Creation and Alteration of Minucipal Corp / LGUs

Sema v COMELEC
558 SCRA 700 Political Law Municipal Corporation Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions
(ARMM) Population Requirement
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly
created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the
municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only
made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo
should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called
Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from
Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with
Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate
legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her
rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the
Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains
legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is
being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan
being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or
its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay
must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no
conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,
subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite

requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff
Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a
province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in
order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato
City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand,
ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in
Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
League of Cities v. Comelec
Action:These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines,
City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the constitutionality of the subject
Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.During the
12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on
30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed
to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities
filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7
June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July
2007 without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the

share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal
protection clause.
Held:We grant the petitions.The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective,
not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a
city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to
any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage
of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government
Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.

NAVARRO VS ERMITA
Creation Of A Province Must Comply With Statutory Requirements Under RA 7160
November 24, 2014 by The Lawyer's Post

Rodolfo, Victor and Rene, as taxpayers, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court to
declare as unconstitutional Republic Act 9355, which created the Province of Dinagat. According to
them, the province did not meet the requirements of the Local Government Code, Republic Act 7160
in terms of population and territory. The creation of the province will unjustly deprive the people of
Surigao del Norte a large chunk of territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and rich resources from the
area. Whereas RA 7610 mandates that a province to be created should have a population of at least
250,000, the Province of Dinagat, as of the 2000 NSO Census only had 106,591; whereas the law
requires a new province to have at least 2,000 square kilometres of contiguous area, the new

province will only have a land area of 802.12 square kilometres. Further, the act of creating the
province was an act of gerrymandering.
In their defense, the respondents posited that the law is constitutional. Dinagat as a new province
complied with the requirements of Republic Act 7610 in terms of population and land area. The 2003
population of Dinagat Islands based on the special census ordered by the then governor of Surigao
del Norte, Lyndon Barbers, was 371, 576 inhabitants; it is exempt from the land area requirement
because it is composed of several islands, which exception is provided for under the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act 7160.
Issue:
Whether or not the creation of the Province of Dinagat complied with the requirements of the law.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and invalidated the law:

The territorial requirement in the Local Government Code is adopted in the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR),thus:

ART. 9. Provinces.(a) Requisites for creationA province shall not be created unless the following
requisites on income and either population or land area are present:

(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for
the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by
DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and

(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants, as certified by National Statistics Office; or land area which must be
contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds.

However, the IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government
Code when it added the italicized portion above stating that [t]he land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. Nowhere in the Local
Government Code is the said provision stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local
Government Code, the only instance when the territorial or land area requirement need not be
complied with is when there is already compliance with the population requirement. The Constitution
requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such criteria,
must all be written in the Local Government Code. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy
between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law
prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law.Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that [t]he land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands is
null and void.
Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law within the laws four
corners. If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law
according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or
injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history
of the law, or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive
issuances in the nature of executive construction.In this case, the requirements for the creation of a
province contained in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code are clear, plain and unambiguous,
and its literal application does not result in absurdity or injustice. Hence, the provision in Art. 9(2) of
the IRR exempting a proposed province composed of one or more islands from the land-area
requirement cannot be considered an executive construction of the criteria prescribed by the Local
Government Code. It is an extraneous provision not intended by the Local Government Code and,
therefore, is null and void.
The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less
than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population
conducted by the NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was
only 106,951.Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census
of population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was
not certified by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code. Moreover, respondents failed
to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother
Province of Surigao del Norte) would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement
prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the new province.
In fine, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the population requirement for the
creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands.The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of
local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any
derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec.
10, Art. X of the Constitution.Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with
the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code.
Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so
contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined gerrymandering as the formation of one legislative
district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution
proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as

practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.As stated by the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one island and about 47 islets closely situated
together, without the inclusion of separate territories. It is an unsubstantiated allegation that the
province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman.

MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
Posted by kaye lee on 12:46 PM
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an
independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a
plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for
the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely
reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. It
allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the
petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said
petition because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court
could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected
is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of
Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners
were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of
their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No.
8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.
Cawaling v. COMELEC
Facts: President Estrada signed into law RA 8806 (Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging
The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds
Therefor). The COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter
for ratification. The Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) then proclaimed the creation of the
City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Cawaling, invoking his rights as a taxpayer, filed a petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment of the plebiscite and challenging RA 8806.
Issues:
1. WON the creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a)
LGC (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" NO.
Criteria for the creation of a city:
SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays
may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of
the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not
less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National
Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less
than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a
newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement
on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one
(1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income."
Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The
phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in
support of his posture, allows the merger of LGUs to create a province city,
municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code.
The creation of an entirely new LGU through a division or a merger of existing LGUs
is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall
comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.
2. WON it violates the one bill one subject rule. NO.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which
are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities
of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about
the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has been
provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.

 Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the
law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the
corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger
is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such
abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the
merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was
created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of
abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public
of fair information on this consequence.
3. WON the plebiscite was timely conducted. YES.
The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a newspaper of
general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of
local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was
completed on September 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be
the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the
plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not
yet been published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for
the effectivity of a law, citing the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera, it could only
schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the
December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day period from the effectivity
of the law on September 1, 2000
the plebiscite shall be conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the
law, not from its approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix
"another date" for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the
date of the effectivity of the law.
Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be
read together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only mean
"effectivity" as used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code. This construction is
in accord with the fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws relating to the same
subject should be read together and reconciled to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy
to established jurisprudence
Tan vs comelec
G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986
NOTA BENE: This case is relevant to the current buzz regarding the "Sugbuak." The issue in this
case, however, is a bit on the technical side.
- when the boundaries of a LGU is substantially altered, there are necessarily more than one unit
affected -- the parent LGU and the new LGU that was created as a result of the alteration
FACTS:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3,
1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante,

Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto.

Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3,
1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is
unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
(1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory
of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite
(2) The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros del Norte would only be about
2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute
The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered.
Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the plebiscite
sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3.
ISSUE:
W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under Article XI, Sec. 3
of the Consititution, which states that -"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected."
HELD:
In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the approval of a majority of
votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division
and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental.
"Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be
the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered.
The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother
province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte."
The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable
Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6), which
the respondents used to support their case, should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
precedent. Rather, it held that the dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in the
aforementioned case is the forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting that:
"...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or
more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision."
It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province
of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that "the plebiscite shall be

conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of
this Act." However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, tehre was an unexplained change from
"areas affecte" to "the proposed new province, which are the areas affected." The Supreme Court
held that it was a self-serving phrase to state that the new province constitutes the area affected.
"Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous, and far
from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial
alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it
might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners."
Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebscite held on January 3, 1986 has no
legal effect for being a patent nullity.
"WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of
the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also
declared null and void.
SO ORDERED."
AQUINO VS COMELEC
ts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A.
9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative
Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District
from such Reapportionment.
Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo.
Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall form
additional district where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383 population count.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard with a
minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if population is less than
that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum
population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.
Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error in
choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A.
9716.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or
whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province.
Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a city
and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It
states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was mentioned about a
population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007,
CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two additional districts from
the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the results of the

apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during the deliberations of
House Bill No. 4264.
Mariano vs comelec
FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail
Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends the
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and
concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
1.Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati
violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds
with technical descriptions
2.Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate
existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms
as allowed by the Constitution
3.Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the
reapportionment cannot be made by a special law
HELD/RULING:
1.Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized
city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has
jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and
the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the
southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even
by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the
requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is
not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming
a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be
left to the courts to decide.

1.Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already
qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence.
The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions
and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the
occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties
to raise this abstract issue.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of
not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than
a general reapportionment of the law.
Alvarez v. Guingona
Facts: HB 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the HoR, subsequently passed by
the HoR, and transmitted to the Senate. A counterpart of HB 8817, SB 1243 was filed in the Senate,
and was passed as well. The enrolled bill was submitted to and signed by the Chief Executive as RA
7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered
voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
Issue: Constitutionality of RA 7720. SC: YES, petition denied, presumption of constitutionality, no
clear and unequivocal breach of the Consti.

1. WON Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) must be included in determining the average
annual income for purposes of conversion.YES
For a municipality to be converted into an independent component city, its average annual
income for the last two consecutive years (at that time, based on 1991 constant prices)
must be at least 20M. Petitioners contend that the IRAs must be deducted from the
municipalitys income because they are not income but transfers and/or budgetary aid
from the NG and that they fluctuate depending on different factors.
The court in its discussion of what an LGU is said that:
a. it is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of
substantial control over its own affairs.
b. It is an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however,
to be an imperium in imperio
c. It is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities
and resources.
Since the LGU is given broadened powers and increased responsibilities, it now operates
on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. The
vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every LGU is accompanied with a
provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry
out its functions.
Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every LG unit of (1) the
right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just
share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments
(IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization
and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.
The court held that the IRAs were properly included because they are items of income
and form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the LGU. The IRAs regularly and
automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of
the LG unit. They thus constitute income which the LG can invariably rely upon as the
source of much needed funds.
LGC, Sec 450 (c): "the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income."
DOF Order 35-93: ANNUAL INCOME: revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities
and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal
revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Secs 284, 290 and 291 of the Code,
but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial
assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others.
2. WON considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA 7720 can
be said to have originated in the HoR. YES
Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the HoR. Petitioners
contend that since a bill of the same import was passed in the Senate, it cannot be said to
have originated in the HoR.
Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr 1993).
The SB was filed 19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec, and was
transmitted to the Senate 28 Jan 1994.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application
should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act
thereupon until it receives the House bill.

 The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
HoR, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application
should originate in the HoR, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it
receives the House bill.
Tolentino v. SoF: what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the HoR on the theory that, elected as they are
from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are
expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are
thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit
the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the
House bill.