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G.R. No.

L-44896

July 31, 1936

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER vs.


MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First
Instance of Manila
Facts: This petition is for a writ of prohibition
overruled with a view to preventing the Court
of First Instance of Manila from taking
cognizance of the criminal action filed against
him. The petitioner was an accredited
honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila. He was
charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila of falsification of a private document.
He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on
the ground that both under the Constitution of
the United States and the Constitution of the
Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction
to try him. His objection was overruled hence
this present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First
Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the
petitioner.
Held: The counsel for the petitioner contend
that the CIF of Manila has no jurisdiction
according to Aticle III Sec. 2 of the United
States Constitution which stipulated that the
Supreme Court of the United States has
original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls,
and such jurisdiction which excludes the
courts of the Philippines and that that such
jurisdiction is conferred exclusively upon the
Supreme Court of the Philippines. Although
section 17 of Act No. 136 vests in the
Supreme Court the original jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto, such jurisdictiona was also
conferred on the Courts of First Instance
by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No.
190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It
results that the original jurisdiction possessed
and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands was not exclusive of, but
concurrent with, that of the Courts of First
Instance. Hence, the Court of Instance has
jurisdiction over the petitioner.

G.R. No. 125865

January 28, 2000

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) vs. PEOPLE


OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: Petitioner is an economist working with
the Asian Development Bank (ADB). He was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts
of grave oral defamation for uttering
defamatory words against fellow ADB worker
Joyce Cabal. Petitioner was arrested by virtue
of a warrant issued by the MeTC. On April 13,
1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an
advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs
that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal
processes under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of
the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) dismissed
the two criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution. On a petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed by the People, the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled
and set aside the order of the Metropolitan
Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases. After
the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner was denied, petitioner elevated the
case to this Court via a petition for review
arguing that he is covered by immunity under
the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal
cases were filed in court.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is
covered by immunity.
Held: The DFA's determination that a certain
person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in
courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice
and in motu propio dismissing the two
criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution, the latter's right to due process
was violated. Furthermore, the immunity
mentioned under Section 45 of the Agreement
is not absolute, but subject to the exception
that the act was done in "official capacity." It
should have been determined first if the case
falls within the ambit of Section 45(a) thus,
the prosecutor should have been given the
chance to rebut the DFA Protocol. Finally,
slandering a person could not possibly be
covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of

official duty. Hence, the petitioner is covered


by immunity.

G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972


THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and
DR. LEONCE VERSTUYFT vs. HON.
BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge
of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of
Rizal
Facts: The present petition is an original
action for certiorari and prohibition to set
aside respondent judge's refusal to quash a
search warrant issued by him at the instance
of respondents Constabulary Offshore Action
Center (COSAC) officers for the search and
seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft of
the WHO (World Health Organization)
notwithstanding
his
being
entitled
to
diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by
the Executive branch of the government and
to prohibit respondent judge from further
proceedings
in
the
matter.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P.
Romulo pleaded to Hon. Aquino that Dr.
Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search
in respect for his personal baggage as
accorded to members of diplomatic missions
pursuant to the Host Agreement and further
requested for the suspension of the search
warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly
joined the petitioner for the quashal of the
search
warrant
but
respondent
judge
nevertheless summarily denied the quash
hence,
the
petition
at
bar.
Issue: Whether or not personal effect of WHO
Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from
search and seizure under the diplomatic
immunity.
Held: The executive branch of the Phils has
expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled
to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the
provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA
formally advised respondent judge of the
Philippine Government's official position. The
Solicitor General, as principal law officer of
the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed
said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity
and asked for the quashal of the search

warrant.
The unfortunate fact remains that respondent
judge chose to rely on the suspicion of
respondents COSAC officers "that the other
remaining
crates
unopened
contain
contraband items"
The provisions of Republic Act 75 declares as
null and void writs or processes sued out or
prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of
an ambassador or public minister is arrested
or imprisoned or his goods or chattels are
seized or attached and makes it a penal
offense for "every person by whom the same
is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or
as attorney, and every officer concerned in
executing it" to obtain or enforce such writ or
process.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent
judge acted without jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the
quashal of the search warrant issued by him
in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of
petitioner Verstuyft. The writs of certiorari and
prohibition from the petitioners were granted.
G.R. No. 85750 September 28, 1990
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION
COMMISSION vs. HON. PURA CALLEJA IN
HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
Facts:
As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the
plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from
South Vietnam's communist rule confronted
the international community.
In response to this crisis, on 23 February
1981, an Agreement was forged between the
Philippine Government and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an
operating center for processing Indo-Chinese
refugees for eventual resettlement to other
countries was to be established in Bataan .
ICMC was one of those accredited by the
Philippine Government to operate the refugee
processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was
incorporated in New York, USA, at the request
of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency
involved in international humanitarian and
voluntary work. It is duly registered with the
United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status,
Category II. As an international organization

rendering
voluntary
and
humanitarian
services in the Philippines, its activities are
parallel to those of the International
Committee for Migration (ICM) and the
International Committee of the Red Cross
On 14 July 1986, Trade Unions of the
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed
with the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment a Petition for Certification
Election among the rank and file members
employed by ICMC The latter opposed the
petition on the ground that it is an
international organization registered with the
United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic
immunity.

to proceedings in personam and proceedings


in rem.
ICMC did not invoke its immunity and,
therefore, may be deemed to have waived it,
assuming that during that period (1983-1985)
it was tacitly recognized as enjoying such
immunity.
Petition is GRANTED, the Order of the Bureau
of Labor Relations for certification election is
SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining
Order earlier issued is made

Issue: Whether or not the grant of diplomatic


privileges and immunites to ICMC extends to
immunity from the application of Philippine
labor laws.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., et al. vs Office


of the Executive Secretary represented by
Hon. Alberto Romulo, and The Department Of
Foreign Affairs, Represented By Hon. Blas
Ople

Held:
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction
to ICMC is clearly necessitated by their
international
character
and
respective
purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger
of partiality and interference by the host
country in their internal workings. The
exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of
Labor in these instances would defeat the
very purpose of immunity, which is to shield
the affairs of international organizations, in
accordance with international practice, from
political pressure or control by the host
country to the prejudice of member States of
the organization, and to ensure the
unhampered performance of their functions
ICMC employees are not without recourse
whenever there are disputes to be settled.
Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of
the United Nations 17 provides that "each
specialized agency shall make provision for
appropriate modes of settlement of: (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other
disputes of private character to which the
specialized agency is a party." Moreover,
pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of
Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine
Government, whenever there is any abuse of
privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to
withdraw the privileges and immunities
accorded.
Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to
be standard provisions in the constitutions of
international Organizations. "The immunity
covers the organization concerned, its
property and its assets. It is equally applicable

G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005

Facts : This is a petition for mandamus to compel


the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit (even
without the signature of the President) the signed
copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to the Senate of the
Philippines for its concurrence or ratification - in
accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitioners contend that that ratification of a treaty,
under both domestic law and international law, is a
function of the Senate. That under the treaty law
and customary international law, Philippines has a
ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute.
Respondents on the other hand, questioned the
legal standing of herein petitioners and argued that
executive department has no duty to transmit the
Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
Issues :

Whether or not petitioners have the legal


standing to file the instant suit.

Whether or not the Executive Secretary


and the Department of Foreign Affairs have
the ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute
signed by the Philippine Member to the
United Nations even without the signature
of the President.

Held: Only Senator Pimentel has a legal standing


to the extent of his power as member of Congress.
Other petitioners have not shown that they have
sustained a direct injury from the non-transmittal
and that they can seek redress in our domestic
courts.

Petitioners interpretation of the Constitution is


incorrect. The power to ratify treaties does not
belong to the Senate.
Under E.O. 459, the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) prepares the ratification papers and forward
the signed copy to the President for ratification.
After the President has ratified it, DFA shall submit
the same to the Senate for concurrence.
The President has the sole authority to negotiate
and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a
limitation to his power by requiring the
concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the
Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by
him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that no treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate. The participation of the legislative branch
in the treaty-making process was deemed essential
to provide a check on the executive in the field of
foreign relations.
It should be emphasized that under the
Constitution the power to ratify is vested in the
President subject to the concurrence of the Senate.
The President has the discretion even after the
signing
of
the
treaty
by
the
Philippine
representative whether or not to ratify a treaty.
The signature does not signify final consent, it is
ratification that binds the state to the provisions of
the treaty and renders it effective.
Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, concurrence to the ratification. It is within
the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it. Such decision is
within the competence of the President alone,
which cannot be encroached by this court via writ
of
mandamus,
Thus, the petition is DISMISSED.
G. R. No. 167919, February 14, 2007
Plaridel M. Abaya vs. Hon. Secretary
Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.
FACTS:
On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC)
of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It
was approved by DPWH Acting Secretary Florante
Soriquez. This resolution recommended the award
to China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract
for the implementation of civil works for Contract
Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the
improvement/rehabilitation of the San AndresVirac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the lengt of 79.818
kilometers, in the island province of Catanduanes.

This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by


and between the JBIC and the Philippine
Government pursuant to the exchange of Notes
executed by and between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
Japan to the Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs
Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their respective
governments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204
between the JBIC and the Philippine Government is
a kind of a treaty.
HELD:
The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in
conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated
December 27, 1999 between the Japanese
Government and the Philippine Government is an
executive agreement.
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine
agreement that has many similarities with the
private law contract. The agreement consists of the
exchange of two documents, each of the parties
being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other.
treaties, agreements, conventions, charters,
protocols,
declarations,
memoranda
of
understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of
notes all are refer to international instruments
binding at international law.
Although these instruments differ from each other
by title, they all have common features and
international law has applied basically the same
rules to all these instruments. These rules are the
result of long practice among the States, which
have accepted them as binding norms in their
mutual relations. Therefore, they are regarded as
international customary law.
GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002
Lim v Executive Secretary
Facts: This case involves a petition for certiorari
and prohibition as well as a petition-in-intervention,
praying that respondents be restrained from
proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and
that after due notice and hearing, that judgment be
rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunction
and/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S.
troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal
and
in
violation
of
the
Constitution.
Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel
from the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take part,
in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
"Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan"

exercises are the largest combined training


operations involving Filipino and American troops.
In theory, they are a simulation of joint military
maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty,
a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States in 1951.
The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is
proximately rooted in the international antiterrorism campaign declared by President George
W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that
occurred
on
September
11,
2001.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and
Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari
and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of
the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently
by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA,
both party-Iist organizations, who filed a petitionin-intervention
on
February
11,
2002.
Issues:

Whether Balikatan 02-1 is covered by the


Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).

Whether the VFA authorized American


soldiers to engage in combat operations in
Philippine territory.

Held:
In resolving the first issue, it is necessary to refer
to the VFA itself. However, not much help can be
had
therefrom,
unfortunately,
since
the
terminology employed is itself the source of the
problem. The VFA permits United States personnel
to engage on an impermanent basis in activities,
the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The
sole encumbrance placed on its definition is
couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must abstain from any activity
inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and
in particular, from any political activity.
The Supreme Court, after studied reflection of
Articles 31 and 32 of Section 3 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded that
the ambiguity sorrounding the meaning of the word
activities arose from accident. In our view, it was
deliberately made that way to give both parties a
certain leeway in negotiation. Under these
auspices, the VFA if given legitimacy to the current
Balikatan exercise. It is only logical to assume that
Balikatan 02-1 a mutual anti-terrorism advising,
assisting and training exercise, falls under the
umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the
context of the agreement. In connection with the
second issue, both the history and intent of the
MDT and the VFA support conclusion that combatrelated activities, as opposed to combat itself are
indeed authorized.
More so, the Terms of Reference are explicit
enough. Paragraph 8 of Section I stipulates that US

exercise participants may not engage in combat


except in self-defense. It is the opinion of the
Court that neither the MDT nor the DFA allow
foreign troops to engage in an offensive war in
Philippine territory bearing in mind the salutory
prescription stated in the Charter of the United
Nations.
In the same manner, both the MDT and the VFA, as
in all other treaties and international agreements
to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in
the context of the 1987 Constitution. Although the
Constitution presents a conflict between the
fundamental law and our obligations from
international agreements, it however resolves it in
section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution. The
foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US
forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive
war on the Philippine territory.

G. R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000


Bayan v. Zamora
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine
panel to discussed, among others, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and
13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed
by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador
Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5,
1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it
by (2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art
XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not
Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under
they provision cited, the foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities may be allowed in the
Philippines unless the following conditions are
sufficiently
met:
a)
it
must
be
a
treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by
congress,
and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting
state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that
Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is
requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is
the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the
members
of
the
senate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the VFA governed by the
provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25,
Article XVIII of the Constitution?

HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals
with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops or facilities should apply in the instant case.
To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however,
the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find
applicability with regard to the issue and for the
sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between
transient and permanent. We find nothing in
section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops
or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently
in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States
treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty.

Executive Order No.68 which requires counsels


need to be qualified to practice law in the
Philippines. In fact, it is common in military
tribunals that counsels for the parties are usually
military
personnel.
Under the doctrine of incorporation, although the
Philippines was not a signatory of the Hague and
Geneva Conventions, international jurisprudence is
automatically incorporated in Philippine law, thus
making war crimes punishable in the Philippines.
The Military Commission having been convened by
virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the
crimes charged which fall under the provisions of
Executive Order No 68, and having jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner by having said
petitioner in its custody, the court will not interfere
with the due process of such Military Commission.
Petition is denied with costs de oficio.

Kuroda vs Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 195, GR No. L2662, March 26, 1949

G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957

Facts : Shigenori Kuroda, a former LieutenantGeneral of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Imperial Forces of the
Philippines was charged before a Military
Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. He had unlawfully
disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as a
commander to control the operations of members
of
his
command.
Petitioner was duly prosecuted for acts committed
in violation of the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention through the issuance and
enforcement
of
Executive
Order
No.
68.
Executive Order No. 68 provided the organization
of such military commissions, established National
War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and
regulations governing the trial of accused war
criminals.
Attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port of the
United States of America participated in the
prosecution of the case in behalf of the United
States
of
America.
Issue : Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is
legal and constitutional.
Held : This court holds that the Executive Order
No. 68 is legal and constitutional as provided in
Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution, that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of
the
law
of
the
nation.
The participation of the two American attorneys
although under our law, they are not qualified to
practice law is valid and constitutional. Military
Commission is a special military tribunal governed
by special law not by Rules of the Court, which
govern ordinary civil courts. There is nothing in

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in


behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. by
Republic
Act
No.
1180,
petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and
MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila,
respondents.
Facts:
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing
upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and farreaching in significance. The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal
protection of the laws. It also poses an important
issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which
the disputed law purports to remedy really or
actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep,
militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law
purports to protect citizen and country from the
alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of
economy it regulates, Congress attempts to
translate national aspirations for economic
independence and national security, rooted in the
drive and urge for national survival and welfare,
into a concrete and tangible measures designed to
free the national retailer from the competing
dominance of the alien, so that the country and the
nation may be free from a supposed economic
dependence and bondage. Do the facts and
circumstances
justify
the
enactment?
The

rule

in

general

is

as

follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional


protection which forbids a classification otherwise
justified simply because the limitation of the class
falls along the lines of nationality. That would be
requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as
a class than for similar classes than for similar
classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the

difference in status between citizens and aliens


constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in
the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
Issue:
Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the
retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious,
taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious
form and manner in which the aliens have
heretofore
engaged
therein?
Held:
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold
that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from
dominance and control; that the enactment clearly
falls within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that
the law does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated,
nor the due process of law clause, because the law
is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;
that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out
its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident
as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate
but actually necessary and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion the
Judicial department of the Government may not
interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it
cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with
treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police
power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that
the radical effects of the law could have been
made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it
is stated that the more time should have been
given in the law for the liquidation of existing
businesses when the time comes for them to close.
Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if
the law falls within the scope of legislative
authority and does not transcend the limitations of
due process and equal protection guaranteed in
the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness
of the law should be addressed to the Legislature;
they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.

Raquiza vs. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 (1948)


FACTS: By virtue of the proclamation issued by
General of the Army MacArthur, petitioners were
arrested by the 306 CIC and detained under
security
commitment order
No
385.
The
petitioners Raquiza, Tee Han Kee, and Infante were
charged with Espionage activity with the Japanese,
active collaboration with the enemy respectively.
Power
for
Commander
of
the
US
Army to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is
not questioned. He based proclamation on the
reasons that the apprehended have violated due
allegiance to the US and it is a military necessity.
Petitioners move for writ of Habeas Corpus.
ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the war terminated within


the meaning of that part in the
proclamation.
[Note: The power of
commander in chief of the US Army to
issue a proclamation providing for military
measures
to
be
taken
upon
the
apprehension of Filipino citizens who
voluntarily have given aid, comfort and
sustenance to the enemy, cannot be
seriously questioned.]

2.

Whether or not this court has jurisdiction or


legal power to afford relief to the
petitioners in the sad and sorry plight to
which they have been and are being
subjected.

Held:
1.

2.

No. The war, in the legal sense, continues


until, and terminated at the same time of,
some formal proclamation of peace by an
authority competent to proclaim it. It is the
province of the political department, and
not the judicial department, to determine if
war has ended. The fact that delivery of
certain persons under custody of the US
Army has already begun does not mean
that the war has, in the legal sense,
already terminated, which clearly it has
not. Delivery within the power of military
authorities to make even before was
terminates.
No. Civil Courts should not interfere. A
foreign army permitted to march through a
friendly country or to be stationed in it, is
exempt from civil and criminal jurisdiction
of the place. Grant of free passage implies
a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops
during passage (let them exercise their
own discipline). Any attempt by our civil
Courts to exercise jurisdiction over US
troops would be a violation of our countrys
faith. On the other hand, petitioners may

have
recourse
authorities.

to

proper

military

Miquibas vs. Commanding General, 80 Phil.


267 (1948)
FACTS: Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian
employee of the US army in the Philippines who
had been charged of disposing in the Port of Manila
Area of things belonging to the US army in violation
of the 94th article of War of the US. He was
arrested and a General Court-Martial was
appointed. He was found guilty. As a rule, the
Philippines being a sovereign nation has
jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its
territory but it may, by treaty or by agreement,
consent that the US shall exercise jurisdiction over
certain offenses committed within said portions of
territory.
ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the offense has been


committed within a US base thus giving the
US jurisdiction over the case.

2.

WON the offender is a member of the US


armed forces

Held:
1.

2.

No. The Port of Manila Area where the


offense was committed is not within a US
base for it is not names in Annex A or B of
Article XXVI of the Military Base Agreement
(MBA) and is merely part of the temporary
quarters located within presented limits of
the
city
of
Manila.
Moreover,
extended installations and temporary
quarters are not considered to have the
same jurisdictional capacity as permanent
bases and are governed by Article XIII
paragraphs 2 and 4. The offence at bar,
therefore is in the beyond the jurisdiction
of
military
courts.
No. Under the MBA, a civilian employee is
not considered as a member of the US
armed forces. Even under the articles of
war, the mere fact that a civilian employee
is in the service of the US Army does not
make him a member of the armed forces.

U.S. v. Ah Sing, 36 Phil. 978 (1917)


FACTS: The defendant is a subject of China
employed as a fireman on a steamship. The
steamship is a foreign steamer which arrived the
port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage
direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant
bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought

them on board the steamship and had them in his


possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu.
When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu,
the authorities on making the search found the
cans of opium hidden in the ashes below the boiler
of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed
that he was the owner of the opium and that he
had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess,
however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He
did
not
say
that
it
was
his
intention
to
import
the
prohibited
drug.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of illegal
importation of opium into the Philippine Islands has
been
proven?
Held:
Yes. It is the onus of the government to prove that
the vessel from which the drug discharged came
into Philippine waters from a foreign country with
the
drug
on
board.
In
this
case, it is to be noted that Sec. 4 of Act No. 2381
begins, Any person who shall unlawfully import or
bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands
Import
and
bring
should
be
construed as synonymous terms. The mere act of
going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima
facie evidence of importation. The importation is
not
the
making
entry
of
goods
at
the customhouse, but merely the bringing them
into the port, and the importation is complete
before the entry to the customhouse. Moreover,
possession for personal use is unlikely, judging
from the size of the amount brought.
Liang vs. People, 323 SCRA 652 (2000)
FACTS: Petitioner is an economist for ADB who was
charged by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong city for allegedly uttering defamatory
words against her fellow worker with two
counts of grave oral defamation. MeTC judge then
received an office of protocol from the Department
of Foreign Affairs, stating that petitioner is covered
by immunity from legal process under section 45 of
the agreement bet ADB and the government. MeTC
judge, without notice, dismissed the two criminal
cases. Prosecution filed writ of mandamus and
certiorari
and
ordered
the MeTC to enforce the warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is covered by
immunity under the agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal
cases
were
filed
in
court.
Held: He is not covered by immunity because the
commission of a crime is part of the performance
of official duty. Courts cannot blindly adhere and
take on its face the communication from the DFA
that a certain person is covered by immunity. That
a person is covered by immunity is preliminary.
Due process is right of the accused as much as the
prosecution.

Slandering a person is not covered by the


agreement because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime such as defamation in the
name
of
official
duty.
Under
Vienna
convention on Diplomatic Relations, commission of
a
crime
is
not
part
of
official
duty.
On the contention that there was no preliminary
investigation conducted, suffice it to say that
preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in
cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at
bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary
investigation may be invoked only when
specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal
procedure is clear than no preliminary investigation
is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of
the MeTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary
investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction
nor
does
it
impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective.

2.

Yes. Though assault by military officer


against a POW is not in the RPC, physical
assault charges may be pressed under the
RPC.

3.

No. The application of the general principle


that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is
unaffected by the military or other special
character brought before them for trial
(R.A.
No. 7055). Appellant claims that the act
was servicebut this cannot affect the right
of the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction of the
case.
Judgment: Judgment thereby affirmed An
offense charged against a military officer in
consequence of an act done in obedience
to an order is clearly shown on the face,
where such offense is against the military
law, is not within the jurisdiction of the
courts of the Civil Government. Per
Cooper, J., concurring

U.S. v. Sweet, 1 Phil. 18 (1901)


FACTS: Sweet was employed by the United States
military who committed an offense against a POW.
His case is filed with the CFI, who is given original
jurisdiction
in
all
criminal
cases
for
which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed.
He is now contending that the courts are without
jurisdiction because he was acting in the line of
duty.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the case at bar is within the
jurisdiction of the CFI.
2. Whether or not an assault committed by a
soldier or military employee upon a
prisoner of war is not an offense under the
penal code?
3. Assuming that it is an offence under the
penal code, whether or not the military
character sustained by the person charged
with the offence at the time of its
commission exempts him from the ordinary
jurisdiction of the civil tribunals?
Held:
1.

Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil


Commission, the CFIs are given original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a
penalty more than 6 months imprisonment
or
a
fine
greater
than $100 may be imposed. Furthermore,
CFIs have jurisdiction to try offenders
charged with violation of the Penal Code
within their territorial limits, regardless of
the military character of the accused. The
defendant and his acts are within the
jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed
to prove that he was indeed acting in
theline of duty.

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA


160 (2000)
FACTS: On June 18, 1999 the Department of
Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest,
and other supporting documents for said
extradition were attached along with the request.
Charges
include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
US
2.
Attempt
to
evade
or
defeat
tax
3.
Fraud
by
wire,
radio,
or
television
4.
False
statement
or
entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice, through a designated
panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and
assessment of the extradition treaty which they
found having matters needed to be addressed.
Respondent, then requested for copies of all the
documents included in the extradition request and
for him to be given ample time to assess it.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff.
grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior
to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in
time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating
whether the procedures and requirements under
the relevant law (PD 1069Philippine Extradition
Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have
been
complied
with
by
the
Requesting
Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the
documents is not a preliminary investigation like in
criminal
cases
making
the
constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal
prosecution
inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of
unauthorized disclosure of the information in the
documents.

3. Finally, the country is bound to the Vienna


convention on the law of treaties such that every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
The respondent filed for petition of mandamus,
certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in
favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was
made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as
well
as
conducting
further
proceedings.
ISSUES:
1.
2.

3.

Whether or not private is respondent


entitled to the two basic due process rights
of notice and hearing.
Whether or not this entitlement constitutes
a breach of the legal commitments and
obligation of the Philippine Government
under the RP-US Treaty.
WON there is any conflict between private
respondents basic due process rights and
the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition treaty

Held:
1.

Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines


extradition as the removal of an accused
from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities
to
enable
the requesting state or government to hold
him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him in
connection with any criminal investigation
directed against him or the execution of a
penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or
government. Although the inquisitorial
power exercised by the Department of
Justice as an administrative agency due to
the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any
judicial discretion, it primarily sets the
wheels for the extradition process which
may ultimately result in the deprivation of
the liberty of the prospective extradite.
This deprivation can be effected at two
stages: The provisional arrest of the
prospective
extradite
pending
the
submission of the request and the
temporary arrest of the prospective
extradite during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court. Clearly, there
is an impending threat to a prospective
extraditees liberty as early as during the
evaluation
stage.
Because
of
such
consequences, the evaluation process is
akin
to
an
administrative
agency
conducting an investigative proceeding,
the consequences of which are essentially
criminal since such technical assessment
sets off or commences the procedure for
and ultimately the deprivation of liberty of
a prospective extradite. In essence,
therefore, the evaluation process partakes

of the nature of a criminal investigation.


There are certain constitutional rights that
are ordinarily available only in criminal
prosecution. But the Court has ruled in
other cases that where the investigation of
an administrative proceeding may result in
forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the
administrative proceedings are deemed
criminal or penal, and such forfeiture
partakes the nature of a penalty. In the
case at bar, similar to a preliminary
investigation, the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings which may result in
the filing of an information against the
respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest,
and to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus,
the extraditee must be accorded due
process
rights
of
notice
and hearing according to Art. 3 sec 14(1)
and (2), as well as Art. 3 sec 7the right of
the people to information on matters of
public concern and the corollary right to
access to official records and documents.
The court held that the evaluation process
partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation, having consequences which
will result in deprivation of liberty of the
prospective
extradite. A favorable action in an
extradition request exposes a person to
eventual extradition to a foreign country,
thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the
process.
The evaluation process itself is like a
preliminary
investigation
since
both
procedures may have the same result the
arrest and imprisonment of the respondent.
The basic rights of notice and hearing are
applicable
in
criminal,
civil
and
administrative
proceedings.
Nonobservance
of these rights will invalidate the
proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be
notified of any pending case affecting their
interests, and upon notice, may claim the
right
to appear therein and present their side.
Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable
in
3
cases:
a.When there is an urgent need for
immediate action (preventive suspension in
administrative charges, padlocking filthy
restaurants, cancellation of passport).
b.Where
there
is
tentativeness
of
administrative action, and the respondent
is not prevented from enjoying the right to
notice and hearing at a later time
(summary distraint and levy of the
property
of
a
delinquent
taxpayer,
replacement
of
an
appointee)
c.Twin rights have been offered, but the
right to exercise them had not been

claimed.
2.

3.

No. The U.S. and the Philippines share


mutual concern about the suppression and
punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. Both states accord common
due process protection to their respective
citizens. The administrative investigation
doesnt fall under the three exceptions to
the due process of notice and hearing in
the Section 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of
Court.
No. Doctrine of incorporation under
international law, as applied in most
countries,
decrees
that
rules
of
international law are given equal standing
with, but are not superior to national
legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute
and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict.
Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request
should impose veil at any stage.
Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of
merit.

BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA v SABBATINO


376 US 398; 84 (1964)
FACTS
In July 1960, the Cuban government retaliated
against the US for various measures imposed
against the Castro government by expropriating
property held by US citizens in Cuba. This included
the seizure of sugar owned by CAV. A different
American company, Farr, Whitlock & Co. had
contracted to buy this sugar from CAV, but after it
was seized, they bought it directly from the Cuban
government. After receiving the sugar, however,
Farr, Whitlock & Co. did not pay the Cuban
government--instead, they paid CAV's legal
representative, Sabbatino. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, the national bank of Cuba (acting on behalf
of the Cuban government), filed a suit in the US
District Court for the Southern District of NY
against Sabbatino, to recover the money paid for
the sugar. The District Court and the CA ruled in
favor of Sabbatino, and the case was appealed to
the SC.
ISSUE
Whether the Act of State Doctrine should be
applied

HELD
YES. The Court applied the Act of State Doctrine
and upheld the legality of the expropriation
because it was an official act of another country,

not subject to question in the US courts. The Court


refused to hold that the expropriation violated
international law, because there no clear unity of
international opinion disapproving the seizure of
land or property in a country by a government of
that country.
It noted that interposition of the Executive was
unnecessary to prevent the courts from interfering
in the affairs of state, as a single court could upset
delicate international negotiations through the
assertion of US law in another country.
Finally, the Court found no bar to application of the
doctrine should imposed by the fact that Cuba had
brought the suit, comparing this to the sovereign
immunity enjoyed by the US states which can sue,
but cannot be sued.

Go Tian Chai v. Commissioner of Immigration


GR No. L-20645, 22 September 1966
Facts:
Go Tian Chai (Go) is a Chinese national, admitted
as a temporary visitor into the Philippines on April
23, 1947. Having failed to leave upon expiration of
his visa, notwithstanding the granted extensions,
he was arrested March 1, 1950. During the
deportation proceedings, he was temporarily
released under bail.
Later, the Board of Commissioners (BoC)
unanimously declared him to have unlawfully
overstayed in the Philippines and ordered his
deportation on the first available flight. The
Warrant for deportation was issued on March 8,
1951, but the actual arrest and custody by the
immigration authorities was 11 years later, on Oct
8, 1962. During his detention and pending his
deportation to Taiwan, Go filed a petition for
habeas corpus. In his petition, he alleged (1) the
representations made by his counsel in admission
and repatriation to Taiwan were futile, and (2) it
was unlikely that the Phil. Govt would be able to
deport him in the near future. So he prayed for
temporary liberty on bail, with the case of
Borovsky v. Commissioner as basis, which said that
A foreign national, not an enemy and no criminal
charges were filed against or judicially issues, was
also entitled to protection against deprivation of
liberty without due process of law
The lower court ruled in favor of Go. It took notice
of the fact that there were indeed negotiations
between
the
Chinese
and
the
Philippine
Governments, and recognizes that these take time.
However in this case, the petition of habeas corpus
has been filed only less than 2 months from Gos
arrest and detention. And deportation can only be
effect when the matters are final. It cannot be said

that the detention was for an unreasonable length


of time. On the other hand, negotiations between
the Phil and Taiwanese governments may drag on
for a long time, it would be unjust to detain the
petitioner for that length of time. The Court in the
case of Borovsky v. Commissioner said the 6
months is considered a reasonable length of time
as the limit, after which a writ of habeas may be
ordered, and release on bail in an amount the court
may deem proper. Hence the lower court ordered
release under bail, after such lapse of 6 months.
On appeal, Commissioner contends that the lower
court erred in the provided six month limit,
applying Borovsky, because (1) it compels the Phil.
Govt to finalize negotiations to 6 months, (2)
unlike Borovsky, Go is NOT a stateless individual,
but a national who can be deported to Taiwan and
(3) The court has no authority to interfere.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Held:
1.

Whether or not Go may be released on bail


during the pendency of the negotiations
Whether or not the 6 month period may be
applied to this case.
Whether or not Go had an inherent right to
bail.
Whether or not the Courts can interfere
with Immigration authority?
No. The Court ruled in many previous
cases, a Chinese national declared to be
overstaying may be subject to deportation
pending negotiations. It has been ruled
that
there is nothing unjust in the
detention of the overstaying Chinese
nationals, because all is in accordance of
Philippine Laws. Also, as in Tan Seng Pao v.
Commissioner, the petitioner is NOT a
stateless aliens hence has a KNOWN
country, to which he may be deported to.
If there be any delay, it is not due to the
fault or negligence of the Government or
its officers. It may be a result from
diplomatic negotiations which can have
variable results, in any case, cannot be
taken against the Government and be a
ground for declaring the order of
deportation functus oficio. Otherwise,
orders of deportation can easily be
rendered ineffective by aliens frustrating all
diplomatic efforts in negotiation.

2.

3.

No. The 6 month period may not be applied


since the case of Borovsky is separate and
distinct, Go being an alien with a known
state, therefore, the Supreme Court ruled
against the lower courts ruling in Gos
favor.
No. Aliens in deportation proceedings, as a
rule, have no inherent right to bail and that

any release can only be granted expressly


by law (Bengzon v. Ocampo). In Sec 37 (9)
(e) of the Phil Imm Act, it provides that
Any alien...may be released under bond
and other such conditions as may be
imposed by the Commissioner. Note that
it is only the Commissioner who had the
power and discretion to grant bail. The
word may indicates bail is merely
permissive and discretionary upon the
Commissioner.
4.

No. The determination of the aliens


propriety, is subject to the law and
procedure under the Immigration Act as to
bail and release, and falls exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner,
and not the courts of justice. Simply
because
courts
do
not
administer
immigration laws. (The only thing the
courts
can
check
is
the
proper
administration and execution of Philippine
immigration laws, and EXCLUDES the
discretion of the Commissioners.)

Khosrow Minucher vs CA and Scalzo GR No.


97765 (1992)
Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attach of the
Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then
connected with the American Embassy in Manila,
was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an informer
belonging to the military intelligence community).
According to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying
Iranian products like caviar and carpets. Minucher
complained to Scalzo about his problems with the
American Embassy regarding the expired visas of
his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave
Minucher a calling card showing that the former is
an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) assigned to the American Embassy in Manila.
As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy
caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal
of
the
visas.
Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to
be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for which he
had a buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and
claimed that he had already made arrangements
with his contacts concerning the visas and asked
for
$2,000.
It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frameup a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin
trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and charged
with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Minucher prays for actual and compensatory
damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a
motion to quash summons alleging that the
defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine

court for the action for damages is a personal


action and that Scalzo is outside the Philippines.
TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for
lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous
assumption that because of the Diplomatic Note
(advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of the
US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for
drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed with diplomatic
immunity.
Issues:
1.
2.

Whether or not a complaint for damages be


dismissed in the sole basis of a statement
complained in a Diplomatic Note.
Whether or not private respondent Arthur
Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged
diplomatic immunity conformably with the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

Held:
1.

No. Jurisdiction over the person of the


defendant is acquired by either voluntary
appearance or by the service of summons.
In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion
to quash, which, in effect already waived
any defect in the service of summons by
earlier asking an extension to file time to
file an Answer and filing an Answer with
Counterclaim.
The complaint for damages cannot be
dismissed.
Said
complaint
contains
sufficient allegations which indicate that
Scalzo committed imputed acts in his
personal capacity and outside the scope of
his official duties and functions. The TC
gave credit to Minucher's theory that he
was a victim of frame-up hence, there is a
prima facie showing that Scalzo could be
held personally liable for his acts. Further,
Scalzo did not come forward with evidence
to, prove that he acted in his official
capacity.

2.

The SC DENIED the petition.


Conformably with the Vienna Convention,
the functions of the diplomatic mission
involve, the representation of the interests
of the sending state and promoting friendly
relations with the receiving state. Only
diplomatic agents, are vested with
blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and
criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a
diplomat entitled to immunity is the
determination of whether or not he
performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being

an Attache, Scalzos main function is to


observe, analyze and interpret trends and
developments in their respective fields in
the host country and submit reports to
their own ministries or departments in the
home government. He is not generally
regarded as a member of the diplomatic
mission. On the basis of an erroneous
assumption that simply because of the
diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of
jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic
immunity is contentious.
Under the related doctrine of State
Immunity from Suit, the precept that a
State cannot be sued in the courts of a
foreign state is a long-standing rule of
customary international law. If the acts
giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent,
although not necessarily a diplomatic
personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the complaint could be barred by
the immunity of the foreign sovereign from
suit
without
its
consent.
Suing
a
representative of a state is believed to be,
in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit
of an individual but for the State, in whose
service he is, under the maxim par in
parem, non habet imperium that all
states are sovereign equals and cannot
assert jurisdiction over one another. The
implication is that if the judgment against
an official would require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
award, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages
decreed against him, the suit must be
regarded as being against the state itself,
although it has not been formally
impleaded
A foreign agent, operating within a
territory, can be cloaked with immunity
from suit but only as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state. The consent
of the host state is an indispensable
requirement of basic courtesy between the
two sovereigns.
The buy-bust operation and other such
acts are indication that the Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not
consent, to the activities within Philippine
territory of agent Scalzo of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency. In
conducting
surveillance
activities
on
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the
criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo
hardly can be said to have acted beyond
the scope of his official function or duties.

BORIS MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS


TAADA VS. ANGARA 272 SCRA 18

90 Phil. 70 (1979) Court of the Philippines

Facts
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government
represented by its Secretary of the Department of
Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the
Philippine Government to submit to its respective
competent authorities the WTO (World Trade
Organization) Agreements to seek approval for
such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97
was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the
WTO
Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of
the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II,
providing for the development of a self reliant and
independent national economy, and Sections 10
and 12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first
policy.

Facts:
The case is a second petition for habeas corpus
filed by petitioner Boris Mejoff, the first having
been denied in a decision of this Court of July 30,
1949.
Herein petitioner is an alien of Russian decent who
was brought from Shanghai by the Japanese forces.
Upon liberation, he was arrested as Japanese spy
by U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps and was
handed to the Commonwealth Government for

Issue

disposition in accordance with Commonwealth Act

Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the


WTO
Agreement
is
unconstitutional.

No. 682. Thereafter, the People Court ordered his

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is
not unconstitutional. While the constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests
only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional
policy of a self-reliant and independent national
economy does not necessarily rule out the entry
of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither economic seclusion nor
mendicancy in the international community.

up declared the petitioner as an illegal alien for

The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its


consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it
a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court
gave due respect to an equal department in
government. It presumes its actions as regular and
done in good faith unless there is convincing proof
and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a
result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits
or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A
treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but
creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

petitioner out of the country.

release but the Deportation Board taking his case


lack of necessary documents presented upon
entering the Philippines. The immigration officials
then ordered that the petitioner be deported on the
first available transportation to Russia but failed to
do so in several times. While the arrangements for
his departure are being made and for the best
interest of the country, petitioner Mejoff was
detained at the Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa. Over
two years having elapsed since the decision
aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has
not found ways and means of removing the

Issue: Whether or not prolonged detention of the


petitioner is warranted by law and the Constitution.

Held:
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and
commanded the respondents to release the former
from custody subject to terms and conditions. The
petitioners unduly prolonged detention would be
unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the

only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a

The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the

danger that is by no means actual, present, or

petition. The statutes in question are deemed not

uncontrollable. The possibility that he might join or

unconstitutional. These were definitely in the

aid disloyal elements if turned out at large does not

exercise of police power as such was established to

justify prolonged detention, the remedy in that

promote public welfare and public safety. In fact,

case being to impose conditions in the order of

the

release and exact bail in a reasonable amount with

constitutional provision of adopting to the generally

sufficient sureties. Hence, a foreign national, not

accepted principles of international law as part of

enemy, against whom no criminal charges have

the law of the land. The letter of instruction

been formally made or judicial order issued, may

mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions

not be indefinitely be kept in detention. He has the

of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and

right to life and liberty and all other fundamental

Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the

rights as applied to human beings, as proclaimed in

United Nations - that such letter was issued in

the

consideration

Universal

Declaration

of

Human

Rights

letter

of

instruction

of

is

growing

based

number

on

of

the

road

approved by the General Assembly of the United

accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the

Nations, of which the Philippines is a member.

streets and highways.

Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195

J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, GR No. 65366


October 25, 1983

Facts:
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the

Facts : Petitioner, retired Justice JB .L Reyes filed a

constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229,

petition to respondent, Mayor Ramon Bagatsing,

issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring

the city mayor of manila that on behalf of anti-

all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early

bases coalition sought a permit from the city of

warning devices to be installed a distance away

manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on

from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In

october 26, 1983 from 2.00 to 5.00 in the

compliance with such letter of instruction, the

afternoon, starting from the luneta, a public park,

Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office

to the gates of united states embassy, hardly two

issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the

blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of

compliance

the public property, a short program would be held.

thereof.

This petition alleges that such letter of instruction


and subsequent administrative order are unlawful
and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on

On october 20, 1983 the petitioner filed a suit for

due process, equal protection of the law and undue

mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of

delegation

preliminary mandatory injunction because due to

of

police

power.

the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not


been informed of any action taken on his request
Issue:

on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. On

Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229

october 25, 1983, the answer of respondent mayor

and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is

was filed on his behalf by assistant solicitor general

unconstitutional

eduardo g. montenegro. It turned out that on


october

held:

19,

suc

permit

was

denied.

Issues :

immunity.

In

GR

No.

76607,

the

private

respondents are suing several officers of the US Air


Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with
1. Whether or not holding a rally in front of the US

the bidding conducted by them for contracts for

embassy would be applicable or a violation of

barbering services in the said base.

Ordinance

no.7295

of

the

city

of

manila.

2. Whether or not the denial of the exercise of the

In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint

constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably

for damages against petitioners Lamachia, Belsa,

assembly was

Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in

justified by clear and present

danger.

the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John


Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been

Ruling : The petition was granted. The Supreme

ascertained after investigation, from the testimony

Court granted the mandatory injunction allowing

of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had

the proposed march and rally. The court found that

poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking

there was no clear and present danger of a

the vegetables served to the club customers.

substantive evil to a legitimate public interest that

Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and

would justify the denial of the exercise of the

thereafter

constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably

arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining

assembly.

agreement between the center and its employees.

referred

the

case

to

board

of

The board unanimously found him guilty and


Our country is signatory of the Vienna Convention.

recommended his dismissal. Genoves reaction was

It is binding in our laws. The second paragraph of

to

its Article 22 that the receiving state is under a

petitioners.

file

his

complaint

against

the

individual

special duty to take appropriate steps tp protect


the premise of the mission against any intrusion or
damage and to prevent any disturbance of the

In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed

peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.

as a barracks boy in Cano O Donnell, an extension

The constitution adopts the generally accepted

of Clark Air Bas, was arrested following a buy-bust

principles of international law as part of the law of

operation conducted by the individual petitioners

the land. That being the case, if there were clear

who are officers of the US Air Force and special

and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or

agents

disturbance of the of the peace of the mission, or

Investigators. On the basis of the sworn statements

impairment of its dignity, there would be a

made by them, an information for violation of R.A.

justification for the denial of the permit insofar as

6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs

the terminal point would be the embassy.

Act, was filed against Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac.

of

the

Air

Force

Office

of

Special

Said officers testified against him at his trial.


United States of America vs. Guinto

Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He


then filed a complaint against the individual

182 SCRA 644

petitioners claiming that it was because of their


acts that he was removed.

FACTS: These

cases

have

been

consolidated

because they all involve the doctrine of state

In GR No. 80258, a complaint for damages was

filed by the private respondents against the herein

judgment against such officials will require the

petitioners (except the US), for injuries sustained

state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy

by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the

the same, the suit must be regarded as against the

defendants. There is a conflict of factual allegations

state although it has not been formally impleaded.

here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants


beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed
dogs on them which bit them in several parts of

When the government enters into a contract, it is

their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them.

deemed to have descended to the level of the

The defendants deny this and claim that plaintiffs

other

were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs

sovereign immunity from suit with its implied

because they were struggling and resisting arrest.

consent. In the case o US, the customary law of

In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the US and

international law on state immunity is expressed

the individually named defendants argued that the

with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty.

suit was in effect a suit against the US, which had

There is no question that the US, like any other

not given its consent to be sued.

state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its

contracting

party

and

divested

of

its

non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its


proprietory or private capacity. It is only when the
ISSUE: Whether the defendants were also immune

contract involves its sovereign or governmental

from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts

capacity that no such waiver may be implied.

done by them in the performance of their official


duties.
It is clear from a study of the records of GR No.
80018 that the petitioners therein were acting in
HELD: The rule that a State may not be sued

the exercise of their official functions when they

without its consent is one of the generally accepted

conducted the buy-bust operations against the

principles of international law that were have

complainant and thereafter testified against him at

adopted as part of the law of our land. Even

his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties

without such affirmation, we would still be bound

as agents of the US, they cannot be directly

by

the

generally

international

law

accepted
under

the

principles

of

impleaded for acts imputable to their principal,

doctrine

of

which has not given its consent to be sued.

incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by


the majority of the states, such principles are
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized

As for GR No. 80018, the record is too meager to

state as a condition and consequence of its

indicate what really happened. The needed inquiry

membership in the society of nations. All states are

first be made by the lower court so it may assess

sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction

and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on

over one another.

the basis of evidence that has yet to be presented


at the trial.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits

Holy See vs. Rosario Jr.

against the state without its consent, it is also


applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the states for acts allegedly performed by them in
the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the

238 SCRA 524

FACTS: A piece of real property was acquired by


the Holy See by way of donation from the
Archdiocese

of

Manila.

The

purpose

was

to

construct the official place of residence of the Papal


Nuncio. Later, the Holy See sold the property on
condition that it will evict the squatters therein. For
failure to comply with the condition, the Holy See
was sued. It moved to dismiss on the ground of
state immunity.

respondent

trial

court

has

jurisdiction over petitioner being a foreign state


enjoying sovereign immunity.

Republic

of

the

Philippines

has

accorded the Holy See the status if a foreign


sovereign, the Holy See, through its Ambassador,
the

Papal

Facts:
Yamashita was the Commanding General of the
Japanese army in the Philippines during World War
2. He was charged before the American military
commission for war crimes.
He filed a petition for habeas corpus and
prohibition against Gen. Styer to reinstate his
status as prisoner of war from being accused as a
war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal.
Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether

HELD: The

Yamashita vs. Styer


G.R. L-129 December 19, 1945

Nuncio,

has

had

diplomatic

representations with the Philippine Government


since

1957.

The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case


was sufficiently established by the memorandum
and certification of the Department of Foreign
Affairs. The DFA has formally intervened in this
case and officially certified that the Embassy of the
Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to
the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local
jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges

Held:
YES. The military commission was lawfully created
in conformity with an act of Congress sanctioning
the creation of such tribunals.
The laws of war imposes upon a commander the
duty to take any appropriate measures within his
powers to control the troops under his command to
prevent acts which constitute violation of the laws
of war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately
charged with personal responsibility arising from
his failure to take such measure. In this regard the
SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV
of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention No.
X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among
others.
Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner
merely sought for restoration to his former status
as prisoner of war and not a discharge from
confinement. This is a matter of military measure
and not within the jurisdiction of the courts.
The petition for prohibition against the respondent
will also not life since the military commission is
not made a party respondent in the case. As such,
no order may be issued requiring it to refrain from
trying the petitioner.

and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy


in this country. The determination of the executive
arm of government that a state or instrumentality
is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a
political question that is conclusive upon the
courts.

Where the plea of immunity is recognized and


affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of
the courts to accept this claim so as not to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in
conducting the countrys foreign relations.

HERBERT BROWNELL, JR. vs SUN


ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA
G.R. No. L-5731, June 22, 1954

LIFE

Facts:
This is a petition instituted in the CFI under the
provisions of Philippines Property Act of the US
against the Sun Life Assurance company of Canada
to compel the latter to comply with the demand of
the former to pay him the money which of the
proceeds of an endowment policy payable to
Aihara, Japanese national. The defenses of Sun Life
Assurance are that immunities in Trading with the
Enemy Act of US is doubtful application in the
Philippines and defendant is a trustee of the
fund and under legal obligation to see to it that it is

paid to the person entitled.CFI granted the petition.


Hence, appeal was filed with the SC contending
that CFI erred in holding that the law is binding
upon the inhabitants of the Philippines.
Issue: WON the Trading with the Enemy Act apply
to Philippines Govt.
Held:
Yes, A foreign law may have extraterritorial effect
in a country other than the country of origin
providedthe former in which it sought to be made
operative gives its consent. The consent need
not be express it is enough to be implied from its
conduct or from that of its authorized officers. In
this case, the said act was conformed by President
Roxas in a joint statement signed by him and by
Commissioner McNutt. Ambassador Romulo also
formally expressed the conformity of the
Government of the Philippines to the approval of
said act to the American Senate. It is well settled in
the US that its laws have no extraterritorial effect.
The application of said law in the Philippines is
based concurrently on Philippines Property Act of
1946 and on the tacit consent and conduct of the
Government of the Philippines in receiving the
benefits of its provisions.
HAW PIA v CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
FACTS
Haw Pia had previously contracted a loan from
China Banking Corporation in the amount of
P5,103.35, which, according to Haw Pia, had been
completely paid, on different occasions from 1942
to 1944 through Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., which was
appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as
liquidator of China Banking Corp. With this, Haw Pia
instituted an action against China Banking Corp. to
compel the bank to execute a deed of cancellation
of mortgage on the property used as security for
the loan and to deliver its title.
However, upon service of summons, China Banking
Corp. demanded from Haw Pia for the payment of
the sum of its indebtedness with interests, which
also constituted its counter claim in its answer.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of China Banking
Corp. on the basis that there was no evidence to
show that Bank of Taiwan was authorized by China
Banking Corp. to accept Haw Pia's payment and
that Bank of Taiwan, as an agency of the Japanese
invading army, was not authorized under the
international law to liquidate the business of China
Banking Corp. As such, Haw Pia's payment to Bank
of Taiwan has not extinguished his indebtedness to
China Banking Corp.
ISSUE
Whether the Japanese Military Administration had
authority to order the liquidation of the business of
China Banking Corp. and to appoint Bank of
Taiwan as liquidator authorized as such to accept
payment

HELD
YES. Under international law, the Japanese Military
authorities had power to order the liquidation of
China Banking Corp. and to appoint and authorize
Bank of Taiwan as liquidator to accept the payment
in question, because such liquidation is not
confiscation of the properties of China Banking
Corp., but a mere sequestration of its assets which
required its liquidation.
The sequestration or liquidation of enemy banks in
occupied territories is authorized expressly, not
only by the US Army and Naval Manual of Military
Government and Civil Affairs, but also similar
manuals of other countries, without violating Art.
46 or other articles of the Hague Regulations. They
do not amount to an outright confiscation of
private property.
The purpose of such sequestration, as expounded
in the Annual Report of the Office of the Alien
Custodian, is that enemy-owned property can be
used to further the interest of the enemy and to
impede their war efforts. All enemy- controlled
assets can be used to finance propaganda,
espionage, and sabotage in these countries or in
countries friendly to their cause.
It is presumed that Japan, in sequestering and
liquidating China Banking Corp., must have acted
in accordance, either with her own Manual of the
Army and Navy and Civil Affairs OR with her
Trading with the Enemy Act, and even if not, it
being permitted to the Allied Nations, specially the
US and England, to sequestrate, impound, and
block enemy properties found within their own
domain or in enemy territories occupied during the
war by their armed forces, and it not being
contrary to Hague Regulations or international law,
Japan had also the right to do the same in the
Philippines by virtue of the international law
principle that "what is permitted to one belligerent
is also allowed to the other."
Taking these into consideration, it appears that
Japan did not intend to confiscate or appropriate
the assets of said banks or the debts due them
from their debtors. The fact that the Japanese
Military authorities failed to pay the enemy banks
the balance of the money collected by the Bank of
Taiwan from the debtors of the said banks, did not
and could not change the sequestration by them of
the bank's assets during the war, into an outright
confiscation thereof. It was physically impossible
for the Japanese Military authorities to do so
because they were forcibly driven out of the
Philippines, following the readjustment of rights of
private property on land seized by the enemy
provided by the Treaty of Versailles and other
peace treaties entered into at the close of WWI.
The
general
principles
underlying
such
arrangements are that the owners of properties
seized are entitled to receive compensation for the

loss or damage inflicted on their property by the


emergency war measures taken by the enemy.
Since Japan war notes were issued as legal tender,
Japan was bound to indemnify the aggrieved banks
for the loss or damage on their property, in terms
of Phil. Pesos of US $. Since the Japanese Military
Forces had power to sequestrate and impound the
assets of China Banking Corp. and to appoint Bank
of Taiwan as liquidator, it follows that payments of
Haw Pia to Bank of Taiwan extinguished his
obligations to China Banking Corp.
THE INTERHANDEL
MARCH 21, 1959)

CASE

(ICJ

JUDGMENT,

FACTS
The General Aniline and Film Company (GAF) is a
corporation incorporated in the United States.
Under the Trading with the Enemy Act the
government of the United States took almost all of
the shares of said company reasoning that such
shares were controlled by I.G. Farben, a German
and therefore enemy company. I.G. Farben
controlled the shares of GAF through a Swiss
company called I.G. Chemie of Basle. However by
1940, I.G. Chemie had changed its name to
Interhandel and was found by Swiss authorities to
no longer be controlled by any German or other
enemy company. Switzerland therefore seeks the
restoration of the shares of GAF that is owned by
Interhandel. Such restoration is however being
opposed by the United States who still maintains
its stance that Interhandle is being controlled by
I.G. Farben. Switzerland would like to submit the
dispute to the International Court of Justice
however the United States believes that the ICJ has
no jurisdiction over the matter. Switzerland bases
its claim that the ICJ has jurisdiction on Art. 36, Par.
2 of the statute of the Court.
ISSUE
Whether the ICJ has jurisdiction to decide the case
between Switzerland and the United States of
America
HELD
NO. The Swiss Application is inadmissible. The
United States presented four objections to
Switzerlands Application. One of which was
sustained therefore making the Swiss Application
inadmissible. The objection sustained held that the
Swiss Application could not be entertained because
not all local remedies have been exhausted by
Interhandel. The local remedy referred to is a case
still pending in the US courts.
Doctrine of the case (according to the book):
Reciprocity in the case of Declarations accepting
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court enables a Party
to invoke a reservation to that acceptance which it
has not expressed in its own Declaration but which
the other Party has expressed in its Declaration.

Thus, if a party that has made a Declaration


unconditionally is brought to the court by another
that has made a Declaration with conditions, the
former can invoke the conditions in the latters
Declaration.
The situation in this case was that the United
States was invoking the reservation that it made
when it accepted the statute of the Court on the
countrys acceptance of the Courts compulsory
jurisdiction. Such reservation sought to limit the
courts jurisdiction to cases hereinafter arising
July 28, 1948. Following the doctrine stated in the
book; this means that Switzerland may therefore
invoke such reservation if in their own declaration
does not contain such. This is the effect of
reciprocity. However, it cannot justify a State, in
this instance the United States, in relying upon a
restriction which the other Party, Switzerland has
not included in its own Declaration.
THE PAQUETE HABANA CASE
FACTS
The Paquete Habana was a sloop and the Lola was
a schooner both were flying under the Spanish flag
and both were owned and manned by Spanish
subjects residing in Cuba which was then a colony
of Spain. Both left Havana on a fishing expedition
and upon making their way back to the capital
encountered the naval blockade of the United
States of America who had recently declared war
on Spain. The crews of both ships were unaware of
the state of war between the two nations and were
also unaware of the blockade of the navy. They
nevertheless did not try to escape or resist. Upon
searching the vessels no weapons or ammunition
was found and it appears that the crew members
had no intention of aiding the cause of the Spanish
forces. Their ships were commandeered and
brought to Fort Keys in Florida wherein they were
declared as prizes of war and auctioned off for
$490 and $800 respectively.
ISSUE
Whether the fishing smacks were rightfully
captured by armed vessels of the United States
during the recent war with Spain.
HELD
NO. The fishing vessels were captured illegally. By
an ancient usage among civilized nations,
beginning centuries ago and gradually ripening
into a rule of international law, coast fishing
vessels pursuing their vocation of catching and
bringing in fresh fish have been recognized as
exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture
as prize of war. The United States had no authority
to commandeer the fishing smacks in question.
Sources from as far back as 1403 were cited by the
court to prove the ancient tradition. Letters
between kings of European powers were quoted as

well as treaties between European nations. All


emphasized the need to spare fishermen and their
vessels from the effects of war. Some quotes: In
time of war, the freedom of fishing is respected by
belligerents; fishing boats are considered as
neutral; in law, as in principle, they are not subject
either to capture or to confiscation.
"An exception to the usage of capturing enemy's
private vessels at sea is the coast fishery. . . . This
principle of immunity from capture of fishing boats
is generally adopted by all maritime powers, and in
actual warfare they are universally spared so long
as they remain harmless
"Regarding the capture of enemy property, an
exception must be mentioned, which is a universal
custom. Fishing vessels which belong to the
adjacent coast, and whose business yields only a
necessary livelihood, are, from considerations of
humanity, universally excluded from capture."
The capture was unlawful and the proceeds gained
through the sale of the ships and their cargo should
be restored to the claimant.
THE COUNT BERNADOTTE CASE (ADVISORY
OPINION OF THE ICJ ON REPARATION FOR
INJURIES SUFFERED IN THE SERVICE OF THE
UN)
FACTS
Folke Bernadotte, Count of Wisborg, was a Swedish
diplomat and nobleman noted for his negotiation of
the release of about 31,000 prisoners from the
German concentration camps during WWII. After
the war, he was chosen by the victorious powers to
be the UN Security Council mediator in the ArabIsraeli conflict. He was assassinated in Jerusalem
by the militant Zionist group, Lehi, while pursuing
his official duties.
The UN Security Council condemned the killing of
Bernadotte as a cowardly act, which appears to
have been committed by a criminal group of
terrorists in Jerusalem while the UN representative
was fulfilling his peace-seeking mission in the Holy
Land.
ISSUE
In the event of an agent of the UN in the
performance of his duties suffering injury in
circumstances involving the responsibility of a
State, has the UN the capacity to bring an
international claim against the responsible
government with a view of obtaining the reparation
due in respect of the damage cause (1) to the UN,
(2) to the victim or to persons entitled through
him? Does the UN have international personality?
HELD

YES. The Court states that the Charter conferred


upon the UN rights and obligations, which are
different from those of its members. The Court
stresses further the important political tasks of the
UN--the maintenance of international peace and
security. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the
UN, possessing as it does rights and obligations,
has at the same time a large measure of
international personality and the capacity to
operate upon an international plane, although it is
certainly not a super-State.
The Court reaches a conclusion that the UN has the
capacity to bring an international claim against a
State (whether member or not) for damage
resulting from a breach by that State of its
obligations towards the UN.
The Court points out that it is not called upon to
determine the precise extent of the reparation,
which the UN would be entitled to recover; the
measure of the reparation should depend upon a
number of factors.
The Court points out in this connection that really
only the Organization has the capacity to present a
claim in the circumstances referred to, inasmuch as
at the basis of an international claim there must be
a breach by the defendant State of an obligation
towards the Organization. In the present case the
State of which the victim is a national could not
complain of a breach of an obligation towards itself.
Here the obligation is assumed in favor of the
Organization. However, the Court admits that the
analogy of the traditional rule of diplomatic
protection of nationals abroad does not in itself
justify an affirmative reply. In fact, there exists no
link of nationality between the UN and its agents.
This is a new situation and it must be analyzed. Do
the provisions of the Charter relating to the
functions of the UN imply that the latter is
empowered to assure its agents limited protection?
These powers, which are essential to the
performance of the functions of the UN, must be
regarded as a necessary implication arising from
the Charter. In discharging its functions, the UN
may find it necessary to entrust its agents with
important missions to be performed in disturbed
parts of the world. These agents must be ensured
of effective protection. It is only in this way that the
agent will be able to carry out his duties
satisfactorily.
The Court therefore reaches the conclusion that the
UN has the capacity to exercise functional
protection in respect of its agents. The situation is
comparative simple: in the case of Member States,
for these have assumed various obligations
towards the Organization.
But what is the situation when a claim is brought
against a State, which is not a Member of the
Organization? The Court is of opinion that the
Members of the United Nations created an entity

possessing objective international personality and


not merely personality recognized by them alone.
Question No. I1 of the General Assembly refers to
the reconciliation of action by the United Nations
with such rights as may be possessed by the State
of which the victim is a national. In other words,
what is involved is possible competition between
the rights of diplomatic protection, on the one
hand, and functional protection on the other. The
Court does not state here which of these two
categories of protection should have priority and in
the case of Member States it stresses their duty to
render every assistance provided by Article 2 of the
Charter. It adds that the risk of competition
between the Organization and the national State
can be reduced or eliminated either by a general
convention or by agreements entered into in each
particular case, and it refers further to cases that
have already arisen in which a practical solution
has already been found.
Finally, the Court examines the case in which the
agent bears the nationality of the defendant-State.
Since the claim brought by the UN is not based
upon the nationality of the victim but rather upon
his status as an agent of the UN, it does not matter
whether or not the State to which the claim is
addressed regards him as its own national. The
legal situation is not modified thereby.

UNDERHILL v HERNANDEZ
168 U.S. 250 (1897)
FACTS
In an 1892 revolution, General Hernandez deposed
the existing Venezuelan government and took
control of Ciudad Bolivar, where Pl Underhill, an
American citizen, lived and ran a waterworks
system for the city. Underhill applied to Hernandez,
requesting a passport to leave the city. Hernandez
initially refused, but ultimately granted it. When
Underhill finally got back to the US, he brought an
action to recover damages caused by the refusal to
grant the passport, by his detention in Venezuela,
for alleged confinement to his own house, and for
certain alleged assaults and affronts by the soldiers
of Hernandez's army.
ISSUE
Whether the action instituted by Underhill will
prosper
HELD
NO. The Court determined that Hernandez had
acted in his official capacity as a military
commander so his actions were those of the
Venezuelan government.
The Court therefore refused to hear the claim
against Hernandez based on the Act of State
Doctrine. The Court reasoned, "Every sovereign
state is bound to respect the independence of

every other sovereign state, and the courts of one


country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another, done within its own
territory." Also, it did not matter that it was a
revolution, and that the commander may not have
had recognition at the time as the leader from
outside the territory. What matters is that he
succeeded and is now recognized as such.
THE NOTTEBOHM CASE: LIECHTENSTEIN v
GUATEMALA (ICJ JUDGMENT, NOVEMBER 18,
1953, APRIL 6, 1955)
FACTS
Nottebohm, born in Germany, possessed German
citizenship. Although he lived in Guatemala from
1905 until 1943, he never became a citizen of
Guatemala. In 1939, Nottebohm applied to become
a naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein. The
application was approved under exceptional
circumstances and he became a citizen of
Liechtenstein. He then returned to Guatemala on
his Liechtenstein passport and informed the local
government of his change of nationality. When he
tried to return to Guatemala once again in 1943, he
was refused entry as an enemy alien since the
Guatemalan authorities did not recognize his
naturalization and regarded him as still German. It
has been suggested that the timing of the event
was due to the recent entry of the US and
Guatemala into the WWII.
He was later extradited to the US where he was
held at an internment camp until the end of the
war. All his possessions in Guatemala were
confiscated. After his release, he lived out the rest
of his life in Liechtenstein.
The
Government
of
Liechtenstein
granted
Nottebohm protection against unjust treatment by
the government of Guatemala and petitioned the
ICJ. However, the government of Guatemala argued
that Nottebohm did not gain Liechtenstein
citizenship for the purposes of international law.
ISSUE
Whether the conferment of the Liechtenstein
citizenship is not contrary to international law and
if Liechtenstein's claim on behalf of Nottebohm is
admissible in court
HELD
NO. The Court agreed with Guatemala and held
that the claims by Liechtenstein
were
inadmissible. Although the Court stated that it is
the sovereign right of all states to determine its
own citizens and criteria for becoming one in
municipal law, such a process would have to be
scrutinized on the international plain in questions
of diplomatic protection. The Court upheld the
principle of effective nationality, where the national
must prove a meaningful connection to the state in
question. This principle was previously applied only

in cases of dual nationality to determine which


nationality should be used in a given case.
However Nottebohm had forfeited his German
nationality and thus only had the nationality of
Liechtenstein.
According to the practice of States, nationality
constitutes the juridical expression of the fact that
an individual is more closely connected with the
population of a particular State. Conferred by a
State, it only entitles that State to exercise
protection if it constitutes a translation into
juridical terms of the individual's connection with
that State.
With regard to Nottebohm, the Court pointed out
that he always retained his family and business
connections with Germany and that there is
nothing to indicate that his application for
naturalization in Liechtenstein was motivated by
any desire to disassociate himself from Germany.
There is thus the absence of any bond of
attachment with Liechtenstein, but there is a longstanding and close connection between him and
Guatemala, a link, which his naturalization in no
way weakened. That naturalization was not based
on any real prior connection with Liechtenstein, nor
did it in any way alter the manner 'of life of the
person upon whom it was conferred in exceptional
circumstances of speed and accommodation. In
both respects, it was lacking in the genuineness
requisite to an act of such importance, if it is to be
entitled to be respected by a State in the position
of Guatemala. It was granted without regard to the
concept of nationality adopted in international
relations.
Naturalization was asked for not so much for the
purpose of obtaining a legal recognition of
Nottebohm's membership in fact in the population
of
Liechtenstein, as it was to enable him to substitute
for his status as a national of a belligerent State
that of the subject of a neutral State, with the sole
aim of thus coming within the protection of
Liechtenstein but not of becoming wedded to its
traditions, its interests, its way of life or of
assuming the obligations other than fiscal
obligations and exercising the rights pertaining to
the status thus acquired.
Jusmag vs NLRC
GR 109913, Dec 15, 1994
Facts:
Florencio Sacramento was a support personnel of
the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to
the Philippines. When he was dismissed, he held a
position as Illustrator 2 was the president of a labor
organization registered with DOLE. However, he
was terminated due to the abolition of his position.
He filed a complaint with DOLE on the ground that

he was illegally terminated. Respondent asked for


reinstatement. Petitioner filed for motion to dismiss
as he invoked his immunity from suit. Labor arbiter
dismissed his suit and has petitioned in the
National Labor Relations Commission and the latter
reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter for the
reason that the petitioner lost his right not to be
suid because the petitioner failed to refute the
existence of the employer-employee relationship
and when he hired the services of the private
respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has immunity from
suit
Ruling:
The petitioner has immunity from suit. Even if he
hired the services of the private respondent, it has
still been acting on behalf of the governmental
function of the United States pursuant to the
Military Assistance Agreement between the
Philippines and America. Since USA has not
consented for the waiver of its immunity from suit,
the complaint shouldnt have prospered. The
immunity is one of the recognized principles of
International law that the Philippine adopts. Hence,
the petition has been granted.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES
219 SCRA 192 (1993)

FACTS:
Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen,
worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange
(NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters in Quezon City. Shes married to
Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman
employed by the US Navy & stationed in San
Francisco.
Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed
at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity
exchange manager.
On Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from
the retail store Bradford managed, where she had
purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she
was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy,
a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that
she needed to search her bags upon Bradfords
instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to
protest the search but she was told that it was to
be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day.
Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her
person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other
curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus
she was allowed to leave afterwards.

Montoya learned that she was the only person


subjected to such search that day & she was
informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that
NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside
the store unless there is a strong evidence of a
wrong-doing.
Montoya
cant
recall
any
circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a
wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradfords
propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or
shoplifting.
Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no
action was taken. Montoya filed a suit against
Bradford for damages due to the oppressive &
discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in
excess of her authority as store manager. She
claims that she has been exposed to contempt &
ridicule causing her undue embarrassment &
indignity. She further claims that the act was not
motivated by any other reason aside from racial
discrimination in our own land w/c are a blow to our
national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral
damages of P500k and exemplary damages of
P100k.
On May 13, 1987, Summons & complaint were
served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer,
she along with USA government filed a motion to
dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against
US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o
its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit
for acts done in the performance of her official
functions under Phil-US Military Assistance
Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of
1947. They claim that US has rights, power &
authority w/in the bases, necessary for the
establishment, use & operation & defense thereof.
It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will
have effective command over the facilities, US
personnel, employees, equipment & material. They
further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is
a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets
to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash &
equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of
NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1.
On July 6, 1987 , Montoya filed a motion for
preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was
about to leave the country & was removing &
disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her
creditors.
Motion
granted
by
RTC.
On July 14, 1987, Montoya opposed Bradfords
motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was
outside NEX JUSMAG store thus its improper,
unlawful & highly-discriminatory and beyond
Bradfords authority; (2) due to excess in authority
and since her liability is personal, Bradford cant
rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradfords act was
committed outside the military base thus under the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can
inquire into the factual circumstances of case to
determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her
authority.

RTC granted Montoyas motion for the issuance of a


writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued
writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya
allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in
default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in
favor of Montoya claiming that search was
unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against
Montoyas liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was
awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for
exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses.
Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC
granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing
decision.
Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a
civilian
employee
thus
not
performing
governmental functions. Even if she were
performing governmental acts, she would still not
be covered by the immunity since she was acting
outside the scope of her authority. She claims that
criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his
private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She
believes that this case is under RP courts
jurisdiction because act was done outside the
territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does
not fall under offenses where US has been given
right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does
not possess diplomatic immunity. She further
claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual
circumstances & determine WON Bradford is
immune.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
4.

WON the case is under the RTCs


jurisdiction.
WON RTC committed a grave abuse of
discretion in denying Bradfords motion to
dismiss.
WON case at bar is a suit against the State.
WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity.

HELD:
1. Yes. Intervention of a third party is
discretionary upon the Court. US did not
obtain leave of court (something like
asking for Courts permission) to intervene
in the present case. Technically, it should
not be allowed to intervene but since RTC
entertained its motion to dismiss, it is
deemed to have allowed US to intervene.
By voluntarily appearing, US must be
deemed to have subjected itself to RTCs
jurisdiction.
2.

No. Petitioners failed to specify any


grounds
for
a
motion
to
dismiss
enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of
Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of
action. A cause of action is necessary so
that Court would be able to render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails

to state a cause of action hypothetically


admits the truth of the allegations in the
complaint. RTC should have deferred the
resolution instead of denying it for lack of
merit. But this is immaterial at this time
since petitioners have already brought this
petition to the SC.
3.

No. Doctrine of state immunity is expressed


in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987
Constitustion. This immunity also applies to
complaints filed against officials of the
state for acts allegedly performed by them
in discharge of their duties since it will
require the state to perform an affirmative
act such as appropriation of amount to pay
damages. This will be regarded as a case
against the state even if it has not be
formally impleaded. But this is not all
encompassing. Its a different matter where
the public official is made to account in his
capacity as such for acts contrary to law &
injurious to rights of plaintiff. State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers.
Action against officials by one whose rights
have been violated by such acts is not a
suit against the State w/in the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. The
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used
as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice. It will not apply & may not be
invoked where the public official is being
sued in his private & personal capacity as
an ordinary citizen. This usually arises
where the public official acts w/o authority
or in excess of the powers vested in him. A
public official is liable if he acted w/malice
& in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA)
Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is
not conferred with blanket immunity for all
acts done by it or its agents in the
Philippines merely because they have
acted as agents of the US in the discharge
of their official functions. In this case,
Bradford was sued in her private/personal
capacity for acts done beyond the scope &
place of her official function, thus, it falls
w/in the exception to the doctrine of state
immunity.

4.

No. First of all, she is not among those


granted diplomatic immunity under Art.
16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance
Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second,
even
diplomatic
agents
who
enjoy
immunity are liable if they perform acts
outside their official functions (Art. 31,
Vienna
Convention
on
Diplomatic
Relations).
Petition denied. TRO lifted.

Eremes Kookooritchkin v. Solicitor General


G.R. No. L-1812, August 27, 1948
FACTS:
In August 1941, appellee-petitioner Kookooritchkin
filed with the CFI of Camarines Sur a petition for
naturalization, supported by (a) the affidavits of exJudge Jaime M. Reyes and Dr. Salvador Mariano,
residents of Camarines Sur, (b) his declaration of
intention which was sworn in July 1940, and (c)
notice of hearing. The petition was filed in August
1941 but was not heard until August 28 and Sept.
30, 1947 when appellee-petitioner presented his
evidence, since the province was invaded by the
Japanese forces during WWI and the case records
had to be reconstituted after being destroyed
during the war. Appellant SolGen cross-examined
appellee-petitioners witnesses but did not file any
opposition and did not present any evidence to
controvert the petition. The CFI granted the
petition for naturalization, finding that appelleepetitioner was a native-born Russian who grew up
as a citizen of and was part of the military of the
defunct Imperial Russian Government under the
Czars. He had several stints while in military
service before he joined the White Russian Army at
Vladivostok and fought against the Bolsheviks until
1922 when the latter force defeated the former.
Refusing to join the Bolshevik regime, he fled by
sea to Shanghai, and eventually went to Manila as
part of the group of White Russians under Admiral
Stark in March 1923. He finally permanently
resided in Iriga, Camarines Sur except during his
stint in the guerrilla force in Caramoan from 1942
to July 1945. The lower court also made findings of
the establishment of his family, employment, social
life, his ability to speak and write English and Bicol,
his good moral character, adherence to the
underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution,
and being a stateless refugee belonging to no
State.
ISSUES:
1.

2.

3.

W/N appellee-petitioners declaration of


intention to become a Filipino citizen was
valid and sufficient basis for his petition for
naturalization.
W/N
appellee-petitioner
sufficiently
established
legal
residence
in
the
Philippines and could speak and write any
of the principal Philippine languages.
W/N appellee-petitioner was stateless
refugee.

HELD:
1.

Section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law


applies and provides that [n]o declaration
shall be valid until entry for permanent
residence has been established and a
certificate showing the date, place and
manner of his arrival has been issued.
While appelleepetitioners declaration was
reconstituted, the attached certificate
referred to in the declaration was not

reconstituted. The SC ruled that the law


does not state that the certificate is
essential to the validity of the declaration
as the only requirement is for the said
certificate to be issued. There is the
uncontroverted fact of appellee-petitioners
peaceful and continuous residence in the
Philippines for 25 years and statement in
his declaration that a certificate had been
attached to the said declaration. Hence,
appellee petitioners declaration was valid
under law in view of other competent
evidence showing the facts sought to be
established under the certificate that was
not reconstituted.
2.

Appellee-petitioner has sufficiently shown


legal residence in the Philippines for a
continuous period of not less than 10 years
as required by Section 2 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. In addition, appelleepetitioner had good command of both
English and Bicol. While there may be
many standards out there, none was set in
the law on the required ability to speak and
write any of the principal Philippine
languages. Appellee petitioner got along
well with his comrades during his
hazardous days in the guerrilla movement
thus showing that he satisfied the
requirement of the law. There was also
circumstantial evidence that appelleepetitioner also ought to know how to write
Bicol, which uses the same alphabet used
in English and so widely used in the
Philippines. Given his good command of
English as shown in his testimony,
appellee-petitioner could easily make use
of the same alphabet in the place where he
had been residing for 25 years.

3.

Appellant SolGen asserted that appelleepetitioner failed to show that he lost his
citizenship under the laws of Russia and
that Russia granted to Filipinos the same
right to be naturalized citizens. However,
the SC still found that lower court did not
err in finding appellee-petitioner as a
stateless refugee. Appellee-petitioners
testimony that he is not a Russian citizen
and that he has no citizenship is
uncontroverted. There is also the wellknown
ruthlessness
of
modern
dictatorships giving rise to a great number
of stateless refugees or displaced persons,
without country or flag. The tyrannical
intolerance of dictatorships to opposition
translates
into
beastly
oppression,
concentration camps and bloody purges,
such that it is only natural that those who
flee to other countries to escape such a
situation, such as appellee- petitioner,

lose all bonds of attachments to


their former fatherlands.

circulated in the English language and read by


almost all the U. S. Naval Base personnel.
The defendants however contended by filing a

WYLIE VS. RARANG

motion to dismiss based on the grounds that the


defendants

G.R. No. 74135, May 28 1992, 209 SCRA 357

M.

H.

Wylie

and

Capt.

James Williams acted in the performance of their


official functions as officers of the United States

FACTS:

Navy and are, therefore, immune from suit; and the

Petitioner

M.

H.

Wylie

was

administrative officer while

the

assistant

petitioner

Capt.

James Williams was the commanding officer of the

United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of


the US government which cannot be sued without
its consent.

U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City.


Private

respondent

Aurora

I.

Rarang

was an

employee in the office of the Provost Marshal


assigned as merchandise control guard.
M.

H.

Wylie,

in

his

capacity

ISSUE:
Whether or not the officials of the United States

as

assistant

administrative officer of the U.S. Naval

Station

Naval Base are immune from suit.


HELD:

supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day"


(POD) which was published daily by the US Naval

The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated

Base

February 3, 1978 mentions a certain "Auring" as ". .

station.

announcements,

The

POD

featured

necessary

important

precautions,

and

a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the

general matters of interest to military personnel.

Provost

One of the regularfeatures of the POD was the

implies

"action line inquiry." On February 3, 1978, the POD

appropriating for herself confiscated items like

made a publication, under the "NAVSTA ACTION

cigarettes and foodstuffs. There is no question that

LINE INQUIRY" which mentioned a certain person

the Auring alluded to in the Article was the private

named Auring who is described as a disgrace to

respondent as she was the only Auring in the Office

her division and to the Office of the Provost

of the Provost Marshal. Moreover, as a result of this

Marshal.

article, the private respondent was investigated by

Marshal."
that

The

Auring

same

article

explicitly

was

consuming

and

her supervisor. Before the article came out, the


The private respondent was the only one who was
named "Auring" in the Office of the Provost Marshal
and was subsequently proven that it was her being

private respondent had been the recipient of


commendations by her superiors for honesty in the
performance of her duties.

referred to when petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a


letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication.
The private respondent the filed an action for
damages alleging that the article constituted false,

It may be argued that Captain James Williams as

injurious,

and

libel

commandingofficer of

virtue

and

removed in the chain of command from the

reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt

offensive publication and it would be asking too

and ridicule; and that the libel was published and

much to hold him responsible for everything which

tending

and
to

malicious

impeach

her

defamation
honesty,

the

naval

base

is

far

goes wrong on the base. This may be true as a

Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the

general rule. In this particular case, however, the

POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation

records show that the offensive publication was

against the character and reputation of the private

sent to the commanding officer for approval and he

respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that

approved it. The factual findings of the two courts

the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly

below are based on the records. The petitioners

recommended the deletion of the name Auring if

have shown no convincing reasons why our usual

the article were published. The petitioners,

respect for the findings of the trial court and the

however, were negligent because under their

respondent

direction they issued the publication without

court

should

be

withheld

in

this

particular case and why their decisions should be

deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is

reversed.

ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was


a tortious act which ridiculed the private
respondent. As a result of the petitioners' act, the
private respondent, according to the record,

Article 2176 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil

suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety,

liability for damages caused by a person's act or

wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially

omission constituting fault or negligence, to wit:

so, since the article was baseless and false. The


petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission, causes


damage to another, there being fault or negligence

liable for the damages they caused the private


respondent.

is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault


or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual

ABAYA vs. EBDANE

relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this

G.R. No. 167919 Feb. 14, 2007

Chapter.
Facts:
"Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts

The Government of Japan and the Government of

criminal

the

in

character,

whether

intentional

or

voluntary or negligent."

Philippines,

representatives,

through
namely,

their
Mr.

respective

Yoshihisa

Ara,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of


Japan to the Republic of the Philippines, and then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon,
Moreover, Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides
that moral damages may be recovered in case of
libel, slander or any other form of defamation. In
effect, the offended party in these cases is given

have

reached

an

understanding

concerning

Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines.


These loans were aimed at promoting our countrys
economic stabilization and development efforts.

the right to receive from the guilty party moral


damages for injury to his feelings and reputation
in addition to punitive or exemplary damages.

The assailed resolution recommended the award to


private

respondent

China

Road

&

Bridge

Corporation of the contract for the implementation


of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I),
which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of
the San Andres (Codon)-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road,

with the length of 79.818 kilometers, in the island

9184. They point out that to be considered a

province of Catanduanes.The DPWH caused the

treaty, an international or an executive agreement,

publication of the Invitation to Prequalify and to

the parties must be two sovereigns or States

Bid for the implementation of the CP I project, in

whereas in the case of Loan Agreement No. PH-

two leading national newspapers, namely, the

P204, the parties are the Philippine Government

Manila Times and Manila Standard on November 22

and the JBIC, a banking agency of Japan, which has

and

a separate juridical personality from the Japanese

29,

and

December

5,

2002.

Government.
A total of twenty-three (23) foreign and local
contractors

responded

by

The respondents however contend that foreign

prequalification

loan agreements, including Loan Agreement No.

documents on January 23, 2003. In accordance

PH-P204, as executive agreements and, as such,

with the established prequalification criteria, eight

should be observed pursuant to the fundamental

contractors were evaluated or considered eligible

principle

to bid as concurred by the JBIC. Prior to the

servanda. The Constitution, the public respondents

opening of the respective bid proposals, it was

emphasize,

announced that the Approved Budget for the

executive agreements in the same way that it

Contract

recognizes

submitting

their

(ABC)

to

the

accomplished

was

in

invitation

the

amount

of

P738,710,563.67.

in

international
recognizes
generally

law
the

of

pacta

enforceability

accepted

principles

sunt
of
of

international law as forming part of the law of the


land.34 This recognition allegedly buttresses the

The bid goes to private respondent China Road &

binding effect of executive agreements to which

Bridge Corporation was corrected from the original

the Philippine Government is a signatory. It is

P993,183,904.98 (with variance of 34.45% from

pointed

the ABC) to P952,564,821.71 (with variance of

executive agreements are essentially contracts

28.95% from the ABC) based on their letter

governing the rights and obligations of the parties.

clarification

A contract, being the law between the parties,

dated

April

21,

2004.

out

by

the

public

respondents

that

must be faithfully adhered to by them. Guided by


The petitioners anchor the instant petition on the

the fundamental rule of pacta sunt servanda, the

contention that the award of the contract to private

Philippine Government bound itself to perform in

respondent

good faith its duties and obligations under Loan

China Road

& Bridge

Corporation

violates RA 9184, particularly Section 31 thereof


which

Agreement.

reads:

SEC. 31. Ceiling for Bid Prices. The ABC shall be

Issue: Whether or not the the loan agreement

the upper limit or ceiling for the Bid prices. Bid

violates RA 9184.

prices that exceed this ceiling shall be disqualified


outright from further participating in the bidding.

Held:

There shall be no lower limit to the amount of the

The court ruled in favor of the respondents.

award.

Significantly, an exchange of notes is considered a


form of an executive agreement, which becomes

The petitioners insist that Loan Agreement is

binding through executive action without the need

neither

executive

of a vote by the Senate or Congress. executive

agreement that would bar the application of RA

agreements, They sometimes take the form of

an

international

nor

an

exchange of notes and at other times that of more

express

formal documents denominated agreements or

renunciation that is made known distinctly and

protocols.

explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

renunciation

Petitioner

after

having

held

to

renounced

Portuguese

citizenship

pacta sunt servanda, which is, in fact, embodied in

reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen

Section 4 of RA 9184 as it provides that [a]ny

by applying for a renewal of his Portuguese

treaty or international or executive agreement

passport and represented himself as such in official

affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the

documents even after becoming a naturalized

observed, the DPWH, as the executing agency of


the projects financed by Loan Agreement No. PH-

naturalization,

mean

The fundamental principle of international law of

Philippine government is a signatory shall be

upon

was

resumed

or

Filipino citizen. Such acts is grossly inconsistent


with his maintenance of Philippine Citizenship.
Philippine Citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a

P204, rightfully awarded the contract for the

commodity or ware to be displayed when required

implementation of civil works for the CP I project to

and suppressed when convenient.

private

respondent

China

Road

&

Bridge
Wherefore,

Corporation.

premises

considered,

petitioner's

motion for release from detention is denied. The


Willie Yu vs Miriam Defensor-Santiago GR No.

decision is immediately executory.

83882n (1989)

Facts:

[ G.R. NO. 182701, JULY 23, 2008 ]


Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez vs. Commission on

Willie Yu (Petitioner) is a naturalized Filipino citizen.

Elections and Tessie P. Villanueva

Petitioner was holder of a Portuguese passport and


despite his naturalization on February 10, 1978

Facts:

applied for a renewal of his travel document with

Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez herein petitioner was a

the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo and was issued


same on July 21, 1981. Albeit, petitioner has
renounced his former allegiance, he continues to
revert to the former whenever convenient i.e. in
business

dealings

overseas.

Herein

and

transactions

respondent

local

has

and

candidate for the Barangay Election held last


October

29,

2007.

Petitioner

won

but

was

nonetheless disqualified by COMELEC. Allegedly, he


is a Filipino-American.

detained

Petitioner avers that he is indeed a dual citizen

petitioner for eventual deportation alleging that the

pursuant to his compliance with the Citizenship

latter is not a citizen by virtue of his acts &

Retention & Re-acquisition Act of 2003 and that he

evidences adduced. Petitioner filed a petition for

returned to the Philippines and possesses all the

habeas corpus seeking his release from detention.

qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman, hence


this petition.

Issue:
Whether the Bureau of Immigration & Deportation

Issue: Whether herein petitioner, as a Filipino-

(BID) was justified in detaining petitioner and

American or with dual citizenship, is eligible to run

processing him for deportation.

for the office of Barangay Chairman.

Held:

Held:

The

court

quo,

In

Board

of

Immigration

Commissioners vs. Go Gallano, enunciated that

The petition was dismissed and the order of the


COMELEC disqualifying petitioner was upheld.

The court stated that the petitioner cannot rely on


Valles vs. COMELEC because his case does not sit
four squares with the facts of the same and that
the doctrine in Valles has been superseded by the
enactment

of

R.A.

No.

9225

in

2003

which

expressly provides the conditions before those who


re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for public
office to wit:
Section

5. Civil

and

Political

who

retain

Liabilities. - Those

Rights
or

and

re-acquire

Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full


civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant

liabilities

and

responsibilities

under

existing laws of the Philippines and the following


conditions:

xxxxxx

(2) Those

seeking

elective

public

office

in

the Philippines shall meet the qualification for


holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all

foreign citizenship before

any

public

officer authorized to administer an oath.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHAN


FOOK, G.R. No. L-16968 October 6, 1921

FACTS: The accused, a Chinese subject, was a


passenger of the United States Military Transport
South Bend. Having been allowed by the
immigration authorities to land, he left the boat on
the same day. The following day, he went to pier
no. 1 to get his baggage. After the search of the
baggage in which postcards of an indecent
character were found, a customs agent attempted
to search the body of the accused, to which the
latter apparently objected. A dispute took place
between the two, which terminated in the secret
agent seizing the Chinaman by the arm with intent
to search his body, after showing him his police
badge. The accused resisted and struck the secret
agent on the stomach. The latter in turn struck him
on the neck. The customs inspector intervened and
explained to the accused that Cruz was a customs
secret service agent and had the right to search

him in order to find whether he had on his person


any contraband. Then the appellant made no
further resistance and allowed himself to be
searched.
Chan Fook was prosecuted for the crime of
resistance and disobedience to the public authority
by the CFI of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is guilty of the crime of
resistance and disobedience.
Held: No. The prosecution alleges that under
section 1338 of the Administrative Code all persons
coming into the Philippine Islands from Foreign
countries shall be liable to detention and search by
the customs authorities under such regulations as
may be prescribed relative thereto. The defense,
however, contends that once the accused has
arrived at the point of his destination by being
allowed to leave the boat and to land he was
beyond the jurisdiction of the customs authorities,
and, therefore, not liable to search without judicial
warrant.
Having in mind the aim of the law in
authorizing the search of persons coming from
foreign countries, which is to avoid the clandestine
introduction into the Philippine Islands of goods
subject to the payment of customs duties, or the
importation of the articles prohibited by law, or the
entrance of persons who have no right to reside in
these Islands, after the customs authorities have
permitted the accused to land in Manila, the
terminus of his voyage, he ceased to be a
passenger within the meaning of said section 1338
of the Administrative Code.
The scope of the respective powers of public
officers and their agents is fixed. If they go beyond
it and they violate any recognized rights of the
citizens, then the latter may resist the invasion.
In the case at bar the action of the accused
in laying his hands on the agent Cruz is an
adequate defense to repel the aggression of the
latter, who had seized him by the arm for the
purpose of searching him. In accordance with the
repeated decisions of the supreme court of Spain,
the gravity of a disobedience to an order of a
person in public authority is measured and graded
by the circumstances surrounding the act, the
motives prompting it, and the real importance of
the transgression rather than by the source of the
order disobeyed. And, taking into consideration the
circumstances of the present case, wherein the
agent Cruz had exceeded his functions, and
wherein the accused acted in defense of the most
highly esteemed of individual rights the
constitutional right to be secured against
unreasonable searches we are of the opinion
that there is no ground for finding the accused
guilty of the crime defined in article 252 of the
Penal Code.
The supreme court of Spain held that the act
of obstinately disregarding an order of an agent of
the authority does not constitute the crime of

grave resistance and disobedience to an agent of


the public authority where it appears that upon
being directed for the third time, the accused
obeyed, though uttering unpleasant words, for
although the accused did not leave the premises
on the first and second requests, he, however,
obeyed on the third, and did not render it
necessary for the public officer to make use of the
means authorized by law to make himself
respected. That the accused had no intention to
resist and disobey the agents of the authority, in
the legal sense of the word, is shows by the fact
that by the mere explanation of the customs
inspector, he finally allowed himself to be
searched.
That foreigners in the Philippines are
entitled to the benefits of the individual rights
secured by the Philippine Bill is undeniable. When
Congress came to pass the Act of July 1, 1902, it
enacted, almost in the language of the President's
instructions, the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. In
view of the expressed declarations of the President,
followed by the action of Congress, both adopting,
with little alternation, the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, there would seem to be no room for
argument that in this form it was intended to carry
to the Philippine Islands those principles of our
government which the President declared to be
established as rules of law for the maintenance of
individual freedom, at the same time expressing
regret that the inhabitants of the Islands had not
therefore enjoyed their benefit.
And according to the principles underlying
the Constitution, as extended to the Philippine
Islands by the President's instructions to the
Commission and by the Philippine Bill, foreigners
are entitled to the protection of their life, liberty,
and property.
PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
v. UNION INSURANCE SOCIETY OF CANTON,
LTD
G.R. No. L-16473 November 11, 1921
FACTS: The plaintiff was the owner of the steel
tank lighter named Philmaco. The defendant is an
insurance company organized under the laws of
Hong Kong and duly authorized to transact
business here.
The defendant insured the plaintiff's lighter
and issued its policy for such insurance. During the
life of the policy and as a result of a typhoon, the
lighter was sunk in the Manila Bay, of which the
plaintiff notified the defendant and demanded
payment of the full amount of its policy, which the
defendant refused, and denied its liability. Plaintiff
commenced an action and alleged in the complaint
that the loss of the said steel tank lighter was total
and the full amount for which it was insured upon
such loss immediately became due and payable.
For answer the defendant admits the issuance and
delivery of the policy, and, as a further and
separate defense, alleges that, under its terms, the
defendant was only liable for an absolute total loss,

and that there was not a total destruction of the


lighter.
The lower court rendered judgment for the
defendant. Hence, an appeal was taken.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant is liable.
Held: Yes. Counsel for the defendant points out that
the policy provides that it "shall be of as much
force and effect as the surest writing or policy of
insurance made in London," and contend that the
policy should be construed under the Marine Law of
Great Britain, but as to what may be the law there
is not alleged or proven.
The law of Great Britain since the
Declaration of Independence is the law of a foreign
country, and, like any other foreign law, is matter
of fact, which the courts of this country cannot be
presumed to be acquainted with, or to have judicial
knowledge of, unless it is pleaded and proved.
The rule that the courts of one country
cannot take cognizance of the law of another
without plea and proof has been constantly
maintained at law and in equity, in England and
America.
When in a litigation the application of a
foreign law, for example the law of China, is
sought, it is necessary to prove before the courts of
the Islands, in a satisfactory manner, the existence
of such law as a question of fact; and when proof of
such a law is lacking, it is improper to apply
unknown laws to suits pending before the courts of
the Islands.
In the English practice, a ship is a total loss
when she has sustain such extensive damage that
it would not be reasonably practical to repair her.
The ordinary measure of prudence which the courts
have adopted is this: If the ship, when repaired, will
not be worth the sum which it would be necessary
to expend upon her, the repairs are, practically
speaking, impossible, and it is a case of total loss.
(Citing a number of English authorities.)
After a careful consideration of the
important case, the decision of the trial court
should be reversed, and that a judgment should be
entered here in favor of the plaintiff against the
defendant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOL-LO and
SARAW, G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
FACTS: On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left
matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another
Dutch possession. There the boat was surrounded
by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on
the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo,
attacked some of the men, and brutally violated
two of the women by methods too horrible to the
described. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo,
who also raped one of the women, and Saraw.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their


home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There they were arrested and were
charged in the CFI of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for
the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense
charged was not within the jurisdiction of the CFI,
nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that
the facts did not constitute a public offense, under
the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. The
demurrer was overruled by the trial judge.
Judgment was rendered finding the two
defendants guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offense committed is penalized
by Philippine laws.
Held: Yes. It is evident that the provisions of the
Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating
to piracy are not inconsistent with the
corresponding provisions in force in the United
States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the
Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical
construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the
articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be
that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be
substituted by the words "United States" and
wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word
should be substituted by the expression "citizens of
the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands." Somewhat similar reasoning led this court
in the case of United States vs. Smith to give to the
word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a
limited
meaning,
which
would
no
longer
comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers,
but only public officers in the Government of the
Philippine Islands.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WONG
CHENG, G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922
FACTS: Wong Cheng is accused of having illegally
smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel
Changsa, which is of English nationality, while
anchored in Manila Bay and two and a half miles
from the shores of the city. Wong Cheng presented
a demurrer to the criminal information, alleging
lack of jurisdiction of the lower court.
Lower court ruled in favor of the accused and thus
dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippines courts have jurisdiction
over the crime committed on board a foreign
merchant vessel anchored in our jurisdiction
waters.
Held: Yes. There are two fundamental rules on this
particular matter in connection with International
Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which
crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant
vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of

the country within whose territorial jurisdiction


they were committed, unless their commission
affects the peace and security of the territory; and
the English rule, based on the territorial principle
and followed in the United States, according to
which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of
the country within territory they were committed.
Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in
this jurisdiction, because at present the theories
and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States
on this matter are authority in the Philippines
which is now a territory of the United States.
We have seen that the mere possession of
opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held
by this court not triable by or courts, because it
being the primary object of our Opium Law to
protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against
the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this
drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without
being used in our territory, does not being about in
the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere
possession is not considered a disturbance of the
public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial
limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant
ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here
established, because it causes such drug to
produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It
seriously contravenes the purpose that our
Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute.
GO JULIAN v. GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. L-20809 October 22, 1923
FACTS: On Sept. 7, 1899, Go Julian, a Chinese
merchant, was born in the Philippines of Chinese
parents. Since then, he has been residing in Iloilo.
In 1922, he filed a petition in the CFI of Iloilo for
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines under
Act No. 2972. He admits that he was currently a
citizen of the Chinese Republic and that he holds a
certificate of residence issued under the Act of
Congress of Apr. 29, 1902. Nothing in the records
shows that his Chinese parents were considered as
Spanish subjects before the ratification of the
Treaty of Paris.
The Attorney-General opposed his petition
on the grounds that: (a) the petitioner, being
Chinese, was not entitled to the benefits granted
by said law since it can only be availed of by
citizens of the United States or foreigners who
under the laws of the United States may be
become citizens of said country if residing therein;
and (b) under the laws of the United States, Julian
could not be naturalized as a citizen of the U.S.
even if he were residing therein.
Lower Court Ruling: The trial court sustained the
opposition of the Attorney-General and denied
Julians petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may recover his
Philippine citizenship.
Held: YES. Assuming that Julian, by reason of
having been born in the Philippines, had at least a
latent right to Philippine citizenship; and assuming
that during his minority, his father chose the
nationality of his country in applying for a
certificate of residence, in 1903, and that Julian,
upon attaining the age of majority, chose the
nationality of his father; the question that presents
itself now for our consideration is whether or not
the petition may recover the Philippine citizenship
under Act No. 2927.
In the case of United States v. Wong Kim
Ark (169 U. S., 649), the Court stated that the 14 th
Amendment affirmed the ancient and fundamental
rule of citizenship by birth within the territory. The
Amendment includes the children born within the
territory of the United States, of all other persons,
of whatever race or color, domiciled within the
United States.
Section 2 of the Act of Congress of August
29, 1916 provides:
SEC. 2. That all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain in accordance with
the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and except such
others as have since become citizens of
some other country: Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for,
is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who
do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United
States, or who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United
States if residing therein.
By virtue of the authority granted by said
Act, the Philippine Legislature enacted on March
26, 1920, Act No. 2927 known as Naturalization
Law. Section 1 of this Act provides:
SEC. 1. Who may become Philippine
citizens. Philippine citizenship may be
acquired by: (a) Natives of the Philippines
who are not citizens thereof under the
Jones Law; (b) natives of the other Insular
possessions of the United States; (c)
citizens of the United States, or foreigners
who under the laws of the United States

may become citizens of said country if


residing therein.
The Court is of the opinion that Julian is a
native of the Philippines within the meaning of the
word "natives" used in the Act and the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916. Therefore, since he is
a native of the Philippine Islands, but is not,
however, within the provisions of Section 2 of the
Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, for having
chosen the nationality of his father, he may now
recover his Philippine citizenship, under section 1
of Act No. 2927. As Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking of
Act No. 2927, says:
The only qualification for a native of the
Philippines to be able to acquire Philippine
citizenship is that he must not be less than
twenty-one years of age.
Even in viewing the question from the
standpoint that Julian is a Chinese on account of
the fact that he chose the nationality of his father
after attaining the age of majority, the fact of his
having born in the Philippine still stands, and under
the doctrine laid down in the Wong Kim Ark case,
and followed by this court in various decisions, he
may now recover his Philippine citizenship under
the provisions of the Naturalization Act.
BEHN, MEYER & CO. v. STANLEY
G.R. No. L-22537 December 8, 1924
FACTS: In February 1918, during the war with
Germany, all the business, property, and assets if
every nature of a Behn, Meyer & Co. (BMC), a
foreign corporation with a branch in the Philippines,
were taken over by the Alien Property Custodian
under the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy
Act and a receiver appointed and placed in full
charge of the business and assets of the firm.
In February 1919, the Alien Property
Custodian declared BMC to be an enemy not
holding a license granted by the President of the
United States and at the same time made demand
upon the receiver to convey, transfer, assign,
deliver and pay over to the Custodian all the
property and assets of the firm, as well as the net
proceeds of the sale and liquidation of its business.
In 1922, in a civil case against BMC, the CFI
of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of Jureidini
& Bros. by declaring it to be the rightful owner of
certain merchandise by virtue of a sale ordered by
the British Admiralty Court of Alexandria, Egypt in a
prize court proceedings. Upon petition of Jureidini &
Bros. as judgment creditor of BMC, the CFI ordered
the appointment of a receiver of BMCs property,
assets and estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction
to appoint a receiver of the property, assets and
estate of a corporation which was declared by the
Alien Property Custodian as an enemy.

Held: No. According to Section 9 of the Trading


with Enemy Act, Except as herein provided, the
money or other property conveyed, transferred,
assigned, delivered, or paid to the Alien Property
Custodian shall not be liable to lien, attachment,
garnishment, trustee, process, or execution, or
subject to any order to decree of any court.
Since the firm was declared an enemy not
holding license, it became the duty of the Alien
Property Custodian to take possession of its
business and all its assets within United States
territory. It must be presumed that this duty was
fully performed and that the assets are now either
actually or constructively in the possession of the
Alien Property Custodian and under his control and
thus, beyond the jurisdiction and control of the
Philippine courts. The only jurisdiction given to the
courts of the Philippines is in regard to criminal
offenses under the Act, as provided in Section 18
thereof. Having said that, the appointment of the
receiver was in excess of the jurisdiction of the
Philippine courts.
INGENOHL v. WALTER E. OLSEN AND CO., INC.,
G.R. No. L-22288 January 12, 1925
FACTS: Ingenohl filed a suit against the defendant,
a corporation duly organized, existing and doing
business under the laws of the Philippines, before
the Supreme Court of Hongkong for infringement of
trademark. Since Ingenohl and his company are
alien enemies as declared by the Alien Property
Custodian, its properties and other assets,
including the trademarks, were seized and sold to
Olsen and Co. The Supreme Court of Hong Kong,
which was then a colony of Great Britain, an ally of
the United States, of being a court of competent
jurisdiction and having jurisdiction over both
parties, rendered a final judgment in favor of
Ingenohl and refused to recognize the sale of said
trademarks done by the Alien Property Custodian
to Olsen and Co. Defendant corporation refused to
pay Ingenhol HKD26,244.23, the amount awarded
to the latter in the Hong Kong judgment. Therefore,
Ingenohl filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, seeking to recover the costs
adjudged against the corporation by the Hongkong
court.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of
Ingenohl for the amount of his claim, with interest
of 6% p.a.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of the Hongkong
Supreme Court, being a foreign judgment, may be
enforced in the Philippines.
Held: No. It is well settled, upon the ground of
comity and the law of nations, that in the absence
of treaty or statute, a judgment rendered by a

court of competent jurisdiction of one foreign


country in which the parties appeared and
contested the case on its merits, will be recognized
and enforced in any other foreign country. But here
we have a statute which clearly defines the specific
conditions upon which a foreign judgment can be
enforced in the Philippine Islands, and we have a
decision of the United States Supreme Court which
holds that "where there is no written law upon the
subject, such as treaty or statute, questions of
international law must be determined by judicial
decisions, the works of jurists, and the acts and
usages of civilized nations." The converse of that
proposition is also true that where you do have a
treaty or statute, to enforce a foreign judgment, it
must come under and within the specific provisions
of the treaty or statute.
Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides: x x x but the judgment may be repelled
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Under such a statute, where a party
seeks to enforce a foreign judgment, the defendant
has a legal right to make any of such defenses, and
if any of them is shown to properly exist, it will
defeat the judgment.

RATAN SINGH v. GOVERNMENT


G.R. No. L-30685 July 29, 1929
FACTS: Ratan Singh, filed an application for
citizenship in the Court of First Instance in the
Province of Zambales, praying that he be
neutralized as a citizen of the Philippine Islands. He
alleged that he was born at Sangtipur, Jullunder,
Punjab, India and was a subject of Great Britain;
and he had all the qualifications required by the
Natralization Law (Act No. 2927) as to age,
residence, education, conduct, and he did not have
any of the disqualifications of the said Act.
Petitioner alleges that he falls in the class of
persons mentioned in paragraph (c) in Section 1 of
"The Naturalization Law. The provision of said law
enumerates the classes of persons who may
acquire Philippine citizenship. They are:
(a) Natives of the Philippines who
are not citizens thereof under the
Jones Law;
(b) Natives of the other Insular
possessions of the United States;
(c) Citizens of the United States, or
foreigners who under the laws of
the United States may become
citizens of said country if residing
therein.
The law of the United States regulating the
immigration of alien to the United States and their
residence therein, is found in the Act of Congress of
1917, which was expressly made applicable to the
Philippine Islands. Section 3 of said Act excludes
from admission into the United States various
classes of persons, among which are the following:

. . . natives of any
country, province or
dependency situate on
the Continent of Asia
west of one hundred
and
tenth
(110th)
meridian of longitude
east from Greenwich
and east of the fiftieth
(50th)
meridian
of
longitude east from
Greenwich and south of
the
fiftieth
(50th)
parallel of the latitude
north, . . .
Said section 3 however, establishes an exception in
favor of the persons who are natives of
That
portion
of
said
territory (Continent of Asia)
situate between the fiftieth
(50th) and the sixty-fourth
(64th)
meridians
of
longitude
east
from
Greenwich and the twentyfourth (24th) and the thirtyeight (38th) parallels of
latitude north, . . .
From the above-quoted provisions of the
Acts of Congress of 1917, it clearly appears that
natives of the Continent of Asia within specified
limits are excluded from the admission into the
United States, with the exception of natives in the
portion of the said continent "situate between the
fiftieth (5th) and the sixty-fourth (64th) meridians
of longitude east from Greenwich and the twentyfourth (24th) and the thirty-eight (38th) parallels of
latitude north."
Petitioner contends he is a native of Kohek,
Province of Baluchistan, India, because his parents
were natives of the place; that the Province of
Baluchistan is found between the 50th and 64th
meridians of longitude east from Greenwich and
the 24th and 38th parallels of latitude north; that,
therefore the appellant is a native of a territory
whose residents are not excluded from admission
into the United States under the provisions of the
saving clause of section 3 of the Act of Congress of
1917, above quoted, and that, consequently, the
appellant is qualified to become a citizen of the
United States under said Act of Congress and also
of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of the
Naturalization Law of the Philippine Legislature in
relation to said Act of Congress.
The judge arrived at a conclusion that the
petitioner was not qualified to become a
naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands,
The lower court judgment is affirmed.
ISSUE: Is the petitioner a foreigner who, under
the laws of the United States, may become a
citizen of that country residing therein?

Held: There is absolutely no proof in the record to


show that the town of Kohek, Province of
Baluchistan, is found in the portion of the Asiatic
Continent, whose natives are not excluded from
admission into the United States. We have
consulted the map of India , particularly the
Province of Baluchistan for purpose of verifying the
assertion of the appellant's counsel. We found,
however, that the Province of Baluchistan is inside
the specified limits of Asia, whose natives are
excluded from admission to the United States, and
is outside of the "territory situate between the 50th
and the 64th meridians of the longitude east from
Greenwich and the 24th and 38th parallels of
latitude north,' whose natives are not excluded
from admission into the United States, with the
exception of a very small portion thereof of the
northwest. But neither in this portion nor in any
other place of the Province of Baluchistan did we
find a place called Kohek. The appellant has thus
utterly failed to show that he is native of a place
whose residents may be admitted into the United
States and may become citizens thereof.
And moreover, the petitioner being a
British subject, we are of opinion that the
principle jus soli, and not that of jus sanguinis,
should be applied in this case. In England questions
of citizenship are governed by the principle jus soli.
Therefore, in view of the fact that the appellant
was born in the Province of Punjab, India, he is
disqualified from becoming a citizen of the United
States and consequently of the Phil. Islands.
Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon Vs. Alberto
Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel
Smith is a member of the US Armed Forces. He
was charged with the crime of rape committed
against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime
on November 1, 2005. Pursuant to the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of
the Philippines and the US entered into, the US, at
its request, was granted custody of Smith. The RTC
of Makati rendered a decision finding defendant
Smith guilty due to sufficient evidence.
Defendant Smith was taken out of the
Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law
enforcement agents, purportedly acting under
orders of the DILG and brought to a facility for
detention under the control of the US government
under the new agreements between the Philippines
and the US, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney
Agreement.
Petitioners
contend
that
the Philippines should have custody of defendant
L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void
and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the VFA is void and unconstitutional.
HELD: NO.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 states:

Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the


Agreement between the Philippines and
the United States of America concerning
Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in
the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the
Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact
that the presence of the US Armed Forces through
the VFA is a presence allowed under the RP-US
Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and
concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the
US Senate, there is no violation of the
Constitutional provision resulting from such
presence.
The VFA being a valid and binding
agreement, the parties are required as a matter of
international law to abide by its terms and
provisions.
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA,
the Court finds that there is a different treatment
when it comes to detention as against
custody. Art. V, Sec. 10. The confinement or
detention by Philippine authorities of United
States personnel shall be carried out in facilities
agreed
on
by
appropriate Philippines and US authorities.
Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements
of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are
agreements on the detention of the accused in
the United States Embassy, are not in accord
with the VFA itself because such detention is not
by Philippine authorities. Respondents should
therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with
representatives of the United States towards an
agreement on detention facilities under Philippine
authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the
VFA.
G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969
WILLIAM
C.
REAGAN,
ET.
AL vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS:
Petitioner Reagan, a civilian employee of an
American
corporation
providing
technical
assistance to the US Air Force in the Philippines,
questioned the payment of the income tax
assessed on him by respondent CIR on an amount
realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a
member of the US Marine Corps, the transaction
having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at
Pampanga. It is his contention, that in legal
contemplation the sale was made outside
Philippine territory and therefore beyond our
jurisdictional power to tax. He seeks that an

amount of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by


him be refunded.
ISSUE: WON the Clark Field Air Base is a foreign
property therefore excluded from the power of
Philippine taxation.
HELD: NO.
By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it
should be noted, the Philippine Government merely
consents that the United States exercise
jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given
purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or
expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction
over offenses committed therein. This provision is
not and can not on principle or authority be
construed as a limitation upon the rights of the
Philippine Government.
The State is not precluded from allowing
another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its
territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that
such areas become impressed with an alien
character. They retain their status as native soil.
They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction
may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it
is with the bases under lease to the American
armed forces by virtue of the military bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be
foreign territory.
G.R. No. L-11154
March 21, 1916
E.
MERRITT vs.
GOVERNMENT
OF
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

THE

FACTS:
Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the trial court
erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which
the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000
as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting
the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two
months and twenty-one days and fixing the
damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead
of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant
urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that
the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to
the negligence of the chauffeur, who is an alleged
agent or employee of the Government; (b) in
holding that the Government of the Philippine
Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true
that the collision was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against
the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
Consequently, the Government issued an act
allowing the plaintiff to commence a lawsuit
against it.
ISSUE:
1) WON the Government conceded its liability
to the plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to
commence against it.

government

longer possible, to order the defendants to pay


damages.

HELD:
1) NO.
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
2) NO.
We will now examine the substantive law touching
the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its
officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of
article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: The state is
liable in this sense when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage should have been
caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable. The responsibility of the state is limited
to that which it contracts through a special agent,
duly empowered by a definite order or commission
to perform some act or charged with some definite
purpose which gives rise to the claim.
The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.

ISSUE: WON the US is immune from suit having


dealt with a private corporation.

2) WON the chauffeur


employee or agent.

is

GRN L-35645 May 22, 1985.


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES B.
GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER vs. HON. v. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge
of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal
and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.
FACTS:
The United States of America had a naval
base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of
those provided in the Military Bases Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited
the submission of bids for a couple of repair
projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded
to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the US two
telegrams requesting it to confirm its price
proposals and for the name of its bonding
company. The company construed this as an
acceptance of its offer so they complied with the
requests. The company received a letter which
was signed by William I. Collins of Department of
the Navy of the United States, also one of the
petitioners herein informing that the company did
not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating in repairs, and that the projects were
awarded to third parties. The company filed a
complaint
against
the
defendants
herein
demanding specific performance that the company
be allowed to perform the work on the projects
and, in the event that specific performance was no

HELD: YES.
A State may be said to have descended the the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when
it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to
the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order, they are not
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.

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