Professional Documents
Culture Documents
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE
COMPANY v.
REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORP
(EFFECT OF DEATH ON SURETYS LIABILITY)
attorneys
expenses.
fees,
andP5,000.00
as
litigation
liability
under
the
PNB v. CA
(Expropriation; 32k)
FACTS:Loreto Tan is the owner of a parcel of land abutting
the national highway in Bacolod. Expropriation proceedings
were instituted by the government against private
respondent Tan and other property owners before the CFI.
Tan filed a motion requesting issuance of an order for release
to him of the expropriation price of 32k.
PNB was subsequently required by the TC to release to Tan
the amount of 32k deposited with it by the government.
issued a managers check and delivered the dame
to
one
Sonia
Gonzaga
WITHOUT
TANS
KNOWLEDGE, CONSENT, and AUTHORITY.
Sonia Gonzaga deposited it in her account in
FEBTC and later on withdrew said amount.
Tan subsequently demanded payment from petitioner for
the same amount but the latter refused on the ground that
petitioner had already paid and delivered it to Sonia on the
strength of an SPA allegedly executed in her favor by Tan.
Tan executed an affidavit before petitioners
lawyer that
He never executed an SPA
Never authorized Sonia to receive the sum
He signed a motion for the court to issue an order
to release said sum of money to him and gave the
same to husband of Sonia to be filed in court.
However, after the order was subsequently issued
by the court, a certain Engr. Decena of Highway
Engrs Office issued the authority to release the
funds not to him but to Mr. Gonzaga.
filed a motion in court to require PNB to pay the
same to him.
Petitioner filed an opposition contending
Sonia Gonzaga presented to it a copy of an order
and
SPA by virtue of which petitioner delivered the
check to her.
failed to present the SPA before the court.
TC decided that there was need for the matter to be
ventilated in a separate civil action and thus Tan filed a
complaint with the RTC against petitioner and Juan
Tagamolila, PNBs assistant Branch Mgr., to recover said
amount. Petitioner contended that
Private respo had authorized Sonia to act as agent
Filed a 3rd party complaint against spouses
Gonzaga
Praying that they be ordered to pay 32k to pr
Tagamolila said that Sonia presented the SPA but
later borrowed it again for she needed it in
encashing the check
RTC ordered petitioner and Tagamolila to pay Tan jointly and
severally the amount + legal interest + damages + attys
fees.
ISSUE: W/N the SPA ever existed. Petitioner avers that
SPA need not be proved under the best evidence rule
because it already proved the existence of the SPA from the
testimonies of its witnesses and by the certification issued
CULABA V. CA
(SMC)
SMC, for its part, contended that the primary issue in the
case at bar revolved around the BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY.
It was incumbent upon the Culaba to exercise
ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence to
verify and identify the extent of the alleged agents
authority.
It was their burden to establish the true identity of
the assumed agent, and this could not be
established by mere representation, rumor or
general reputation. As they utterly failed in this
regard,
the
appellants
must
suffer
the
consequences.
SMC, for its part, avers that the burden of proving
payment is with the debtor, in consonance with
the express provision of Article 1233 of the New
Civil Code. The petitioners miserably failed to
prove the self-serving allegation that they already
paid their liability to the private respondent.
under normal circumstances, an obligor would not
just pay a substantial amount to someone whom
he saw for the first time, without even asking for
the latters name.
CA affirmed RTC:
1)
2)
ISSUES:
W/N the respondent SMC had proven by preponderant
evidence that it had properly and timely notified Culaba of
lost booklet of receipts
W/N respondent SMC had proven by preponderant evidence
that Culaba was remiss in the payment of his accounts to
its agent.
HELD: dismissed. A careful study of the records of the case
reveal that the appellate court affirmed the trial courts
factual findings as follows:
Summonses were duly served upon all the parties except for
Santos, who was no longer connected with Producers Bank.
six (6) months after funding the check, Allied informed
Metrobank that the signature on the check was forged. Thus,
3)
4)
5)
e)
f)
ESTANISLAO V. EASTWEST
BANKING CORP
(replevin with damages)
FACTS: On July 24, 1997, petitioners obtained a loan from
the respondent in the amount of P3,925,000.00 evidenced
by a promissory note and secured by two deeds of chattel
mortgage dated July 10, 1997: one covering two dump
trucks and a bulldozer to secure the loan amount of
P2,375,000.00, and another covering bulldozer and a wheel
loader to secure the loan amount of P1,550,000.00.
Petitioners defaulted in the amortizations and the entire
obligation became due and demandable.
EastWest
filed a suit for replevin with damages, praying that
the equipment covered by the first deed of chattel
mortgage be seized and delivered to it. In the
alternative, respondent prayed that petitioners be
ordered to pay the outstanding principal amount of
P3,846,127.73 with 19.5% interest per annum
reckoned from judicial demand until fully paid,
exemplary damages of P50,000.00, attorneys fees
equivalent to 20% of the total amount due, other
expenses and costs of suit.
-
b)
c)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
a)
ISSUES:
when it failed and refused to apply procedural requisites
which would warrant the setting aside of the summary
judgment in violation of appellants right to due process;
b)
c)
d)
HELD:
Both parties admit the execution and contents of MoA and
Dacion in Payment. They differ, however, on whether both
contracts constitute pactum commissorium or dacion en
pago.
MoA
and
Dacion
in
Payment
constitute
pactum
commissorium, which is prohibited under Article 2088 of the
Civil Code which provides:
The creditor cannot appropriate the things given
by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them.
Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.
conveyed to
and lot in
name of Lina
(FEBTC) the
CA affirmed.
petitioner could have easily belied the existence of
the pesadas and the purpose for which they were
offered in evidence by presenting his daughter
Elena as witness; however, he failed to do so.
Thus, it gave credence to the testimony of
respondent Guillermo in that the net proceeds
from the copra deliveries were applied as
installment payments for the loan.
ISSUES
(1)
(2)
HELD:
We found no clear showing that the TC and the CA
committed reversible errors of law in giving credence and
according weight to the pesadas presented by respondents.
According to Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court,
there are two ways of proving the due execution and
authenticity of a private document, to wit: SEC. 20. Proof of
private document. Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:(a) By anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.Any other private document need only be identified as
that which it is claimed to be. (21a)
As reproduced above, the trial court found that the due
execution and authenticity of the pesadas were established
by the plaintiffs daughter Elena Tan and sometimes by
plaintiffs son Vicente Tan.
In any event, petitioner is already estopped from questioning
the due execution and authenticity of the pesadas. As found
by the CA, Tan Shuy could have easily belied the existence of
x x x the pesadas or receipts, and the purposes for which
they were offered in evidence by simply presenting his
daughter, Elena Tan Shuy, but no effort to do so was actually
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
i.
2)
8% per annum for the dollar loans. The basis for the
payment of the dollar obligation is the conversion rate of
P26.50 per dollar availed of at the time of incurring of the
obligation in accordance with Article 1250 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines;
H)
Dismissing [Equitable's] counterclaim except the
payment of the aforestated unpaid principal loan obligations
and interest.
RTC
a.
Ordering [Equitable] to reinstate and return the amount
of [respondents'] deposit placed on hold status;
b.
Ordering [Equitable] to pay [respondents] the sum of
P12 [m]illion [p]esos as moral damages;
was
an
extraordinary
1)
2)
3)
3)
4)
TC
3.
4.
5.
6.
At the outset, we qualify that this case deals only with the
extinguishment of Central Suretys P6M loan secured by the
Wack Wack Membership pledge. We note that both lower
courts were one in annulling Premiere Banks application of
payments to the loans of Casent Realty and the Spouses
Castaeda under PN Nos. 235-Z and 717-X, respectively,
thus:
It bears stressing that the parties to PN No. 714-Y secured by
Wack Wack membership certificate are only Central Surety,
as debtor and [Premiere Bank], as creditor. Thus, when the
questioned stipulation speaks of "several obligations", it only
refers to the obligations of [Central Surety] and nobody else.
[I]t is plain that [Central Surety] has only two loan
obligations, namely:
1.) Account No. 714-Y secured by Wack Wack
membership certificate; and
2.)
Account No. 367-Z secured by Condominium
Certificate of Title.
The two loans are secured by separate and different
collaterals. The collateral for Account No. 714-Y, which is the
Wack Wack membership certificate answers only for that
account and nothing else. The collateral for Account No. 367Z, which is the Condominium Certificate of Title, is
answerable only for the said account.
The fact that the loan obligations of [Central Surety] are
secured by separate and distinct collateral simply shows that
each collateral secures only a particular loan obligation and
does not cover loans including future loans or
advancements.
As regards the loan covered by Account No. 235-Z, this was
obtained by Casent Realty, not by [Central Surety]. Although
Mr. Engracio Castaeda is the vice-president of [Central
Surety], and president of Casent Realty, it does not follow
that the two corporations are one and the same. Both are
invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from
each other.
Thus, [Central Surety] cannot be held liable for the obligation
of Casent Realty, absent evidence showing that the latter is
being used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud or defend crime; or used as a shield to confuse
the legitimate issues, or when it is merely an adjunct, a
business conduit or an alter ego of [Central Surety] or of
another corporation; or used as a cloak to cover for fraud or
illegality, or to work injustice, or where necessary to achieve
equity or for the protection of creditors.1avvphi1
Likewise, [Central Surety] cannot be held accountable for the
loan obligation of spouses Castaeda under Account No. IND
717-X. Settled is the rule that a corporation is invested by
law with a personality separate and distinct from those of
the persons composing it. The corporate debt or credit is
not the debt or credit of the stockholder nor is the
stockholders debt or credit that of the corporation.
The mere fact that a person is a president of the corporation
does not render the property he owns or possesses the
1.
2.
3.
the bank shall be entitled to declare this Note and all sums
payable
hereunder to be immediately due and payable, without need
of presentment, demand, protest or notice of nay kind, all of
which I/We hereby expressly waive, upon occurrence of any
of the following events: x x x (ii) My/Our failure to pay
any amortization or installment due hereunder; (iii) My/Our
failure to pay money due under any other document or
agreement evidencing obligations for borrowed money x x
x.32
by virtue of which, it follows that the obligation under
Promissory Note 367-Z had become past due and
demandable, with further notice expressly waived, when
Central Surety defaulted on its obligations under Promissory
Note No. 714-Y.
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals33 forecloses any doubt that an
acceleration clause is valid and produces legal effects. In
fact, in Selegna Management and Development Corporation
v. United Coconut Planters Bank,34 we held that:
Considering that the contract is the law between the parties,
respondent is justified in invoking the acceleration clause
declaring the entire obligation immediately due and payable.
That clause obliged petitioners to pay the entire loan on
January 29, 1999, the date fixed by respondent.
It is worth noting that after the delayed payment
of P6,000,000.00 was tendered by Central Surety, Premiere
Bank returned the amount as insufficient, ostensibly because
there was, at least, another account that was likewise due.
Obviously, in its demand of 28 September 2000, petitioner
sought payment, not just of theP6,000,000.00, but of all
these past due accounts. There is extant testimony to
support this claim, as the transcript of stenographic notes on
the testimony of Atty. Araos reveals:
Atty. Opinion: Q. But you accepted this payment of Six Million
(P6,000,000.00) later on when together with this was paid
another check for 1.8 Million?
Witness: A. We accepted.
Atty. Opinion: Q. And you applied this to four (4) other
accounts three (3) other accounts or to four (4) accounts
mentioned in Exhibit "J." Is that correct?
Atty. Tagalog: We can stipulate on that. Your Honor.
Court: This was stipulated?
Atty. Tagalog: Yes, Your Honor. In fact, there is already
stipulation that we confirm that those are the applications of
payments made by the defendant Bank on those loan
accounts.
Atty. Opinion: Q. Were these accounts due already when you
made this application, distribution of payments?
Witness: A. Yes sir.35
Conversely, in its evidence-in-chief, Central Surety did not
present any witness to testify on the payment of its
obligations. In fact, the record shows that after marking its
evidence, Central Surety proceeded to offer its evidence
immediately. Only on the rebuttal stage did Central Surety
present a witness; but even then, no evidence was adduced
of payment of any other obligation. In this light, the Court is
constrained to rule that all obligations of Central Surety to
Premiere Bank were due; and thus, the application of
payments was warranted.
Being in receipt of amounts tendered by Central Surety,
which were insufficient to cover its more onerous obligations,
Premiere Bank cannot be faulted for exercising the authority
granted to it under the Promissory Notes, and applying
payment to the obligations as it deemed fit. Subject to the
caveat that our ruling herein shall be limited only to the
Date
August
Instrume
nt
20,
PN 714-Y
Amoun
t
covere
d
P6M
1999
August
1999
29,
Deed
of
Assignme
nt
with
Pledge
P 15 M
As security for PN
714-Y and/or such
Promissory
Note/s
which
the
ASSIGNOR
/
PLEDGOR
shall
hereafter execute in
favor
of
the
ASSIGNEE/PLEDGEE
Instrument
Continuing
Guaranty/Comprehensive
Surety Agreement
Instrument
PN 714-Y
Deed of Assignment
Pledge
Stipulation
Notarized,
Sept. 22, 1999
Continuing
Guaranty/Comprehensive
Surety Agreement
P4
00
P4
00
1278-1290 COMPENSATION
1.
BPI V. CA
2.
PNB V. CA
3.
BGV REALTY V. CA
4.
METROPOLITAN BANK V. TONDA
5.
TRINIDAD V. ACAPULCO
6.
INSULAR INVESTMENT V. CAPITAL ONE
7.
FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTION V.
BAYANIHAN
1291-1304- NOVATION
1.
LICAROS V. GATMAITAN
2.
GARCIA V. LLAMAS
3.
CALIFORNIA BUS LINES V. STATE
INVESTMENTS
4.
AQUINTEY V. TIBONG
5.
RICARZE V. CA
6.
LEDONIO V. CAPITOL DEVELOPMENT
7.
VALENZUELA V. KALAYAAN
8.
TOMIMBANG V. TOMIMBANG
9.
MILLA V. PEOPLE
10.
HEIRS OF SERVANDO V. GONZALES
11.
PNB V. SORIANO
12.
SERFINO V. FAR EAST BANK
13.
PHIL. RECLAMATION V. ROMAGO
14.
ACE FOODS V. MICROPACIFIC
15.
DAVID V. DAVID