CASE NO. 97 PETRONA JAVIER VS.

LAZARO OSMENA (as administrator of

the estate of the deceased Tomas Osmena)
CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS (with
consent)
PONENTE: ARELLANO, C.J.:
FACTS:
1.) Petrona Javier, the only daughter of Felix Javier and Matea Corunan, is the
wife of Florentino Collantes.
2.) Matea Corunan died in 1901 and Felix in 1908.
3.) In 1890, Florentino and Petrona were married. And after the death of Matea,
Felix married Pascuala Santos.
4.) At the death of Feliz and Matea, they left as an inheritance to Petrona TWO
URBAN PROPERTIES situated on Calle Carriedo and Calle San Sebastian.
5.) In order to gain her absolute ownership of the properties, Petrona acquired
the usufructuary right of Pascuala to the estate of Felix for the sum of 3000
PHP.
6.) This 3000 PHP was obtained through the mortgage of the property she had
inherited.
7.) Side Story: In 1891, Florentino was employed by Petronas father, Felix, in a
commission business in Manila. In 1902, Felix retired from the business and
was succeeded by Florentino. He was able to handle the business for 6 years
(1908).
8.) One of the major clients of the Felix and Florentino was Tomas Osmena, a
merchant from Cebu.
9.) Felix and Florentino represented Tomas in Manila for the sale of tobacco
consigned to them by Tomas. The profits were to be invested in Tomas name.
10.)
When Felix retired in 1902, he was indebted to Tomas Osmena in the
sum of 4K-5K PHP.
11.)
In 1908, Florentino gave a statement to Tomas stating that their debt
amounted to 14K-15K PHP. Tomas did not do anything about this.
12.)
In June of 1913, upon the death of Tomas, his administrator, Lazaro
Osmena, took the step to collect the debt. Florentino admitted the debt with
an interest of 12% per annum. Total debt was 26plus thousand.
13.)
So, on June 15, 1913, the judgement was rendered and the sherif
executed it by selling at public auction all the right, title, interest of Florentino
over the 2 parcels of improved real estate, including the usufructuary interest
of Pascuala which was acquired by Petrona.
14.)
Despite her protest, the sale was carried out. The successful bidder
was Lazaro Osmena who paid P500 for each parcel.
15.)
Petrona asserted that her husband had no rights over the land or in the
usufructuary interest that she acquired. Thus, she filed claim of intervention
to recover her ownership and the right of usufruct upon the annulment of the
sale.

16.)
Osmena said that he admits the fact that Petrona actually owned the 2
parcels of land and the usufructuary right of Pascuala. However, he said, that
the money used to purchase the usufructuary right belonged to the conjugal
partnership, thus making the right conjugal. So he prays that:
a) The revenues from both parcels of land are conjugal partnership property
b) That the revenues be made liable for the payment
c) That a receiver be appointed to take charge of the 2 properties and
manage them so that the revenues may be given as payment to the debt.
17.)
RTC annulled the sale of the 2 properties. So he appealed.
ISSUE: WON the sum owed by Florentino to the Osmena estate can and should be
paid out of the fruits and revenues of the 2 parcels of land which exclusively belong
to Petrona.
RULE: Yes. The revenues are liable for the payment of the debt of the husband and
that there is no need for an appointment of a receiver.
ANALYSIS:
1.) There is a natural presumption of fact that whatever the husband may have
spent for his family was out of his commission for the services as a broker.
2.) The origin of the debt was the balance from the accounts rendered by him as
a broker to his principal Osmena. Considering 1 and 2, which were
statements of Petrona, it can be concluded that the debt must be paid out of
the community property of the marriage since Article 1408 of the Civil Code
provides that(PAGE 340)
3.) Article 1385: The fruits of the paraphernal property form a part of the assets
fo the conjugal partnership, and are liable for the payment of marriage
expenses. Hence, the creditor may bring his action not against the
paraphernal property but against the fruits and revenues of the private
property of the wife.
4.) Petrona asserts the provision of Article 1386 (page 340 at the bottom) But
the debts contracted by the husband during the marriage in the exercise of
his profession, cannot be deemed his personal and private debts nor can they
be excepted from payment out of the products or revenue of the wifes own
property, which, like that of her husbands, is liable for the discharge of the
marriage liabilities.
5.) Lastly (last na to promise. Sorry napahaba ) According to article 1384, the
wife shal have the management of.and the husband the administrator
(page 344). So to confide the management of the property to a receiver is to
deprive the husband and the wife of their respective rights.

CASE NO. 98 SOCCORRO L. VDA DE STA. ROMANA VS. PHILIPPINE

COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK
Article 105 (with consent)
PONENTE: VASQUEZ, J.
FACTS:
1.) This case is an ofshoot of a previous case which is Civil Case No. 7678
entitled PCIB, et al. vs Ramon Sta Romana which was filed on August 6,
1968. It was an action for recission with damages filed by PCIB as
Administrator of the estate of the late C.N. Hodges, and for the recovery of a
parcel of land Lot No. 1258-G which Ramona purchased from Hodges under a
Contract to Sell.
2.) Ramona purchased another lot, Lot No. 1258-F, under the Contract to Sell. On
motion of PCIB, a writ of preliminary attachment was issued on the rights and
interests of Ramon Sta Romana over the lot and its improvements.
3.) A third party claim was filed by Emilio Sta Romana who claimed that 1258-F
and its improvements had been sold to him by Ramon Sta ROmana on August
16, 1963.
4.) On June 16, 1975, RTC rendered its decision on 7678, rescinding the Contract
to Sell and ordering Ramon to return the 1258-G to PCIB as well as to pay
rentals or damages from the occupation. This was appealed to the CA but it
affirmed RTC and further ordered to pay the land taxes.
5.) On October 21, 1979, Ramon Sta Romana DIED INTESTATE. So, his widow,
Socorro filed a motion to quash the writ of execution alleging that 7658 did
not afect her rights and interests over the lot 1258-G and 1258-F inasmuch
as she was not a party in the said action. RTC denied her motion and the
public sale was held and PCIB was issued a certificate of sale. Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied.
6.) On September 1, 198o, Soccorro filed Civil Case No. 13533 praying that the
writ of execution on 1258-F and its improvements be annulled because of her
share in the property and that she be declared the lawful and absolute
owner of the said of the properties.
7.) PCIB filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata
which the court granted on November 30 1980. THIS IS THE ORDER THAT
SOCCORRO SEEKS TO ANNUL NOW.
8.) Soccorro says that she cannot be barred by res judicata because she was not
a party in that case so the writ of attachement and execution imposed on
1258-F are null and void considering her share.

ISSUE: Can Soccorro enforce an obligation of the conjugal partnership? If yes, is

there a need forher to be a party in the case for the purpose of binding the conjugal
partnership properties? Can she be barred by re judicata?
RULE: The petition was denied. Decision of the lower courts affirmed.
ANALYSIS:
1.) The 7678 case (1st case) arose out of the failure of Roman to pay the
purchase price of the lot which he bought from Hodges PRESUMABLY in behalf
of the conjugal partnership. Since Soccorro does not deny the conjugal nature
of both lots, it cannot also be denied that the liability incurred by Ramon is
chargeable against the conjugal partnership assets because it is undisputed
that it was for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
2.) He non inclusion to the case is immaterial. There is no law that requires that
in a suit against the husband to enforce an obligation, he must be joined by
his wife. (On the contrary, Section 4, Rule 3 of the rules of court and article
113 of the civil code)
3.) On res judicata, on March 5, 1980, the court denied the motion for lack of
merit. She did not do anything on this. Technically speaking, the judgement
does not constitute res judicata but it attained finality due to the failure of
Soccorro to appeal or seek a review.

CASE NO. 103 BA FINANCE VS COURT OF APPEALS

ARTICLE 105 (WITHOUT CONSENT)
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J
FACTS:
1.) On July 1, 1975, Augusto Yulo secured a loan from BA Finance in the amount
of P591,003.59 as evidenced in a promissory note which he signed as a
representative of A&L Industries.
2.) Augusto presented and alleged Special Power of Attorney in order to obtain
the loan. This document was allegedly executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who
manages A&L Industries, authorizing him to procure a loan and sign the
promissory note. The business is registered under her name.
3.) However, 2 months before the execution of the loan, Augusto had already left
Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned the conjugal home. Augusto
failed to pay for the said loan.
4.) On October 7, 1975, BA Finance prayed for the issuance of a writ of
attachment alleging that the spouses Yulo were guilty of fraud in contracting
the debt and that they had convinced BA Finance to enter into a contract with
them by executing a Deed of Assignment, assigning all their rights, titles, and
interests over a construction contract between Yulos and A. Soriano
Corporation on June 19, 1974 for P615,732.50 when in truth, the spouses did
not have any intention to remit the proceeds. Instead, they allegedly misused
the funds for themselves. (Page 612)
5.) RTC granted the issuance of a writ of attachment. However, BA Finance was
not contented. It filed another motion for the examination of the attachment
debtor saying that the attached properties were not enough. This was also
granted by the RTC.
6.) Lily Yulo, in her answer, said that Augusto had abandoned her and their
children and that they were already separated when the promissory note was
executed; that her signature was forged because she had never authorized
Augusto to transact any business for her and in behalf of A&L, and that she
never got a single centavo from the proceeds of the loan.
7.) RTC, after hearing, dismissed BAs complaint against the Lily, and ordering BA
to pay Lily 660,000 as actual damages, 500,000 as unrealized profits,

300,000 as exemplary damages, 30,000 for attorneys fees and to pay the
costs. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC except that it
reduced the exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
8.) CA decided on the authenticity of the signature by considering the testimony
of Atty. Crispin Ordona, the Notary Public, who admitted that the signatures
were not signed in his presence. For the CA, this was a strong commanding
circumstance to show that Lily did not appear personally before the Notary
Public and did not sign the document. Moreover, Atty Ordonia had a credible
background (page 614)
9.) Another witness was presented by Lily. His name was Police Captain Yakal
Giron, a handwriting expert. (Please see his credentials on page 614
masyadong madami nakaka overwhelm) He specified in open court what he
observed to be about 12 GLARING AND MATERIAL SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERRENCES IN HIS COMPARISON OF THE SIGNATURES IN THE GENUINE
SPECIMEN SIGNATURES OF LILY. BA Finance did not bother to conduct a crossexamination of this witness and it did not present another expert to balance
the testimony of Giron. Hence, the court did not have a factual basis to
disagree.
10.)
BA Finance asserts that even if the signature was forged or even if the
attached properties were her exclusive properties, it can be made answerable
to the obligation because they form part of the conjugal partnership. The
court did not find this meritorious. Evidences supplied in page 615.
11.)
On the damages, CA affirmed that there was bad faith on the part of
BA becauseit never presented the deed of assignment or the construction
agreement to support the claim of fraud. Also, BA not satisfied with the
courts order, filed foreclosure proceedings, utilizing the Deed of Chattel
Mortgage, foreclosing the remaining properties inside the premises formerly
occupied by the A&L. But is shows that the transaction was between Augusto
and BA so this action was without legal basis. (In other words, abusado ang
BA. One more procedural evidence on page 616 kaya lang procedural kaya di
ko na sinama),
12.)
These incidents and action taken by BA, according to the CA, were
enough to prove that and establish the element of bad faith which entitles
Lily to award of damages.
ISSUE: WON A&L, which is an exclusive property of LiLy Yulo can be made
answerable to the debt of her husband. (There are 2 more issues on page 617 and
620 but this is the only one pertinent to our discussion.)
RULE: CAs decision was set aside. BA is ordered to pay 660K as actual damages.
ANALYSIS:
While there is no dispute that the property is conjugal, for it to be said liable, the
obligation contracted by the husband must have been made to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Undoubtedly, Augusto contracted the load for his own benefit

because he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home.
Furthermore, he made it appear that his wife authorized him to procure the loan to
make A&L liable for the payment.
As to the award for damages, Lily would be entitled to this IF the attachment of the
property was wrongful. The SC said that the attachment is said to be wrongful
when the plaintif has no cause of action, or that there is no true ground therefor etc
Page 621. Although BA failed to prove the ground relied upon the issuance of the
writ, this cannot be equated with bad faith or malicious intent. There is no question
that 591,003.59 was borrowed from the bank. So, Lily is only entitled to actual
damages.