Mayor Gamal Hayudini vs COMELEC and Mustapha Omar

G.R. No. 207900 April 22, 2014

FACTS:
Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of Municipal Mayor
of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 elections. Ten days after, Omar filed a
Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudinis CoC asserting that Hayudini
should be disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence, that
Hayudini is not a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian but of Zamboanga City.
Thereafter, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in
Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the MCTC which granted his petition
despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki. On same day, the COMELECs First
Division dismissed Omars earlier petition to cancel Hayudinis CoC for lack of
substantial evidence. Oppositor Baki, elevated the case to the RTC which reversed
MCTCs ruling and ordered the deletion of Hayudinis name in the permanent list of
voters. In view of said decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel
the CoC of Hayudini.
Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, and was proclaimed and
took his oath of office.
Later on, the COMELEC Second Division granted Omars second petition to cancel
Hayudinis CoC. Hayudini, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En
Banc but was denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether Public Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when it resolved to
cancel Petitioners CoC and declare his proclamation as null and void.
RULING:
NO. The COMELEC was accurate in cancelling Hayudinis CoC. Under Section 74 of
the OEC, it is required that a candidate must certify under oath that he is eligible for
the public office he seeks election. When petitioner stated in his CoC that he is a
resident of Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian, Tawi Tawi and eligible for a public
office, but it turned out that he was declared to be a non-resident thereof in a
petition for his inclusion in the list of registered voters, he therefore committed a
false representation in his CoC which pertained to a material fact which is a ground
for the cancellation of his CoC under Section 78 of the OEC.
As held in Aratea v. COMELEC, a cancelled CoC void ab initio cannot give rise to a
valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Whether a CoC is cancelled before or
after the elections is immaterial, because the cancellation on such ground means he
was never a candidate from the very beginning, his CoC being void ab initio. Since
the winning mayoralty candidate's CoC was void ab initio, he was never a candidate
at all and all his votes were considered stray votes, and thus, proclaimed the second
placer, the only qualified candidate, who actually garnered the highest number of
votes, for the position of Mayor.
Since Hayudini was never a valid candidate for the position of the Municipal Mayor
of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.
Consequently, the COMELEC properly proclaimed Salma Omar, who garnered the
highest number of votes in the remaining qualified candidates for the mayoralty
post, as the duly-elected Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi Tawi.

Mamerto Sevilla, Jr vs COMELEC and Renato So

G.R. No. 203833 March 19, 2013
FACTS:
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Sucat, Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections, in which, Sevilla was proclaimed as the winner. So filed an
election protest with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud,
anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts. The MeTC dismissed the
election protest.
So filed a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of a notice of
appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. But the
MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was a prohibited
pleading. In response, So filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge.
The COMELEC Second Division granted Sos petition and held that certiorari can be
granted despite the availability of appeals when the questioned order amounts to
an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. It also ruled that the assailed Order was
fraught with infirmities and irregularities in the appreciation of the ballot.
The COMELEC en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions
ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it gave due course to the
petition despite its loss of jurisdiction after the dismissal order became final and
executory due to Sos wrong choice of remedy.
RULING:
The Court resolve to dismiss the petition for having been prematurely filed, and
remand the case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action. It ruled that COMELEC
en bancs Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority decision required by the
Constitution and by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
The Court have previously ruled that a majority vote requires a vote of four
members of the COMELEC en banc. In Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections, it
declared "that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all the
members of the COMELEC en banc, and not only those who participated and took
part in the deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling."

In the present case, while the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc appears to have
affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevillas
motion for reconsideration, the equally divided voting between three
Commissioners concurring and three Commissioners dissenting is not the majority
vote that the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require for a valid
pronouncement of the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC en banc. Thus, the
assailed Resolution of the COMELEC en banc had no legal effect whatsoever except
to convey that the COMELEC failed to reach a decision and that further action is
required. The COMELEC en bancs Resolution must be reheard pursuant to the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 206987 September 10, 2013
FACTS:
On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution canceling
petitioners Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation on three grounds: (1)
Petitioner ANAD does not belong to, or come within the ambit of, the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors; (2) There is no proof showing that nominees Arthur J.
Tariman and Julius D. Labandria are actually nominated by ANAD itself for the
Certificate of Nomination shows that ANAD submitted only the names of Pastor
Montero Alcover, Jr., Baltaire Q. Balangauan and Atty. Pedro Leslie B. Salva, and so
having only 3 nominees, ANAD failed to comply with the procedural requirements;
and (3) ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for
the 2007 National and Local Elections as required.
In the assailed Resolution, the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation and disqualified
petitioner from participating in the 2013 Elections. The COMELEC held that while
ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined political
constituencies, its disqualification still subsists for violation of election laws and
regulations, particularly for its failure to submit at least five nominees, and for its
failure to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007
Elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in finding that petitioner violated election laws
and regulations.
RULING:

NO. The COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of
elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions
rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by
this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity
or error of law.
As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown reasons, submitted only three
nominees instead of five, in violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Compliance thereof
is essential as the said provision is a safeguard against arbitrariness and rids a
party-list organization of the prerogative to substitute and replace its nominees, or
even to switch the order of the nominees, after submission of the list to the
COMELEC.
Moreover, the COMELEC noted ANADs failure to submit a proper Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections, in violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9476. An incomplete statement, or a statement that does not contain
all the required information and attachments, or does not conform to the prescribed
form, shall be considered as not filed and shall subject the candidate or party
treasurer to the penalties prescribed by law.
As empowered by law, the COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply
with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections. Thus, the Court find no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it issued the assailed
Resolution dated 11 May 2013.
In any event, the official tally results of the COMELEC show that ANAD garnered
200,972 votes. As such, even if petitioner is declared qualified and the votes cast for
it are canvassed, statistics show that it will still fail to qualify for a seat in the House
of Representatives.

Rommel Apolinario Jalosjos vs COMELEC and Dan Erasmo, Sr

G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Jalosjos was born in Quezon City but migrated to Australia when he was 8
years old and acquired Australian citizenship. At age 35, he returned to the
Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. He took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines reacquiring
Philippine citizenship. Thereafter, he renounced his Australian citizenship. He also
applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil and was approved.

On November 28, 2009, Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Respondent Erasmo, the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, promptly filed a
petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos COC on the ground of material
misrepresentation in failing to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2)
the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code.
The Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to prove the residency
requirement for a gubernatorial candidate. On motion for reconsideration, the
COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Second Divisions decision. Pending further orders,
Jolosjos won the election and was proclaimed winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC was correct that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof
of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
RULING:
NO. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a
domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile
remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at
a time. Under these guidelines, Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for
provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite
the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by
operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a
domicile or residence somewhere. Also, to insist that the candidate own the house
where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is
that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention
of making it his domicile.
The Court respect the decision of the people when Jalosjos won and was proclaimed
winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay, and resolve all
doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

Mozart Panlaqui vs COMELEC and Nardo Velasco

GR No. 188671
FACTS:

Februaru 24, 2010

Velasco, with a dual citizenship, applied for registration as a voter of Sasmuan,

Pampanga. He was denied by the Election Registration Board (ERB). He thus filed a
petition for the inclusion of his name in the list of voters before the MTC which
reversed the ERBs decision and ordered his inclusion in the list of voters. The RTC
reversed the MTC decision, and on appeal, the CA dismissed it for lack of
jurisdiction.
Meantime, Velasco filed on March 28, 2007 his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
mayor of Sasmuan, therein claiming his status as a registered voter. Panlaqui, who
vied for the same position, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course
To and/or To Cancel Velascos COC based on gross material misrepresentation as to
his residency and his qualification to vote.
Velasco won over Panlaqui as mayor. As the COMELEC failed to resolve Panlaquis
petition prior to the elections, Velasco took his oath of office and assumed the
duties of the office. However, finding material misrepresentation, the COMELEC
cancelled Vealscos COC and nullified his proclamation. Panlaqui thereafter filed a
motion for proclamation which the COMELEC denied pointing out that the rule on
succession does not operate in his favor as the second placer because Velasco was
not disqualified by final judgment before election day.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners case is an exemption to the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer.
RULING:
NO. The Court rejects Panlaquis interpretation that the RTC properly cancelled
Velascos COC when it ruled on his right to vote. Voters inclusion/exclusion
proceedings essentially involve the issue of whether a petitioner shall be included in
or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law and
the facts presented to show possession of these qualifications. On the other hand,
COC denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether there is a false
representation of a material fact.
It is not within the province of the RTC in a voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings
to take cognizance of and determine the presence of a false representation of a
material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the
misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there was an intention to
deceive the electorate in terms of ones qualifications for public office.
Velascos disqualification as a candidate had not become final before the elections,
thus the COMELEC properly applied the rule on succession. The second placer is just
that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority
or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed. To allow the defeated and repudiated
candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the
importance and the meaning of democracy and the right of the people to elect
officials of their choice.

Salvador Violago, Sr vs COMELEC and Joan Alarilla

GR No. 194143

October 4, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the mayoralty race during the
May 10, 2010 elections in the City of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Private respondent was
proclaimed the winner. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition with the COMELEC
questioning the proclamation of private respondent on the following grounds: (1)
massive vote-buying; (2) intimidation and harassment; (3) election fraud; (4) nonappreciation by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines of valid votes cast
during the said election; and, (5) irregularities due to non-observance of the
guidelines set by the COMELEC.
The COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed petitioners protest on the ground that the
latter belatedly filed his Brief in violation of the COMELEC rule on the filing of briefs.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc but was
denied.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioners electoral protest should be dismissed.
(2) Whether petitioners motion for reconsideration should be denied.
RULING:
(1)

NO

Records show that the Court finds no justifiable reason why the COMELEC 2nd
Division hastily dismissed petitioners election protest. There is no indication that
the COMELEC 2nd Division made prior verification from the proper or concerned
COMELEC department or official of petitioners allegation that he did not receive a
copy of the subject Order. Fairness and prudence dictate that the COMELEC 2nd
Division should have first waited for the requested certification before deciding
whether or not to dismiss petitioners protest on technical grounds.
Petitioner should not be penalized for belatedly filing his Preliminary Conference
Brief. A one-day delay, as in this case, does not justify the outright dismissal of the
protest based on technical grounds where there is no indication of intent to violate
the rules on the part of petitioner and the reason for the violation is justifiable.
(2)

NO

Even if the COMELEC Rules of Procedure clearly require that a motion for
reconsideration should be verified, the settled rule is that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure are subject to liberal construction.
Following Pacanan v. Commission on Elections, the Court, in clarifying the mandated
liberal construction of election laws, held thus: It has been frequently decided, and
it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all courts, that statutes providing
for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public
interest since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival
candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which
beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the
prerogatives of the office within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep
in office for an uncertain period one whos right to it is under suspicion. It is

imperative that his claim be immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the
winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing
aside technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial of an ordinary
action.

Joel Quio, et al vs COMELEC and Ritchie Wagas

G.R. No. 197466 November 13, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Quio and private respondent Wagas both ran for the position of Mayor of
Compostela, while petitioner Dangoy was a candidate for vice-mayor and the other
petitioners were candidates for municipal councilors, during the May 10, 2010
elections.
Quio won and along with the rest of the petitioners who were the winning
candidates for members of the Sangguniang Bayan, were proclaimed by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC). Thereafter, Wagas filed an Election Protest
against Quio before the RTC. He also filed a petition for annulment of proclamation
in the COMELEC claiming that after the proclamation, the Audit/Print Logs of the
Consolidating Machine of the MBOC did not reflect at least 14 clustered precincts
but the Consolidating Machine generated the Certificate of Canvass and Statement
of Votes (SOV). Quio denied the allegations.
Later on, petitioners took their oath of office and immediately assumed office, and
on same day, however, the COMELEC Second Division granted the "Extremely
Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effect of Proclamation" filed by Wagas. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration with the Commission but was denied.
Thus, to settle the unrest and to truly determine the will of the electorate of
Compostela Cebu, the Commission canvassed the votes in the clustered precincts
subject of this controversy.
ISSUE:
Whether the annulment of petitioners proclamation is proper
respondents contention of irregularities of canvassing of votes.

basing

on

RULING:
NO. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy, with the advent of the Automated
Election System, has now been limited into only two (2) issues, to wit: a) illegal
composition of the Board of Canvassers; and b) illegal proceedings, as when there is
precipitate canvassing, terrorism, lack of sufficient notice to the members of the
Board of Canvassers, and improper venue. The alleged irregularity on the audit logs
does not fall within the ambit of the new definition of a pre-proclamation
controversy.
Further, under COMELEC Resolution No. 8809 in relation to Republic Act No. 9369, it
was expressly provided that there shall be no pre-proclamation cases on
issues/controversies relating to the generation, transmission, receipt and custody
and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass.

Assuming that the Commission, in the exercise of its plenary power, may validly rule
on that issue raised by petitioner, such contention is still doomed to fail as no strong
evidence has been adduced establishing that the COC and its supporting SOV do
not reflect the true election results. Jurisprudence dictates that there is a
presumption that an election was honestly conducted, and the burden of proof to
show otherwise is on the party assailing the results. Thus, in the absence of strong
evidence to the contrary, the COC and the corresponding SOV are deemed to have
been regularly issued.
Moreover, a scrutiny of the records reveal that in the margin of votes between
Wagas and Quio, there is no doubt that Quio would still have emerged as the
winner. Thus, annulment of proclamation is not necessary.

Rolando Layug vs COMELEC, Mariano Velarde (alias Brother Mike) and

Buhay Party-List
G.R. No. 192984 February 28, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Layug, in his capacity as a taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed pro se a
Petition to Disqualify Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010
elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-List
is a mere "extension of the El Shaddai," which is a religious sect and neither does
Brother Mike qualify as "one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector. The COMELEC Second Division denied the petition for lack of substantial
evidence.
Thus the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers for PartyList, proclaimed Buhay Party-List as a winner entitled to 2 seats in the House of
Representatives. Being the fifth nominee, however, Brother Mike was not
proclaimed as the representative of Buhay Party-List.
Aggrieved, Layug filed a petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC. In their respective Comments to the petition, respondents assail the
jurisdiction of the Court arguing that, with the proclamation of Buhay Party-List and
the assumption into office of its representatives, it is now the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over
questions relating to their qualifications.
ISSUE:
Whether the HRET not the Court has jurisdiction over the present petition.
RULING:

NO. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its Members. The members of
the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall be elected
from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. In this
case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first
two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the
other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had
not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has
no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List,
as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC.
Section 6 of said Act states that "the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition
xxx."

Cesar Manalo vs. COMELEC, DILG and Ernesto Miranda

GR No. 201672

August 13, 2013

FACTS:
Manalo and Miranda were among the three candidates for Punong Barangay of Sta.
Maria, Mabalacat, Pampanga during the October 25, 2010 elections. After the
canvass of votes, Miranda was proclaimed as the winner. Thus, Manalo filed an
election protest before the MCTC contesting the proclamation of Miranda as the
winner for irregularities on the credibility and conduct of the Barangay Elections.

As Manalo failed to prove any election irregularities, the trial court proceeded with
the appreciation of the ballots. Upon tabulation, the results showed that Manalo was
the winner of the election. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Manalo and
declared him as the true choice. On same day, Miranda filed a Notice of Appeal
appealing the Decision of the lower court to the COMELEC. Miranda protested the
Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal of Manalo mainly on the basis that
no good reason was shown for its immediate execution.
Also, Miranda before the COMELEC filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for Status Quo Ante or Restraining Order which the COMELEC Second
Division granted. Manalo filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. The
COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings that the Special Order granting Manalos
Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal is invalid as it failed to specify
superior circumstances justifying execution pending appeal and merely lifted the
reasons cited in jurisprudence without any explanation as to its applicability to the
present case.
ISSUE:
Whether the defeat of Miranda or the victory of Manalo is clearly established by
public respondent.
RULING:
YES. The Decision complied with the form of decision in election protests, Sec. 2,
Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. A tabulation was presented by the public
respondent which provided for a detailed ruling on each of the questioned ballots. It
discussed why some ballots were not considered "marked" ballots and therefore
valid for Miranda. It also detailed out why some ballots were considered "marked"
ballots and therefore invalid votes. Furthermore, the specific marks that made the
ballots "marked" were duly explained in the Decision.
The Decision provided for a summary of the total number of votes that were
nullified or voided, thus, must be deducted from Mirandas total number of votes as
well as the total valid claim that will be added to the votes obtained by Manalo. On
the basis of this, public respondent made a pronouncement that Manalo won the
said election, with a plurality of eleven (11) votes.
As correctly argued by the Manalo, "public respondent thoroughly, meticulously and
painstakingly studied and took into consideration all the contentions and evidence
adduced by both Miranda and Manalo. We therefore rule that the victory of Manalo
and the defeat of Miranda are manifest in the Decision. Hence, neither haste nor
bias is present herein.

Samson Alcantara, et al. vs. COMELEC, Jonathan De la Cruz, et al.

GR No. 203646

April 16, 2013

FACTS:
Alcantara, et al., along with their fellow law teachers, organized a party named
Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers.
The party has a constitution and by-laws (CBL). Later, the party name was
amended and changed to Abakada Guro Party list. The change was duly approved
by the COMELEC, and in the May 2007 elections, where ABAKADA participated and
won a seat, De la Cruz, its first nominee, became the partys sole representative in
Congress.
De la Cruz requested Alcantara in writing to convene the Supreme Assembly
because of the nationwide party caucuses being held and of the common sentiment
among members that a party meeting should be called. In response, Alcantara
explained that the Supreme Assembly cannot be held as requested. Thus, an All
Leaders Assembly was convened. The proposal was to hold the meeting sometime
in February 2010. As scheduled, the respondents proceeded to hold a Supreme
Assembly that resulted in the approval and ratification of the revised ABAKADA CBL;
the ouster of Alcantara et. al from their positions; the expulsion of the petitioners
from the party; and the election of De la Cruz and Albano as new President and
Secretary-General, respectively.
This prompted the petitioners to file a petition with the COMELEC to declare the
meeting void and restrain the respondents from falsely representing themselves as
the duly elected officers of ABAKADA. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the
petition. The petitioners moved for reconsideration but the COMELEC En Banc
denied the petitioners motion.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC should have declared the Supreme Assembly void.
RULING:
NO. While ABAKADA is registered as a sectoral party, the general principles
applicable to political parties as a voluntary association apply to it. Political parties
constitute a basic element of our democratic institutional apparatus. Among others,
political parties help stimulate public participation in the political arena and
translate the results of this participation into meaningful policies and programs of
government offered to the electorate. Thus, political parties are generally free to
conduct its internal affairs pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free
association which includes the determination of the individuals who shall constitute
the association and the officials who shall lead the party in attaining its goals. To the
group belongs the power to adopt a constitution; to them likewise belongs the
power to amend, modify or altogether scrap it.
The petitioners argument is contrary to these basic tenets. If the validity of the
Supreme Assembly would completely depend on the person who calls the meeting
and on the person who sends the notice of the meeting who are petitioners
Alcantara and Dabu themselves then the petitioners would be able to perpetuate
themselves in power in violation of the very constitution whose violation they now
cite. This kind of result would strike at the heart of political parties as the "basic
element of the democratic institutional apparatus."
As the COMELEC correctly observed, ABAKADAs constitution expressly requires the
convening of the Supreme Assembly once every three years for electing the
members of the National Executive Board - the governing body of ABAKADA -

headed by petitioner Alcantara as President. In contravention of ABAKADAs own

constitution, no Supreme Assembly was ever held since ABAKADA came into
existence in 2003, prompting the respondents to communicate with petitioner
Alcantara to urge him "to call for and assemble the leaders, as well as members of
the party, for the coming May 2010 elections." This call, to our mind, is far from
unreasonable and was in fact a practical approach to a coming political exercise.

Leonor Dangan-Corral vs. COMELEC and Ernesto Fernandez

GR No. 190156

February 12, 2010

FACTS:
Corral and Fernandez were candidates for the position of mayor of the Municipality
of El Nido, Palawan during the May 14, 2007 elections. Corral was eventually
proclaimed the winner. The latter, thereafter, filed an election protest in the RTC
which declared Fernandez as the duly elected Mayor in view of the invalidation of
the ballots declared as written by 1 or 2 persons.
Corral filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the motion was denied. Thus, Corral
filed a petition for certiorari before the Comelec which affirmed the Order of
respondent court. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration before the Comelec En
Banc which dismissed petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and
affirmed the dismissal of the herein Petition by the COMELEC First Division.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in affirming the execution
pending appeal of the decision of the RTC.
RULING:
YES. There are clear cut requirements on when RTC decisions may be executed
pending appeal. Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests
states:reasons must (2) be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed,
that the defeat of the protestee or the victory of the protestant has been
clearly established; and Sec. 2 of Rule14 states: (d) On Pair or Group of Ballots
Written by One or Individual Ballots Written by Two- When ballots are invalidated on
the ground of written by one person, the court must clearly and distinctly specify
why the pair or group of ballots has been written by only one person. The specific
strokes, figures or letters indicating that the ballots have been written by one
person must be specified. A simple ruling that a pair or group of ballots has
been written by one person would not suffice. The same is true when
ballots are excluded on the ground of having been written by two persons.
The RTC Decision does not specify why the court considered particular groups of
ballots to have been written by one person, and other invalidated ballots to have
been written by two persons. Worse, the Decision does not state which and how
many ballots were written by one person; and which and how many ballots were
written by two persons. The entire Decision fails to yield the exact number of and
which ballots were written by one person, and the exact number of and which
ballots were written by two persons. There is also no mention in the decision of
whether or not the RTC took into consideration the entries of the Minutes of Voting

and Counting relative to illiterate or disabled voters, if any, who cast their votes
through assistors. It utterly violates the mandatory requirement that "the court
must clearly and distinctly specify why the pair or group of ballots has been written
by only one person. The specific figures or letters indicating that the ballots have
been written by one person must be specified." The victory of the protestant and
the defeat of the protestee were not clearly established in the Decision because of
the RTCs failure to conform to the prescribed form of the Decision.

Luis Villafuerte vs. COMELEC and Miguel Villafuerte

GR No. 206698

February 25, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the
Province of Camarines Sur in the May 13, 2013 local and national elections.
Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Verified Petition to deny due course to or cancel
the certificate of candidacy (COC) of respondent, alleging that respondent
intentionally and materially misrepresented a false and deceptive name/nickname
that would mislead the voters when he declared under oath in his COC that "L-RAY
JR.-MIGZ" was his nickname or stagename and that the name he intended to appear
on the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L-RAY JR.-MIGZ NP; that respondent
deliberately omitted his first name "MIGUEL" and inserted, instead "LRAY JR.," which
is the nickname of his father, the incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur, "LRay
Villafuerte, Jr."
The COMELEC's First Division denied the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which denied the same.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent committed a material misrepresentation under Section 78 of
the OEC so as to justify the cancellation of his COC.
RULING:
NO. For the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to
prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his
eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the
requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run

for local elective office as provided in the Local Government Code. Hence,
petitioners allegation that respondents nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" written in his
COC is a material misrepresentation is devoid of merit. Respondent's nickname
written in the COC cannot be considered a material fact which pertains to his
eligibility and thus qualification to run for public office.
Moreover, the false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. Respondent's nickname is not considered a material fact, and
there is no substantial evidence showing that in writing the nickname "LRAY JR.
MIGZ" in his COC, respondent had the intention to deceive the voters as to his
identity which has an effect on his eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks
to assume.
Considering that respondent's name is VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.-MIGZ, his name would
indeed be ahead of petitioner's name, VILLAFUERTE, LUIS, in the official ballot.
However, petitioner's claim that such listing would lead to confusion as to put him
to undue disadvantage is merely speculative and without basis as the voters can
identify the candidate they want to vote for.

Jesus Typoco vs. COMELEC, The New Municipal Board of Canvassers of

Labo, The New Provincial Board of Canvassers of Camarines Norte and
Edgardo Tallado
GR No. 186359

March 5, 2010

FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, petitioner and private respondent
vied for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and
canvassing of votes, Typoco was proclaimed winner. Thus, respondent Tallado filed
before the COMELEC a petition for correction of manifest error. He claimed that,
after he reviewed and examined the figures in the Statement of Votes by Precinct
(SOVP) vis--vis the Certificate of Canvass of Votes (COC) in the municipalities in the

province, he found that, in the municipalities of Labo and Jose Panganiban, errors
were committed in the transposition of votes from the SOVP to the COC. Respondent
contended that if the errors were corrected he would be the true winner in the
gubernatorial race in the province.
The COMELEC First Division granted respondent Tallados petition and annulled the
proclamation of Typoco as the winning gubernatorial candidate. Aggrieved,
petitioner moved for reconsideration but wasdenied by the COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its issuances
ordering the correction of the manifest error in the pertinent election documents
and the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner.
RULING:
NO. The COMELEC, in ordering the correction of manifest errors in the SOVP and
COC, merely exercised its bounden duty to ascertain the true will of the electorate
of the province. Proven during the proceedings before it were errors or
discrepancies in the recording or transferring of votes from the SOVP of Labo to the
COC, such that the votes in the latter document did not reflect the true and correct
votes received by the candidates. SOVPs are the basis of COCs; the two must jibe
with each other. Certainly, an error in transposing the contents of one to the other
only calls for a clerical act of reflecting in the said election documents the true and
correct votes received by the candidates. This does not involve the opening of the
ballot boxes, examination and appreciation of ballots and/or election returns. All
that is required is to reconvene the board of canvassers for it to rectify the error it
committed in order that the true will of the voters will be given effect. The previous
proclamation of petitioner will not be a hindrance to the said correction. The
proclamation and assumption of office of petitioner based on a faulty tabulation is
flawed right from the very beginning, and may, therefore, be annulled.
The Court also rule that in the light of the erroneous computation of the votes of
petitioner Tallado and private respondent Typoco, the latter was erroneously
proclaimed as the winning gubernatorial candidate. Such proclamation is, therefore,
null and void.

Bienvenido William Lloren vs COMELEC and Rogelio Pua, Jr.

GR No. 196355

September 18, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent Pua were the candidates for Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Inopacan, Leyte in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Pua as the winning
candidate. Alleging massive vote-buying, intimidation, defective PCOS machines in
all the clustered precincts, election fraud, and other election-related manipulations,
petitioner commenced an Election Protest Case in the RTC.
The RTC dismissed the election protest for insufficiency in form and substance and
for failure to pay the required cash deposit. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the
RTC. However, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the appeal on the ground of
petitioners failure to pay the appeal fee within the period set. Petitioner moved for
the reconsideration of the dismissal but the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners election protest lacks merit.
RULING:
YES. Contents of the protest or petition under Sec. 10(c), Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M.
No. 10-4-1-SC pertinently provides as follows: An election protest shall also state: (i)
that the protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy
and had been voted for the same office; (ii) the total number of precincts in the
municipality; (iii) the protested precincts and votes of the parties in the protested
precincts per the Statement of Votes by Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are
not specified, an explanation why the votes are not specified; and (iv) a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral frauds,
anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts.
As the findings of the RTC show, petitioner did not indicate the total number of
precincts in the municipality in his election protest. The omission rendered the
election protest insufficient in form and content, and warranted its summary
dismissal, in accordance with summary dismissal of election contests under Sec. 12,
Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC, to wit: The court shall summarily dismiss,
motu proprio, an election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on
any of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (b) The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section
10; (c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules; (d) The
filing fee is not paid within the period for filing the election protest or petition for
quo warranto; and (e) In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit
is not paid within five (5) days from the filing of the protest.
Likewise, the RTC found that the cash deposit made by petitioner was insufficient.
Considering that the Court cannot disturb the findings on the insufficiency of
petitioners cash deposit made by the trial court, that finding was another basis for
the summary dismissal of the election protest under Sec. 12. The summary
dismissal of the election protest upon any of the grounds mentioned in Sec. 12 is
mandatory.

Jose Atienza, Jr., et al vs. COMELEC, Manuel Roxas II, et al

GR No. 188920

February 16, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent Drilon, as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his
partys withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria MacapagalArroyo. But petitioner Atienza, LP Chairman, and a number of party members
denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made the announcement without
consulting his party. Thereafter, petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to
supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the
assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and
elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately
filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the elections. The COMELEC partially
granted respondent Drilons petition. It annulled the elections and ordered the
holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilons term expired. Eventually, that meeting installed respondent
Roxas as the new LP president. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming
the presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which elected him was
invalidly convened. On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that
Roxas election as LP president faithfully complied with the provisions of the
amended LP Constitution.
The COMELEC denied petitioners Atienza, et al.s petition. It noted that the
petitioners failed to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president was
not properly convened. As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.s expulsion as
LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related
to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an
internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the
issue concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue
concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party.
RULING:
NO. The key issue in this case is not the validity of the expulsion of petitioners
Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly that elected
respondent Roxas as LP president. Given the COMELECs finding as upheld by this
Court that the membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP
Constitution, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the party validly expelled
petitioners cannot affect the election of officers that the NECO held. Under the

circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion was purely a

membership issue that had to be settled within the party. It is an internal party
matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have
blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties.
Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference
from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only
when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. The COMELECs
powers and functions under Sec. 2, Art. IX-C of the Constitution, "include the
ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for its acts." Also, the COMELECs power to register political parties
necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf.
Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case
brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that
the COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is
the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all
national elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP
officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts.
The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that will
redound to the benefit of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations
upon registered political parties that have to be carried out through their leaders.
The resolution of the leadership issue is thus particularly significant in ensuring the
peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections.

Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG LINGKOD) vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 206952

October 22, 2013

FACTS:
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant
farmers and fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system. It
participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes
needed for a seat in the House of Representatives.
In May 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to
participate in the May 2013 elections. In compliance with the COMELEC's Resolution,
ABANG LINGKOD filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its
continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941. However, the
COMELEC En Banc cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group
pointing that it failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the
marginalized and underrepresented and that it merely offered photographs of some
alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc
further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are
themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in
activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors it claims to represent.
ISSUE:
Whether ABANG LINGKOD is qualified to be registered under the party-list system.
RULING:
YES. Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as
ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track

record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the
sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. It is sufficient that the ideals
represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent. Thus, there is no basis in law and established
jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration under the party-list system
still comply with the track record requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it
mandated that groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to
show their track record as a group.
Moreover, ABANG LINGKOD had been previously registered as a party-list group, as
in fact it participated in the May 2010 party-list elections, and it was able to obtain a
sufficient number of votes in the May 2013 party-list elections to obtain a seat in
the House of Representatives. These are circumstances, which clearly indicate that
ABANG LINGKOD is indeed a legitimate party-list group. ABANG LINGKOD,
notwithstanding the cancellation of its registration three days prior to the May 13,
2013 elections, was able to obtain a total of 260 215 votes out of the 26 722 131
votes that were cast for the party-list, thus entitling it to a seat in the House of
Representatives. This is indicative of the fact that a considerable portion of the
electorate considers ABANG LINGKOD as truly representative of peasant farmers
and fisherfolk.
Though the Court does not condone the deceit perpetrated by ABANG LINGKOD that
in order to establish its track record, submitted photographs that were edited to
make it appear that it conducted activities aimed at ameliorating the plight of the
sectors it represents. Nevertheless, considering that track record is no longer a
requirement, ABANG LINGKODs misrepresentation as to its track record cannot be
used as a ground to deny or cancel its registration.

Romeo Jaloslos vs. COMELEC, Maria Isabelle Climaco-Salazar, et al

G.R. No. 205033

June 18, 2013

FACTS:
In 2001, Jalosjos was convicted by final judgment of 2 counts of statutory rape and
6 counts of acts of lasciviousness. In 2007, his prison term was commuted to 16
years, 3 months and 3 days. In 2009, he was issued a certificate of discharge from
prison after serving the same.
In 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City but was denied
because of his previous conviction, thus prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion
in the Permanent List of Voters before the MTCC. Pending resolution, he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the
upcoming May 2013 local elections.

The MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute
disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election and
this was affirmed by the RTC. Meanwhile, 5 petitions were lodged before the
COMELECs First and Second Divisions (COMELEC Divisions), praying for the denial
of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioners CoC.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is qualified to run for any elective office.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners argument that Art. 30 of the RPC was partially amended by Sec.
40(a) of the LGC and thus, claims that his perpetual absolute disqualification had
already been removed is untenable.
While Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office
after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the said
provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty,
either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to
run for elective office. Accordingly, Sec. 40(a) of the LGC, which broadly speaks of
offenses involving moral turpitude and those punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment without any consideration of certain disqualifying effects to ones
right to suffrage, should be considered as a law of general application and therefore,
must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle of lex
specialis derogat generali general legislation must give way to special legislation
on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in
which the special provisions are not applicable. In other words, where two statutes
are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially designed
therefor should prevail.
In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC,
carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in
turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As
discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal
provision such as Article 41 in this case directly and specifically prohibits the
convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years
from petitioners service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer
the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently,
disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
All told, applying the established principles of statutory construction, and more
significantly, considering the higher interests of preserving the sanctity of our
elections, the Court holds that Section 40(a) of the LGC has not removed the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which petitioner continues to suffer.
Thereby, he remains disqualified to run for any elective office pursuant to Article 30
of the RPC.

Maria Lourdes Locsin vs. HRET and Monique Yazmin Maria Lagdameo
G.R. No. 204123

March 19, 2013

FACTS:
Locsin and Lagdameo vied for the position to represent the First Legislative District
of Makati in the 2010 national elections where Lagdameo was proclaimed the
winner. Locsin then instituted an election protest before the HRET alleging that the
results were tainted by election fraud, anomalies, and irregularities.
The HRET, in order to clear all doubts surrounding the victory of Lagdameo, held
revision proceedings. After the parties filed their respective memoranda, for failure
to show a reasonable recovery of votes, the HRET assailed a decision dismissing
petitioner's election protest and affirming Lagdameos proclamation. The HRET also
denied with finality petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
election protest.
RULING:
NO. Public respondent HRET conducted a revision and appreciation of all the ballots
from all the precincts. This was done despite the fact that results of initial revision
proceedings in 25% of the precincts increased the winning margin of private
respondent from 242 to 265 votes. Out of due diligence and to remove all doubts on
the victory of private respondent, the HRET directed continuation of revision
proceedings. This was done despite the dissent of three of its members. The three
voted "for the dismissal of the instant election protest without further proceedings
for lack of reasonable recovery of votes in the pilot protested clustered precincts."
Thus, in reaching the assailed decision, the HRET took pains in reviewing the
validity or invalidity of each contested ballot with prudence. This is evident from the
decision's ballot enumeration specifying with concrete basis and clarity the reason
for its denial or admittance. The results, as well as the objections, claims,
admissions, and rejections of ballots were explained sufficiently and addressed by
the HRET in its Decision.
Moreover, Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be
the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members." The Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral
Commission is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process. The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs. HRET, venture into the
perilous area of correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the
Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or
correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution
itself calls for remedial action. Well settled also is the rule that the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts, and factual issues are beyond its authority to review.