Professional Documents
Culture Documents
L-44896
warrant.
The unfortunate fact remains that respondent
judge chose to rely on the suspicion of
respondents COSAC officers "that the other
remaining
crates
unopened
contain
contraband items"
The provisions of Republic Act 75 declares as
null and void writs or processes sued out or
prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of
an ambassador or public minister is arrested
or imprisoned or his goods or chattels are
seized or attached and makes it a penal
offense for "every person by whom the same
is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or
as attorney, and every officer concerned in
executing it" to obtain or enforce such writ or
process.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent
judge acted without jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the
quashal of the search warrant issued by him
in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of
petitioner Verstuyft. The writs of certiorari and
prohibition from the petitioners were granted.
G.R. No. 85750 September 28, 1990
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION
COMMISSION vs. HON. PURA CALLEJA IN
HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
Facts:
As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the
plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from
South Vietnam's communist rule confronted
the international community.
In response to this crisis, on 23 February
1981, an Agreement was forged between the
Philippine Government and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an
operating center for processing Indo-Chinese
refugees for eventual resettlement to other
countries was to be established in Bataan .
ICMC was one of those accredited by the
Philippine Government to operate the refugee
processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was
incorporated in New York, USA, at the request
of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency
involved in international humanitarian and
voluntary work. It is duly registered with the
United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status,
Category II. As an international organization
rendering
voluntary
and
humanitarian
services in the Philippines, its activities are
parallel to those of the International
Committee for Migration (ICM) and the
International Committee of the Red Cross
On 14 July 1986, Trade Unions of the
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed
with the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment a Petition for Certification
Election among the rank and file members
employed by ICMC The latter opposed the
petition on the ground that it is an
international organization registered with the
United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic
immunity.
Held:
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction
to ICMC is clearly necessitated by their
international
character
and
respective
purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger
of partiality and interference by the host
country in their internal workings. The
exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of
Labor in these instances would defeat the
very purpose of immunity, which is to shield
the affairs of international organizations, in
accordance with international practice, from
political pressure or control by the host
country to the prejudice of member States of
the organization, and to ensure the
unhampered performance of their functions
ICMC employees are not without recourse
whenever there are disputes to be settled.
Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of
the United Nations 17 provides that "each
specialized agency shall make provision for
appropriate modes of settlement of: (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other
disputes of private character to which the
specialized agency is a party." Moreover,
pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of
Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine
Government, whenever there is any abuse of
privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to
withdraw the privileges and immunities
accorded.
Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to
be standard provisions in the constitutions of
international Organizations. "The immunity
covers the organization concerned, its
property and its assets. It is equally applicable
Held:
In resolving the first issue, it is necessary to refer
to the VFA itself. However, not much help can be
had
therefrom,
unfortunately,
since
the
terminology employed is itself the source of the
problem. The VFA permits United States personnel
to engage on an impermanent basis in activities,
the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The
sole encumbrance placed on its definition is
couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must abstain from any activity
inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and
in particular, from any political activity.
The Supreme Court, after studied reflection of
Articles 31 and 32 of Section 3 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded that
the ambiguity sorrounding the meaning of the word
activities arose from accident. In our view, it was
deliberately made that way to give both parties a
certain leeway in negotiation. Under these
auspices, the VFA if given legitimacy to the current
Balikatan exercise. It is only logical to assume that
Balikatan 02-1 a mutual anti-terrorism advising,
assisting and training exercise, falls under the
umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the
context of the agreement. In connection with the
second issue, both the history and intent of the
MDT and the VFA support conclusion that combatrelated activities, as opposed to combat itself are
indeed authorized.
More so, the Terms of Reference are explicit
enough. Paragraph 8 of Section I stipulates that US
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals
with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops or facilities should apply in the instant case.
To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however,
the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find
applicability with regard to the issue and for the
sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between
transient and permanent. We find nothing in
section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops
or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently
in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States
treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty.
Facts : Shigenori Kuroda, a former LieutenantGeneral of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Imperial Forces of the
Philippines was charged before a Military
Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. He had unlawfully
disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as a
commander to control the operations of members
of
his
command.
Petitioner was duly prosecuted for acts committed
in violation of the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention through the issuance and
enforcement
of
Executive
Order
No.
68.
Executive Order No. 68 provided the organization
of such military commissions, established National
War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and
regulations governing the trial of accused war
criminals.
Attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port of the
United States of America participated in the
prosecution of the case in behalf of the United
States
of
America.
Issue : Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is
legal and constitutional.
Held : This court holds that the Executive Order
No. 68 is legal and constitutional as provided in
Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution, that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of
the
law
of
the
nation.
The participation of the two American attorneys
although under our law, they are not qualified to
practice law is valid and constitutional. Military
Commission is a special military tribunal governed
by special law not by Rules of the Court, which
govern ordinary civil courts. There is nothing in
rule
in
general
is
as
follows:
2.
Held:
1.
2.
have
recourse
authorities.
to
proper
military
2.
Held:
1.
2.
2.
3.
3.
Held:
1.
claimed.
2.
3.
HELD
YES. The Court applied the Act of State Doctrine
and upheld the legality of the expropriation
because it was an official act of another country,
2.
3.
Held:
1.
2.
Facts
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government
represented by its Secretary of the Department of
Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the
Philippine Government to submit to its respective
competent authorities the WTO (World Trade
Organization) Agreements to seek approval for
such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97
was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the
WTO
Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of
the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II,
providing for the development of a self reliant and
independent national economy, and Sections 10
and 12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first
policy.
Facts:
The case is a second petition for habeas corpus
filed by petitioner Boris Mejoff, the first having
been denied in a decision of this Court of July 30,
1949.
Herein petitioner is an alien of Russian decent who
was brought from Shanghai by the Japanese forces.
Upon liberation, he was arrested as Japanese spy
by U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps and was
handed to the Commonwealth Government for
Issue
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is
not unconstitutional. While the constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests
only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional
policy of a self-reliant and independent national
economy does not necessarily rule out the entry
of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither economic seclusion nor
mendicancy in the international community.
Held:
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and
commanded the respondents to release the former
from custody subject to terms and conditions. The
petitioners unduly prolonged detention would be
unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the
the
the
consideration
Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights
letter
of
instruction
of
is
growing
based
number
on
of
the
road
Facts:
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the
compliance
thereof.
delegation
of
police
power.
unconstitutional
held:
19,
suc
permit
was
denied.
Issues :
immunity.
In
GR
No.
76607,
the
private
Ordinance
no.7295
of
the
city
of
manila.
assembly was
danger.
thereafter
assembly.
referred
the
case
to
board
of
to
petitioners.
file
his
complaint
against
the
individual
agents
of
the
Air
Force
Office
of
Special
FACTS: These
cases
have
been
consolidated
other
contracting
party
and
divested
of
its
by
the
generally
international
law
accepted
under
the
principles
of
doctrine
of
of
Manila.
The
purpose
was
to
respondent
trial
court
has
Republic
of
the
Philippines
has
Papal
Facts:
Yamashita was the Commanding General of the
Japanese army in the Philippines during World War
2. He was charged before the American military
commission for war crimes.
He filed a petition for habeas corpus and
prohibition against Gen. Styer to reinstate his
status as prisoner of war from being accused as a
war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal.
Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether
HELD: The
Nuncio,
has
had
diplomatic
1957.
Held:
YES. The military commission was lawfully created
in conformity with an act of Congress sanctioning
the creation of such tribunals.
The laws of war imposes upon a commander the
duty to take any appropriate measures within his
powers to control the troops under his command to
prevent acts which constitute violation of the laws
of war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately
charged with personal responsibility arising from
his failure to take such measure. In this regard the
SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV
of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention No.
X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among
others.
Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner
merely sought for restoration to his former status
as prisoner of war and not a discharge from
confinement. This is a matter of military measure
and not within the jurisdiction of the courts.
The petition for prohibition against the respondent
will also not life since the military commission is
not made a party respondent in the case. As such,
no order may be issued requiring it to refrain from
trying the petitioner.
LIFE
Facts:
This is a petition instituted in the CFI under the
provisions of Philippines Property Act of the US
against the Sun Life Assurance company of Canada
to compel the latter to comply with the demand of
the former to pay him the money which of the
proceeds of an endowment policy payable to
Aihara, Japanese national. The defenses of Sun Life
Assurance are that immunities in Trading with the
Enemy Act of US is doubtful application in the
Philippines and defendant is a trustee of the
fund and under legal obligation to see to it that it is
HELD
YES. Under international law, the Japanese Military
authorities had power to order the liquidation of
China Banking Corp. and to appoint and authorize
Bank of Taiwan as liquidator to accept the payment
in question, because such liquidation is not
confiscation of the properties of China Banking
Corp., but a mere sequestration of its assets which
required its liquidation.
The sequestration or liquidation of enemy banks in
occupied territories is authorized expressly, not
only by the US Army and Naval Manual of Military
Government and Civil Affairs, but also similar
manuals of other countries, without violating Art.
46 or other articles of the Hague Regulations. They
do not amount to an outright confiscation of
private property.
The purpose of such sequestration, as expounded
in the Annual Report of the Office of the Alien
Custodian, is that enemy-owned property can be
used to further the interest of the enemy and to
impede their war efforts. All enemy- controlled
assets can be used to finance propaganda,
espionage, and sabotage in these countries or in
countries friendly to their cause.
It is presumed that Japan, in sequestering and
liquidating China Banking Corp., must have acted
in accordance, either with her own Manual of the
Army and Navy and Civil Affairs OR with her
Trading with the Enemy Act, and even if not, it
being permitted to the Allied Nations, specially the
US and England, to sequestrate, impound, and
block enemy properties found within their own
domain or in enemy territories occupied during the
war by their armed forces, and it not being
contrary to Hague Regulations or international law,
Japan had also the right to do the same in the
Philippines by virtue of the international law
principle that "what is permitted to one belligerent
is also allowed to the other."
Taking these into consideration, it appears that
Japan did not intend to confiscate or appropriate
the assets of said banks or the debts due them
from their debtors. The fact that the Japanese
Military authorities failed to pay the enemy banks
the balance of the money collected by the Bank of
Taiwan from the debtors of the said banks, did not
and could not change the sequestration by them of
the bank's assets during the war, into an outright
confiscation thereof. It was physically impossible
for the Japanese Military authorities to do so
because they were forcibly driven out of the
Philippines, following the readjustment of rights of
private property on land seized by the enemy
provided by the Treaty of Versailles and other
peace treaties entered into at the close of WWI.
The
general
principles
underlying
such
arrangements are that the owners of properties
seized are entitled to receive compensation for the
CASE
(ICJ
JUDGMENT,
FACTS
The General Aniline and Film Company (GAF) is a
corporation incorporated in the United States.
Under the Trading with the Enemy Act the
government of the United States took almost all of
the shares of said company reasoning that such
shares were controlled by I.G. Farben, a German
and therefore enemy company. I.G. Farben
controlled the shares of GAF through a Swiss
company called I.G. Chemie of Basle. However by
1940, I.G. Chemie had changed its name to
Interhandel and was found by Swiss authorities to
no longer be controlled by any German or other
enemy company. Switzerland therefore seeks the
restoration of the shares of GAF that is owned by
Interhandel. Such restoration is however being
opposed by the United States who still maintains
its stance that Interhandle is being controlled by
I.G. Farben. Switzerland would like to submit the
dispute to the International Court of Justice
however the United States believes that the ICJ has
no jurisdiction over the matter. Switzerland bases
its claim that the ICJ has jurisdiction on Art. 36, Par.
2 of the statute of the Court.
ISSUE
Whether the ICJ has jurisdiction to decide the case
between Switzerland and the United States of
America
HELD
NO. The Swiss Application is inadmissible. The
United States presented four objections to
Switzerlands Application. One of which was
sustained therefore making the Swiss Application
inadmissible. The objection sustained held that the
Swiss Application could not be entertained because
not all local remedies have been exhausted by
Interhandel. The local remedy referred to is a case
still pending in the US courts.
Doctrine of the case (according to the book):
Reciprocity in the case of Declarations accepting
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court enables a Party
to invoke a reservation to that acceptance which it
has not expressed in its own Declaration but which
the other Party has expressed in its Declaration.
UNDERHILL v HERNANDEZ
168 U.S. 250 (1897)
FACTS
In an 1892 revolution, General Hernandez deposed
the existing Venezuelan government and took
control of Ciudad Bolivar, where Pl Underhill, an
American citizen, lived and ran a waterworks
system for the city. Underhill applied to Hernandez,
requesting a passport to leave the city. Hernandez
initially refused, but ultimately granted it. When
Underhill finally got back to the US, he brought an
action to recover damages caused by the refusal to
grant the passport, by his detention in Venezuela,
for alleged confinement to his own house, and for
certain alleged assaults and affronts by the soldiers
of Hernandez's army.
ISSUE
Whether the action instituted by Underhill will
prosper
HELD
NO. The Court determined that Hernandez had
acted in his official capacity as a military
commander so his actions were those of the
Venezuelan government.
The Court therefore refused to hear the claim
against Hernandez based on the Act of State
Doctrine. The Court reasoned, "Every sovereign
state is bound to respect the independence of
FACTS:
Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen,
worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange
(NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters in Quezon City. Shes married to
Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman
employed by the US Navy & stationed in San
Francisco.
Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed
at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity
exchange manager.
On Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from
the retail store Bradford managed, where she had
purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she
was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy,
a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that
she needed to search her bags upon Bradfords
instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to
protest the search but she was told that it was to
be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day.
Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her
person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other
curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus
she was allowed to leave afterwards.
HELD:
1. Yes. Intervention of a third party is
discretionary upon the Court. US did not
obtain leave of court (something like
asking for Courts permission) to intervene
in the present case. Technically, it should
not be allowed to intervene but since RTC
entertained its motion to dismiss, it is
deemed to have allowed US to intervene.
By voluntarily appearing, US must be
deemed to have subjected itself to RTCs
jurisdiction.
2.
4.
2.
3.
HELD:
1.
3.
Appellant SolGen asserted that appelleepetitioner failed to show that he lost his
citizenship under the laws of Russia and
that Russia granted to Filipinos the same
right to be naturalized citizens. However,
the SC still found that lower court did not
err in finding appellee-petitioner as a
stateless refugee. Appellee-petitioners
testimony that he is not a Russian citizen
and that he has no citizenship is
uncontroverted. There is also the wellknown
ruthlessness
of
modern
dictatorships giving rise to a great number
of stateless refugees or displaced persons,
without country or flag. The tyrannical
intolerance of dictatorships to opposition
translates
into
beastly
oppression,
concentration camps and bloody purges,
such that it is only natural that those who
flee to other countries to escape such a
situation, such as appellee- petitioner,
M.
H.
Wylie
and
Capt.
FACTS:
Petitioner
M.
H.
Wylie
was
the
assistant
petitioner
Capt.
respondent
Aurora
I.
Rarang
was an
H.
Wylie,
in
his
capacity
ISSUE:
Whether or not the officials of the United States
as
assistant
Station
Base
station.
announcements,
The
POD
featured
necessary
important
precautions,
and
Provost
implies
Marshal.
Marshal."
that
The
Auring
same
article
explicitly
was
consuming
and
injurious,
and
libel
commandingofficer of
virtue
and
tending
and
to
malicious
impeach
her
defamation
honesty,
the
naval
base
is
far
respondent
court
should
be
withheld
in
this
reversed.
relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Facts:
"Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal
the
in
character,
whether
intentional
or
voluntary or negligent."
Philippines,
representatives,
through
namely,
their
Mr.
respective
Yoshihisa
Ara,
have
reached
an
understanding
concerning
respondent
China
Road
&
Bridge
and
29,
and
December
5,
2002.
Government.
A total of twenty-three (23) foreign and local
contractors
responded
by
prequalification
principle
emphasize,
Contract
recognizes
submitting
their
(ABC)
to
the
accomplished
was
in
invitation
the
amount
of
P738,710,563.67.
in
international
recognizes
generally
law
the
of
pacta
enforceability
accepted
principles
sunt
of
of
pointed
clarification
dated
April
21,
2004.
out
by
the
public
respondents
that
respondent
China Road
& Bridge
Corporation
Agreement.
reads:
violates RA 9184.
Held:
award.
neither
executive
an
international
nor
an
express
protocols.
renunciation
Petitioner
after
having
held
to
renounced
Portuguese
citizenship
naturalization,
mean
upon
was
resumed
or
private
respondent
China
Road
&
Bridge
Wherefore,
Corporation.
premises
considered,
petitioner's
83882n (1989)
Facts:
Facts:
dealings
overseas.
Herein
and
transactions
respondent
local
has
and
29,
2007.
Petitioner
won
but
was
detained
Issue:
Whether the Bureau of Immigration & Deportation
Held:
Held:
The
court
quo,
In
Board
of
Immigration
of
R.A.
No.
9225
in
2003
which
5. Civil
and
Political
who
retain
Liabilities. - Those
Rights
or
and
re-acquire
liabilities
and
responsibilities
under
xxxxxx
(2) Those
seeking
elective
public
office
in
any
public
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may recover his
Philippine citizenship.
Held: YES. Assuming that Julian, by reason of
having been born in the Philippines, had at least a
latent right to Philippine citizenship; and assuming
that during his minority, his father chose the
nationality of his country in applying for a
certificate of residence, in 1903, and that Julian,
upon attaining the age of majority, chose the
nationality of his father; the question that presents
itself now for our consideration is whether or not
the petition may recover the Philippine citizenship
under Act No. 2927.
In the case of United States v. Wong Kim
Ark (169 U. S., 649), the Court stated that the 14 th
Amendment affirmed the ancient and fundamental
rule of citizenship by birth within the territory. The
Amendment includes the children born within the
territory of the United States, of all other persons,
of whatever race or color, domiciled within the
United States.
Section 2 of the Act of Congress of August
29, 1916 provides:
SEC. 2. That all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain in accordance with
the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and except such
others as have since become citizens of
some other country: Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for,
is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who
do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United
States, or who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United
States if residing therein.
By virtue of the authority granted by said
Act, the Philippine Legislature enacted on March
26, 1920, Act No. 2927 known as Naturalization
Law. Section 1 of this Act provides:
SEC. 1. Who may become Philippine
citizens. Philippine citizenship may be
acquired by: (a) Natives of the Philippines
who are not citizens thereof under the
Jones Law; (b) natives of the other Insular
possessions of the United States; (c)
citizens of the United States, or foreigners
who under the laws of the United States
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of the Hongkong
Supreme Court, being a foreign judgment, may be
enforced in the Philippines.
Held: No. It is well settled, upon the ground of
comity and the law of nations, that in the absence
of treaty or statute, a judgment rendered by a
. . . natives of any
country, province or
dependency situate on
the Continent of Asia
west of one hundred
and
tenth
(110th)
meridian of longitude
east from Greenwich
and east of the fiftieth
(50th)
meridian
of
longitude east from
Greenwich and south of
the
fiftieth
(50th)
parallel of the latitude
north, . . .
Said section 3 however, establishes an exception in
favor of the persons who are natives of
That
portion
of
said
territory (Continent of Asia)
situate between the fiftieth
(50th) and the sixty-fourth
(64th)
meridians
of
longitude
east
from
Greenwich and the twentyfourth (24th) and the thirtyeight (38th) parallels of
latitude north, . . .
From the above-quoted provisions of the
Acts of Congress of 1917, it clearly appears that
natives of the Continent of Asia within specified
limits are excluded from the admission into the
United States, with the exception of natives in the
portion of the said continent "situate between the
fiftieth (5th) and the sixty-fourth (64th) meridians
of longitude east from Greenwich and the twentyfourth (24th) and the thirty-eight (38th) parallels of
latitude north."
Petitioner contends he is a native of Kohek,
Province of Baluchistan, India, because his parents
were natives of the place; that the Province of
Baluchistan is found between the 50th and 64th
meridians of longitude east from Greenwich and
the 24th and 38th parallels of latitude north; that,
therefore the appellant is a native of a territory
whose residents are not excluded from admission
into the United States under the provisions of the
saving clause of section 3 of the Act of Congress of
1917, above quoted, and that, consequently, the
appellant is qualified to become a citizen of the
United States under said Act of Congress and also
of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of the
Naturalization Law of the Philippine Legislature in
relation to said Act of Congress.
The judge arrived at a conclusion that the
petitioner was not qualified to become a
naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands,
The lower court judgment is affirmed.
ISSUE: Is the petitioner a foreigner who, under
the laws of the United States, may become a
citizen of that country residing therein?
THE
FACTS:
Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the trial court
erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which
the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000
as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting
the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two
months and twenty-one days and fixing the
damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead
of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant
urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that
the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to
the negligence of the chauffeur, who is an alleged
agent or employee of the Government; (b) in
holding that the Government of the Philippine
Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true
that the collision was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against
the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
Consequently, the Government issued an act
allowing the plaintiff to commence a lawsuit
against it.
ISSUE:
1) WON the Government conceded its liability
to the plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to
commence against it.
government
HELD:
1) NO.
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
2) NO.
We will now examine the substantive law touching
the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its
officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of
article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: The state is
liable in this sense when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage should have been
caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable. The responsibility of the state is limited
to that which it contracts through a special agent,
duly empowered by a definite order or commission
to perform some act or charged with some definite
purpose which gives rise to the claim.
The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.
is
HELD: YES.
A State may be said to have descended the the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when
it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to
the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order, they are not
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.