Power of the Supreme Court to amend and suspend procedural rules

Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633
Facts:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land
and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional
Trial Courtof Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development,
Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo
Among the motions filed by the both parties were: (1) the motion filed by
petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of
Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent
heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion
to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of
prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial
proper.
The trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3,
1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration[3] which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days
later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal[4] and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.
The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of
appeal.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court,
the order was the final order appealable under the Rules.
Issues:
Whether petitioners filed their notice of appeal within the Reglementary period
Whether petitioners in fact filed their notice of appeal on time If July 1, 1998 was
the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal.
Held:

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely
a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, as
amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals.
The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of
any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that
in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the
notice of judgment appealed from
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the
rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that
dismisses an action.
Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on
July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they
filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing
appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court
allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file
their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. [30]
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from

the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies[31] to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court.[32] The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within
15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July
1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of
the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of
appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.[34]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED