power
should be zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however,
disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by
Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true
distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z.
R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by
Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature
may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom
t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to
give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the
enactment of section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature
merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial
board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the
law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to
require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one
hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by
the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised
Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of
the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to
the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal,
especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before saying

that this language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for
the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not
doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such
supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special
provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as
corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S..,
364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court:
U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An
exception to the general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are
better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department
head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf
of his unknown clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous.
In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it
provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result,
them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate
between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently,
unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the
Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial
construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the
statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as
hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given
to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to
religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative
action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines

Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code
of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious
differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's
instructions of to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing
"That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and these provisions, it has been
said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick
Wo vs.Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then
as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible
with the possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics,
p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized
licentiousness that trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high
civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can understand.
Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on
others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who
is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not
being forced to do what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the
Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac
according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions
essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in
Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.
On any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its

members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself
would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all
could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right
of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or
his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is,
of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of
his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government
especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution to
interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very wellordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its
members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times,
under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may
demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason
and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario
Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a
civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in
others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist
and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but
is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been
endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the
common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the
citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will;
to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that
purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to
his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the
guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to
labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which
are ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866],
4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179
U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902],
114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly
apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty
regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual

and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license.
The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law
for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if
exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally
natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the
citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order
and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See
Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs.Cruz
[1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.
Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before
the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the
meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,
property, an immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice
are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the
discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See
McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind
sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means
simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be
reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the
citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104,
affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of
law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of
the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not
infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have
a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made
later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.

The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to


the United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine
Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall
involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since
reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in
the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with
necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States
Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary
servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced,
compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The
term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any
servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have
been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for
their freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under which the
State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at
this moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible
to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to
legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add
to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we
are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of
the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with
self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be
said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill
Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the
judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided
the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for
the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right
to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the
public interest. "There can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the
Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only
by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation

of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil.,
580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before
finally deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by
section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the
intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative
intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the
Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the
following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the
Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The SolicitorGeneral adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection
of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized
customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the
motives for its selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken
together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918,
made a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good one;
that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests,
construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction
by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear
to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily
a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly
behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results
obtained during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the
institution definitely justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation.
Such was naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his
return to Manila, made the following statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those
who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the influence of
civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them
into political communities and to educate their children with the
object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them

to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state


and on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and
make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the
non-Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the
advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and
unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the
adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of
seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in
organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public
health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to
facilitate their development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among
non-Christians, to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain
amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially
agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private
capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued
among the non-Christian people. These people are being taught and guided
to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the
benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits
are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized
settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the
Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent
communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid
them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse,
educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized

life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the
purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic,
social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized
inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with
the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial,
and economic development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208,
2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes,
defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in the following
unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work
for advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian
Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and
complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political
development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering
permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the
Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the
Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States,
proper wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may
not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be
advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently
working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the
Government is evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes,
leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors,
uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the
Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a
reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to
improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this
method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea
adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes
and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be improved,
that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in
some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized
people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we
know that the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not
free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate

brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which
citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the
Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag
upon the progress of the State.

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not
have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful
way?

In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of
the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are
again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from
predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such
crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after
commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to
develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive
regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.

To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of
such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar,
that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare
and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this
people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of
savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in
its true and noble sense.

Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the
State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to
protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great
law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.

In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the


Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or
guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as
the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of
civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction
burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its
interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty
they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will
ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their
ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will
be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty
and does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the
right to do anything they will going from one place to another in the
mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins
thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how
can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of
law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended


more and more towards the education and civilization of such people and
fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage
of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to
a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the
light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the
gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work
simply because a certain element, believing that their personal interests
would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the
authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization?
Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem
this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire
because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that
Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional
guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue
the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus
left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to
attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal
with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao.
There they are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions.
They are being made to understand that they object of the government is to

organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are
being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school
especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from them
in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be
assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves
or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not
work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary
servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some
other places under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is
invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not
have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another
as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are
roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of
public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands,
why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a
certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all
over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of
the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the
proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government.
For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return
to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is
provinced for, you can not make them live together and the noble intention of
the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.

presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the
law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined,
there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the
courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity
of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the
attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily
hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may
the right and liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will
of the Government? It is a question which has assailed the very existence of
government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical
subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum
of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very
existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to
some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be
benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can
go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will
be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms
of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as
widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The
courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of
the government in this progressive march.

Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections
and to reach a general conclusion.

Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot
fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an
unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic
remedy.

In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go
where he pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To
furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2
U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess
absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of
marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and
followed time and again without question.

Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained
for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
and it applies alike to all of a class.

It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and
defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official.
What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer
would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the
law would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the

As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt,
would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the
courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision
with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern
Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:

We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every
really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined
on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case
or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing
conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes
will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or
principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast
its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time
as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called
non-Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental
policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to
unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception
of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in
intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be
populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the
Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino
people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must
be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the
country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the
Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the
best considered case is toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever
political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms
for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal
contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in
the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts
must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the
effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's
performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception
which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other
departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code
does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny
to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in
accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of
the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus
can, therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes
against petitioners. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-33237 April 15, 1988


GREGORIO T. CRESPO, in His Capacity as Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva
Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA and PEDRO T. WYCOCO, respondents.
Bernardo P. Abesamis for petitioner.
Cecilio F. Wycoco for respondents.

PADILIA, J.:
Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local
elections of 1967. On 25 January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed against
him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and
oppression. 1 As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should
not be dealt with administrdatively, with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in
accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. 2
On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent
Provincial Board conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During
the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence,
testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented,
the respondent Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending
petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. 3
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for preliminary
injunction, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public
respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin
public respondent from enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive
suspension and from proceeding further with the administrative case.
According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied in Resolution
No. 51 issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking
and grossly violative of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing
and investigation of the truth or falsity of charges before preventive suspension is
allowed. In issuing the order of preventive suspension, the respondent Provincial
Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated the fundamental and elementary
principles of due process. 4

On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. 5 We agree with the
petitioner that he was denied due process by respondent Provincial Board.
In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 6 this Court held:
It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is
well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment,
profession, trade or calling is a "property right," and the wrongful
interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is
considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional
guaranty of due process of law. 7
Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving the
petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not
fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its
Memorandum, contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner
mayor made known by a request in writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial
Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said petitioner
mayor at the usual time of the respondent Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire
of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner mayor to appear as requested by
him, he failed to appeal." 8
The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in the absence of proof or
evidence to support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15 February 1971,
nothing therein can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written
explanation submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The assailed order was
issued mainly on the basis of the evidence presented ex parte by respondent
Wycoco.
In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said:
From the earliest inception of instutional government in our country,
the concepts of notice and hearing have been fundamental. A fair
and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without the
right to notice and to be board. The emphasis on substantive due
process and other recent ramifications of the due process clause
sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due
process was initially concerned with fair procedure. Every law
student early learns in law school definition submitted by counsel
Mr. Webster in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4
Wheat. 518) that due process is the equivalent of law of the land
which means "The general law; a law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,

property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules


which govern society.
A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment
only after a lawful hearing by a coldly neutral and impartial judge
are essential elements of procedural due process.

G.R. No. 112386 June 14, 1994


MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and AGUSTIN B. DOCENA, respondents.
Semaco P. Sacmar & Associates for petitioner.

We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos (63 SCRA


392), which, unlike the case before us now, was only a summary
action for ejectment that:
In an adversary proceeding, fairness and
prudence dictate that a judgment, based only on
plaintiffs evidence adduced ex parte and
rendered without hearing defendant's evidence,
should be avoided as much as possible. In order
that bias may not be imputed to the judge, he
should have the patience and circumspection to
give the opposing party a chance to present his
evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's
proof might not be adequate to overthrow the
case for the plaintiff. A display of petulance and
impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of
conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge". 10
The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records do not show that in
the last local elections held on 18 January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public
office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on 3 May 1971 is LIFTED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner Marcelino C. Libanan, the incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar, was
a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of that province prior to the 11 May 1992
elections. He was among those charged before the Sandiganbayan, on 25 May 1992,
with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in an information, docketed
Criminal Case No. 17756, stating
That on or about 08 January 1991, and for sometime thereafter, in
Borongan, Eastern Samar, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Lutgardo B. Barbo, Governor of Eastern
Samar; Camilo A. Camenforte, Vice-Governor of same province;
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members Marcos B. Alido, Nonato A.
Gerna, Ismael G. Kho, Marcelino C. Libanan, Nicolas O. Pimentel,
and Generoso A. Yu, of the same province, conspiring with one
another, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully, through evident
bad faith and manifest partiality, prevent and exclude Agustin B.
Docena, a duly appointed and Qualified replacement of deceased
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Luis A. Capito, from exercising
his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said body, by
promulgating in their official capacities Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Resolution No. 01, Series of 1991, wherein accused expressed
their recognition of Atty. Socrates B. Alar as the official replacement
of aforesaid deceased member, notwithstanding the recall of his
appointment by the Department of Local Government, to the
damage and prejudice of Agustin B. Docena.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
On motion of the prosecution for the suspension of the accused public
officials pendente lite, and finding that said accused were charged under a valid
information, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, dated 26
July 1993, to the following effect:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Gov. Lutgardo


Barbo, Vice-Gov. Marcelino C. Libanan, and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan members Nonato A. Gerna and Generoso A. Yu are
hereby suspended from their respective public positions, or from
any other public office that they may be holding, the same to
commence upon their receipt hereof and for a period of ninety (90)
days thereafter.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Hon. Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, and the Hon.
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for their information and
guidance and they are hereby directed to inform this Court within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof of any action they have
undertaken on the matter.
SO ORDERED. 2
Accused Barbo and Libanan filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which
the Sandiganbayan denied in its resolution of 30 September 1993. From the orders,
Libanan appealed.
Petitioner presents three grounds to support his appeal, to wit: That
I. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION IF
EXECUTED WOULD CONSTITUTE AN
AFFRONT ON PETITIONER(S)
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
II. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION ONCE
IMPLEMENTED WOULD AMOUNT TO AN
ASSAULT OF THE SACRED COVENANT
REPOSED ON PETITIONER VICE-GOVERNOR,
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN BY THE PEOPLE OF
EASTERN SAMAR.
III. THE REASONS SOUGHT TO BE
PREVENTED BY THE SUSPENSION
ORDERPENDENTE LITE NO LONGER EXIST.
The petition is without merit.
The amendatory provision of Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019, here applicable,
provides:

Sec. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public


officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under title 7, book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. . . .
Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts
supposedly committed while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer
attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent
Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. The implementation of the suspension order, he
further claims, would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
In Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 this Court rejected a similar argument advanced by
Governor Deloso who, at the time of issuance of the suspension order, was already
occupying the office of governor and not the position of municipal mayor that he held
previously when charged with having violated the Anti-Graft Law. Prior to Deloso,
in Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, 4 the suspension of then Cavite mayor Bayot was also
sustained even as he was charged for acts committed as a government auditor of the
Commission on Audit. In both instances, this Court ruled that the term "office" used in
the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding
and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged.
Obviously, the suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without
due process of law. Public office is "a public agency or
trust," 5 and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision 6 which
petitioner invokes.
Libanans second contention neither holds water. His so-called "covenant" with the
people of Eastern Samar is far from being synonymous to, or the equivalent of,
license, and it is not one that can cut athwart the long arm of the law. In Oliveros vs.
Villaluz, 7 we have said:
Since the criminal prosecution against petitioner-accused is
concededly not abated by the fact of his reelection, the pendency of
such criminal case under a valid information under Republic Act
3019 may clearly be and supplies the legal basis for his suspension
from office in a subsequent term in the event of his reelection by
virtue of the provisions of section 13 of the Act.
The third assigned error raised by petitioner need not be delved into. When the
statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination

or rationalization of the law. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the
suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution against him.
This Court has repeatedly held that
such preventive suspension is mandatory, 8 and there are no "ifs" and "buts" about
it. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed resolution of respondent
Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in toto.

On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for
declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her
from receiving survivorship pension.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146494

1985.5 On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas' application for retirement


"effective 17 February 1984," granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five
years and a monthly annuity thereafter.6 Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed
with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS
denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no
right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.7 According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one
year from his date of retirement on "17 February 1984."

July 14, 2004

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner,


vs.
MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated 13 December 2000 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48784. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cebu City ("trial court"), which held
that Milagros Orbiso Montesclaros is entitled to survivorship pension.

On 9 November 1994, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
survivorship pension. The trial court ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due
including interest. Citing Articles 1158 and 1179 of the Family Code, the trial court held
that retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned for services rendered and
for which the pensioner has contributed through monthly salary deductions, are
onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are property the pensioner acquired
through labor, such benefits are conjugal property. The trial court held that the
prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for being inconsistent with
the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has retroactive effect if it does not
prejudice or impair vested rights.
GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review.
In the meantime, in a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that
she has accepted GSIS' decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship
pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case.10 Commenting on
Milagros' letter, GSIS asserts that the Court must decide the case on the merits.11
The Court will resolve the issue despite the manifestation of Milagros. The issue
involves not only the claim of Milagros but also that of other surviving spouses who
are similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the proviso.
Social justice and public interest demand that we resolve the constitutionality of the
proviso.

The Facts
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros ("Nicolas") married Milagros
Orbiso ("Milagros") on 10 July 1983.3 Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he
married Milagros who was then 43 years old.
On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the Government Service Insurance System
("GSIS") an application for retirement benefits effective 18 February 1985 under
Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977 ("PD 1146"). In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros
as his sole beneficiary.4 Nicolas' last day of actual service was on 17 February

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the retirement benefits are
onerous and conjugal because the pension came from the deceased pensioner's
salary deductions. The Court of Appeals held that the pension is not gratuitous since
it is a deferred compensation for services rendered.
The Issues
GSIS raises the following issues:

1. Whether Section 16 of PD 1146 entitles Milagros to survivorship pension;


2. Whether retirement benefits form part of conjugal property;
3. Whether Articles 254 and 256 of the Family Code repealed Section 18 of
PD 1146.12
The Court's Ruling
The pertinent provisions of PD 1146 on survivorship benefits read:
SEC. 16. Survivorship Benefits. When a member or pensioner dies, the
beneficiary shall be entitled to survivorship benefits provided for in sections
seventeen and eighteen hereunder. The survivorship pension shall consist
of:
(1) basic survivorship pension which is fifty percent of the basic monthly
pension; and
(2) dependent's pension not exceeding fifty percent of the basic monthly
pension payable in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by
the System.
SEC. 17. Death of a Member. (a) Upon the death of a member, the primary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to:
(1) the basic monthly pension which is guaranteed for five
years; Provided, That, at the option of the beneficiaries, it may be
paid in lump sum as defined in this Act: Provided, further, That, the
member is entitled to old-age pension at the time of his death; or
(2) the basic survivorship pension which is guaranteed for thirty
months and the dependent's pension; Provided, That, the deceased
had paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions within the five-year
period immediately preceding his death, or a total of at least one
hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to his death.
(b) At the end of the guaranteed periods mentioned in the preceding subsection (a), the survivorship pension shall be paid as follows:
(1) when the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he shall
receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he remarries;
(2) when only dependent children are the survivors, they shall be
entitled to the survivorship pension for as long as they are qualified;

(3) when the survivors are the dependent spouse and the
dependent children, they shall be entitled to the survivorship
pension so long as there are dependent children and, thereafter,
the surviving spouse shall receive the basic survivorship pension
for life or until he remarries.
(c) In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the secondary beneficiaries
designated by the deceased and recorded in the System, shall be entitled to:
(1) a cash payment equivalent to thirty times the basic survivorship
pension when the member is qualified for old-age pension; or
(2) a cash payment equivalent to fifty percent of the average
monthly compensation for each year he paid contributions, but not
less than five hundred pesos; Provided, That, the member paid at
least thirty-six monthly contributions within the five-year period
immediately preceding his death or paid a total of at least one
hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to his death.
(d) When the primary beneficiaries are not entitled to the benefits mentioned
in paragraph (a) of this section, they shall receive a cash payment equivalent
to one hundred percent of the average monthly compensation for each year
the member paid contributions, but not less than five hundred pesos. In the
absence of primary beneficiaries, the amount shall revert to the funds of the
System.
SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a pensioner, the primary
beneficiaries shall receive the applicable pension mentioned under
paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the
dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage
with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. When the pensioner dies within the
period covered by the lump sum, the survivorship pension shall be paid only
after the expiration of the said period. This shall also apply to the pensioners
living as of the effectivity of this Act, but the survivorship benefit shall be
based on the monthly pension being received at the time of death.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are (1) the dependent spouse until
such spouse remarries, and (2) the dependent children.13 The secondary
beneficiaries are the dependent parents and legitimate descendants except
dependent children.14 The law defines dependent as "the legitimate, legitimated,
legally adopted, acknowledged natural or illegitimate child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age or is over twenty-one years
of age but physically or mentally incapacitated and incapable of self-support." The
term also includes the legitimate spouse dependent for support on the
member, and the legitimate parent wholly dependent on the member for support.15

The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD
1146, which proviso prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship
pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before
the pensioner qualified for the pension ("the proviso").
We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of
Milagros' claim, is unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause. The
proviso is also discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law.
Retirement Benefits as Property Interest
Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee to pay
monthly contributions. PD 1146 mandates the government to include in its annual
appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the contributions. It is
compulsory on the government employer to take off and withhold from the employees'
monthly salaries their contributions and to remit the same to GSIS.16 The government
employer must also remit its corresponding share to GSIS.17 Considering the
mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the government
pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation.
In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is
that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is
part of the terms of employment.18 The reason for providing retirement benefits is to
compensate service to the government. Retirement benefits to government
employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the
government service. Retirement benefits to government employees reward them for
giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country.19
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires
a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause.20 Retirees enjoy
a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment
under pre-existing law.21 Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that
have become due as provided under the terms of the public employees' pension
statute.22 No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of
law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.23
In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also provides for benefits to
survivors of deceased government employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the
dependent spouse is one of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A widow's right
to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husband's
contractual compensation.24
Denial of Due Process
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." The proviso is
unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouse's claim for survivorship
pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the

three-year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the


surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The
proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and
integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees and their
dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the
government employees.
The "whereas" clauses of PD 1146 state:
WHEREAS, the Government Service Insurance System in promoting the
efficiency and welfare of the employees of the Government of the
Philippines, administers the laws that grant to its members social security
and insurance benefits;
WHEREAS, it is necessary to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of
the funds administered by the System; to guarantee to the government
employee all the benefits due him; and to expand and increase the benefits
made available to him and his dependents to the extent permitted by
available resources;
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws have impeded the efficient and
effective discharge by the System of its functions and have unduly
hampered the System from being more responsive to the dramatic changes
of the times and from meeting the increasing needs and expectations of the
Filipino public servant;
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that have prejudiced, rather than
benefited, the government employee; restricted, rather than broadened, his
benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the payment of benefits, must now
yield to his paramount welfare;
WHEREAS, the social security and insurance benefits of government
employees must be continuously re-examined and improved to assure
comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance programs that
will provide benefits responsive to their needs and those of their dependents
in the event of sickness, disability, death, retirement, and other
contingencies; and to serve as a fitting reward for dedicated public service;
WHEREAS, in the light of existing economic conditions affecting the welfare
of government employees, there is a need to expand and improve the social
security and insurance programs administered by the Government Service
Insurance System, specifically, among others, by increasing pension
benefits, expanding disability benefits, introducing survivorship benefits,
introducing sickness and income benefits, and eventually extending the
compulsory coverage of these programs to all government employees
regardless of employment status.
PD 1146 has the following purposes:

a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by


the System;
b. to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and
c. to expand, increase, and improve the social security and insurance
benefits made available to him and his dependents such as:
increasing pension benefits
expanding disability benefits
introducing survivorship benefits
introducing sickness income benefits
extending compulsory membership to all government employees
irrespective of status25
The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of
the deceased member or pensioner to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse
economic effects resulting from the death of the wage earner or pensioner.26
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivor's
benefits under a pension system. However, statutes sometimes require that the
spouse should have married the employee for a certain period before the employee's
death to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain. One example is
the Illinois Pension Code which restricts survivor's annuity benefits to a surviving
spouse who was married to a state employee for at least one year before the
employee's death. The Illinois pension system classifies spouses into those married
less than one year before a member's death and those married one year or more.
The classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of deathbed
marriages where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries another so
that person becomes eligible for benefits. In Sneddon v. The State Employee's
Retirement System of Illinois,27 the Appellate Court of Illinois held that such
classification was based on difference in situation and circumstance, bore a rational
relation to the purpose of the statute, and was therefore not in violation of
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection of the law.28 The requirements for a valid and
reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.29 Thus, the law
may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real
and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.30

The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso
discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner
within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.31 Under the proviso,
even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the
pensioner's death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension
if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for
pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not
provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is
to prevent "deathbed marriages," then we do not see why the proviso reckons the
three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from
the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial
distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within
three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted
primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason
Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 ("RA 8291"),32 otherwise
known as the "Government Service Insurance Act of 1997," the law revising the old
charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving
spouse who married the member immediately before the member's death is still
qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving
spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit.33
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three
years before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail
of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the
survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS
member within three years before the member's retirement or death. The law
acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to
receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a
sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and
defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for being
violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
law the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states
that "the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with
the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension." The Government Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of
Milagros O. Montesclaros for survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 34163

September 18, 1931

GREGORIO PEDRO, petitioner-appellant,


vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
Arsenio Santos for appellant.
Provincial Fiscal Opinion and Guevara, Francisco and Recto for appellees.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This case is before us by virtue of the appeal taken by the petitioner Gregorio Pedro
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing his action for the
annulment of an ordinance, with costs against him.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as
committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928,
approved by the acting councilors, is valid and legal.
2. The lower court erred in denying the petitioner an acquired right,
notwithstanding Ordinance No. 35 and the permit giving him by the president
in accordance therewith.
3. The lower court erred in holding that the opening, maintenance, and
operation of the Galas cockpit is injurious to the consumptive patients of the
Santol Sanatorium.
4. The lower court erred in abstaining from making any ruling regarding the
legality of the action taken by the provincial board, suspending the effects of
Ordinance No. 35 of the municipal council of Caloocan, and in finally
disapproving it, according to the resolutions enacted by it and numbered
1135, series of 1928, and 154, series of 1929.
5. The lower court erred in dismissing this case and in not declaring
permanent the injunction sought, and in not sentencing the plaintiffs
[respondents] jointly and severally to pay the damages claimed in the
complaint.
The following relevant facts are necessary for the decision of the question raised by
the instant appeal:

On May 8, 1926, there was organized in the municipality of Caloocan, Province of


Rizal, an association for the construction and exploitation of cockpits, called "La
Sociedad Bighani."
On May 22, 1926, Eugenio Tansioco, the president of the association, applied to the
municipal president of Caloocan and obtain a permit to construct a building of strong
materials at Galas, in said municipality, to be used as cockpit, upon payment of the
proper fees. (Exhibit 1.)
While the construction was under way, Pablo, then president of Caloocan, addressed
a communication to Eugenio Tansioco on June 15, 1926, warning him that the site of
the building was not the one designated by the chief of police, and that it was within
the radius of 1,500 meters from the hospital of the Philippine Antituberculosis Society
in Santol, in direct contravention of Ordinance No. 15, series of 1926, enacted on
May, 1926.
The permit having been annulled, and the payments theretofore made forfeited, the
"Sociedad Bighani" filed civil case No. 30537 in the Court of First Instance of Manila
on September 21, 1926, against said Pablo Pablo, as municipal president of
Caloocan, et al., for a preliminary injunction requiring them to refrain from impeding or
obstructing the operation and exploitation of the Bighani cockpit, which at that time
was completed and ready to be thrown open to the public.
On August 26, 1927, the Court of first Instance of Manila rendered judgment
absolving the defendants from the complaint, which was affirmed by this court on
October 15, 1928. (Company "Bighani" vs. 53 Phil., 886.)
On September 18, 1927, the municipal council of Caloocan enacted Ordinance No.
34, providing in the first section, among other things, that outside the barrios of Loma,
Talipapa, and Novaliches, where only one cockpit might be established, cockpits
might be established at a distance of not less than 1,500 meters from another
licensed cockpit, public schoolhouse, or any hospital or charitable institution existing
within the municipal radius.
As a result of the general election held on June 5, 1928, in the municipality of
Caloocan, Rizal, the municipal council, formerly comprising Pablo Pablo, as
president, Blas Bernardino, as vice-president, and Severino Paganiban, Diego
Justo, Esteban Sanchez, Patricio Galuran, Raymundo Andres, Emiliano Samson,
Vicente Sevilla, Lucas Pascual, Placido C. del Mundo, Delfin Rodriguez, Jorge
Nadurata, Anacleto Victoria, Emilio Acab, and Mateo Austria, as councilors, was
substituted by another comprising the newly elected Dominador Aquino, as president,
Diego Justo, as vice-president, and Blas Bernardino, Flaviano de Jesus, Pedro
Galang, Celestino C. Celosa, Nicolas Carpio, Lucas Pascual, Basilio Biglang-awa,

and Lucas Bustamante, as councilors, who were inducted into office on October 16th
of that year.
On December 21, 1928, the plaintiff herein, Gregorio Pedro, acquired by absolute
sale all the rights and interests of the "Sociedad Bighani" in the cockpit bearing its
name. (Exhibit M.)
On the same date, December 21, 1928, said plaintiff, Gregorio Pedro, addressed a
communication to the municipal council of Caloocan soliciting a permit to open,
operate, maintain, and exploit said cockpit for a period of four years, binding himself
to observe to the letter all municipal ordinances on cockpits. (Exhibit A.)
On December 26, 1928, the municipal council of Caloocan passed resolution No. 202
approving Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, amending section 1 of Ordinance No.
34, series of 1927, providing, among other things that only one cockpit could be
established in each of the barrios of Galas, Loma, Talipapa, and Novaliches, and any
other place outside said barrios, provided, in the latter case, said cockpits are at a
distance of not less than 1,000 meters from another licensed cockpit, and 500 meters
from any hospital or charitable institution within the municipality of Caloocan. (Exhibit
C.)
On the same date, December 26, 1928, the municipal councilors of Caloocan, Blas
Bernardino, Flaviano de Jesus, and Pedro Galang, signed and forwarded to the
provincial governor of Rizal an accusation against Dominador Aquino, the municipal
president, and the other councilors who approved Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928,
alleging that they had been bribed to vote in favor of that ordinance. (Exhibit 4.)
The provincial governor endorsed the accusation to the provincial board of Rizal,
which through resolution No. 1110 dated December 27, 1928, ordered the temporary
suspension of the members denounced pending the administrative investigation of
the accusation. By virtue of said resolution No. 1110 of the provincial board of Rizal,
and using one of the powers conferred upon him by law, the provincial governor of
Rizal, Eligio Naval, suspended the municipal president and the denounced members
from their respective offices on December 28, 1928. (Exhibits 5 to 5-E.)
On the same date, December 28, 1928, between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning, the
appellant Gregorio Pedro paid into the municipal treasury the sum of P2,050 as a
license fee on his cockpit for the first quarter of the year 1929, and the proper receipt
(Exhibit L), and the permit (Exhibit D), were issued to him authorizing him to operate,
maintain, exploit, and open to the public a day cockpit in the barrio of Galas,
Caloocan, Rizal, for a period of four years.
On December 29, 1928, the municipal council ad interim in Caloocan, passed
resolution No. 9, series of 1928, approving Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928,

suspending the effects of resolution No. 202 of the suspended council, approving
Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, while a special committee created by the same
ordinance investigated the expediency of permitting the exploitation and opening of
the Galas cockpit at the site applied for by the proprietor, Gregorio Pedro. (Exhibit 6.)
On the same date, December 29, 1928, the provincial board of Rizal passed
resolution No. 1135 suspending the effects of resolution No. 202 of the municipal
council of Caloocan approving Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, pending final
decision on the validity of said ordinance by said board. (Exhibit H.)
On January 16, 1929, the Director of the Santol Tuberculosis Sanatorium addressed
a communication to the temporary president of the municipal council of Caloocan,
Flaviano de Jesus, stating that a cockpit established in the barrio of Galas, owing to
the noise and clamor of the crowd, would retard the recovery of the patients in said
sanatorium, and would tend to increase the danger of spreading the disease among
those visiting the cockpit. (Exhibit 11.)
On February 1, 1929, the Chief of the Executive Bureau confirmed the resolution of
the provincial board of Rizal holding the respondents in the administrative
investigation mentioned above guilty of maladministration, and imposing upon each of
them a punishment of thirty days' suspension. (Exhibit 7.)
On the same date, February 1, 1929, following the decision of the Executive Bureau
mentioned above, the provincial board of Rizal, through resolution No. 154,
disapproved said resolution No. 202 of the municipal council of Caloocan, approving
Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928. (Exhibit 1.)
On February 2, 1929, the president of the third sanitary division of Rizal, acting upon
the appellant's application filed on January 30, 1929, issued a certificate to the effect
that after a proper inspection of the Galas cockpit, he had found it to be in good
sanitary condition.
On February 7, 1929, Gregorio Pedro furnished a bond of P10,000 in favor of the
municipality of Caloocan to secure the payment of the fees accruing during the years
from 1929 to 1932, which is the period included in the license issued to him for the
opening and operation of his cockpit in Galas, and this bond was accepted and
approved by the respondent municipal president, Dominador Aquino, and certified by
the provincial treasurer, Jose Villegas. (Exhibit E.)
On February 13, 1929, councilor Lucas Bustamante submitted a resolution at a
special session of the municipal council of Caloocan, whereby said council appealed
to the Executive Bureau from the aforementioned resolution No. 154 of the provincial
board of Rizal, but the resolution did not pass owing to the lack of two-thirds of the
members necessary, with five members voting in favor and three against it.

On February 14, 1929, the appellant Gregorio Pedro sent the municipal president of
Caloocan a communication, informing him that having fulfilled all the requirements of
the law and the ordinances then in force, he would open his cockpit in Galas to the
public in the morning of February 17, 1929. (Exhibit J.)
On February 15, 1929, the respondent municipal president of Caloocan addressed a
communication to the appellant Gregorio Pedro informing him that under no
circumstance could said president permit the appellant to open his cockpit in Galas,
Caloocan, to the public, for Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, under which a permit
had been given him to open and exploit his aforesaid cockpit had been disapproved
by the provincial board of Rizal in its resolution No. 154, series of 1928, as a result of
which the aforementioned ordinance became null and void.
The first question to decide in this appeal is that raised in the first assignment of error,
to wit, whether Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved by the temporary
councilors, is valid.
The appellant argues for the nullity of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved on
December 29, 1928, by the temporary councilors appointed by the provincial
governor of Rizal, Eligio Naval, on the ground that (1) it impairs the acquired rights of
said appellant; (2) it was enacted on account of prejudice, because it was intended for
a special and not a general purpose, namely to prevent, at any cost, the opening,
maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the said petitioner-appellant; and (3) it
provides for special committee composed of persons who are not members of the
council, vested them with powers which of their very nature, cannot be delegated by
said council to that committee.
The petitioner-appellant contends that, having obtained the proper permit to maintain,
exploit, and open to the public the cockpit in question, having paid the license fee and
fulfilled all the requirements provided by Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, he has
acquired a right which cannot be taken away from him by Ordinance No. 36, series of
1928, which was subsequently approved. This court has already held that an
ordinance regulating the functioning of cockpits does not create irrevocable rights and
may be abrogated by another ordinance. (Vinco vs. Municipality of Hinigaran, 41
Phil., 790; Joaquin vs. Herrera, 37 Phil., 705; 12 Corpus Juris, 958, sec. 494; 37
Corpus Juris, 168.)
The petitioner-appellant also contends that said Ordinance No. 36 was passed due to
prejudice "because it was intended for a special and not a general purpose, namely to
prevent, at any cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the
said petitioner." The aforesaid Ordinance No. 36 was not approved for the purpose of
injuring the petitioner, but to correct an irregularity consisting in the passage of
Ordinance No. 35, which had been enacted to favor the said petitioner-appellant. The
"Sociedad Bighani," from which the herein petitioner-appellant acquired the

ownership of the cockpit here in question, was denied a license to operate it, because
it had been constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 15, series of 1926, later
amended by Ordinance No. 34, series of 1927. The "Sociedad Bighani" instituted
proceedings against the president and municipal council of Caloocan, Rizal, in civil
case No. 30537 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to prevent said defendants
from impeding the operation and exploitation of the Bighani cockpit, and the court
decided in favor of said defendants, absolving them from the complaint on the ground
among other reasons, that the Bighani cockpit had been constructed within the
prohibited distance from the Antitubercular Sanatorium of Santol, and that decision
was affirmed by this court on appeal. (Company "Bighani" vs. Pablo, supra.) The
cockpit in question now is the former Bighani cockpit mentioned above; it occupies
the same site; and the same hygienic reasons which prompted the enactment of
Ordinance No. 15, amended by Ordinance No. 34, cited above, exist now; therefore,
when this was amended by Ordinance No. 35, reducing the distance between a
cockpit and any hospital, so that the Bighani cockpit would be beyond said distance,
the municipal council which amended it acted with partiality towards a certain person,
namely, the petitioner-appellant, to the prejudice of the patients in the aforesaid
sanatorium. According to Elliot in his work "Municipal Corporations," cited by said
petitioner-appellant himself, said Ordinance No. 35 is void because it is partial. (Elliot,
Municipal Corporations, sec. 147; Dillon, Municipal Corporations, p. 915).
Ordinance No. 36, which seeks to correct said irregularity, suspended the effects of
said Ordinance No. 35, impliedly reestablishing Ordinance No. 34, is therefore valid.
The other reason given by the petitioner-appellant to show that Ordinance No. 36, is
void is that the municipal council in approving it delegated its legislative powers to a
special sanitary committee.
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, provides as follows:
SEC. 2. A committee is hereby provided for, to be composed of the president
of the third sanitary division of Caloocan, Rizal, a practising physician
residing in this municipality, and a member of the municipal council, whose
duty it shall be to make the necessary investigation to determine whether or
not the exploitation of the cockpit in the barrio of Galas for which Gregorio
Pedro has applied for a permit, would be injurious to any public or private
interest. This special committee shall make such investigation and submit a
report in due form to this municipal council within the shortest time possible
for its definite action.
The municipal council of Caloocan pro tempore therefore does not delegate by that
ordinance to the special committee thereby created any legislative function, but only
entrusts to it the study of the effect of the operation and exploitation of the cockpit
under consideration upon public and private interests, in order to determine whether

or not the license should issue. Informational work of this nature, owing to its
technical character, may be entrusted to technical committees. (12 Corpus Juris,
846.)
Having arrived at the conclusion that Ordinance No. 36 is valid and that the petitionerappellant has acquired no irrevocable right by virtue of the license granted him under
Ordinance No. 35, approved to favor him, which is therefore void, we need not
discuss the other assignments of error by the petitioner-appellant.

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986


EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F.
PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That a license authorizing the operation
and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived
without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when the
public interests so require; (2) that the work entrusted by a municipal council to a
special sanitary committee to make a study of the sanitary effects upon the
neighborhood of the establishment of a cockpit, is not legislative in character, but only
informational, and may be delegated; and (3) that an ordinance, approved by a
municipal council duly constituted, which suspends the effects of another which had
been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and legal.

CRUZ, J.:

By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby


affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the
Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more
popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with
all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter
contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally
heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the
electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition
candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.

The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a
result of supervening events it has become moot and academic. It is not as simple as
that. Several lives have been lost in connection with this case, including that of the
petitioner himself. The private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has
been defiled and the popular will scorned through a confabulation of those in
authority. This Court cannot keep silent in the face of these terrible facts. The motion
is denied.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election
developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to
railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission
on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were
dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division
of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the
proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission
on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of
his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the
petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already
indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of

Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by
the assailants who apparently believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder
was possibly one of the factors that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the
February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present
government under President Corazon C. Aquino.

of record that the petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents.
All the electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a
more active step as befitted its constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly and
honest elections. A more assertive stance could have averted the Sibalom election
eve massacre and saved the lives of the nine victims of the tragedy.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in
dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone
their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But
there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only
to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest
in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone
wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and
academic.

Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its
transparent bias in favor of the administration. This prejudice left many opposition
candidates without recourse except only to this Court.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must
also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we
cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer
possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice
demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though
gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that
elections during the period of the Marcos dictatorship were in the main a desecration
of the right of suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and violence, illegal listing of voters,
falsified returns, and other elections anomalies misrepresented and vitiated the
popular will and led to the induction in office of persons who did not enjoy the
confidence of the sovereign electorate. Genuine elections were a rarity. The price at
times was human lives. The rule was chicanery and irregularity, and on all levels of
the polls, from the barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites
and referenda that also elicited the derision and provoked the resentments of the
people.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of
elections in other provinces dominated by the KBL. Terrorism was a special feature,
as demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned, which victimized no less than
one of the main protagonists and implicated his rival as a principal perpetrator.
Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their supporters were
gripped with fear of violence at the hands of the party in power.
What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude
of the Commission on Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter

Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the
election returns, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to prevent the
impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein. 1 Specifically, the
petitioner charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation,
duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under
duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed
men of respondent Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was made of the municipalities
of Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of San Remigio, where the
petitioner claimed the election returns were not placed in the ballot boxes but merely
wrapped in cement bags or Manila paper.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the
provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend
the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. 3 On June 7, 1984, the
same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the
Commission. 4 On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of
canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. 5 Finally, on July 23,
1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition
which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the
province of Antique. 6
This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners
Jaime Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the
ground that he was a former law partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion
had refused. 7
The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.
The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second Division of
the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984,
proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973
Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective
provincial and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All
election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and
decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall
be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.
While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents have
arrived at opposite conclusions. The records are voluminous and some of the
pleadings are exhaustive and in part even erudite. And well they might be, for the
noble profession of the law-despite all the canards that have been flung against itexerts all efforts and considers all possible viewpoints in its earnest search of the
truth.
The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid
because all contests involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa come under
the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it should be, he
says, to insure a more careful decision, considering the importance of the offices
involved. The respondents, for their part, argue that only contests need to be heard
and decided en banc and all other cases can be-in fact, should be-filed with and
decided only by any of the three divisions.
The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible
distinction between the terms "contests" and "cases" to prove his point. 8 Simply put,
his contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the
private respondent was not yet a contest at that time and therefore could be validly
heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections, consonant with Section 3.
The issue was at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble by the
Commission under its power to administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections, 9 not its authority as sole judge of the election contest.
A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties for the
same office "in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder but also to
have himself inducted into the office." 10 No proclamation had as yet been made when

the petition was filed and later decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner nor the
private respondent had at that time assumed office, there was no Member of the
Batasang Pambansa from Antique whose election, returns or qualifications could be
examined by the Commission on Elections en banc.
In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding
election cases, according to this theory, the Constitution was laying down the general
rule. The exception was the election contest involving the members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc. 11 The en banc requirement
would apply only from the time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was
proclaimed as winner, for it was only then that a contest could be permitted under the
law. All matters arising before such time were, necessarily, subject to decision only by
division of the Commission as these would come under the general heading of
"election cases."
As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction
of the Commission on Elections into two, viz.: (1) over matters arising before the
proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its
administrative power; and (2) over matters arising after the proclamation, which could
be heard and decided only en banc in the exercise of its judicial power. Stated
otherwise, the Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of
its divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation matter affecting the candidates for the
Batasang Pambansa because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still another
way, the Commission en banc could not do what one of its divisions was competent to
do, i.e., decide a pre-proclamation controversy. Moreover, a mere division of the
Commission on Elections could hear and decide, save only those involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa, all
cases involving elective provincial and city officials from start to finish, including preproclamation controversies and up to the election protest. In doing so, it would
exercise first administrative and then judicial powers. But in the case of the
Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would begin only after the proclamation was
made and a contest was filed and not at any time and on any matter before that, and
always in the exercise only of judicial power.
This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the
whole, granting to the division while denying to the banc. We do not think this was the
intention of the Constitution. The framers could not have intended such an irrational
rule.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give
it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all

matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the
winners.
It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now
called "pre-proclamation controversies" is a relatively recent innovation in our laws,
having been introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as the
1978 Election Code. Section 175 thereof provided:
Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission
shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its
decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It may,motu
proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order the
suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any
proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in
Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.
Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of
public officers came under the complete jurisdiction of the competent court or tribunal
from beginning to end and in the exercise of judicial power only. It therefore could not
have been the intention of the framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth Charter was
adopted, and even in 1973, when the past Constitution was imposed, to divide the
electoral process into the pre-proclamation stage and the post-proclamation stage
and to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage, considering the first
administrative and the second judicial.
Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C. Section 2(2)
was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did not follow the strict definition of a
contention between the parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of 1971,
which presumably was taken into consideration when the 1973 Constitution was
being drafted, election contests included the quo warranto petition that could be filed
by any voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such
voter was himself not claiming the office involved. 12
The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it
should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used
in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973
Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the
title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the
winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to
stress, the term should be given a consistent meaning and understood in the same
sense under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is

necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting
and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns and "qualifications" to
matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.
All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
insofar as they applied to the members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa and,
under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided
by it only en banc.
We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and
decided by the Commission on Elections, only by division as a general rule except
where the case was a "contest" involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which
had to be heard and decided en banc.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that
cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases.
Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en
banconly after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already.
We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy
of many unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the frustration of the popular
will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory
would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being
summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in division,
without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the
Commission en banc.
After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to rectify
in time the proclamation summarily and not very judiciously made by the division.
While in the end the protestant might be sustained, he might find himself with only a
Phyrric victory because the term of his office would have already expired.
It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation
question upon the division, the Constitution did not intend to prevent the
Commission en banc from exercising the power directly, on the theory that the greater
power embraces the lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it could also allow the
division to act for it. That argument would militate against the purpose of the
provision, which precisely limited all questions affecting the election contest, as
distinguished from election cases in general, to the jurisdiction of the Commission en

bancas sole judge thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also
and even the division of the Commission A decision made on the contest by less than
the Commission en banc would not meet the exacting standard of care and
deliberation ordained by the Constitution
Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation
controversies in Section 175, supra, the law was obviously referring to the body
sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation controversies involved inAratuc vs.
Commission on Elections, 13 where the said provision was applied, were heard and
decided en banc.
Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded
cavalier attention by the respondent Commission on Elections is due process of law,
that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free society.
Commissioner Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was
formerly a law partner of the private respondent, he obstinately insisted on
participating in the case, denying he was biased. 14
Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power
at the time, and the particular relationship between Commissioner Opinion and MP
Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of
the body would be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's
refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the case to another
division cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter
belied his wounded protestations of innocence and proved the motives of the Second
Division when it rendered its decision.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. 15 To bolster that
requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just. 16 The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when
their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must
trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense
of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what
Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice.
There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed
to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized
after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and
also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are
supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared

script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions
only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the
law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only posssible,
due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense
of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion. Commissioner
Opinion, being a lawyer, should have recognized his duty and abided by this wellknown rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second Division
of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act, and
rendered the proceeding null and void. 17
Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place, not
the least significant of which was the February revolution of "people power" that
dislodged the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of travail for this captive
nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose
by assassins whose motive is yet to be disclosed. The private respondent has
disappeared with the "pomp of power" he had before enjoyed. Even the Batasang
Pambansa itself has been abolished, "an iniquitous vestige of the previous regime"
discontinued by the Freedom Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been suggested
not without reason, to send the recrds of this case to the archives and say the case is
finished and the book is closed.
But not yet.
Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in
the vigor of his youth because he dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a
meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in hopes of
safety and even reward, he chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did not tempt
him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and allexacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And though he fought not in
the barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier
nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies of his
race, unfortunately of his race too, who would impose upon the land a perpetual night
of dark enslavement. He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a
very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer because he was, like
Saul and Jonathan, "swifter than eagles and stronger than lions."
A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the late Justice
Calixto Zaldivar. I am the mother of Rhium Z. Sanchez, the grandmother of Plaridel
Sanchez IV and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of Mamerta Zaldivar. I lost all four of them
in the election eve ambush in Antique last year." She pleaded, as so did hundreds of
others of her provincemates in separate signed petitions sent us, for the early

resolution of that horrible crime, saying: "I am 82 years old now. I am sick. May I
convey to you my prayer in church and my plea to you, 'Before I die, I would like to
see justice to my son and grandsons.' May I also add that the people of Antique have
not stopped praying that the true winner of the last elections will be decided upon by
the Supreme Court soon."
That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the wake of
the February revolution. The despot has escaped, and with him, let us pray, all the
oppressions and repressions of the past have also been banished forever. A new
spirit is now upon our land. A new vision limns the horizon. Now we can look forward
with new hope that under the Constitution of the future every Filipino shall be truly
sovereign in his own country, able to express his will through the pristine ballow with
only his conscience as his counsel.
This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can and will be
won if we are able at last, after our long ordeal, to say never again to tyranny. If we
can do this with courage and conviction, then and only then, and not until then, can
we truly say that the case is finished and the book is closed.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the
supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition
would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July
23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986


SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P. BENGZON, MARY
CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS; S.J., M. BELLARMINE
BERNAS, O.S.B., FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, SOLITA COLLAS-MONSOD,
SANTIAGO DUMLAO, JR., MARIA FERIA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANCISCO
GARCHITORENA, * ANDREW GONZALEZ, JOSE C. LAURETA, SALVADOR P.
LOPEZ, FELIX K. MARAMBA, JR., CECILIA MUOZ PALMA. JAIME V. ONGPIN,
FELIX PEREZ, JOSE B.L. REYES, JOSE E. ROMERO, JR., RAMON DEL
ROSARIO, JR., RICARDO J. ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, EMMANUEL V.
SORIANO, DAVID SYCIP, ENRIQUE SYQUIA, CRISTINA TAN, JESUS VARGAS,
BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS, VICENTE JAYME, **,petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION (represented by Justice Manuel Pamaran,
Chairman, and Justices Augusto Amores and Bienvenido Vera Cruz, Members),
JUSTICE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ (Ombudsman) and GEN. FABIAN C. VER,
MAJ. GEN. PROSPERO A. OLIVAS, BRIG. GEN. LUFHER A. CUSTODIO, COL.
ARTURO G. CUSTODIO, COL. VICENTE B. TIGAS, JR., CAPT. FELIPE VALERIO,
CAPT. LLEWELYN KAVINTA, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS
CASTRO, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. ARNULFO DE MESA, SGT. TOMAS
FERNANDEZ, SGT. CLARO LAT, SGT. FILOMENO MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C.
DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, SGT.
LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, SGT.
PROSPERO A. BONA, CIC ROGELIO MORENO, CIC MARIO LAZAGA, AIC
CORDOVA G. ESTELO, AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO and HERMILO GOSUICO,
*** , respondents.
Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for petitioners.
Antonio R. Coronel for respondents Gen. Ver and Col. Tigas, Jr.
Rodolfo U. Jimenez for respondent Brig. Gen. Custodio.
Ramon M. Bernaldo for respondent H. Gosuico.
Romulo Quimbo for respondent B. Vera Cruz.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent P. Olivas.
Felix Solomon for respondent Col. A. Custodio.
Alfonso S. Cruz for B. Fernandez.

Edgardo B. Gayos for M. Pamaran.


RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time in freedom
the third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of foremost opposition leader
former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for almost eight years since
the imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, he was sentenced to death by firing squad by a military tribunal for common
offenses alleged to have been committed long before the declaration of martial law
and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial process by civil
courts he repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are admittedly
not courts but mere instruments and subject to the control of the President as created
by him under the General Orders issued by him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and that he had already been publicly indicted and
adjudged guilty by the President of the charges in a nationwide press conference held
on August 24, 1971 when he declared the evidence against Ninoy "not only strong but
overwhelming ." 1 This followed the Plaza Miranda bombing of August 21, 1971 of the
proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party candidates for the November, 1971
elections (when eight persons were killed and practically all of the opposition
candidates headed by Senator Jovito Salonga and many more were seriously
injured), and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly attributed to
the communists but the truth has never been known. But the then President never
filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the country
to undergo successful heart surgery. After three years of exile and despite the
regime's refusal to give him a passport, he sought to return home "to strive for a
genuine national reconciliation founded on justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly killed
while under escort away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila
International Airport on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a
bullet fired point blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin,
notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000
soldiers and "from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically impossible to get inside
(such) a cordon." 2 The military investigators reported within a span of three hours
that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and
was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal
friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on August
17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him

down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted according
to this version and continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were taken live
on the spot. The then President instantly accepted the military version and repeated it
in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of August
22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce disbelief that the military had a hand in
the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and outraged the
free world. The large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national
mourning and came out in millions in the largest and most orderly public turnout for
Ninoy's funeral reflected their grief for his martyrdom and their yearning for the truth,
justice and freedom.
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board 3 to investigate
"the treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.
on August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and
national shame specially because of the early distortions and exaggerations in both
foreign and local media 4 so that all right thinking and honest men desire to ventilate
the truth through fare, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and
free investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the Board 6 on
October 22, 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing November 3, 1983
(including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard
the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the
submission of their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and
24, 1984. This was to mark another first anywhere in the world wherein the minority
report was submitted one day ahead by the ponente thereof, the chairman, who was
received congenially and cordially by the then President who treated the report as if it
were the majority report instead of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it to
respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the legal system" and for trial in
the Sandiganbayan which was better known as a graft court; and the majority report
of the four other members was submitted on the following day to the then President
who coldly received them and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of their
report with the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience with
what you have done."
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military
version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that
Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to
the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in
agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot
him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and
that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted
Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another,
gave a perjured story to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino

and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination
was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot The only difference
between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private
respondents abovenamed in the title of the case headed by then AFP Chief General
Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the
premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the
MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen
of them and limit as plotters "the six persons who were on the service stairs while
Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio . . . because the
criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without his intervention."
The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The
epilogue to our work lies in what will transpire in accordance with the action that the
Office of the President may thereafter direct to be taken. "The four-member majority
report (also prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after warning the forces who adhere
to an alien and intolerable political ideology against unscrupulously using the report
"to discredit our traditionally revered institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes
and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be
capable of doing." They wrote:
The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not
only to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the
death of the late former Senator. Of greater significance is the
awesome responsibility of the Board to uphold righteousness over
evil, justice over injustice, rationality over irrationality, humaneness
over inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful test, the inevitable
result of which will restore our country's honored place among the
sovereign nations of the free world where peace, law and order,
freedom, and justice are a way of life.
More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the
killing of the late former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper
focus, the ills pervading Philippine society. It was the concretization
of the horror that has been haunting this country for decades,
routinely manifested by the breakdown of peace and order,
economic instability, subversion, graft and corruption, and an
increasing number of abusive elements in what are otherwise noble
institutions in our country-the military and law enforcement
agencies. We are, however, convinced that, by and large, the great
majority of the officers and men of these institutions have remained
decent and honorable, dedicated to their noble mission in the
service of our country and people.

The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our
worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As
former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban observes. "Nobody who
has great authority can be trusted not to go beyond its proper
limits." Social apathy, passivity and indifference and neglect have
spawned in secret a dark force that is bent on destroying the values
held sacred by freedom-loving people.
To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that
public officials should regard public service as a reflection of human
Ideals in which the highest sense of moral values and integrity are
strictly required.
A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the
crisis that followed, would have normally caused the resignation of
the Chief of the Armed Forces in a country where public office is
viewed with highest esteem and respect and where the moral
responsibilities of public officials transcend all other considerations.
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public acts and
statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's above findings
and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin. In upholding
this view that "there is no involvement of anyone in his government in the
assassination," he told David Briscoe (then AP Manila Bureau Chief in a Radio-TV
interview on September 9, 1983 that "I am convinced that if any member of my
government were involved, I would have known somehow ... Even at a fairly low level,
I would have known. I know how they think. I know what they are thinking of." 7 He
told CBS in another interview in May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was holding its
hearings) the following:
CBS: But indeed there has been recent evidence
that seems to contradict earlier reports, namely,
the recent evidence seems to indicate that some
of the guards may have been responsible (for
shooting Ninoy).
MARCOS: Well, you are of course wrong. What
you have been reading are the newspapers and
the newspaper reports have been biased. The
evidence still proves that Galman was the killer.
The evidence also shows that there were
intelligence reports connecting the communist
party to the killing. 8

In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going on
leave of absence upon release of the Board's majority report implicating him, he
wrote that "(W)e are even more aware, general, that the circumstances under which
the board has chosen to implicate you in its findings are fraught with doubt and great
contradictions of opinion and testimony. And we are deeply disturbed that on the
basis of so-called evidence, you have been so accused by some members of the
Board," and extended "My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy
resolution of your case," 9 even as he announced that he would return the general to
his position as AFP Chief "if he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an interview on
June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo Agency, as respondent court was hearing the
cases, he was quoted as saying that "as will probably be shown, those witnesses
(against the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman
and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman,
and twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed of three former Justices of this
Court, five incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff,
outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed
the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan
committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the
sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the
Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert
genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and
documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were
biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded
with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the
Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary
restraining order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision
on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on November 20,
1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial
tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in
the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the
restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to
file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a threeday period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution as filed
in the Sandiganbayan, the signature page of which alone had been submitted to the
Court as Annex 5 of his comment.

But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to- two-vote
ratio in reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining
order issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its
decision. 13 The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period
counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution
(which apparently was not served on them and which they alleged was "very material
to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a consolidated
reply thereto and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to-three vote, with
Justice Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be
set for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of partiality and bias against
the respondents and suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the
petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The People are entitled to due
process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State
is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict because certain material
evidence is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the
entire proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan
be restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled anew on December 2,
1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion
for reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as
scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused
of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil
liability. This marked another unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect
convicted the very victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of
Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence submitted by the prosecution. In
opposition, respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal,
the instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same
Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, with the
writer and Justice Abad Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion for
reconsideration was the startling and theretofore unknown revelations of Deputy
Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila
Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had ordered the
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the
prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26
respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal.

On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for
reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on
April 11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold office as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986
when he was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales, but reiterating his
position in his comment on the petition, he added "relative to the reported alleged
revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, herein respondent never
succumbed to any alleged attempts to influence his actuations in the
premises, having instead successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure
to drop the case after preliminary investigation, and actually ordered the filing and
prosecution of the two (2) murder cases below against herein private party
respondents." He candidly admitted also in his memorandum: "There is not much that
need be said about the existence of pressure. That there were pressures can hardly
be denied; in fact, it has never been denied." 15-a He submitted that "even as he
vehemently denies insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or participation in
any alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this
Honorable Court find sufficient cause to justify the reopening and retrial of the cases
below, he would welcome such development so that any wrong that had been caused
may be righted and so that, at the very least the actuations of herein respondent in
the premises may be reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that the end will
show that he had done nothing in the premises that violated his trust as Tanodbayan
(Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his comment of April 14, 1986
"interposed no objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he
urged that the said cases be reopened in order that justice could take its course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective comment
of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them was valid and
regular and decided on the basis of evidence presented and the law applicable, but
manifested that "if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan,
Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital evidence which
would probably alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents would not
interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to take
its course." Respondent Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a
separate comment, asserted that he passed no note to anyone; the note being
bandied about is not in his handwriting; he had nothing to do with the writing of the
note or of any note of any kind intended for any lawyer of the defense or even of the
prosecution; and requested for an investigation by this Court to settle the note
passing issue once and for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986 affirmed the
allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to
whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He amplified his revelations, as follows:

1. AB INITIO, A. VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!


Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous
signs that the fate of the criminal case on the death of Ex-Senator
Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 was
doomed to an ignominous end. Malacanang wanted dismissal-to
the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating
Panel (composed of the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto Bernabe and
Leonardo Tamayo) for signature. This, of course, was resisted by
the panel, and a resolution charging all the respondents as
principals was forwarded to the Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF
TRIAL
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the
former President) summoned to Malacaang Justice Bernardo
Fernandez (the Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel
Pamaran (the Presiding Justice) and an the members of the Panel
Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the
Coordinator) and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who left earlier, came
back and left again. The former President had a copy of the panel's
signed resolution (charging all accused as principals), evidently
furnished him in advance, and with prepared notes on the contents
thereof.
The former President started by vehemently maintaining that
Galman shot Aquino at the tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned
argued against the theory, to remain silent was the more discreet
posture when the former President became emotional (he was
quite sick then).
During a good part of the conference, the former President talked
about Aquino and the communists, lambasting the Agrava Board,
specially the Legal Panel. Shifting to the military he rumbled on
such statements as: "It will be bloody . . . Gen. Ramos, though
close to me, is getting ambitious and poor Johnny does not know
what to do". . . 'our understanding with Gen. Ramos is that his stint
is only temporary, but he is becoming ambitious "the boys were
frantic when they heard that they will be charged in court, and wig
be detained at city jail."

From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more


pragmatic approach. The former President more or less conceded
that for political and legal reasons all the respondents should be
charged in court, Politically, as it will become evident that the
government was serious in pursuing the case towards its logical
conclusion, and thereby ease public demonstrations; on the other
hand, legally, it was perceived that after (not IF) they are acquitted,
double jeopardy would inure. The former President ordered then
that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of
each respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the
Coordinator was ordered to get in touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera,
Gen. Vicente Eduardo and Director Jolly Bugarin to put on record
that they had no place in their respective institutions. The existence
of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to commanding officers of members
of AFP charged in court) was never mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would
personally handle the trial, and assurance was made by him that it
would be finished in four to six months, pointing out that, with the
recent effectivity of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial
could be expedited.
Towards the end of the two-hour meeting and after the script had
been tacitly mapped out, the former President uttered: "Mag moromoro na lang kayo."
The parting words of the former President were: "Thank you for
your cooperation. I know how to reciprocate."
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned
manifested his desire to the Tanodbayan to resign from the panel,
or even the office. This, as well as other moves to this effect, had
always been refused. Hoping that with sufficient evidence sincerely
and efficiently presented by the prosecution, all involves in the trial
would be conscience-pricked and realize the futility and injustice of
proceeding in accordance with the script, the undersigned opted to
say on.
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the
holding of a "make-believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the filing of the Informations
with the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while there were no members
of the media; the installation of TV monitors directly beamed to Malacanang; the

installation of a "war room" occupied by the military; attempts to direct and stifle
witnesses for the prosecution; the suppression of the evidence that could be given by
U.S. Airforce men about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of rebuttal
witnesses and the bias and partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of
his plea that it "should not decide these cases on the merits without first making a
final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and the Presiding Justice's over-kill with the
declaration that "the Court finds all accused innocent of the crimes charged in the two
informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," adding that
"in the almost twenty years that the undersigned has been the prosecutor in the sala
of the Presiding Justice this is the only occasion where civil liability is pronounced in a
decision of acquittal. " He "associated himself with the motion for reconsideration and
likewise prayed that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan and its decision be
declared null and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted that a
declaration of mistrial will depend on the veracity of the evidence supportive of
petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and collusion. He submitted that this
would require reception of evidence by a Court-appointed or designated
commissioner or body of commissioners (as was done in G.R. No. 71316, Fr.
Romano case; and G.R. No. 61016, Morales case; and G.R. No. 70054, Banco
Filipino case); and that if petitioners' claim were substantiated, a reopening of the
double murder case is proper to avoid a miscarriage of justice since the verdict of
acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a double jeopardy claim.
Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for
its denial. Respondent Olivas contended that the proper step for the government was
to file a direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal and at a regular trial present its
evidence of collusion and pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and
invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of
the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents- accused on December
2, 1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further
arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the
remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon
the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the
nullity.
After Petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its
resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member commission composed of
retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired Intermediate
Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to
hear and receive evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion
and pressures and relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit

their findings to this Court for proper disposition. The Commission conducted
hearings on 19 days, starting on June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986, On the
said last day, respondents announced in open hearing that they decided to forego the
taking of the projected deposition of former President Marcos, as his testimony would
be merely corroborative of the testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran and
Tanodbayan Fernandez. On July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page
Report 16 wherein it discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a
recapitulation of its findings in capsulized form, as follows:
1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and
the Special Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal
Bernabe and Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view
that all of the twenty-six (26) respondents named in the Agrava
Board majority report should all be charged as principals of the
crime of double murder for the death of Senator Benigno Aquino
and Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacanang learned of the impending filing of the said
charge before the Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel
having already prepared a draft Resolution recommending such
course of action, President Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez,
the tree members of the Special Investigating Panel, and justice
Pamaran to a conference in Malacanang in the early evening of
January 10, 1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his
disagreement with the recommendation of the Special Investigating
Panel and disputed the findings of the Agrava Board that it was not
Galman who shot Benigno Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was
convinced of the advisability of filing the murder charge in court so
that, after being acquitted as planned, the accused may no longer
be prosecuted in view of the doctrine of double jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused
would be denied bail during the trial, considering that they would be
charged with capital offenses, President Marcos directed that the
several accused be "categorized" so that some of them would
merely be charged as accomplices and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the
case be handled personally by Justice Pamaran who should
dispose of it in the earliest possible time.

7. The instructions given in the Malacanang conference were


followed to the letter; and compliance therewith manifested itself in
several specific instances in the course of the proceedings, such
as, the changing of the resolution of the special investigating panel,
the filing of the case with the Sandiganbayan and its assignment to
Justice Pamaran, suppression of some vital evidence, harassment
of witnesses, recantation of witneses who gave adverse testimony
before the Agrava Board, coaching of defense counsels, the hasty
trial, monitoring of proceedings, and even in the very decision
rendered in the case.
8. That that expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he
wanted the Aquino-Galman case to be handled and disposed of
constituted sufficient pressure on those involved in said task to
comply with the same in the subsequent course of the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested
no revulsion against complying with the Malacaang directive,
justice Herrera played his role with manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and
pre-determined manner of handling and disposing of the AquinoGalman murder case, as stage-managed from Malacaang and
performed by willing dramatis personnae as well as by recalcitrant
ones whipped into line by the omnipresent influence of an
authoritarian ruler.
The Commission submitted the following recommendation.
Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing
that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices
who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of
some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist,
and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its
position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise
presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case,
the Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to
the better opinion and judgment of this Honorable Court that the
proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due
process, and hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the
petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos.
10010 and 10011 entitled "People vs. Luther Custodia et al.," be
granted.

The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with copies of
the Report and required them to submit their objections thereto. It thereafter heard the
parties and their objections at the hearing of August 26, 1986 and the matter was
submitted for the Court's resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the basis
thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the Commission and duly
supported by the facts of public record and knowledge set forth above and
hereinafter, that the then President (code named Olympus) had stage-managed in
and from Malacanang Palace "a scripted and pre-determined manner of handling and
disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the
Aquino Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under
the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist',
and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer
all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also pre-determined
the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents
accused of all criminal and civil liability.

President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling


them. From the start, he expressed irritation and displeasure at the
recommendation of the investigating panel to charge all of the
twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the crime of double
murder. He insisted that it was Galman who shot Senator Aquino,
and that the findings of the Agrava Board were not supported by
evidence that could stand in court. He discussed and argued with
Justice Herrera on this point. Midway in the course of the
discussion, mention was made that the filing of the charge in court
would at least mollify public demands and possibly prevent further
street demonstrations. It was further pointed out that such a
procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused
are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim
the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid
another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when
President Marcos is no longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx

The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by reference) and
findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the evidence and facts of public
record. Composed of distinguished members of proven integrity with a combined total
of 141 years of experience in the practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral
and judicial services (86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting the
chaff from the grain, 17 the Commission properly appraised the evidences presented
and denials made by public respondents, thus:
The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case
disposed of in a manner suitable to his purposes was quite
understandable and was but to be expected. The case had stirred
unprecedented public outcry and wide international attention. Not
invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to those then in power
who supposedly had the means and the most compelling motive to
eliminate Senator Aquino. A day or so after the assassination,
President Marcos came up with a public statement aired over
television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts,
but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of
wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a
manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the
same time, would clear his name and his administration of any
suspected guilty participation in the assassination.
The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish this
purpose. . . .

After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of


dismissing it, but with some of the accused to be charged merely as
accomplices or accessories, and the question of preventive custody
of the accused having thereby received satisfactory solution,
President Marcos took up the matter of who would try the case and
how long it would take to be finished.
According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice
Pamaran 'point blank' to personally handle the case. This was
denied by Justice Pamaran. No similar denial was voiced by
Justice Fernandez in the entire course of his two-day
testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such order could not
have been given inasmuch as it was not yet certain then that the
Sandiganbayan would try the case and, besides, cases therein are
assigned by raffle to a division and not to a particular Justice
thereof.
It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having
received such presidential directive. His denial, however, falls to
pieces in the light of the fact that the case was indeed handled by
him after being assigned to the division headed by him. A
supposition of mere coincidence is at once dispelled by the
circumstance that he was the only one from the Sandiganbayan
called to the Malacanang conference wherein the said directive was
given. . . .

The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be


inferred from his admission that he gave President Marcos the
possible time frame when asked as to how long it would take him to
finish the case.
The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and
after an agreement was reached on filing the case and
subsequently acquitting the accused, President Marcos told them
"Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;" and that on their way out
of the room President Marcos expressed his thanks to the group
and uttered "I know how to reciprocate," did not receive any denial
or contradiction either on the part of justice Fernandez or justice
Pamaran. (No other person present in the conference was
presented by the respondents. Despite an earlier manifestation by
the respondents of their intention to present Fiscal Bernabe and
Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was abandoned without any
reason having been given therefor.)
The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on
record. In the mind of the Commission, the only conclusion that
may be drawn therefrom is that pressure from Malacanang had
indeed been made to bear on both the court and the prosecution in
the handling and disposition of the Aquino-Galman case. The
intensity of this pressure is readily deductible from the personality
of the one who exerted it, his moral and official ascendancy over
those to whom his instructions were directed, the motivation behind
such instructions, and the nature of the government prevailing at
that time which enabled, the then head of state to exercise
authoritarian powers. That the conference called to script or stagemanage the prosecution and trial of the Aquino-Galman case was
considered as something anomalous that should be kept away
from the public eye is shown by the effort to assure its
secrecy.None but those directly involved were caned to attend. The
meeting was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First
Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the
President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going
to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape
notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the
President. Actually,no public mention alas ever made of this
conference until Justice Herrera made his expose some fifteen (15)
months later when the former president was no longer around.
President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the
matter he wanted to take up with the officials he asked to be

summoned. He had to do it personally, and not merely through


trusted assistants. The lack of will or determination on the part of
Justice Fernandez and Justice Pamaran to resist the presidential
summons despite their realization of its unwholesome implications
on their handling of the celebrated murder case may be easily
inferred from their unquestioned obedience thereto. No effort to
resist was made, despite the existence of a most valid reason to
beg off, on the lame excuses that they went there out of "curiosity,"
or "out of respect to the Office of the President," or that it would be
'unbecoming to refuse a summons from the President.' Such frame
of mind only reveals their susceptibility to presidential pressure and
lack of capacity to resist the same. The very acts of being
summoned to Malacanang and their ready acquiescence thereto
under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves
pressure dramatized and exemplified Their abject deference to
President Marcos may likewise be inferred from the admitted fact
that, not having been given seats during the two-hour conference
(Justice Fernandez said it was not that long, but did not say how
long) in which President Marcos did the talking most of the time,
they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure
became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside
Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985.18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more significant
inquiry is on whether the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Tanodbayan actually
succumbed to such pressure, as may be gauged by their subsequent actuations in
their respective handling of the case." It duly concluded that "the pressure exerted by
President Marcos in the conference held on January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire
proceedings of the Aquino Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific
incidents and instances it enumerated in the Report under the heading of
"Manifestations of Pressure and Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all the twentysix accused as principals by conspiracy by categorizing and charging 17 as
principals, Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as accessories and the civilian as
accomplice, and recommending bail for the latter two categories: "The categorization
may not be completely justified by saying that, in the mind of Justice Fernandez, there
was no sufficient evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as principals.
The majority of the Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and
recommended that all of the accused be charged accordingly. Without going into the
merit of such finding, it may hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in

accordance with the standard practice of the prosecution to charge accused with the
most serious possible offense or in the highest category so as to prevent an incurable
injustice in the event that the evidence presented in the trial will show his guilt of the
graver charge, the most logical and practical course of action should have been, as
originally recommended by the Herrera panel, to charge all the accused as principals.
As it turned out, Justice Fernandez readily opted for categorization which, not
surprisingly, was in consonance with the Malacaang instruction." It is too much to
attribute to coincidence that such unusual categorization came only after the then
President's instruction at Malacanang when Gen. Ver's counsel, Atty. Coronel, had
been asking the same of Tanodbayan Fernandez since November, 1984; and "Justice
Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of that time, [the Malacanang conference on
January 10, 1985], his own view was in conformity with that of the Special
Investigating Panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of
the crime of double murder." 19 As the Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez
never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the draft resolution of January 10, 1985
(Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals] was to have been the subject of
a press conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go through due to the
summons for them to go to Malacanang in the early evening of said date."20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses:" Realizing, no doubt,
that a party's case is as strong as the evidence it can present, unmistakable and
persistent efforts were exerted in behalf of the accused to weaken the case of the
prosecution and thereby assure and justify [the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal.
Unfavorable evidences were sought to be suppressed, and some were indeed
prevented from being ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured
or threatened either to refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner favorable to the
defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses: 21 Cesar Loterina, PAL
employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who recanted their testimonies
before the Fact Finding Board and had to be discarded as prosecution witnesses
before at the trial. WitnessesViesca and Raas who also testified before the Board
"disappeared all of a sudden and could not be located by the police. The Commission
narrated the efforts to stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy
on his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and described them as "palpable, if crude and
display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to
Manila on August 20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but
was deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on the next plane for Tokyo.
The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his testimony before the
Japanese police in accordance with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the
Commission that the English transcription of his testimony, as prepared by an official
of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the
testimony he gave "although there was no clear showing of the discrepancy from the
original transcription which was in Nippongo. Upon his arrival at the MIA on August
21, 1985 on invitation of Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was

fired and a soldier was seen running away by media men who sought to protect
Wakamiya from harm by surrounding him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration
officials to leave the country by Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's
request to let him stay until he could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the
case of principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the Commission reported that
... Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her
proposed testimony and its unfavorable effect on the cause of the
defense, the efforts exerted to suppress the same was as much as,
if not more than those in the case of Wakamiya. ... She recounted
that she was in constant fear of her life, having been hunted by
armed men; that their house in Tabaco, Albay was ransacked, her
family harassed by the foreclosure of the mortgage on their house
by the local Rural Bank, and ejected therefrom when she ignored
the request of its manager to talk with her about her proposed
testimony; that a certain William Farias offered her plane tickets
for a trip abroad; that Mayor Rudy Farias of Laoag City kept on
calling her sister in the United States to warn her not to testify; that,
later, Rudy and William Farias offered her two million pesos
supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in
Baguio, the dropping of her estafa case in Hongkong, and the
punishment of the persons responsible for the death of her father, if
she would refrain from testifying.
It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and
harassments, or perhaps because of them, Ms. Quijano eventually
testified before the Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by
justice Fernandez of the displeasure expressed by Olympus at
justice Herrera's going out of his way to make Ms. Quijano to testify,
and for his refusal to honor the invitation to attend the birthday party
of the First Lady on May 1, 1985, as on the eve of Ms. Quijano's
testimony on May 2, 1985. The insiduous attempts to tamper with
her testimony, however, did not end with her taking the witness
stand. In the course of her testimony several notes were passed to
Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the defense counsel who cross-examined
her, one of which suggested that she be asked more questions
about Dean Narvasa who was suspected of having coached her as
to what to declare (Exhibit "D"); and on another occasion, at a
crucial point in her testimony, a power brownout occurred; which
lasted for about twenty minutes, throwing the courtroom into
darkness, and making most of those present to scamper for safety,
and Ms. Quijano to pass over the railing of the rostrum so as to be
able to leave the courtroom. It was verified that the brownout was
limited to the building housing the Sandiganbayan, it not having
affected the nearby Manila City Hall and the Finance Building.

Justice Herrera declared that the main switchboard of the


Sandiganbayan electrical system was located beside the room
occupied by Malacaang people who were keeping track of the
proceedings.
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th hearing
that the two Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine (hospitality girls) disappeared on
September 4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. And the informant, by the
name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who jotted down the number of the car that
took them away, also disappeared. On January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of
the Board, Lina Galman, the common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was kidnapped
together with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc, They have been missing since then,
despite his attempts to find any of them. According to him, "nobody was looking for
these five persons because they said Marcos was in Power [despite his appeal to the
Minister of National Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one is looking for these
people." And he appealed to the new leadership for its assistance in learning their
fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen "While it is true that the
U.S. airmen's proposed testimonies would show an attempt of the Philippine Air Force
to divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some other place, such showing would not
necessarily contravene the theory of the prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator
Aquino was killed at the Manila International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately
pointed out that such attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed a 'wider
range of conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three other plans designed to
accomplish the same purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any event, even
assuming that the said piece of evidence could go either way, it may not be
successfully contended that it was prudent or wise on the part of the prosecution to
totally discard the said piece of evidence. Despite minor inconsistencies contained
therein, its introduction could have helped the cause of the prosecution. If it were not
so, or that it would even favor the defense, as averred by Justice Fernandez, the
determined effort to suppress the same would have been totally uncalled for."
4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented.
5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments: "When
the Supreme Court denied the petition of Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of
the testimonies given by the military respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact
Finding Board], the latter almost immediately announced to media that he was not
filing a motion for the reconsideration of said denial for the reason that it would be
futile to do so and foolhardy to expect a favorable action on the same. ... His
posture ... is, in the least, indicative that he was living up to the instruction of finishing
the trial of the case as soon as possible, if not of something else."

6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera


testified that President Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-blank to handle the
case. The pro-forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such instruction crumbles under
the actuality of such directive having been complied with to the letter. ...
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by President
Marcos to handle the case personally by explaining that cases in the Sandiganbayan
are assigned by raffle and not to a particular Justice, but to a division thereof. The
evidence before the Comission on how the case happened to be assigned to Justice
Pamaran evinces a strong indication that such assignment was not done fairly or
regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular
raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran. ... Despite an
announcement that Justice Escareal would be presented by the respondents to testify
on the contents of his aforesaid Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was
given why Justice Escarel could not, or would not like to testify. Neither was any one
of the officials or employees of the Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice
Pamaran, were present during the supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the
claim of Justice
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder case were
filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and the members of the
Raffle Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m. or only 18 minutes after the filing of
the two Informations. Such speed in the actual assignment of the case can truly be
categorized as unusual, if not extraordinary, considering that before a case filed may
be included in the raffle, there is need for a certain amount of paper work to be
undertaken. If such preliminary requirements were done in this case within the limited
time available therefor, the charge that the raffle was rushed to avoid the presence of
media people would ring with truth.
What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been actually
conducted which resulted in the assignment of the case to the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any evidence on how or why it was
handled personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the decision thereof, and not by
any one of the two other members of his division. . . .
7. The custody of the accused their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a
civilian jail: "When the question of custody came up after the case was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order directing the confinement of the accused in
the City Jail of Manila. This order was not carried out in view of the information given
by the Warden of the City Jail that there was no space for the twenty-six accused in

said jail. The same information was given when the custody was proposed to be
given to the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau of
Investigation. At that point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree No. 1950A
which authorizes the custody of the accused military personnel with their respective
Commanding Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that the said Presidential Decree was
not known even to the Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who had to call up the then
Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and was given
such copy only after sometime. ..."
8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by
Malacaang personnel: "There is an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the developments of the case outside
the Court had been monitored by Malacaang presumably for it to know what was
happening and to take remedial measures as may be necessary. Justice Pamaran
had candidly admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the label of 'Office of
the President of the Philippines' " were installed in the courtroom for that purpose.
There was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned 'war room', wherein
military and Malacaang personnel stayed to keep track of the proceedings."
the close monitoring by Malacaang showed its results on several occasions
specified in the Report. Malacaang was immediately aware of the Japanese witness
Wakamiya's presence injustice Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and forestalled
the giving of his testimony by having the Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to
leave the country at once. Likewise, Col. Balbino Diego, Malacaang intelligence
chief, suddenly appeared at the National Bureau of Investigation office when the
"crying lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought there by NBI agents for interrogation and
therein sought to obtain custody of her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the
Commission noted "that several military personnel pretended to be deputy sheriffs of
the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the prescribed deputy sheriffs'
uniforms." The Commission's inescapable finding. " It is abundantly clear that
President Marcos did not only give instructions as to how the case should be handled
He saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be complied with."
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President Marcos had
wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. The disposal
of the case in said manner is an integral part of the scenario which was cleverly
designed to accomplish two principal objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves,
but favorable both to then administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the
satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be
charged in court, and [2] the foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be
prosecuted for the same offense in the event that President Marcos shall no longer be
in power.
"In rendering its decision the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential
directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was glaringly obvious. The

evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. ... It was
deemed not sufficient to simply acquit all of the twenty-six accused on thestandard
ground that their guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the
most logical and appropriate way of justifying the acquittal in the case, there not being
a total absence of evidence that could show guilt on the part of the accused. The
decision had to pronounce them 'innocent of the crime charged on the two
informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a rare
phenomenon to see a person accused of a crime to be favored with such total
absolution. ...
Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices who
concurred with the majority decision penned by Justice Pamaran was revealed by
Justice Herrera who testified that in October, 1985, when the decision was being
prepared, Justice Agusto Amores told him that he was of the view that some of the
accused should be convicted he having found difficulty in acquitting all of them;
however, he confided to Justice Herrera that Justice Pamaran made it clear to him
and Justice Vera Cruz that Malacaang had instructions to acquit all of the twenty-six
accused (TSN, July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice Amores also told Justice Herrera that he
would confirm this statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to
the Second Motion for Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19, 1986, pp.
92-93). This testimony Justice Herrera remained unrebutted " (Emphasis supplied)
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used,
or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the
Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and
borne out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitur 22) since the resolution prepared by his
"Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the
Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would
summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23) and at any rate was not acceptable
to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused
after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacanang conference, would accomplish the
two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers to
be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of
double jeopardy. 24
Indeed, the secret Malacanang conference at which the authoritarian President called
together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and
the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them
how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire
proceedings to assure the pre-determined ignominious final outcome are without
parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase from
Ninoy's April 14, 1975 letter withdrawing his petition for habeas corpus, 25 "This is the
evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive

officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect
to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of
justice." 26 His obsession for "the boys' " acquittal led to several first which would
otherwise be inexplicable:
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding Board
that he himself appointed to investigate the "national tragedy and national shame" of
the "treacherous and vicious assassination of Ninoy Aquino and "to ventilate the truth
through free, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
investigators."
2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead of the
four majority members and instantly referred it to respondents "for final resolution
through the legal system" as if it were the majority and controlling report; and rebuked
the four majority members when they presented to him the next day their report
calling for the indictment of all 26 respondents headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas
(instead of the lesser seven under the chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of acquittal, he
totally disregarded the Board's majority and minority findings of fact and publicly
insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the killer of Ninoy Aquino
and sought futilely to justify the soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to
provide any security for Ninoy in contrast to their alacrity in gunning down the alleged
assassin Galman and searing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando
Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding that he was not on trial but the victim
according to the very information filed, and evidence to the contrary submitted, by the
Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores
who wanted to convict some of the accused) granted all 26 accused total absolution
and pronounced them "innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence
on the basis of which the Fact Finding Board had unanimously declared the soldiers'
version of Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given deliberately and in
conspiracy with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacaang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the
authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal
charges against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice
Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator"
Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was

illegal under our penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding Justice who
attended. As the Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned to
Malacaang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then
obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. ... Verily, it can be
said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure
became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on
January 10, 1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral
arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the AquinoGalman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court
martial, as mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military
men 26-a) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an
impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then
wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not
by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a
means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. 26-b"This criminal collusion
as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret
Malacanang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel
Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its
verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of
respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as
accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them,
that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an
accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the
testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and
opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and
retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of
justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of
law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to
be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress
the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and
committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and
removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar
where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our
judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy
had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in
the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death,
Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives

and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of
law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is
constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that
the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.

In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of
the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower
courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

1. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked


against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal
where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is
denied due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27

More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar
where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian
president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and
closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined final outcome
of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of an the respondents-accused.
Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end
"deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution
was already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of
the overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the
prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses,
secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the
prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and
reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying
tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings
in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The
prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards
(it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as
compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of being
"cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a
certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses Herrera pleaded for "a
reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending cases
before respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time where the
"dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly, the
prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial
court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and
pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the
case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be
treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the
people. To paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian head of the government
becomes the law-breaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to
become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy.

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute


and prove its case its right to due process is thereby violated. 27-a
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]which cannot be glossed
over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental
right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of
that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L30370 [May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-3011112, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision
rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a
"lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight,
or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs.
Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null
and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a
proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs.
Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before
a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having
been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was
ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution
to due process.

Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal


ends the case which cannot be appealed or re-opened, without being put in double
jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People vs. Court of Appeals,
which is fully applicable here, as follows: "That is the general rule and presupposes a
valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of
acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double

jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all By
it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone.
All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
|lang1033 xxx xxx xxx
"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail the scales
must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the
society, which they have wronged must also be equally considered. A judgment of
conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither
necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended,
it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render
justice where justice is due. 30
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved Ahead.-The private
prosecutors had filed a motion to disqualify and for inhibition of respondents Justices
of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality to the defense and
arising from then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Justice VeraCruz had been passing coaching notes to defense counsel. Justice Herrera had
joined the motion and pleaded at the hearing of June 25, 1985 and in the prosecution
memorandum that respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide the case on the
merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted
the exchange between him and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following
the script of Malacanang.
PJ PAMARAN
Well the court believes that we should proceed
with the trial and then deal later on with
that. After all, the most important thing here is,
shall we say, the decision of the case.
J. HERRERA
I think more important than the decision of the
case, Your Honor, is the capacity of the justices
to sit in judgment. That is more important than
anything else.(p. 13 TSN, June 25, 1985)
(Emphasis supplied by Herrera). 31
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly blamed him,
in the decision, for supposedly not having joined the petition for inhibition, contrary to
the facts above-stated, as follows:

... the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for
the contempt proceeding. Too, it must be remembered that the
prosecution neither joined that petition, nor did it at any time
manifest a desire to file a similar motion prior to the submission of
these cases for decision. To do it now is not alone out of season but
is also a confession of official insouciance (Page 22, Decision). 32
The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of
respondents Justices pursuant to the procedure recognized by the Court in the 1969
case of Paredes vs. Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent court might
result in a verdict of acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor
appeal in view of the double jeopardy rule, not to mention the overiding and
transcendental public interest that would make out a case of denial of due process to
the People if the alleged failure on the part of the Tanodbayan to present the
complete evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their
petition and lifting of the temporary restraining order enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had
required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no
restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have
precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final
action of this Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan35, Wherein the court in
setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent
judge) refrain from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the
promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence gave way to
imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases [hastily
without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest
grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which
substantively prejudiced the petitioner."
3. Re: Objections of respondents.-The other related objections of respondents'
counsels must be rejected in the face of the Court's declaration that the trial was a
mock trial and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab
initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the judgment,
instead of the present action which was timely filed initially to declare a mistrial and to
enjoin the rendition of the void judgment. And after the hasty rendition of such
judgment for the declaration of its nullity, following the presentation of competent
proof heard by the Commission and the Court's findings therefrom that the
proceedings were from the beginning vitiated not only by lack of due process but also
by the collusion between the public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for the

rendition of a pre-determined verdict of acquitting all the twenty-six respondentsaccused.


(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in the conduct
of the proceedings or errors of judgment which do not affect the integrity or validity of
the judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the sovereign people
are not entitled to due process is clearly erroneous and contrary to the basic
principles and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the pressure
applied by the authoritarian president on public respondents and that no evidence
was suppressed against them must be held to be untenable in the wake of the evil
plot now exposed for their preordained wholesale exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party should
be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the
Court's membership for review of his lost case once more, since public policy and
sound practice demand that litigation be put to an end and no second pro
forma motion for reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept
pending so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first
motion for reconsideration), This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here,
petitioners' second motion for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986
following the denial under date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration
and the same was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now
being resolved within five months of its filing after the Commission had received the
evidence of the parties who were heard by the Court only last August 26th. The
second motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new material ground which
was not known at the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion for
reconsideration, i.e, the secret Malacaang conference on January 10, 1985 which
came to light only fifteen months later in March, 1986 and showed beyond per
adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that
the authoritarian president had dictated and pre-determined the final outcome of
acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court (without any new appointees)
unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration. 37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried
before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.-There has been the long dark
night of authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in September, 1972 of then
Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now admitted by Enrile himself was staged
to trigger the imposition of martial law and authoritarian one-man rule, with the
padlocking of Congress and the abolition of the office of the Vice-President.

As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to
the new members of the Bar last May, "In the past few years, the judiciary was under
heavy attack by an extremely powerful executive. During this state of judicial siege,
lawyers both in and outside the judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of
technicality. In the end, morality was overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter
emerged ugly and naked in its true manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public
faith and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of the
sword nor of the purse. Its strength lies mainly in public confidence, based on the
truth and moral force of its judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions
of objectivity and impartiallity integrity and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the
Constitution and the rule of law which compels acceptance as well by the leadership
as by the people. The lower courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With
this Court's judgment today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or
acquittal and directing a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of
becoming instruments of injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims.
The end of one form of injustice should not become simply the beginning of another.
This simply means that the respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes
charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all
due process. What the past regime had denied the people and the aggrieved parties
in the sham trial must now be assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved
parties. The people will assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed
as well as when it has failed.
The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe
their primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are accountable to him alone
and not to the people or the Constitution must be discarded. The function of the
appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government,
is to fill the public posts. While the appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the
opportunity thus given of rendering public service, the appointing authority
becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to
the Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of
office. To paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme
Court, the Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency,
serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in
accordance with their oath of office, guided only, the Constitution and their own
conscience and honor.
5. Note of Commendation.- The Court expresses its appreciation with thanks for the
invaluable services rendered by the Commission composed of retired Supreme Court
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of Appeals Justices
Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members. In the pure spirit of public
service, they rendered selflessly and without remuneration thorough competent and

dedicated service in discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the evidence,
evaluating the same and submitting their Report and findings to the Court within the
scheduled period and greatly easing the Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The
resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu
thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent
Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodia et al." and ordering
a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and
with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth may be
finally known and justice done to an
This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
Yap, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Feria, **** Fernan and Narvasa , ***** JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. L-49360 December 14, 1979


FILEMON DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GREGORIO U. AQUILIZAN, FELOMENO JUGAR and RICARDO
JUGAR, respondents.
Arturo P. Aponesto for petitioner.
Dominador Mortera for private respondents.
SANTOS, J.:
Petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction filed November 27,
1978 to set aside the decision dated September 29, 1978 of the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR), 16th Regional District, Branch II at Cotabato City, presided by Judge
Gregorio U. Aquilizan. 1
We resolved on April 10, 1979, finding the verified petition sufficient in form and
substance, to require respondents to answer, not to move to dismiss. 2 On June 9,
1979, respondent Judge after an extension of 20 days, filed an answer. 3 Private
respondents did not answer notwithstanding due and proper notice. 4
The factual and procedural antecedents which gave rise to this petition follow.
Earlier or on February 17, 1976, the herein private respondents, Felomeno and
Ricardo Jugar brothers, filed against Felimon C. David, herein petitioner, a "Petition
for Reinstatement" in the CAR, 15th Regional District, Branch II, Cotabato City.
They alleged, inter alia, that sometime in 1971, they were installed as share tenants
by petitioner over separate portions of the latter's landholding situated at Polomolok,
South Cotabato, each portion having a seeding capacity of two (2) hectares, more or
less, their sharing agreement being 50-50% of the net produce; that the parcels they
were cultivating are devoted to the production of corn crops, the produce per hectare
being 60 to 70 cavans in corn cobs; that sometime in the middle part of 1973, private
respondents were no longer allowed to continue their cultivation of the subject lots as
petitioner-landholder prohibited them from doing so and took possession of said lots
for no reason at all; that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Team Office at
General Santos intervened for the immediate reinstatement of private respondents to
their respective portions, but such intervention was to no avail as petitionerlandholder refused and still refuses to reinstate them, and that because of such
unlawful act, private respondents suffered and will continue to suffer damages and
litigation expenses. 5

In herein petitioner's answer, as respondent below, he denied that herein private


respondents were his tenants. He claimed that "... Ricardo David (should be Jugar)
who was then the tractor driver of respondent (now petitioner herein) was given
additional incentive to work on a one hectare portion of respondent's land which he
surrendered after resigning as tractor driver and after he worked with the Dolefil and
as a farm tenant of his father; Felomeno Jugar truly worked with the respondent
(herein petitioner) on share basis until the petitioner Felomeno Jugar (now private
respondent) sold his working animals and resumed his faith-healing and later worked,
as in fact to the present is working, with his father ..." 6 He further averred that the
average harvest per hectare is not only 60 to 70 sacks of corn on cobs but if properly
cultivated the land would easily yield no less than 120 sacks of corn on cobs at 4
cans each sack; that the truth is that private respondents voluntarily surrendered their
landholdings as follows: "...Ricardo, in September, 1972, after he resigned as tractor
driver of respondent (now petitioner), due to ill health; and later on as farm tenant of
his father; Felomeno Jugar voluntarily surrendered his landholdings after he sold his
working animals, and later, he continued his religious faith healing occupation and as
farm tenant of his father." 7
As affirmative defense, petitioner alleged that private respondents lodged their
petition with the DAR, now Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), and after a thorough
investigation, the Hearing Officer of said Department, Guillermo Tanawit, rendered a
Report (DAR ARDO # 11-38-000, Koronadal, South Cotabato) on April 12, 1976
containing the following findings and recommendation, to wit:
There was no dispute that Ricardo was installed on a 1.0 hectare
land, so also there was no dispute that Felomeno Jugar was
installed on 2.0 hectare land.
The allegation however, that both were "illegally ejected" is belied
by the admission in their position paper termed as memorandum
that the landowner ONLY BORROWED their land for a short period
to time, Noted with all aspect that Ricardo even employed himself
with the DOLE which only but confirm the stand of voluntary
surrender by his landlord. Not only that he even worked on his
father's land He claimed that he resigned as a tractor driver
because he was sick and then later claimed that he was reinstalled
on another 2.0 hectare augmenting his 1.0 hectare into 2.0 hectare
as claimed. But the fact remain thereafter he relinquished his fights
thereat because of sickness and work on his father's land.
So also with his brother Felomeno Jugar he claimed that his lot of
2.0 hectare was only borrowed by his landlord the latter part of
1975 because of their (David) debt with the bank, and work with his
father.

Taken as a whole, there could not be unlawful ejectment contrary to


PD No. 316 dated October 26, 1973, because during that particular
time, Ricardo is either working with the Dole, supplemented by his
farming with his father and Felomeno Jugar with his laymen
(religious) activities supplemented with his farming with his father's
land.
The above foregoing, the undersigned observation (sic), when the
conducted this hearing, can not but penned this dictum that there
was no unlawful ejectment but indeed petitioners had summarily
surrendered their landholdings separately, on their own will and
without any duress (unlawful),
Accordingly, for want of merit, the case is hereby dropped from the
undersigned roster of legal (mediation) case. 8 (Emphasis
supplied.)
On June 29, 1978, after the issues were joined, the respondent Judge issued an
order directing the Department (now Ministry) of Agrarian Reform "... to cover the land
in area under operation Land Transfer (sic) ..." This order is worded as follows.
When CAR Case No. 43-South Cot. '76 was called, plaintiffs and
counsel appeared as well as the defendant and counsels.
In view of the recent ruling of the Court of Appeals with respect to
land devoted primarily to rice and/or corn and as of October 21,
1972, said land is automatically covered by operation Land
Transfer.
WHEREFORE, in view of the revelation gathered in open court, the
Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to cover the land
in area under operation Land Transfer. 9
Three months later, or on September 29, 1979, respondent Judge without conducting
any hearing rendered judgment for private respondents and against herein petitioner
finding that "...plaintiffs Ricardo and Felomeno, both surnamed Jugar (now private
respondents) were tenants of defendant Filemon C. David (petitioner herein) at the
time PD 27 was promulgated on October 21, 1972," 10 and thereafter declared them
"owners" thereof. Thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is rendered:

1. Plaintiffs (private respondents herein) are hereby 'deemed


owners' of the land they were cultivating when P.D. 27 was
decreed;
2. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to cover the
land point of controversy under Operation Land Transfer;
3. Directing the the provincial Commander, Philippine Constabular
of South Cotabato to install peacefully plaintiffs to the land covered
by operations land 'Transfer after the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
shall have Identified and sketched them, in conformity with the
DND/DAR Memorandum Agreement of September 18, 1975.
4. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Hon. Secretary,
Ministry of Agrarian Reform for his guidance and easy reference for
similar case.
No pronouncement as to cost or damages. 11
On the bases of the foregoing tactual and procedural antecedent petitioners seek to
annul and set aside the aforesaid order and decision of respondent Judge Aquilizan
on the grounds that: (a) he was denied due process of law; (b) the respondent Judge
has no jurisdiction over the instant case, jurisdiction being legally lodged with the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform: (c) assuming respondent Judge has jurisdiction thereof,
the order of June 29, 1978 has already become final and no new decision novating
the same may be rendered; and (d) the findings of facts, arrived at without hearing,
are contrary to the evidence (sic). 12
In his Answer, respondent Judge Aquilizan did not deny the lack of hearings alleged in
the petition, but interposed the defense that the subject decision has already become
"... final and executory after the lapse of the period for the perfection of an appeal ..."
and "... there is no showing that an appeal was brought to the Appellate Court in
accordance with provisions of PD 946 and the Uniform Rules of Procedure of the
Court of Agrarian Relations." 13That instead, the respondent (should be petitioner)
filed the instant "Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction' to review the "Decisions of the
Honorable Court of Agrarian Relations dated September 29, 1978", and "...that
certiorari cannot be substituted for an appeal ..." 14
On June 22, 1979, We considered the case submitted for decision.
This petition is quite obviously invested with merit. In the light of the foregoing factual.
and procedural milieu and since, admittedly, respondent judge did not conduct any
hearing in the case prior to issuance of the challenged decision, the ineluctible
conclusion is that the challenged decision is null and void for want of due process.

The following requisites, as set forth in a leading case before the 1935 Constitution
took effect, must concur for procedural due process in civil cases: "(1) There must be
a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before
it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over
the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given
an opportunity to be heard;and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful
hearing." 15 Thus, it is well-settled rule that "no one shall be personally bound until he
has had a day in court", by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to
appear, and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such
citation and opportunity lacks all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is a
judicial usurpation and oppression, and can never be upheld where justice is justly
administered. (Ong Su Han vs. Gutierrez David, 76 Phil. 546, etc.; Moran Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1957 ed., p. 476). And it has been held that a final and
executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation when
the judgment is void for lack of due process of law. (Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, supra, p. 523; Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 ). 16 Being
null and void from its inception, the decision sought to be set aside does not exist in
the eyes of the law because it is "as though it had not been done. 17 In legal
contemplation, it is no judgment at all. 18 "By it, no rights are divested. From it, no
rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are
equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all
claims flowing out of it are void. ..." 19 It may be attacked directly or collaterally, and
the action therefor may be brought even after the time for appeal or review has
lapsed. The judgment is vulnerable to attack even when no appeal has. 20 Hence,
such judgment does not become final in sense of depriving a party of his right to
question its validity. 21
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED and the challenged order and decision are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is hereby directed to conduct appropriate
proceedings in the case. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37051 August 3l, 1977


ANITA U. LORENZANA, petitioner,
vs.
POLLY CAYETANO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Desiderio P. Jurado for petitioner.
Vicente L. Santiago for private respondent.
GUERRERO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 31082R entitled "Polly Cayetano, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Anita U. Lorenzana, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees" and from the resolution of the Court denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
We find in this case a perfect example that proves the -validity of that classic legal
dictum that a man's house is his castle where the wind may enter, the rain may enter
but neither the King nor the King's men may enter without the consent of the owner.
The records show that 'In 1958, petitioner filled n the Municipal Court of Manila
ejectment cases for non-payment of rentals against her tenants occupying different
stalls in that quonset hut situated in the San Lazaro Estate (corner of C.M. Recto St.
and Quezpn Blvd., Manila, adjacent to the Bilibid Compound) with a floor area of 360
square meters. leased by her (which she afterwards purchased) from the Manila
Railroad Company and later from the Bureau of Lands together with the use of the
land north and wouth of the quonset hut with an area of 340 square meters. The
private respondent, on the other hand, occupied the area north of the quonset hut
which area was also leased by her from the Manila Railroad Company and
subsequently from the Bureau of Lands, and on which her house stood. Hence, the
areas occupied by the two principal protagonists are adjacent to each other.
The ejectment. cases having been decided by the Municipal Court in favor of the
petitioner, the same were appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I.
The Court affirmed the decision of the municipal court and ordered the defendantstenants to vacate the premises leased. Upon refusal of the tenants to vacate the
premises, the court granted a partial execution of the judgment and on July 20, 1959,
a writ of demolition was issued, specifically commanding the Sheriff of Manila "to
demolish the premises subject of the above-name cases" (Record on Appeal, p. 4).
Thereupon on July 27, 1959, Petitioner together with her counsel, Atty. Nereo
Paculdo and Deputy Sheriff Jose L. Cruz proceeded and entered the premises of the

respondent and in spite of her protests that she was not a party to the ejectment
cases in which the demolition order was secured and that her premises was not
subject of said ejectment cases, they destroyed the latter's fence including flower pots
trellises and electric installations and carted away the materials thereof and built
another fence 5 meters into the premises of the respondent, boring holes into the
cemented garden or patio of her house.
On August 3, 1959, respondent presented to the court a motion to declare petitioner,
her counsel and the sheriff guilty of contempt; that they be punished and held liable in
damages to the petitioner. The presiding judge held the motion in abeyance until the
decision of the court in the ejectment cases shall have been rendered.
Acting upon the petitioner's ex-parte motion and urgent motion for demolition in the
two appealed ejectment cases, Civil Case No. 29664 and Civil Case No. 29665, the
court on September 28, 1959 ordered that "a writ of demolition be issued ordering the
Sheriff of Manila or any of his deputies to demolish any or all improvements erected
and existing on the parcel of land subject of the above- entitled cases. which consists
of an area of about 700 square meters." (Record on Appeal, p. 55). The writ of
demolition was issued by the Sheriff on September 30, 1959.
Upon procurement of this order or demolition, petitioner, together with her counsel
and the deputy sheriff proceeded once more to respondent's premises on October 1,
1959 and moved the fence where it was illegally placed by them on July 27, 1959. On
the same day, October 1, 1959, respondent filed an urgent motion for the suspension
of the execution of the writ of demolition, which motion was denied by the court the
next day, October 2, 1959.
The records further establish that on November 27, 1959, petitioner, her lawyer, Atty.
Paculdo, and Sheriff Cruz went back and moved the fence 1 Meter more into the
premises of the respondent; that on February 19, 1960, the respondent filed an exparte motion to withdraw the petition for contempt on the ground that "conferring with
Judge Bayona after this petition was heard, the petitioner was informed that not being
a party to the above-numbered cases, she is like an intruder to act on her petition."
(Record on Appeal, p. 80).
On October 1, 1959, the respondent Polly Cayetano filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Civil Case No. 42001 against the petitioner Anita U. Lorenzana, Atty. Nereo
J. Paculdo and Deputy Sheriff Jose L. Cruz for damages with mandatory injunction.
The defendants therein filed a motion to dismiss, which was opposed by the plaintiff,
and the Court, Branch XVII, denied on December 19, 1959 the motion to dismiss and
the petition for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The defendants filed their
answers.

Under date of March 9, 1962, the Court issued the Decision dismissing the complaint
of the plaintiff as well as the counterclaim of the defendants Anita U. Lorenzana and
Atty. Nereo J. Paculdo for lack of sufficient evidence. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by the plaintiff but denied by the Court. Not satisfied with the Decision of the
Court, Polly Cayetano appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision appealed from, and ordered "defendant-appellee Lorenzana to
restore to appellant the possession of the property invaded and occupied by her as
shown in Exh. L-1 to L-4; to put back appellant's fence and other valuable
improvements in their place before the writ of demolition was served; ordering
defendants, Lorenzana and Cruz, to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff-appellant
the sum of P5,500.00 as actual and moral damages, and pay the costs, except
defendant, Paculdo."
The above Decision is now sought to be reviewed in the instant petition for certiorari
upon the following assignment of errors: 1. That the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the writ of demolition issued by Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Manila
presided over by Judge Bayona could not be legally effected against respondent Polly
Cayetano; II. That the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the private respondent's
failure to pursue her remedy before a higher court did not to amount a waiver of her
rights; III. The Court of Appeals erred in holding in effect that a writ of execution and
an order of demolition can be collaterally attacked in an action specifically brought for
recovery of damages; and IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the issuance
of the writ of demolition by Judge Bayona was in violation of Section 14, Rule 39.
This case hinges on the legal effects of the writs of demolition issued in the ejectment
cases wherein the respondent was not a party thereto . The writs were issued by
virtue of the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch I), the
dispositive portion of which states, as follows: "WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered
condemning the defendants ... to vacate the premises; ordering herein defendants...
to pay rent to plaintiff ... plus attorney's fees and costs."
The petitioner contends that the respondent having voluntarily appeared before the
court and invoked its jurisdiction seeking affirmative relief by filing on August 3, 1959,
a petition to declare Lorenzana, Atty. Paculdo and Sheriff Cruz in contempt and
holding them liable in damages, and by filing on October 1, 1959, an urgent petition
for the suspension of the execution of the writ of demolition, she could no longer
contest the efficacy of the writ. There is no merit to this contention and We find no
error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the writ of demolition could not be
legally effected against the respondent.
It must be noted that respondent was not a party to any of the 12 ejectment cases
wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did not make her appearance in
and during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Respondent only went to court to
protect her property from demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had

become final and executory. Hence, with respect to the judgment in said ejectment
cases, respondent remains a third person to such judgement, which does not bind
her; 1 nor can its writ of execution be enforced against her since she was not afforded
her day in court in said ejectment cases. 2
The vital legal point here is that respondent did not derive her right or interest from
the defendants-tenants nor from the plaintiff-landlord (the herein petitioner) but from
the Bureau of Lands from which she had leased the property. She is neither a party
nor successor in interest to any of the litigants in the ejectment cases.
We also find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that respondent having been
duly heard by the Court, she was not deprived of her day in court and was accorded
the due process of law.
It cannot be said that the constitutional requirements of due process were sufficiently
complied with because the respondent had been duly heard. Indeed, respondent was
heard but simply hearing her did not fulfill the basic conditions of procedural due
process in courts. When respondent appeared before the court to protect and
preserve her property, the Court had not lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the
property of the respondent because the premises of the respondent was not included
in the ejectment cases and the judgment in said cases could not affect her property,
much less demolish the same. In the leading case of El Banco-Espa;ol-Filipino v.
Palanca 3 cited in Macabingkil v. Yatco, et al., 4 We laid down the court's constitutional
requirements of due process, thus As applied to judicial proceedings. . . it may be laid down with
certainty that the requirements of due process is satisfied if the
following conditions are present namely: (1) There must be a court
or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of
the proceedings: (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to
be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Respondent pursued various steps to protect her property from the invasion and
encroachment of the petitioner, abetted by her counsel and the deputy Sheriff. She
filed a motion for contempt; she protested to the Sheriff of Manila; she appealed to
the Director of the Bureau of Lands; she filed an urgent motion to suspend the writ of
demolition. Although the motions for contempt and for suspension wer heard by the
court, such action s taken af ter the jugdgment had become final and executory did
not make the respondent a party litigant in the ejectment cases. The respondent
remained a stranger to the case and she cannot be bound by the judgment rendered
therein, nor by the writs of execution and demolition issued in pursuance to said
judgment. Intervening as a prejudiced owner of improvements being wrongly

demolished merely to oppose such order of demolition upon learning that the said
order was directed against premises not her own, is not the same as being a party to
the suit to the extent of being bound by the judgment in the case where such order of
demolition was issued. 5 Furthermore, it must be noted that said petitions were filed
after the promulgation of the decision in the ejectment cases and while in the process
of execution. lt. is not proper to speak of an intention in a case already terminated by
final judgment .6
Respondent, not being bound thereby, may avail herself of the proper action afforded
by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the proceedings
where property levied upon is claimed by a third person, stating as follows:
...Tile officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of the property to any
third-party claimant unless a claim is made by the latter- and unless an action for
damages is brought by him against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained shall prevent
such claimant o any third person ffrom windicating his claim to the property by any
proper action... (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent acted within and exercised her right when she filed the proper action to
vindicate her claim afforded to her by Sec. 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,
against the instruders or trespassers before the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XVII, in Civil Case No. 42001 for dam with mandatory injunction. If she did not
insist on her motion for contempt which the court held in abeyance and was later
withdrawn by her, if she did not appeal from the order of the court denying her motion
to suspend the writ of demolition, such failure did not amount to a waiver of her right
to pursue the proper action or remedy provided to her by the Rules of Court. It is of no
moment that the respondent did not file a motion to quash the writ of execution or file
a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court or file a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a higher court after her petition to suspend the writ of
demolition had been denied as suggested by petitioner. The law has specifically given
her the remedies to vindicate her claim to the property. When the property of one
person is unlawfully taken by another, the former has a right of action against the
latter for the recovery of the property or for damages for the taking or retention, and
he is entitled to his choice of these two remedies. 7
We find no legal compulsion for respondent to pursue the remedies suggested by the
petitioner, for the rights of a third party claimant should not be decided in the action
where the third-party claim has been presented, but in a separate action to be
instituted by the third person. 8 In Queblar v. Gardu;o 9 this Court held that:
Strictly speaking, the appeal interposed by the third-party claimantappellant is improper, because she was not one of the parties in the
action who were exclusively Venancio Queblar as plaintiff and

Leonardo Gardu;o as defendant. Considering the provisions of


said section 451 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act
No. 4108, the appealed order was not appealable. The appeal that
should have been interposed by her, if the term "appeal" may
properly be employed, is a separate reivindicatory action against
the execution creditor or the purchaser of her property after the sale
at public auction, or a complaint for damages to be charged against
the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff.
In Potenciano v. Dineros, 10 We ruled that:
We see no merit in the claim that the denial or dismissal of
Potenciano's claim in the court below constitutes a bar to the
present action. Potenciano, it is true, did not appeal, from the
disapproval of his claim. But it should be borne in mind that appeal
is not proper in such cases. (Queblar v. Gardu;o supra). As was
said in that case, the appeal that should be interposed "if the term
'appeal' may properly be employed, is a separate reivindicatory
action against the execution creditor or the purchaser of the
property after the sale at public auction, or complaint for damages
to be charged against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in
favor of the sheriff." Such reivindicatory action is resurged to the
third-party claimant by Section 15 (now 17) of Rule 39 despite
disapproval of his claim by the court itself. (Planas v. Madrigal &
Co., supra; Lara v. Bayona, L-7920, May 10, 1955), and it is the
action availed by Potenciano in this case.
The petitioner contends that a writ of execution and an order of demolition cannot be
collaterally attacked in an action specifically brought for recovery of damages, and
that said action for damages and mandatory injunction (Civil Case No. 42001) filed by
the respondent with Branch XVII was nothing less than an action to review the validity
of the order of demolition issued by Branch I in the ejectment cases which have long
become final.
We are not in accord with this contention. The civil case filed by the respondent for
damages and the restoration of the property destroyed aid her premises taken
unlawfully under the writ of demolition was not brought to reverse, impugn or set
aside the judgment in the ejectment cases but to declare that the writ of demolition
should not have been applied to that portion of the land and the building occupied by
her, as correctly stated by the Court of Appeals. To put it succinctly the judgment and
the demolition orders were valid and binding to the tenants but not to the respondent
and her property. Fundamentally, it is the wrongful execution of the judgment and the
writ that is the basis of the claim for damages.

If the judgment and the writs of execution and demolition were alleged in the
complaint for damages, this was not necessarily a collateral attack on said processes
of another branch of the Court but averments to prove the wrongful, illegal and
unauthorized exercise of the writs; it is merely a statement of the legal basis which
the sheriff exceeded, abetted by the petitioner.
The contention of the petitioner that a branch of a Court of First Instance cannot
interfere with or nullify decisions, orders or proceedings of another branch of the
same court and therefore the writs of execution and demolition cannot be impugned is
not exactly on all fours with and hence not applicable to the case at bar. The settled
rule has been clearly laid down in Abiera v. Court of Appeals, 11 wherein the Court,
after a review of the doctrines in Cabigao v. Del Rosario & Lim, 44 Phil. 192; Manila
Herald Publishing Co., Inc., v. Ramos, 88 Phil. 94; Hacbang, et al. v. Hon. Clementino
Diez, 8 SCRA 103 (May 30,1963) and National Power Corporation v. Hon. Jesus de
Veyra 3 SCRA 646 (Dec. 22,1961), held that
No court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or
decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having
equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction.
For this doctrine to apply, the injunction issued by one court must
interfere with the judgment or decree issued by another court of
equal or coordinate jurisdiction and the relief sought by such
injunction must be one which could be granted by the court which
rendered the judgment or issued the decree.
Under Section 17 of Rule 39 a third person who claims property
levied upon on execution may vindicate such claim by action. A
judgment rendered in his favor - declaring him to be the owner of'
the property would not constitute interference with the powers or
processes of the court which rendered the judgment to enforce
which the execution was levied. If that be so and it is so because
the property, being that of a stranger, is not subject to levy then
an interlocutory order, such as injunction, upon a claim and prima
facie showing of ownership by the claimant, cannot be considered
as such interference either
The right of a person who claims to be the owner of property levied
upon on execution to file a third-party claim with the sheriff is not
exclusive, and he may file an action to vindicate his claim even if
the judgment creditor files an indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff
to answer for any damages that may be suffered by the third-party
claimant. By "action," as stated in the Rule, what is meant is a
separate and independent action.

With respect to the fourth assignment of error, petitioner's contention appears to be


quite tenable in that under See. 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court which the
Court of Appeals applied, the notice required before demolition of the improvements
on the property subject of the execution, is notice to the judgment debtor, and not to a
stranger or third party to the case like the private respondent herein. Nonetheless, the
claim that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the aforecited Rule is as immaterial and
inconsequential as the application of this legal provision is superflous and
unnecessary for the affirmance of the Court's decision.
The Manifestation filed by petitioner in the records dated June 1, 1977 with Annexes
A, B, C and D, is Noted.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is dismissed, and the
appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111397

August 12, 2002

HON. ALFREDO LIM and RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, petitioners,


vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO REYES and BISTRO PIGALLE,
INC., respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 25, 1993,2 and its Resolution dated July 13, 19933 which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The assailed Decision sustained the orders
dated December 29, 1992, January 20, 1993 and March 2, 1993,4 issued by Branch
36 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial courts orders enjoined petitioner
Alfredo Lim ("Lim" for brevity), then Mayor of Manila, from investigating, impeding or
closing down the business operations of the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic
Garden Restaurant owned by respondent Bistro Pigalle Inc. ("Bistro" for brevity).
The Antecedent Facts
On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition5 for mandamus and
prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. Bistro filed the case
because policemen under Lims instructions inspected and investigated Bistros
license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the
stoppage of work in Bistros night club and restaurant operations.6 Lim also refused to
accept Bistros application for a business license, as well as the work permit
applications of Bistros staff, for the year 1993.7
In its petition, Bistro argued that Lims refusal to issue the business license and work
permits violated the doctrine laid down this Court in De la Cruz vs. Paras,8 to wit:
"Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. They
may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business."
Acting on Bistros application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued the first
assailed temporary restraining order on December 29, 1992, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

"WHEREFORE, respondent and/or his agents and representatives are


ordered to refrain from inspecting or otherwise interfering in the operation of
the establishments of petitioner (Bistro Pigalle, Inc.)."9
At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in support of their respective
positions. On January 20, 1993, the trial court granted Bistros application for a writ of
prohibitory preliminary injunction. The dispositive portion of the trial courts order
declared:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Petitioners application for a writ
of prohibitory preliminary injunction is granted, and Respondent, and any/all
persons acting under his authority, are and (sic) ordered to cease and desist
from inspecting, investigating and otherwise closing or impeding the
business operations of Petitioner Corporations establishments while the
petition here is pending resolution on the merits.
Considering that the Respondent is a government official and this injunction
relates to his official duties, the posting of an injunction bond by the
Petitioners is not required.
On the other hand, Petitioners application for a writ of mandatory injunction
is hereby denied, for to grant the same would amount to granting the writ of
mandamus prayed for. The Court reserves resolution thereof until the parties
shall have been heard on the merits."10
However, despite the trial courts order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistros
operations effective January 23, 1993, even sending policemen to carry out his
closure order.
On January 25, 1993, Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for Contempt" against Lim and
the policemen who stopped Bistros operations on January 23, 1993. At the hearing of
the motion for contempt on January 29, 1993, Bistro withdrew its motion on condition
that Lim would respect the courts injunction.
However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim,
acting through his agents and policemen, again disrupted Bistros business
operations.
Meanwhile, on February 17, 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order
of January 20, 1993 and to dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor
to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the
statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and
licenses. This statutory power is expressly provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II of

the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
The trial court denied Lims motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case
in an order dated March 2, 1993, the dispositive portion of which stated:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby orders:
(1) The denial of respondents motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction or the dismissal of the instant case;
(2) Petitioner-corporation is authorized to remove the wooden cross-bars or
any other impediments which were placed at its establishments, namely,
New Bangkok Club and Exotic Garden Restaurant on February 12, 1993
and February 15, 1993, respectively, and thereafter said establishments are
allowed to resume their operations;
(3) All the other petitioners are allowed to continue working in the
aforenamed establishments of petitioner-corporation if they have not yet
reported; and
(4) The hearing on the contempt proceedings is deferred to give sufficient
time to respondent to elevate the matters assailed herein to the Supreme
Court."11
On March 10, 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. Lim claimed that
the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals reasoned thus:


"x x x. A writ of preliminary injunction may issue if the act sought to be
enjoined will cause irreparable injury to the movant or destroy the status quo
before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.
A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may
only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests
and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is
primarily intended to maintain the status quo between the parties existing
prior to the filing of the case.
In the case at bar, We find that the respondent Judge did not act
improvidently in issuing the assailed orders granting the writ of preliminary
injunction in order to maintain the status quo, while the petition is pending
resolution on the merits. The private respondent correctly points out that the
questioned writ was regularly issued after several hearings, in which the
parties were allowed to adduce evidence, and argue their respective
positions.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is within the limits of the
sound exercise of discretion of the court and the appellate court will not
interfere, except, in a clear case of abuse thereof. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is accordingly
DISMISSED."16
Hence, this petition.
The Issues

On March 25, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision.12 In a
resolution dated July 13, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied Lims motion for
reconsideration.13
On July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No. 778314 took effect. On the same day, Lim
ordered the Western Police District Command to permanently close down the
operations of Bistro, which order the police implemented at once.15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In denying Lims petition, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion since it issued the writ after hearing on the basis of the
evidence adduced.

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:


1. "DID RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS
SAID ASSAILED ORDERS OF DECEMBER 29, 1992, JANUARY 20, 1993
AND MARCH 2, 1993?"
2. "DID RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT REVERSIBLE
ERRORS IN RENDERING ITS ASSAILED DECISION OF MARCH 25, 1993
AND ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTION OF JULY 13, 1993?"

3. "DID SAID CIVIL CASE NO. 92-63712 AND SAID CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381
BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC WHEN THE NEW BANGKOK CLUB
AND THE EXOTIC GARDEN RESTAURANT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
WERE CLOSED ON JULY 1, 1993 PURSUANT TO ORDINANCE NO.
7783?"
The Ruling of the Court

power to prohibit the operation of night clubs. Lim failed to specify any violation by
Bistro of the conditions of its licenses and permits. In refusing to accept Bistros
business license application for the year 1993, Bistro claims that Lim denied Bistro
due process of law.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the prohibitory preliminary injunction.

The petition is without merit.

We uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals.

Considering that the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783 was not raised before the
trial court or the Court of Appeals, and this issue is still under litigation in another
case,17 the Court will deal only with the first two issues raised by petitioner.

The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question.
The law expressly provides for such authority. Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila, reads:

Validity of the Preliminary Injunction


Bistros cause of action in the mandamus and prohibition proceedings before the trial
court is the violation of its property right under its license to operate. The violation
consists of the work disruption in Bistros operations caused by Lim and his
subordinates as well as Lims refusal to issue a business license to Bistro and work
permits to its staff for the year 1993. The primary relief prayed for by Bistro is the
issuance of writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction. The mandatory injunction
seeks to compel Lim to accept Bistros 1993 business license application and to issue
Bistros business license. Also, the mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to
accept the applications of Bistros staff for work permits. The writ of prohibitory
injunction seeks to enjoin Lim from interfering, impeding or otherwise closing down
Bistros operations.
The trial court granted only the prohibitory injunction. This enjoined Lim from
interfering, impeding or otherwise closing down Bistros operations pending resolution
of whether Lim can validly refuse to issue Bistros business license and its staffs work
permits for the year 1993.
Lim contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the prohibitory injunction.
Lim relies primarily on his power, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to grant and refuse
municipal licenses and business permits as expressly provided for in the Local
Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Lim argues that the
powers granted by these laws implicitly include the power to inspect, investigate and
close down Bistros operations for violation of the conditions of its licenses and
permits.
On the other hand, Bistro asserts that the legal provisions relied upon by Lim do not
apply to the instant case. Bistro maintains that the Local Government Code and the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila do not expressly or impliedly grant Lim any

"Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the mayor. The general duties
and powers of the mayor shall be:
x x x.
(l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and
to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which they
were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinances are being
committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which
the business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any
other reason of general interest." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code provides:
"Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and Compensation: xxx.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which
is the general welfare of the City and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16
of this Code, the City Mayor shall:
(3) x x x.
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the
same for any violation of the condition upon which said
licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance." (Emphasis supplied)
From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue
business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend,

revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke
these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of
these permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the "violation of the
condition(s)" on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to
refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the
prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe
due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the
applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits.
However, the mayor has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in
the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments. Lim acted
beyond his authority when he directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club and
the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance No. 771618 which
expressly prohibits police raids and inspections, to wit:
"Section 1. No member of the Western Police District shall conduct
inspection of food and other business establishments for the purpose of
enforcing sanitary rules and regulations, inspecting licenses and permits,
and/or enforcing internal revenue and customs laws and regulations. This
responsibility should be properly exercised by Local Government Authorities
and other concerned agencies." (Emphasis supplied)
These local government officials include the City Health Officer or his representative,
pursuant to the Revised City Ordinances of the City of Manila,19 and the City
Treasurer pursuant to Section 470 of the Local Government Code.20
Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any business establishment in
Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these
laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private
commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such
provision would be void. The due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim
should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the
conditions of its licenses and permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law.21 Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant case, we find that Lims exercise
of this power violated Bistros property rights that are protected under the due process
clause of the Constitution.

Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its business
license or permits. Still, Lim closed down Bistros operations even before the
expiration of its business license on December 31, 1992. Lim also refused to accept
Bistros license application for 1993, in effect denying the application without
examining whether it complies with legal prerequisites.
Lims zeal in his campaign against prostitution is commendable. The presumption is
that he acted in good faith and was motivated by his concern for his constituents
when he implemented his campaign against prostitution in the Ermita-Malate area.
However, there is no excusing Lim for arbitrarily closing down, without due process of
law, the business operations of Bistro. For this reason, the trial court properly
restrained the acts of Lim.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the trial courts orders.
The sole objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case can be heard fully. It is generally availed of to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be disposed of.22 In the instant case,
the issuance of the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction did not dispose of the
main case for mandamus. The trial court issued the injunction in view of the
disruptions and stoppage in Bistros operations as a consequence of Lims closure
orders. The injunction was intended to maintain the status quo while the petition has
not been resolved on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-54070 February 28, 1983


HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ZAMBALES and JOAQUINA ZAMBALES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NIN BAY MINING CORPORATION, ANGELA C. PREYSLER
and JOAQUIN B. PREYSLER, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in the case entitled "Enrique Zambales
and Joaquina Zambales, Plaintiffs-appellees vs. Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes, Nin Bay
Mining Corporation and Joaquin B. Preysler, Defendants-appellants" (CA-G.R. No.
59386-R), setting aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Palawan in Civil
Case No. 678 for Annulment of a Deed of Sale with Recovery of Possession and
Ownership with Damages", is the subject of this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Joaquin B. Preysler is now deceased and was substituted by Angela C. Preysler, his
widow.
Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes was originally a defendant in Civil Case No. 678 but he
did not appeal from the Decision of the lower Court.
The Zambales spouses (Zambaleses, for brevity) were the homestead patentees of a
parcel of land with an area of 17,8474 hectares situated in the Municipality of Del
Pilar, Roxas, Palawan, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. G 1193 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Palawan, issued pursuant to Homestead Patent
No. V-59502 dated September 6, 1955.
Claiming that the Nin Bay Mining Corporation (Corporation, for short) had removed
silica sand from their land and destroyed the plants and others improvements
thereon, the Zambaleses instituted, on November 10, 1958, Civil Case No. 316
before the Court of First Instance of Palawan claiming damages in the total sum of
P48,000.00.
The Corporation denied having caused any damages and claimed that it had
excavated and extracted silica sand only from its own mining claims and on which it
had mining lease contracts with the Philippine Government.
On October 29, 1959, the Zambaleses, duly assisted by their counsel, Atty. Perfecto
de los Reyes, and the Corporation, entered into a Compromise Agreement, the
portions of which, pertinent to this case, read:

1. DEFENDANT shall pay the PLAINTIFFS a rental of TWENTY


(P20.00) PESOS per hectare per year from September 9, 1955 to
September 30, 1960, or a total rental price of ONE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR PESOS AND SEVENTYFOUR CENTAVOS (P1,784.74), Philippine currency, in lieu of all
damages...
2. The payment to the PLAINTIFFS of the above-mentioned rental
price shall be considered full, absolute and final payment and
indemnity for all the alleged damages to PLAINTIFFS' property and
its improvements, or any other actual, moral, exemplary or other
damages that PLAINTIFFS may have suffered or will suffer in
connection with the mining operations of DEFENDANT on the
property in question, which property, by virtue of the terms of this
Agreement shall be used by DEFENDANT as occupant thereof until
September 30, 1960.
3. PLAINTIFFS hereby agree and bind themselves to sell, transfer
and convey, and DEFENDANT or its assigns, qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain, hereby agrees to purchase and
pay for, the aforesaid property of the PLAINTIFFS, containing an
area of 17.8474 hectares, situated in the Municipality of Del Pilar,
Roxas, Palawan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
G1193 of the Registry of Deeds of Palawan, at the fixed selling
price of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS per hectare or a total
purchase price of EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY
THREE PESOS and SEVENTY CENTAVOS (P8,923.70),
Philippine currency. The contract to purchase and sell herein
provided for, shall be reciprocally demandable and enforceable by
the parties hereto on September 10, 1960. PLAINTIFFS hereby
irrevocably constitute and appoint DEFENDANT, its successors
and/or assigns their true and lawful attorney-in-fact with full power
and authority to sell, transfer and convey on September 10, 1960 or
at any time thereafter the whole or any part of PLAINTIFFS'
property hereinabove mentioned to the DEFENDANT, its
successors and/or assigns, or to any third party, and to execute and
deliver all instruments and documents whatsoever necessary for
the purpose, and all acts done and to be done by DEFENDANT, its
successors and/or assigns in conformity with the powers herein
granted are hereby ratified and confirmed by the PLAINTIFFS. ...
4. In consideration of the payment of the amount of P1,784.74 by
DEFENDANT, and of other good and valuable consideration,
PLAINTIFFS, jointly and severally, hereby forever release, fully and

completely, said DEFENDANT, its successors and/or assigns in


interest, from any and all liabilities, whether arising from past,
present or future excavation or removal of silica sand from the
property in question or otherwise, and from all the other claims
against the DEFENDANT contained in their Complaint in Civil Case
No. 316 of the Court of First Instance of Palawan. 1
The Trial Court rendered judgment on October 29, 1959 based on the Compromise
Agreement. The document was duly annotated an OCT No. G - 1193 (Exhibit " A ")
the day after, or on October 30, 1959 (Exhibit " 10 A ").
On September 10, 1960, the Corporation, as attorney-in-fact for the Zambaleses, as
Vendors, sold the disputed property to Joaquin B. Preysler for the sum of P8,923.70
fixed in the Compromise Agreement (Exhibit " 11 "). Transfer Certificate of Title No. T970 was issued in the vendee's name on December 19, 1960 (Exhibit " 2 ").
The Deed of Sale to Preysler contained the following proviso:
The VENDORS hereby represent and warrant that the five-year
restrictive period on alienation of lands acquired under the
homestead provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, has already expired, the
date of issuance of the herein homestead patent to the VENDORS
as aforesaid being September 6, 1955 as shown in Original
Certificate of Title No. G-1193.
On October 18, 1960, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved
the sale to Preysler of the subject property (Exhibit "13 ").

On. December 6, 1969, or ten (10) years after the Trial Court's Decision based on the
Compromise Agreement, and nine (9) years after the sale to Preysler, the
Zambaleses filed Civil Case No. 678 before the Court of First Instance of Palawan for
"Annulment of a Deed of Sale with Recovery of Possession and Ownership with
Damages". They contended that it was their lawyer who prevailed upon them to sign
the Compromise Agreement; that they are unschooled and did not understand the
contents thereof; that they were made to understand that they would receive the sum
of P10,700.00, only as payment for damages sustained by the land from 1955 to
1960; that through fraud, deceit and manipulation by their lawyer and the Corporation,
they were made to agree to appoint the Corporation as their attorney-in-fact with full
power and authority to sell; that it was never their intention to sell the land; that in
September 1969, they were surprised to learn that the land was already titled in the
name of Joaquin B. Preysler; that the land was acquired and registered in the latter's
name through fraud and deceit. The Zambaleses then prayed that the deed of sale
and the title in Preysler's name be annulled on the ground of fraud and that the
property be reconveyed to them.
In their Answer, the Corporation denied all allegations that the Zambaleses had
signed the Compromise Agreement without understanding the contents thereof, the
truth being that it was read to them by their counsel, Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes, who
explained thoroughly the full implication and legal consequence of each and every
provision, which was then submitted and approved by then Presiding Judge Juan L.
Bocar; and that the Corporation had sold the property to Preysler as a duly
constituted attorney-in-fact pursuant to the Compromise Agreement.
After trial, the lower Court rendered judgment in favor of the Zambaleses, the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:
1) That the deed of sale executed by Nin Bay Mining Corporation
through its president, to Joaquin B. Preysler is hereby declared null
and void;
2) That the defendant Joaquin B. Preysler is hereby ordered to
reconvey the land subject matter of this litigation to the plaintiffs;
3) That the defendants Nin Bay Mining Corporation and Joaquin B.
Preysler shall pay the plaintiffs the sum of P85,000.00 as actual
damages plus the legal rate of interest from September 30, 1960 up
to the time the amount is fully paid;

4) That the defendants to pay the sum of FIVE THOUSAND


(P5,000.00) PESOS as attorneys fees; and
5) The defendants to pay the costs.
On appeal by the Corporation, the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court, after
finding that the alleged fraud or misrepresentation in the execution of the
Compromise Agreement had not been substantiated by evidence.
The case is now before us on review.
The controversy revolves around the issue of due execution and validity of the
Compromise Agreement (Exhibit "8") dated October 29; 1959, and of the subsequent
Deed of Sale (Exhibit "11 "), dated 10 September 1960.
I
The general rule is that whoever alleges fraud or mistake must substantiate his
allegation, since the presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns
and that private transactions have been fair and regular. The rule admits of an
exception in Article 1332 of the Civil Code which provides:
When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a
language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged,
the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof
have been fully explained to the former.
For the proper application of said provision, it has first to be established convincingly
that the illiterate or the party at a disadvantage could not read or understand the
language in which the contract was written. 2 The evidence discloses that the spouses
Zambales are unschooled. They cannot read, speak, much less understand English
or write, except to sign their names. 3 The Zambaleses alleged in their Complaint that
the Compromise Agreement (Exhibit "8") was executed through fraud by the
Corporation and by their counsel Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes, whom they included as
a defendant. The burden of proof, therefore, shifted to the Corporation to show that
the compromise agreement had been fully explained to the plaintiffs.
In refuting the allegation that plaintiffs were misled into signing the compromise
agreement, their former counsel, Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes, and the notary, Atty.
Salomon Reyes, a lawyer for Nin Bay Mining Corporation, established that the terms
and conditions of the Compromise Agreement were thoroughly explained and fully
understood by the spouses Zambales in accordance with their proposal to sell the
land at P500.00 a hectare; that before the signing of the Compromise Agreement, the

notary requested Atty. de los Reyes to read and explain each and every provision to
the spouses, and with the help of Ricardo Nunala, Atty. de los Reyes did so in their
dialect (Cuyuno). Thereafter, the parties went to Judge Juan Bocar, who was assured
that the spouses Zambales understood and signed the Compromise Agreement. 4
We sustain the finding of the Court of Appeals that fraud and misrepresentation did
not vitiate petitioners' consent to the Agreement when it observed:
Taking into account the foregoing observations, this Court is not
convinced that indeed appellees were victims of a fraudulent
scheme employed upon them by their former counsel by reason of
their alleged illiteracy and ignorance. The evidence discloses that
appellees, although unschooled, are intelligent, well-informed and
intelligent people. They are not the kind of persons who could
easily be fooled of their rights and interests. Even as commented
by the court a quo, which had a chance to observe the demeanor of
the witness, it had no observation that the witness, Joaquina
Zambales, is ignorant. As correctly observed by appellants,
appellees 'are political leaders and chief campaigners; they speak
in the platform during political rallies; and they are widely travelled'
(p. 28, Appellants' Brief). As a matter of fact they are
knowledgeable of the right connections in the government. They
had approached former Sen. Rogelio de la Rosa, no less, the
congressman and the governor. Even the lawyers they have
retained previous to their present counsel are the Padilla Law
Office and the Diokno Law Office, It is common knowledge that
these law offices are among the established law offices in Manila. It
is far convincing that an ignorant couple would have knowledge of
these law firms. All these are obvious manifestations of their being
well-informed and the way they have conducted their way of living
apparently is inconsistent with the plea of being illiterate and/or
ignorant. They cannot capitalize on the fact that they are
uneducated only because they had no formal schooling inasmuch
as one's knowledge of the facts of life is not dependent on whether
one had formal schooling or not and it does not necessarily follow
always that if one is unschooled he is ignorant.
Furthermore, when plaintiffs-appellees signed the questioned
compromise agreement they were duly assisted and represented
by their counsel, Atty. de los Reyes. When Atty. de los Reyes
testified in court he categorically declared that it was to the best
interest of his clients that they compromise Civil Case No. 316. This
declaration finds support in Joaquina Zambales' testimony wherein
she stated thus:

ATTY. SEMBRANO:
Q. Except for this present case, would you say to
the Court that Atty. de los Reyes extended to you
legal assistance to your satisfaction?
A. Yes, sir, he is good to us.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So these people never gave their services to
you?
A. Nobody was able to help us except Atty. de los
Reyes. (Tsn., pp. 29, 31 & 32, June 19, 1974)
... Thus, it having been established that appellees could not have
been misled by their former counsel into signing the compromise
agreement and taking into account the acts of the appellees and
their children subsequent to the execution of the compromise
agreement perforce the court a quo erred in not giving credence to
the clear and convincing testimonies of Atty. Perfecto de los Reyes
and Atty. Salomon Reyes anent the execution of the compromise
agreement. 5
However, although we find that the Zambaleses were not misled into signing the
Compromise Agreement, we hold that there has been violation of the Public Land Act.
The evidence on record shows that the land in question was awarded t the
Zambaleses as a homestead on September 6, 1955 (Exhibit "A"). Before us, the
Zambaleses now argue that the Compromise Agreement executed on October 29,
1959 is in violation of the Public Land Act, which prohibits alienation and
encumbrance of a homestead lot within five years from the issuance of the patent. 6
We sustain that contention. The fact that the issue was not raised in the Courts below
is not a deterrent factor considering that the question affects the validity of the
agreement between the parties. The Supreme Court has the authority to review
matters even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it is found that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. 7 Moreover, a
party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof
would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order
to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory. 8 In the case at bar it
is indisputable that Homestead Patent No. V-59502 was issued on September 6,
1955 as shown in Original Certificate of Title No. 1193 (Exhibit "A ").

The sale of a homestead lot within the five-year prohibitory period is illegal and void.
The law does not distinguish between executory and consummated sales.
The law prohibiting any transfer or alienation of homestead land
within five years from the issuance of the patent does not
distinguish between executory and consummated sales; and it
would hardly be in keeping with the primordial aim of this prohibition
to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader the piece of
land that the state had gratuitously given to them, to hold valid a
homestead sale actually perfected during the period of prohibition
but with the execution of the formal deed of conveyance and the
delivery of possession of the land sold to the buyer deferred until
after the expiration of the prohibitory period, purposely to
circumvent the very law that prohibits and declares invalid such
transaction to protect the homesteader and his family. 9
In the compromise agreement executed between the parties, (1) the Zambaleses
promised to sell and the Corporation agreed to buy the disputed lot at P500.00 per
hectare, the contract to be reciprocally demandable and enforceable on September
10, 1960; and as a substitute procedure, (2) an irrevocable agency was constituted in
favor of the Corporation as attorney- in-fact to sell the land to any third person on
September 10, 1960 or any time thereafter.
Clearly, the bilateral promise to buy and sell the homestead lot at a price certain,
which was reciprocally demandable 10, was entered into within the five-year
prohibitory period and is therefore, illegal and void. Further, the agency to sell the
homestead lot to a third party was coupled with an interest inasmuch as a bilateral
contract was dependent on it and was not revocable at will by any of the parties. 11 To
all intents and purposes, therefore, there was an actual executory sale perfected
during the period of prohibition except that it was reciprocally demandable thereafter
and the agency to sell to any third party was deferred until after the expiration of the
prohibitory period. That "rentals" were ostensibly to be paid during the five-year
prohibitory period, and the agency to sell made effective only after the lapse of the
said period, was merely a devise to circumvent the prohibition.
To hold valid such an arrangement would be to throw the door wide open to all
possible subterfuges that persons interested in homesteads may devise to defeat the
legal prohibition against alienation within five years from the issuance of the patent.
We hold, therefore, that the bilateral promise to buy and sell, and the agency to sell,
entered into within five years from the date of the homestead patent, was in violation
of section 118 of the Public Land Law, although the executed sale was deferred until
after the expiration of the five-year- prohibitory period.

As the contract is void from the beginning, for being expressly prohibited by law 12 the
action for the declaration of its inexistence does not prescribe. 13 Being absolutely
void, it is entitled to no authority or respect, the sale may be impeached in a collateral
proceeding by any one with whose rights and interest it conflicts. There is no
presumption of its validity. 14 The approval of the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources after the lapse of five years from the date of the patent would
neither legalize the sale. 15

G.R. No. L-54597 December 15, 1982

The homestead in question should be returned to the Zambaleses, petitioners herein,


who are, in turn, bound to restore to the Corporation the sum of P8,923.70 as the
price thereof. The actual damages awarded by the Trial Court of P85,000.00 have not
been adequately substantiated. Moreover, under the agreement, the total rental price
of P1,784.74 was intended to be "in lieu of all damages, or any other actual, moral,
exemplary or other damages.

Antonio P. Amistad for petitioner.

This is without prejudice to the corresponding action on the part of the State for
reversion of the property and its improvements, if any, under Section 124 of the Public
Land Act. 16
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby REVERSED, and another one
entered (1) declaring null and void a) the bilateral promise to buy and sell entered into
between Enrique Zambales and Joaquina Zambales, on the one hand, and the Nin
Bay Mining Corporation on the other, and b) the sale executed by Nin Bay Mining
Corporation in favor of Joaquin B. Preysler; (2) ordering Angela C. Preysler to
reconvey the land subject matter of this litigation to petitioners upon refund by the
latter to the Nin Bay Mining Corporation of the sum of P8,923.70, all expenses for the
reconveyance to be borne by private respondents; (3) ordering Nin Bay Mining
Corporation to pay rentals to petitioners at the price of P20.00 per hectare per year
from December 6, 1969, the date of the institution of the Complaint, till the date that
possession is turned over to petitioners; and (4) ordering the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Palawan to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-970 of his
Registry, and reissue to the Heirs of Enrique Zambales and Joaquina Zambales the
title to the homestead in question.

FELICIDAD ANZALDO, petitioner,


vs.
JACOBO C. CLAVE as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and as
Presidential Executive Assistant; JOSE A. R. MELO, as Commissioner of the
Civil Service Commission, and EULALIA L. VENZON,respondents.

Artemio E. Valenton for private respondent.


Madamba, Deza & Almario Law Offices for respondent .
Demegildo Laborte & Lazano Law Offices for respondent public officials.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a controversy over the position of Science Research Supervisor II, whose
occupant heads the Medical Research Department in the Biological Research Center
of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST).
Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo 55, seeks to annul the decision of Presidential
Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave dated March 20, 1980, revoking her
appointment dated January 5, 1978 as Science Research Supervisor IIand directing
the appointment to that position of Doctor Eulalia L. Venzon, 48.
The contested position became vacant in 1974 when its incumbent, Doctor Quintin
Kintanar, became Director of the Biological Research Center. Doctor Kintanar
recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed to that position. Doctor Anzaldo
protested against that recommendation. The NIST Reorganization Committee found
her protest to be valid and meritorious (p. 34, Rollo). Because of that impasse, which
the NIST Commissioner did not resolve, the position was not filled up.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Solicitor General.


No costs.
SO ORDERED.

At the time the vacancy occurred, or on June 30, 1974, both Doctors Anzaldo and
Venzon were holding similar positions in the Medical Research Department: that of
Scientist Research Associate IV with an annual compensation of P12,013 per annum.
Both were next-in-rank to the vacant position.
Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman, became the Officer-in-Charge of the
NIST. Effective January 5, 1978, he appointed Doctor Anzaldo to the contested
position with compensation at P18,384 per annum. The appointment was approved
by the Civil Service Commission.

Doctor Afable, in his letter dated January 20, 1978, explained that the appointment
was made after a thorough study and screening of the qualifications of Doctors
Anzaldo and Venzon and upon the recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation
Committee that gave 88 points to Doctor Anzaldo and 61 points to Doctor Venzon (p.
78, Rollo).
Doctor Venzon in a letter dated January 23, 1978, addressed to Jacobo C. Clave,
appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines (pp. 139-40). The appeal
was forwarded to the NIST Anzaldo to the contested position (p. 63, Rollo). The
appeal-protest was later sent to the Civil Service Commission.
Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo
recommended in Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 that Doctor Venzon be
appointed to the contested position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the
1978 appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the
Civil Service Commission (pp. 30 and 48, Rollo).
The resolution was made pursuant to section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 807 (which took effect on October 6, 1975) and
which provides that "before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the
President shall consult the Civil Service Commission."
After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January
5, 1980, Doctor Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. As
stated earlier, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave (who was concurrently
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission) in his decision of March 20, 1980 revoked
Doctor Anzaldo's appointment and ruled that, "as recommended by the Civil Service
Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and Commissioner Melo), Doctor
Venzon should be appointed to the contested position but that Doctor Anzaldo's
appointment to the said position should be considered "valid and effective during the
pendency" of Doctor Venzon's protest (p. 36, Rollo).

When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was "inclined
to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission", what he meant
was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave's recommendation: he was
concurring with himself (p. 35, Rollo).
It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of
the Civil Service Commission. The case is analogous to Zambales Chromite Mining
Co. vs. Court of Appeals, L-49711, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was
held that the decision of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M.
Gozon, affirming his own decision in a mining case as Director of Mines was void
because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of
administrative justice.
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own
recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between
Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research
Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.
Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service
Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a
person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the
appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.
In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person
in the Civil Service Commission who was consulted by the Office of the
President: Jacobo C. Clave. The Civil Service Decree could not have contemplated
that absurd situation for, as held in the Zambales Chromite case, that would not be
fair to the appellant.

In a resolution dated August 14, 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave denied
Doctor Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration. On August 25, 1980, she filed in this
Court the instant special civil action of certiorari.

We hold that respondent Clave committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the
appeal in favor of Doctor Venzon. The appointing authority, Doctor Afable, acted in
accordance with law and properly exercised his discretion in appointing Doctor
Anzaldo to the contested position.

What is manifestly anomalous and questionable about that decision of Presidential


Executive Assistant Clave is that it is an implementation of Resolution No. 1178
dated August 23, 1979 signed by Jacobo C. Clave, as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission and concurred in by Commissioner Jose A. Melo.

Doctor Anzaldo finished the pharmacy course in 1950 in the College of Pharmacy,
University of the Philippines. She obtained from the Centro Escolar University the
degree of Master of Science in Pharmacy in 1962 and in 1965 the degree of Doctor of
Pharmacy.

In that resolution, Commissioner Clave and Melo, acting for the Civil Service
Commission, recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed Science Research
Supervisor II in place of Doctor Anzaldo.

Aside from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered medical
technologist and supervisor (unassembled).

She started working in the NIST in 1954 and has served in that agency for
about twenty-eight (28) years now. As already stated, in January, 1978, she was
appointed to the contested Position of Science Research Supervisor II. Her present
salary as Science Research Supervisor II, now known as Senior Science Research
Specialist, is P 30,624 per annum after she was given a merit increase by Doctor
Kintanar, effective July 1, 1981 (p. 259, Rollo).
On the other hand, Doctor Venzon finished the medical course in the University of
Santo Tomas in 1957. She started working in the NIST in 1960. She has been
working in that agency for more than twenty-one (21) years.Doctor Anzaldo is senior
to her in point of service.
Considering that Doctor Anzaldo has competently and satisfactorily discharged the
duties of the contested position for more than four (4) years now and that she is
qualified for that position, her appointment should be upheld. Doctor Venzon's protest
should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Clave dated March 20, 1980 is set aside,
and petitioner Anzaldo's promotional appointment to the contested position is
declared valid. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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