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KarlH. Potter
Professor in the
Departmentof
Philosophyat the
University of
Washington
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408
409
410
by "a priori"what Lewis says we should mean by it-a concept answering to the three requirements I have indicated-then only the pragmatic
a priori is a genuine a priori,the Kantian and conventionalist a prioris not
answering to all the requirements. This is a verbal point, needless to say,
and I shall assume that Lewis' requirements are not definitive of the
notion of a priori but rather constitute a recommendation or theory
about the nature of what the a priori should be.
Now: is there an a priori in Indian thought? For there to be one, it
would seem that it would either have to be analytic, as the conventionalist and pragmatic conceptions hold it to be, or, if in part synthetic,
it would have to be "necessary" in some way that makes it impossible for
us to revise that synthetic part, as in the Kantian conception of the forms
and categories.
I do not think there is any systematic concept of analyticity in Indian
philosophy. Characteristic symptoms of analyticity are absent from what
Indians think and say about necessary relationships. Sanskrit doesn't have
terminology to distinguish "necessary" from "regular"or "lawful."They
use such terms as virodha or asambhava both in contexts where we
should be likely to say "impossible" as well as in contexts where we
should say "contrary to fact."
Consider the kinds of examples of empty terms which one finds
scattered through the pages of Indian technical philosophy. One favorite
among such illustrations is "the son of a barren woman." Others, used for
exactly the same purposes, are "sky-flower" or "hare's horn." We would
say that it is impossible for there to be a son of a barren woman because
to be barren means to have no children, while the nonexistence of
flowers growing in the sky, or of horns growing on rabbits' heads, is a
matter not of meaning but of fact. It is not logically impossible, we intone,
for a flower to grow in the sky, or a horn on a hare's head; these
conceptions are not self-contradictory, as "son of a barren woman" is.
Yet Indian thought regularly assimilates all these instances into a single
sort.
Definitions do not work in Indian thought the way they do in ours.
The Sanskrit term we translate into English as "definition" is laksana.
Laksana means a "mark,"a feature by which we demarcate or recognize
the definiendum (in Sanskrit,the laksya). Likewise,when Westerners offer
a definition they specify a feature or group of features by which one may
demarcate or recognize the definiendum, call it X. But that a feature
demarcates or brings on the recognition of something is not sufficient to
qualify that feature as a definition. That a feature is a defining characteristic of X can be challenged by asking whether something lacking that
feature would still be called an X. Thus to say that Y is a defining
characteristic of an X is to say that Y is a logically essential characteristic,
that the presence of Y is a logically necessary condition for anything to
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NOTES
1 - Lewis says that "The paradigm of the a priori in general is the definition" (Clarence I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order [New York:Dover
definitions legislate meaning
Publications, 19291, p. 239)-because
rather than report facts.
2 - C. I. Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the a Priori,"in Readings
in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), p. 239.
3 - I think Lewis' strictures here were in fact heeded-although
perhaps
not even needed-by
his opponents: the holism of Quine's "Two
Dogmas" and the Kuhnian picture of scientific revolution are cases
in point, even though the notion of "criteria-in-mind"remains something of a whipping boy, suggesting a procrustean urge to hypostatize
meanings.
4- A possible exception might be urged in the case of late Buddhist
logic as in DharmakTrti,but even here the case is debatable.
5 - Cf. Patanjali, Yogasutra IV.2-3, and Vyasa's Bhasya thereon.
KarlH. Potter
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