2

IMPERATIVES AND LOGIC

2.2. Now clearly, if we are looking for the essential difference between statements and
commands, we have to look in the neustic, not in the phrastic. But, as the use of the single word
'neustic' indicates, there is still something in common between indicative and imperative
neustics. This is the common notion of, so to speak, 'nodding' a sentence. It is something that is
done by anyone who uses a sentence in earnest and does not merely mention it or quote it in
inverted commas; something essential to saying (and meaning) anything. The absence of
inverted commas in written language symbolizes the element of meaning of which I am
speaking; to write a sentence without inverted commas is like signing a cheque; to write it within
inverted commas is like drawing a cheque without signing it, e.g. to show someone how to draw
cheques. We could have a convention that, instead of putting inverted commas round sentences
that we were mentioning and not using, we nodded, or made some special mark in writing, when
we were using a sentence in earnest. The 'assertion symbol' in the logical system of Frege, and in
that of Russell and Whitehead has, among other functions, this one of signifying the use or
affirmation o a sentence.1 It could, in this function, be applied to commands as well as to
statements. We may perhaps strain language slightly an use the word 'affirm' of both.
Closely allied to such an affirmation sign would be a sign for agreement or assent for use by a
hearer. To use such a sign of assent would be tantamount to repeating the sentence with the
pronouns, &c., changed where necessary. Thus, if I said 'You are going to shut the door', and
you answered 'Yes', this would be a sign of assent, and would be equivalent to 'I am going to
shut the door'. And if I said 'Shut the door', and you answered 'Aye, aye sir', this likewise would
be a sign of assent; if we wished to express what it is equivalent to, we might say 'Let me shut
the door' or 'I will shut the door' (where 'I will' is not a prediction but the expression of a resolve
or a promise). Now this should give us a clue to the essential difference between statements and
commands; it lies in what is involved in assenting to them; and what is involved in assenting to
them is, as I have said, closely allied to what is involved in affirming them in the first place.2
If we assent to a statement we are said to be sincere in our assent if and only if we believe that it
is true (believe what the speaker has said). If, on the other hand, we assent to a second-person
command addressed to ourselves, we are said to be sincere in our assent if and only if we do or
resolve to do what the speaker has told us to do; if we do not do it but only resolve to do it later,
then if, when the occasion arises for doing it, we do not do it, we are said to have changed our
mind; we are no longer sticking to the assent which we previously expressed. It is a tautology to
say that we cannot sincerely assent to a second-person command addressed to ourselves, and at
the same time not perform it, if now is the occasion for performing it and it is in our (physical
and psychological) power to do so. Similarly, it is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely
assent to a statement, and at the same time not believe it. Thus we may characterize
provisionally the difference between statements and commands by saying that, whereas sincerely
assenting to the former involves believing something, sincerely assenting to the latter involves
(on the appropriate occasion and if it is within our power), doing something. But this statement
is over-simplified, and will require qualification later (11.2).
In the case of third-person commands, to assent is to join in affirming. In the case of first-person
commands ('Let me do so and so') and resolves ('I will do so and so'), which are closely similar
to one another, affirmation and assent are identical. It is logically impossible for a man to dissent
from what he himself is affirming (though of course he may not be sincere in affirming it).