Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.

208566, November 19, 2013

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging
five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints
are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking
that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

1.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of

powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congressrole must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.

2.

Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects was declared constitutional . IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND
THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM
CALAMITIES.
(b) and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME
FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A PRIORITY. VERILY,
THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE
THE SAME.
Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, 07 December 2010

BIRAOGO VS PTC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
x -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON
A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the
powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as
it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect
and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no
power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.

Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such

facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to
enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power
of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its
operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because
the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new
public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when
it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively
targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of
the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species
even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of

petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include
the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No.
9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate
funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the
functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a factfinding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection
clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and
question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds
for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the

DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office
remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of
any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in
danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to
the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-

in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted

or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the
plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He
has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order
and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the
petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to
those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionallymandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows
from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have
been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which
the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised

and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution

and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations
of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the
part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.
There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress
has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of
the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated
to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations
so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. The function
of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts
so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the
equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to

treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose

of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of
the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the
equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include
past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the

commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC
must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with
which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should
be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 80916 November 9, 1990
C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO J. HIBIONADA, EFREN DIONGON, and PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,respondents.
Federico T. Tabino Jr. for petitioner.
Depasucat, Depasucat & Su Law Offices for Efren Diongon.

CRUZ, J.:
The same issue of jurisdiction that was raised in Solid Homes v. Payawal 1 is raised in the case at bar.
The same ruling laid down in that earlier case must be applied in the present controversy.

The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development Corporation sold a

subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments having
been completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. When
neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for specific
performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. 3514. The two defendants each filed an answer with cross-claim and counterclaim.
The plaintiff filed a reply and answered the counterclaims. Pre-trial was scheduled and heard and
trial briefs were submitted by Pleasantville and Diongon. The case was set for initial hearing. It was
then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the
competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The
motion was heard and Diongon later filed an opposition. On September 17, 1987, the trial
court 2 denied the motion to dismiss in an order reading as follows:
Before this Court for resolution is the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc. alleging among other things, that this Court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter considering that the present action falls within the jurisdiction of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board by virtue of Executive Order No. 90
dated December 17, 1986.
Plaintiff filed an opposition to the said motion to dismiss traversing the allegations
therein stated. A perusal of both pleadings and the complaint filed by plaintiff, the
issue to be determined are basically governed by the provisions of the New Civil
Code, particularly on contracts. The complaint is one for specific performance with
damages which is a justiciable issue under the Civil Code and jurisdiction to hear the
said issue is conferred on the regular Courts pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
It is, therefore, the finding of this Court that jurisdiction as conferred by law is vested
in the regular courts and not in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The
Motion to Dismiss is, therefore, DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner is now before this Court on certiorari to question this order.
In holding that the complaint for specific performance with damages was justiciable under the Civil
Code and so came under the jurisdiction of the regular courts under B.P. 129, the trial court failed to
consider the express provisions of P.D. No. 1344 and related decrees. It also erred in supposing that
only the regular courts can interpret and apply the provisions of the Civil Code, to the exclusion of
the quasi-judicial bodies.
P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides that the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive authority to regulate the real estate trade and business.
The scope of the regulatory authority lodged in the National Housing Authority is indicated in the
second and third paragraphs of the preamble, thus:
WHEREAS, the numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and
obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage,
water systems, lighting systems and other similar basic requirements, thus
endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and

fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from
hens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes and fraudulent sales of the
same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value. (Emphasis supplied)
P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the National Housing Authority
to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the
quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the agency as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed
by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied)
Under E.O. No. 648 dated February 7, 1981, the regulatory functions conferred on the National
Housing Authority under P.D. Nos. 957,1344 and other related laws were transferred to the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission, which was renamed Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
by E.O. No. 90 dated December 17, 1986.
It is clear from Section 1(c) of the above quoted PD No. 1344 that the complaint for specific
performance with damages filed by Diongon with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental
comes under the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Diongon is a buyer of
a subdivision lot seeking specific performance of the seller's obligation to deliver to him the
corresponding certificate of title.
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the
Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies
now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial
function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them
of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.
In the Solid Homes case, for example, the Court affirmed the competence of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board to award damages although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable
ordinarily only by the courts of justice. This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental
powers is justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently
to the pressing problems of the modem world.
Thus we have held:

It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and

perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited
delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g. the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations
Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for
special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the
resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a
companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded
and clogged. 3
xxx xxx xxx

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary
to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified
activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the
problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unquestionably called
the fourth department of the government. 4
xxx xxx xxx

There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an

administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the
agency's special expertise. The very definition of an administrative agency includes
its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and
functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active
intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and
speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular
courts. 5
The argument of the private respondents that the petition is premature because no motion for
reconsideration of the questioned order of trial court had been filed stresses the rule but disregards
the exception. It is settled that the motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with if the issue
raised is a question of law, 6 as in the case at bar. The issue pleaded here is lack of jurisdiction. It could
therefore be raised directly and immediately with this Court without the necessity of an antecedent motion
for reconsideration.
We hold, in sum, that the complaint for specific performance and damages was improperly filed with
the respondent court, jurisdiction over the case being exclusively vested in the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board. We also hold that the order denying the motion to dismiss was subject to
immediate challenge before this Court as the filing (and denial) of a motion for reconsideration was
not an indispensable requirement.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Order of September 17, 1987, is SET
ASIDE and Civil Case No. 3514 in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental is hereby
DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of the proper complaint with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board if so desired. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72.
2 Through Judge Romeo J. Hibionada.
3 Antipolo Realty Corp. vs. NHA, 153 SCRA 399.
4 Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, supra.
5 Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. NHA, 152 SCRA 540.
6 Quirino vs. Gorospe, 169 SCRA 702; Gonzales, Jr. vs. IAC, 131 SCRA 468; PALEA
vs. PAL, 111 SCRA 215.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS

231 SCRA 292
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994
FACTS

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the
Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the
possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of
Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first
securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and
clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
The LLDA found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving
streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters
since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may
have contaminated the sample during collection or handling.
On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering
the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their
contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from
dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin
dumpsite.

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine
National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the
entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being
utilized as a dumpsite.
The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist
order
In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as
the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance
the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to
dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an order denying LLDA's motion to
dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from
enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff
City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the
pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the court.
COURT OF APPEALS
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that:
(1) the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and
decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.

ISSUE

Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to entertain the complaint against
the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin
authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly
endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the
sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to
pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite

SUPREME COURT

Yes.
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law
provides for another forum.

It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized

administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850
and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared
national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of
Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and
Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution.
Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its
special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of
the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating
from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated,
among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs,
and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region,
public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans,
programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the
development of the region.

ISSUE

Whether or not the LLDA has the power and authority to issue a "cease and
desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws

SUPREME COURT

Yes.
By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter
or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24 (Emphasis
supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever
order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue an exparte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City
Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which,
admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of
1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that
there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power
"to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is
expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983.

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting

vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution.
Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the
correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the
declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in
mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health
as a fundamental human right.

Smart v. National Telecommunications

Commission, G.R. No. 151908, 12, August
2003
Smart Communications, Inc. et. al. vs.
National Telecommunications Commission
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION
(PILTEL) vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 151908
August 12, 2003

FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications
Commission issued a Memorandum Circulars on the billing of telecommunications services and
on measures in minimizing, if not eliminating, the incidence of stealing of cellular phone unit. Isla
Communications Co., Inc. (IslaCom) and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PilTel) filed an action for
the declaration of nullity of the memorandum circulars, alleging that NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods as stated in the subject memorandum circulars. Such
jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Acts of the Philippines. Soon thereafter,
Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint motion for leave to intervene
and to admit complaint-in-intervention. This was granted by the trial court.

The trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC from implementing the MCs. NTC filed a Motion to
Dismiss, on the ground that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The
defendant's MD is denied for lack of merit. NTC filed a MR but was later on denied by the trial
court. The CA, upon NTC's filing of a special action for certiorari and prohibition, reversed the
decision of the lower court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the private respondents failed to exhaust administrative
remedies?

RULING: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power

to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of
the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of
law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order
for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect
to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with
respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which
are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is

its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice
has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question
by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of
some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally
cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of
rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within
the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally

__

demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.

ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima

G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
FACTS:
1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status
2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards.
Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on
the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional.
In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of oversight embraces all
activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over
the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns postenactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance
with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent
executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity
with the congressional perception of public interest. The power of oversight has been held
to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se,
meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to
the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive
branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on
Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or
judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the

procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.

Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1)
scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation and
(2)

investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power

of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to
present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or
through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.

Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National

Telecommunications Commission [G.R.
No.143964. July 26, 2004]
23NOV
FACTS
Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to effect the
interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe). Globe
pointed out procedural defects in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I also pointed out
that another network, Islacom, was allowed to provide such service without prior NTC approval. The
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) ruled that both Smart and Globe were
equally blameworthy and issued an Order penalizing both on the ground of providing SMS under Value
Added Services (VAS) without prior approval from the NTC. The Court of Appeals sustained the
NTC Order.
ISSUES
Whether or not:
(1) Globe may be required to secure prior NTC approval before providing SMS or texting services;
(2) SMS is a VAS under Public telecommunications Act (PTA) of 1995;

RULING
(1) NO. The NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue providing
SMS. This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to classify it as VAS.
However, the move should be implemented properly, through unequivocal regulations applicable to all
entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-handed manner. This should not be interpreted,
however, as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction and review by the NTC. The NTC will continue
to exercise, by way of its broad grant, jurisdiction over Globe and Smarts SMS offerings, including
questions of rates and customer complaints. Yet caution must be had. Much complication could
have been avoided had the NTC adopted a proactive position, promulgating the necessary rules and
regulations to cope up with the advent of the technologies it superintends. With the persistent advent of
new offerings in the telecommunications industry, the NTCs role will become more crucial than at any
time before.
(2) NO. There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to
denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should
be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA. The Court realizes that the
PTA is not intended to constrain the industry within a cumbersome regulatory regime. The policy as preordained by legislative fiat renders the traditionally regimented business in an elementary free state to
make business decisions, avowing that it is under this atmosphere that the industry would prosper. It is
disappointing at least if the deregulation thrust of the law is skirted deliberately. But it is ignominious if the
spirit is defeated through a crazy quilt of vague, overlapping rules that are implemented haphazardly.
__

Victorias Milling Co. Inc. v. Social Security

Commission [G.R. No. L-16704. March
17, 1962]
28AUG
FACTS
The Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor:
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into
consideration and include in the Employees remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the
cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employees remuneration or
earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for
any one month.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the
Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular
No. 7, expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers and employees
respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, In order to assist your System in arriving at a

proper interpretation of the term compensation for the purposes of such computation, their observations
on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words compensation,
remuneration and wages. Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on
the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for
lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act
1161 empowering the Social Security Commission to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of
the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes
of this Act.
RULING
No. The Commissions Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the
President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of
the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. The
Circular purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the
amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees
upon which the social security contributions should be based. The Circular neither needs approval from
the President nor publication in the Official Gazette.

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY Case
Digest
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION v. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987
FACTS: Jose Hernando acquired ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights
Subdivision from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando
transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. However, for failure of
Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to
the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment
payments falling due thereafter. On October 14 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice
to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already
been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15.
Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay
the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell,
and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Mr. Yuson
brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA.

After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the jurisdiction to
hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA.
The motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent NHA, which sustained its jurisdiction to
hear and decide the Yuson complaint. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction over the present controversy.
HELD: NHA was upheld by the SC.
It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform
adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or
quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically
because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the
resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition
that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. In general the quantum
of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the
enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly
interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts.
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Decree", states that National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions
of this decree. Presidential Decree No. 1344, clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions
of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following manner:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are
indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute. There is no question that
under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the

rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements,
as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.

United Resident of Dominican Hills vs.

Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems
THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF
LAND PROBLEMS
G.R. No. 135945
March 7, 2001
TOPIC: AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY IS NOT A COURT.
FACTS: Dominican Hills, formerly registered as Diplomat Hills in Baguio City, was mortgaged to the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). It was eventually foreclosed and acquired later on by the said
bank as the highest bidder. On 11 April 1983, through its President Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., the subject
property was donated to the Republic of the Philippines. The deed of donation stipulated that Dominican
Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in human settlements and economic
development and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human Settlements.
On December 12, 1986, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 85 abolishing the Ministry of Human
Settlements. All agencies under the its supervision as well as all its assets, programs and projects, were
transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS).
On 18 October 1988, United (Dominican Hills) submitted its application before the PMS to acquire a
portion of the Dominican Hills property. In a MOA, PMS and United agreed that the latter may purchase a
portion of the said property from HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATIO, acting as originator,
on a selling price of P75.00 per square meter.
Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED. The deed of conditional
sale provided that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price would be paid upon signing, with the balance to
be amortized within one year from its date of execution. After UNITED made its final payment on January
31, 1992, HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992.
Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered the Dominican Hills property
allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order
from the city mayor. Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the name
DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed
an action for injunction before RTC Baguio City. Private respondents were able to obtain a temporary
restraining order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied.
The ASSOCIATION filed a separate civil case for damages, injunction and annulment of the said MOA. It
was later on dismissed upon motion of United. The said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with the
Court of Appeals.
The demolition order was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City Mayor and the City
Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that private respondents returned and
reconstructed the demolished structures.
To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed a petition for
annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the
City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent

COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo. Without filing a
motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status quoorder, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.
ISSUE: W/O COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a
TRO and to issue a status quo order and conduct a hearing thereof?
RULING: COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It discharges quasijudicial functions:
"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative
officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature."
However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that exercises
quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of
the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers observed
in our system of government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3) branches the
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary each department being co-equal and coordinate, and
supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the
judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, it is empowered "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."

Carlito C. Encinas v PO1 Alfredo Agustin, Jr

and PO1 Joel Caubang GR No. 187317, April 11,
2013
Case Doctrine:
There is forum shopping when litis pendencia or res judicata is present.
FACTS:
The petitioner Encinas was the Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija. He was charged
administratively with grave misconduct and conductprejudicial to the best interest of the service
in violation of the Administrative Code of 1987. He was dismissed from the service. The two
respondents were holding the positions of Fire Officer I. He petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorari under rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the Civil Service Commission to dismiss the petitioner from
the service.
The case arose when the petitioner allegedly required the respondents to pay him P5,000 in
order not to relieve them from their station at the Cabanatuan City and re-assign them to a far
flung area. The respondents decided to pay in fear of the re-assignment, but they manage to
come up with P2,000 only causing the petitioner to order for their re-assignment to Cuyapo and
Talugtug.

As a result, the respondents decided to file a complaint for illegal transfer before the Bureau of
Fire Protection and at the same time filed another complaint before the Civil Service
Commission Regional Office in Pampanga and the Civil Service Commission in Cabanatuan.
Based on the filed complaints, the petitioner alleges that the respondents are guilty of forum
shopping by filing the two identical complaints. The petitioner claims that the charges of
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to public interest that were filed before
the Civil Service Commission and the BFP are in violation of the rules against forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Is

there

a violation on the

rules against

forum

shopping?

RULING:
The court held the respondents are not guilty of forum shopping. The court enumerated what
constitutes a violation of forum shopping which include the presence of the requisites of litis
pendentia and res judicata. There is litis pendentia when: (1) identity of parties is the same with
the same interests in both actions, (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for and
founded on the same facts, (3) identity of the two preceding cases where a judgment rendered in
the pending case will amount to res judicata in the other case.
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites include (1)
the former judgment is final, (2) the courtrendering the said decision has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter, (3) judgement is based on the merits, (4) between the two
actions, there must be identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
In applying the above requisites, the court held that the dismissal of the petitioner based on the
BFP complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSC complaint. The
dismissal by the BFP is not based on the merits, but based on the recommendation of the fact
finding committee in determining whether a formal charge of an administrative offense may be
filed. There is therefore no rights and liabilities of the parties that were determined in the said
action with finality. The court thereby affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner and denied
the petition.

BEDOL VS COMELEC
MARCH 30, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

LINTANG BEDOL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

G.R. No. 179830/ December 3, 2009
FACTS: As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for
the province of Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner]
discharged his official functions and was able to ensure the PBOCs

performance of its ministerial duty to canvass the Certificates of

Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and municipalities in
the province.
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the
burdensome and gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial
Elections Supervisor for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a
neighboring province of Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled
canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of
Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor which
was slated on May 22, 2007.
On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en
banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the
election of senators to submit the provincial certificate of canvass
for Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections
Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to certain
observations on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain
parties, canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance and
respondent was queried on the alleged fraud which attended the
conduct of elections in his area.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May
30, 2007, but failed to appear despite prior knowledge.
Respondents [petitioner] contention:
Bedol explained before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact
finding activity that, while in his custody and possession, the
election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007, or

some fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the first time
such an excuse was given by the respondent [petitioner] and no
written report was ever filed with the Commission regarding the
alleged loss.
Due to absences in the next scheduled investigative proceedings
and due to failure and refusal to submit a written explanation of his
absences, respondent [petitioner] was issued a contempt charge by
COMELEC.
Petitioner was later arrested by members of the Philippine National
Police on the basis of an Order of Arrest issued on June 29, 2007 by
the COMELEC after petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during the
fact-finding proceedings before Task Force Maguindanao.
Petitioner questioned the COMELECs legal basis for issuing the
warrant of arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the
contempt charges. Nevertheless, he was declared in contempt by
COMELEC.
Petitioner, then, filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the COMELEC in the other assailed Resolution dated August 31,
2007.
ISSUE: Whether or not the initiation and issuance of contempt order
is within the constitutional powers of the COMELEC.
RULING:
Powers of COMELEC
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an
adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all

election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6,

Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the
1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified
into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasijudicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to
be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its
quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and
regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such
legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by
Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the
Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code
(Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and
regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
and the Omnibus Election Code.
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power
to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same
law.

The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of

legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of and
administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the
exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the
exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and
what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority,
and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.
The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure is broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect
contempt proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore,
the above-quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the
Omnibus Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties
provided by the Rules of Court.
Findings of guilt of indirect contempt
Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds.
First, he repeatedly failed to attend, despite notice of the
scheduled[12] canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass,
the hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao; and refused to submit
his explanation for such absences, which he had undertaken to
submit, in violation of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election
documents, which were lost while in his possession, and
consequently failed to deliver the same, in violation of paragraphs
(a), (c) and (d) Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.

Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of

the COMELEC through the media (interviews on national television
channels, and in newspapers and radios) by flaunting an armory of
long firearms and side arms in public, and posing for the front page
of a national broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in
violation of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is hereby DENIED. No costs.

NACU VS. CSC AND PEZA

G.R. No. 187752: November 23, 2010
IRENE K. NACU, substituted by BENJAMIN M. NACU, ERVIN K.
NACU, and NEJIE N. DE SAGUN, Petitioners, v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
and
PHILIPPINE
ECONOMIC
ZONE
AUTHORITY, Respondents.
Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
PEZA issued a memorandum prohibiting its employees from charging
and
collecting
overtime
fees
from
PEZA-registered
enterprises. Nacu however, still charged overtime fees. After
investigations, the Director General of PEZA filed a complaint
forDishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. The PEZA used the services of the NBI in
determining the similarity of her signature with the alleged items.
After the hearing, Nacu was found guilty. Upon appeal, the CSC affirmed
the findings of the PEZA Board of Discipline. The Court of Appeals
likewise upheld the decision of the CSC after appeal. After a failed
motion for reconsideration, Nacu appeals to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Nacu is guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is supported by
substantial evidence.
HELD: The petition has no merit.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Substantial Evidence

Instead of just discrediting the PNP Crime Labs findings, Nacu should
have channeled her efforts into providing her own proof that the
signatures appearing on the questioned SOS were forgeries. After all,
whoever allegesforgery has the burden of proving the same by clear and
convincing evidence. Nacu could not simply depend on the alleged
weakness of the complainants evidence without offering stronger
evidence to contradict the former.
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically
operational. It must be claimed; otherwise, the protection does not come
into play. Moreover, the right must be claimed at the appropriate time, or
else, it may be deemed waived.In the present case, it does not appear
that Nacu invoked her right against self-incrimination at the appropriate
time, that is, at the time she was asked to provide samples of her
signature. She is therefore deemed to have waived her right against selfincrimination.
All told, Nacu was rightfully found guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and penalized
with dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties.The general
rule is that where the findings of the administrative body are amply
supported by substantial evidence, such findingsare accorded not only
respect but also finality, and are bindingon this Court. It is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that
of the administrativeagency on the sufficiency of evidence.
Petition is DENIED.

EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR vs.

LUIS BUNDALIAN
G.R. No. 149335

July 1, 2003

EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR vs. LUIS BUNDALIAN

FACTS: An unverified letter-complaint was addressed by private respondent

LUIS BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate General accusing petitioner, then
OIC-Regional Director of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in
violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. Private respondent charged
among others that petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot in Los
Angeles, California and that petitioners in-laws who were living in California had
a poor credit standing due to a number of debts they could not have purchased
such an expensive property for petitioner and his wife. Private respondent also
accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works
projects.
The PCAGC conducted its own investigation of the complaint. Petitioner fully
participated in the proceedings. After the investigation, the PCAGC found that
petitioner purchased a house and lot in California, for US$195,000.00 evidenced
by a Grant Deed. The body concluded that the petitioner could not have been
able to afford to buy the property on his annual income of P168,648.00 as
appearing on his Service Record. The PCAGC concluded that as petitioners
acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it
has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it recommended petitioners dismissal from
service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019.
The Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the
recommendation of the PCAGC, issued Administrative Order No. 12,4 ordering
petitioners dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process in the investigation
before the PCAGC
HELD: NO. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is
the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met. In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to
notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not

be located. Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due
process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant.
Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in
the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his
counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved
for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. issued by the President and
eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in
every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural
deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He
cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the
investigation.
It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough
that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is
decided. This was afforded to the petitioner in the case at bar.
ESTELITO REMOLONA VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION[G.R. No. 137473, August 2, 2001]
PUNO, J:FACTS: Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery isa teacher
in Kiborosa Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, theDistrict Supervisor of Infanta
inquired about Nerys Civil Service eligibility whopurportedly got a rating of 81.25%. Mr. America also
disclosed that he receivedinformation that Nery was campaigning for a fee of 8,000 pesos per examinee
for apassing mark in the board examination for teachers.It was eventually revealed that Nery Remolonas
name did not appear in thepassing and failing examinees and that the exam no. 061285 as indicated in
her reportof rating belonged to a certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of 65%.Estelito Remolona in his
written statement of facts said that he met a certain Atty.Salupadin in a bus, who offered to help his wife
obtain eligibility for a fee of 3,000pesos. Mr. America however, informed Nery that there was no vacancy
when shepresented her rating report, so Estelito went to Lucena to complain that America askedfor
money in exchange for the appointment of his wife, and that from 1986-1988,America was able to receive
6 checks at 2,600 pesos each plus bonus of NeryRemolona. Remolona admitted that he was
responsible for the fake eligibility and thathis wife had no knowledge thereof.On recommendation of
Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civil Service, theCSC found the spouses guilty of dishonesty and
imposed a penalty of dismissal and allits accessory penalties. On Motion For Reconsideration, only Nery
was exonerated andreinstated.On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and
denied themotion for reconsideration and new trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of due process as the extra-judicialadmission allegedly signed by him
was in blank form and that he was not assisted bycounsel.
HELD: NO

. Right to Counsel is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation when
questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after aperson has been taken in custody. The right
to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. The exclusionary rule under Paragraph 2,
Section 12 applies only toadmissions made in a criminal investigation but not those made in
an administrativeinvestigation.

CARBONNEL VS CSC
MARCH 30, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT

Carbonnel vs Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 187689, September 07, 2010
Facts: On May 21, 1999, petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure
a copy of the result of the Computer Assisted Test (CATS) Career
Service Professional Examination given on March 14, 1999, because
she lost the original copy of her Career Service Professional
Certificate of Rating (hereafter referred to as certificate of rating).
Petitioner was directed to accomplish a verification slip. The
Examination Placement and Service Division noticed that
petitioners personal and physical appearance was entirely different
from the picture of the examinee attached to the application form
and the picture seat plan. It was also discovered that the signature
affixed on the application form was different from that appearing on
the verification slip. Because of these discrepancies, the Legal
Affairs Division of the CSCRO IV conducted an investigation.
In the course of the investigation, petitioner voluntarily made a
statement before Atty. Rosalinda S.M. Gepigon, admitting that,
sometime in March 1999, she accepted the proposal of a certain
Bettina J. Navarro (Navarro) for the latter to obtain for petitioner a
Career Service Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an
application form and paying the amount of P10,000.00. Petitioner
thus accomplished an application form to take the CATS Career
Service Professional Examination and gave Navarro P5,000.00 as
down payment. Upon receipt of the original copy of the certificate of
rating from Navarro, petitioner gave the latter the remaining

P5,000.00. Petitioner, however, misplaced the certificate of rating.

This prompted her to secure another copy from the CSCRO IV.
Hence, the formal charge against petitioner.
Denying her admissions in her voluntary statement before the
CSCRO IV, petitioner, in her Answer, traversed the charges against
her. She explained that after filling up the application form for the
civil service examination, she asked Navarro to submit the same to
the CSC. She, however, admitted that she failed to take the
examination as she had to attend to her ailing mother. Thus, when
she received a certificate of eligibility despite her failure to take the
test, she was anxious to know the mystery behind it. She claimed
that she went to the CSCRO IV not to get a copy of the certificate of
rating but to check the veracity of the certificate. More importantly,
she questioned the use of her voluntary statement as the basis of
the formal charge against her inasmuch as the same was made
without the assistance of counsel.
After the formal investigation, the CSCRO IV rendered its March 25,
2002 Decision No. 020079 finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty,
grave misconduct, and falsification of official documents. The
penalty of dismissal from the service, with all its accessory
penalties, was imposed on her. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by CSCRO IV on November 14, 2003.
Petitioner appealed, but the CSC dismissed the same for having
been filed almost three years from receipt of the CSCRO IV decision.
The CSC did not give credence to petitioners explanation that she
failed to timely appeal the case because of the death of her counsel.
The CSC opined that notwithstanding the death of one lawyer, the
other members of the law firm, petitioners counsel of record, could

have timely appealed the decision. Petitioners motion for

reconsideration was denied in Resolution No. 072049 dated
November 5, 2007.
Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. On November
24, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the
decisions and resolutions of the CSCRO IV and the CSC. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on April 29, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
Issue: Serious error of fact and law amounting to grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the Court of Appeals in its assailed
decision dated November 24, 2008 because petitioners finding of
guilt was grounded entirely on her unsworn statement that she
admitted the offenses charged and without the assistance of a
counsel.
Ruling: The petition is without merit.
Petitioner faults the CSCs finding because it was based solely on her
uncounselled admission taken during the investigation by the
CSCRO IV. She claims that her right to due process was violated
because she was not afforded the right to counsel when her
statement was taken.
It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave credence to
petitioners uncounselled statements and, partly on the basis
thereof, uniformly found petitioner liable for the charge of
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official document.
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during
custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph
(2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made

in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an

administrative investigation.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at
times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under
existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
petitioners capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such
body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The right
to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether
there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures
against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.
As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation
may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. We have carefully
scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no compelling
reason to deviate from the findings of the CSC and the CA. The
written admission of petitioner is replete with details that could have
been known only to her. Besides, petitioners written statement was
not the only basis of her dismissal from the service. Records show
that the CSCRO IVs conclusion was reached after consideration of
all the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the
parties during the formal investigation.

Odchigue-Bondoc vs Tan Tiong Bio, GR 186652, October 6, 2010

Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

(Admin Law, DOJ Secretary, Prosecutor, Quasi-judicial power)

Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary, herein
respondent. Petitioner denies the allegations.

The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed the
petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error.
The CA set aside the DOJ Secretarys resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
Resolution dismissing respondents petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on
which the dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based).
Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution applies only to decisions of courts of justice, and it does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive
departments such as the DOJ.
Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.
Issue:
1.

Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power.

2.

Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power.

Held:
1.

No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making powers. A preliminary investigation is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine the guilt of innocence
of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the determination whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass
judgment on the accused.

2.

No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review
cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Sec 14, Art. VIII of
the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.

Roquero vs UP Chancellor, GR 181851, March 9, 2010FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45seeking to set aside the
Decision
dated 22 March 2007, and theResolution2 dated 1 February 2008, of the Court
of the Appeals inCA-G.R. SP No. 87776 entitled, "Capt. Wilfredo G. Roquero v.
TheChancellor of the University of the Philippine-Manila (UP Manila), etal.," a
petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of CivilProcedure with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary RestrainingOrder (TRO), which sought to
reverse and set aside the Ordersdated 8 June 2004 and 9 November 2004 of the
AdministrativeDisciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of UP-Manila, chaired by Atty. Zaldy
B.Docena with Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara as members
ISSUE:
Who can invoke the right to speedy
disposition ofcases? In what cases can this
right be invoked? What factorsare
considered and balanced in determining that
the right tospeed trial was violated? Was

the right to speedy dispositionof case

violated?
RULING:
The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases"is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends toall parties in all cases, including
civil and administrative cases, andin all proceedings, including judicial and quasijudicial hearings.Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may
demandexpeditious action by all officials who are tasked with theadministration of
justiceThe right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to aspeedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings areattended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or whenunjustified postponements of the trial
are asked for and secured; oreven without cause or justifiable motive, a long
period of time isallowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equallyapplicable is the balancing test used to determine whether adefendant
has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedydisposition of a case for
that matter, in which the conduct of boththe prosecution and the defendant is
weighed, and such factors asthe length of the delay, the reasons for such delay,
the assertion orfailure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudicecaused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is arelative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept

LAGUNA CATV NETWORK, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALEX E. MARAAN, Regional Director, Region IV, Dept. of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), ENRICO SAGMIT, Acting Deputy Sheriff, DOLE Region IV,
PEDRO IGNACIO, DIOMEDES CASTRO, FE ESPERANZA CANDILLA, RUBEN
LAMINA, JR., JOEL PERSIUNCULA, ALVINO PRUDENTE, JOEL RAYMUNDO, REGIE
ROCERO, LINDA RODRIGUEZ, JOHN SELUDO, ALBERTO REYES, and ANACLETA
VALOIS, respondents.
G.R. No. 139492

November 19, 2002

FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the DOLE Region IV separate complaints for underpayment of

wages and non-payment of other employee benefits against their employer, Laguna CATV.
Private respondents filed their separate complaints pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor

Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7730.

DOLE Region IV conducted an inspection within the premises of Laguna CATV and found

that the latter violated the laws on payment of wages and other benefits.
Thereupon, DOLE Region IV requested Laguna CATV to correct its violations but the latter
refused, prompting the Regional Director to set the case for summary investigation.

o
o
o

Thereafter, he issued an Order directing Laguna CATV to pay the concerned employees the
sum of P261,009.19 representing their unpaid claims.
Forthwith, Laguna CATV filed a motion for reconsideration.
In view of Laguna CATVs failure to comply with the Order directing it to pay the unpaid
claims of its employees, DOLE Regional Director Maraan issued a writ of execution ordering the
Sheriff to collect in cash from Laguna CATV the amount specified in the writ or, in lieu thereof, to

attach its goods and chattels or those of its owner, Dr. Bernardino Bailon.
Laguna CATV and Dr. Bailon filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, notice of levy and

sale on execution and garnishment of bank deposits.

Regional Director Maraan issued an Order denying the motion to quash the writ of
execution, stating that Laguna CATV failed to perfect its appeal because it did not comply with the
mandatory requirement of posting a bond equivalent to the monetary award of P261,009.19; and

that the writ of execution should be considered as an overt denial of Laguna CATVs motion for
reconsideration.
Instead of appealing to the Secretary of Labor, Laguna CATV filed with the CA a motion for

extension of time to file a petition for review.

Laguna CATV was of the view that an appeal to the Secretary of Labor would be an exercise
in futility considering that the said appeal will be filed with the Regional Office and it will surely be

o
o
o

disapproved.
The CA denied Laguna CATVs motion for extension and dismissing the case.
The Appellate Court found, among others, that it failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Laguna CATV filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals in its

Resolution dated July 22, 1999.

Hence, it filed a petition for review on certiorari to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Laguna CATV failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

RULING:
The SC ruled that Laguna CATV failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

As provided under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, an order issued by the duly

authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the latter.

Thus, petitioner should have first appealed to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing with the

Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.
Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the
available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been
given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum.

The SC, in a long line of cases, has consistently held that if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every

opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought.
The party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before

seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the
matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.
The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption that the administrative agency,

if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter will decide the same correctly.
Therefore, petitioner should have completed the administrative process by appealing the

questioned Orders to the Secretary of Labor.

___________