NATOs Northern Front:

DOV S. ZAKHEIM
U.S. Department of Defense,

Developments

and

Prospects

Washington, D.C.

Zakheim, D. S. NATOs Northern Front: Developments and Prospects. Cooperation

and Conflict, XVII
, 1982, 193-205.
in
Beginning the mid-1970s, a number of observers of the so-called Nordic balance

began to draw attention to the growing imbalance in NATO and Warsaw Pact
capabilities in the region. The U.S.-Norwegian prestocking arrangement was one
NATO response to the limited warning time for a Soviet move to cut off the North
Cape area. Whereas Norway, in conjunction with the United States, is currently in
the midst of a major effort to restore the credibility of its northernmost defenses,
Denmark has been amongst the most reluctant of Alliance members to increase its
level of defense spending. Furthermore, Greenlands home rule represents another
complication. Given Greenlands clear determination to go its own way in international
economic affairs, it is important to assess whether it might do the same on defense
matters. Greenlands importance to NATO is often overlooked but cannot be overstated. Finlands neutrality and Swedens more forceful armed neutrality permit NATO
to adopt a posture which does not impose upon Denmark and Norway the burden of

hosting foreign troops

upon their soil.

I. INTRODUCTION

is the primary reason for the

renewed U.S. concern about defending
vital petroleum supplies from the Persian
Gulf. Within Europe, the importance of
continuity is best underlined with respect
to U.S. policy towards what has been
termed the Northern Flank.
For many years, the United States
seemed somewhat less than preoccupied
with NATOs posture in Scandinavia, an
area that is as much NATOs Northern
Front as it is a flank. In part, U.S. unconcern was accidental, a carryover from the
early days of the Alliance when American
and British naval forces posed the primary
threat to any Soviet aggression against
Denmark and Norway, and were expected
to balance the ground force advantage
that, as elsewhere in Europe, lay with the
Warsaw Pact, specifically the Soviet
Union and its East German and Polish

security

The 1980 election has had a profound

impact upon U.S. defense policy. The
incoming Reagan Administration has
raised a number of fundamental questions
about defense strategy, policy and program requirements, and proposed a variety of initiatives geared to strengthening
U.S. defense posture. In the realm of
conventional forces, the Administration
has discarded the timeworn notion of a
one-and-one-half war strategy in favor
of a more flexible approach that takes
more realistic account of the proliferation
of Soviet capabilities, and clients
worldwide.
It is significant, however, that the new
Administrations approach has built
upon, rather than replaced, long standing
commitments to friends and Allies. For
no area is this observation more valid than
Europe, whose economic and political

allies.

193
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force balance, that gap, and to threaten early warning facilbetween the ities throughout Scandinavia.
forces available to each alliance in NorthBeginning in the mid-1970s, a number
of observers of the so-called Nordic balern Europe, continues to favor the Pact.
On a day-to-day basis, the Soviet Unions ance began to draw attention to the growforces on the Kola Peninsula and the Len- ing imbalance in NATO and Soviet capaingrad Military District, as well as the bilities in the region. It became clear that
German Democratic Republic and Polish while U.S. naval forces could be enhanced
forces likely to be committed to any battle to provide a continuing threat to Soviet
for Denmark, far outnumber active Nor- fleet assets in the Barents and Baltic Seas,
wegian, Danish and FRG forces commit- the price for their doing so was costly both
ted to Allied Forces North. What has in terms of dollars to be expended on
shifted over the past two decades, how- shipbuilding and losses to be expected in
wartime. While neither cost deterred the
ever, has been the degree of that ground
force disparity, as well as the concomitant U.S. Navy and its supporters, growing
naval and tactical air equation that had demands for Navy deployments elsewhere
and continuing strains on the U.S. defense
underwritten the balance in the area.
The United States no longer can assume budgets prompted a search for other, supfree and easy access to Soviet targets north plemental solutions to restoring the
of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. The NATO/Pact balance in northern Europe.
United Kingdom no longer operates large The greatest advances in rectifying the
imbalance were achieved with respect to
deck aircraft carriers. On the other hand,
the Soviet Unions naval forces, particu- Norway, and specifically, the defense of
larly those deploying from the Northern north Norway, an area of special concern
Fleet based at Murmansk, include the both to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On
nuclear powered battle cruiser, the Kirov the other hand, there has been far less
the largest ship of its kind in any Navy progress in this regard with respect to the
defense of Denmark, while budget conone of the two Soviet VTOL carriers
and an ever more modern array of cruise straints also threaten to hamper the ability
missile capable surface escorts, sub- of neutral Sweden and Finland to expand
marines and smaller patrol boats.
upon, or even maintain, current capaFinally, there is Backfire. Backfire con- bilities. Accordingly, the following pages
stitutes the primary Soviet naval aviation will deal in turn with developments relatthreat to U.S. carrier forces in the Atlan- ing to each of the four continental Scanditic, to convoys that would provide needed navian states.
supplies to U.S. forces reinforcing European and forward based U.S. units, and II. NORWAY: THE U.S.to key NATO installations throughout the
North Atlantic area. North of the G-I- NORWEGIAN PRESTOCKING
UK gap it has the potential (for which the AGREEMENT AND RELATED
Soviets have expended considerable train- ISSUES
ing time) to operate in coordination with The region encompassing the provinces
all of the aforementioned cruise missile of Finnmark and Troms would be a temptunits in attacking U.S. carrier forces. ing target for the Soviets in the context
of a conflict in Europe (some would even
Older Soviet Naval Aviation aircraft
Badgers, Blinders and Bear-Ds - also argue that it would tempt the Soviets in
have the range and payload to supplement other contexts as well). A Soviet move to
Backfires capability north of the G-I-UK cut off the Northern provinces could be

The static

ground

is, the quantitative disparity

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195

launched either across the border into the

Kirkenes area or through the Finnish
the
north from the rest of the country. Were
the Soviets to control northern Norway,
they could:

wedge, thereby effectively isolating

operate their Backfire bombers along

into the
less demanding flight profiles
.0
North Atlantic
disrupt Western anti-submarine warfare operations
rob NATO of valuable early warning
information on movements in the Kola
and benefit from an additional margin
of protection for their own forces based
in the region.

been sensitive to
about stability in the far
North, and has taken steps to limit the
nature and locale of training in the North
Cape area. Traditionally, it has also
deployed a small, brigade-sized active
force in the region, relying on reserve
call-ups and redeployments to respond to
any demands for active defense during
crisis or wartime. Of course, these forces
were meant to be supplemented by the
NATO naval forces that, as noted above,
in fact have come to pose less of a credible
offset to Soviet capabilities than they had
in the 1950s and 1960s.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, a number
of observers of the balance in North Cape
suggested that a combination of prestocking of equipment and rapid deployment
by air of American ground forces would
enable Norway to buttress its thin
defenses in the event of a crisis. This
approach drew upon two distinct

Norway has always

Soviet

concerns

Second, it

was

assumed that the pre-

stocking of equipment, organized along

lines similar to the POMCUS (prepositioned material configured to unit sets)
that was initiated in the Federal Republic
of Germany, would not conflict with Norways long standing policy of not permitting foreign basing on its soil.
The first assumption dealt with military
planning and strategy; the second with
political realities. By the late 1970s it had
become abundantly clear that the West
could no longer posit that warning time
was likely to be measured in weeks, but
that it could (some argued that it would)
be measured in days. A number of observers suggested that the Soviets could launch
a bolt from the blue attack drawing upon
their 30 divisions in East Germany.
Others argued that the Soviets could reach
well over twice that number within a
week. The Department of Defense, under
Harold Brown, established a planning
scenario that assumed a Soviet attack
could take place with as little as 14 days
warning, and that, allowing for the time
required for member NATO governments
to agree to mobilization, only ten days
would be available to the United States
for a massive reinforcement of Europe.1
To be sure, current assumptions are not
immutable. There is, in fact, a distribution
of warning times ranging from none to
several months to which the NATO allies
would respond in different and appropriate

ways. Nevertheless, for

country

as

exposed as Norway, NATOs postulation

of shorter warning times had to be taken
most seriously: Norwegian territorial
integrity rode on the effectiveness of
NATOs response to such short warning.
principles.
the
it
was
assumed
that
To some extent, growing Western
First,
warning
time available to NATO would be rather preoccupation with shorter warning time
limited. Deployments by sea therefore interacted
with Norways political
could not be sufficiently well-timed to response to the question of prestocking.
prevent a land grab by the Soviets that Norway had never ruled out foreign
could be expected to take place at or near reinforcements in the event of a crisis
when it had first announced its no foreign
the onset of conflict in Central Europe.
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196

The door has been left

form of reinforcement if
Norway chose to open it. Furthermore,
prestocking merely involved the basing of

basing policy.

open

to some

equipment, not foreign personnel, on

Norwegian soil. At issue, therefore, was
how Norway would choose to interpret
its basing policy, not whether that policy
was open to a looser interpretation.
Beginning in the late 1970s, the United
States and Norway undertook serious
negotiations on the prestocking of equipment in the northern theater. It soon

became clear that the U.S. Marine Corps

particularly suitable force for such

first blush, the logical assumption

that equipment should be prestocked
near the area in which it was expected to
be used, namely, north Norway. On the
other hand, an arrangement to do so
posed some political problems for Norway. A big buildup in northern Norway
was likely to be construed as provocative,
not only by the Soviets (that was to be
expected) but by the neutrals as well.
On 16 January 1981, the U.S. and Norwegian governments achieved a major
milestone in the effort to restore the
northern European balance. The governter. At

was

jointly announced

long-awaited

was a

ments

arrangement. The Marines are the

essence of a combined arms force, mating
infantry, artillery, armor and aircraft into
task-organized units called, appropriately
enough, Marine Air/Ground Task Forces.
The Marines also were not committed to
any particular NATO battle theater, but
rather served in the rather ambiguous
capacity of SACEURs (Supreme Allied
Commander Europe) strategic reserve.
Finally, it was clear that Marines deployed
aboard amphibious ships could not deploy
in time to arrive at the forward edge of
battle if a conflict indeed began with less
than a few weeks strategic warning.
While this factor certainly did not rule out
the value of the Marines to a variety of
theaters within Europe, it did diminish
their utility with respect to north Norway,
whose defense, however demanding, is a
far less arduous task than its recapture
once lost at the outset of conflict. Prestocking Marine equipment in Norway
and having the Marines flown in by air
would do away with problems of speed
of response and ensure that the Marines
would be available to defend the area,
not recapture it.
If the issue of which forces might be
available to defend north Norway under
a prestocking scheme was relatively
simple to deal with, the question of where

Memorandum of Understanding to prestock U.S. Marine equipment in Norway.33

The agreement permitted Norway to
maintain its long standing policy of no
foreign basing on its soil, but nevertheless
allowed a much more rapid reinforcement
of its own military forces in time of crisis.
The principle underlying the prestocking
arrangement was therefore a cousin to
the POMCUS arrangements into which
the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany had entered. The United
States would procure the necessary equipment to support the ground element of
a Marine Air/Ground Amphibious Brigade, and store that equipment in Norway. Norway and the United States would
reach an arrangement to finance the
operations and maintenance of that
equipment: During periods of crisis, and
at the invitation of the Norwegian Government. the U.S. Marine Amphibious
Brigade, which, with its air arm is roughly
the size of a Soviet division (about 10,000
men), could deploy to Norway aboard
commercial aviation and marry up with
its equipment upon arrival.
The agreement was very specific both
about the nature of the Marine Amphibious Brigade and about the equipment to
be prestocked. The memorandum stated
that the Brigade would include infantry
and combat service support as well as

an

to

prestock was an entirely different mat-

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197

aviation, artillery, infantry and anti-tank

weapons. It added that the Marine aviation element would consist of two air
defense squadrons, two close support
squadrons, and other fixed wing support
aircraft as well as 75 helicopters of varying
types. The importance of this provisions
specificity was that it highlighted the
unique nature of the Marine air/ground
task force that was assigned the Norwegian mission: It was not merely a brigade
in the sense employed by Army forces
everywhere. Instead it was a large selfcontained unit
matching the size of a
Soviet division, and probably balancing
it in terms of combined air and ground
based firepower. Finally, the agreement
specifically provided for the prestocking
of 24, 155 mm howitzers and associated
-

vehicles, bridging equipment, approximately 250 trucks with about 100 trailers,
ammunition, food, and fuel.
ended

where exactly
Speculation
the equipment might be stored. The two
governments agreed that central, rather
than north Norway, was the preferred
location, and specifically, the Trondelag
region. The choice satisfied several political as well as military requirements.
Politically, the site appeared less
threatening to the Soviet Union, and the
arrangement could less easily be termed
destabilizing to the Nordic balance. (To
be sure, the Soviets remained hostile to
the arrangement, and, as late as December 1981, they had pressed Norwegian
Foreign Minister Frydenlund not to
accede to an agreement on the grounds
that it violated Norways ban on the basing
of foreign troops on its soil. )3 The decision
to base in central Norway also allayed
some of the concerns within the governing
Norwegian Labour Party, who likewise
harbored fears of a new buildup and
East-West confrontation in northern
Europe. Militarily, the agreement permitted the local commanders several

options

for Marine

as to

Corps deployment.

The Marines could still deploy northward,

of course. On the other hand, because
Trondheim is a key railroad junction
along the Norwegian coast, the Marines
might prove more useful guarding the
general area, freeing local Norwegian
forces for operations further north. If
necessary, of course, the Marines could
deploy south as well.

Evaluating the Prestocking Agreement

While public and press comment tended
to focus on the fact that it was Marines
who were to deploy to Norway and that
the agreed to site was in central rather
than north Norway, the memorandum
involved several other features of significance to the defense of the northern

region.
First, while the memorandum ties the
more explicitly to the defense of
than
to any other area, it actually
Norway
no
than to state that the
further
goes
United States may provide, consistent
with SACEUR requirements (emphasis
added) a U.S. Marine Amphibious Brigade. In other words, the Marine brigade remains a key element of
SACEURs flexible strategic reserve that
might actually deploy elsewhere in the
event that SACEUR deemed some other

Marines

deployment
superficially

more

pressing. Although

the ambiguity of the commitment appears to undermine the intent

of the memorandum, in fact it preserves
a key element of flexibility that is important in any effort to deter attack and to
confound those who plan any such attack.
The provision, though incorporated in a
document signed during the final week of
the Carter Administration, thereby
nevertheless reflects a key element of
Reagan Administration strategy, which
attempts to avoid as much as possible any
telegraphing of the locale to which flexible
U.S. forces might be deployed. The U.S.
Marines could operate anywhere in the

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198

NATO
Azores.

Cape to the
Being a relatively small force
(two Division~Wing Task Forces are dedicated to NATO), it is obvious that they
cannot deploy everywhere. To the extent
that ambiguity about their deployments
might deter or at least hinder Soviet
attacks on a variety of exposed areas on
area

from North

either NATO flank or front, the Marines

will have provided far greater leverage
with their forces than their size would

imply.
as the memorandum does
commit the Marines to deploy to Norway, it also does not commit them to
deploy to the far north even if they do
mary up with their equipment in central
Norway. In a section discussing the Norwegian provision of transport to the
Marines (about which more will be said
below), the memorandum states that the
Marines would be transported from central Norway to other threatened areas in

Second, just

not

Norway. As noted above, the flexibility

that deployment to central, rather than
north, Norway affords to the local commanders should not be lightly dismissed.
Norwegian forces will have a comparative .
advantage over the Marines with respect
to in-country operations, however well
trained the Marines might be. That advanfunction of more intense and
sustained training, better familiarity and
resistance to difficult climates, and the
natural boost to morale that any good
military force will acquire if it is defending
its own territory. Circumstances of a crisis
or of combat will determine how that comparative local advantage can be maximized : the Memorandum of Understanding therefore usefully avoids imposing an
artificial constraint upon the theater commander that could be costly in time of

tage is

support and service support

Combat commanders tend to be hesitant

about relying on foreign personnel for the
critical support of their troops. There is
no certainty that there will be a common
understanding of procedures, or indeed,
a satisfactory level of communication
between the combat forces of one state
and the support units of another. On the
other hand, policy makers who must
budget for host nation support must
choose between funding that support or
providing additional resources to their
own national military programmers. That
choice is particularly difficult at a time,
such as the past few years, when budget
resources are severely constrained by
stagnant economies and persistent public
demands for maintaining, if not enhancing, social entitlement programs.
The aforementioned reservations did
not

prevent the Norwegian government

from
-

undertaking to provide:
engineering and airbase
equipment
150

sets forth in
detail the nature of host nation
support that Norway will provide to reinforcing Marine units. Host nation sup-

support

vehicles

over-snow

two motor

transport companies of 90

trucks each
an
ambulance

company

ambulances)
a refueling section
general responsibility
maintenance

of

the

(with

35

for

security and
prepositioned

equipment
-

load and transport Marines

other parts of the country.

means to

to

Most of these provisions resemble in a

way those of host nation support
agreements that have since been negotiated by the Reagan Administration with
a number of other European states including Luxembourg, Belgium, and, of the

general

Third, the Memorandum

to the arriv-

ing countrys units. The concept is simple

to understand but not necessarily appealing to military strategists and operators.

war.

some

port involves the provision by the receiving country of various forms of combat

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199

greatest scope, the Federal

Republic

of

Germany.
Beyond the Prestocking Agreement

Completing a negotiation

and

signing

an

agreement is, of course, a significant

achievement. It culminates the efforts of
the negotiators, who then turn their attention to other matters. In reality, however,
the signed agreement only begins the process of implementation, wh~h, in Western societies, is long, drawn out, and subject to budgetary and political vag4ries
that might arise during the implementation period.
It will take several years before the
equipment for a Marine Amphibious Brigade is prestocked in Norway. The equipment must be procured, and that in turn
requires Congressional support and
authorization of funds. The Reagan
Administration is staunchly supportive of
the effort to strengthen north Norways
defenses and has programmed funds for
the necessary equipment purchases. Each
year, however, the Congress will have to
be convinced yet again of the wisdom of
the agreement. While all indications are
that problems are not likely to arise in
this regard, every year brings its own
budgetary vicissitudes against which the
program will have to be guarded.
For its part, Norway has undertaken
several other commitments in addition to
its obligations under the prestocking
agreement. Most notable is its planned
acquisition of the Improved Hawk air
defense missile system, a program that
was dealt with tangentially in the pre-

stocking agreement.
Air defense and early warning in north
Norway are critical elements in the
defense of the sea lanes from North
America to Europe. Early warning installations are likely to be attractive targets
for the Soviets at the onset of a NATO/
Pact conflict: the Soviet goal clearly would

be to silence NATO sensors so that, at

most, warning would be provided just
once, for the impending first attack.
A number of observers of the Nordic
balance have pointed to Norways severe
deficiencies in the realm of active air
defenses. It was suggested as early as 1977
that Norway be provided with Hawk
missiles on favourable terms.5 The 1981
Memorandum of Understanding commits
the United States to make two Improved
Hawk missile batteries available for sale
to Norway, subject to the requirements
of U.S. laws and regulations.
The Improved Hawk provides considerably more capability than the earlier
version of the Hawk medium altitude
missile. The Improved Hawk has a new

guidance package, a larger warhead, and

improved propellant for longer range. Its
radar is more resistant to electronic countermeasures, as is the missile itself.
Finally, it incorporates a new procedure
whereby missiles can be delivered to the
field without field maintenance or testing,
thereby reducing operation and maintenance costs.

The I-Hawk is

an

expensive system,

however, with missiles costing roughly

$250,000 each in current prices and
launchers roughly a half million dollars
each. Although Norway has gone well
beyond its commitment to increase its
defense spending by three percent
annually in real terms (in 1981 that
increase was about four percent), its
heaviest burden is the cost of acquiring
the F-16 fighter. Other major acquisition
programs, such as the I-Hawk acquisition,
have, as a result, been accorded lower
budgetary priority. Nevertheless, there is
widespread confidence in both Oslo and
Washington that Norway will acquire a
new air defense system in the near future.
The delivery schedule for the Improved
Hawk missile which, incidentally, was
chosen by the Norwegian Government
over several other foreign competitors,

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200

has now been set. Early delivery of the

first battery will take place in the spring
of 1984.
In a further effort to enhance the
defense of its northern territories, Norway
has also announced that it will preposition
equipment for an additional Norwegian
brigade in north Norway. This measure
is one that was announced roughly concomitant with the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding. Under Secretary of Defense Robert Komer
described it as one which goes beyond
Norways commitments in the LTDP
(Long Term Defense Plan).6 The prepositioning of Norwegian equipment, incidentally, provides further indications that
the Marines might not necessarily be sent
north. Instead they might deploy to areas
formerly assigned to the Norwegian units
to which the newly prepositioned equipment in the north will be distributed.
One area that remains unexplored in
terms of enhancing Norways air defense
and early warning capability is the potential of Jan Mayen Island. Jan Mayen is
essentially a large rock in the north Norwegian Sea located 640 miles from Norway and 360 miles from Iceland. There
have been suggestions for some time that
radars be placed on Jan Mayen because
its elevation would enable the radar to
7
detect low flying missiles and aircraft.
The counterargument has been ventured,
however, that Jan Mayens radars would
provide early warning only once, because
they would then be destroyed. While such
a possibility certainly cannot be ruled out,
the survivability of the radars will be a
function of their hardening, as well as of
other factors, such as control of the air
space near the island. A radar on Jan
Mayen might prove worthwhile even if it
were knocked out after the first attack;
to the extent that it can survive beyond
increases
value
its
that
attack,

geometrically.
In general, it can be

said that

Norway,

with the United States, is

midst of a major effort
in
the
currently
to restore the credibility of its northernmost defenses. The static balance, day to
day, will continue to favor the Soviets by
an overwhelming margin. But the advantages that warning and terrain will provide
Norway (its forces train for mobilization
within 24 hours) coupled with the more
tangible evidence of a U.S. commitment
to assist in the defense of Norway, and
in

conjunction

the improvement that Norway currently

is undertaking on its own, should go some
way to restore the dynamic balance that
has operated north of the Arctic circle.
III. DENMARK: FRICTION,
FRUSTRATION AND

DISAPPOINTMENT
The southern part of the Northern Front
the region that centers on the Jutland
Peninsula
has, like North Norway,
witnessed a significant buildup in Soviet
and Warsaw Pact capabilities during the
past decade, and particularly in the past
few years. Unlike the Kola-based Northern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet deploying from
Leningrad and other Soviet parts is pri-

marily geared

to

amphibious assault;

Polish and East German forces are likewise oriented to such operations. Soviet
and Pact forces conduct training in
amphibious assault tactics on a regular
basis, and Danish observers have noted
with some concern the increasingly westward locale of Pact amphibious training
exercises, such as those conducted off the
East German island of Rugen. Such concerns were

certainly

not

dispelled during

the Polish crisis, when the Baltic Fleet

was arrayed at nearly full strength during
the posturing that preceded the imposition of martial law in Poland
It is ironic, therefore, that despite a
clear pattern of Pact efforts to establish
the Baltic as a Soviet lake, Denmark has
been amongst the most reluctant of Alli-

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201

members to increase its level of

defense spending. Denmark has backed
so far away from such increases that the
minority Social Democratic government
ance

markization, (a play upon Finlandization, which describes the influence of

proximity to the Soviet Union upon Finnish neutrality) became a popular term
in some European and U.S. circles who
found themselves unable to impress upon
the Danes the urgency for significant
improvements in their military capability.
Little has changed since the Reagan

actually proposed a temporary freeze

no real growth - in defense spending. The implications of a long term freeze
would have been extremely serious. Denmark, like Norway, is committed to the
acquisition of the F-16 aircraft which, Administration took office. Denmark
though a low mix, inexpensive plane for continues to maintain a level of spending
the United States Air Force (relative to considerably below the prescribed three
the more capable and more expensive percent increases in real growth that the
F-15), is nevertheless a very expensive NATO members agreed to in the 1977
aircraft from the perspective of the Danish Long Term Defense Program. Denmark
defense budget. The F-16 purchase has has been lukewarm to the deployment of
dominated Danish defense spending to long range theater nuclear forces in
the point where three percent real growth Europe, and has been among the most
in Danish spending could be consumed vocal in pressing for arms control agreeby the purchase of less than half a squad- ments. Danish officials have indeed gone
-

that is,

of additional F-16s. Thus, a decision

eliminate growth in Danish defense
funding would have had the effect of eliminating other program initiatives and
would have prompted force structure
reductions. Indeed, one measure that had
been seriously considered by the Government was the reduction of force levels of
the island of Zealand, which is a potential
target for a Soviet amphibious assault.
Danish attitudes to the NATO-wide
commitment to real increases in defense
spending particularly galled Carter
Administration officials who had engineered those commitments. During the
final year of the Carter Administration,
Denmark was the cause of particular frustration in Washington because of its seeming overreliance upon hoped for U.S.
reinforcements as compensation for its
own proposed reductions in force structure. Furthermore, Denmark seemed to
yearn for a stronger effort to achieve
detente at the very time that the Carter
Administration began to have second
thoughts about that approach. The variance between Washington and Copenhagen grew so great by 1980 that Den-

for the Brezhfar as to voice

INF Proposals.1 Finally, Denmark
has evinced little public support for
NATO initiatives outside the NATO

ron

so

to

nev

sympathy

although the Danes, like most of

Europe (but unlike Norway) are
highly dependent upon the importation
area,

Western

of Persian Gulf oil

Denmark continues to suffer from relative economic stagnation, and it will continue to face internal pressures for eliminating real increases in defense spending.
Ironically, despite what appears to be
Denmarks implicit assumption that more
U.S. reinforcements will offset Danish
reductions in force structure, there has
been little evidence that the United States
is moving towards anything like a prestocking arrangement for Denmark such
as that which was achieved with Norway.
Indeed, suggestions for such an arrangement have been criticized in a Congressional report in part because they might
furnish Denmark with further excuses for
reductions in defense spending.&dquo;
Denmarks economic situation is not
unique to the West, however, and its
proximity to Poland places it in a particu-

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while
observers of the Nordic balance enjoy
pointing to its stability, they tend to focus
on the far northern balance. Poland is
hardly a stable country, and will not be
as long as the current repression continues. In these circumstances, Danes may
wish to reconsider their reluctance to
commit themselves more forcefully to
programs that, in the end, may prove to
be the critical difference between freedom
and subjugation to a hostile adversary.

larly exposed position. Indeed,

Greenland: Does Departure from the

European Community Have an Impact
on

NA TO Posture?

On 1 May 1979, Denmark granted Greenland home rule. Denmark retained

responsibility for the management of
Greenlands foreign policy and defense
concerns, while ceding responsibility in
other areas. Despite formal Danish retention of the defense and foreign affairs
portfolios, the complexity of modern
affairs of state rules out the possibility of
maintaining a neat differentiation
between these areas and other concerns,
as was the case when other European
powers granted their colonies home rule
earlier in this century. Decisions on socalled domestic issues such as management of the economy or energy policy
inevitably have an impact on defense
decisions and foreign affairs posture.
Indeed, it is noteworthy that one of
Greenlands earliest major domestic
decisions after it acquired home rule was
its vote to withdraw from the European
Community. The EC can no longer be
defined as merely an economic community (the term economic was dropped
from its nomenclature some time ago). Its
purview extends to foreign policy, such
as its stand on the Middle East outlined
in the Venice Communique of 23 June
1980, and, indirectly to defense policy as

well. That Greenlanders decided in their

plebiscite to opt out of the Community

in February 1982 (despite the face that
Denmark was to assume the presidency
the following June) cannot be construed
simply as a domestic political decision.
Given Greenlands clear determination
to go its own way in international econ-

omic affairs, it is important to assess

whether it might do the same on defense
matters. Greenlands importance to the
NATO alliance is often overlooked but
cannot be overstated. Greenland sits
half-way along the great circle route
between the most vital military areas to
the United States and the Soviet Unison. 13
It is therefore a critical location for the
emplacement of sites capable of providing
early warning of ballistic missiles aimed
at targets in the United States. It is incorporated into the Distant Early Warning
(DEW) line system that stretches across
Alaska and Canada, and into the Ballistic
Missile
Early
Warning Systems
(BMEWS), with an installation at Thule.
The BMEWS radar in Greenland is cur-

rently being upgraded.

Greenland also provides an important
link to the defense of the Atlantic sea
lanes. As part of the G-1-UK gap, it sits
astride the primary Backfire (and submarine and surface ship) route from the
Kola Peninsula to the Atlantic Ocean.
Nevertheless, the current basing structure
on Greenland is not optimally configured
to support interceptor operations over the
Denmark Strait. U.S. bases are in western
Greenland, at Sondre Stromfjord and at
Thule; both are too distant to support
supersonic fighter intercepts of Soviet aircraft transiting the Denmark Strait. For
the present, therefore, the burden of
detection and response falls to Icelandbased aircraft, though these might be
preoccupied with the direct defense of
Iceland itself. An additional, longer-range
problem is that posed by the prospect of
Soviet development of bombers with

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203

combat radii than Backfire. Such

bombers could avoid Iceland-based radars
entirely and possibly fly outside the orbits
of AWACS planes based in Iceland. It
may well be necessary to expand current
facilities in Greenland to permit the basing of a larger, more responsive air
defense capability. Such expansion might
be resisted by Greenlanders, however,
unless the importance of Greenland to
NATOs defense, and the importance of
air defense to Greenlands defense, is
transmitted
clearly to the local

longer

population.
Greenlands rupture oftits ties

to the

European Community certainly does not

indicate that similar feelings obtain with
respect to NATO. Norway, for example,
rejected entry into the European Community but remains a critical and active
member of the Alliance, while, on the
other hand, Ireland belongs to the Community but not to NATO. Membership
one of the
or the refusal to join
organizations does not, therefore, imply
any particular policy posture with respect
to the other. Nevertheless, Greenlanders
decision on the European Community
does indicate a strong independence of
mind as well as a readiness to interpret
domestic affairs in its broadest sense.
Efforts will have to be made to ensure
that no aspect of defense policy is similarly
included in a broad interpretation of
domestic affairs. It is therefore somewhat
worrisome that Denmarks own marked
lack of enthusiasm for major defense commitments could have a negative impact on

Greenlanders perceptions, with unforeseen consequences for the Alliance as a

whole.
IV. THE NEUTRALS AND THE
BALANCE IN THE NORTH
It is commonly accepted that the neutrals,
and particularly Sweden, play an important role in maintaining the balance in the

North. A recent survey of Swedish

defense capabilities has termed Sweden
the regional equilibrator, adding that
Sweden has provided yeoman service over
the years for western defense... Without
this Swedish contribution, NATO would
have to shift large forces, particularly air,
for Norwegian and Danish defense from an
already tenuous military balance in the

all-important center region. 14

Budget constraints have not been the sole
province of the West, however, and both
Sweden and Finland have had to confront
unpleasant choices regarding the future
of their defense posture. Swedens commitment is, of course, greater than that
of Finland, and the alternatives it is considering likewise have more significant
implications for its overall posture than
those which are the primary focus of Finnish concerns.
Swedens budget problems arise from
its long standing commitment to a large

defense establishment, including highly

capable, high-technology Air Force and
Navy components. Budget constraints
have already forced the Swedes to move
from a destroyer-oriented surface fleet to
one consisting exclusively of fast patrol
boats. 15 That shift, incidentally, has not
been slowed by the Whiskey Class Incident of 27 October 1981, although it has
been argued that larger surface ships
could better support coordinated ASW,
anti-air and anti-surface operations as well
as provide important sea-based platforms
for ASW helicopters.l6 Instead, the Swedish government has actually accelerated
the patrol boat program, providing for
more conversions of T-42 motor torpedo
boats into patrol craft as well as for more
shorebased helicopters and surveillance.&dquo;
Swedens high-technology oriented Air
Force has declined by roughly 50 percent
(in terms of the number of squadrons it
operates) in the past fifteen years.&dquo; To
be sure, the rising costs of defense technology have forced similar retrenchments

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204

in other western states, including the

United States, whose fleet has declined
from about 1,000 to about 500 ships in the
past decade. Nevertheless, the Swedish
decision to forego development of the
B3LA ground attack fighter could represent the start of an ominous trend if
Sweden does not find the wherewithal to
develop its new Viggen follow-on, the
JAS.
Sweden is currently committed to
developing its own, homebuilt fighter; the
Swedish Parliament approved the JAS by
a five-vote margin on 4 June 1982. Nevertheless, the Social Democrats, then in
opposition, favored postponement of the
decision. Should the Social Democrats
return to power in the September elections, or should budget constraints combine with an unstable parliamentary
majority subsequent to the election, the
JAS issued may remain, de facto,
unresolved.
The future of Swedens fighter force is
but one aspect of a debate that has been
ongoing for some time in Sweden, and
that is of great consequence to Swedens
contribution to the balance in northern
Europe. Sweden traditionally has relied
upon a strategy of armed neutrality that
emphasizes forward (or extrovert)
defense based on a high-technology Navy
and Air Force. A number of observers
have argued for less costly, introverted
or territorial defense, expanding primarily
the Armys current tactics, that draw the
Finnish model of fluid, regional defense.
Indeed, the case has been made that
Sweden must now choose between its
long-standing posture and an introvert

defense.9
It is unlikely, however,

that a Swedish
decision for the upcoming five year period
will necessarily be final, even if it does
point towards a more introverted posture. To begin with, the Swedish Air
Force will continue to operate highperformance fighters for several more

years, barring the unlikely instance

wherein a large number of remaining
squadrons would be prematurely retired.
Secondly, the options remain open for the
opening of a new high-performance
fighter production line, or for the purchase of a foreign aircraft such as the US
F/A-18 fighter/attack plane. Thus, a break
with past Swedish posture is more likely
to be evolutionary rather than revolutionif any break is made at all
and
ary
could, in any event, be reversed at least
during the next few years.
Budget constraints have been as much
in evidence in Finland as in Sweden. In
particular, the Navy has been forced to
abandon its plans to build additional corvettes and minesweepers, and to forego
conversion of a Riga class frigate to a
minelayer. Nevertheless, Finland does
not appear to have cut back on its plans
to create a brigade structure out of its
battalion in Lapland.
Finlands build-up in the North will
not, of course, change the balance in that
region or truly offset the forces that the
Soviet Union could marshal on the Kola
Peninsula for a thrust through the Finnish
wedge. Nevertheless, in its own small
way, this restructuring represents a
continuing Finnish determination to preserve its neutrality within the political
constraints that geography has imposed
upon it. It is this neutrality, coupled with
Swedens more forceful armed neutrality,
that permits NATO to adopt a posture
which does not impose upon Denmark
and Norway the burden of hosting foreign
troops upon their soil. Thus a change in
Swedish policy, and even a slackening in
within its own
Finnish determination
well-known constraints
to preserve the
image of independence, could have precisely the opposite effect for which those
who seek reductions in the force levels
deployed in Scandinavia profess to strive.
Unless and until the Soviet Union is prepared to countenance reductions in its
-

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205

posture in both the far north and the

Baltic Sea, cutbacks by any of the Scandiown

navian states will be inherently destabilizing, for they will merely tempt the
Soviets to exploit growing imbalances in
their favor, with consequences that the
so-called Nordic Balance has successfully
forestalled for over three decades.

NOTES
*
Dov S. Zakheim is Special Assistant to the
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). The
author wishes to thank Ms. V. Lane Pierrot.

for her assistance.

U.S. Department of Defense, Annual
Report, Fiscal Year 1979, p. 38; Annual
Fiscal Year 1980, p. 110.
Report,
2
The differences between the Norwegian
and Danish formulation on this issue are interbut are beyond the scope of this essay.
esting,
3
Frydenlund was quoted by Reuters in
Norway Approved U.S. Plan to Store Arms
for Marines, The New York Times, 14 January
1981. The Norwegian Foreign Minister also
indicated that the Soviets had pressed the
argument that the agreement violated the Norwegians on the stationing of nuclear weapons
on its soil in peacetime.
4
Memorandum of Understanding Governing Prestockage and Reinforcement of Norway, Washington, D.C., 16 January 1981, p.
1.
5
Dov S. Zakheim, The U.S. Sea Control
Mission: Forces, Capabilities and Require, Congressional Budget Office, Backments
ground Paper, Washington, D.C., June 1977,

p. 629.

Remarks of Ambassador Robert Komer

of MOU-US and Norway, 16 January 1981.
at

signing

Dov S. Zakheim, The U.S. Sea Control

Mission, p. 22.
8
Captain Matthew J. Whelan, USN, The
Soviet Baltic Fleet: An Amphibious Force in
Being, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 107, December 1981, pp. 122-124.
9
U.S. Discloses Soviet Fleet Data, The
New York Times, 7 August 1981, p. 3; Richard
Halloran, Soviet Ships in Baltic Mass for
Amphibious Games, The New York Times,
5 August 1981, p. 8.
10
Morton Fyhn, Anker Jørgensen Under
Pressure, Nordic Affairs, Vol. 7,19 May 1982,

p. 112.

H. Peter Dryer, Danes See Need for New

Approaches to the Problem of Energy Supplies, Journal of Commerce, 22 April 1974,
p. 122.
Dov S. Zakheim, The Marine Corps in
the 1980s: Prestocking Proposals, The Rapid
Deployment Force, and Other Issues, Congressional Budget Office Budget Issue Paper for
Fiscal Year 1981, Washington, D.C. 1980, p.
24.
13

Commander H. C.

Bach, RDN and

Jørgen Taagholt, Greenland and the Arctic

Region — in the Light of Defense Policies,
Danish Defense Information and Welfare Ser-

vice, Copenhagen 1977.

14
Steven L.

Canby, Swedish Defense, Sur-

May/June 1981, pp. 116-117.

S. Roberts, Western European
and NATO Navies, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 108, March 1982, p. 41.
16
Dov S. Zakheim, The Power Balance in
the North Atlantic, in Lars B. Wallin (ed.),
The Northern Flank in a Central European
War, Swedish National Defense Research
Institute, Stockholm 1982, p. 51.
17
Roberts, Western European and NATO
Navies, p. 41.
18
Canby, Swedish Defense, p. 117.
19
Ibid.
vival, Vol. 108,
15

Stephen

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