Cavile vs Lintania-Hong

Facts
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1
, a Deed of Partition5 was entered into by the heirs of the spouses Bernardo Cavile and
Tranquilina Galon
Subject of the Deed of Partition were several parcels of land situated in the Municipality of
Tolong, Negros Oriental, which were then covered by Tax Declarations No. 5615, No. 5729,
No. 7143, No. 7421 and No. 7956, all under the name of Bernardo.
In accordance with the Deed of Partition, the conjugal properties of Bernardo and Tranquilina
were divided into two parts.
o The first part, corresponding to Bernardos share, was further divided into six equal
shares
o The second part, corresponding to Tranquilinas share, was subdivided only into
three shares
Also stated in the Deed of Partition was the sale by the other aforementioned legal heirs to
their co-heir, thus, making Castor the sole owner of the said properties

Similarly, the Deed of Partition acknowledged the sale by all the legal heirs to Ulpiano Cavile of
their respective shares in the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 5729, thus, transferring to the
latter absolute ownership of said parcel of land.

Castor and Susana executed a Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, 7 whereby Castor

recognized and confirmed that the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040
were the just and lawful shares of Susana in the properties left by their deceased parents
Bernardo and Tranquilina, and that Susana was in actual possession of the said properties

The descriptions of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040 in the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition were strikingly close to those of the lots covered by Tax
Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956, respectively, in the Deed of Partition.

Fourteen years after respondents filed on 23 December 1974 a Complaint for Reconveyance
and Recovery of Property with Damages before the RTC against Perfecta Cavile
Respondents invoked the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition dated 5 August 1960 wherein
Castor purportedly recognized Susanas ownership of the subject lots
After Susanas death in 1965, the subject lots were inherited by her daughters, respondents
Justina and Genoveva, who then assumed the mortgage thereon.
However, respondents alleged that Castor and petitioner spouses eventually intruded upon and
excluded respondents from the subject lots.
Petitioner spouses countered in their Answer to the Complaint that, by virtue of the Deed of
Partition dated 5 April 1937, the heirs of both Bernardo and Tranquilina took exclusive
possession of their respective shares in the inheritance
. In 1962, Castor sold to petitioner Perfecta the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and
No. 7956, which corresponded to the subject lots in the Complaint. Following the sale, petitioner

Perfecta took possession of the subject lots and filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for
the issuance of title over the same. The Bureau issued free patent titles over the subject lots in
favor of petitioner Perfecta
Petitioner spouses asserted that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition dated 5 August 1960
involving the subject lots was a nullity since said properties were never owned nor adjudicated in
favor of Susana, respondents predecessor-in-interest. Castor and Susana executed the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition merely to accommodate the latter who then needed
security for the loan she was trying to obtain from the Rural Bank of Dumaguete City
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner spouses.
o petitioner spouses evidence was more worthy of credence in establishing their ownership
of the subject lots
o RTC further subscribed to the testimony of Perfecta that the Confirmation of
Extrajudicial Partition was executed by Castor solely to accommodate Susana, enabling
her to obtain a bank loan using the subject lots as collateral. It noted that Susana did not
bother to apply for the issuance of title to the subject lots in her name
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
o The Court of Appeals agreed in the respondents contention that the Confirmation of
Extrajudicial Partition was not a simulated document. The said document should be
entitled to utmost respect, credence, and weight as it was executed by and between parties
who had firsthand knowledge of the Deed of Partition of 1937. Moreover, the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition constituted evidence that was of the highest
probative value against the declarant, Castor, because it was a declaration against his
proprietary interest
o Perfecta herself admitted that she only started paying real estate taxes for the subject lots
in 1993. It was Susana and, later, her children, respondents Justina and Genoveva, who
had been paying for the realty taxes on the subject lots since 1937

Issue: Who has the better right to the property?

Decision: It is the petitioners.
Ratio Decidendi:

there being no issue raised on the matter, that the subject lots covered by Tax Declarations No.
07408 and No. 07409 described in the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6111 are the very same lots
covered by Tax Declarations No. 7956 and No. 7421 included in the Deed of Partition, and by
Tax Declarations No. 2040 and No. 2039 subject of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition.

Nevertheless, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition is just one piece of evidence against
petitioner spouses. It must still be considered and weighed together with respondents other
evidence vis--vis petitioner spouses evidence

the Court is still convinced that the evidence adduced by the petitioner spouses preponderated
over that of the respondents

In analyzing the two vital documents in this case, the Court discerns that while the Deed of
Partition clearly explained how Castor came to fully own the subject lots, the Confirmation
of Extrajudicial Partition, even though confirming Susanas ownership of the subject lots,
failed to shed light on why or how the said properties wholly pertained to her when her
parents Bernardo and Tranquilina clearly had other heirs who also had shares in the
inheritance.

At best, tax declarations are indicia of possession in the concept of an owner. 30 Conversely, nondeclaration of a property for tax purposes does not necessarily negate ownership. 31

Sometime in 1962, petitioner Perfecta applied for and was granted by the Bureau of Lands free
patents over the subject lots. Pursuant thereto, Original Certificates of Title No. FV-4976, No. FV4977, and No. FV-4978, covering the subject lots, were issued by the Registry of Deeds

the Court pronounces that respondents Complaint for reconveyance of the subject lots and
damages filed only on 23 December 1974 is already barred.

A Torrens title issued on the basis of the free patents become as indefeasible as one which was
judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance of the patent

In the instant case, respondents brought the action for reconveyance of the subject lots before the
RTC only on 23 December 2004, or more than 12 years after the Torrens titles were issued in
favor of petitioner Perfecta on 9 October 1962. The remedy is, therefore, already time-barred.
, the Court would still rule that respondents failed to satisfactorily prove that they were in
possession of the subject lots prior to the grant of free patents and issuance of Torrens titles over
the same in favor petitioner Perfecta
No information was provided as to how said possession of the subject lots was actually exercised
or demonstrated by Susana

Yujuico vs Republic
Facts:

In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and confirmation of her title over
a parcel of land with an area of 17,343 square meters covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 located in
the Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal (now Paraaque City), in the Pasig-Rizal Court
of First Instance (CFI),
The application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and by Mercedes
Dizon
Castro won the case
He sold it to the petitioner of this case
o petitioner subdivided the land to two lots, one for him and the other to petitioner Carpio
Annotations at the back of TCT No. 446386 show that Yujuico had, at one time or another,
mortgaged the lot to the Philippine Investments System Organization (PISO) and Citibank
o . Annotations in the title of petitioner Carpio reveal the lot was mortgaged in favor of
Private Development Corporation (PDC), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) and then Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to secure various loans.
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1085 was enacted. This gave lands in the offshore and foreshore
areas to Public Estates Authority (PEA).
Some of the land included the land of petitioner.
Petitioner filed for removal of cloud or quiteting of title.
. On May 15, 1998 the parties entered into a compromise agreement
the parties executed a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, pursuant to the compromise
agreement, where the PEA property with an area of 1.4007 hectares would be conveyed to Jesus
Yujuico and petitioner Carpio in exchange for their property with a combined area of 1.7343
hectares.

But the President of PEA did not give his approval, hence filed a petition for relief from the

compromise agreement on the basis of mistake and excusable negligence.

respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, alleged that when the land registered to

Castro was surveyed by Engr. H. Obreto on August 3, 1972 and subsequently approved by the
LRC on April 23, 1973, the land was still a portion of Manila Bay as evidenced by Namria
Hydrographic Map No. 4243, Surveys to 1980
More significantly, respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land was still

underwater, it could not be registered in the name of Fermina Castro.Second, the land registration
court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable lands, thus the decision adjudicating the
subject parcel of land to Fermina Castro was void. And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio,
being derived from a void title, were likewise void. [9]
The CA observed that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use and,

therefore, not registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into
properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant.
Issue: Is a reversion suit proper in this case? (2) Is the present petition estopped by laches? (3) Did the CA
erroneously apply the principle of res judicata
Decision: No.
Ratio Decidendi:
The instant Civil Case No. 01-0222 for annulment and cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 and

its derivative titles was filed on June 8, 2001 with the Paraaque City RTC. It is clear therefore that
the reversion suit was erroneously instituted in the Paraaque RTC and should have been dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
This was not done in this case. The Republic misfiled the reversion suit with the Paraaque RTC. It

should have been filed with the CA as required by Rule 47.Evidently, the Paraaque RTC had no
jurisdiction over the instant reversion case.
Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this case, the lot was

already alienated to innocent buyers for value and the government did not undertake any act to
contest the title for an unreasonable length of time
Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the lot in 1974, and more than 27

years had elapsed before the action for reversion was filed, then said action is now barred by
laches
. Section 32 of PD 1592 recognized the rights of an innocent purchaser for value over and above

the interests of the government

There is no allegation that Yujuico was a buyer in bad faith, nor did he acquire the land

fraudulently. He thus had the protection of the Torrens System that every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same free
from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate
When respondent government filed the reversion case in 2001, 27 years had already elapsed from
the time the late Jesus Yujuico purchased the land from the original owner Castro. After the
issuance of OCT No. 10215 to Castro, no further action was taken by the government to question

the issuance of the title to Castro until the case of Public Estates Authority, brought up in the oral
argument before this Court on September 6, 2000
Clearly from the above, Firestone is a precedent case. The Public Estates Authority had become

final and thus the validity of OCT No. 10215 issued to Castro could no longer be questioned.
On the other hand, the Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 does not reveal what portion

of Manila Bay was Castros lot located in 1974. Moreover, a hydrographic map is not the best
evidence to show the nature and location of the lot subject of a land registration application
More so, respondent Government, through its counsel, admits that the land applied by Fermina

Castro in 1973 was solid and dry land, negating the nebulous allegation that said land is
underwater. The only conclusion that can be derived from the admissions of the Solicitor General
and Government Corporate Counsel is that the land subject of the titles of petitioners is alienable
land beyond the reach of the reversion suit of the state
The waiver by PEA of its right to question petitioners title is fortified by the manifestation by

PEA in the Joint Motion for Judgment based on Compromise Agreement

The recognition of petitioners legal ownership of the land is further bolstered by the categorical

and unequivocal acknowledgment made by PEA in its September 30, 2003 letter
In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the Paraaque RTC. Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the case nevertheless has to
be upheld because it is already barred by laches. Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is
already precluded by res judicata in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining
therein.

Roque vs Aguado
Facts:
petition for review on certiorari1
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land with an area of 20,862 square meters (sq. m.),
located in Sitio Tagpos, Barangay Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal, known as Lot 18089. 5

petitioners-spouses Jose C. Roque and Beatriz dela Cruz Roque (Sps. Roque) and the original
owners of the then unregistered Lot 18089 namely, Velia R. Rivero (Rivero), executed a Deed
of Conditional Sale of Real Property6 over a 1,231-sq. m. portion of Lot 18089 (subject portion)
for a consideration of P30,775.00.
o parties agreed that Sps. Roque shall make an initial payment of P15,387.50 while the

remaining balance of the purchase price shall be payable upon the registration of Lot
18089
After the deeds execution, Sps. Roque took possession and introduced improvements on the

subject portion which they utilized as a balut factory

Fructuoso Sabug, Jr. (Sabug, Jr.), former Treasurer of the National Council of Churches in the

Philippines (NCCP), applied for a free patent over the entire Lot 18089 and was eventually issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-59558 in his name on October 21, 1991
Sabug, Jr., through a Deed of Absolute Sale 10 ), sold Lot 18089 to one Ma. Pamela P. Aguado

(Aguado), who caused the cancellation of OCT No. M-5955 and the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-96692 dated December 17, 199911 in her name.
Aguado mortgaged the property and it was eventually consolidated under the ownership of

Landbank.
Roque filed for a reconveyance.
In defense, NCCP and Sabug, Jr. denied any knowledge of the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale
through which the subject portion had been purportedly conveyed to Sps. Roque. 16

For her part, Aguado raised the defense of an innocent purchaser for value
On the other hand, Land Bank averred that it had no knowledge of Sps. Roques claim relative to

the subject portion

The RTC found that the Roque failed to establish their ownership over the subject portion
o RTC ruled that Sps. Roques action for reconveyance had already prescribed, having been

filed ten (10) years after the issuance of OCT No. M-5955
, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the foregoing RTC findings
Issue: whether or not the CA erred in not ordering the reconveyance of the subject portion in Sps.
Roques favor.
Decision: No. Petition Denied.
Ratio decidendi:

The petition lacks merit

for recovenyance, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that he has a legal claim on
the property superior to that of the registered owner and that the property has not yet passed to the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value

Examining its provisions, the Court finds that the stipulation above-highlighted shows that the
1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is actually in the nature of a contract to sell and not one of sale
contrary to Sps. Roques belief
o

why?

, it has been consistently ruled that where the seller promises to execute a deed of
absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the purchase
price, the contract is only a contract to sell even if their agreement is
denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale

Sps. Roque have not paid the final installment of the purchase price thus transfer of ownership of
the subject portion from the sellers to the buyers cannot be deemed to have been fulfilled

Sps. Roque did not even take any active steps to protect their claim over the disputed portion.

1977 Deed of Conditional Sale was never registered

did not seek the actual/physical segregation of the disputed portion

For the distinguishment of contract to sale and contract to sell ( go to original case)

If it is a contract to sell, a third person buying such property despite the fulfilment of the suspensive
condition such as the full payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad
faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property

since it is a contract to sell, reconveyance is not a remedy.

Iglesias Filipina Independiente vs Taeza

Facts:
Petition for Review on Certiorari
plaintiff-appellee Iglesia Filipina Independiente was the owner of a parcel of land described as

Lot 3653, situated at Ruyu, Cagayan and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-8698.
The said lot is subdivided as follows: Lot Nos. 3653-A, 3653-B, 3653-C, and 3653-D
sold Lot 3653-A and B to Taeza for the amount of P100,000.00, through installment,

the defendant allegedly completed the payments

a complaint for the annulment was filed through Supreme Bishop Most Rev. Tito Pasco, against
the defendant-appellant, with the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3.

the defendant Bernardino Taeza registered the subject parcels of land. Consequently, Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-77995 and T-77994 were issued in his name.

The defendant then occupied a portion of the land. The plaintiff-appellee allegedly demanded the
defendant to vacate the said land which he failed to do.

It is alleged that the sale of the property in question was done without the required approval and
conformity of the entities mentioned in the Canons; hence, petitioner argues that the sale was null
and void.

IFI lost in RTC and CA

Issues: whether then Supreme Bishop Rev. Ga is authorized to enter into a contract of sale in behalf of
petitioner.
Decision: No. IFC lawful owner.
The Court finds it erroneous for the CA to ignore the fact that the laymen's committee objected to
the sale of the lot in question. The Canons require that ALL the church entities listed in Article IV
(a) thereof should give its approval to the transaction. Thus, when the Supreme Bishop executed
the contract of sale of petitioner's lot despite the opposition made by the laymen's committee, he
acted beyond his powers.

In the present case, however, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Bernardino Taeza, had already
obtained a transfer certificate of title in his name over the property in question. Since the person
supposedly transferring ownership was not authorized to do so, the property had evidently been
acquired by mistake

The Court held in the same case of Aznar,21 that unlike in express trusts and resulting implied
trusts where a trustee cannot acquire by prescription any property entrusted to him unless he
repudiates the trust, in constructive implied trusts, the trustee may acquire the property through
prescription even if he does not repudiate the relationship. It is then incumbent upon the
beneficiary to bring an action for reconveyance before prescription bars the same.

it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property

Here, the present action was filed on January 19, 1990, 24 while the transfer certificates of title
over the subject lots were issued to respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Bernardino Taeza, only
on February 7, 1990.25

Clearly, therefore, petitioner's complaint was filed well within the prescriptive period stated
above, and it is only just that the subject property be returned to its rightful owner.

Since it was filed on time, 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens title, Petitioner wins the case.

Republic vs Transunion Corporation

Facts:

petition for review on certiorari

Salamat) filed an Application to Purchase Friar Lands, 5 specifically Lot No. 5741 of the Imus
Estate (Lot No. 5741), with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR

indorsed to the Land Management Bureau (LMB)

Thereafter, Salamat was informed that Lot No. 5741 was already covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-6167408 in the name of Transunion

Made Salamat file against Transunion a protest on the ground of fraud ( no deed of conveyance
issued to anyone)

Salamat averred that she and her family had been in continuous possession and occupation of the
said lot since time immemorial and had even introduced improvements thereon. She likewise
stated that it was only after the LMB favorably endorsed her application, that it was discovered
that Lot No. 5741 was already covered by TCT No. T-616740.12

On April 20, 2004Republic filed a reversion complaint against Transunion and its predecessorsin-interest, with the RTC.23

Petitioner won in RTC but lost in CA

Issue: The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly granted Transunions
petition for certiorari against the RTC's order denying the latters motion to dismiss.
Decision: No. Petition granted.
Ratio Decidendi:

An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor
finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be
justified

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction

In the present case, the Court finds that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
denying Transunions motion to dismiss considering that the latters further reconsideration or
appeal of the investigation report was not a condition precedent to the filing of the Republics
reversion complaint

the LMB proceeding subject of Transunions motion to dismiss was merely investigative in nature
since it was conducted as a fact-finding/recommendatory procedure, meant only to determine
whether or not the LMB Director should initiate reversion proceedings.

Transunion confuses the investigation report and the recommendation made therein with an
action of the LMB Regional Executive Director found in Section 3.1 of the Manual on Settlement
of Land Disputes39

Finally, the Court finds that there was no violation of Transunion's right to administrative due
process since, as the Republic pointed out, not only did it file an answer, but it also presented its
evidence and formally offered the .same. 46 It is well-established that the touchstone of due
process is the opportunity to be heard.47 This Transunion was unquestionably afforded in this case

For the reasons above-stated, the Court therefore concludes that the RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in denying Transunion 's motion to dismiss against the Republic's reversion complaint.
As such, the CA committed a reversible error in granting Transunion's petition for certiorari,
warranting the reversal of its Decision

De Luzurriaga vs Republic
Facts:

Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 1524 of the Bacolod Cadastre

, petitioners filed an Application for the Registration of Title

o

the subject lot was specifically identified as Lot No. 1524, AP-06-005774, Cad. 39,
Bacolod Cadastre, situated in the City of Bacolod

The survey plan, conducted by Geodetic Engineer Eluminado E. Nessia, Jr.

technical description of the subject lot

Application approved and issued in the name of the late Jose Luzurriaga

OSG, Republic made appearance.

Among the evidence petitioners adduced during the hearings was a copy of Decree No.
22752[8] dated October 7, 1916, issued by the General Land Registration Office (GLRO

trial court confirmed the incomplete title of the late De Luzuriaga

The OSG, for the Republic, received a copy of the Decision on June 22, 1999, but opted not to
file an appeal.
o

six months after, filed a petition for relief from judgment.

alleged
first, that petitioners failed to indicate in their application all the heirs of the late

De Luzuriaga, Sr. and their corresponding authorization for the application in

their behalf.
Second, the Republic asserted that petitioners cannot use Decree No. 22752 as
basis for the application of land registration as said decree effectively barred said
application. It invited attention to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1529, which requires the simultaneous issuance of the decree of registration and
the corresponding certificate of title. As argued, the policy of simultaneous
issuance prescribed in the decree has not been followed in the instant case.

o
(DAALCO) filed a Complaint[10] against petitioners before the RTC for Quieting of Title,
Annulment and Cancellation of [OCT] No. RO-58

DAALCO claimed that its predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Lizares, was the registered, lawful,
and absolute owner of Lot No. 1524 as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)

Finally, DAALCO maintained having been in actual, open, and continuous possession as
registered owner of the subject lot.

The RTC denied petition of Republic but

CA granted the same.

Issue: whether the appellate court gravely abused its discretion in granting the Republics petition for
relief from judgment
Decision: No. Petition denied.

we agree with the appellate courts holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for relief from the May 24, 1999 Decision.

Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where there
is no other available or adequate remedy. [31] And its determination rests with the court. In the
instant case, certain attending facts and circumstances, as shall be set forth below, make for an
exceptional case for allowing relief from judgment
o First. The Letter/Report[32] issued by the Bacolod City RD on December 7, 2001 provides
a reasonable ground to believe that a case of double titling would result should another
title issue for the same lot in the name of De Luzuriaga, Sr
o Second. The prior issuance on November 14, 1916 of OCT No. 2765 in the name of
Lizares over Lot No. 1524 persuasively buttresses a prima facie case on the issue of
double titling. Obviously, one and the same decree cannot serve as basis for a valid grant
of separate titles in fee simple over the same lot to two different person
o Third. Since petitioners and DAALCO separately claim owning Lot No. 1524, the
ownership issue would be best litigated in Civil Case No. 99-10924 filed by DAALCO
for quieting of title
o Nothing on the records adequately explains, nor do petitioners attempt to do so, how a
registration decree adjudicating Lot No. 1524 to De Luzuriaga, Sr. became the very
medium for the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Lizares. Consequently,
whatever rights petitioners might have over the subject lot as heirs of De Luzuriaga, Sr.
ought to be litigated against the successors-in-interest of Lizares to put a final rest to their
clashing claims over Lot No. 1524
o Fourth. OCT No. RO-58 was issued by the RD of Bacolod City
Yet the Court notes that the title issuance went beyond the scope of the judgment
sought to be executed.
o Cadastral Case and Quieting of Title Case can proceed independently
A final consideration. A petition for relief is in effect a second opportunity for an aggrieved party
to ask for a new trial

People vs Cainglet
Facts:
Wilfredo G. Cainglet was prosecuted before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur for
falsification of public and/or official documents
the accused moved to quash the afore-quoted informations on the ground that they contain
averments, which if true, would constitute an excuse or justification, invoking Section 2(g) of
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
o consist in the statements in the informations that in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC
Cadastral Record No. N-184 the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur declared
Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492 with improvements thereon to be the private properties of
Wilfredo G. Cainglet
Such judicial pronouncement which has become final, as can be inferred from the
information, allegedly runs counter to the charge that accused falsely claimed
said real estate to be his own private properties.
Issue: whether or not the final judgment in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. N-184
declaring Wilfredo G. Cainglet owner of Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492 bars his subsequent prosecution for
falsely stating in his answers in said Cadastral Case that he possessed and owned Lots Nos. 8479 and
8492.
Decision:
It is fundamental and well-settled that a final judgment in a cadastral proceeding a
proceeding in rem is binding and conclusive upon the whole world
However, this conclusiveness of judgment in the registration of lands is not absolute. It admits of
exceptions
the aggrieved party may file a suit for reconveyance of property 2 or a personal action for recovery
of damages against the party who registered his property through fraud
In the same way, therefore, the State may criminally prosecute for perjury the party who obtains
registration through fraud, such as by stating false assertions in the sworn answer required of
applicants in cadastral proceedings
Section 116 applies to all and does not distinguish between those who make false statements and
successfully procure registration by such statements, and those whose statements were not given
credence by the land registration court. The law therefore applies with equal brunt on both types
of offenders.
For the Court, therefore, to sustain appellee's view would be to unduly discriminate in the
prosecution of persons charged with falsification or perjury
, on the other hand, every interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by
artificial refinements and narrow technicalities
a judgment on the guilt of the appellee would not undermine the indefeasibility of the titles over
Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492. Neither would the criminal proceeding for falsification or perjury be a
collateral attack on the titles in question. The prosecution for falsification or perjury is a
proceeding in personam which inquires into the criminal liability of the accused. Not being an
attack on the validity of the titles in question, any judgment rendered therein would leave said
titles undisturbed

Treasurer of the Phil vs CA

Facts:
Lawaan Lopez offered to sell to the private respondents a parcel of land located in Quezon City
and consisting of 1,316.8 square meters, which he claimed as his property.
. The sale was deferred because the prospective vendor said his certificate of title had been
burned in his house in Divisoria, and he would have to file a petition with the court of first
instance of Quezon City for a duplicate certificate of title
The corresponding transfer certificate of title was subsequently issued to them after cancellation
of the duplicate certificate in the name of Lawaan Lopez.

Two years after, another person claiming to be the real Lawaan Lopez, filed a petition in the court
of first instance of Quezon City to declare as null and void the transfer of her land in favor of the
private respondents

Subsequently the private respondents filed a complaint against the impostor Lawaan Lopez and
the Treasurer of the Philippines as custodian of the Assurance Fund for damages

Lower courts held Treasurer liable ( Assurance Fund) because the impostor could not be located.

Issue: Whether or not the Treasurer is liable

Decision: No.
Ratio Decidendi:

A careful reading of the above provision will readily show that the private respondents do not
come under either of the two situations above mentioned.

The petition correctly points out that such sale conveyed no title or any interest at all to them for
the simple reason that the supposed vendor had no title or interest to transfer. He was not the
owner of the land. He had no right thereto he could convey.

the real Lawaan Lopez had her own genuine certificate of title all the time and it remained valid
despite the issuance of the new certificate of title in the name of the private respondents. That
new certificate, as the trial court correctly declared, was null and void ab initio, which means that
it had no legal effect whatsoever and at any time

The private respondents were not for a single moment the owner of the property in question and
so cannot claim to have been unlawfully deprived thereof when their certificate of title was found
and declared to be a total nullity.

Additionally, the Court observes that the private respondents were not exactly diligent in
verifying the credentials of the impostor whom they had never met before he came to them with
his bogus offer
o

The fact alone that he claimed to have lost his duplicate certificate of title in a fire, not to
mention the amount of the consideration involved, would have put them on their guard
and warned them to make a more thorough investigation of the seller's Identity.

we are not prepared to rule under the circumstances of this case that they are entitled to even
claim the status of innocent purchasers of the land.

They are, of course, not entirely without recourse, for they may still proceed against the impostor
in a civil action for recovery and damages or prosecute him under the Revised Penal Code,
assuming he can be located and arrested

Lopez vs Esquivel
Facts:

Petitions for Review on Certiorari

Hermogenes Lopez (Hermogenes), father of the Lopez siblings, applied with the Bureau of Lands
for a homestead patent over a parcel of land

the Bureau of Lands approved Hermogenes application

The patent was subsequently transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for transcription and

issuance of the corresponding certificate of title [9] in Hermogenes name.

Unaware that he had already been awarded a homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land,

Hermogenes sold[11] the same to Ambrocio Aguilar (Aguilar) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale[12] dated 31 July 1959
Years later, it was allegedly discovered that the subject property, with an area of 2.6950 hectares,

was erroneously included in survey plan H-138612 of Hermogenes property. The subject property
supposedly formed part of the land owned by Lauro Hizon (Hizon), which adjoined that of
Hermogenes.
Hermogenes executed a Quitclaim[13] over his rights and interests to the subject property [14] in
Hizons favor.

Hizon, in turn, sold the subject property to Esquivel and Talens, as evidenced by a Deed of

Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land[15] dated 26 August 1968.

The Lopez siblings filed a cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Hermogenes and

Aguilar
Esquivel and Talens filed an Application for Registration of the subject property with the RTC of

Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73 but the Lopez siblings opposed it.

Respondents then filed for Reconveyance on the advise of the RTC
RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
o the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1959 between Hermogenes and Aguilar was
already declared null and void ab initio by a court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore,
the Lopez siblings were estopped from asserting said Deed to defeat the rights of
Esquivel and Talens to the subject property.
CA affirmed RTC

Issue: Whether or not the respondents have a right to reconveyance of the property based on the quitclaim
made by Hermogenes in Hizon's favor.
Decision: Yes.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Lopez siblings additionally avow that in the proceedings conducted on Hermogenes

homestead application by the Bureau of Lands, it was verified that the land applied for, which
included the subject property, was disposable public land. If it was true that the subject property
was only erroneously included in the homestead patent awarded to Hermogenes, then such an
award could only be challenged by the government in an action for reversion under Section 101
of the Public Land Act
The Lopez siblings also maintain that Hizon, predecessor-in-interest of Esquivel and Talens, who

claimed ownership over the subject property, was duty bound to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family by opposing or taking exception to Hermogenes homestead application,
which included said property. Even after the homestead patent over the subject property was
already awarded to Hermogenes, Hizon still had opportunity to protest the same before the
Bureau of Lands, prior to the registration of said homestead patent with the Register of
Deeds. For failing to take appropriate actions, Hizon, and his successors-in-interest, Esquivel and
Talens, are now barred from doing so by the statute of limitations and laches.
In this case, the subject property was included, whether correctly or erroneously, in the 19.4888-

hectare land awarded to Hermogenes

Between the date of issuance of the homestead patent to Hermogenes and that of the execution of
the Quitclaim, more than 26 years had passed. Therefore, the execution of the Quitclaim was no
longer within the five-year period within which the land covered by the homestead patent issued
to Hermogenes must not be encumbered or alienated; and was also beyond the period between
five and 25 years following the issuance of patent within which approval of the Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources is still necessary to make the alienation or encumbrance
valid
o the intention of Hermogenes in executing the quitclaim was to restore to Hizon the

subject property, which Hermogenes believed to have been mistakenly included in his
homestead patent.
Hermogenes cannot simply convey property to Hizon.
Since it is a homestead, the property was originally public hence belonging to the State.
the property must therefore ( if really erroneously included in Hermogenes patent) be returned to

the state and not hizon.

There is no other proof that Hizon possessed, cultivated, and introduced improvements on the

subject property. Neither is there any showing that after the execution of the Quitclaim, Hizon
himself applied for a homestead patent over the subject property. In fact, it is undisputed that the
subject property has always been in the possession of Hermogenes, then the Lopez
Siblings. Hizon and Esquivel and Talens never came into the possession of the subject property
even after the execution of the supposed deeds of conveyances in their favor.
Even granting arguendo, that the Quitclaim is valid and transferred ownership of the subject
property from Hermogenes to Hizon, the latter and his successors-in-interest, Esquivel and
Talens, are now barred by the statute of limitations and laches from asserting their rights to the
subject property, after failing to exercise the same for an unreasonable length of time.

Bulawan vs Aquende
Facts:
petition for review
Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title against Yap
Bulawan claimed that she is the owner of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13733 having bought the property from its owners, brothers Santos
and Francisco Yaptengco (Yaptengco brothers
Yap clarified that she asserts ownership
1996 trial court ruled in favor of Bulawan.
CA affirmed RTC
in 2002, Aquende alleged that he was unaware of any litigation involving his property having
received no summons or notice thereof, nor was he aware of any adverse claim as no notice
of lis pendens was inscribed on the title.

Aquende filed a Third Party Claim15 against the writ of execution because it affected his property
and, not being a party in Civil Case No. 9040, he argued that he is not bound by the trial courts 26
November 1996 Decision

Thereafter, Aquende filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on

the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction

Aquende argued that there was extrinsic fraud when Bulawan conveniently failed to implead him

despite her knowledge of the existing title in his name and, thus, prevented him from participating
in the proceedings and protecting his title
CA ruled in favor of Aquende

Issue: Whether or not petition for annulment is a proper remedy

Decision: Yes.
Ratio Decidendi:
Bulawan adds that the Court of Appeals erred because it annulled a decision which had already
been considered and affirmed by another division of the Court of Appeals. According to Bulawan,
the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision is already final and had been fully executed.

In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be annulled on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.26 Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party from having
a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining
not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. 27 The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court

Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err when it took cognizance of Aquendes petition for
annulment of judgment and overturned the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision even if
another division of the Court of Appeals had already affirmed it and it had already been executed

During the proceedings before the trial court, the answers of Yap 36 and the Register of
Deeds37 should have prompted the trial court to inquire further whether there were other
indispensable parties who were not impleaded. The trial court should have taken the initiative
to implead Aquende as defendant

However, even if Aquende were not an indispensable party, he could still file a petition for
annulment of judgment. We have consistently held that a person need not be a party to the
judgment sought to be annulled. 40 What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the
judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and that he would be adversely affected
thereby

Likewise, Aquende was never made a party in Civil Case No. 9040. Yet, the trial court ordered
the cancellation of Psd-187165 and any other certificate of title issued pursuant to Psd-187165,
including Aquendes TCT No. 40067. Aquende was adversely affected by such judgment as his
title was cancelled without giving him the opportunity to present his evidence to prove his
ownership of the property.

Benatiro vs Cuyos
Facts:

Petition for Review on Certiorari

Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria filed a petition for Letters of Administration

Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case